A discussion paper on the links between armed conflict and the exploitation of economic resources, in two regions of Africa
Bryan R Evans
January 2002
Tearfund, 100 Church Road, Teddington, Middlesex TWI 1 8QE, UK
Tel. 020 8977 9144 Fax 020 8943 3594
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Tearfund discussion papers are short exploratory research papers aimed at provoking wider discussion of development-related issues among Tearfund staff and the organisations and individuals with which Tearfund works. They do not necessarily constitute Tearfund policy.
Comments from readers are welcomed.
Bryan Evans is a researcher in Tearfund’s Public Policy Team and may be contacted by email at: Bryan.Evans@tearfund.org
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1. Executive summary
2. Introduction
3. The roots of conflict
3.1 Great Lakes region: the historical background
3.2 The civil wars in DR Congo
3.3 Sierra Leone: historical background
3.4 The civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia
3.5 A brief look at Angola
4. The exploitation of resources in conflict zones
4.1 DR Congo: methods of exploitation
4.2 The beneficiaries: DR Congo rebels and backers
4.3 The beneficiaries: Kinshasa’s allies
4.4 The Great Lakes region: a ‘who’s who’ of exploiters
4.5 The Great Lakes region: economics and defence budgets
4.6 Sierra Leone and Liberia: diamonds and timber
4.7 Ripe for plucking
5. Features of the wars, wider issues raised
5.1 Features of the wars in the two regions
5.2 Wider issues
6. The search for peace
6.1 Great Lakes region: impediments to peace
6.2 Mano River region: impediments to peace
6.3 Policy processes for the Great Lakes region
6.4 Policy processes for the Mano River region
6.5 Policy processes re: diamonds and arms flows
6.6 NGO involvement
7. Questions and recommendations
7.1 Lessons to ponder
7.2 What role for churches and parachurch organisations?
7.3 Policy steps
Appendices:
1) Chronology
2) Motives of the state players
3) The Lomé Peace Agreement
4) Key NGO allies
5) Abbreviations
6) Sources
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This paper seeks to explore the question, why is the issue of the interplay between natural resources and armed conflict so important? It finds the answers in the very heavy human price being paid, in the aggravation of the original injustice, and in the de-stablising of the two regions which threatens the security of other parts of Africa and of the world.
It is surely one of the great ironies of the developing world that abundance of wealth, being something to fight over, may be a greater problem than scarcity. As wars have dragged on in the Great Lakes and Mano River regions of Africa there is growing evidence that strategies are aimed less at military success and more at securing the unhindered exploitation of natural resources. While the aggressor uses its neighbour’s wealth to make the war selffinancing, the threatened party uses it to reward allies. Governing élites on both sides seek personal gain. The civilian population pay the price, not so much in war deaths, but more in the denial of income, employment and education, in the collapse of social services, in the legacy of amputees, orphans, child soldiers, and those mentally scarred by witnessing atrocities.
Why should these two regions be so vulnerable to armed predatory enterprise? There are a number of reasons. Firstly, they are rich in resources that the developed world needs, such as oil, tropical hardwoods, coltan and diamonds. Crucially, much of this wealth is ‘lootable’ because located at the edge of central government control. Secondly, the countries of these two regions have been characterised by corrupt and decaying state infrastructures, and by armed forces that are poorly trained, poorly paid, and apt to plunder. Thirdly these countries have been characterised by social injustice and a lack of democratic accountability. Governments with monopoly control of natural resources have not needed a popular mandate. They could buy the support of the political and business élite. For many in the urban slums and the neglected hinterlands armed insurgency seemed the only way to obtain redress.
Other factors have made conflict resolution very complex. One is ethnic tension, particularly in Rwanda/Burundi where a Tutsi élite has long ruled over the Hutu majority (with roles reversed for a generation in Rwanda). Another factor is the emergence of substate ‘faction groups’, talking as if they were recognised members of the international community, yet not letting themselves be bound by international rules, having no permanent allegiances, and using brutality as a deliberate strategy for enforcing control. A third complication is the use of child soldiers. This has serious implications in terms of alienation from the community and the consequent difficulty of post-war re-integration. A fourth point is that, although the international community wants assured access to natural resources, the two regions are otherwise seen as insignificant in world geopolitics. Even their disintegration can be judged to have minimal effects on international security. And lastly there is the issue of collusion by outside players and the ‘smoke-screens’ that hide it. So-called ‘junior’ mining and oil exploration companies have taken on the frontline role. Airlines and banks have facilitated the export of stolen resources. Other governments in the two regions have enabled the players to evade trade and arms embargoes.
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There is an urgent need to ponder the disturbing synergy between military commercialism, international crime and aspects of globalisation. There appears to be a growing trend to the conversion of military apparatus into a commercial asset. Among possible factors behind this trend are: Africa’s military coups which have introduced armed forces into the political and economic fields; the post-Cold War financial crisis in the former Soviet bloc encouraging soldiers to engage in illegal activities, including the sale of military hardware; global capitalism’s dislike of unproductive sectors. The trend is damaging to the military (it blurs entry and exit strategies), and dangerous for civilian government. To maintain the incomes of army commanders the state may have to incorporate them further into the political field, and/or embark on further predatory external deployment. In the two regions, links with international crime have developed. President Taylor, for example, has made
Liberia a safe haven for organised crime, involving arms, drugs, diamonds and moneylaundering, in Africa and beyond. Criminal cartels have connections worldwide, and will not readily relax their grip in destabilised parts of Africa. The ‘adversarial competition’ that is the harsher side of globalisation has destroyed livelihoods and made many people vulnerable to recruitment by insurgent and criminal groups. The deregulation of financial flows has helped illegitimate as well as legitimate business to operate.
The Lomé peace agreement covering the Mano River region, and the Lusaka agreement covering the Great Lakes could each work if all parties were committed to peace, but there are serious impediments. The legitimacy of the Freetown and Kinshasa governments is not wholly convincing. There is a lack of trust among the warring parties, particularly at leadership level. There is the issue of war crimes. Is the emphasis to be on justice for victims, or amnesty for perpetrators who may fight on rather than risk prosecution? Many government and rebel leaders have a stake in wars that enrich them. In the Great Lakes region Rwanda, Uganda and Angola do have legitimate security concerns. It is hard to see how these are to be addressed when insurgents can operate almost with impunity from bases in remote parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). UN action in both regions has been slow and cumbersome. Arms and trade embargoes have not been rigorously enforced. The UN is unwilling to deploy in eastern DR Congo until peace is established, and no major power having the capacity for peace enforcement is ready for such action.
The issue of conflict resources is receiving some attention. Adverse publicity about ‘blood diamonds’, and the prospect of a crippling consumer boycott has forced a reluctant diamond industry to initiate the ‘Kimberley process’, exploring ways of identifying and certifying diamonds. Regulation will not be easy, but the problems are somewhat reduced by the fact that the bulk of the worldwide trade in rough diamonds is centralised in only two organizations and two locations, the Diamond High Council in Antwerp and De Beers’
Central Selling Organisation in London. Antwerp now has an electronic link with a government database in Freetown.
The international community has so far failed to stem the flow of weapons to war-torn regions of the world. US-led opposition to controls confined the UN conference on the illicit arms trade (July 2001) to a few technical measures.
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So where may peace with justice be found? This paper reaches a number of conclusions on this question, and offers some policy recommendations.
1) The developed world bears much responsibility for the political and economic fragility of the Great Lakes and Mano River regions, because of the exploitation, and the unjust structures left behind, from the colonial and Cold War eras. Their participation in the restoration of peace is a matter of justice, and also of self-interest, for injustice tends to rebound on the heads of those who stand aside. The international community will have to
‘be in for the long haul’ in areas such as the funding of disarmament programmes, enforcing certification schemes, and tracing the proceeds of stolen resources and awarding reparations.
2) The synergy between military commercialism, adversarial market capitalism, and international crime, needs to be understood and addressed, for example, through measures to discourage commercial enterprise as a way of subsidising the defence budget, curbing destabilising short-term capital flows and hostile international takeover bids.
3) The legitimacy of the Freetown and Kinshasa governments is not secure enough to warrant their overseeing fresh elections. The establishment of broad-based transition governments should come first. DR Congo is surely too large to be a unitary state and should work out a federal system. Artificial colonial-era boundaries should not be regarded as sacrosanct.
4) Many policy areas will have to be tackled simultaneously, for example, issues of regional security, war crimes, disarmament and reintegration of insurgent groups. The the issue of war crimes must not be side-stepped, though account must be taken of the fact that many
(child soldiers, for example) are both perpetrators and victims.
5) Peace agreements and new constitutions will all be of little avail if the underlying problems of economic and social deprivation are not tackled. The states of the two regions should devolve political and economic power. The developed world should remove trade barriers.
It should increase development aid and devolve disbursement to local governments and
NGOs.
6) There is a surely a key role for the churches (though they must put their own house in order, first). At the core of the biblical message is teaching on the high worth of all human beings, the vileness of sin, redemption through the Cross. It is for the churches, before all, to support victims, confront perpetrators, model forgiveness and the foregoing of rights, and face gender issues. The churches should teach, and model, the ideal human polity where every member has a stake and a valued role.
7) Churches should join with other members of international civil society to campaign for change in key countries, for example France as an importer of ‘conflict’ timber, Belgium as the home of diamond traders and arms brokers, Canada as home to ‘junior’ mining and oil exploration companies, the USA as the world’s number one arms supplier.
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The German military author, Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), said that war is ‘the pursuit of politics by other means’. David Keen (lecturer in complex emergencies at the London
School of Economics) has suggested re-wording this to read, ‘war is the pursuit of economics by other means’. The aim of such ‘economics’ is not to win, but to ‘engage in profitable crime under the cover of warfare’. i
Two regions of Africa – the Great Lakes in central Africa, and the Mano River area of the west coast – seem made for such ‘economics by other means’. They are characterised by great natural wealth in the hinterland, soft and unclear borders, crumbling state infrastructures, and an underlying social injustice that has provoked insurgency. The resulting wars are only superficially intrastate. The national capital, far away on the coast, has become effectively a city state, and the deployment of its army in the hinterland of the country has many of the characteristics of external operations. This is too tempting for neighbours, and military and political interference in the affairs of neighbouring countries becomes the norm.
In the wars in the two regions there have been few conventional battles. Military action has been directed towards securing access to resources, and at terrorising civilians. The fighting might almost be characterised as large-scale gang warfare over the carving up of territory.
One of the ironies of this warfare is the distorted ‘kinships’, between the leaders on both sides (the ones who profit most), and between the rank and file, for example between the rebel from Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Kamajor militiaman.
This kinship is reflected not only in their brutal methods of operation, but also in their common background of social and economic deprivation.
For the civilian inhabitants of the far reaches of the state the consequences have been devastating. It is not simply a matter of war deaths. Even more people have died from the economic consequences of war – lack of access to food, lack of income and employment, production failures, and the collapse of social services. The injustice that lies at the root of the fighting has now been exacerbated as the wars have contributed to the effective disbanding of local government, the underdevelopment of physical infrastructure, the corruption of the administrative and judicial organs of government, and the polarisation of the regional support base for different political parties.
It is a sobering thought that these bloody wars in the Mano River and Great Lakes regions have roots that go back such a very long way. In the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia the divisions arising from the establishment of a ‘coastal élite’ can be dated to the very beginnings of these two countries, when freed slaves were settled here (in Sierra Leone from
1787 onwards, and in Liberia from 1822). The immediate cause of the conflict in the Great
Lakes region is to be found in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the flight of the perpetrators to DR Congo to escape retribution. That genocide was the culmination of generations of injustice, Hutu injustice against the Tutsi after Rwandan independence in
1960/61, and Tutsi injustice against the Hutu in the colonial period, and for a long time before that.
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The paper begins by seeking the root causes of conflict in the historical background of the two regions. It then outlines the events leading to war and the subsequent ebb and flow of the fighting and the fragile ceasefires. Next the paper seeks to describe how the exploitation has been carried out, who has benefited, who are the key responsible players, and what has made the two regions so ‘ripe for plucking’. The paper goes on to identify some of the notable features of these conflicts: the emergence of faction groups, the exploitation of child soldiers, the part played by the outside world in treating these regions as politically insignificant while colluding in their troubles, the distortion of economic and political structures. The disturbing synergy between military commercialism, international crime, and
‘adversarial’ globalisation is examined. The impediments to peace, the stumbling progress of peace agreements, the measures promoted to curb the flow of ‘conflict’ resources, and the role of non-government organisations (NGOs) are outlined. Lastly, the paper puts forward some questions to ponder, asks how the churches and parachurch organisations might respond, and suggests policy steps to be pursued.
This section traces the roots of conflict in the long-festering frustration and poverty felt by the marginalised, as they have been denied access to a fair share of economic resources and political power by the élite. It outlines the events leading up to war, and the ebb and flow of the fighting and the ceasefires.
Outline
The rule of the Tutsi élite of Rwanda and Burundi over the Hutu majority was cemented by
Belgian colonialism, then, in Rwanda, overturned in democratic elections at independence.
Civil war and the genocide of 1994 followed. Where were the churches through all this? In general rank and file members failed to confront structural evil. Some denominational leaders, on the other hand, were too close to government and forfeited their prophetic role.
Origins of the Hutu and Tutsi
The long-accepted account of Rwandan history makes the Twa hunters and gatherers the original inhabitants of the region. They were then displaced c.AD 1000 by the somewhat more advanced Hutu cultivators who, in turn, were subjugated by the Tutsi (15 th
century onwards), with their greater political and military abilities. This view fitted in with the
European colonial theory that a superior ‘Caucasoid’ race from north-eastern Africa was responsible for all signs of true civilisation in black (‘Hamitic’) Africa.
This account of historical origins is challenged in a Human Rights Watch paper, ‘Leave none to tell the story’. According to their understanding the Kinyarwanda-speaking peoples of
Rwanda are one ethnic group. When Rwanda emerged as a major state in the 18 th
century its rulers measured power in terms of numbers of subjects, and wealth in terms of cattle ownership. The granting of cattle was thus a way to secure the loyalty of the élite and their followers.
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However, acquiring cattle was not the only route to leadership in the community. A cultivator skilled in making war, and able to mobilise many followers, could rise through the military system. ‘Tutsi’ originally meant a person rich in cattle, and ‘Hutu’ the subordinate or follower of a more powerful person. Most people married within the occupational group in which they had been raised, thus creating a shared gene pool, and common physical characteristics, within each group. The pastoralists were generally tall, thin, and narrowfeatured, the cultivators were shorter, stronger and with broader features.
The colonial era
Serious colonial interest in the Congo River basin began with the travels of the explorertrader, Henry Morton Stanley, in the 1870s. Between 1879 and 1884 he negotiated treaties with about 450 African rulers on behalf of the Association Internationale du Congo, in which Leopold II of Belgium was the leading investor. The Berlin Conference of 1884-
85 accepted the sovereignty of King Leopold II over what became the ‘Congo Free State’.
The colonial partition assigned the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi to German East
Africa, and overlooked the fact that a substantial number of Tutsi and Hutu were left in the
Kivu province of the Congo, even though their original allegiances were to the kingdoms to the east of them. (There had been some ‘rounding out’ of the borders of the Rwandan kingdom under its greatest king, Kigeri Rwabugiri, in the late 19th century.) Germany lost its colonial empire during the First World War, and Rwanda and Burundi were assigned to
Belgium.
The Belgians (and the Germans before them) sought to rule Rwanda for the most profit, but with the least cost – in short, by indirect rule. In the 1920s and 1930s they removed Hutu from positions of power, and excluded them from higher education (except for a few allowed to study in religious seminaries). They thus ensured a Tutsi monopoly of power for the next generation. Furthermore by instituting a system of registration and identity cards they changed the character of society from one where differentiation was ‘flexible and amorphous’ into one with almost fixed ‘castes’. The Hutu began to experience ‘the solidarity of the oppressed’.
Another hangover from the Belgian colonial system of indirect rule was the division of the
Congo into two distinct legal systems, one civic, enforced by the central state (and provinces) through civil law, and the other ethnic, enforced by native authorities under customary law. Only ethnic citizenship gave people secure access to land, and ethnic citizenship could be enjoyed only through being part of an ethnic group recognised as indigenous and awarded its own native authority. The system of double citizenship was continued after independence, and the Citizenship Law of 1981 accepted some groups as civic citizens only. These were the so-called ‘Banyamulenge’, the mainly Tutsi immigrants in the Mulenge area of the Ruzizi river valley in South Kivu, and the ‘Banyabwisha’, Hutu and
Tutsi people living in Bwisha, Masisi territory. Some of these people were, indeed, only recent immigrants, refugees from the troubles of the 1960s and 1970s, but others had been settled in Kivu for some 300 years.
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Independence and after
Having condemned the Hutu to second-class status in Rwanda and Burundi the Belgians began to back-peddle in the 1950s, as the end of colonial rule loomed. It was, however, too late, and moderate parties lost ground, on the one hand to the exclusively Hutu Parti du
Mouvement de l’Émancipation des Bahutu (Parmehutu) and on the other to the Tutsi Union
Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR). In 1960/61 about 80 per cent of Rwandans voted for a
Parmehutu government and for the abolition of the monarchy. This electoral process was crafted into the myth of the Hutu revolution as a long and courageous struggle against repression. Now the ‘rubanda nyamwinshi’, the ‘great majority’, had the right to rule over the minority. Tempted by the chance to take over both land and other property, Hutus targeted not only former power-holders, but all Tutsi. By 1967 some 20,000 Tutsi had been killed, and 300,000 driven into exile.
The international community overlooked systematic discrimination against the Tutsi in
Rwanda. When the Hutu government began massacring Tutsi in 1990, some governments protested, but none openly challenged Rwandan claims that the killings were spontaneous and uncontrollable. The lack of international response to the 1993 massacres in Burundi allowed Rwandan extremists to expect that they too could kill without consequences.
In October 1990 the mainly-Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from
Uganda. Following a ceasefire in 1992 the Arusha Peace Accord was signed in August
1993. A UN peacekeeping force was despatched to Rwanda. The UN and member states wanted a successful peacekeeping operation to offset Somalia, but they wanted it at low cost. The force for Rwanda was cut to one third the recommended size, and there was no money for a human rights division, that might have tracked the growing hostility to the Tutsi.
By January 1994 an analyst at the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) knew enough about the underlying tensions to lead him to predict that as many as half a million people might die in the event of renewed conflict. By February 1994 the Belgians were talking of the danger of genocide. France, the power closest to the Habyarimana regime, presumably knew at least as much as the other two. Yet when the Belgians urged a stronger mandate for the UN force, they were rebuffed by the USA and UK on grounds of cost.
The 1994 genocide
On April 6 1994 President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. The killing of Tutsi leaders and moderate Hutu politicians began within half an hour. All moderate political leaders had been killed by mid-day on the 7 th
. Yet the UN Secretary-General’s special representative, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, minimised both the extent and the organised nature of the killings. Rather than denouncing the evil and explaining to the public what had to be done to end it, national and international leaders studiously avoided the word
‘genocide’, and instead stressed the ‘confusing’ nature of the situation, the ‘chaos’ and the
‘anarchy’. They spoke of ‘tribal violence’ or the ‘breakdown of a ceasefire agreement’. In order to promote a ceasefire between the Rwandan government and the RPF diplomats maintained a posture of neutrality, which meant not condemning the genocide. “Members of the Security Council gave more importance to maintaining diplomatic procedures than to condemning the perpetrators of genocide” (Human Rights Watch) – thus the representative of the Hutu government was allowed to continue attending meetings of the Security Council,
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affording him the chance to know and communicate to his government all proposals for UN action in Rwanda. RPF opposition to a new UN force complicated and slowed the effort to mount a rescue operation for Tutsi civilians. It was the non-permanent members of the
Security Council in the end who showed the strongest commitment to action (HRW).
Could the international community have mounted an effective military operation to stop the genocide? General Dallaire, commander of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda
(UNAMIR), has repeatedly argued that if he had been given the 5,000 well-trained, wellequipped troops he asked for, and a clear mandate, he could have stopped the killing. The report of the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict (1997) came to very similar conclusions. A suggested alternative to a ‘normal’ peace enforcement operation is the ‘shock troop variant’ – the use of overwhelming force to seize key assets, ‘shock’ the local forces, and gain the initiative. Another proposal is what has been termed the
‘decapitation’ strategy, that is, an operation to seize the leaders of the genocide. Careful examination of the course of events suggests that to be effective in stopping the genocide any intervention force would have had to arrive by April 11 (the most devastating massacres took place between April 11 and May 1). There were three comparatively easy options that could have had some effect: to stop extremist radio broadcasts by Radio Mille Collines
(RTLM) and Radio Rwanda, to protect groups of people where they were found (this would not have saved great numbers, as there were not enough foreign troops to cover the country, but it might have had a deterrent signalling effect), and to remove road blocks (this would probably have significantly reduced the killing in Kigali). Other actions that were considered and rejected, or implemented too late, were the withholding of aid by donor governments and the World Bank, and an arms embargo (not implemented until 17/5/94).
Simply to stop the killing the most effective strategy would probably have been to help the
RPF win the war. Overall it is reasonable to conclude that intervention would have saved
200,000 lives at most, considering the speed at which the genocidaires worked and the length of time needed to deploy foreign troops. Even this would have been perceived as failure. Attention would have focused on the 600,000 lives lost, and any deaths of western soldiers. No one would have known that the mass exodus of over a million refugees to
Zaire, and the subsequent wars, had been averted.
The churches in Rwanda: a case study
Where were the churches through all this? The case of Rwanda offers some hard lessons.
Rwanda experienced revival, beginning in 1936, characterised by repentance from personal sin, and witness to others. (And there was another movement of the Holy Spirit in the
Roman Catholic Church of Rwanda in the 1970s.) Among the positive outcomes were the confronting of the ethnic issue – among African tribes, and racism on the part of white missionaries. However, it seems that the gains were too often only skin deep.
The revival did not leave a legacy of solid teaching in the churches (where people were keener to pass on the blessing, and testimony became the substitute for teaching), in schools
(where there was a lack of Christian input), and in theological colleges (where there seemed to be a tradition that intellectual study led to spiritual coldness). What Bible study did take place was commonly a matter of favourite passages, a ‘canon within the canon’. This pietism and other-worldliness obscured the importance of the church acting as salt and light in the world. It was evangelism without social involvement. The missionaries had sought to
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be ‘apolitical’ and did not teach the church to be involved in public life.
There was a limited doctrine of sin, which was seen as a matter of private morality (drinking, smoking, adultery, etc.), and with little understanding of structural evil or corporate sin.
Human rights were not upheld. In the colonial era the churches favoured the Tutsi as a ‘lost tribe of Christendom, of Coptic Ethiopian extraction’. In the 1930s the powerful Catholic church resisted even moderate Belgian attempts at reform in nominating Hutus for political positions. After the events of 1960/61, however, the churches aligned themselves with the
Hutu and, through 30 years, failed to plead the cause of the 300,000 Tutsis in exile.
There was naive support for those in power, based on Romans 13. (Obedience to authority is also very much part of African culture.) Teaching methods, in churches and in schools, did not encourage reflection and questioning. Both Catholics and Protestants forfeited their independence of government (that is, their prophetic role). The Archbishop of Kigali, Mgr.
