SNIE 57-1 -73
The Short-Term
Prospects for
Cambodia Through the Current Dry
Season May 1974
5 December 1973
I
APPROVED
DATE:
FOR
RELEASE
~N ~O~5
(b) (3)
SPECIAL
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
The Short-Term
Prospect for Cambodia
Through the Current Dry SeasonMay 1974
SNIE 57 1 73
.
5 December 1973
112
91
THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD
intelligence organizations participated
The following
the estimate
The Central
ments
Intelligence Agency and
of State ond
Defens~,
the
in
the preparation of
Concurring
The
Deputy
Director Qf Central
Intelligence
lntelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense
The Director, National
intelligence Agency
Security Ageiicy
The Assistant General Manager for National
Special
Depart
-~
The Director of
The
of the
intelligence organizations
and the NSA
Assistant to the
Secretary
Security,
of the
Atomic
Energy
Commission
Treasury
Abstaining
The Assistant Director
~6f his
Federłl Bureau of lpvestigotion
the
subject being ~uj~j.de
iurisdiction
WARNIl~4G
ional Defense of the United States
This material contains information
within the
mission
or
ws, Tit e
meaning of the espio
revelotio
c
in ahy manner to
C, Secs 793 and 794 the
an
unau
erson
is
trans
prohibited
-
-
-
-
-
-
~r.
~EC2~
SNIE 57-1-73
THE SHORT-TERM PROSPECT FOR CAMBODIA
THROUGH THE CURRENT DRY
SEASONMAY
1974
CONTENTS
Page
PRCIS
1
.
I. THE
MILITARY
FACTOR
3
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE OPTIONS
III. NEGOTIATIONS:
THE
PARTIES
ANNEX A: ARGUMENTS
3
INVOLVED
PRO AND CON
SEASON MILITARY OPTIONS
ANNEX B: THE
REGARDING
7
KC
DRY
9
MILITARY BALANCE IN CAMBODIA
ANNEX C: THE CAMBODIAN
15
ECONOMIC SITUATION
23
ANNEX D: THE NORTH VIETNAMESE-KHMER COMMUNIST RELA
TIONSHIP
ANNEX E: FACTIONALISM WITHIN THE KHMER INSURGENCY
27
...
33
THE SHORT-TERM PROSPECT FOR CAMBODIA
THROUGH THE CURRENT DRY
SEASONMAY
1974
PRECIS
During this dry
the Khmer Communists (KG) are likely to
follow a strategy which calls for the interdiction of Phnom Penhs
key lines of communication, attacks against the citys outlying de
fenses, and attacks elsewhere. The goal of this strangulation strategy
season,
physical
and
psychological, that will lead to
collapse or capitulation of the Government of the Khmer Republic
(GKR). A direct all-out assault on Phnom Penh this dry season also
has some appeal to the KC and might occur later in the dry season.
is to create pressures,
the
Our
judgmentalthough
will be able
be able
bring
military
to
essential
the CKRs
it is
a
very
close callis
that the GKR
the coming round of military action, and will
enough supplies up the Mekong to meet its minimum
to survive
and economic needs. The
key factors determining
failure, however,
will be the relative staying
of
the
the
KG
and
ability
of
Phnom Penh to prevent the
CKR,
power
KG from closing the Mekong for prolonged periods, and the avail
success
or
of external support to both the GKR and the KC from their
respective allies. The movement of events in each of these areas is
ability
far from certain.
The prospects for a negotiated settlement do not appear good until
the KG have made an effort to win it all militarily this dry season. But
only
the KC
are
adamantly opposed
to
negotiations. Sihanouk, Peking,
apparently all view a negotiated settlement as
Hanoi, and
the preferable way to resolve the Cambodian imbroglio, and some
elements of the GKR also hold this view. Thus, if the KG fail to topple
the GKR this dry season, they might be more willing to consider the
Moscow
though they are likely to come out
somewhat improved position in the countryside vis--vis the CKR.
possibility
in
2
a
of negotiations,
even
I. THE MILITARY FACTOR
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE OPTIONS
1. Phnom Penh is and will remain
the
on
militarily. There is no prospect of
the CKR doing much more than holding its
own; it lacks the capability to push the KC
back and regain lost territory. Through at
least this dry season, the KC are in the posi
tion to carry the fight to the FANKand
all
evidence indicates that they will do so.
defensive
2. The
KC
Option
basic
dry
season
1
direct all-out assault
Aa
Penh
three
have
military options:
designed
to
on
defeat the CKR
Phooni
in
one
decisive stroke.
clearly
a
conventional attacks against the
citys
out
lying defenses, and attacks against
gov
strongholds elsewhere in an ef
force the collapse or capitulation
ernment
of the CKR.
Ca
modest increase in
military
ac
tivity designed to keep FANK on the de
fensive, but with no serious attcmpt to
seek
dry
See
a
final resolution of the situation this
season.
Annex
A
on
making
major effort
a
the battlefield
on
for
a
discussion of the arguments
to win
this
dry
They believe their prospects of doing
so are good. Since Option C forecloses a total
victory during this dry season, the KG would
not go this route unless they decided that (a)
they did not have the wherewithal to make
Options A or B work or (b) the pressures
froth their allies
forego
4.
to
negotiate
final military solution
were irresistible.
a
Although Option A,
Phnom Penh,
probably
a
has
or
at
during
least
this
to
dry
direct assault
on
appeal to the
KC, we believe the arguments against it make
it unlikely that they would choose this option,
except possibly as a follow-on action to Op
tion B. If they did choose to mount a major
effort to take Phnom Penh, however, the odds
less than
even
\Vhile there is
a
that
some
they could pull
chance that the CKRs
it off.
will
to
persist might collapse in the face of a KC
push, it is more likely th~it FANK would offer
effective resistance.
Moreover,
that the KG could sustain
for and against each option.
during
season.
are
Option
bent
solution
season
Option Ba more deliberate, but still major,
campaign coordinating interdiction oper
ations against the capitals
supply lines,
fort to
3. At this point, Option C, a status quo
military strategy, is a nonstarter, and has al
ready been rejected by the KG. They are
effort
against the capital; their
materiel losses would be
~6g~
a
it
is
unlikely
major military
manpower and
high, and
it is ques
3
~6~EZ~
tionable whether sufficient supplies would be
available either from their own stocks or from
North Vietnam if inconclusive heavy fighting
dragged
for
on
prolonged period.
a
judgment, therefore,
5. Our
is
that the KC
a
two- to
three-month
only greatly
problems,3 but the government would
probably collapse. Some parts of an effort to
accomplish this would be easier than others.
Road interdiction would present the KC with
problems, although even here the
the fewest
lic and private statements by KC leaders, and
preparations undertaken thus far are consistent
arteries to the
a
strategy. But while
clear how the KC
plan
all clear whether
ing
conclusion
a
they
on
reasonably
proceed,
it is not at
will succeed. In reach
this matter, the major fac
success or failure will
their
determining
tors
to
it is
be the relative staying power of the KC and
the GKR, and the availability of support from
prime allies, Hanoi and Washington
their
respectively.
The KG. At the
6.
July,
within
a
height
of the
fighting
last
estimated 17,000 troops
25-mile radius of Phnom Penh.2 In
the KC had
an
coming dry season, KC military com
manders probably plan to commit at least as
the
not
eco
nomic
will pursue Option B, a strangulation strategy,
this dry season. The evidence, including pub
with such
period, they would
exacerbate Phnom Penhs
keeping the key land
capital simultaneously cut for
KC could have trouble
prolonged periods.
