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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
TAB E TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
DESTRUCTION
1. Situation. The United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) currently seek ways to
convince the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that is should forego the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, initially by allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct full
inspections of suspected facilities. North Korea thus far has refused, although it did agree to an incomplete
examination of declared sites early in March 1998. This plan reviews military planning since there are
constant threats of war from Pyongyang.
.
a. Enemy Situation. See Annex B, North Korean armed forces, with few
exceptions, greatly exceed the size of ROK counterparts: twice as many active uniformed personnel and
main battle tanks, five times as many self-proprelled artillery pieces, air defense suites that dwarf South
Korean analogues, plus many more submarines, torpedo boats, and antiship missile craft. Neither Korea
possesses a large air force. The U.S. 2d Infantry Division, deployed on a main invasion route, primarily
symbolizes U.S. resolve, but U.S. air and naval power (a small part which now is in place) provides
capabilities that the DPRK cannot match. There is little qualitative difference between North and South
Korean military personnel. Both sides are well organize, thorougly professional, dedicated, tough,a nd highly
motivated, although one may question how large a share on North Korea’s rank and file would welcome
orders to initiate large-scale offensive operations. Both deploy he bulk of their best ground forces near the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in well-prepared positions, but technological superiority and synergistic U.S.
relations with ROK allies confer unique advantages on our side.
b. Friendly Situation. See Annex A, Task Organization, and the current operations
summary (OPSUM). Because of the long-standing US emphasis on fighting aggression on the Korean
peninsula, US aid has tended to focus on bolstering the 633,000 member ROK military. They have been
effective in deterring DPRK aggression. The 633,000 military force is capable, but is out manned by DPRK
and stretched thin with indications that it is poorly trained, ill equipped, under-funded.
c. Assumptions. See basic plan.
2. Mission. When directed, CFC conducts command and control and information infrastructure destruction
in support of JTF operations in the Joint Operations Area to assist the Government of South Korea defeat the
North Korean.
3. Execution. Physical destruction will be used to degrade DPRK C3 systems. Physical destruction of
elements of the C3 system with “hard kill” weapons will contribute to the isolation of DPRK leadership from
their field commanders and make them more vulnerable to electronic and physical attack. Destruction of the
command and control and information infrastructure of the DPRK will start in Phase III (Decisive Combat, DDay through D+68) as friendly forces execute pre-emptive strikes on previously identified DPRK
headquarters, telecommunications centers and intelligence nodes. The weapons used will be situational
dependent but will include aircraft borne precision guided munitions, cruise missiles, special operations
forces, naval gunfire, artillery, and maneuver forces.
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a. Tasks for Subordinate Commands. Total destruction of the DPRK C3 system may not be
attainable, desirable, or supportable. The goal will be the deliberate degradation of its capabilities to enable
JTF Korea and other tactical commands to defeat DPRK military field forces.
(1) CJG2. In coordination with the command’s and JTF Korea Information Operations (IO)
planners develop a target list to nominate locations for destruction.
(2) CJG3. Organize and staff the command IO cell and coordinate with JTF Korea for
destruction targets.
(3) JTF Korea
(a) Coordinate with CJG2, CJG3 and CFC IO Cell for candidates for physical
destruction.
(b) Identify critical points for destruction and nominate them to CJG3.
(c) Be prepared to accept augmentation from higher headquarters to staff the JTF
IO cell.
(d) When directed, attack selected C3 targets.
(e) Provide feedback to higher headquarters on the results of destruction mission,
both those executed by JTF Korea and those from other CFC components.
(f) Identify those targets not sufficiently destroyed to require another strike to
prevent their recovery.
b. Coordinating Instructions
(1) All combatants provide analysis of the DPRK’s ability to reconstitute the attacked C3
node.
(2) Monitor the targets after the strike and re-strike if necessary.
(3) Coordinate with the CFC IO Cell to identify, target, attack and evaluate results of
destruction.
4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D, Logistics.
5. Command and Control
a. Command. See Annex J, Command Relationships.
b. Signal. See Annex K, Command, Control and Communications Systems.
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