Vincent Nsengiyumva, was for many years a member of the central committee of the ruling
Mouvement Révolutiormaire National pour le Développement (MRND), and after the military coup of 1973 Protestant church leaders also accepted positions in public life. The
Anglican leadership openly courted President Habyarimana.
The churches were also weakened by divisions and power struggles, between and within denominations. A major theme of the Revival had been ‘the ground is level at the foot of the cross’, but afterwards Hutu/Tutsi tensions were not faced and dealt with.
Outline
In neighbouring DR Congo the ailing president Mobutu exploited discriminatory citizenship laws against Tutsi settled in the east. The flight of the perpetrators of the genocide, and their subsequent incursions from bases in eastern DR Congo, brought on the invasion by
Rwandan Tutsi forces and their Ugandan allies, and then the intervention of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe on behalf of the Kinshasa government.
The first civil war 1996/97
Tensions in Zaire/Congo came to a head in late 1996. President Mobutu had for some time been under Western pressure to carry through democratic reforms. In 1991 he had called a national conference to draw up a blueprint for national renewal. Motivated partly by economic envy, the North Kivu delegates called for the enforcement of the 1981 citizenship laws against the prosperous Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge (who did not have the protection of ‘ethnic’ citizenship). Mobutu was happy to comply, portraying this as ‘internal reforms’. The resulting tension led to clashes in 1993 between the Banyamulenge (Tutsi and
Hutu) and the local Hunde, Tembo, Nyanga and Nande. The renewal of civil war in
Rwanda that year turned the Kivu Tutsi and Hutu against each other, thus making a threecornered killing match. (Put another way, Rwanda’s domestic struggles were now being fought out on Zairian soil.) The genocide in Rwanda followed, and the defeat of the Hutu government there by the RPF. As the remnants of the Hutu ‘Interahamwe’ militias were driven across the border into eastern DR Congo, ethnic cleansing ensued. Many thousands of Banyarwanda were killed, and the survivors fled into Rwanda. Two years later (1996) the Deputy Director of South Kivu province declared that the 300,000 Banyamulenge were to be deported to Rwanda. There was not to be a repeat of the Banyarwanda expulsions,
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however, for with peace now prevailing in Rwanda the Banyamulenge knew they could count on help from the RPF government. According to the Institute for Security Studies
(ISS) the latter were well aware they would be portrayed as invading foreigners, and so took up arms under the umbrella of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Congo-Zaire (AFDL), which under the titular headship of Laurent-Désiré Kabila overthrew the Mobutu regime.
The second civil war 1998 to the present
The war that began in DR Congo in 1998 stems from the security concerns of Uganda and
Rwanda. In many ways it is ‘unfinished business’ left from the 1996/97 war. The external backers of Kabila’s AFDL, Uganda and Rwanda, were dismayed to find him courting public support by playing on the unpopularity of the Banyamulenge, and following the
Mobutu policy of tolerating, even actively helping, Ugandan and Rwandan insurgents. Of these by far the most dangerous were the remnants of the army of the former extremist Hutu government of Rwanda, the Forces Armée Rwandaises (FAR) and their allies the
Interahamwe militias. Matters came to a head in July 1998 when Kabila, convinced that the
Rwandans were planning a coup against him, dismissed his army Chief of Staff (James
Kabereke, a Rwandan national), and announced that all foreign troops had to leave the country. Within days soldiers in South Kivu, who had not been paid for months, mutinied – it is said at the instigation of the Rwandans. Shortly afterwards the Rassemblement
Congolaise pour la Démocratie (RCD, the Congolese Rally for Democracy) was created.
On August 2 Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi invaded in support of the rebels, though they initially denied any involvement. In a dramatic bid for a swift victory RCD troops flew across the country on August 6 in a hijacked Boeing 737, to threaten Kinshasa. More rebels followed in other aircraft and they were within days of taking the city when, in response to pleas from Kabila, troops from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervened.
(The RCD has a distinct regional and ethnic composition, and lacks widespread popular support in the country. Many perceive them as a Rwandan-backed Tutsi invasion.)
The character of the war
The subsequent civil war has been characterised by: splits in the rebel movement, growing confusion in the fighting, growing evidence that strategies are now aimed less at military success and more at securing the unhindered exploitation of natural resources.
The first rebel split came in November 1998 when the Mouvement pour la Libération du
Congo (MLC, Movement for the Liberation of Congo) was formed under the leadership of
Jean-Pierre Bemba. 1999 saw the RCD divide into RCD-Goma, backed by Rwanda, and
RCD-ML (RCD – Mouvement de Libération), backed by Uganda, and the next year
Uganda also formed and supported the front organisation called RCD-National. This last named group appears to be an operation to extract and market the rich mineral resources of the Bafwasende area rather than the political party which it claims to be. The leader is
Roger Lumbala, formerly of RCD-ML whose spokesman is quoted as saying, ‘We deployed [Lumbala] as our mobilisation officer in the Kisangani area. Little did we know that he was only interested in dealing in diamonds.’ ii
In January 2001 Uganda engineered a
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merger between MLC and RCD-ML to form the Front for the Liberation of the Congo
(FLC). According to Human Rights Watch, the aim was to shield Uganda itself from increasing international scrutiny of its role in manipulating local political and ethnic divisions for commercial ends.
The conflict in DR Congo is now being fought on three levels: 1) government and allied forces against rebels and allied forces, 2) RCD-Goma and its Rwandan allies against MLC or RCD-ML and their Ugandan allies, 3) rebel and allied forces against the so-called negative forces, such as the Interahamwe, the Maï-Maï militias and others. (Maï-Maï means
‘water, water’ and refers to the practice of fighters dousing themselves with supposedly protective ‘magic water’. iii
)
The number of big battles has been decreasing, and those that have been fought recently have been in areas of major economic importance. For example, Katanga (copper, cobalt) and Mbuji Mayi (diamonds), the fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan forces in
Kisangani in 1999/2000 for control of the diamond mining, and the fighting between
Rwandan troops and Maï-Maï militias in the so-called ‘coltan belt’. The Rwandans make an attack, occupying an area for two days, coinciding with the period when coltan has been extracted and bagged up. The Rwandans remove it, then retreat and await the next information on available coltan. In some areas the risks are too high, and then adversaries, if they are not deadly enemies, will become partners in business, for example, the sale by the
Maï-Maï chief of 60 tons of coltan to the Rwandans in November 2000. According to the
April 2001 report of the UN Panel of experts investigating conflict and resources in the eastern Congo, the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) have trained both the Hema and the Lendu in different camps, and then manipulated them to fight each other. The aim is to justify staying in the gold-rich and potentially coltan-rich areas of Nyaleki. The Panel say there was even fighting between different groups of the UPDF in October 2000. In this confused situation the army of the Kinshasa government, the Forces Armées Congolaises
(FAC) periodically weighs in with reprisal attacks on civilians accused of supporting the rebels.
The Lusaka peace agreement
In July 1999 all the states involved in the Congo war signed the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, witnessed by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) and the UN, and sponsored by Zambia and South Africa. The MLC and RCD signed up the following month. Implementation has proved elusive, however. For one thing there were nine armed groups on DR Congo territory that did not sign the
Agreement. iv
Even those who did sign were in no hurry to move. Eventually, in December
2000, the Kinshasa government and the main rebel groups signed another agreement in
Harare, providing for the withdrawal of troops from frontline positions. Defence chiefs from
Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe also agreed to pull back their troops.
Even now it is not certain that the combatants are serious about peace. For example, it is alleged that the Kinshasa government is still making clandestine air drops of fresh weapons and food supplies to the Hutus in the Kivu frontier region. v
Again, Rwandan Patriotic Army
(RPA) troops withdrawn from the frontlines in mid-March 2001 are reported to have been redeployed in South and North Kivu. They might be there to tackle the Democratic Forces
14

for the Liberation of Rwanda. Or it might be merely a move to permit more intensive activity in the mining zones. Rwanda is also busy sending hundreds of Congolese community leaders, civil service officials, and youth and women activists to training sessions in Rwanda, for indoctrination and limited military training (Human Rights Watch).
Civilians pay the price
Civilians, and especially the poor, have paid a heavy price. The International Rescue
Committee recently issued a report on the latest war in DR Congo. The Committee believe that 350,000 civilians have died violently in the war, while more than 2 million (other sources say more than 3 million) have died from the consequences of that war, mainly from forced displacement and the resulting lack of food, water and medical help. 18.5 million now have no access to formal health care, 16 million have ‘critical’ food needs. Infant mortality has reached 41 per cent, and national maternal mortality is 1,837 per 100,000 live births, rising to 3,000 per 100,000 live births in parts of eastern DR Congo. Only 45 per cent of people have access to safe water, falling to 3 per cent in some rural areas. Some aspects of the situation will have long-term consequences. Officially between 800,000 and 900,000 children have been orphaned by AIDS, and the presence in DR Congo of troops from countries with a high rate of HIV/AIDS (Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Angola) can only make this situation worse. There are more than 10,000 child soldiers, and altogether 40 per cent of children are not in school. Even with peace restored, the DR Congo will be left with an unskilled, partially literate workforce, denied the opportunity to fulfil their potential.
Outline
With its wealth of resources and relatively small population Sierra Leone could have become one of the richest nations in Africa. Yet the majority of its people have been kept among the poorest by a corrupt political and business élite in Freetown.
Historical divisions
The uneven pace of development between the comparatively wealthy coastline, and the less developed hinterland dates back to the establishment of the Freetown colony for enfranchised slaves in 1787. The two parts of the British protectorate were ruled separately until the establishment of a unitary Constitution in 1951, and political and economic disparities lingered after that date.
The failure of democracy
The Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) assumed power at independence in 1961, but lost it to the All People’s Congress (APC) in 1967. However, the victory was not undisputed, and it caused some disquiet within the military. It was only finally secured (with the support of a section of the army), after a coup and counter-coup (1967/68). Neither party had been able to satisfy the aspirations of the people. Over a number of years there was increasing corruption, nepotism and fiscal mismanagement as a political and business élite in Freetown
(civil servants, military officials, enterprising ‘strongmen’) diverted to their own use revenues and assets from the country’s vast deposits of diamonds, gold, bauxite and rutile (a mineral form of titanium dioxide), as well as from the country’s rich fish stocks. The coups and
15

counter-coups that claimed to target the corruption and nepotism, merely reshuffled slightly the composition of the controlling élite. ‘Thus, while its resource endowment and its relatively small population could have made it one of the richest nations in Africa, Sierra
Leone had, by the end of the 1980s, become one of the poorest countries in the world.’ vi
Growing anger and frustration were fuelled by the decline of the educational system and the lack of employment opportunities for young men. Here, among middle class professionals, semi-educated youths in the Freetown slums (taking ‘regular doses of Rambo,
Schwarzenneger and Jackie Chan’) and the mass of impoverished peasantry, was fertile ground for an insurgent movement.
Growing insurgency
The APC established a one-party system in 1978, but it faced growing armed opposition from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by a former corporal in the Sierra Leone army, Foday Sankoh. As this opposition grew, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra
Leone (AFRSL) were becoming less and less able to deal with insurgency. The coup and counter-coup had taught politicians that the military could play a decisive role in national politics. They responded by limiting the army budget, by refusing to supply ammunition, and by appointing as senior officers only those from their own ethnic groups and political affiliations. The role of the army was further undermined by the creation of the Internal
Security Unit (ISU) from within the police, and then its offshoot, the Special Security
Division (SSD). Both these units were better trained and equipped than the army itself, and they acted as a private army for the APC. The AFRSL was thus greatly weakened as a fighting force, becoming noted rather for ill-discipline, corruption and a poor human rights record. Various elements within the army became preoccupied with developing links with corrupt politicians and, through them, with insider businessmen connected with diamond and logging operations. In the fighting of the 1990s they were to earn the nickname ‘sobels’ – soldiers by day, rebels by night.
Outline
Charles Taylor in neighbouring Liberia, seeking resources for his quest to gain and hold power, supported insurgency first in Sierra Leone, then in Guinea, in return for access to natural resources in rebel hands. There has thus been a three-cornered tussle as government forces in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea have carried out cross-border incursions in support of, or retaliation for, attacks by each other’s insurgents.
Civil war in Liberia
Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), once held a senior position in the Doe administration. He fled the country in 1984 after being accused of embezzlement. He began his armed insurrection in December 1989, in Nimba County, in the north-eastern border region, and within a few months had gained control of 90 per cent of the country. (Doe himself was captured and killed by a rival rebel faction in September
1990.) Both the government Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the NPFL were guilty of atrocities, frequently along ethnic lines, and it was this that persuaded the members of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that they should intervene.
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ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) forces took control of the capital Monrovia in
August 1990, brokered the Bamako ceasefire in November, and set up the Interim
Government for National Unity (IGNU) under Dr Amos Sawyer. However, Charles Taylor saw the intervention as an attempt by the Nigerians to prop up the Doe regime and deny him victory. (ECOWAS action was not united. Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso backed
Taylor.) Frustrated by Taylor’s evasiveness and hostility, ECOWAS, supported by the UN
Security Council, declared an arms embargo against the NPFL and sought to enforce it with air strikes against airfields and ports in NPFL hands (1992). Then, in early 1993, offensives by ECOMOG and ULIMO (an anti-Taylor rebel group, drawn from the Muslim Mandingo and Krahn tribes) drove back the NPFL, and forced Taylor to the negotiating table again.
Through 1993/96, faction leaders squabbled over political office, before Taylor made a partial comeback following a split in ULIMO. In April 1996 there was once again heavy fighting in Monrovia. ECOMOG eventually drove the NPFL out, but it was evident they lacked the manpower and logistical support needed to effect disarmament of the various factions. Moreover, as in other African civil conflicts, this was not a straight fight between the AFL government army and the NPFL. The situation constantly changed as faction groups multiplied, coalesced, and broke up again. These groups included:
ULIMO-K, led by Alhaji GV Kromah (Mandingo); (ULIMO is the United Liberation
Movement of Liberia for Democracy)
ULIMO-J, led by Roosevelt Johnson (Krahn)
Liberia Peace Council (LPC), an armed group comprising mainly ethnic Krahn and disaffected AFL troops, operating in SE Liberia
Lofa Defence Force (LDF), operating in Lofa County
Joint Forces for the Liberation of Liberia (JFLL), appearing on the scene in April 1999, reported to comprise former members of ULIMO-K
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), believed to be a loose alliance of Taylor’s disgruntled former officers and rival warlords, backed by Guinea.
Civil war in Sierra Leone
Meanwhile there was growing chaos in Sierra Leone. President Momoh had been overthrown by Captain Valentine Strasser in a coup in 1992, and Strasser in his turn was overthrown by Julius Maada Bio (January 1996). In March 1996 Ahmed Tejan Kabbah gained the victory in presidential elections, only to be overthrown a year later by Major
Johnny Paul Koroma, acting in collusion with the RUF. Koroma and the RUF were not acting alone. There had been cross-fertilization from the Liberian civil war since 1991 when
NPFL forces made incursions into Sierra Leone, to support the RUF and to make trouble for the Sierra Leone government (who had contributed troops to ECOMOG). The latter retaliated with raids of their own. Thus the confused and bloody civil war now involved:
The Sierra Leone government army
Mercenaries hired by the Freetown government, first ex-British Army Gurkhas, then other ex-soldiers recruited through a South African concern, Executive Outcomes
The RUF insurgents
Johnny Koroma’s Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) that held power for a few months in 1997/98, in collusion with the RUF and their Liberian backers
ECOMOG
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Peacekeeping troops (mainly Nigerian, Indian and Kenyan), of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
A British Army task force, engaged in training Sierra Leone government forces
Militia groups allied with the Freetown government, the Kamajors being the most significant
Other militia groups, such as the notorious ‘West Side Boys’, acting on their own account.
The search for peace: Liberia
The Abuja Extension Agreement of 1996, targeting the faction leaders themselves, seems to have been the turning point in the long-drawn-out search for peace in Liberia. The agreement provided for restricting any travel by faction leaders, freezing their business activities and assets in ECOWAS states, excluding them from the electoral process, restricting their use of ECOWAS airspace and territorial waters, expelling faction leaders and members of their families from ECOWAS states, invoking the OAU resolution that calls for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal, and requesting the UN to impose visa and import restrictions.
In 1997, the various armed factions converted themselves into political parties, and in the elections of July that year Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party of Liberia (NPPL) won a convincing victory. He had the advantage of superior organisation and financial resources, and the opposition were fragmented. In the run up to the elections Taylor tried to cultivate a statesmanlike image, talking of remorse and reconciliation, and it seems he was perceived as the leader most likely to be able to restore normality to Liberia.
The search for peace: Sierra Leone
Steps towards peace in Sierra Leone have been very slow and painful. The UN Security
Council responded to the Koroma coup with an arms and oil embargo, and Kabbah was eventually reinstated by ECOMOG forces in March 1998. In July 1999, under pressure from Nigeria, the UK and USA, Kabbah signed the Lomé Peace Agreement with the RUF.
Sankoh was given vice-presidential powers and control of the lucrative mining sector, and there was to be an amnesty for perpetrators of human rights abuses. The following year after months of obstruction by the RUF (resisting disarmament and UNAMSIL deployment)
Foday Sankoh was arrested. Since then UNAMSIL and British-trained government troops have gradually wrested back territory from the RUF. The latter have also been under attack by troops from Guinea. The end result is that rebel fighters have been constrained to hand in their weapons to UNAMSIL. By December 2001 the UN Mission could claim that 37,000
RUF troops had disarmed, and that the process was in its final stage. vii
Guinea entangled
Guinea is now a part of this complex struggle. In the country’s eastern provinces of
Macenta and Kerouane lie diamonds and gold that are a potent attraction to the Liberian regime. The Guinean rebel group Rassemblement des Forces Democratiques de Guinee has reportedly received training in Liberia. Since 1999, there have been cross-border incursions between Guinea and Liberia, in support of/ retaliation for attacks by each other’s insurgents, and RUF troops have had to be sent to Liberia to help Taylor.
Guinea is also of great interest to the USA, which gets 40 per cent of its bauxite from here.
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It is thought that the US may provide military support to Guinea, and might even channel aid to the Liberian rebel group Ulimo-K.
Civilians pay the price
It is the civilian population of Sierra Leone that has paid the highest price for the fighting:
War-related deaths are estimated at between 30,000 and 75,000 (although these figures are impossible to confirm)
By 1993, an estimated 1 million Sierra Leoneans, of a total population of 4.5 million, had been displaced within the country or forced to take refuge in Guinea and Liberia. Families were shattered, agriculture was halted, children were denied education, and the urban infrastructure (where hundreds of thousands sought refuge) was placed under extreme pressure
Atrocities such as the amputation of limbs, ears and lips with machetes, decapitation, branding and the gang rape of women and children have been common. In March 2000, the UN’s Humanitarian Co-ordination Unit reported that the number of survivors of amputation was approximately 600, and it is assumed that the survivors represent only about a quarter of all amputees. For the amputees there are heavy psychological and social costs
– the shattered emotional worlds, the destruction of basic human trust
An estimated 5,000 under-age combatants, some as young as eight years old, were forced or volunteered into the various armed factions. Many were provided with drugs such as marijuana and cocaine and forced or encouraged to take part in atrocities. Again the psychological and social costs are unimaginable. Many of the present leaders of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) are themselves the product of earlier cycles of abduction
There has been an increase in sexually transmitted diseases, prostitution and the social ostracism of rape victims and other women and girls associated with various fighting factions
The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation estimates that the country’s Gross National
Product declined by an average of 4.9 per cent each year from 1992 to 1998, while the population was increasing by about 2.3 per cent annually.
Outline
Oil and diamonds have enabled the MPLA government in Angola and Savimbi’s UNITA rebels to sustain their war through more than 25 years. The powerless majority are kept quiescent by fear of Savimbi, making peace a questionable benefit for a corrupt and incompetent government.
The Angolan ‘oiligarchy’
It has been noted that Angola is governed by an ‘oiligarchy’, a corrupt élite within the ruling
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA, Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola) that controls the country’s huge oil reserves. It also has access to some of the diamond fields, and when it does not want arms purchases to show up in the
IMF-scrutinised budget, prefers to pay with licences to trade in diamonds rather than cash. viii
Corruption extends to the top. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos controls a company registered in the British Virgin Islands that has a $720 million contract to supply the Forças
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Armadas Angolanas (FAA, the Angolan government army) for the next five years. The
USA, which gets seven per cent of its oil from Angola, does not seem unduly concerned about the civil war, or Angola’s involvement in DR Congo, as long as the oil continues to flow. Indeed, the Bush administration has a strong oil sector lobby, and is thought likely to back Angola in propping up the Kinshasa regime.
The UNITA rebels
The União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) funds its war effort from diamonds, in defiance of
UN sanctions. According to a recent UN Security Council report of the Monitoring
Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA, between $1 million and $1.2 million worth of illicit diamonds are smuggled out of Angola everyday, UNITA accounting for between 25 and 30 percent of the illegal stones. (Over the course of a year, this amounts to about 5 per cent of the world’s supply of rough stones.) The UN report also states that trading companies based in Antwerp (where UNITA has a virtual branch office) and South Africa serve as key points of sale or transit for embargoed Angolan stones and that Israel is being used as a laundering route for some imports. There is now a severe recession in rough diamond trading as a consequence of the economic slowdown in the USA, but this has increased the demand for the ‘conflict’ diamonds that dealers can buy tax-free.
Some have observed that there is now a terrible paradox in Angola. It is seen in the fact that if the MPLA government were to destroy UNITA and end the war, then the people of
Angola (who are quiescent at present because of their fear of Savimbi) would no longer feel bound to tolerate the government’s corruption, neglect and incompetence. In other words, victory is not an option.
This section seeks to describe how the exploitation of resources in conflict zones has been carried out, who has benefited, who are the key responsible players, and what has made the two regions so ‘ripe for plucking’.
Outline
The rebel groups in DR Congo and their external backers first looted stockpiles, then began timber harvesting and mineral extraction for themselves. They strengthened their hold on these resources through the creation of monopolies, or collected ‘taxes’ (protection money) on the activities of others. They exploited forced labour (young men, children and convicts) and set up freight companies to remove resources.
The natural wealth of DR Congo
The natural wealth of DR Congo includes diamonds, coltan and other minerals, tropical hardwoods, and agricultural products such as coffee. Diamonds were first found in the
Congo in 1918, in kimberlite pipes in the Bakwanga hills. Today most of the diamonds are mined from alluvial
20

sites on the Kasai river and its network of tributaries in the province of West Kasai, centring on Mbuji-Mayi (an area largely controlled by the Zimbabwean army). ‘Coltan’, or columbo-tantalite, is an ore rich in the element tantalum, and a key ingredient in advanced mobile phones, jet engines, air bags, night-vision goggles, fibre optics and capacitators – the components that maintain an electric charge in computer chips.
Removal of stockpiles
Following the invasion of the eastern part of DR Congo in 1998, the exploitation of the natural resources began with the looting of stockpiles:
The SOMINKI company (Société minière et industrielle du Kivu) had seven years’ worth of columbo-tantalite (coltan). From late November 1998, Rwandan forces and their RCD allies organised its removal to Kigali. Between November 1998 and April 1999, some
2,000 – 3,000 tons of cassiterite and 1,000 – 1,500 tons of coltan were removed from the region.
Ugandan soldiers of General James Kazini removed stockpiles of timber.