8.
not
Pochentong Airport is an important, but
critical, supply funnel for the CKR. The
airfield is vulnerable to sapper attacks and at
tacks by fire. Greatly increased use of Po
chentong
mount
a
would
undoubtedly lead the KC
major effort
to
close the
to
field, and
the risk of
heavy losses of
supply aircraft, perhaps making resupply im
possible on a sustained basis. Although this
would be psychologically demoralizing to the
GKR, the inability to use Pochentong would
not create major supply strains as long as the
this would
Mekong
run
corridor
were
open. If the
Mekong
closed, however, Pochentong alone could
handle the quantities necessary to keep
were
many
troops
to
the effort around Phnom Penh.
not
of many of these troops is
suspect. The KC suffered heavy losses in the
fighting last summer, not only in absolute
But the
quality
importantly in terms of
personnel. In many in
stances, the replacements, both troops and
cadres, are ill-trained and inexperienced. KC
terms,
but
more
combat-hardened
commanders
have
can
no
how well these forces will
great confidence
perform
under
in
KC effort under
con
lish and maintain
Cambodias
above, the objectivc of the
Option
an
9. The
B would be to estab
Mekong corridor
for the
major LOCs. If the KC could
and
4
capabilities
discussion of the military forces
of the CKR and KC.
a
is
From
the major
supply
a
supply buildup in the capital will give the
some breathing room. The late rains in
November will complicate KC action along
the river, making it more difficult for them
the
to move in
close
to
firing positions. But,
the banks and establish
in
fact, the KC have al
Plagued by war-relateti problems, the Cambodian
is already shaky. Inflation is exceedingly
high, now approaching an annual rate of 275 percent.
The GKRs
major economic problem, however, is to
economy
the food and other commodity requirements of
See Annex C for a fuller discussion
of the CKRs economic situation.
meet
Annex B for
CKR.
strictly supply
standpoint, the critical period is likely to be
from now until the middle of January; if river
traffic is not significantly reduced before then,
route
effective interdiction of
simultaneously close the key LOCs and Pa
chentong Airport, and keep them closed for
See
supplied.
CKR
ditions of sustained offensive action.
7. As mentioned
the CKR and its forces
the
population.
ready stepped-up attacks
as
the
water
the convoys, and
on
recedes, KC operations will be
easier. KC action will also
no
longer be
-im
US air power over the river, al
the GKR plans to commit its own air
supply system, and the insurgents could ulti
mately run out of steam. It is very doubtful
that the KG have
peded by
assurances
though
Hanoi; if
keeping
if supplies
power and increased naval asset to
corridor open. Moreover, even
available in Phnom Penh, if a month
without any convoys
passed
key
factor in the GKRs
KC
will
probably
Mekong
from time
likely
to
to
cause
rests
on
be able
to
it to the
the
populace
to
the GKRs
the
success
on
to
interdict the
time, but they
along
are
un
sufficient
the river, and the
willingness
of
attacks.
key
element in the situation is the ade
supplies. We lack good evidence
of the amount of supplies currently held by
quacy of KC
the KC. There is considerable evidence, how
ever,
that
the
KC
rely
on
supplies
cap
purchased from the FANK. Al
though they continue to talk of being able to
pull off major and sustained action, there are
numerous indications of shortages of supplies,
particularly arms and ammunition, from all
levels of the KG military structure. Moreover,
tured and
Sihanouk has statedand
Hanoi has hinted
that the KG lack the wherewithal
to
mount
military effort sufficient to bring down the
CKR this dry season. Though not conclusive,
the evidence suggesting that China and North
a
Vietnam have cut back support to the KC is
fairly firm. We do not, however, know to what
extent.
would
not
In any event,
a
the
overcome
The
recent
between
Although
Hanoi
historical animosity
deep
fighting
prolonged
place heavy requirements
on
offensive
the KG
around
and
KG
Kampot and Takeo
Communist
Vietnamese
forces is only the most obvious manifestation of
difficulties between the KG and the North
at
to
civilian merchant captains and seamen to con
tinue to run the convoys in the face of KC
11. A
12. The North Vietnamese.
of the current effort
a
and
founded and nurtured the KC movement, the
relationship has never been an easy one. It has
Vietnamese.
for
build up supplies in Phnom Penh, the ability
of the GKR to use its naval, marine, and air
units
anything,
period
collapse. This judgment
so
Peking
the evidence points to the
between the Cambodians and the Vietnamese.
Mekong will be the
supply situation. The
be able
do
so
get advance
to
opposite conclusion.
are
making
city, the psychological impact
would be unsettling.
10. In any event, the
or
the
expect
or
of increased aid from
Initially dependent
Vietnamese for
the outset
on
the North
practically everything,
not
were
able
the KG
to exercise
much
their strategy or operations. Since
the spring of 1972, however, the KC have
been making most of their own tactical deci
control
over
and have become increasingly inde
pendent on strategic questions. Just how much
militaryand politicalinfluence the Vietna
sions,
still exercise
mese
it is
over
clear that the KG
Flanoi
as
they
13. From
Hanois
Cambodia is
seen
once
primarily
not
a
the KG is unclear, but
are
not
as
responsive
to
were.4
perspective, moreover,
major target. Its role is
in terms of the North Vietna
effort against South Vietnam. And in
this regard, the Vietnamese Communists al
mese
ready
have what
they need
support whatever strategy
South
Vietnam.
Given
this,
in Cambodia to
they
a
opt for
stalemate
in
in
appreciably affect North
Vietnamese objectives, and Hanoi might, in
fact, see some problems with a nationalistic
KC leadership in Phnom Penh. In short, Hanoi
does not have a vested interest in a quick KC
Cambodia does not
victory
See
in
Cambodia, and while North Viet
Annex D for
Vietnamese-KC
a
fuller elaboration of the North
relationship.
5
KC
likely
is not
nam
totally,
off its support
to cut
neither is it
likely
to
the
such
to increase
support.
of the KC, but their
principal question,
strength or weak
strengths relative to
those of the GKR. Under
Option B, the thrust
14. GKR
of
Viability.
ness
The
the absolute
course, is not
is not toward
of the KCs
approach
conventional military victory,
ating
pressures,
decisive
but toward
and
physical
a
cre
psychological,
bring the GKR to a point where it either
collapses or capitulates. Despite an estimated
which
two to
one
advantage
in
ground
combat troops
FANK for the past two years
has followed a defensive strategy. It has suf
the
over
matter
fense of
Kompong
Cham demonstrates that
FANK cannot be counted Out
force, and that unless
as
morale
its
fighting
collapses,
a
momentum.
to
necessary
Cambodias
assistance
present levels
at
Penh remains crucial. And this
the question of the CKRs
to
vent
a
major battlefield
not
decisive
and
ultimately
reverseeven
militarilycould
the GKR
The first. reverberation
to
cause
if
FANK
begin unraveling.
might
be within the
Penh, and
only
or
militarily if strongly
16. As with the
in the
CKRs
KC,
situation
an
important element
is the
availability of
material and political.
external support, both
Without continuing US assistance at least at
present
would
6
levels,
effective
evaporate, and
it
FANK
would
resistance
only
be
a
pres
by the US, and then only if
it could be assured that helping Cambodia
to
do
would not
so
damage
the GVNs
own
prospects
18. The
the
Military Bakince. Both combatants
problems in sustaining themselves over
course of a prolonged offensive. The CKR
has to cope with the factor of morale and must
be able to persist in the face of an adversary
who has the
military initiative. Given past
performance and present capabilities, it seems
certain that the KC will register some gains.
a
minimum, pressure on Phnom Penhs
LOCs will be intense, and this will further
temporarily.
the KC.
key
on receiving sig
military support from South
assist the GKR
sured
the wars
or
ability
to pre
Vietnam. The GVN has indicated that it would
At
end with Sihanouk
down
comes
17. Cambodia cannot count
nificant aid
a move to
top leadership
push aside Lon Nol and perhaps others would
become likely. The logical instigators of such
a move might allege
(and in some cases ac
.tually believe) that they were motivated by a
desire to prosecute the war more effectively.
