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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
ANNEX C TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
OPERATIONS
REFERENCES: . Maps, WGS-84, series L654, KOREA, sheets 3118,3119, 3120, 3121, 3122, 3218, 3219,
3220, 3221, 3222, 3318, 3319, 3320, 3321, 3322, 3418, 3419, 3420, 3421, 3422, 3515, 3516, 3517,3518,
3519, 3520, 3521, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3715, 3716, 3717, 3815, 3816,and 3817, 3915, 3916, 3917, 4016,
4017, edition 001-KAMC, scale 1:100,000
a. Status of Forces Agreements, UNITED STATES of AMERICA and the REPUBLICS of KOREA, 1
June 19WW.
b. Area Study, REPUBLIC of KOREA.
c. Joint Pub 1-03, “Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions,” January 1994.
d. “Joint Operations Planning and Execution System Reporting Structure,” May 1994.
e. USPACOM Order of Battle (CINC OB).
f. USPACOM OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX.
g. The South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1948.
1. General
a. Purpose. This Annex provides guidance for the conduct of combat, combat support, and
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) by US military forces to assist the armed forces of Korea in
their combat operations against attacking DPRK forces in executing its NEO plan.
b. Mission. When directed, CINCKorea in coordination with the Government Republic of Korea
conducts military operations to protect US interests and assist the Republic of Korea Government.
c. Alliance Plans. Operations envisaged in this plan will be conducted in accordance with Status of
forces Agreements, United States of America and the Republic of Korea and Japan, June 19WW.
d. Theater of Operations. The Theater of Operations is comprised of multiple areas of operations
within the country of South Korea, adjacent waters, and those cross-border areas whose population and
elected officials support the DPRK combat operations.
2. Concept of Operations. Basic plan.
3. Conduct of Operations
a. Readiness, Alert, and Marshaling
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(1) Readiness. Upon notification, supporting commands and Service components will
ensure that subordinate units are brought to the directed state of readiness in anticipation of deployment.
Selected commands will be directed by appropriate authority to increase readiness.
(2) Alert. Warning time for Phase II (Establish ISBs), and Phase III (Decisive Combat)
operations may be minimal. Consequently, a high state of force readiness, a responsive alert system, and
detailed supporting plans are essential. Services and/or supporting commanders are responsible for
establishing and maintaining alerting systems. Alert status of units will be increased through normal alert
notification procedures. Selected deceptive cover force units will receive alert notification through appropriate
command channels.
(3) Marshaling and Dispersal. There is to be no change to normal deployment procedures.
Predesignated unit deployment marshaling arrangements will be specified in unit alert order. Marshaling of
units deploying to Joint Operations Area Korea will be IAW unit SOPs and Service policies and directives.
Deception activities will be in accordance with Tab A to Appendix 3 of this Annex.
(4) OPSEC. Forces will be most vulnerable during readiness, alert, and marshaling.or
dispersal activities. The need for OPSEC during these activities is essential. Planners must ensure that only
major commands with an explicit need-to-know are made aware of this plan. Other participating units will be
informed upon receipt of the alert order.
b. Air Operations. COMJTF South Korea in coordination with Commander, 7th Air Force (7AF), is
responsible for establishing a system of control and coordination of air operations in Korea prior to
deployment of CONUS based/UNC forces. Air operations over South Korea will not be modified -- they will
continue as currently required by aviation regulations and international agreements.
c. Air Defense Operations. COMJTF South Korea in coordination with Commander 7AF, will
establish a system for coordination of aerospace/air defense operations in South Korea. Air defense
operations over South Korea will not be modified -- they will continue as currently required by directives,
regulations, and international agreements.
d. Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations. There are no MPS or APA assets apportioned in this
plan.
e. Antisubmarine Warfare Operations (ASW). Is the reponsibility of NGCC and its CVBGs.
f. Information Operations. CFC Information Operations (IO) support JTF South Korea throughout
the range of its operations to execute pre-emptive strikes on selected hostile targets, conduct non-combatant
evacuation operations (NEO), and secure key installations. The IO effort will sustain deception efforts, gain
and maintain operational surprise, inhibit the reaction time of DPRK leadership, and assist in influencing the
South Korean population to support their government and US military operations.
g. Counterinsurgency. Reference b.
h. Nuclear Operations. Appendix 1, Omitted.
i. NBC Defense Operations; Riot Control Agents and Herbicides. Appendix 2.
j. Information Operations. Appendix 3.
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k. Special Operations. Appendix 4.
l. Evasion and Recovery Operations. Appendix 5.
m. Rules of Engagement. Appendix 6.
n. Reconnaissance. Appendix 7.
o. Air Base Operability. Appendix 8.
p. Visual Information and Combat Camera Documentation. Appendix 9. (TBP)
q. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. Appendix 10.
r. Escape and Evasion Operations. Appendix 11.
s. Counterattack. Appendix 12, Omitted.
t. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Appendix 13.
u. Amphibious Operations. COMJTF South Korea will plan for and conduct amphibious operations
as required. Amphibious operations outside the JOA, to include security of SLOC, countermine operations (if
required), and maritime intercept operations (if required), will be coordinated by CINCKorea with
CINCPACOM and CINCPAC operating in support of CINCKorea.
Appendix 14, Omitted.
v. Force Protection. Appendix 15.
w. Operational Reports. IAW applicable CFC TACSOPs and references c and d.
4. Operational Constraints. Factors that may impede accomplishment of the mission are:
a. Tactical surprise, especially during Phases I, II, and III, must be maintained for operations
associated with the destruction of DPRK military forces down to brigade level.
b. Weather in the JOA may significantly impede operations.
c. Access to the limited theater POD throughput capability for both materiel and combat forces may
significantly hinder the pace and timing of operations.
d. Limited intratheater LOCs and transportation assets will impede the pace of operations unless
significant aviation assets are committed to offset this deficiency.
e. The availability of theater communications assets is limited, and JCS-directed communications
support must be available for JTF South Korea to provide adequate command, control, and intelligence to the
participating forces.
f. Success of this operation will depend heavily on US forces not being perceived as aggressors,
especially on the Asia subcontinent. It is critical that the Republic of Korea populace, as well as the political
establishment, support CFC/UNC operations.
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g. Expect troop ceilings to be placed on US forces in both the Pacific AOR and South Korea.
Without advance knowledge of what those ceilings will be, planners should prioritize all forces by functional
area and location.
JIM J. RILEY
General, USA
Commander in Chief
Appendixes:
1 - Nuclear Operations (Omitted)
2 - Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations; Riot Control Agents and Herbicides
3 - Information Operations
4 - Special Operations
5 - Evasion and Recovery (E&R) Operations
6 - Rules of Engagement
7 - Reconnaissance
8 - Air Base Operability
9 - Combat Camera
10 - Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
11 - Escape and Evasion Operations
12 - Counterattack (Omitted)
13 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal
14 - Amphibious Operations (Omitted)
15 - Force Protection
OFFICIAL:
/s/
JOHN T. TICKET
Major General, USAF
Director, J5
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