In January 1999 Jean-Pierre Bemba of the MLC and General Kazini organised the confiscation of coffee beans. So much was removed that the Société congolaise du café, the largest owner of coffee stocks in the area, went bankrupt.
In some cases factories were dismantled or machinery spare parts taken away. ‘Whole factories have been dismantled and taken to Rwanda and Uganda, such as the sugar cane factory at Kiliba, south Kivu,’ (Antoine Lokongo). ix
In Uganda, car registrations went up by about a quarter in 1999, the assumption being that this can only be accounted for by the bringing in of stolen vehicles.
Rwandan soldiers systematically targeted local banks as soon as they conquered a town.
The amount taken is variously estimated at between $1 million and $8 million-worth of
Congolese francs.
Extraction and harvesting
Once stockpiles had been removed, the rebels and their backers began mineral extraction and timber harvesting for themselves. They have strengthened their exploitation by the creation of monopolies. For example, the Congo Desk of Rwanda’s Department of
External Relations awarded two ‘comptoirs’, Nassour and Arslanian, a monopoly in diamond trading in Kisangani. (In return they pay 5 per cent of the value of purchased diamonds to the Congo Desk.) Both locally owned, and some foreign, businesses have been forced to close down by methods ranging from looting to harassing.
‘Taxation’
Another aspect of the exploitation is the collection of ‘taxes’ (effectively protection money) in support of the war effort. MCL, RCD-ML and RCD-Goma have all been involved in this practice.
Forced labour
Then there is the exploitation of labour. Young Congolese men of 12-18 have been recruited for the gold mines, having been told that the Ugandan army is an ‘army of development’ that aims to improve living conditions for ordinary people. Rwanda is reported to have utilised prisoners to dig coltan, in exchange for a sentence reduction. The
21

use of child labour is also rampant in the occupied territories.
Transport networks
New transport networks have grown up to facilitate the removal of economic resources.
Aircraft fly in troops and war supplies from the military airports at Entebbe and Kigali. On the return flights they carry coffee, gold, diamond traders and other business representatives.
The Ugandan Revenue Authority has denounced what it sees as smuggling, citing the existence of 121 freight companies, some of them connected to the Ugandan army, mysteriously licensed to operate unscheduled flights between Congo and Uganda.
Outline
The Ugandan economy has benefited by the enrichment of key figures, by a significant improvement in its balance of payments, and by an increase in taxation flows to the
Treasury, enabling it to cover the overspend on the defence budget. Rwanda’s exploitation has been even more systematic and efficient, operating through ‘inner circle’ companies and individuals, and making the war ‘self-financing’.
Uganda
According to Ugandan Central Bank reports, Uganda exported $23 million of gold in 1995,
$60 million in 1996, and $105 million up to September 1997. Figures for exports of gold are consistently greater than production values. Ugandan sources are silent about diamonds and, indeed, Uganda itself has no known diamond production. However, in just the last few years, reports from the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Federation of
Diamond Bourses, and the Diamond High Council have indicated diamond exports from
Uganda. Inexpensive DR Congo coffee is bought by Ugandan traders, often with counterfeit currency, and then re-exported as Ugandan robusta (of better quality than
Congolese robusta). Satellite images between 1998 and 2000 reveal the extent of deforestation in Orientale Province. Logging activity has been conducted without consideration of the minimum acceptable rules of timber harvesting for sustainable forest management. The UN Panel lay this at the door of DARA-Forest, a Ugandan-Thai timber company operating with a concession from RCD-ML. (DARA-Forest is a subsidiary of
DARA Great Lakes Industries, DGLI.) Timber taken into Uganda, escorted by soldiers, generally pays no customs duties. (The Ugandan Revenue Authority have expressed concern to the Ministry of Defence about the revenue loss to the treasury.) It is exported through Kenya, to the Far East (30per cent), Europe (40per cent), and North America
(25per cent). The Panel state that DGLI, together with a sister company in Uganda, Nyota
Wood Industries, is in collusion with the Ministry of Water, Land and Forests of Uganda in a scheme to facilitate the certification of timber coming from DR Congo. Some unconfirmed information indicates that members of President Museveni’s family are shareholders in
DGLI. Timber extraction is directly related to the Ugandan presence in Orientale Province, and the RCD-ML administration acknowledge their lack of control. Since September
1998, DARA-Forest has been exporting about 48,000 cubic metres of timber a year. All this re-exportation activity has benefited the Uganda economy in three ways: 1) enrichment of key businessmen, 2) a significant improvement in Uganda’s balance of payments
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(particularly through gold sales), 3) more money has gone into the Treasury through various taxes on goods, services and international trade.
Rwanda
Rwanda finances its presence in the Congo in five ways: a) direct commercial activities, b) profits from shares, c) payments from RCD-Goma, d) ‘taxes’ paid for ‘protection’, e) direct uptake by its own soldiers. The exploitation is much more systematic and efficient than that carried out by Uganda, through the links between the RPF and the RPA, and a number of companies in relationship with one another. Rwanda’s extraction of coltan (through two companies, Rwanda Metals and Grands Lacs Metals), is an example. Its coltan production went up from 99 tons in 1996 to 250 tons in 1997. The UN Panel estimate that the RPA must have made $250 million from coltan over a period of 18 months in 1999/2000. All this economic activity has been devastating for wildlife. In the Kahuzi-Biega Park, a zone controlled by the Rwandans and RCD-Goma, only two out of the former 350 elephant families remained in 2000.
Burundi
Burundi has also been involved. The export of diamonds dates only from 1998 and is surely illicit. Statistics from the Tanzanian Port Authority indicate that Burundi exported barks from
‘prunus Africana’ (used in medicine for prostate treatment) in 1998 and 1999. The tree does not grow in Burundi, but rather in the forests of South Kivu.
Outline
Former president Laurent Kabila, unable to pay his allies in dollars, awarded them mining and logging concessions instead. Angola is now well placed to control future oil exploration.
Namibia has a stake in diamonds. Zimbabwe is exploiting diamonds, gold, copper and agricultural land and, with financial backing from unscrupulous timber companies, hopes to take up four huge logging concessions.
Angola and Namibia
The first report of the UN Panel barely touched on the activities of Kinshasa’s allies, asserting that Angola and Namibia have been motivated by political and strategic considerations and have not benefited financially from the conflict. x
It is argued that the joint mining, agricultural and logging ventures with which former president Laurent Kabila rewarded his friends were a sign of gratitude rather than an incentive for support. Yet
Angola and Namibia have benefited considerably. Angola has positioned itself to control future oil exploration in Kinshasa’s offshore territorial Congo Basin. Namibia has been granted a stake in the Miba Diamond Company, giving them an extra incentive to defend the
Mbuji Mayi diamond area. A diamond concession in Western Kasai has been granted to a company whose main shareholder is the Namibian Defence Ministry (together with a US and a Congolese company).
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Zimbabwe
Born from the independence struggle, ZANU-PF has always been highly militarised, and most senior officers have been embraced into the patronage system. xi
Yet the Zimbabwe
Defence Force (ZDF) did not participate in ‘extracurricular’ commercial activity during its years in Mozambique (1985-93), and when it pulled out it was South African companies that exploited the commercial openings brought by the peace. This ‘missed opportunity’ perhaps helps explain the commercial aspects of Zimbabwe’s involvement in DR Congo.
This involvement has become a matter of necessity as, 1) the ZDF has become increasingly mired in what has been described as ‘Zimbabwe’s Vietnam’, and 2) Zimbabwe’s own economy has gone into steep decline forcing the regime to seek other sources of revenue even more vigorously (issues that must raise questions about the genuineness of any announced troop withdrawals). Economic decline in Zimbabwe is the result of donor policies (cuts in foreign aid to corrupt and undemocratic governments, demands for economic and political liberalisation), and the loss of credibility with the international lending institutions and foreign investors by the manner of Zimbabwe’s land reforms.
The exploitation centres around Osleg (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy), a company established at the end of 1998 to purchase diamonds and gold from artisanal producers in
DR Congo. It is effectively the ‘economic wing’ of the ZDF. Osleg has entered into partnership with the Kinshasa-based company Comiex-Congo to form ‘Cosleg’, and in
January 2000 they established a subsidiary SOCEBO, the Congolese Society for the
Exploitation of Timber. They have been awarded four logging concessions, in Katanga,
Kasai, Bandundu and Bas-Congo provinces, covering 33 million hectares (80 million acres) of forest. The logging will actually be carried out by the ZDF. Global Witness, which has investigated logging operations in Cambodia and Liberia, thinks that investment finance may come from French, Lebanese, and south-east Asian companies. (Zimbabwe and Malaysia, in particular, have close economic and political links.) Indeed the failure of the rule of law, and the lack of enforcement capabilities and tax structures in DR Congo would, in the view of Global Witness, make the venture a ‘honey pot’ for unscrupulous companies from those countries. They will be likely to plunder the forests in an unsustainable way, and to bribe officials in DR Congo and Zimbabwe.
Other commercial ventures include: the allocation of more than 500,000 hectares of DRC agricultural land to the Zimbabwe
Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, the resumption of profitable smelting at the Mhangura Copper Mines in Zimbabwe following the arrival of DR Congo copper supplies (the Zimbabwean army is in control in Katanga);
Zimbabwe’s own mining sector is in decline and has much spare industrial and processing capacity. The Zimbabwe national railway has built a new line to bring the copper to
Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwean army has connections with Oryx Diamonds Ltd, whose attempt to secure a flotation on the London Stock Exchange in 2001 failed.
It is has been observed that none of this new-found wealth appears to have entered
Zimbabwe’s economy and benefited tax revenue. xii
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Outline
All rebel groups and foreign players (and unscrupulous Congolese politicians) are involved in the exploitation of DR Congo’s natural resources, but Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe are to the fore. The chief Ugandan players are close relatives and army or business associates of President Museveni. Rwanda’s exploitation is carried out through a number of companies owned either by the government or by individuals very close to the inner circle of
President Kagame. One company is central to Zimbabwe’s activity in DR Congo, Osleg
(Operation Sovereign Legitimacy), effectively the ‘economic wing’ of the Zimbabwe
Defence Force (ZDF).
Uganda
Key individual players are:
Major General (retired) Salim Saleh, alias General Khaleb Akandwanaho, younger brother of President Yoweri Museveni, said to be very popular in the Ugandan army, and his wife
Mrs Jovia Akandwanaho. According to the panel, these two are at the core of the illegal exploitation in the Ugandan-controlled area. Mrs Akandwanaho is said to be the more aggressive, and to be most interested in diamonds.
Brigadier General James Kazini is Salim Saleh’s right hand (and a cousin of his wife).
Muhoozi Kainerugabe (son of Yoweri Museveni).
Among the companies involved in the illicit exploitation of the Congo’s resources, the most interesting, in the view of the UN Panel, are the Victoria Group and Trinity. Victoria Group, is chaired by a Mr Khalil. The Panel were told it belonged to Muhoozi Kainerugabe and
Salim Saleh and his wife. It is involved in trading in diamonds, gold and coffee. It is also reputed to be involved in making counterfeit currency. Trinity is a fictitious company, a conglomerate of various businesses owned by Salim Saleh and his wife. In November
1999, RCD-ML granted it a ‘tax holiday’ on all activities in areas controlled by Uganda and administered by RCD-ML. Lebanese dealers who were once based in Kisangani now operate in Kampala, from where they are pumping the eastern DR Congo diamond market by paying prices above the odds. Agence France Presse reported (July 2000) that it had received confirmation from DR Congo security services that diamonds worth 120 dollars a carat in Kisangani were being bought for 160 dollars by Lebanese traders in Kampala.
Rwanda
At the heart of Rwanda’s involvement is the Banque de commerce, du développement et d’industrie (BCDI, set up only in 1996), Rwanda Metals, Grands Lacs Metals, and Tristar.
Most of these companies are owned either by the government or by individuals very close to the inner circle of President Kagame. The Panel was told that the shareholders of BCDI are the RPF, COMIEX, Alfred Khalissa, and some Angolans. Rwanda Metals is controlled by the RPF, and there are indications that RPA is a shareholder in Grands Lacs Metals. Tristar is a consortium shrouded in secrecy, and contributing to Rwanda’s war effort. In addition to these larger companies, a myriad of small companies has been created. Their shareholders are invariably powerful individuals in the Rwandan or RCD power structures. President
Kagame has close relationships with top Rwandan businessmen, such as Modeste
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Makabuza (‘owner’ of Jambo Safari), Alfred Khalissa (‘founder’ of BCDI), and Faustin
Mbundu (who is known for his arms dealing activities). Other names that keep recurring are:
Ali Hussein (from the President’s office in Kigali),
Colonel James Kaberebe of the RPA,
Tibere Rujigiro,
Mrs Aziza Kulsum Gulamali. Mrs Gulamali is said to hold several passports. She lives in
Bukavu, Brussels or Nairobi, depending on her schedule. In the past she has been involved in arms trafficking on behalf of Hutu rebels in Burundi, but she has now made herself a valuable ally of the Kigali regime and RCD-Goma. Other past and present activities include dealings in gold, coltan and cassiterite, ivory trafficking, and cigarette smuggling. Some sources told the panel that Mrs Gulamali controls almost every official in RCD-Goma.
Other sources refer to her involvement, with her daughter Djamila, in counterfeiting currency. She is famous for forging customs declarations.
Zimbabwe
In Zimbabwe, the key players in the web of the ZDF and ZANU-PF are the ZDF commander, Lieutenant General Vitalis Zvinavashe, and the Parliamentary Speaker,
Emmerson Mnangagwa. Another key player is Gilbert Albert Ziegler (alias Van Brink), a
US national and head of the First International Bank of Grenada. In 1999, RCD-ML (the wing of the rebel movement that is led by Wamba dia Wamba), gave him permission to open a private central bank in Kisangani and to issue a new currency backed by gold and diamonds. xiii
Outline
Uganda’s gains from extracting resources from eastern DR Congo have improved its GDP, enabling it to increase defence spending without increasing the percentage of GDP assigned to defence. Rwanda in effect maintains a separate account for the profits of its ventures in
DR Congo, and this account pays for the war effort.
Uganda
Uganda uses its regular defence budget for operations in the Congo, and the deficit is handled by the Treasury. According to some sources, Uganda spent $126 million on defence in 1999, an overspend on budget of $16 million. How was this covered? The UN
Panel note that the ‘trickle-down’ effect of the heightened economic activity has enabled
Uganda to improve its GDP. This has made possible an increase, in absolute terms, of the military budget without exceeding the agreed 2 per cent of GDP. The apparent strength of the Ugandan economy has also boosted investment and encouraged bilateral and multilateral donors to continue aid for health and education spending. This has given the Ugandan government room to spend more on security matters. Some military supplies are bought on credit, and the accruing debt is treated as internal debt. There is also indirect funding through local commanders turning a blind eye to racketeering by soldiers, seeing this as a way of paying their bonuses.
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Rwanda
In the current fiscal year, Rwanda has allocated $70 million to defence. The Panel estimates transportation and pay for the troops in DR Congo at $51.6 million. Clearly this could not be financed from the normal budget, and the Panel concurs with President Kagame’s depiction of the conflict in the Congo as ‘a self-financing war’. In other words Rwanda does not pay for military operations in DR Congo through increases in its own defence budget, but through profits from economic exploitation.
Turning to the rebel movements, the MLC has 12,000 to 15,000 troops, mostly armed with light equipment from Uganda. It seems that these acquisitions are financed through the granting of business opportunities and mining concessions. The troops themselves are apparently not paid and, in consequence, are directly involved in the exploitation of natural resources. RCD-Goma likewise has about 12,000 to 15,000 troops, on uncertain pay, and surviving for much of the time at the expense of the local population and wildlife.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe has financed its deployment of 10,000 troops in DR Congo by using its defence budget, the cost being about $36 million a year.
Outline
In the Sierra Leone/Liberia/Guinea triangle it is ‘blood diamonds’ and logging that give most cause for concern. Diamonds have proved to be the most lucrative and portable fuel for war. Exploitation has involved a tangled web of Sierra Leonean politicians, Lebanese and
Israeli businessmen, smaller mining companies (known as ‘juniors’), private security organisations and, latterly, the Liberian ruling élite. President Taylor of Liberia controls the logging. France is a key customer for timber, and China for both timber and diamonds.
The world diamond trade
Diamonds come from two main sources, a primary source in volcanic kimberlite rock, and a secondary source in alluvial deposits. The latter result from weathering of the kimberlite and the action of river systems that carry the products of disintegration, including diamonds, over widely scattered areas, even as far as the sea-bed. The mining of kimberlite ‘pipes’ is an expensive and capital-intensive operation, involving comprehensive geological surveying, and specialist plant for tunnelling hundreds of feet underground. Alluvial mining involves the separating of rough diamonds from earth and gravel. This can be done by large dredgers which remove tons of earth and gravel quickly, or by a single person working with sieve and shovel.
Diamonds are intrinsically valueless, apart from limited industrial use as drillbits. Yet a one carat diamond (one carat being 3.2 grains, or about 0.20 grammes) may be valued at anything up to US $2,000, according to weight, shape, clarity and colour. Current annual production worldwide is reckoned at some $6.8 billion. The leading centres of the industry are Tel Aviv, Bombay and, above all, Antwerp. Here, in three back streets near the Central
Station (Hovenierstraat, Vestingstraat and Rufstraat) some 1,500 registered dealers handle
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80 per cent of the world’s rough diamonds. The dealers include Belgians, Indians, Israelis and Lebanese. The formal trading of diamonds in Belgium is structured around the ‘Hoge
Raad voor Diamant’ (HRD) – the Diamond High Council. The HRD is a non-profit umbrella organisation, officially acknowledged as the voice of the Belgian diamond industry, committed to maintaining and strengthening the position of Antwerp as the world centre for diamonds. This industry accounts for 7 per cent of Belgium’s exports, yet it is shrouded in secrecy. The role of monitoring imports and exports on behalf of the Belgian government is carried out largely by the HRD itself, and a UN Report of March 2000 highlights ‘extremely lax controls’ that more or less encourage illegal activity. For example, the country of origin is deemed to be the one from which the diamonds were imported, not the one where they were mined. This has helped win Antwerp a name as the ‘diamond smuggler’s dream’. xiv
According to the NGO Partnership Africa-Canada, cases of fraud in the Antwerp diamond and banking trade are legendary and Antwerp has become one of the primary world centres for Russian organised crime. xv
Sierra Leone’s diamond wealth
The first Sierra Leonean diamond was found in 1930. Significant production began in 1935, and Sierra Leone is now second only to Namibia in terms of quality of gems, with a much higher incidence of exceptionally large stones. Diamond deposits in Sierra Leone are most commonly of the alluvial type, but there are some highly-prized kimberlite dikes as well.
There are three main diamond fields in Sierra Leone:
Koidu-Yengema (Kono), the largest and oldest of Sierra Leone’s diamond fields, with several kimberlite pipes (the area does not suit petty opportunists and has been largely mined by international mining companies), the Tongo Field, south-west of Kono, the Zimmi field, running south from Zimmi town, along the Moro River and down to the
Liberian border, with both kimberlite and alluvial deposits.
The ‘web’ of exploitation
The exploitation of the diamond fields in the last thirty years has involved a tangled web of
Sierra Leonean politicians, Lebanese and Israeli businessmen, smaller mining companies
(known as ‘juniors’), private security organisations and, latterly, the Liberian ruling élite.
Background players include the al-Qa’eda network, China, and Burkina Faso. Al-Qua’eda is reputed to have been buying diamonds from members of the RUF, at only 10 per cent of the normal market price. xvi
China manifests a huge thirst for industrial diamonds to meet its development requirements and it has vast stocks of decommissioned 1960’s vintage small arms for sale. There is good evidence that a lively trade of this nature is channelled through
Burkina Faso.
One notable figure illustrates the Lebanese connection. This is Jamil Mohammed, a
Lebanese businessman and right hand man first of Siaka Stevens, then of Joseph Momoh.
From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, aspects of Lebanon’s civil war were played out in miniature in Sierra Leone. Various Lebanese militia sought financial assistance from their compatriots in Sierra Leone, and the country’s diamonds became an important informal tax base for one faction or the other. This was of great interest to Israel, in part because the leader of the important Amal faction, Nabih Berri, had been born in Sierra Leone and was a
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boyhood friend of Jamil. Following a failed (and probably phoney) 1987 coup attempt in
Sierra Leone, Jamil went into exile, opening the way for a number of Israeli ‘investors’ with close connections to Russian and American crime families, and with ties to the Antwerp diamond trade.
State kleptocracy and the growing insecurity in Sierra Leone forced De Beers out of the picture, and the Israeli experience proved both disappointing and shortlived. The NPRC military government now began to receive overtures from smaller mining firms, known in the business as ‘juniors’ – companies more willing to take risks with their capital and their reputations. Partnership Africa-Canada name three, all of whom trade on Canadian stock exchanges. (Canada has a reputation as a source of easy venture capital for small mining and exploration companies.) The first is Rex Diamond, with de facto headquarters in
Antwerp. It holds concessions in the Zimmi and Tongo Fields. The second firm is AmCan
Minerals, based in Toronto. Because of the security situation, AmCan has so far done little diamond mining, although it recently acquired a South African-owned firm, ArmSec
International (SL), with connections to both the diamond and security industries. AmCan’s
Sierra Leone lawyer is also Chairman of the Government Gold and Diamond Office, the body responsible for overseeing the monitoring, valuation and taxation of the diamond industry. The third firm is DiamondWorks which, in 1995, acquired Branch Energy Ltd, a private company registered in the Isle of Man. (DiamondWorks and Branch Energy have become the subject of widespread interest because of their apparent but much-denied connections with two major international security firms, Executive Outcomes and Sandline.)
Liberia and the diamond trade
By the end of the 1990s, Liberia had become a safe haven for organised crime of all sorts – based on diamonds, but with connections to guns, drugs and money laundering throughout
Africa and considerably further afield. In return for weapons, Liberia has provided the RUF with an outlet for diamonds. (It has also fuelled more distant African wars by providing the same service to groups in other diamond-producing countries.) A comparison of West
African diamond export figures with Belgian imports is revealing. For example: the Government of Sierra Leone recorded exports of only 8,500 carats in 1998, but the
HRD recorded imports of 770,000 carats, annual Liberian diamond mining capacity is between 100,000 and 150,000 carats, but the
HRD recorded Liberian exports to Belgium of over 31 million carats between 1994 and
1998 – an average of over six million carats a year,
Ivory Coast, where the small diamond industry was closed in the mid-1980’s, apparently exported an average of more than 1.5 million carats to Belgium between 1995 and 1997.