In all likelihood, however, this phase would be
only an interim step to a desire to negotiate
in Phnom
be
to
it to Phnom
Cambodian LOCs.
face
one
an
the
KC interdiction of the
prolonged
factors will be very im
portant. If Phnom Penh were faced with a
drawn out siege and mounting supply prob
lems,
continues
available, the problem of getting
for receiving US aid.
Psychological
of
dip into US reserves to meet
needs.) Even assuming that US
FANK may put up a strong defense of Phnom
Penh and other key population centers.
15.
developed
(Because
worldwide energy crisis, the supply of POL
to Cambodia may prove particularly difficult
in the coming months, and it might become
KC,
fered many sharp battlefield reverses but has
also shown considerable resilience. The de
of time before the KC
irreversible
complicate an already shaky supply situation
in the capital. In addition, FANK is likely to
give
up
additional territory, and there is
a
strong possibility that some outlying GKR
strongpoints (including provincial capitals)
will
fall,
or
19. Our
at
least have
to
judgment~lthough
close callis
be
it
given
is
a
up
very
that the GKR will be able
to
coming round of action. All ele
of the Intelligence Community agree,
survive the
ments
however, that the uncertainties are such that
at this point the odds are very close.
22. Sihanouk. Sihanouks
20. Even if the GKR survives
dry
its
season,
through the
likely to have
is
position
deteriorated further. The KC will have suf
fered
setback in
a
failing
the Phnom
topple
to
Government, and they might be battered
from the effort, but their overall position in
Penh
the
the
countryside vis--vis
somewhat improved. The
will be
GKR
KC will
probably
territory and more people
end of the dry season than they did
control
21. The
KG.
at
The
are
back
trolling
rests
negotiating with the GKR.
insurgency
and
Sihanouk
force
to
the
in
the
not
con
The
movement.5
they
favor
probably
are
can
have made it clear that
KC
militarily,
they do not
be desirable. The
negotiated settlement might
KG suspect the motives of their
service to Sihanouks
spite lip
KG have
allies, and
of Sihanouk. De
particularly leery
are
leadership,
ment, that his value is
ing point, and
play
a
the
told their adherents that
privately
most
only
tactical
that he would not be
significant
unlikely
to
with the GKII until
one
more
or
lasting
as
a
rally
permitted
role in any
attempt
move
they
toward
a
have made
to win it
dialogue
at
least
all
militarily.
more willing
If
to
might be
consider the possibility of negotiations, and
their allies might be more willing and able to
they fail,
exert
his
only
the KG
pressure toward such
See Annex E
for
a
an
can
suade them. We would reiterate
do to dis
however, that
a negotiated settle
military effort appear
if the prospects for
even
before the KC
ment
Sihanouk will still be
slim,
assuming the KG do
23. If Sihanouk should
head of
a
he would
a
military victory.
eventually
government
new
important factor
an
not win
become
in Phnom
Penh,
be beholden to the KG
initially
they would restrict his freedom of action.
negotiated settlement in which he played a
leading role, however, would increase his
leverage. Furthermore, if a coalition govern
and
A
including
ment
non-Communist elements
outcome
were
negotiations, his ability
of
to
move
KC-dominated government. In sum, the KC
are
there is little that Sihanouk
the
the Prince is not the real leader of the
to
that
major political role
problem is that while
a
gents in the field. As long as the KC are deter
mined to press ahead with a military effort
win
intend at present to go along with any advice
from Sihanouk or Peking and Flanoi that a
they
His
negotiations.
on
elements in the
dialogue, they
a
they
playing
nominally the head of the KC movement,
he does not in fact control or greatly influence
the military or political strategy of the insur
impediment
major
leaders believe that
and
realizes
Sihanouk
Moscow.
the
this time is the KG who have
interest in
While there
which
has
he is
negotiations
opening
in
uals in Phnom Penh, and last, but not least,
that he has the support of Peking, Hanoi, and
at
NEGOTIATIONS: THE PARTIES
no
Cambodia, that he
figure
supporters within the KC, that his return is
acceptable to important groups and individ
chance of again
INVOLVED
shown
best known
the
beginning.
III.
the fact that he is the
at
more
power in the pres
ent situation rests on
end.
discussion of KC factions.
maneuver
would
be
enhanced.
He
would
doubt attempt to whittle away whatever
fetters the KG sought to place on him, play
no
ing
the theme of Cambodian nationalism,
on
and
capitalizing
tion
as
major
on
factionalism in the coali
external support from the
Communist states and from the US.
well
as
on
Sihanouk would also
velop
a
relationship
elements in
a
probably attempt
to
de
with the non-Communist
coalition government. And, like
Souvanna Phouma in
Laos,
that he would succeed
in
quite possible
undercutting the
it is
Communist elements in the government, par-
7
ticularly
if he
were
able
to
gain support and
scarcely
now
24. North Vietnam.
The limited evidence
hand suggests that Hanoi has come around
to the view that a negotiated settlement in
involving Sihanouks
North
serve
Vietnams
would
return
leverage
immediate
interests,
ended.
might
in
effort
uncertain
an
Hanoi
even
may
also
fear
that
a
North Vietnams
season
more
likely
to
hedge
25. The
now
Ma~or
own
Powers. The
appear to be
case
to arrange
major
powers
toward
negotiated settlement in Cambodia. Peking
championing Sihanouk as the only
possible solution to the Cambodian imbroglio.
has been
Pekings
8
leverage
something
perspective, the
serve
for Soviet interests out of the
But the
Soviets
are
more
or
less
they might
intermediary, but they lack the entree
play a power brokers role.
frozen
of the action;
out
serve
an
Washingtons
26.
role in
a
negotiating
as
to
con
major factor. The GKR is unlikely
to go much further than it has already in
offering concessions to the KC and Sihanouk
text is
a
tions while
return to
to maximize
in the situation. Moscow is
they spin
27. The GKR.
out
their
Although
the motions
through
military option.
the GKR has gone
concerning negotiations,
it has not
yet faced the likely realities of the
situation.
Major concessions would be re
Nol, Sink Matak, and probably
quired.
favorably disposed
power of Sihanouk would
was
this is necessary. In any event, the KC will
remain unreceptive to the notion of negotia
it
a
From the Chinese
settlement
until and unless the US makes it clear that
its bets than it is to
take.a major initiative on its
a Cambodian settlement.
