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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1 June 19XX
ANNEX N TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
SPACE OPERATIONS
REFERENCES:
a. See Basic Plan.
b. Annex B.
c. Maps, WGS-84, series L654, KOREA, sheets 3118,3119, 3120, 3121, 3122, 3218, 3219,
3220, 3221, 3222, 3318, 3319, 3320, 3321, 3322, 3418, 3419, 3420, 3421, 3422, 3515, 3516, 3517,3518,
3519, 3520, 3521, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3715, 3716, 3717, 3815, 3816,and 3817, 3915, 3916, 3917, 4016,
4017, edition 001-KAMC, scale 1:100,000.
d. Map, NIMA, series L654, sheet reference c, scale 1:1,000,000.
1. Situation
a. General. This Annex provides planning guidance concerning space related support for the
deployment and employment of CFC forces in the JOA. Space assets support several critical areas
enabling CFC forces to conduct military operations in Japan and the Republic of Korea. Space assets
support the areas of warning, navigation, communications, environmental sensing, multi-spectral imagery
and surveillance, and reconnaissance. The proper use will ensure CINCKorea maintains the advantage in
information warfare and battlefield awareness.
b. Enemy.
See Annex B.
(1) Threat to space systems. The North Korean military forces have no known or
suspected anti-satellite capability or possesses a direct enemy threat to US space-based assets. There is
the possibility of enemy SOF attacks on satellite ground stations during Phases II through V.
(2)
Communications.
The North Korean miliary forces have no domestic
communications satellite construction or launch capability, nor is there any indication they plan to develop
those capabilities. The North Korea limited economic resources allow them to contract the use of
commercial satellite systems for communications.
(3) Other. Acquisition of imagery through commercial sales such as SPOT (Systeme
Probatoire d’Observation de la Terre) is always a possibility.
c. Friendly. The following military, civil and commercial space systems provide “space-related”
force enhancement support:
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(1) Communications. Space communications support is provided by USSPACECOM
and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Communications support is highly responsive, with Air
Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM), Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS),
Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM), MILSTAR, Leased Satellite (LEASAT), and other
commercial communications satellites.
(2) Environmental. CFC receives environmental and weather data from a variety of
military, civilian, and commercial systems. Space-based support will be provided during all phases of this
plan.
(3) Navigation. The Global Positioning System provides navigation capability during all
phases of this plan, within JOA South Korea and during deployment/redeployment.
(4) Surveillance
(a) Non-military reconnaissance sensors are available to complement the military
sensors.
(b) CFC, CJG-2 collection management is the office of primary responsibility for
consolidation, prioritization, and transmission of requests for support.
(5) Tactical Warning. N/A.
d. Assumptions. See Basic Plan.
(1) Space-based capabilities will be available to friendly forces.
(2) The DPRK have no anti-satellite capabilities.
2. Mission. See basic OPLAN.
3. Execution. CFC forces have available to them a variety of space systems to successfully conduct CFC
OPLAN (South Korea) 9518X-XX. CFC conducts all space-based operations through USSPACECOM.
Space operations assist with intelligence preparation of the battlefield and collect data on opposing forces.
Space-based communications and navigation systems provide important support for command and
control throughout all phases of this plan. Upon execution of this plan space-based capabilities provide
weather information for use in planning. GPS is used to guide friendly forces and weapons against the
North Korea and its military forces in both day and night operations as well as all weather conditions.
Satellite communications support and GPS are critical to the success of this plan, particularly Phases II-V.
a. Concept of Operations
(1)
Phase I, Prehostilities: Alert and Staging.
Priority during this phase is
communications support to the deployment preparations and staging areas to include TPFDD tracking.
Reconnaissance through space assets will be initiated for planning in future phases.
(2)
Phase II, Establish Intermediate Staging Base(s). This phase begins with the initial
deployment of forces from their home stations to establish an Intermediate Staging Base in Japan and/or
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lodgment(s) in South Korea. To accomplish this phase intelligence and reconnaissance preparation of the
lodgment and follow-on areas is critical to detect opposing force activity. Additional systems to move
initially into the lodgment areas are communications, weather satellite receivers, and GPS receivers which
will support the reception of aircraft, port operations, and onward movement of ground forces.
(3) Phase III, Decisive Combat. The use of surveillance and reconnaissance assets are
vital to support counterair and air interdiction operations against North Korean military forces within South
Korea and disrupt enemy ability to concentrate its combat power. The surveillance and reconnaissance to
support the JTF security forces for the US owned and operated radar sites. The reconnaissance and
surveillance also supports friendly force movement along South Korea’s borders and ascertain the
movement and intentions of the PRC and it’s military force activities. Communications systems are
extremely essential to coordinate the operations of the dispersed JTF components and supporting
organizations and must be forward deployed with major headquarters. Use of GPS is required to comply
with the restriction of forces going beyond the land and air “hot pursuit” limits precisely to locate the North
Korean Army’s headquarters and UGF locations. Multi-spectral imagery of the terrain is required for
planning and provide terrain recognition by forces. Priority of capabilities is communications, surveillance
and reconnaissance, and GPS.