Confirmation of what has been going on came after the arrest of the RUF leader, Foday
Sankoh, in May 2000. Documents found at his house in Freetown revealed that 10 per cent of diamonds from the Kono fields went to Sankoh himself, 10 per cent to his deputy Sam
‘Mosquito’ Bockarie, 30 per cent were used for buying weapons, and the rest went to
Charles Taylor. xvii
The RUF could have financed its war through illicit coffee, cocoa, timber or gold exports. It just happened that diamonds proved to be the most lucrative and portable fuel for war. Richard Holbrooke, the former US permanent representative to the
UN, estimated that diamond sales have been earning
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i
David Keen, ‘War as a source of losses and gains’, talk given at Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, July
1995. ii
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, November 2000. iii
Daily Telegraph 13/8/01 iv
The groups were ex-FAR, the Interahamwe, UNITA, ADF, LRA, WNBF, UNRF II, FUNA, CNDD-FDD. v
Financial Times 10/8/01 vi
Abiodun Alao, ‘Sierra Leone: tracing the genesis of a controversy’, RIIA Briefing Paper No.50, June
1998 vii
Daily Telegraph , 13/12/01 viii
Africa Confidential 4/8/00 ix
Guardian 6/8/01 x
Reprt, para 125. xi
Africa Confidential 15/6/01 xii
SIPRI Yearbook 2000, p.67. xiii
Africa Confidential 4/5/01 xiv
Diamond dealers ‘fuel Africa’s wars’, Times , 16/3/00 xv
‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, diamonds & human security’, by Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, and Ralph Hazleton (Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000) xvi
Daily Telegraph , 3/11/01 xvii
Independent , 24/7/00
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the RUF between US$ 30-50 million a year.
‘Blood’ diamonds
The civil wars in diamond-rich areas of Africa (Angola, and the Kisangani area of DR
Congo, as well as Sierra Leone) have now brought disturbing talk of ‘blood diamonds’ or
‘conflict diamonds’. The mining houses maintain that ‘just 4 per cent’ of the worldwide trade can be classified as ‘conflict diamonds’. i
(Other sources maintain it could be as much as 20 per cent. ii
) Even ‘just 4 per cent’ of $6.8 billion is still $272 million. Having banned diamond exports from UNITA-held areas of Angola in 1998, the UN is now trying to ban diamond exports from Sierra Leone unless they come with a proper government certificate of origin. In accordance with proposals put forward by the UK, and accepted by the UN, export licences have been awarded to just a few carefully chosen traders in Freetown.
(According to one news report, iii
stones from the RUF-held Kono fields are passing through their hands.)
The Liberian logging industry
The active role of the forestry industry in regional insecurity was highlighted in a report of the
UN Panel of Experts, appointed under UN Security Council Resolution 1306 to investigate the links between diamonds and arms trafficking. The Liberian industry, probably 99 per cent of which is for export, is very much in the hands of President Taylor and his closest associates. This situation has actually been written into law. The Strategic Commodities
Act, passed in 2000 without proper legislative process, gives the president of Liberia sole power to conclude commercial contracts involving the exploitation of commodities held to be ‘strategic’. And it is for the president to decide what shall be deemed strategic.
The key players
One key player is Gus Kouwenhoven. He is Chairman of the Oriental Timber Company
(OTC), Managing Director of the Royal Timber Corporation (RTC), and on the board of the Liberian Forestry Development Authority (the FDA, whose Managing director is D
Robert Taylor, Charles Taylor’s brother). RTC has concessions in Lofa County, which is in the Guinea border region, an area where no timber company could operate without armed protection. This means, in effect, that the logging can only take place with the active backing of the Taylor regime. Of OTC, Global Witness reports that there is no evidence that the company is paying the required fees to the FDA, or taxes to the Treasury, or that it is fulfilling reporting requirements. It is said to have bulldozed villages with little or no warning, and without compensation to the displaced people. Reforestation efforts are few and haphazard. Kouwenhoven is also said to be ‘responsible for the logistical aspects of many of the arms deals involved in arms trafficking between Liberia and Sierra Leone’ (UN
Panel).
Other key players are: Talal El-Dine, a Lebanese businessman who is also on the board of the FDA, ‘Jamil’ Said Mohamed, the Lebanese trader (Sierra Leone-born and former righthand man to Sierra Leonean presidents), and President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso.
There are also close trade links with China and France, the main importers of Liberian timber, taking 46.4 per cent and 17.9 per cent respectively. (This almost certainly explains
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why they were the main objectors to the imposition of timber sanctions.) Liberian timber became important to France after it had depleted the forests of Côte d’Ivoire in less than two decades. Observations by Global Witness at French ports, in April 2001, suggested that Liberian timber made up a significant proportion of the total imports of timber.
However, it is not possible to be sure of the amount as it is probable that the actual origin of some timber is obscured by the use of aliases.
One key figure in the French connection was a certain Sampei, a French businessman who settled in Liberia, and was said to have had a logging company there. (He died some years ago, but his sons have continued the business.) After the military coup in 1980, Sampei moved to Côte d’Ivoire. There he made many friends in Ivorian political circles and also forged a relationship with Michel Dupuch, then French ambassador and now head of the office of African Affairs in Paris. Bruno Delaye, a close friend of the Mitterand family, and a former French ambassador to Togo, was another contact. He now heads the office of cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.
Outline
All the factors that may foster armed predatory enterprise are present in both the Great
Lakes area and the Mano River region. They are rich in resources (oil, coltan, etc) that the developed world needs and, crucially, much of this wealth is ‘lootable’. The countries of these two regions have been characterised by corrupt and decaying state infrastructures, and by poorly equipped armed forces. They have been blighted by social injustice and a lack of democratic accountability.
A wealth of natural resources
In terms of natural resources DR Congo is by far the richest African country. It is rich in minerals (copper, cobalt, coltan, gold, diamonds, cassiterite); it has vast areas of agricultural land (producing tobacco, tea and palm oil, and allowing livestock rearing), and there are extensive tropical forests. Sierra Leone is rich in diamonds, and Liberia in tropical timber.
The developed world has a great thirst for this wealth. For example, there are at present some sixty companies participating in the $60 billion International Space Station. The special alloys needed for the Space Station require huge quantities of rare and precious metals, such as cobalt, coltan, niobium, tungsten and gold, and some of the highest grade ores are found in DR Congo. iv
It is ‘lootability’ that has made the two regions so ripe for plucking. It seems that the greater the availability of valuable resources at the periphery of state control, the greater the likelihood of prolonged war. Botswana and Namibia have enjoyed peace despite their great diamond wealth. In the former the diamonds are found only in kimberlite pipe deposits, while in the latter they are on the coastal seabed. By contrast the RUF rebel group has been able to exploit alluvial deposits in northern and eastern Sierra Leone, and the mineral and forest resources of eastern DR Congo are readily accessible to eastern-based rebel movements. In Angola there is a dual lootability, with UNITA exploiting alluvial diamond
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deposits, while the Luanda government has sole access to off-shore oilfields, out of reach of a rebel group with no navy.
Decay and corruption
The two regions have been characterised by state infrastructures that are corrupt, decayed and seemingly near collapse. The DR Congo, for example, has been plagued by a multitude of competing political parties (some say 250, others as many as 500). The investigating UN
Panel are scathing about ‘unsavoury politicians’ who are ready to make any deal for the sake of power or for personal enrichment. Among those they name are Jean-Pierre Bemba
(now the leader of the FLC), Mwenze Kongolo, Victor Mpoyo, Gaëtan Kakudji, Adolphe
Onusumba (Leader of the RCD-Goma), Jean-Pierre Ondekane, and Emmanuel Kamanze. v
It has also been noted that a destabilised country such as DR Congo serves as a ‘simulated off-shore tax haven’ issuing export permits, country-of-destination documents, bank accounts and tax records free from inspection. In all three war-torn countries (DR Congo,
Sierra Leone, Liberia), armies have been poorly trained and poorly paid. Sometimes they have not been paid at all, and then they have taken matters into their own hands and plundered the civilian population.
The lack of justice and accountability
The three countries we have focused on are each characterised by the divide between a coastal/urban élite and a more backward, and neglected, hinterland (yet in each case a hinterland rich in natural resources). The Mobutu regime in Zaire/Congo is a particularly striking example. It did not need to seek popular legitimacy, for it could always buy any support it needed among the élite. During the Cold War era it also had powerful external backing from the West. Too many grievances were left to fester – among unpaid soldiers, ill-equipped and under-funded public services, ethnic groups denied full citizen rights. In this situation violence seemed to be the only way to obtain redress and gain access to the national wealth. This was the route chosen by Kabila senior and the AFDL (only for them to slip into the same pattern of exploiting wealth for political and personal ends). It was likewise the route chosen by Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor.
Democratic credentials in the two regions have been (and remain) decidedly shaky.
President Kabbah of Sierra Leone secured little more than a third of the votes in the first round of the elections in 1996. The Liberian people voted for Charles Taylor because he seemed to hold out the hope of a return to some kind of normality. They may also have feared that he would not have accepted electoral defeat, but, in the manner of Jonas Savimbi in Angola, return to the battlefield. The democratic standing of the Kinshasa government is certainly no stronger than that of the rebels. It gained power by armed force in 1996/97, just as the rebels sought to do in 1998.
This section points up some of the disturbing features of these conflicts: the emergence of faction groups, the exploitation of child soldiers, the part played by the outside world in treating these regions as politically insignificant while colluding in their troubles, the distortion of economic and political structures. It draws attention to the synergy between military
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commercialism, international crime, and ‘adversarial’ globalisation.
Outline
The emergence of unpredictable and opportunistic ‘faction groups’, and the brutal exploitation of child soldiers, are two of the more disturbing elements in these wars.
Another is the general perception on the part of the international community that these two regions are of little significance in world geopolitics. They have turned a blind eye to the illicit exploitation of resources, and allowed trade and arms embargoes to be circumvented.
Local economic and political structures have been distorted.
Emergence of substate ‘faction groups’
These groups manifest a number of significant characteristics:
They act as if they are recognised members of the international community, yet are not pinned down by international rules and regulations. It is much more difficult to apply sanctions against them than against regular state actors. (They simply resort to
‘unconventional suppliers’.)
They have no recognised ante-bellum territory to which they can withdraw. Defeat means political and, perhaps, physical elimination, so that for them the only logic is to fight on.
Brutality, rather than being an aberration and an ‘unavoidable’ consequence of war, has been made into a deliberate strategy whereby to instil fear and establish control
All have shown disdain for the codes and conventions of war. Faction leaders may not even know the number of combatants under their control because of the lack of permanent allegiances and alliances. Mutual suspicion among faction groups has contributed to noncompliance with disarmament agreements. Sometimes combatants have been temporarily sent across borders in order to evade demobilisation programmes.
Their actions are characterised by opportunism. ‘More often than not, negotiations were tactics manipulated as windows of opportunity either to re-arm or to win new political allies.
In the calculations of the RUF and the NPFL, every new situation was evaluated in terms of the potential constraints and opportunities that it generated for the organisation’. vi
The exploitation of economic opportunities (ranging from looting to regular mining operations) has given new impetus and meaning to their warring, and this in turn has contributed to vibrant war economies straddling border regions. Yet their motives remain political as much as commercial. (ECOWAS made the mistake of treating the NPFL and
RUF as mere criminal elements.)
The use of child soldiers
In the Mano River region, child soldiers are thought to have made up 25 per cent of the combatants in Liberia, while 12 per cent of the 45,000 soldiers to be demobilised in Sierra
Leone are children. The use of children in war has serious implications in terms of the difficulties of post-war re-integration, even their long-term alienation from the community.
(It is salutary to recall that Rashidi Kasereka, the bodyguard who shot Kabila senior was said to be part of the Kadogo unit. ‘Kadogo’ means child soldier and refers to a unit of soldiers recruited when they were very young.)
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Insignificance in world geopolitics
The leading members of the international community have, for the most part, weighed the wars in the Mano River region in a narrow and oversimplified cost-benefit analysis. Even the possibility that Liberia and Sierra Leone might disintegrate could be judged as likely to have minimal effects on international security, and so did not justify the material, political and moral costs of intervention. (ECOWAS, on the other hand, perceived the conflict as threatening the interests of member states.) In dealings with the Great Lakes region and neighbouring Angola, the chief concerns seem to have been the uninterrupted supply of resources such as coltan and oil. (It has been noted vii
that Walter Kansteiner, US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, formerly held a position at the Defence Department, working on the strategic minerals task force.) Yet Africa is not wholly insignificant to the
West, for there are old rivalries still to be played out. It seems that, during the Liberian and
Sierra Leone civil wars, the NPFL secured French diplomatic and economic support by portraying its struggle as partly against suspected Nigerian (and therefore English-speaking) hegemonic ambitions.
Collusion
A related issue is collusion and the ‘smoke-screens’ that obscure it. The UN Panel of
Experts that investigated DR Congo pointed to passive, and not so passive, facilitation by outsiders. As regards coltan, for example, they identify three key factors in Rwanda’s exploitation:
The passive role of some companies such as Sabena Cargo, which has transported coltan from DR Congo from Kigali to European destinations, and others such as Citibank (the corresponding bank of BCDI) in the financial arrangements, and of individuals such as the self-styled US honorary consul in Bukavu, Ramnik O Kotecha, who promotes deals between American companies and coltan dealers. (Following the publication of the UN
Panel report Sabena stopped their involvement.)
The rush to profit by some foreign companies, ready to do business regardless of unlawfulness.
The political legitimisation provided by some developed countries.
Some western companies are heavily involved in economic activity in the Great Lakes region. The bulk of Uganda’s gold transactions are handled by companies that are either
100 per cent foreign-owned or are joint ventures with army officers. For example, Salim
Saleh is a shareholder in Catalyst Corporation of Canada. President Museveni enjoys much favour with various western investors because his policies of economic liberalisation have created a climate conducive to business. Thus he has some justification for thinking he is unlikely to face sanctions following the UN Panel report. viii
The lists of colluding governments, and the varieties of collusion, are almost endless. Kenya has been involved as the base for the supply of counterfeit US dollars. Then there are the transit countries through which extracted resources pass one way, and weapons the other.
Certain countries are to some extent bound by regulations signed within the framework of subregional organisations such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA). This would account for Tanzania’s part in allowing gold, diamonds and timber
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from RCD-Goma to pass through Dar es Salaam, but others have less excuse.
Collusion and ‘smoke-screens’ are very much part of the weapons business, where as many as thirty separate parties may be involved in one illegal arms shipment. ix
The Central African
Republic (CAR) seems to overlook the use of Bangui airport by MLC and the arms trader
Victor Butt. Most weapons shipments (e.g. from the Ukraine) that reach the RUF through
Liberia pass first through Burkina Faso. (That country has also trans-shipped weapons to
UNITA as has Togo. Both countries provide false end-user certificates for weapons purchases, in exchange for diamonds. x
) The RUF has also obtained weapons through ambushes of Sierra Leone army, ECOMOG and UN troops, and through those parties selling weapons in exchange for cash, diamonds, food and medicines. (There are also reports of Nigerian ECOMOG troops and Guinean UN troops selling weapons.) Côte d’Ivoire has aided Charles Taylor and thus, indirectly, the RUF. Large EU-based firms with temporary bases in Côte d’Ivoire have negotiated business deals with the NPFL without having to satisfy export controls. The latter bypassed the ECOWAS blockade of Liberian ports by shipping goods via the Côte d’Ivoire port of San Pedro (a boom town during the
Liberian civil war). Libya is a known provider of weapons and training to the RUF. (In the past both Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh have trained in Libya. xi
)
The role of the Kinshasa government itself should not be overlooked. The late President
Laurent-Désiré Kabila granted mining concessions during his 1996 advance on Kinshasa, though at the time he certainly had no authority to do so. Once in power he called for
‘parafiscal taxation’, that is, cash contributions by large companies to presidential funds.
The Kinshasa government has entered into a contract for military equipment from China, in exchange for the awarding of a mining concession to a joint venture between a Chinese company and a parastatal of the DR Congo. Likewise a mining concession around
Shinkolobwe (very rich in uranium) has been granted to North Korea in exchange for the training of troops. The export of gold, diamonds and timber through Dar es Salaam is backed by documentation indicating issuance from a Kinshasa government organisation, complete with the required stamps and signatures. In the case of coltan, although the needed documentation for its export is produced in Kigali, there are accomplices at the
Ministry of Mines in Kinshasa.
The UN Panel questions the uncritical attitude of those Western governments (chiefly the
UK, Denmark, Germany and the USA) that continue to provide bilateral aid to Uganda and
Rwanda. The aid is being used to fund social expenditure which, in the view of the Panel, should be covered by government. They ask, are savings in national budgets used to finance the war? xii
The Panel also finds the World Bank complicit in the exploitation. It appears to be turning a blind eye to the increasing export of resources from Uganda and Rwanda (as they did in the case of the illicit exploitation of Cambodian timber in the 1980s).
Economic and political distortions
The interweaving of armed conflict and the exploitation of natural resources can distort a whole local economy. The illicit extraction and export of natural resources, and the smuggling of weapons, may provide a rural population with greater opportunities to gain an income than could have been won from legitimate endeavours. Furthermore, such activities
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require armies of drivers, porters and guards, while truck-stop markets create a demand for local produce. Border crossings require legions of officials to fabricate documents and falsify destinations. In some areas the rural economy has been energised and the urban-rural bias reversed.
It has been noted that a ruling élite with access to abundant resources is not so dependent on internal relations of reciprocity and traditional forms of restraint. It needs neither popular legitimacy, nor efficient bureaucracy, nor consent for broad-based taxation. Access to resources, and the ambiguous ethics of international business – where commercial corporations are generally willing to deal with whoever is in control – may also make both the government and rebel sides less amenable to external political pressures. The contrasting experiences of Mozambique and Angola illustrate the point. In Mozambique, cash-strapped RENAMO relied on an intergovernmental trust fund, and adhered to the peace process in consequence. In Angola, however, foreign dealers have been willing to buy diamonds from the UNITA rebels, and lending institutions have readily agreed loans to the MPLA government, guaranteed by oil sales. In a global society it is not clear where the responsibility of transnationals ends and that of government begins, but the move by the UN and NGOs to involve corporations acknowledges that there is a new balance of power.
Outline
There appears to be a growing trend to the conversion of the government military apparatus into a commercial asset. This raises the possibility of it being used for predatory external deployment. Parallel with this trend, insurgent groups have turned to resource extraction to fund their operations. As illicit exploitation becomes an end in itself, both sides form links with international criminal groups. Some aspects of globalisation – its dislike of unproductive sectors, for example, and its impatience with restrictions on financial flows – seem to contribute to these trends.
‘Military commercialism’
The link between the extraction of natural resources and armed conflict is not new, neither is it accidental. Copper was a factor in Indonesia’s annexation of West Papua in 1962, in the coup in Chile in 1973, and in the Shaba crises in southern Zaire in 1977-78. The control of oilfields was a factor in the secession of Biafra and the Nigerian civil war, 1967-70. It was also a factor in Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980. Gems and timber have played a part in the wars in Cambodia. xiii
During the 1970’s and 1980’s, top South African officers were involved in the export of Angolan diamonds, ivory and hardwood. In Hispanic civil-military culture there has long been a much tighter link between the military and the national economy. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in China is an even clearer example of military commerce, and one that has certainly influenced some African governments (through past involvement with anti-colonial movements, for example, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe).
Yet although the phenomenon is not new, there does appear to be a growing trend to what may be termed ‘military commercialism’:
Africa’s military coups have institutionalised forays by the armed forces into the domestic
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economy, e.g. Nigeria, where there is now a commercially inclined military ethos. ‘Nigeria’s military deployments in Liberia and Sierra Leone exhibit an increasing tendency towards military commercialism, as command and control systems become distended and clear mandates confused.’ xiv
In Angola, ironically, the behaviour of the FAA has become quite similar to that of UNITA as they both look (sometimes just across the river from each other) for lucrative resource extraction opportunities.
The end of the cold War has spurred on the trend. Weak economies in Latin America have been unable to afford unproductive sectors, and military establishments have been forced to become, at least in part, productive enterprises. In post-Soviet Russia, the ongoing financial difficulties have forced soldiers of all ranks to engage in illegal activities, including even the sale of military hardware.
Even in the English-speaking world, where a clear divergence has been maintained, in traditional theory and practice, between the military and the political economy, things may be changing. The military in some countries are now being forced to adopt a more corporate outlook, and to market military service as ideal training for later corporate employment.
The conversion of the military apparatus into a commercial asset may damage the military by blurring entry and exit strategies, motivating field commanders away from any military action perceived as high risk, and inclining them towards warlordism. Furthermore, military commercialism alters civil-military relations and debases state structures. Yet the most dangerous consequences of external military commercialism arguably emerge when the war is over – governments must continue to provide comparable income to commanders. One response has been to incorporate the military further into the state. Another is to embark on continuing external deployment of the armed forces. Either way the domestic élite is drawn into a self-destructive spiral. The trend threatens to transform foreign policy into a form of economic predatory behaviour. Traditional exit criteria, such as the return of stability or the achievement of foreign policy objectives, become irrelevant.
International crime
One of the most disturbing aspects of the current resource-conflict links in Africa is the trend to criminal activity. It seems there are always shadowy arms dealers and their intermediaries ready to assist on the one hand the rebel group and, on the other, the government whose defence budget may be under IMF scrutiny, or is under a UN embargo. It is a very small step from such illicit commercial activity to outright criminalisation. Chains of command may be quickly undermined and an armed group, or a part of it, may become a criminal group.
As a footnote to the Sierra Leone war, and as a salutary warning of the ramifications of civil war, it has been noted that Nigerian ECOMOG troops have smuggled back to Nigeria weapons captured from rebel groups and sold them to criminal elements there. The UN
Panel accuses even national leaders of complicity. They say President Museveni of Uganda is responsible for entrusting the direction of the Congolese Liberation Front to those who are the accomplices of illegal cartels, namely Mbusa Nyamwisi and Tibasima. They go on to assert that, by choosing not to act (despite being passed reports of their activities), ‘the
President has put himself in the position of accomplice.’ xv
Criminal cartels have connections worldwide, involving arms, drugs, diamonds and moneylaundering. These networks are unlikely to withdraw if/when a conflict is resolved. In fact it
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has been suggested that criminals will take over fully if all foreign armies leave DR Congo.
The role of globalisation
The readiness of international commercial organisations to do business in war zones, the growing trend to military commercialism, and the growth of international crime need to be viewed in the context of that general breaking down of barriers (some distorting, others intended to be safety barriers) known as globalisation. There are other areas where natural resource conflict seems to be linked with aspects of globalisation. The structural adjustment programmes imposed on developing countries have brought about a massive redeployment, without sufficient safety nets, of workers from decaying public bureaucracies to the informal networks of the shadow economy. These can be ready-made recruiting grounds for rebel groups. Deregulation has had disconcerting side effects, such as making it easy to move money from illegal business dealings and difficult to trace it afterwards. Privatisation schemes (often imposed by the IMF) may introduce powerful foreign interests and consolidate external support for unaccountable governments. Websites may be used to attract financial help for clashes over resources. Ankie Hoogvelt (researcher, writer and teacher on global political economy), speaking at the 2001 CODEP conference, notes a transition from ‘complementary trade’ to ‘adversarial trade’, with mergers and acquisitions now accounting for 83 per cent of investment flows.
xvi
Neo-liberalism seeks to activate competitive market-oriented economic behaviour. Why is the predatory activity of rebel groups ‘greed’, while that of multinationals can be ‘competition’ to be praised by the World
Bank and others? Mark Duffield (IPIS, University of Leeds) asks, what if intractable conflicts in countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, and DR Congo ‘were not failures of modernity, but, rather, the realisation of its inner potential?’
This section seeks to identify the impediments to peace. It outlines the progress of peace agreements, the measures promoted to curb the flow of ‘conflict’ resources, and the role of non-government organisations (NGOs).