Sihanouk, perhaps
negotiated
KC
would have less leverage on the ensuing gov
ernment. Faced with such uncertainties, Hanoi
is
vage
a
without
the
military victory
backing, in which
win
force
to
negotiations before the dry
the KC into
first continuing to
CKR, Moscow has
and offered the best chance to sal
possible
situation.
although a military stalemate is probably also
acceptable for the time being. But Hanoi is
caught in something of a dilemma. While
North Vietnamese logistic support is still im
portant to the KC, Hanoi is unlikely to use
its
After
thrown its support to
in the belief that
at
Cambodia
factor.
a
maintain relations with the
assistance from external powers.
Lon
several other
ceptable
to
Sihanouk
key figures
would not be
the other side. Not
come
back
as
ac
only might
head of the govern
ment, but the KC would have a major, perhaps
dominant, voice in a coalition government.
Though
that
the evidence is sparse, we believe
Cambodians would accept these
most
conditions if
they brought
the
war
to
an
end.
ANNEX A
ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON REGARDING KC DRY SEASON
MILITARY OPTIONS
ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON REGARDING KC DRY SEASON
MILITARY OPTIONS
A.
Option
A: A Direct All-Out Assault
on
Phnom Penh
1. The
arguthents against Option
2. The major
A
are:
major arguments for Option
A
arc:
It would
require the massing of KC
By maximizing pressure on Phnom
Penh, the KC might anticipate a sud
units
the
den
easier
of the
collapse
GKRs
will
to
in
around
relatively
Phnom
terrain
open
Penh, making them
targets for CKR artillery and
persist, thereby gaining their objective
aircraft and posing the risk of
almost before the battle
really began.
losses.
Since they
capital, the
believe
KC
could achieve
win
a
could
already close
are
might
to
the
they
tactical surprise and
victory before the CKR
quick
rally its
Unless
they gained
a
high
quick victory,
it is doubtful that the KC could
sus
a
forces
or
bring
in rein
against Phnom Penh
without increased aid from Hanoi, and
tain
major
action
the KC appear to doubt that they can
such assistance for a high
forcements.
count on
Despite the likelihood of heavy losses
and materiel, the KC might
men
calculate that a major effort against
of
Phnom Penh would in the
require fewer
a
resources
long
than
run
would
strategy of protracted fighting.
Confronted
tions
that
with
volved with
gotiated
increasing indica
other parties in
Cambodia prefer a ne
all
settlement
and particularly
reliability of North
Vietnam as a source of supply, going
for the jugular would allow the KC
a
all-out
attack
Phnoiii
on
Penh.
As
demonstrated
Kompong Cham,
effective
in
the
battle
FANK is
resistance
in
for
capable of
a
set-piece
battle vvhen its back is up against the
wall.
the
worried about the
to
visibility
present their friends and foes with
fait accompli.
In the KC view, the massive US air
effort of the past year is
to be repeated.
not
likely
Even
though they probably
the risk
low,
the KC would
consider
not
dismiss
the
possibility of the US (or South
Vietnam) responding with air power.
Failure of
Option
would not
only
buoy
seriously
(lamage the KCpolitically, psycho
logically, and militarilyand would
make the KC more susceptible to
political pressure from their allies.
A
GKR morale, but would
11
B: The
Option
B.
The failure of
Strangulation Strategy
Option B to topple the
damaging to the
would the failure of Option A.
GKR would be less
3. The
major arguments for Option
B
are:
KC than
The cumulative impact of Option B,
particularly if the capitals LOGs were
any
FANK
could
without
will
FAN Ks
destroy
to resist
internal
lead to the GKRs
costly attack
a
collapse
Phnom
on
4. The
major arguments against Option B
are:
the KC; by initially following
B the KC could later in the dry
to
Option
season
shift
A
Option
to
over
or
Option
B is in effect
KC forces have had considerable
in
the types of action in
B.
factor in the
key
efficacy
Option B; the KC
option less likely
of
would consider this
than
Option
the resump
provoke
A to
of
of
Option
supplies and
success
availability
manpower; this strategy
tained
offensive
fronts and
The absence of US air power is likely
to give the KC increased confidence
the
the
ex
undertaking
Option
during
KCs 1973 offensive.
A
success
continuation of
the strategy that faltered
B is the
perience and
a
revert
Option C.
in
already shaky
exacerbate the CKRs
economic situation.
It is the most flexible strategy avail
to
Phnom
and
Penh.
able
By concentrating on cutting LOCs to
Penh, the KC could greatly
length of time and/or
suffered significant reverses,
for
cut
a
action
requires
substantial investment of
and materiel. Yet, KC units
men
sus
several
on
are
suffering from some supply shortages,
particularly arms and ammunition, and
there
increasing indications that
are
the North Vietnamese have cut back
tion of US air strikes.
their materiel support to the KC.
Although Option
B would entail the
commitment of substantial manpower
and
supplies,
the KC could better ad
just the level of combat
available
Option
to
might
be
more
at
level and
mese
moment.
sumption;
acceptable
Strangulation
adequacy
B
would
time to gauge the
of North Vietna
the chance that
key physical
administrative
facilities
machinery
functioning
should collapse.
remain in
that the GKRs
cut
for
a
of Phnom Penh
would
condition if the
requires
economic lifelines be
prolonged period;
thus
the KC have had considerable
in
interdicting the LOCs,
have not demonstrated
increases
Phnom Penhs
GKR
Option
support.
Option
and
more
plan on this as
probably know this.
defensive
the KC
minimum, Option B
a
allow the KC
an
based its
the assets
the North Vietnamese than
A;
12
particular
at any
B
to
anticipates that the KC will
Option B strategy and has
The GKR
follow
an
far,
success
but they
ability to
keep a sufficiept number of them cut
long enough to strangle Phnom Perth.
At the upper end of the actions called
for in
Option B, the KG could find
inexorably drawn into a
themselves
~6R~
series of
at
costly battles (such as that
Kompong Cham last summer)
where the scale of commitment and the
losses suffered forced them
future actions in order
limit
to
to recoup.
6. The
major arguments against Option C
are:
Option C offers little hope for resolv
ing the situation.
It flies
C.
Option
Strategy
C: A Status Quo
directly
Military
past 18 months
to
5. The major arguments for
C
Option
are:
It places the fewest strains on the KC,
sparing them the heavy losses of men
and materiel that the other options
what
they
the face of what
in
the KC have been
striving for
or so
have
intend to do this
and
runs
already
dry
The KC would risk
over
the
counter
stated
they
season.
losing
their mili
tary momentum, and the revolutionary
zeal of KC adherents would flag.
entail.
Option
The KC could
the time
use
bought
consolidate their control in the
tryside and
strength.
C
Option
wait and
led
to
litical
a
to
coun
military
would
permit the KC
to
if the passage of time
weakening of the GKRs po
to
C would be viewed in Cam
bodia and elsewhere
sign of weak
as a
ness.
The
GKR
could
use
the
respite
to
build up its forces.
see
viability
support
build up their
to
or
a
diminution of US
Cambodia.