(4) Phase IV, Lodgment and Follow-Through. CINCKorea will plan for the continued use
of space assets to support the security of the US owned and operated radar sites. Priority for planning is
communications, intelligence, and reconnaissance.
(5) Phase V, Posthostilities and Redeployment. Communications deployed forward for
command and control and redeployment tracking are critical during this phase. Reconnaissance and
surveillance of the terrain areas will continue to provide the status of military forces and bordering
countries' activities and intentions. Environmental and weather space assets are required for planning the
orderly pull back of ground forces to APODs/SPODs, schedule of transportation and tracking of
redeployment to home station.
b. Space Activities
(1) Communications. The use of SATCOM from various sources is required to support
all phases of this plan. Requirements will be submitted to USSPACECOM and DISA for apportionment of
bandwidth and frequencies.
Requirements include data transfer for the tracking of TPFDD
implementation and forward movement of forces from the staging areas to the lodgment and beyond.
(2) Environmental. The use of weather, MSI, and oceanographic satellite capabilities are
required to support the air interdiction, counterair, resupply, terrestrial navigation, and possible amphibious
operations.
(3) Navigation. The extensive use of GPS is required for land component and air
operations. The use of deployment tracking using the capabilities of space-based systems is necessary
for TPFDD analysis. GPS selective availability is (active) and anti-spoofing is (on).
(4) Surveillance. Space based surveillance capabilities is anticipated to track locations of
North Korea military force operations. See Annex B for additional information.
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(5) Tactical Warning. Use of tactical warning for enemy ballistic missile or space-weapon
attacks is anticipated.
(6) Space Control. There is no anticipated requirement for implementation of space
control activities.
(7) Nuclear Detonation. None anticipated.
(8) Friendly Missile Impact. There are no known friendly ballistic missile launches
anticipated to support this OPLAN. Dissemination of a launch notice if necessary will be disseminated
through GCCS.
(9) Enemy Space Activity. The primary enemy involved with this OPLAN have limited
ability to conduct space activities which would affect friendly action. See Annex B for additional
information.
(10) Command and Control Warfare. See Appendix 3, Annex C (Information Warfare).
c. Tasks and Responsibilities
(1) CFC
(a) Will request space-based support through USSPACECOM.
(b) Integrate JTF Korea, components, and supporting commands space
requirements.
(c) Ensure adequate GPS receivers are available and in adequate quantities to
support this plan.
(d) Identify anticipated or known shortfalls in SATCOM frequencies and
bandwidth limitations to USSPACECOM and DISA.
(e) Be prepared to receive space support teams from USSPACECOM and move
to supported elements.
(2) USSPACECOM
(a) Provide space based communications support as required by CINCKorea.
(b) Upon request provide CINCKorea and COMJTF Korea space support teams
for integration into CFC operations.
(c) Provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, environmental, and
weather information as requested by CINCKorea.
(3) JTF Korea
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(a) Plan for the use of space-based assets including;
intelligence, environmental, weather, GPS, and reconnaissance and surveillance.
(b)
communications,
Plan for reception and integration of USSPACECOM support teams.
(c) Integrate JTF, Service Components, and supporting commands space
related requirements into OPLANS.
d. Coordinating Instructions
(1)
JTF Korea components and supporting commands provide space based
requirements to JTF Korea’s headquarters.
(2) JTF Korea consolidates space requirements and forwards to CFC.
(3) CFC will identify force enhancement requirements as early as possible in the preconflict environment.
(4) Individual SATCOM systems managers ensure access is apportioned per
USSPACECOM, DISA, and CFC guidance.
(5) Datum used throughout this operation is WGS 84.
4. Administration and Logistics
a. Resupply. Resupply for USSPACECOM support teams is the responsibility of the supported
unit less those items specifically supported by USSPACECOM.
b. Cryptologic Support. Requirements for cryptological materials for space-related applications
will be established through the normal channels.
5. Command and Control
a. Command and Control. USSPACECOM will provide, upon request, a Joint Space Support
Team(s) to USSOUTHCOM and subordinate elements. Request support by message to USSPACECOM
PETERSON AFB CO//SPJ3// or if time does not permit, by telephone through the Space Command
Center at (719) 554-5525 or DSN 692-5525.
JIM R. RILEY
General, USA
Commander in Chief
N-5
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Appendixes:
1-Space Systems Summary (Omitted)
2-Support Request Matrix (Omitted)
OFFICIAL:
/s/
GEORGE J. JOLLY
Major General, USAF
Director, J-5
N-6
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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX N TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
SPACE SYSTEMS SUMMARY
(OMITTED)
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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX N TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
SUPPORT REQUEST MATRIX
(OMITTED)
N-2-1
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