Outline
Efforts to rebuild peace are hindered by questions of legitimacy (what mandate do the various ‘Fronts’ and ‘Movements’ have?), by lack of trust among the warring parties, by the issue of war crimes, and by the stakes that government and rebel leaders have in wars that bring them wealth. Rwanda, Uganda and Angola have security concerns that are certainly legitimate, but difficult to address. There are glimmers of hope: the general war fatigue; a possible change of attitude in Rwanda to the granting of an amnesty to Hutu rebels; improved co-operation from Kinshasa under Joseph Kabila; the recent power-sharing deal in Burundi. Yet the fundamental issue of social injustice remains largely unaddressed.
DR Congo
The chief impediments to peace are:
Personal animosities between rebel leaders such as Jean-Pierre Bemba of the MLC and
Adolphe
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Onusomba of RCD-Goma.
Rwanda, Uganda and Angola seem convinced that they can control the infiltration of insurgents by maintaining soldiers in DR Congo. Thus Angola remains interested in maintaining troops outside its borders, and Rwanda is steadfast in refusing to withdraw so long as the Hutu militias remain a threat. Yet the DR Congo is so large and the terrain so difficult that insurgents can operate from its territory with impunity. From a purely military perspective, it would seem that Rwanda and Uganda are committing themselves to staying indefinitely.
The Lusaka agreement names nine groups operating on DR Congo territory that did not sign up. These include the ex-FAR, the Interahamwe, UNITA and the Ugandan insurgent group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The agreement gives them little incentive to disarm, and the threat of war crimes prosecutions is a strong disincentive. Though the Burundian and Ugandan rebel groups are weak, the Angolan and Rwandan rebels are formidable armed groups, and the DR Congo’s dense jungles will almost certainly prevent forced disarmament.
The question of crimes against humanity cannot be side stepped, though it is, admittedly, very complex. There is the question of the alleged attacks on Rwandan Hutu refugees by the AFDL during the 1996-97 war, when tens of thousands were said to have been killed, raped, and otherwise injured. So far the DR Congo and Rwandan governments have frustrated UN attempts to investigate the allegations. There is the matter of the ethnic cleansing of thousands of Banyarwanda, in eastern DR Congo, by defeated FAR and Hutu
‘Interahamwe’ militias, driven across the border from Rwanda in 1994. Then there is the matter of the genocide trials in Rwanda. Only 4,000 of the 119,000 in jail in Rwanda have been tried and convicted, and Human Rights Watch say that lack of political will as much as logistical difficulties has delayed the re-establishment of the judicial system. These trials need to be completed, and justice done, without delay.
The land disputes and ethnic animosities in Kivu remain a big stumbling block
No state with the capability to launch a peace enforcement operation is interested in doing so. xvii
Another obstacle lies in the fact that, for a number of high-level government and military officials from Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, peace would mean the loss of access to mineral wealth. Because of the level of Zimbabwe’s investment, it cannot afford to withdraw without being sure of a friendly government in Kinshasa.
There are perhaps some glimmers of hope. In September 2001, Joseph Kabila promised to show MONUC evidence of the disarming of 3,000 Hutu fighters. Clearly this could be an encouraging development. A mission led by the Emergency Response Division (ERD) of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) conducted a mapping and programming mission to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo in August/September 2001. They concluded that the time is right for the implementation of ‘disarmament, demobilisation and durable solutions’. Among the favourable currents that they discerned were a general war fatigue and a lack of popular support at home (particularly in Uganda and Zimbabwe), a change of attitude on the part of the Rwandan government to the granting of an amnesty to Hutu rebels, improved co-operation from Kinshasa since Joseph Kabila came to power, a ‘new dynamic’ in eastern DR Congo – a sense that peace is possible – and the withdrawal of forces from frontline positions. However, the mission also noted certain ‘counter currents’,
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including continued instability in eastern DR Congo, the emergence of the Forces democratiques pour la liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), who seek a political dialogue in
Rwanda before they will return home, and doubts about power-sharing in Burundi. xviii
Even if it is true that Namibia and Uganda have withdrawn most of their troops from DR
Congo (as they announced in September 2001) it is likely that the withdrawal of Angolan and Zimbabwean forces would be linked to the withdrawal of the Rwandans.
Burundi
In neighbouring Burundi there are moves to stem the country’s ‘slow genocide’. After two years of painstaking mediation, the former South African president, Nelson Mandela, has secured a power-sharing agreement. There is to be a three-year transition period before elections in 2004. The Tutsi president, Pierre Buyoya, will stay in office for the first eighteen months of this period, then hand over power to his Hutu deputy. Cabinet posts have been shared between the two ethnic groups with a Hutu taking responsibility for police and public security, and a Tutsi holding the defence portfolio. However, the two Hutu rebel groups – the Burundian Forces de defense pour la democratie (FDD) and the National Forces for
Liberation (FNL) – have not signed up to the agreement, and Tutsi extremists of the Uprona
Party are calling for attacks on the South African peacekeeping troops. xix
If the rebels are to be brought to the negotiating table, DR Congo, Zimbabwe and Tanzania will have to exert their influence. The first two have armed and trained the rebels, and the third hosts refugee camps that are havens and staging areas for incursions into Burundi. xx
The rebels’ legitimate grievances will have to be addressed, in particular the reform of the army and the security services.
Outline
As in the Great Lakes region, efforts to rebuild peace are hindered by questions of legitimacy (does the government still have a mandate? do the rebels have an ideology?), by lack of trust, and by the issue of war crimes. Overawed by the UN/UK presence, the RUF do seem to be giving way. Issues of social injustice remain to be addressed.
Government legitimacy
One serious threat to peace arises from questions about the continued legitimacy of the
Kabbah government, and the failure to include all parties in the Lomé process. (In particular the remnants of the SLA were left out.) Does the Kabbah government retain sufficient support to be capable of uniting the country? Perhaps not, but there is a fear that elections could divide the country further. An interim government of national unity may be appropriate, but who would be part of it, and how would they be chosen? What of a national conference process, as has been undertaken in some other post-war situations?
Another problem has been that the war has not really been waged on the grounds of an ideology. If it had been it might have been possible to address substantive issues.
However, such ‘radical intellectual’ roots as the RUF may once have had were extinguished in murderous internal purges during the movement’s first year of operations. It seems that
Sankoh’s commitment was not to peace, but to state power and continued access to mineral
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wealth. He was helped by the connivance of some of Sierra Leone’s neighbours.
Lack of trust
A further serious impediment to peace has been the lack of trust among the various armed groups, particularly at leadership level. The RUF, and most especially Sankoh himself, have all along proved very unreliable. Sankoh in his turn was extremely suspicious of
UNAMSIL, and contested its legitimacy. According to one of his aides, this distrust of international agencies stems from incidents such as the betrayal and murder of Patrice
Lumumba in the Congo in 1961, and the murder of Samuel Doe in Liberia in 1990.
The issue of war crimes
Yet, at root, the RUF have been driven by the fear of justice and an unwillingness to face their victims. In the pursuit of peace, is it morally or politically defensible (as has been tried in Sierra Leone) to forgo applying retributive justice and to instead offer protection and economic status to perpetrators of atrocities? It may be that the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) will play a key role here. The setting up of the Commission recognises the cathartic effect of victims at last knowing the truth and, on the other hand, the need felt by the perpetrators to tell the truth as a therapy against guilt and as an implied act of penitence. The current proposal for a Special Court for Sierra Leone to try war-related crimes raises a number of questions. How will the court relate to the TRC? How fair is the proposed cut-off date beginning at the Abidjan Agreement of November 1996? How is the responsibility of child soldiers to be assessed? Would the establishment of such a court make ex-combatants more reluctant to come forward for fear of prosecution? Is there not a danger that such a court may be perceived as implementing a kind of ‘victor’s justice’?
There is, moreover, an underlying lack of faith in the system of policing and justice in Sierra
Leone.
Outline
UN action has been slow and cumbersome, reflecting the perception of the great powers that the region is not strategic to their interests, and their consequent reluctance to become seriously involved. The UN has backed the Lusaka Peace Agreement, but has not been willing to deploy peace-keepers until convinced the warring parties are serious about peace.
A UN Panel has investigated the illegal exploitation of natural resources in DR Congo and has called for measures against Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (the backers of the rebel movements). The failure to investigate Kinshasa’s allies at the same time exposed the Panel to charges of bias. The UN has now published a report on the activities of Zimbabwe.
UN Security Council resolutions re: DR Congo
1234 9/4/99 Upheld the territorial integrity of DR Congo; deplored the presence of the forces of foreign states; condemned the activities of armed groups, including the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe.
1258 6/8/99 Authorised the deployment of 90 military liaison personnel.
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1291 24/2/00 Authorised the deployment of MONUC force of up to 5,537 military personnel; agreed to send mine experts to gauge the scale of the problem of mines and unexploded ordinance, and to draw up an action plan; reaffirmed the importance of holding an international conference on peace and security in the Great Lakes region.
1304 16/6/00 Demanded the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan forces from DR
Congo and expressed the view that the respective governments should make reparations for the loss of life and property damage inflicted in
DR Congo; called on all parties in DR Congo to participate in the
National Dialogue provided for in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement; reaffirmed the importance of holding an international conference on security and development in the Great Lakes region.
1341 22/2/01 Reiterated the demand for the withdrawal of Ugandan, Rwandan, and all other foreign forces; demanded an end to the use of child soldiers; expressed full support for the work of the expert Panel; hinted at possible measures to be taken against parties that fail to comply fully with the resolution. (France was behind resolution 1341, according to
Global Policy Forum.)
1355 15/6/01 Reiterated previous points (e.g. the sovereignty and territorial integrity of DR Congo, the demand for the withdrawal of foreign forces and an end to illegal exploitation of resources, demand for an end to recruitment of child soldiers); acknowledged that the disarmament and demobilisation of the ex-FAR and the interahamwe is essential to any settlement; stressed that peace in the DRC should not be at the expense of peace in Burundi; MONUC mandate extended to 15/6/02.
The UN Security Council has now expressed support for Phase III (Deployment of UN troops and military observers) of the UN peacekeeping operation in the DR Congo. xxi
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999
The agreement was signed by leaders of the six countries involved in the conflict in DR
Congo (Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda and DR Congo itself) and then, somewhat later, by the rebel groups. The agreement is commendable in that it does give explicit attention to the security concerns of all state signatories. It also has the advantage of being backed by the SADC, OAU and UN, organisations which have regional mandates and hence the potential to address violence in the region as a whole. The agreement provided for: a) the immediate cessation of hostilities, including an end to all acts of violence against the civilian population, b) a Joint Military Commission, composed of two representatives from each belligerent party under a neutral chairman to be appointed by the OAU, to be established within one week of the signing of the agreement. The commission was to oversee implementation of the agreement until the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. It was to be responsible for investigating reported ceasefire violations, working out mechanisms to disarm militia groups, verifying the disarmament of Congolese civilians, and monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces, c) deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to ensure the collection of weapons from
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civilians, to schedule and supervise the withdrawal of all foreign forces (in collaboration with the JMC and the OAU), and to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees, d) the tracking down and disarming of armed groups, the screening of mass killers and war criminals, and the handing over of suspected ‘genocidaires’ to the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania. The armed groups in question were identified as the Rwandan ex-FAR and Interahamwe, the Ugandan Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II), the Former Ugandan National Army
(FUNA), the Burundian Forces de defense pour la democratie (FDD) and Angola’s
UNITA, e) political negotiations between the DR Congo government, the RCD, MLC, and
Congolese civil society, to culminate in the setting up of a new political dispensation in the
DR Congo, including the organisation of democratic elections, and a restructured national army. This implies – without spelling out the point – that there is to be an all-inclusive transition government before elections.
The UN observer mission in the Congo (MONUC) is mandated to develop, and monitor, an action plan for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. This involves, in particular, the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) of members of armed groups, and the withdrawal of foreign forces. It is also to work for the release of prisoners of war, to facilitate humanitarian aid to vulnerable groups, and assess the extent of the problem of mines and unexploded ordnance. However, there is confusion over the key disarmament role. The Lusaka agreement mandated MONUC to ‘track down and disarm armed groups’, but the MONUC mission statement refers only to separating warring groups and supervising voluntary disarmament. Even this more limited role is daunting with only
2,500 troops at its disposal. There are other crucial practical problems. For example, no one seems to know how many Interahamwe fighters there are, and estimates vary from
5,000 to 40,000.
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD)
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue – part of the Lusaka peace process – is being facilitated by the former Botswana president Ketumile Masire. It opened in Addis Ababa in October
2001, but quickly broke up. Following further talks in Abuja, Nigeria, the Dialogue is scheduled to resume in South Africa in January, 2002. However, there is a serious impasse in the process. The Kinshasa government say they will not consider sharing power with the rebels without guarantees of a full withdrawal from DR Congo by Rwandan and Ugandan forces. The latter say they will not withdraw until a transition government is in place.
Moreover the precedents are not good. The national conference convened by the former
Congolese president Mobutu in 1991 became just a talking shop between delegates who preferred ‘per diem’ payments to real political change.
The UN Panel on the Great Lakes region
Much information on conflict and resources in the Great Lakes region has been gathered by the ‘Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo’. This panel was set up by the UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, at the request of the Security Council. Its Report, submitted in April
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2001, recommended that the UN Security Council should:
Declare a temporary embargo on the import and export of coltan, niobium, pyrochlore, cassiterite, timber, gold and diamonds coming from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda
Decide that all member states should freeze the assets of the rebel movements and their leaders, and of companies and individuals who participate in the illegal exploitation
Declare an immediate embargo on the supply of weapons to rebel groups and their state backers
Urge member states to suspend balance of payments support to countries involved in illegal exploitation
Request the World Bank/International Monetary Fund to suspend budget support
Urge member states sharing a common border with DR Congo to halt activities that contribute to the continuation of hostilities
Encourage DR Congo to curb the flow of illicit diamonds by liberalising the diamond trade.
Diamond dealers operating in the occupied territories should stop doing business with the rebel groups and backers, under threat of action by the World Diamond Council. A certification scheme should be introduced
Timber should likewise be certified, and countries with ports and other transit facilities should report to the UN Forum on Forests on the transit of timber
States involved in illegal exploitation should pay reparations to those (individuals, religious groups, companies) whose property, livestock and crops have been damaged, looted or expropriated
The Security Council should set up an international mechanism to investigate and prosecute individuals
The Council should consider setting up a permanent mechanism to investigate the illicit trafficking of natural resources in conflict situations.
The work done by the Panel has been criticised, mainly because of its strong focus on only two of the outside players involved, namely Rwanda and Uganda. One reason offered by the Panel members was the high number of ‘insiders’ living in DR Congo and Europe who were ready to give evidence on the involvement of these two countries. Rather more significant was the Panel’s understanding of its remit to investigate the illegal exploitation of resources. In judging illegality the Panel were guided by four criteria:
Resource exploitation by forces not invited in by the Kinshasa government was held to be illegal. (Conversely exploitation by invited forces was automatically legal.)
Activity violating the regulatory framework of the state as regards resource exploitation was judged illegal
Discrepancies between widely accepted practices in trade and business and actual practice
(for example, military-enforced monopoly, unilateral fixing of prices, confiscation of stocks) were held to indicate illegality
Violation of international law including ‘soft’ law.
The decision about which resources to concentrate on was based on the commercial value of the resources, the interest of the parties in those resources, and the scale of the exploitation. Three categories of product were considered: a) minerals (copper, cobalt, coltan, gold, diamonds, cassiterite), b) products of agriculture, forests and wildlife (tobacco, tea, palm oil, livestock, gorillas, okapis), c) financial products (mainly taxes).
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The focus on just two of the external players, and virtual exoneration of the others, appears unfortunate, leading as it does to the questioning of the Panel’s impartiality and independence. The RCD note that three members of the Panel were from countries with close ties to Paris (Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Senegal). xxii
Adolphe Onusomba of RCD-
Goma draws attention to a 1981 decree, still in force, which entitles Congolese individuals and mining co-operatives to prospect and exploit mineral deposits, under rules distinct from those for formal companies. A 1984 law permits citizens to sell their minerals to anyone they want.
Nevertheless the Report has been accepted by the UN Security Council. Uganda has responded by saying it will establish an independent judicial commission. Burundi has also promised to launch an investigation. Rwanda, however, has rejected the Report, saying it is inaccurate and based on ‘unacceptable sources’, including deserters. (The UN has now carried out a similar investigation into the activities of Zimbabwe.)
Legal processes
The Kinshasa government has brought a case to the International Court in the Hague, demanding reparations from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.
International Criminal Tribunal
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was set up by the UN Security
Council in November 1994 to prosecute serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Rwanda in 1994, and to contribute to the process of national reconciliation in
Rwanda. It is still continuing its work in Arusha, Tanzania.
All Party Parliamentary Group recommendations
A group of MPs from the UK parliament visited DR Congo in August 2001. Their key recommendations were: that DFID and the FCO together draw up a regional strategy for UK policy towards the
Great Lakes, that the UK press for a clarification of the role of MONUC, and that its mission to disarm the warring groups be expanded and accelerated, that the UK seek to ensure that the EU embargo on arms imports into the region is made legally binding, and that a similar embargo is imposed by the UN, that financial support for the office of the ICD facilitator be doubled, that the approach to all parties engaged in illegal exploitation of the natural resources of DR
Congo must be even-handed, that the certification scheme for diamonds (welcomed by the group) be extended to other precious resources, that the UK substantially increase aid to DR Congo in the areas of health, nutrition and education through the UN and NGOs, that bilateral aid be linked to the cessation of illegal exploitation of resources and implementation of the Lusaka Accords.
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Other processes
DR Congo has signed up to the Optional Protocol to the UN Children’s Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. At the invitation of the host nation, Canada, the New African Initiative endorsed by the OAU at its July 2001 summit is be discussed at the G8 meetings in 2002. The UN is scheduled to conduct a session on Africa in September 2002.
The communiqué issued at the end of the fourth Southern African Development Community-
European Union ministerial conference in Gaborone, November 2000, noted that a UN and
OAU conference on peace, security, democracy and development in the Great Lakes region, would, at the appropriate time, provide a suitable framework in which the profound causes of the conflict in the region could be addressed.
The time frame for a return to democracy in Rwanda, originally five years, has been put back to nine years, to July 2003. Since November 2000, the Rwandan government has been engaged in a programme of decentralising institutions and power, with the declared aim of destroying the political machinery that facilitated the genocide. Democracy is also struggling in DR Congo where, on the one hand, the ban on political activity has been lifted while, on the other hand, administrative measures are used to prevent opposition meetings.
Outline
Again, and for the same reasons, UN action has been slow and cumbersome though, in contrast to DR Congo, it has been willing to deploy a large (if sometimes ill-managed) peacekeeping force to back up the Lomé peace process. Mandatory arms embargoes are in force against Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone, but the UN is not known to have investigated any reported violations of these embargoes. Following UNSC resolution 1306, efforts are now under way to establish a chain of legally authorised transactions from the diamond mines in Sierra Leone to the consumer. The ECOWAS moratorium on arms shipments in the region is useful, but insufficient on its own.
UN Security Council resolutions re: Liberia/Sierra Leone
788 19/11/92 Mandatory arms embargo on Liberia.
985 13/4/95 Set up a Committee of the Security Council to monitor the arms embargo and recommend appropriate measures in response to violations.
1132 8/10/97 Mandatory arms embargo on Sierra Leone.
1270 22/10/99 Established UNAMSIL to: co-operate with all parties in the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement, assist with disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration programme, monitor the ceasefire agreement of 18/5/99, support the election process.
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1306 5/7/00 Banned trading in diamonds from the rebel-held areas of Sierra Leone.
1313 4/8/00 Strengthened the UNAMSIL mandate, and authorised a more robust response to RUF attacks.
1315 14/8/00 Requested the UN Secretary-General to negotiate with the Sierra
Leone government an agreement to create an independent special court to try those accused of war crimes and/or crimes against humanity.
1343 7/3/01 Terminated the 1992 arms embargo against Liberia and dissolved the sanctions committee; demanded that Liberia cease military and financial aid to the RUF and stop importing Sierra Leone rough diamonds without government certificate of origin; imposed a new arms embargo, and a ban on all diamonds coming out of Liberia; imposed a travel ban on senior members of the Liberian government and military; called on the international community to support the ECOWAS moratorium on the trade in small arms; asked the UN Secretary-General to set up a
Panel of Experts to monitor Liberian compliance and to investigate the link between the exploitation of natural resources and the fuelling of conflict in the region.
1346 30/3/01 Authorised increase in UNAMSIL troop levels from 10,500 to
17,500; noted with displeasure that the ceasefire signed in Abuja in
November 2000 had still not been fully implemented.
1370 18/9/01 Extended the UNAMSIL mandate to 31/3/02; urged that all human rights monitoring positions within UNAMSIL be filled; called upon
RUF to stop trying to keep the military option open; encouraged
UNAMSIL to continue helping with the return of refugees; urged donors to support the disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration programme; urged the Sierra Leone government to expedite the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (required by the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999), and the Special Court to try those accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
A UN Panel has now recommended extending the sanctions against Liberia to include timber, and placing revenues from the shipping registry in an escrow account. xxiii
(The registry is said to net $15 to $20 million a year for the Taylor regime.) However, the effectiveness of sanctions depends very much on monitoring. The UN is not known to have investigated any reported violation of the arms embargoes against Liberia and Sierra Leone.
The Lomé Peace process
Under Lomé a number of commissions and committees were set up, including: a) the Joint Implementation Committee, chaired by ECOWAS, and including members of the CCP (see below), regional diplomatic representatives, and officials of the Lomé ‘moral guarantors’ (Togo, UN, OAU, Commonwealth), b) the Joint Monitoring Commission, c) the Commission for Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction and
Development (CMRRD); (the Kabbah government took a big risk in conceding the
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chairmanship of this commission to Sankoh – however, he ignored his appointment and continued his own mining activities), d) the Human Rights Commission, e) a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), passed into law in March 2000; the legislation gave the TRC the overall objectives of creating an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé
Peace Agreement, f) the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR); the commission has been hindered by shortfalls in international funding, by Sankoh’s obstruction, and by a system of encampment of fighters, which served to facilitate negative peer pressure and a mob mentality, g) the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders (never set up by the government) might have supplied a dispute resolution mechanism, h) the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP), to monitor the work of the other commissions and, somehow, ensure they had the resources they needed.
The certification of diamonds
There have been two strands to action in Sierra Leone. First, in July 2001, the Sierra Leone government, the RUF and the UN agreed to a ban on diamond mining in the eastern Kono district. UN peacekeeping troops have been deployed in some diamond-producing areas under RUF control (yet mining continues). Secondly, under UN Security Council resolution
1306, all diamonds exported from Sierra Leone, from October 2000 onwards, must be accompanied by a Certificate of Origin. The aim is to ensure that only legally mined diamonds are exported. ‘Legally mined’ means that they come from areas under government control, and are the product of a chain of legally authorised transactions, right through from use of land, to permission to mine, to purchase by authorised dealers and agents, and export by licensed exporters. The NGO ‘Global Witness’ was mandated by the Kimberley Process to review the effectiveness of the new system and make recommendations. It reported back in April 2001. The overall conclusion was that the system was working, but that there were some significant problems. It called for a ‘Fully
Integrated Certification System’ (FICS). Among the needs highlighted are: capacity building and co-ordination between the Ministry of Mineral Resources (MMR), the
Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), the Mines Monitoring Officers (MMOs), the national police, and the Bank of Sierra Leone, the establishment of a co-ordinated intelligence network, and the exchange of information, the regular publication of data (e.g. export data), implementation of anti-corruption programmes, the creation of an independent panel of experts to help in the identification of suspect stones, the clarification of export licensing procedures, for example, the MMR needs to clarify its position on the un-receipted $400 ‘war effort tax’ that many diamond dealers and exporters claim they are having to pay.