Pressure
on
mount, and
faced with
the KC to
they
even
negotiate could
could find themselves
more
reluctance
the part of Hanoi to back
of major hostilities.
a
on
resumption
13
ANNEX B
THE MILITARY BALANCE IN CAMBODIA
THE MILITARY BALANCE IN CAMBODIA
is
primary importance
I. THE MANPOWER BALANCE
as a
manpower
pool for
KG units.
strength
combat
ground
1. FANK
is
cur
rently estimated to be about 110,000-130,000 6
(out of a. total military strength of almost
210,000) organized
sized
in company- to division-
Combat units have
units.
maneuver
a
operations against the KC
defenseand
are
primarily de
dual rolemobile
and
static
ployed around major towns and cities and
along lines of communication. Limited sup
port is also drawn from a nascent Auto-De
fense
3. Some 2,000 VC/~NVA combat troops and
about 18,000 administrative services personnel
remain in Cambodia, but they are operating
primarily
in South
threat
to FANK at
be
this time. In
2,000
addition, there
VC/NVA
troops still operating with KC units as ad
visors, support and liaison personnel.
may
as
as
many
more
program which bolsters local
(militia)
defense in conjunction with FANK. Although
Auto-Defense strength is currently about
II. FANK CAPABILITIES
Manpower
poor state of readiness
restricts their combat capa
60,000, the generally
of
support of Communist activities
Vietnam, and do not pose a direct
in
these units
4. FANKs
2
bilities.
1
to
inability
numerical
exploit
to
superiority
its
stems
roughly
from
a
number of factors. The most critical of these
2. In contrast, the KC have an estimated
strength of about 50,000 to 60,000, or
combat
ganized
neuver
platoon-
in
units.
regimental-sized
Unlike FANK, however, the
need commit
to
relatively
KC
few of their troops
defensive missions, since FANK normally
poses almost no offensive threat to KC-con
trolled
areas.
with
Because there is little informa
which
to
gauge the
supporting administrative
little
is
known
about
strength of
services units, and
the
and
structure
strength of the KC guerrilla/militia, total
KC military strength is unknown. In any event,
the military potential of the guerrilla/militia
is limited since theylike
the governments
Auto-Defense unitsare
ing
more or
See
combat
map
less
firmly
for the
strength.
tasked with
controlled
disposition
garrison
areas.
Their
continuing lack of effective leadership.
war with few capable lead
only a~handful have emerged since
time, especially at the middle and upper
FANK entered the
ma
to
tion
is the
ers,
and
that
levels. Commanders in the field continue
adhere to
tions in the face of little
often
drag
and
KC
or
no
pressure, and
their feet when ordered
to initiate
operations against the KC. Through a com
bination of a lack of aggressiveness and fre
quent absenteeism from their units in the
field, most commanders fail to instill the moti
vation and discipline in their troops necessary
accomplish even a successful defense. A
major factor affecting ~FANK morale is the
to
overall impact of low pay and inflation
individual soldiers
of FANK
to
garrison mentality stressing fixed
defensive positions, frequently abandon posi
a
family.
In
ability
spite of
some
to
provide
recent
on
the
for his
efforts
to
ameliorate the situation, basic sustenance and
17
.FANK
FANK and Khmer Communist Combat
by
FANK Military
Strength
Region
(In thousands)
}
$Ge~
~
.~
.l->~
J
-j
-,
15-18.~
~ ~...
KC 5-7
IV
v
~!
Ill
.;
.
FANKO
KC 1-2
(
FANP( 20-25
I.
\~
--
icc 9-10.,-
~
F
FANk6-8
NK30
-U.
/
5
.,
~
FANK
~
FANK29-32
.
~12,
So~ith
~
~. :~., ,~
KC~5-
~
KC 12-14
.
..
.~
.
.
.~
~
~jPHNoMpENW-~V~Le tfn.a m~
~
.~
.
.~SPEC;AL MR
~
of
:
-?
I,
/1-
~-.J
~
~
-.;,.
-,
.
.~
.
,...
S~u
.
-
\
~
~
-~-~
.\
(-
~
y.:
h,,,..
~
..
Cambodia
L
M1.try
g.ObO
Interna~ofla~
/!
18
dy
bo~.nd~ry
beyond
shelter remain
and
the
Phnom Penh Government
can
of most,
means
substantial reform in this
only
area
by the
termination of the extensive US/South Viet
namese
downward trend.
Logistics
5. Accentuating the problem of ineffectual
leadership in the field is the quality of sup
staff. Operations
port provided by FANKs
have been hampered by constantly changing
and conflicting mission orders, and very little
initiative has been shown in
anticipating KG
pressuresthe staff preferring instead to com
mit units piecemeal only after the situation
has deteriorated. The retrieval of the situa
tion at
Kompong Cham
in
September
the
was
first time that the General Staff acted de
8. The state of FANKs
define
to
objectives
and
situation, especially following the acceleration
of
9. Continued
6. The effectiveness of FANK
at
by
degree
a
leadership
is
of corruption
times, has been excessive
even
the
accepted standards of the area. One
festation of thispayroll paddinghas
by
mani
had
a
critical impact on FANK operations because
units committed to combat frequently have
been found to be
strength,
and
substantially
reported
thus only marginally effective.
below
akin
7.
Closely
problem
padded by phantom
troops has been
the absence, until recently, of a rational sys
tem of personnel replacement. It was not until
mid-summer that conscription was attempted,
to
the
of
unit
rosters
and
the initial
attempts proved ineffective.
With recruitment
largely
in the
hands of local
commanders,
many FANK unitsparticularly
among the reaction forces of the General Re
servehave
been
badly worn down by months
fighting, to the point that FANKs four
divisions (the backbone of the General Re
serve) could field only about half of their
authorized strength at the height of the KC
of
offensive this
past
summer.
Moreover,
ap
plies
port
for FANK. Present levels of MAP sup.
in accord with FANKs
ability to
equipment,
new
the
of FANKs
alleviated.
hand, present levels of support
bat since a substantial portion of the FY 1974
appropriation was consumed during this years
offensive. Any reduction in MAP funding
would similarly deplete ammunition stocks,
although
cant
it
probably
impact
10. Two
the
on
would
additional
factors
a
signifi
of hardware.
make FANKs
first is the govern
three key entry routesthe
supply
ments
reliance
on
have
not
availability
status tenuous. The
Mekong, Pochentong Airport, and Highway 4
from the Port of Kompong Somfor
MAP
deliveries. Given the vulnerability of these
lines of communication, it will be difficult for
FANK to maintain stocks on hand.
11.
FANKs
Second,
internal
distribution
system, although greatly improved in the last
three years, and facilitated by equipment
standardization, remains undependable. More
over,
because of FANKs
land routes and
capability,
only
a
reliance
on
over
limited aerial
the system remains
fire
since
most
adequate to maintain ammunition
during another period of sustained com
stocks
has
increased
and
have been
may not be
terdiction. A
substantially
resupply through the US MAP
adequate sup
are
proximately one-third of FANKs troops re
main untrained. The internal training burden
been
air
is vital to the maintenance of
On the other
further restricted
Program (MAP) deliveries
hardware deficiencies
necessary forces.
which,
Aid
Military
prior to the 15 August cessation of US
operations, but there is cause for concern.
the
deploy
material readiness
has been somewhat better than the manpower
absorb
cisively
program in South Vietnam.
training
halt the present
resupply
subject to in
significant result of this is the
artillery commanders to
reluctance of FANK
harassment
and
interdiction
missions
19
against the
KC for fear that their ammunition
will
stocks
be
not
if
replenished
a
more
and executed with
and aid support
immediate need arises.