Global Witness also note that since October 2000, Belgium, the UK, the USA and Israel have received exports of diamonds from Sierra Leone under the certification system, but that under a strict interpretation of UNSC resolution 1306, only Belgium is operating
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appropriately. At the time of the report only Antwerp had the required electronic link with the GGDO database in Freetown. Global Witness urge that new countries wishing to join the system must become part of the electronic loop. Importing countries need to be more proactive, for example, operating a system of automatic confirmation of receipt of goods, and increasing the number of diamond experts to inspect parcels. (A government certification system like that in Sierra Leone was introduced in Guinea from June 2001.)
The ECOWAS Moratorium on arms shipments
In October 1998, the leaders of the sixteen member states of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) agreed a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and
Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa. The moratorium came into force on
1/11/98 for a renewable period of three years. An operational structure called the
Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development in West Africa
(PCASED) is designed to oversee the moratorium. It was to establish a database and a sub-regional register of light weapons, and offer training programmes in security maintenance and border controls. PCASED is financed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and supported by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the UN Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). PCASED was to run for an initial five-year period, comprising the three years of the moratorium and an additional two years to consolidate the post-moratorium regime.
Other processes
Sierra Leone has signed up to the Optional Protocol to the UN Children’s Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict, and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. Guinea has likewise signed up to the Rome Statute and to the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. In a significant move to end impunity, the
UN Security Council resolved to establish a Special Court for Sierra Leone. As mentioned in the Great Lakes section, the New African Initiative of the OAU is be discussed at the
2002 G8 meetings, and the UN is scheduled to conduct a session on Africa in September
2002.
Outline
Adverse publicity about ‘blood diamonds’, and the prospect of a crippling consumer boycott has forced a reluctant diamond industry to initiate the ‘Kimberley process’, exploring ways of identifying and certifying diamonds. The international community has so far failed to stem the flow of weapons to war-torn regions of the world. At the July 2001
UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, US-led opposition confined agreement to a few technical measures. The EU Code of conduct on arms exports suffers from the failure to address arms brokering and the monitoring of end use.
‘Conflict’ diamonds
NGOs began alerting the world to the issue of ‘conflict’ or ‘blood diamonds’ in December
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1998, and began calling for action. The mining houses tried to argue that it can never be practical or affordable to mark the 860 million stones polished each year. xxiv
However, adverse publicity, and the prospect of a crippling consumer boycott has forced the diamond industry itself to explore ways of identifying and certifying diamonds. In May 2000 the
South African government initiated the so-called ‘Kimberley process’. The diamond industry then set up the World Diamond Council and began working with governments as part of the process. Participants at the Kimberley Process meetings in Pretoria, in
September 2000, drew up plans for an international certification scheme. At the fourth
Southern African Development Community-European Union ministerial conference in
Gaborone, November 2000, delegates agreed to participate positively in designing such a scheme. Then at the UN General Assembly in December 2000, governments committed themselves to greater vigour in establishing adequate controls and procedures. The seventh meeting of the Kimberley Process took place in London in September 2001, and agreed minimum acceptable standards to be presented to the UN, with a view to having the certification scheme fully operational by the end of 2002. The agreed standards include: the use of forgery-resistant certificates and tamper-proof containers for shipments of rough diamonds; internal controls and procedures which provide credible assurance that conflict diamonds do not enter the legal market; a certification process for all exports of rough diamonds; effective enforcement of the provisions of the certification scheme. The UN has now put off a decision until March 2002, citing ‘administrative problems’, and another
Kimberley Process meeting has been scheduled to take place in Canada. Furthermore, the
US administration is now obstructing the agreement, claiming that it would shut out from the diamond trade nations that do not sign up to the principles, and could lead to a challenge under world trade laws. It should also be noted that, in the view of the industry itself, it will not be possible to end the trade in conflict diamonds with certificates alone. NGOs have their own doubts, stating in a September 2001 briefing paper: ‘ Self-regulation will not work . Too many governments, companies and individuals have already proven themselves unworthy of trust’ (their italics).
Is certification practical? It may not be easy, but it could become easier with the development of affordable identification technology, such as microtabs or invisible barcodes.
(The Royal Canadian Mounted Police are among groups investigating diamond
‘fingerprinting’ technology.) In the meantime, the potential difficulties in applying any agreed technology are reduced by the fact that the bulk of the rough diamond trade is centralised in only two organizations and two locations, the HRD in Antwerp and De Beers’ Central
Selling Organisation in London.
Action on diamonds in the USA
Action is also under way in the USA. Supporters of the Clean Diamonds Trade Act and its
Senate companion bill addressed the House Trade subcommittee in October 2001. Cecilia
Gardner, executive director of the Jewellers Vigilance Committee (JVC) and general counsel of the World Diamond Council (WDC), together with Matthew Runci, president and CEO of Jewellers of America (JA) and executive director of the WDC, both spoke to members of the subcommittee – part of the House Ways and Means Committee. The bill pending in the House (HR 2722) and its Senate companion bill (S 1084) would bar the importation of conflict diamonds to the US and put in place a tracking system to keep them
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out of the global supply chain.
NGO campaign on diamonds
A coalition of NGOs is running a petition calling for decisive government and industry action to agree minimum international standards, and make provision for international scrutiny. A consumer boycott of diamond jewellery is still a possibility. Campaigners have held back so far, realising that the legitimate trade would be harmed too. 30 per cent of Botswana’s
GDP, for example, is accounted for by diamond exports, and 800,000 people are employed in the diamond industry in Bombay. xxv
) At one stage it was reported that
‘militant United States groups are just itching to picket the local jeweller’s shop … a network of 38,000 churches had to be persuaded not to start discouraging engaged couples from buying diamond rings’. xxvi
Such a boycott would have to focus on the USA which accounts for almost half the $55 billion of diamond jewellery sold worldwide each year.
Moves to control the proliferation of weapons
The international community is yet to take any serious action against uncontrolled arms brokering, or against the ‘offshore’ havens that facilitate the organisation of such commerce.
The only current protocol to cover the trade of small arms is the UN Convention Against
Transnational Crime, but this does not cover arms transfers between governments. The UN
Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, July 9-
20, 2001, was supposedly aiming for:
A legally binding UN resolution or treaty on the export of small arms
Proper regulation of arms sales to stem the flow of illegal weapons
Incentives to encourage the destruction of stockpiles
An internationally recognised system for marking weapons so they can be traced back.
The Bush administration in the USA, anxious not to offend the powerful gun lobby, blocked the main proposals. The USA had plenty of allies in Africa (which sensed a touch of neoimperialism in the EU’s backing for the proposals), Latin America (where a number of governments have security problems), as well as Russia and China. The conference agreed only a weak ‘Programme for Action’ (technical ‘fixes’, such as marking weapons and improving border policing), and it used equivocal language, such as that binding the signatories not to action, but to ‘consider taking action where appropriate’. The Programme is in any case non-binding. Probably, the positive approach is to take the conference as the beginning of action, not the end. A review conference is scheduled for 2006.
The May 1998 EU Code of conduct on arms exports would seem to be applicable. Before issuing arms export licences, EU members are meant to take into account such factors as the status of human rights in the recipient country, regional security, and the impact of arms purchases on sustainable development. However, there are a number of significant shortcomings in the Code, for example the failure to address arms brokering, and the monitoring of end use. In July 2001, the Belgian Chamber of Deputies passed legislation requiring arms dealers to register.
At the fourth Southern African Development Community-European Union ministerial conference in Gaborone, November 2000, both groups committed themselves to control the
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manufacture, use, stockpiling and transfer of small arms and light weapons.
Great Lakes Region
The UK All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on the Great Lakes includes among its aims the wish to be a campaigning forum for NGOs and others to network more effectively. The visit to DR Congo by four MPs from the group, in August 2001, was facilitated by Oxfam,
Christian Aid, Save the Children Fund, International Alert and Tearfund.
Human Rights Watch has put forward the following recommendations re: the conflict in DR
Congo:
Measures to document crimes against humanity should be supported
The Kinshasa government should implement promised reforms of the civilian and military judicial systems
Civil society must be allowed to function
There must be unfettered access for humanitarian assistance
The recruitment of child soldiers should be ended
Human rights monitors should be deployed in all locations where UN military observers are present.
Sierra Leone peace process
Among participants at a Conciliation Resources seminar on the Sierra Leone peace process
(September 2000), were CARE UK, International Alert, the Parliamentary Human Rights
Group, Responding to Conflict, Link Africa, the British Red Cross, the Centre for
Democracy and Development, Children's Relief Trust, Christian Aid.
Civil society initiatives in Sierra Leone (1994 to present)
In mid-1994, the Sierra Leone Association of University Women (SLAUW) proposed that women’s groups meet regularly for networking, information sharing and collective action on issues of common concern. The Women’s Association for National Development
(WAND), SLAUW, the National Organisation for Women (NOW), the Young Women’s
Christian Association (YWCA) and other Christian women's groups, together with Muslim women’s associations were among the groups that linked up in ‘The Women’s Forum’.
They began networking with the Women’s Wing of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, and the newly formed National Displaced Women’s Organisation. Then the Sierra Leone
Women’s Movement for Peace (SLWMP) was formed and joined the Forum, together with a smaller body, WOMEN, seeking to promote a democratic culture and active participation of women in politics and governance. The women’s peace campaign did put the issue in the public domain in a non-partisan and non-confrontational manner. However, they were largely ignored both by government and by the RUF, and it is clear that thirty years of marginalisation have left women lacking in confidence. Now, as part of a three-year programme (entitled the Community Programmes Peace Initiative), Alliances for Africa
(AfA) and the Federation of African Women Peace Networks (FERFAP) are holding a training event in December 2001. The overall aim of the CPPI is ‘to respond to the urgent
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need for creative and participatory approaches to the resolution of intra-state conflict by promoting respect for human rights, governance and citizen-based third party mediation’.
The training aims to enable and strengthen the capacity of women’s organisations to provide and contribute to the broader goal of empowering Sierra Leonean women to exercise their rights while building the capacity of women’s groups to document, promote and protect these rights in a post-conflict Sierra Leone. It was hoped that the event would provide the opportunity for sub-regional and international advocacy and networking on lessons learned and to voice Sierra Leonean women’s concerns.
In early 1995, some sixty non-governmental and civil society groups came together to form the short-lived National Co-ordinating Committee for Peace. Participating bodies included the Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace (SLWMP), the Council of Churches in
Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone Labour Congress and the Sierra Leone Teachers’ Union.
Among non-government players, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) stands out as the most highly visible and effective bridge builder between the warring factions. The IRCSL was instrumental in initiating dialogue between the government side and the RUF and Charles Taylor of Liberia. As official observers at the Lomé talks, they helped to facilitate dialogue and to mediate. The formation of the Council was inspired by religious beliefs in the promotion of social justice, by the example of the Inter-Religious
Council in Liberia (which was very vocal against human rights abuses during and after
Liberia’s civil war), and by calls from their membership to be more proactive in the peace process. Muslim members include the Supreme Islamic Council, the Sierra Leone Muslim
Congress, the Federation of Muslim Women Associations in Sierra Leone, the Council of
Imams, and the Sierra Leone Islamic Missionary Union. Christian members include the
Roman Catholic Church, the Pentecostal Churches Council and the Council of Churches in
Sierra Leone (an umbrella for eighteen Protestant denominations). Perhaps the greatest impact of the Council’s involvement in the Lomé process was in helping to build confidence between the rebels and civil society (a trust heavily shaken, however, by the return to military confrontation in May 2000).
Among NGOs tackling local issues are the Bo Peace and Reconciliation Movement, the
Campaign for Peace in Bo, the Organisation for Peace Reconciliation and Development
(OPARD) based in Mile 91. Local NGO activity on diamonds and other minerals in Sierra
Leone is co-ordinated by the Network Movement for Justice and Development (NJMD), with operational responsibility taken by the newly created Civil Society Movement of Sierra
Leone (CSM-SL).
A number of factors have hindered the effectiveness of civil society organisations: a lack of consistent support from the international community; negotiations held outside Sierra Leone made civil society input problematic; too much energy has been concentrated on personal and organisational survival.
‘Conflict’ diamonds
Among signatories of a September 2001 briefing paper on conflict diamonds were the following: ACORD, ActionAid, Africa Faith and Justice Network (USA), Alliances for
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Africa, Amnesty International Belgium (Flemish Branch), Amnesty International USA,
Association for Rural Development (Sierra Leone), Campaign Against the Arms Trade,
Christian Aid, Council of Churches in Sierra Leone, Dapadu (Burundi), Evangelical
Fellowship of Sierra Leone, Global Witness, Institute for Development Research (Oxford
Centre for Mission Studies, UK), Institute of Development Studies (University of Sussex),
Integrated Social Development Centre (Ghana), Jong Agalev (Belgium), NGOs and Peace
Building Resource Centre (Liberia), Oxfam, Partnership Africa Canada, Saferworld,
SECADOS (Guinea Conakry), US Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds, Vétérinaires
Sans Frontières-Dierenartsen zonder Grenzen (Belgium), World Vision USA, World Vision
Canada.
Arms trade controls
Among the NGOs that backed a ‘Humanitarian Statement of Concern’ to the UN
Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects’, 9-20
July 2001, were: ActionAid, African Environmental and Human Development Agency
(Nigeria), Amnesty International, CARE International, Centre for Democratic
Empowerment (Liberia), Human Rights Watch, Global Policy Forum, Injury Control Centre
(Uganda), Oxfam International, Save the Children, World Vision International.
Conclusions: key northern NGO allies re: conflict and resources (details, Appendix 4)
ACORD Global Policy Forum
ActionAid
Action for Southern Africa
Essential Information
Global Witness
Alliances for Africa
Amnesty International
CAFOD
CIIR
Human Rights Watch
Humanitarian Coalition on Small Arms
International Action Network on Small Arms
International Alert
Christian Aid
Conciliation Resources
CREATE
International Crisis Group
Oxfam
Conflict, Development and Peace Partnership Africa-Canada
Network (CODEP) Save the Children Fund
World Vision
This last section of the paper puts forward some questions to ponder about international involvement (often negative, but still vital) in Africa. It asks how churches and parachurch organisations might respond in fragile, post-conflict situations, and concludes with some policy recommendations.
Outline
Because injustice has been allowed to fester for too long the states both of central and of
West Africa are now politically and economically very fragile. The developed world bears considerable
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responsibility for this situation, because of the exploitation, and the unjust structures left behind, from the colonial and Cold War eras. While acknowledging that international intervention is ‘ambiguous’ – it may distort both economy and society, and sideline the government – it is none the less essential. This is not a question of altruism, but of enlightened self-interest, for injustice, unaddressed, may rebound on the heads of those who stand aside.
International ‘disengagement’
From one perspective there has been too much outside involvement in African affairs. From another perspective there has been too little. We will start with the second point, which can be readily illustrated from current events.
A recent article in the UK press xxvii
began thus: ‘By now we are all familiar with the day when the world changed and unspeakable acts of terror took the lives of more than 5,000 civilians. I am referring, of course, to January 6 1999, when rebel gunmen killed, maimed and raped their way across Freetown, Sierra Leone’s capital.’ The writer, David Keen of the London School of Economics, is of course drawing attention to the world’s neglect of
Africa compared with its reaction to the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.
The All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes (of the UK parliament) highlights another example: ‘Given the vast size of DRC, if the UN deployed the same density of troops-to-land as it did in Kosovo, it would require 10 million peacekeepers! Whilst this is wildly unrealistic, so too is the proposed deployment of 5,000 UN soldiers.’ xxviii
The
Western powers have been reluctant to get directly involved, and have preferred to act vicariously through bodies such as ECOMOG, or through African armies in UN peacekeeping operations. (One unfortunate consequence of this policy is that it has facilitated the trend to military commercialism. For example, the ECOMOG operations in
West Africa introduced Nigerian troops to diamond-rich Sierra Leone.) Yet it is the
Western powers that have the resources in terms of highly trained soldiers, and modern equipment. They are prepared to use them when their own interests are clearly threatened – in Europe’s ‘back door’ in the Balkans, for example. Should they perhaps be prepared to commit their own military personnel to upholding peace and lawful government in Africa?
There would have to be changes in military doctrine, and the training that stems from it.
Changes in intelligence gathering would be needed, and the tracking of genocide indicators, such as hate media, and the stockpiling of small arms. There would also i
‘Masters of war’, Africa Confidential , Vol 41, No 16, 4/8/00 ii
Christine Gordon, ‘Rebels’ best friend’, BBC Focus on Africa magazine, October-December 1999. iii
Daily Telegraph 20/5/01 iv
New African June 2001 v
Report, para 211 vi
Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, ‘War to peace: dilemmas of multilateral intervention in civil wars’, African
Security Review Vol 9, No 3, 2000 vii
New African June 2001
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viii
See Global Policy Forum paper, ‘Uganda, Sanctions and Congo-K: Who is Who in Uganda mining’,
5/6/01 ix
‘Masters of war’, Africa Confidential , Vol 41, No 16, 4/8/00 x
Guardian , 7/6/00 xi
‘The deadly scramble for diamonds in Africa’ Financial Times 10/7/00 xii
Report, para 185 xiii
‘Conflict, Security and Development Group Bulletin’, no.11, May-June 2001 xiv
Chris Dietrich, ‘The commercilaisation of military deployment in Africa’ (Institute for Security Studies paper, July 2001). xv
Report, para 206 xvi
Editor, Hannah Beardon Report on the CODEP Conference 18-20/6/01. xvii
SIPRI Yearbook 2000, p.75. xviii
Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) of the UN, 26/10/01 xix
Guardian , 1/11/01 xx
Gareth Evans, ‘Get moving now to prevent genocide in Burundi’, International Herald Tribune
22/8/01 xxi
IRIN, 26/10/01 xxii
Africa Confidential 4/5/01 xxiii
Rapaport, 29/10/01 xxiv
Financial Times 12/7/00 xxv
Guardian , 7/6/00 xxvi
Independent , 24/7/00 xxvii
David Keen, ‘Blair’s good guys in Sierra Leone, Guardian 7/11/01 xxviii
‘Report of the All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes and Genocide Prevention’, 2001, p.3
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have to be a public debate in the UK and other Western countries, about the definition of national interests, the nature of state sovereignty, and the role of human rights in foreign policy. Would the Western public be prepared to see their armed forces risked in conflict prevention in Africa?
Exploitative involvement
Destructive outside involvement in Africa has its roots in the colonial era, and the
Cold War period that followed. Some of the states that were carved out by the colonial powers were unnatural, unbalanced and unwieldy. Boundaries were cut through the territories of single ethnic groups, or different groups with no common culture or history were lumped together. As African countries won independence in the 1960s, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed, it was agreed that because there were so many potential problems they should be shelved indefinitely, with colonial boundaries left as non-negotiable. Yet should unnatural boundaries be sacrosanct? The question is, admittedly, very complex. What is the truth about the origins of the people groups of Rwanda? What is the truth about the eastern boundary of the Congo? It has been noted recently that Rwanda has achieved de facto reunification with territory it once ruled, and still claims. i
Is it right that it should rule this territory again, or were the pre-colonial boundaries illegitimately
‘rounded out’ when Tutsi power was at its height? Should the sprawling state of DR
Congo become a federation? Many Congolese seem to fear that the UN has partition in mind, and they strongly oppose the idea. ii
Yet the eastern DR Congo has much closer economic links with Rwanda and Burundi than it does with Kinshasa. If it is felt that boundaries should now be left as they are then surely DR Congo must be encouraged to establish a common citizenship and rights for all Congolese (at least for all those settled in the Congo before 1960).
One of the most destructive aspects of outside meddling in Africa is the supply of arms. A paper from the Arms Trade Resource Centre in the USA highlights US involvement in supplying the means to make war in Africa. During the Cold War
(1950-89) the USA supplied $1.5 billion of weapons to Africa, and a further $227 million of weapons between 1991 and 1998. It helped to keep Mobutu in power with
$300 million in weapons, and $100 million in military training. The USA has supplied almost all the national armies participating in the war in DR Congo, and troops from both sides have received training under the Pentagon’s Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) programme. It is small wonder that Dr Dennis Bright of the Sierra Leone Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) should condemn the West’s laissez-faire attitude to arms and drugs. ‘We seem to have internalised the mass production and distribution of small arms and drugs as one of those unavoidable vices of our civilisation that are of considerable importance to our economies and therefore our survival. But this was the way slavery was considered normal in those days when not a single barrel of sugar came to Europe that was not tainted with the blood of Africans.’ iii
Another unhelpful consequence of colonial and Cold War rivalries is that they still influence both Western and former Eastern-bloc policy- makers. France’s backing for the former Hutu regime in Rwanda against the English-speaking RPF is one example.
Another is France’s suspicion of ECOWAS as Nigerian- (and therefore Englishspeaking) dominated. Russia is engaging in increasingly aggressive commercial operations in the continent. The USA is uneasy about the North Korean presence in
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DR Congo, and its interest in the uranium.
Much of the undue interest in Africa today amounts to economics-without-ethics.
France needs Liberian timber, seemingly at any price. The USA needs Angolan oil (at any price). The world in general needs the Congo’s coltan for its capacitators, its mobile phones, its jet engines and all the rest. Companies, great and small, are very much part of this picture. It has been noted that in the face of NGO activism, growing public awareness, and the threat of consumer boycotts, major companies may step back from direct involvement in resource exploitation. For example, in the oil industry smaller companies have emerged on the scene. They are used to operating under difficult security circumstances. They may do this in conjunction with foreign mercenary groups, although because such groups may attract unwelcome publicity, in some countries the regular armed forces are now becoming more enterprising in the market for security services. The smaller companies provide links between the local
élite, the major oil companies, weapons producers and exporters, and the formal financial sector.
Fragility
The international community cannot afford to go on taking what it wants from Africa, and leaving such serious problems to fester. The high cost of failing to address injustice in the Middle East, and likewise failing to confront oppression and poverty in Afghanistan, were suddenly and brutally brought home to the West on September
11 th
2001. Injustice, oppression and poverty in Africa need attention as well. Too many problems have been left to fester for too long. The present war in DR Congo is really part two of the 1996/97 war. That war was, in part, a consequence of the
Rwandan genocide and the resulting destabilisation of the border area. (It was also partly the consequence of long-standing injustice in DR Congo where not everyone has enjoyed full citizenship rights.) The Rwandan genocide was the culmination of long-standing injustices in Rwandan society: the exclusion of the Tutsi from political power 1960-94, preceding by the holding of the Hutu in second-class status for many generations before that. In the Mano River region, the divide between the urban élites in Freetown and Monrovia on the one hand, and the neglected hinterlands on the other, goes right back to the early 19 th
century.
The political and military situation in the Great Lakes region is extremely fragile.
The Kinshasa government is heavily dependent on Zimbabwean troops. What would happen if the Mugabe regime and/or the Zimbabwean economy suddenly collapsed?
The RPF government in Rwanda is very much a minority regime. Is it not a possibility tha t at some point it might be overthrown by the sheer weight of Hutu numbers? Neighbouring Burundi shares the same ethnic mix as Rwanda, and teeters on the brink of a Rwandan-style genocide. In DR Congo there is a growing hostility towards ethnic groups in the east of the country that are identified with Rwanda and
Uganda (seen as hostile occupying forces by many Congolese iv
). Inter-ethnic fighting is a real danger, for example the Hema-Lendu conflict in the Ituri region which broke out in June 1999 in a dispute over land rights.
Turning to West Africa, urgent attention should be given to the study of natural resource conflicts in the making. In many developing societies, the collapse of the state has been preceded by decades of economic and political abuse of naturalresource wealth. We have seen something of the outcome and should now examine
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resource wars in states that still have a semblance of stability, but which have structures that are gradually being eroded through resource mismanagement. v
There are other countries in the West African sub-region that manifest the same political and socio-economic problems that led to the Sierra Leone war.
Paul Collier of the Centre for the study of African Economics, University of Oxford, makes some interesting points, arising from his statistical analysis of conflict: a) the statistical success rate for rebellions (that is, a rebel group taking over government) is just 18 per cent, and the social and human cost is disproportionate to what they achieve, b) factors that make conflict more likely include dependence on primary commodity exports, dominance by one major ethnic group, the presence of diasporas in rich countries, the existence of geographically remote areas (mountain or forest), and the presence of a widely dispersed population, c) factors that render conflict less likely include ethnic and religious diversity, and proportional representation, d) there is a higher chance of restoring peace in the first two years of a conflict, and almost none for the next two years; and there is a high risk of recurring conflict in the first five years following a peace agreement (the factors that caused the conflict will be there still), e) aid appears to be more effective pre-conflict than post-conflict, f) the resources needed by rebel groups must come from hostile neighbours, from superpowers, from diasporas, or from commodities, g) far from ethnic hatred causing conflict, ethnic hatred is deliberately generated during conflict.
The ‘ambiguity’ of foreign intervention
Speaking at a conference in London in June 2001, Dennis Bright of the CCP noted:
‘For those who have not been to Freetown lately you need to see the impressive display of hundreds of white, four-wheel drive vehicles in the parking lot at Mammy
Yoko, the UNAMSIL headquarters, the helicopters that seem to be landing and taking off all the time at the specially built heliports, in fact, the whole equipment and logistical paraphernalia; people also look at the volume of dollars changed at the black market, the mountains of stuff packed in trolleys at the supermarkets and of course the bottles of beer at the clubs and beach bars.’ vi
The UN presence has created jobs, especially at the junior level of secretaries, drivers, security guards, electricians, plumbers and so on, but there are also serious socio-economic implications. The level of prostitution has risen sharply while the age of the
‘Kolonkos’, as young prostitutes (some schoolgirls) are nicknamed, has been falling to alarmingly low levels. State power is being eroded by a powerful international operation that is paying the piper and calling the tune. (Bright notes a similar trend at the level of NGO activities.)
Too often the international community has seemed to be in such haste to see agreements forged (or imposed) that it has not encouraged in-depth and broad-based consultations that might have addressed root causes of war. Furthermore they have at times been perceived as providing either deliberate or de facto partisan support to factions in a conflict. The role of the UK in Sierra Leone is a case in point. The question arises, is the UK supporting the principles of constitutional order and democratisation, or supporting a specific government? The current objective is to
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train 1,000 troops every six weeks, until the army is large enough to defeat the RUF.
Yet most of the personnel being trained are from the old Sierra Leone Army (SLA), and this means that other fighters, particularly the Kamajor civil defence forces, are not being integrated into the national army. It will be difficult to restore the government’s authority in enforcing the rule of law if there are multiple armed forces in the country. Furthermore, elements in the SLA have supported military coups in the past and have been implicated in atrocities. Can these fighters be sufficiently transformed by a short training course so that the government and population can rely on their professionalism and loyalty? Now, with so much remaining to be done before security and confidence are truly restored, the UK is scaling down its involvement in order to respond to calls from other trouble spots in the world.
For all the ambiguity of international involvement, the international community cannot stand aside. This is not merely a matter of good neighbourliness, but rather of enlightened self- interest. If the response to conflict and looming conflict is to be as slow in future as it has been in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and DR Congo, the African continent will continue to be unstable, and will in time endanger the stability of other parts of the world.
Outline
Provided their own house is in order, then surely there must be a key role for the churches. At the core of the biblical message is teaching on the high worth of all human beings, the vileness of sin, redemption through the Cross. It is for the churches, before all, to support victims, confront perpetrators, model forgiveness and the foregoing of rights, and face gender issues. Churches in countries colluding in the exploitation of Africa’s conflicts should also be involved.
Putting the house in order
The churches in Rwanda need to ask themselves how far they bear responsibility for what has happened in the country. Is it true that they condoned the colonial favouritism of the Tutsi? What were the consequences of excluding Hutu from higher education other than training for the priesthood? Did this produce a pro-Hutu church in the 1970s and 1980s, a church that failed to keep government at arm’s length? Did church leaders fail to confront ethnically-based injustice, in the church and in society in general? Did rank and file Christians focus too much on their own spiritual life, and fail to get involved with the problems and the structural sin of their society?
What does the church need to do by way of acknowledging and redeeming past failure? And then, what of the churches in Burundi and DR Congo? Are there any lessons they need to learn from their neighbour? What failures do the churches of
Sierra Leone and Liberia need to confront? Have they condoned the divide between urban élite and neglected hinterland? Have they been identified with the powerful and the comfortable?
Work with victims and perpetrators
Some terrible atrocities have been committed during the wars in the Great Lakes and
Mano River regions. These have included amputations (in Sierra Leone, for example), the use of rape as a terror tactic, and abducting children into armed groups and forcing them to carry out attacks on their own communities, sometimes even on
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their own families. These were not blind deeds carried out in the heat of battle, but calculated attempts to undermine basic human values. The final outcome may be despair and nihilism. The churches teach both the inestimable value of human beings made in the image of God, and the unimaginable depths of human sin. They know that there is no act, no matter how terrible, that every man or woman might not commit in certain circumstances. Yet the churches also proclaim that God makes peace (wholeness, reconciliation) by the blood of the Cross. Surely there is a key role for the churches, in supporting victims, in confronting perpetrators, in reaching out to those (such as ex-child soldiers) who are both victims and perpetrators, in bringing about forgiveness and reconciliation.
Input into the political debate
The churches should take every opportunity to participate in debates on post-war political structures. (They must, however, balance engagement with detachment, and beware of being co-opted by narrow political interests.) There is an urgent need to examine biblical teaching on the role of government, and the nature of legitimate government. For example, how is justice to be guarded when democracy hands power to a majority ethnic group, and threatens the minority with marginalisation and exclusion? Biblical teaching would seem to point towards everyone having a stake in the resources of the community, towards local accountability, and a focus on the rights that each group does not have. For example, no ethnic group has the right to dominate, no one has the right to lead (though any one may do so).
War and gender
The issue of war and gender is another area where the churches should have something to say. Arguably women (and children) have been the primary victims of the wars in the two regions. Yet men have suffered too, as their traditional role in protecting and providing for their families has been undermined, first by the wars, then by the actions of relief agencies which have (for good reasons) tended to concentrate on women. Surely there is a need for the churches to explore these gender issues, to teach and demonstrate the equal worth of men and women before
God and their different, though complementary, roles.
Relations with international civil society
Civil society in one country cannot address the problems of their community and nation on their own. Churches in the Great Lakes and Mano River regions, need to form alliances with churches and other organisations in neighbouring countries and in the West especially in countries that bear particular responsibilities, such as France,
Belgium and the USA.
Among other matters that Western churches and parachurch organisations need to take up, with governments and with companies, and in alliance with partners in
Africa, is responsibility – responsibility for the past, and responsibility for others in need. Action on matters of injustice and deprivation should not be seen as the gracious dispensing of undeserved favour, but as a matter of common justice. This is firstly because the former colonial powers, the UK obviously among them, bear at least partial responsibility for the ‘built- in’ instability they left behind in Africa.
Secondly the biblical teaching is that, as individuals and nations, we are responsible for one another. Mankind is his brother’s keeper (the implied answer to the question raised in Genesis 4:9).
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Outline
International help is needed in strengthening fragile peace processes and averting threatened new conflicts. This help should include addressing the international dimensions of conflicts, investigating unlawful resource exploitation and recovering the proceeds, increasing investment and development aid, offering fairer terms of trade, and tempering the ‘adversarial’ aspects of globalisation. Conflict-affected countries must themselves address social injustice. The devolution of political and economic power, would seem to be the best way forward.
General principles
Ceasefires and peace agreements, disarmament and the reintegration of former rebels, new constitutions and democratic elections, will all be to no avail if the underlying problems of economic and social deprivation are not tackled.
Many policy areas will have to be tackled simultaneously, for example, in eastern DR
Congo questions of security, the investigation of war crimes, disarmament and the reintegration of insurgent groups, have to be dealt with as a whole.
Yet the international community must not demand too much change all at once. Too often post-conflict countries have been expected to undertake several major transitions at the same time: from war to peace, from authoritarianism to democracy, from command economies to free markets.
If genuine peace and security are ever to be restored the international community will have to ‘be in for the long haul’ (contrast the UK’s hasty and ill-considered military re-training programme in Sierra Leone).
The synergy between military commercialism, adversarial market capitalism, and international crime, needs to be studied and addressed, for example, through measures to discourage commercial enterprise as a way of subsidising the defence budget, curbing de-stabilising short-term capital flows and hostile international takeover bids.
Action at the international level
Stability in the two regions, and the justice that sustains it, will not be achieved without the involvement of the international community.
Political and military settlement
The conflicts discussed in this paper have spread across borders, and have become regional conflicts. All the states that have become involved will have to participate in the peace process, and their concerns will have to be addressed. The conflict in eastern DR Congo will not be resolved unless the security concerns of Angola,
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda are addressed. And because these concerns have become inter- linked they will have to be addressed simultaneously. The problems of
Sierra Leone cannot be settled without the involvement of Liberia and Guinea in the peace-making. This will mean international mediation, and very likely some international arm- twisting.
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Those who breach international arms embargoes, or help others to do so, should be vigorously pursued and punished. Disarmament and rehabilitation programmes must be adequately funded, and international help will be needed. Weapons should not simply be decommissioned, but actually destroyed, otherwise there is a danger of them being recycled to fuel another conflict.
There is an urgent need for serious work on identifying situations of injustice and potential conflict, and standing with failing states as they address their problems.
Specific policy proposals: a) the 2006 arms trade review conference (under the UN) should be brought forward, to 2002 if possible, to 2003 at the latest, b) the European Union should strengthen the weak links in its 1998 Code of Conduct on arms sales (the monitoring of end-use, for example), and apply the guidelines with far more rigour than hitherto, c) arms dealers should be required to register and submit themselves to regulation; the ultimate objective should be to make private arms dealing illegal, d) ECOWAS should be supported in renewing the three- year Moratorium on interregional arms shipments agreed in 1998, e) the recruitment into armed forces of young people aged 17 or under should be made illegal under international law, and the abduction and forced recruitment of such young people should be classified as a war crime.
Resources and finance
Another area where outside help is needed is in the investigation of the unlawful exploitation of natural resources, including investigation into the import of these resources by the developed world in disregard of the ‘side effects’, and tracing the proceeds of this ‘stolen goods’. The task may seem huge, but a ‘web’ may be very thoroughly disrupted without having to destroy every part of it. Much could be achieved by targeting a fairly small number of key individuals and companies.
Specific policy proposals: a) certification schemes should be introduced for all conflict resources (coltan and timber would seem to be the most urgent cases after diamonds). However, neither certification nor embargoes will have much impact if they are not vigorously monitored, and this require the commitment of resources by the international community. Bodies such as the Diamond High Council in Antwerp and De Beers
Central Selling Organisation in London should be brought under close scrutiny, b) until the issue of conflict resources is resolved payments for diamonds, timber coltan and (in the case of Liberia) shipping and aircraft registry services should be made into internationally supervised escrow accounts, c) the assets of key exploiters (individuals and officials of offending companies) should be frozen, and their international travel should be banned, d) a tribunal should be set up, perhaps under the UN, to investigate unlawful resource exploitation and to award reparations, e) measures should be introduced to regulate fundraising by diaspora organisations.
Aid and trade
Conflict in the two regions is, in origin, poverty-related. The states concerned must themselves address issues of disparity, but the poverty does have international
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dimensions. Specific policy proposals: a) the priority for any new round of trade talks at the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) should be the removal of trade barriers against developing country exports, b) countries dependent for much of their export income on a limited range of primary commodities should be helped to diversify, c) development aid should be increased to the UN-recommended level of 0.7 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP), and where appropriate and feasible it should be directed to local government and to indigenous non- government organisations
(NGOs), d) there should be a final and decisive settlement of the debilitating burden of international debt.
Action at the national level
A conflict-ridden country is ultimately dependent on itself. Foreign troops and resources can only be supports and not substitutes for home-grown responsibility for the resolution of conflict and reconstruction of government and society.
Political change
This paper has noted that in both regions the legitimacy of government is not above question. The Kabbah government in Sierra Leone secured little more than a third of the votes in the first round of the elections in 1996, and subsequent events have weakened its standing. The credentials of the Kinshasa government are certainly no stronger than those of the rebels. It gained power by armed force in 1996/97, just as the rebels sought to do in 1998. What then are the marks of legitimate government?
Recognition by other legitimate governments (or is that circular)? Democracy?
Democracy confirmed the lawless Taylor regime in power in Liberia. Democratic legitimacy is a crucial question for Rwanda and Burundi where there is a deep ethnic divide. Human Rights Watch comments: ‘Some policymakers, particularly in France and Belgium, were wedded to the notion that an ethnic majority was necessarily the same as a democratic majority.’ Is this so? Can constitutional arrangements be made to create democracy without a tyranny of the majority? It is suggested here that while a government must have enough power and authority to govern, it will demonstrate its legitimacy by keeping out of areas that are not its province (such as the judiciary and the press), and by seeking to uphold and facilitate other voices – in a constructive political opposition and an active civil society. (There needs to be a decisive move away from a political culture where there is no point in being number two in a coalition, let alone being in opposition.) A truly legitimate government will also seek to separate political, business and military interests. Specific policy proposals: a) the establishment of broad-based transition governments should precede fresh elections, b) DR Congo is too large to be a unitary state and should work out a federal system, c) at some point (the issue is probably too sensitive to be dealt with now) contentious international borders attributable to the colonial period should be re-examined, and where they are found to be artificial they should be changed, d) the tasks of creating a properly trained, properly paid, police force, and a properly trained, properly paid, judiciary should be high priorities (international help may be needed here).
War crimes
The thorny question of justice for war crimes must be faced, even though the fear of
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prosecution may at present be deterring rebels from turning themselves in. This task will involve thorough documentation of what has happened, and punishment for the guilty, tempered by consideration for perpetrators who are also victims. Special attention will have to be given to the question of the treatment of ex-child soldiers and child war-criminals.
Social and economic justice
A key element in building social justice will be government action to ensure that all citizens have access to basic education, adequate health care, nutrition and sanitation.
This paper urges, further, that since the concentration of political and economic power in too few hands has been the problem, the answer surely lies in the devolution of power. There have been some moves in this direction. France has experimented with
‘decentralised co-operation’, the devolution of development aid to local government and NGOs.
Action by civil society
Civil society organisations, some traditional and some new and innovative, are present, though too often they have been under- used. Sierra Leone, for example, has its traditional community decision- making system. Ideas are first discussed in the local community and a consensus position is reached. Then a representative is sent to the next level of consultation and decision- making, and so on, chiefdom by chiefdom, district by district.
Action by women’s groups may not be so traditional, but surely here is a vital resource for peacemaking and peacebuilding. For exa mple, in Sierra Leone, following massive street demonstrations led by women in 1995, National Consultative
Conferences (Bintumani I and II) were held in Freetown and set the stage for elections and a return to civilian government. (Despite their contribution, women’s groups were afterwards excluded from the negotiations in Abidjan and Lomé.) NGOs will yet need financial, technical and political support if they are to play a full part in national life.
Relations with international civil society
Civil society in one country cannot address the problems of their community and nation on their own. The transborder/regional dynamics of the wars in the two regions, and those elements in the conflicts that have roots in the developed world, require advocacy on an international scale. Therefore civil society organisations need to form alliances with like organisations in neighbouring countries and in the West.
They need to feed these allies with hard information about the problems their society faces and the causes.
There is a special need to seek allies, and co-ordinate action, among civil society organisations in countries that bear particular responsibilities. For example, France bears much responsibility for its unrestrained import of timber (from Liberia and possibly DR Congo). Belgium bears heavy responsibilities because of the central role of Antwerp in the diamond trade, and of Ostende in the arms trade. Canada bears responsibilities as the home of the ‘junior’ mining and oil exploration companies.
Israel’s involvement, both in arms dealing and diamond trading, may be less conspicuous, but it is none the less significant. The USA bears heavy responsibility for its role in selling arms, for the failure of the 2001 UN conference on the control of
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the arms trade, and for obstructing moves to secure the certification of diamonds.
There is also a need for co-operation and, possibly, expert help, in monitoring the counter-activity of multinational companies. For example, multinational X may maintain that it is not exploiting resources in a certain war-zone, while it is investing in company Y, whose subsidiary – company Z – is certainly involved.
Specific policy proposals: a) publicise the issues of diamonds, of coltan and mobile ’phones, of the complicity of governments and companies – both multinationals and ‘juniors’; encourage consumers to raise questions (though a consumer boycott should be employed only as a last resort), b) if there is no movement by key government players such as the USA and Belgium, seek to apply pressure through campaigns against ‘big name’ companies and products associated with those countries, c) consider test legal actions ( perhaps at the Hague court), for example, pursuing the
USA for reparations for the damage caused by its ind iscriminate arms exports.
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(1) Chronology Rwanda/DR Congo :
1482 Portuguese reached the mouth of the Congo River
1874-77 HM Stanley explored the Congo River basin
1879-84 Stanley negotiated treaties with about 450 African rulers on behalf of the Association Internationale du Congo, in which Leopold II of Belgium was the leading investor
1890-1916 German colonial rule in Rwanda/Burundi
1916-1962 Belgian colonial rule in Rwanda/Burundi
1990 October: RPF invasion of Rwanda
1992/93 Ceasefire, followed by the Arusha Peace Accord, August 1993
1994 April/May: genocide of Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus
1996/97 Overthrow of the Mobutu regime by the AFDL
1998
1999
2000
July/August: beginning of the second civil war
July: Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
December: DR Congo and rebel groups sign an agreement in
2001
2001
2001
Harare, providing for the withdrawal of troops from frontline positions. Defence chiefs from Uganda, Rwanda, Angola,
Namibia and Zimbabwe also agree to pull back their troops
January: assassination of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila
15 February: the UN Security Council approved a military disengagement plan
March: the MONUC commander, General Mountaga Diallo confirmed that belligerents had withdrawn their troops to new positions 15 kms from the frontline
May 3: the UN Security Council condemned the illegal 2001
2001
1808
1896
1930 exploitation of natural resources by individuals, governments and armed groups (as detailed in the report of the Panel of
Experts)
May/June: at UN Security Council meetings all sides in the DR
Congo conflict agreed to withdraw their troops 100 km from the frontlines
September: Namibia and Uganda announced that they had 2001 withdrawn their troops from DR Congo
Sierra Leone/Liberia
1787 First colonists (black and white) arrived from Britain. Other freed blacks came from Nova Scotia in 1792 and established
Freetown
Crown Colony established
Indigenous kingdoms of the Sierra Leone hinterland joined with the Freetown colony as a British protectorate
Diamonds discovered in Sierra Leone
1951
1961
Unitary Constitution for Sierra Leone
Independence for Sierra Leone
1967/68 SLPP replaced by APC
1967-85 Presidency of Siaka Stevens, followed by Joseph Momoh (1985-92)
1978 APC establishes one-party system
1989 December: outbreak of civil war in Liberia
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1990
1992
1992
1996
1996
1996
1996
1997
1997
1997
1998
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001 presidential powers and control of the lucrative mining sector, and there was an amnesty for perpetrators of human rights abuses
May: arrest of Foday Sankoh, following months of obstruction by the RUF (resisting disarmament and UNAMSIL deployment)
July: UN resolution imposing an international embargo on the purchase of unauthenticated diamonds
November: ECOWAS-mediated ceasefire signed in Abuja
May: UN Security Council resolution 1343, banning Liberian diamond exports (agreed in March, along with a further arms embargo) came into force. At the insistence of France, timber was
2001 excluded from the export ban
September: the Sierra Leone parliament voted to postpone presidential and parliamentary elections by six months, on the ground of insecurity. (Opposition parties and civil society groups had said they were against any delay. The RUF want an interim government of national unity.)
(2) Motives of the state players Great Lakes region
Angola The main concern of Angola’s MPLA government is to deny supply
Burundi
Chad
CAR
France
August: beginning of ‘Operation Liberty’ (the ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian civil war)
April: Momoh overthrown in a coup led by Valentine Strasser
November: mandatory UN embargo on arms sales to Liberia
January: Strasser overthrown in a coup led by Julius Maada Bio
March: Ahmed Tejan Kabbah wins presidential election
August: Abuja Extension Agreement (Abuja II), turning point in securing disarmament in Liberia
November: Abidjan Peace Agreement (for Sierra Leone)
May: overthrow of Kabbah by Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma
July: Charles Taylor elected president of Liberia
October: UN Security Council imposes arms and oil sanctions on
Sierra Leone; Conakry Peace Plan (for Sierra Leone)
March: Kabbah reinstated by ECOMOG forces
January: ECOMOG retake Freetown from AFRC/RUF, but only after some 3,000-5,000 civilians had been killed in the fighting, and many more maimed and abducted
Cross-border incursions between Guinea and Liberia, in support of/ retaliation for, attacks by each other’s insurgents (continuing into
2000)
July: under pressure from Nigeria, UK and USA Kabbah signed the
Lomé Peace Agreement with the RUF. Sankoh was given viceroutes and rear bases to UNITA. It also seeks to isolate the separatist groups in the Cabinda enclave which produces about 70 per cent of the country’s oil and almost all its foreign exchange. It wants a Kinshasa government beholden to itself
Keen to eliminate DR Congo bases used by Hutu extremists
‘Francophone solidarity’ (withdrew its 2,000 troops in May 1999)
‘Francophone solidarity’
In competition with the English-speaking world.