Uncertainty of resupply aside, artillery
supply for FANK units still remains limited.
12.
Although FANK is reasonably well equipped
artillery (the ratio of tubes to ground
forces strength comparing favorably with
ARVN), most of the tubes are deployed in
with
static defensive
use
positions, thus restricting their
for offensive operations. Moreover,
despite
training programboth internal
and externalthe
level of expertise varies
greatly, and generally remains low. Opera
tions are generally hampered by the limited
extensive
an
number of fire direction, ammunition
and forward observation personnel.
13.
By the
token,
same
air
handling
support for
degree of
determina
Cambodian
battle,
proved
ameliorate
steps
to
fairly
well
naval
effective.
Moreover, FANK has initiated
15,
Firepower
a rare
that
During
tion.
of its
some
positive
problems.
A
organized recruitment! conscription
campaign finally got off the ground in early
October vvith
an
ultimate
goal
of 25,000-30,000
troops. As of 20 November, about 9,000
new
had
troops
new
actually
been
inducted.
Tighter manpower controls have been insti
tuted, and unlike past practices, new troops
being assigned to understrength units
being used to form new ones.
are
rather than
KC CAPABILITIES
Ill.
16. The
gains made by the KC during their
1973 offensive demonstrated the progress they
have made toward molding an effective mili
tary
structure.
Before and
during
the
offensive,
Cambodian Air Force
the KC accelerated the formation of regiments,
and significantly expanded their capability to
sortie rate between
control
FANK
units
supportwith
air
tionshas
limited.
remains
been
the
Although
nearly doubled its strike
July and September, total
the cessation of US opera
cut by about 80 percent.
mechanisms
of forward
the effective
use
in the
well
the
air
ground
Recent
as
as
air
forward air
controllers
guides
on
remains limited.
Developments
some
have been observed
logis
have
signs of improvement
recently.
Since the bomb
ing halt, FANK commanders have on occasion
displayed an encouraging degree of aggressive
ness, and at least some ability to integrate
armor and
artillery with infantry operations.
The subsequent defense of Kompong Cham
was relatively well conceived and coordinated,
20
17.
their
multiregimental operations.
time, however, the offensive also
number of KC shortcomings.
the
At
pointed
Despite their organizational gains and
ability to shift units between areas of
operation and coordinate the operations of
multiregimental formations, the KC failed to
provide adequate organic support for their
units. They also did not maintain the degree
of discipline necessary to keep pace with the
increasing magnitude of forces committed.
Indicative of this is that
14. In the midst of these manpower,
tical and firepower problems which
plagued FANK,
a
up
for
coordinating air
and ground operations have only recently been
established, and are not yet fully operational.
Target validation remains cumbersome, and
Moreover,
same
on
several occasions
around Phnom Penli individual elements
from
withdrawn
times to the
similar
surprise of
displays
of
commanders
have
other
well.
areas
as
have been
the
piecemealsome
adjacent unitsand
local autonomy by
frr~strated operations
KC
in
Similarly, the KC supply system seems
caught off guard by the scope of
offensive. Beginning in May, ammunition
18.
to
were
combat
shortages began
tions
near
to
mount, and by
Phnom Penh
July, opera
being adversely
were
affected by those shortages. By the same
token, shortages limited KC effectiveness at
Komp~ng Cham in August and September and
in the Vihear Suor
in October. As
area
was
the
east
of Phnom Penh
case
with command
and control, the KC supply system seems to
have been outstripped by rapid territorial
gains.
19. Of
the question of aid from North Viet
ever, is
nam.
how
potentially greater importance,
Prince Sihanouk has
consistently
main
early in the year that the NVA
have curtailed supply shipments to the KG,
and the magnitude of the supply problems suf
tained since
by them lends some credence to this
possible, however, that even in
absence of a cutback, the NVA may have
fered
claim. It is
the
unwilling to
creased shipments
been
underwrite the
necessary
greatly
determine to what
extent
have made
shortcomings.
experienced by the
countrywide shortages
probably will be, in large part,
replaced by December, although frequent
references
were
caused
by
are
their units. Moreover, many of the new
troops have been impressed, and lack training
out
and motivation.
fensive
was
increased
the
the
years
most
KG of
impact of US airstrikes which
difficulty of resupply and
further
disrupted the command and control
In
addition, US strikes were extremely
system.
effective in inflicting casualtiesdispropor
tionately among the best KG units. Relatively
well-trained and highly motivated troops are
being replaced by green
replacements who
in
many
duress.
cases
Even
have
more
inducted
been
difficult
the unit cadre which
were
trol
21. The
impact
on
to
under
replace
are
lost to airstrikes.
KG of the difficulties
dry
into the coming
season, thereby continuing to limit their
over
taken
being
action
are
being carefully drafted. In addition, increas
ingly frequent supply shipmentsalbeit of
small sizeindicate
that some adjustments
have been made in the supply system.
addition,
22. In
substantially
the KG will benefit from
reduce the
of
cost
combat, and will facilitate the
and
ties still
heightened
movement
materiel, although significant
can
the
be inflicted
Cambodian
on
of
casual
Air
massed KG units
Force.
In
addition,
offensive operations in the coming dry season
will be initiated from positions close to Phnoni
Penh and other major cities such
Cham.
ThLIS, the KG
pressure to bear
costly
and time
on
can
as
Kompong
quickly bring heavy
FANK in contrast to the
consuming preliminaries which
characterized the first few months of the 1973
offensive.
23. The most
significant potential constraint
capabilities in the coming dry season
is the availability of supplies. If their NVA
patrons underwrite heavy munitions expendi
on
KG
tures, the
KG
probably
longed offensive.
outlined above will carry
also
are
manders, and plans for renewed
by
spite of these problems, the
20. In
Steps
and improve the command and con
structure and replace ineffective com
expand
to
with
internal distribution.
crucial factor in stemming this
children, old
and monks suggests that the KC
experiencing some difficulties in fleshing
the absence oi US airstrikes. This alone will
high
impossible
the supply prob
difficulties
or
the induction of
to
women
men,
sustain
to
KC
apparently
last offensive
men
lems
however,
KC,
progress in ameliorating their
Casualties suffered during the
some
in
levels of combat. In any event, it is
to
The
capabilities.
Vietnamese
are
can
sustain
a
pro
To the extent that the North
unwilling
to
level of support, the scope of
would be curtailed.
provide
a
a
high
KG offensive
21
IV. THE BALANCE OF FORCES FOR
increasingly willing
THE DRY SEASON
to
24. On
balance, FANK capabilities
will remain limited. At
a
and
are
minimum, FANK
probably can successfully defend Phnom
Penh, although at great cost. To defend the
capital against
would have
a
determined attack, FANK
most, if not all, of its
might be forced to pull
to commit
reaction force and
additional territorials into the
a
perimeter. Such
commitment would allow the KC to attack
other cities with relative
ease
and
interdict
to
such
an
commit sizable forces
River should be easier to
keep
roads, though during the dry
Penh will have substantial
cline if losses
can
a
very close
in the
estimate
absence of US air support. As
believe that all
(paragraph 19), we
things considered it probably
Nevertheless, the
can.
KG will maintain the
initiative most of the time, and while FANK
prevent the periodicand
power.
tendedinterdiction
threat to the
moderate
of its
in
to
manpower is
reaction
had very limited success in
interdictions. Moreover, the
22
not
garrison all key roads against
attacks, and FANKs
force has
quickly clearing
KG
contain the threat in
have
been
lying
some areas
in
some
it cannot
cases
ex
of lines of communica
the loss of further
or
maximum
FANK can achieve only
maintaining the security
highways. Adequate
available
KG
capital,
success
can
tion
a
whether
indicates
substantial number of KC troops into the city
a
spectacular, if temporary, display of
of
judgment
weather another offensive of the
for
absence
even
intensity and duration of this yearspar
ticularly
the
Phnom
mount.
26. It is thus
FANK
the
in
season
difficulties
willingness of ship owners and captains to
run the gauntleta
willingness that may de
turn, interdiction of those lines of communica
tion could make life in the capital untenable.
25. Even
Mekong
open than the
here. A crucial factor will be the continued
lines of communication with small forces, In
Similarly, FANK cannot totally prevent the
shelling of the capital or the infiltration of a
to
interdiction effort. The
areas.
territory in out
Furthermore, there is little likeli
hood that FANK will be able to recapture any
now in Gommunist hands.
substantial territory
Thus,
even
in the absence of
a
decisive
out
KG
are
the battlefield in coming months, the
likely to improve their position during
the
dry
season.
come on
ANNEX C
THE CAMBODIAN
ECONOMIC SITUATION
THE CAMBODIAN ECONOMIC SITUATION
Plagued by continuing war-related prob
1.
lems, the Cambodian economy is under very
serious pressures at this point simply to meet
commodity requirements
refugee-swollen cities and a disrupted coun
tryside. Although arrangements have been
the food and other
of
made
to secure
adequate
of rice, there
amounts
shipping problems or
other distributional delays could result in such
severe local or temporary shortages as to bring
is
serious risk that
a
riots
on
Phnom
in
areas.
This
until
at
period
Penh
and
other
urban
of uncertainty will persist
and possibly
mid-December
least
Chronic Inflation
continuing. The principal
increase is
the
increase
2. The
has
Cambodianeconomy
sharply
is weak. The
curtailed economic activity
transport
industry has
and
destroyed
been
generalized supply
rice
of
basic
goodsparticularly
shortage
and a significant rise in the cost of living.
Government spending remains far ahead of
domestic revenues, and the resulting large
damaged.
The result is
deficit will continue
tional loans
or
to
a
be financed
by printing
new
by addi
money.
On
international accounts, Cambodia suffers from
an extremely unfavorable balance of trade and
would
even
require large
assistance for
settlement.
some
The
war
amounts
of
time after any
has
foreign
peaceful
kept exports
at
a
fraction of prewar levels, while imports, also
below 1969 totals, have been shifted toward
consumer
goods, especially foodstuffs.
also in short
a
cause
supply,
been hurt
of
Other
of rice.
as
by rising
do
ma
shortage of credit, and.in some
damage to productive facili
instanceswar
ties.
increases have not
Wage
price hikes, however, resulting
prevent
in most sectors, as many peasants have been
driven off their farms and a large share of
or
are
mestic output has
terial costs,
shortage
the
is
commodities
anticipated
Background
dramatically
accelerated
during 1973, with the cost of living in Phnom
Penh now more than double what it was at
the beginning of the year and this rate of
in real income.
beyond.
war
has
3. Inflation
a
decline
are
but these will
not
further
purchasing
in
Substantial salary hikes
early 1974,
in
up with
kept
deterioration
in
consumer
power.
prevailing shortage of
general, government spending in
goods
creases will contribute to further inflationary
pressures. A supplemental appropriation ap
proved in Augustbrought on by increased
salaries for civilian and military employees
4. With
serious
a
in
and greater subsidies
on
rice
importsput
budget
percent higher than that orig
inally proposed and 63 percent greater than
the 1972 budget. Despite the implementation
40
the
this year of
numerous
tax
measures,
govern
lagging behind earlier projec
probably leave an uncovered deficit
ment revenues,
tions, will
equal to
budget.
about one-third of the total
1973
Commodity Shortages
governments most pressing
problem is procuring adequate
5. The Lon Nol
short-term
stocks of commodities,
particularly
rice. Fre
25
quent interdictions of principal highways have
disrupted deliveries of domestic and imported
rice. Route 5 from the Battambang rice bowl
September; the chances
Kompong Som
be closed periodically.
has been closed since 6
good
are
that route 4 from
will also continue
to
Mekong River is open, but
receding, making government
The
more
vulnerable
Negotiations
to
its waters
river
are
convoys
Communist interdiction.
since late
have elicited
summer
additional rice from abroad. Much of this
rice has reached Phnom Penh or is enroute,
shortages until US
shipments begin to arrive in midDecember. Enough PL-480 rice is committed
needs,
to Cambodia to cover Phnom Penhs
both civilian and military, through the dry
season. Stocks of POL are currently adequate,
largely the result of a concerted logistics effort
to increase stockpiles of critical commodities
by 15 August, the termination date for US air
and should prevent rice
PL-480
support; supplying Phnom Penh with these
commodities should pose minimal
as long as the Mekong is kept open.
difficulty
Prospects
6.
could
be
US economic
government. US aid currently supplies
26
the short
over
run.
financing of imports
to see the government through. Without these
imports, the governmentstrapped by limited
reserveswould
exchange
rice
of
probability
similar
to
at
have
beyond
place
this falls
face
the
in
September
rice emergency,
US aid in the form of PL-480
be
reduce
to
least small scale rice riots
those that took
1972. Even
and
drastically
consumption
will
shipments
vital element in reconstituting depleted
commodity stocks so as to avoid similar prob
a
lems in the future.
7. US support is also essential to the Ex
change Support
Fund
(ESF),
tablished in March 1972
which
some
as
of Cambodias
which
was
purchased. Contributions for the period
1973 total
some
es
mechanism
by
imports could be
a
1972-
$70 million, with almost 40
percent coming from the US.7 The GKR is
already havingdifficulty lining up donors
1974 and any significant reductions in
support would almost certainly convince
contributors
not
to
renew
for
US
re
their
pledges.
fatal for the Lon Nol
some
80 percent of all foreign capital inflows and
is the key source of commodity imports. Even
a
unlikely
critical is US
Particularly
maining
Any significant reduction of
assistance
is most
sources
partial replacement
of US
aid
by
other
Cambodia, Japan, United
Zealand, and until their
withdrawal from the ESF, Australia and
recent
Malaysia. The US may contribute an amount equal
Other
contributors
Kingdom, Thailand,
to
a
are
New
combined total of the other members of the ESF.
ANNEX D
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE-KHMER COMMUNIST RELATIONSHIP
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE-KHMER COMMUNIST REI.ATIONSHIP
1. Vietnamese Communist
Cambodia dates back
at
involvement in
Communist offensive in South Vietnam. Al
when
though the insurgents remained heavily de
pendent on the Vietnamese for arms and am
munition and for some limited advisory sup
least
to
1947,
the Viet Mirth made contact with rebel Khmer
elements
the
fighting against
French
and
persuaded them to accept Communist backing
and sponsorship. Over the next six years the
Viet Minh steadily increased their political
and military support to the expanding rebel
lion. In 1953, however, Vietnamese fortunes
in Cambodia began to decline as Sihanouks
~crusade
for independence gathered momen
tum. Following the signing of the Geneva
Accords in 1954, the Vietnamesemindful of
Sihanouks strong domestic positionadopted
a
low
for
profile
over
became
a
in
Cambodia that
to
was
last
decade. In 1967 the Vietnamese
active
more
when
they began
port, they shouldered the tactical load and
soon proved that they were a match for the
demoralized Cambodian
3. The exact nature of the present
Communists
bodia andto a lesser extentin
part of thc country as well.