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Libya
Namibia
Rwanda
Sudan
Uganda
Supported Kinshasa in reaction to Uganda’s backing of the SPLA in
Sudan
Supports Angola in an alliance that goes back to the days when the
SWAPO government was a rebel movement operating from Angola against apartheid South Africa (which backed UNITA). The government also fears that UNITA will exploit instability in the
Caprivi Strip where Namibia faces a secessionist movement of its own
Rwanda’s overriding objective in the DRC is to secure its western border against incursions by ‘genocidaires’. A secondary
(undeclared) motive is to secure economic gains. It is also in
Rwanda’s self- interest to back the Tutsi regime in Burundi. The overthrow of that regime would give Rwandan Hutus new bases from which to operate against Rwanda. It would also likely lead to an exodus of Burundi’s 500,000 Tutsis into Rwanda
Appears to support the Kabila regime against Uganda on the principle that ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’
Uganda was motivated to enter the war by security concerns, and the worry that instability in the region would hamper rising prosperity in
Uganda. It has also been in a tacit alliance with the Rwandan government for some years. Further, it is likely that the Ugandan government miscalculated the cost of overthrowing the Kabila
UK/USA regime, probably looking for victories as swift as those in Rwanda in
1994 and DR Congo in 1996/97. Continuing economic gains seem to be the primary reason for remaining
Want a stable government in DR Congo that opens the region for investment. The USA is also concerned about access to strategic minerals. It is uneasy at the prospect of N Korea gaining access to
DR Congo’s uranium. The UK seeks to use governments in the region to help advance western interests in Africa. It is also in competition with France. In their sympathy for the standpoint of the
RPF government in Rwanda, the USA/UK seem to be motivated by
Zimbabwe feelings of guilt at having failed to stop the 1994 genocide
President Mugabe is competing with South Africa’s leaders (first
Nelson Mandela, now Thabo Mbeki) for regional prestige. Like
Museveni he probably underestimated the length of the conflict. A secondary motive, for top government and military officials, is access to the DR Congo’s minerals.
Mano River region
France Seeks to limit the influence of (English-speaking) Nigeria; wants secure access to Liberian timber
Liberia
Nigeria
UK
With an economy devastated by its own civil war, Liberia needed access to Sierra Leone diamonds
Dreams of being a genuine regional power; sending troops out of the country was perhaps a way of keeping them from mischief at home
(Nigeria has a long history of military coups); operations in the region gave senior officers access to local resources
Lingering sense of responsibility as the ex-colonial power?
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(3) Summary of the Lomé Agreement
Ceasefire (Part I, articles 1–2)
Immediate end to armed conflict between government forces and the RUF
Establishment of Ceasefire Monitoring Group and Joint Monitoring Commission to monitor the ceasefire.
Power-sharing (Part 2, articles 3–5)
Transformation of the RUF into a political party
RUF members to be allowed to hold public office
Formation of broad-based government of national unity including RUF.
Reconciliation (Parts 2–3, articles 6–9)
Establishment of Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
Government control of natural resources
Council of Elders and Religious Leaders to resolve any differences
Pardon for Sankoh
Pardon and amnesty for RUF, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF combatants.
Constitution (Parts 3, articles 10–12)
Establishment of Constitutional Review Committee
Commitment to constitutional elections
Natio nal Electoral Commission to be established.
Military (Part 4, articles 13–20)
New mandates for ECOMOG and UNOMSIL
Guaranteed safety, security and freedom of movement for peacekeeping personnel
All ex-combatants to be disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated
New national army to include ex-RUF, CDF and SLA combatants
Withdrawal of all mercenaries from Sierra Leone
Joint Monitoring Commission to be informed of location/strength of combatants and unexploded devices
All combatants to be notified of their respons ibilities under the Agreement.
Human rights (Part 5, articles 21–31)
Unconditional and immediate release of prisoners-of-war and abductees
Voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons
Rights to asylum fully respected
Full protection of rights within Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
Establishment of a national Human Rights Commission
Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be established, dealing with human rights violations since 1991
Sierra Leone government to ask for international humanitarian assistance
Programme of post-war resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction started with special attention given to women
Design and implementation of a programme for the rehabilitation of war victims
Special attention paid to child combatants
Commitment to free compulsory education and affordable primary healthcare.
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Implementation (Parts 6–8, articles 32–37)
Joint Implementation Committee to be established
Request for formal international involvement in the Agreement, where appropriate
Moral guarantors stated as Government of Togolese Republic, the UN, the OAU,
ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations
Call for international support for the Agreement
Commitment to register and publish the Agreement
Statement of the Agreement coming into immediate force.
(4) Key potential NGO allies on the issues of conflict and resources in the Great
Lakes and Mano River regions
ACORD (Agency for Co-operation and Research and Development)
Dean Bradley House, London SW1 2AF
Telephone: 020 7227 8600, Fax: 020 7799 1868 www.acord.org.uk
ACORD began life as the operational arm of a group of European and Canadian
NGOs, responding to drought in sub-Saharan Africa. It is now an operational NGO in its own right. Working with grass-roots organisations it seeks to promote long-term community development among the poorest and most disadvantaged groups in remote and conflict-affected parts of Africa. It three main aims are: to reduce poverty and vulnerability, to help people win their basic rights, and to help them cope with conflict and build peace. In the Great Lakes region, ACORD have development programmes in Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, DR Congo, and Southern Sudan. They support the
Liberia Peace and Development Programme in Lofa County, Liberia.
ActionAid
Hamlyn House, Macdonald Road, Archway, London N19 5PG
Telephone: 020 7561 7561, Fax: 020 7281 0899
E- mail: mail@actionaid.org.uk www.actionaid.org.uk
Regional office: PO Box 2451, Causeway, 6 Natal Road, Belgravia, Harare,
Zimbabwe. Telephone: 263 4 794 863/4, Fax: 263 4 704 004
E- mail: aaro@harare.iafrica.com
Action Aid’s vision is a world without poverty, in which every person can exercise their right to a life of dignity. It seeks to influence international institutions such as the World Bank, national governments, and major donors such as the European
Union. It has carried out work on diamonds and money- laundering, and has programmes in more than 30 countries, including Burundi (peace-building, skillstraining), Rwanda, Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone.
Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)
(successor organisation to the British Anti- Apartheid Movement) www.anc.org.za
Has done work on Angola, DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, including the questions of ‘conflict’ diamonds, and sanctions against UNITA.
Alliances for Africa
Unit 10, Aberdeen Centre, 24 Highbury Grove, London N5 2EA
Telephone: 020 7359 1181, Fax: 020 7354 4900
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E- mail: afa@alliancesforafrica.org www.alliancesforafrica.org
Through strategic partnerships with local, national and regional organisations, AfA undertakes programmes to enhance or reconstruct civil and political rights, economic and social rights. (AfA has a strong rights emphasis.) The organisation is funded by government (DFID, the German ministry for overseas development, ICCO), and bodies such as the German Greens, the Swedish Amnesty Fund, and the Westminster
Foundation for Democracy. AfA have done quite a lot of work on women’s issues, and on Sierra Leone, and they maintain a ‘key texts’ page on their website, giving the texts of various charters (such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights) and other public instruments.
Amnesty International
1 Easton Street, London WC1X 0DW
Telephone: 020 7417 6364 www.amnesty.org
AI works to promote all the human rights enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human
Rights and other international standards. In particular it works to free prisoners of conscience, to ensure that political prisoners receive fair trails, and to abolish torture, the death penalty, political killings and ‘disappearances’. It has done work on: diamonds (Liberia/Sierra Leone), the small arms trade, the presence of Rwanda and Uganda in the DR Congo.
CAFOD (Catholic Agency for Overseas Development)
Romero Close, Stockwell Road, London SW9 9TY
Telephone: 020 7733 7900, Fax: 020 7274 9630
E- mail: hqcafod@cafod.org.uk www.cafod.org.uk
Has work in DR Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan.
CIIR (Catholic Institute for International Relations)
Unit 3, Canonbury Yard, 190a New North Road, London N1 7BJ
Telephone: 020 7354 0883, Fax: 020 7359 0017
E- mail: ciir@ciir.org www.ciir.org
Works for justice and the eradication of poverty, seeking to secure equitable policies and to strengthen community-based organisations that represent the poor. It operates mainly in Latin America, but does have some work in Zimbabwe.
Christian Aid
PO Box 100, 35 Lower Marsh, London SE1 7RT
Telephone: 020 7620 4444, Fax: 020 7620 0719
E- mail: info@christian-aid.org www.christian-aid.org
As part of its work in tackling poverty, Christian Aid seeks to challenge the systems and processes that work against the poor and marginalised. Has done quite a lot of work on oil and war in the Sudan, the human and environmental costs.
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Conciliation Resources
173 Upper Street, London N1 1RG
Telephone: 020 7359 7728, Fax: 020 7359 4081
E- mail: conres@c-r.org www.c-r.org
CR serves as an international resource for local or national organisations pursuing peace or conflict prevention initiatives. They undertake information management, research and training, and their Committee for Conflict Transformation Support
(CCTS) runs workshops. CR publish a journal Accord and Liberia featured in issue 1,
Sierra Leone in issue 9 (September 2000). In the period leading up to the 1997 elections in Liberia, CR (with DFID funding) supported the Liberian Women
Initiative in a three- months programme of voter education. Support for LWI is ongoing. In Sierra Leone CR has facilitated workshops, given skills training to the
Sierra Leone Association of Journalists, undertaken team-building with the Sierra
Leone Women’s Movement for Peace, supported the Sulima Fishing Community
Development Project, and another community project in Bo.
Conflict, Development and Peace Network (CODEP)
6 th
Floor, Dean Bradley House, 52 Horseferry Road, London SW1P 2AF
Telephone: 202 7799 2477, Fax: 202 7799 2458
E- mail: mail@codep.org.uk www.codep.org.uk
CODEP seeks to explore the causes of conflict and its impact on people’s lives, and then to reduce conflict through sharing with NGOs, government departments and others, ideas on policy and practice. CODEP distributes an e- mail newsletter, facilitates round-table discussions and thematic working groups, and organises an annual international conference. The subjects raised at the 2001 conference included
Sierra Leone, greed and grievance, diamonds (Sierra Leone/Liberia), logging
(Liberia), Uganda, diaspora (Sierra Leone/Liberia), small arms in Africa.
CREATE
Hawthorn House, 1 Lansdown Road, Stroud, Glos GL5 1BJ
Telephone: 01453 757040, Fax: 01453 751138
E- mail: JWLarge4@aol.com
Undertakes research, education and training, to help in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and social justice.
Essential Information
PO Box 19405, Washington DC, 20036, USA
Telephone: 202 387 8030 www.essential.org
Aims to encourage activism by acting as a clearing house for ‘provocative information’ on topics neglected by the mass media and the policy makers, disseminating this information in the global South. In particular its Multinational
Resource Center will provide Southern NGOs with details of companies – their structure, ownership, records as polluters – and point out potential allies in the NGO world. It is particularly focused on environment and pollution issues, for example, it has done work on the operations of the Shell Oil company in the Niger Delta.
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Global Policy Forum
777 UN Plaza, Suite 7G, New York, NY 10017, USA
Telephone: 212 557 3161, Fax: 212 557 3165 www.globalpolicy.org
Monitors global policy- making at the UN, aiming to promote a more transparent and democratic process. It works by building networks of NGOs and people’s organisations. The website is GPF’s primary vehicle for disseminating information.
Particular areas of recent concern are:
‘conflict’ diamonds (Angola/DR Congo, Liberia/Sierra Leone) oil (Sudan), timber (Liberia),
Uganda’s involvement in the DR Congo,
US mining (bauxite) interests in Guinea.
Global Witness
PO Box 6042, London N19 5WP
Telephone: 020 7272 6731, Fax: 020 7272 9425 www:oneworld.org/globalwitness
Global Witness seeks to highlight the link between environmental exploitation and human rights abuse, including the use of natural resources to fund conflict. Particular areas of concern are: the links between oil sales and corruption (GW have done work on Angola, and the
French oil giant TotalFinaElf), diamonds, forests (particularly in Liberia, parts of SE Asia and, most recently, Zimbabwe’s exploitation of DR Congo forests).
Human Rights Watch
33 Islington High Street, London N1 9LH
Telephone: 020 7713 1995, Fax: 020 7713 1800 www:hrw.org
US-based, but with offices in London and Brussels. In carrying out investigations it often joins forces with human rights groups in other countries. HRW seeks to expose human rights abuse (including women’s rights, children’s rights, and arms flows to rights abusers), and to hold abusers to account. It conducts fact-finding investigations, meets with government officials to press for changes in policy and practice, and in extreme cases calls for the withdrawal of military and economic support from abusing governments. It has done work on: small arms, landmines,
Guinea/Liberia/Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso as a conduit for arms shipments
Angola,
DR Congo/Rwanda/Uganda.
Humanitarian Coalition on Small Arms
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Telephone: 41 22 908 1130, Fax: 41 22 908 1140
E- mail (contact Cate Buchanan): cateb@hdcentre.org
The Coalition is a recent initiative to provide a focal point for advocacy and campaigning for the humanitarian, human rights, health and development communities. The Coalition comprises several organizations that participate in the
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International Action Network on Small Arms and also organisations beyond that network.
International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)
Box 422, 37 Store Street, London WC1E 7BS
E- mail: contact@iansa.org www.iansa.org
IANSA seeks to facilitate NGO action that is aimed at enhancing human security by preventing the proliferation and misuse of small arms. They seek both to reduce demand and to stem the supply, but recognise that mere weapons control is not enough. Secure economic, social and political conditions are seen as essential to success.
International Alert
1 Glyn Street, London SE11 5HT
Telephone: 020 7793 8383, Fax: 202 7793 7975 www.international-alert.org
Seeks to address the root causes of violence and contribute to a just and peaceful transformation of conflict situations. It works by facilitating dialogue, developing local capacity, and encouraging the international community to address the structural causes of conflict. It has done work on: the Great Lakes region, West Africa, the Caucasus region, Sri Lanka, Colombia, light weapons transfers, private military companies, the role of corporations in conflict situations.
International Crisis Group
149 Avenue Louise, Level 16, B-1050, Brussels, Belgium
Telephone: 32 2 502 90 38, Fax: 32 2 502 50 38
E- mail: icgbrussels@crisisweb.org www.crisisweb.org
1522 K Street, Suite 200, Washington DC 20005, USA
Telephone: 1 202 408 8012, Fax: 1 202 408 8250
E- mail: icgwashington@crisisweb.org www.crisisweb.org
Offices also in New York and Paris.
ICG is seeking to strengthen the capacity of the international community to
‘anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict’. They place political analysts in countries at risk of crisis, to gather information and assess local conditions.
Among the countries where they have worked are Burundi, Rwanda, DR Congo,
Sierra Leone, and Sudan. ICG work closely with governments (they are funded by governments, foundations and companies, as well as individuals). The former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, is Chairman of the ICG board, and the former
Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, is President and Chief Executive.
Oxfam
Oxfam House, 274 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 7DZ
Telephone: 01865 312610
E- mail: oxfam@oxfam.org.uk
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www.oxfam.org.uk
Oxfam is a development, relief and campaigning organisation dedicated to finding lasting solutions to poverty and suffering around the world. Oxfam published a paper on the war in DR Congo in December 2000. Representatives attended (as observers) the UN Conference on Small Arms, July 2001.
Partnership Africa-Canada
323 Chapel Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 7Z2, Canada
Telephone: 613 237 6768, Fax: 613 237 6530
E- mail: pac@web.ca www.partnershipafricacanada.org
A coalition of 15 pressure groups, backed by the Canadian government, working with
African NGOs on issues of human rights, human security and sustainable development. It aims to strengthen members’ skills in policy matters and advocacy, to promote policies that foster sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa, and to promote greater understanding of sustainable human development in sub-Saharan
Africa.
Save the Children Fund
17 Grove Lane, London SE5 8RD
Telephone: 020 7703 5400, Fax: 020 7703 2278 www.scfuk.org.uk
The long-term aim of SCF is that very child shall enjoy a happy, healthy, secure start in life. SCF supports practical projects, and it also lobbies for changes that will benefit children.
World Vision
599 Avebury Boulevard, Milton Keynes, MK9 3PG
Telephone: 01908 841000, Fax: 01908 841001
E- mail: info@worldvision.org.uk www.worldvision.org.uk
Pursues the vision of enabling families and communities to attain self-reliance in a sustainable manner. As part of their work at the international level WV seek to change the conditions that create poverty. They have campaigned against the use of child soldiers, and have recently (July 2000) done work on Angola.
Other useful websites drcpeace.org The website of the facilitator of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries/
index.html
INCORE is ‘The Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity’ (University of Ulster) sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies University of Pennsylvania, African Studies site
(5) Abbreviations
Great Lakes region
ADF Allied Democratic Forces (Ugandan insurgent group)
AFDL Alliances des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-
Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-
Zaïre)
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AliR
ANC
APC
BCDI
CEMAC
CNDD-FDD
Armee de Liberation du Rwanda (Hutu rebel group composed of ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and new recruits)
Congolese National Army, the military wing of the RCD
Armée Populaire Congolaise (Congolese Popular Army), the armed wing of RCD-ML
Banque de commerce, du développement et d’industrie, Kigali
Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale
(Central African Economic and Monetary Community)
Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (National Council for the Defence of
Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa COMESA
COMIEX
FAA
FAC
FAR
FAZ
FDD
MONUC
MPLA
Compagnie mixte d’import-export
Forças Armadas Angolanas (Angolan government army)
Forces Armées Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces, the government army)
Forces Armée Rwandaises (armed forces of the former Hutu regime)
Forces Armées Zairoises (Zairean Armed Forces)
Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (Forces for the Defence of
Democracy, Burundi Hutu rebel group)
Front de Libération du Congo (Front for the Liberation of Congo, a FLC
FLEC
FLEC-FAC merger of MLC and RCD-ML)
Front for the Liberation of the Enc lave of Cabinda
FLEC – Cabinda Armed Forces
FLEC-Renovata FLEC – Refounders
FNL National Forces for Liberation (Burundi)
Fonus Innovational Forces of the Sacred Union (DR Congo opposition party)
FUNA
Gecamines
ISS
LRA
MLC
Former Ugandan National Army
Générale de carrières et des mines
Institute for Security Studies
Lord’s Resistance Army (Ugandan opposition group)
Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (Movement for the
Liberation of Congo)
Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unie s en République démocratique du Congo (UN Mission in the DR Congo)
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MRND
NALU
OHCHR
Osleg
Parmehutu
RCD
RCD-Goma
RCD-ML
RCD-N
Mouvement Révolutiormaire National pour le Développement
(replacement for the Parmehutu party)
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (insurgent group)
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
Parti du Mouvement de l’émancipation des Bahutu
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy)
Congolese Rally for Democracy – Goma
RCD – Mouvement de Libération (RCD – Liberation Movement)
RCD – National (Congolese Rally for Democracy – National)
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RPA
RPF
RTLM
SADC
SOMINKI
UNAMIR
UNAR
UNICEF
UNITA
Rwandan Patriotic Army (the armed forces of the RPF)
Rwanda Patriotic Front
Radio Mille Collines (extremist Hutu radio)
Southern African Development Community
Société minière et industrielle du Kivu
United Nations Mission in Rwanda
Union Nationale Rwandaise (royalist Tutsi party, late 1950s/early
60s)
United Nations Children’s Fund
União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola (National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
Ugandan National Rescue Front II UNRF II
UPDF
WNBF
ZDF
Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (the government army)
West Nile Bank Front
Zimbabwe Defence Force
Mano River region
AFL
AFRC
Armed Forces of Liberia (government army)
Armed Forces ruling Council
AFRSL
ALCOP
Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone
All Liberian Coalition Party (the political organisation that emerged from ULIMO-K)
APC
CDF
ECOMOG
ECOWAS
HRD
ISU
JFLL
LDF
LPC
LURD
NCDDR
All People’s Congress (of Sierra Leone)
Civil Defence Force
ECOWAS Monitoring Group
Economic Community of West African States
Hoge Raad voor Diamant (Diamond High Council)
Internal Security Unit (Sierra Leone police unit)
Joint Forces for the Liberation of Liberia
Lofa Defence Force
Liberia Peace Council
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
NPFL
NPPL
NPRC
OAU
PDP
RUF
SLPP
National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration (in Sierra Leone)
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
National Patriotic Party of Liberia (the political organisation that emerged from the NPFL)
National Provisional Ruling Council
Organisation of African Unity
People’s Democratic Party
Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone insurgent group)
Sierra Leone People’s Party
SSD
UNAMSIL
UNDP
ULIMO
ULIMO-J
ULIMO-K
UNOMIL
UNOMSIL
Special Security Division (Sierra Leone police unit)
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
United Nations Development Programme
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
ULIMO, Johnson faction
ULIMO, Kromah faction
United Nations Mission in Liberia
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
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UNPP United National People’s Party
(6) Sources
Websites
ACORD
ActionAid
Action for Southern Africa
Alliances for Africa
Amnesty International
BASIC
Conciliation Resources
IANSA
International Alert
International Crisis Group
Keston Institute
NISAT
Oxfam
Partnership Africa-Canada
CODEP
Conflict, Security & Development Grp
United Nations
Global Policy Forum
Global Witness
Human Rights Watch
Institute for Security Studies
Newspapers and Journals
Daily Telegraph
Financial Times
Guardian
Independent
International Herald Tribune
Times
Africa Confidential
African Security Review (published by the
Institute for Security Studies)
BBC (transcript of ‘File on 4’ broadcast,
10/7/01)
BBC focus on Africa magazine, Oct-Dec 1999
(‘Rebels’ best friend’, Christine Gordon)
Church Times (‘Rwanda: class war more than race war’, Alex de Waal, 5/8/94)
Conflict, Security and Development Bulletin
Economist
Integrated Regional Information Network (of the UN)
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives
New African
Rapaport news service
Papers, books
All Party Parliamentary
Group
Report on a visit to DR Congo, August
2001
October
2001
75

Catherine Barnes, Ph D
& Tara Polzer
Ed. Hannah Beardon
Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeffler
Chris Dietrich
Sierra Leone Peace Process: Learning from the Past to Address Current Challenges (an
Expert Seminar Report, London)
Report on the CODEP Conference, London June 2001
Greed and Grievance in Civil War
September
2000
January 2001
Global Witness briefing document
WD Hartung and
Bridget Moix
Human Rights Watch briefing paper
RIIA briefing paper no.50
SCF, Oxfam, Christian
Aid briefing paper
Taylor B Seybolt
The commercialisation of military deployment in Africa (pub. by ISS)
Zimbabwe’s resource colonialism in the DR
Congo
Deadly legacy: US arms to Africa and the
Congo war (Arms Trade Resource Center)
Uganda in eastern DR Congo
Sierra Leone: tracing the genesis of a controversy
No end in sight
July 2001
August 2001
January 2000
March 2001
June 1998
August 2001
Ian Smillie, Lansana
Gberie, and Ralph
Hazleton
UN Panel of Experts
Eyes wide open: Rwanda and the difficulty of worthy military intervention
‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, diamonds & human security’ (pub. by
Partnership Africa Canada)
Report on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the DR Congo
Europa Yearbook
New African Yearbook
SIPRI Yearbook
October
1999
January 2000
April 2001
2001
2001
2000
Information and comment from individuals
Ben Mussanzi wa From the Centre Resolution Conflits, DR Congo,
Mussangu
Mwakamubaya
Nasekwa currently pursuing MA Peace Studies in the UK
CME Nyankunde, DR Congo i
Guardian 1/8/01 ii
‘Report of the All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes and Genocide Prevention’, 2001, p.15 iii
Dr Dennis Bright ‘Sierra Leone, the conflict and the world’, London, 18-20 June, 2001. iv
Human Rights Watch, ‘Backgrounder on the DR Congo’ v
Abiodun Alao, Centre for Defence Studies. vi
From a talk on ‘Sierra Leone, the conflict and the world’ given by Dr Dennis Bright at the CODEP conference, London, 18-20 June, 2001.
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