2. When the
in
March
reacted
to
to
Cambodia
a
directly
Vietnamese Communists
quickly by launching
build
ment.
war came
1970, the
the western
a
crash program
viable Khmer Communist
They have developed
a
regular
move
Cam
bodian combat force that has grown from a
few thousand to between 50,000 and 60,000
men
now.
tion for
is
but
murky,
of the evi
most
dence suggests that the insurgents have as
sume4 responsibility for their own strategy
and tactics. One of the most important factors
bearing
the Khmer-Vietnamese
on
relationship
is the tension that exists between their respec
tive forces, particularly in Cambodias
south
ex
dissidence in northeastern Cam
military
alliance between the Khmer and Vietnamese
ern
ploiting local
Army.
border
areas.
This
past
local
summer,
frictionsfueled
by traditional racial ani
mositylead to some sporadic and relatively
large-scale fighting between insurgent and
North Vietnamese! Viet Cong troops, primarily
in Kampot and Takeo Provinces. The seeds
of conflict in this region were sown early in
1972, when the insurgents began moving to
undercut Vietnamese
economic
military, political, and
jurisdiction
over
areas
near
the
southern border.
They concurrently laid the founda
4.
By mid-August,
senior officials
on
both
Khmer Communist-dominated po
litical structure in all sections of the country.
sides who had become alarmed
Meanwhile, the Vietnamese were also doing
all of the major fighting in Cambodia. The
agreements covering such controversial issues
a
miltary teacher-pupil relationship
between the
Vietnamese and Khmer Communists reached
significant turning point in the spring of
1972, however, when the bulk of the North
Vietnamese/Viet Cong main force combat
a
units
in
Cambodia became involved in the
ing reportedly agreed
to
a
over
truce
and
the
to
fight
several
territorial and
population control. Neither
complied fully with the truce or the
agreements, but, they have had some calming
effect on the situation. If heavy fighting in
as
side has
this
area
should flare up again, Khmer and
Vietnamese Communist leaders
undoubtedly
29
would
keep striving
the border underscores the
along
in
keep it within
volatility of the
to
able bounds. But the
preserving the basic delicacy
nouks
however, the
difficulty
of the Khmer-
alliance.
military
Vietnamese
manage
situation
more
work
at
immediate and
the
in
logistic support
is the level of Viet
to
summer,
have been
arms
not
and
that the in
contending
been
recently,
and ammunition. More
ages
to
or
now
on
arms
and ammunition in
some
of the country. But whether such short
are due to Vietnamese tight-fistedness
battlefield dislocationsor
bothcannot
be ascertained.
relatively high degree of military
autonomy attained by the Khmer Communists
suggests that they may now also have obtained
some degree of political independence from
the Vietnamese. Until the last year
Hanoi
over
probably
the
Khmer Communists.
it established
example,
body in Cambodia,
Cambodia,
Viet Minh
Vietnam.
had been in
or
a
so
at
position
considerable influence and control
to exercise
which
a
In
Communist
the Central
1949, for
governing
Subsequently,
would
have the final, controlling vote
important Khmer Communist policies.
the other hand, the Vietnamese may have
want to
all
over
intended
let the Khmer Communists ulti
to
mately handle
was
when Viet
Due Tho
of their
most
forth
set
Minh
(who
had
nam
set
leadership,
their
as
the
deputy
that while Viet
COSVN)
Cambodias
revolutionary
people had ~to rely
strength for liberationthey
up
own
as
then serving
was
the
affairs. This
April 1951,
headquarters informed Le
the forerunner of
to
own
far back
as
Khmer
do it for them,
necessary and im
cannot trust anyone else to
outside
although
portant
.
.
they
.
While
destiny.
help
is
shape their
must
somewhat
similar
to
own
what
Cong, such a
large part
Hanoi has said about the Viet
view could also be conditioned in
Hanois
by
the Lao,
minded
more
recognition that the Khmer, unlike
an aggressive and independent-
are
people
they
than
who dislike the Vietnamese
fear them.
Office for
put under the main
authority for southern
the Vietnamese
prob
also instrumental in setting up the
Khmer Communist Party, whose
ably were
shadowy
founding date is given by the insurgents as
30 September 1951. Very little is known about
the partys ties to and relationships with the
Lao Dong Party from that date until Siha
30
substantial investment
the years in the Cambodian insurgency,
it would appear that the North Vietnamese
8. Whatever the
was
controlling
Hanoi
military
results that Hanoi wanted in
7. In view of Hanois
on
6. The
least,
the
over
view
Although
short
of
the short-term
produced
political
the Khmer Communists reject
this assessment, there is evidence that they
areas
and
Vietnam
Cuc
Cambodia.
On
are
South
Khmer,
Sihanouk has been stating openly that if this
situation does not improve, the insurgents will
in effect have to settle for a military stale
mate.
be their
the KC. Since mid
North Vietnamese in par
giving the insurgents
alliesthe
surgents
ticularhave
to
top advisor to the Khmer Communist Party.
With the help of specialized Viet Cong cadre
Sihanouk and his in-country defense
minister
enough
factor
military
Khmer-Vietnamese
(and political) equation
namese
widespread
Vietnamese
chief of COSVN, Muoi Cuc,
deputy
from
5. A
after the latter event,
assigned the then
Shortly
ouster.
litical
relationship,
nature
some
of their past po
tentative
suggests that the Khmer Communists
at
of
odds with the Vietnamese
a
negotiated
settlement.
on
evidence
are now
the question
Recently,
two
Vietnamese Communist officials in Paris in-
dependently
indicated
that
Hanoi
was
in
terested in negotiations between Sihanouk and
US officials in China because, as one of them
put it, a purely military attempt to take over
all of Cambodia would be futile.
The other
official clainied that the insurgents resented
such sentiments from a government (Hanoi)
that is not fully supporting them and that
they feared negotiations with the US would
only result in important losses for them in
Cambodia.
31
I
ANNEX E
FACTIONALISM WITHIN THE KHMER INSURGENCY
FACTIONALISM WITHIN THE KHMER INSURGENCY
1. The Khmer
monolithic
a
is far from
Insurgency
being
makeup
Its
movement.
ranges
from hard-core Communists trained in Hanoi
who
are
regime
determined
install
to
Phnom Penh
in
to
a
Communist
nationalists
who
regime, schoolteachers, merchants, and Bud
dhist
Most of these
clergy.
Communists, and
the
many
was
the
objective
outright
recruited with
that
explicit understanding
restoration
not
are
were
Sihanouks
of the movement.
prefer
a more neutral, balanced government.
The Communists, however, are the controlling
factor. A central point in the differences with
in the
role
insurgency
is the
question of Sihanouks
any future realignment of political
forces in Cambodia. The anti-Sihanouk forces
in
in the
insurgency
are
led
shadowy leaders of the
Party, most of whomas
~Khmer
Rouge
Penhwere
political
opposed
to
by
have
commander-in-chief
ful
and
the Prince well before
him
recognized
powerful
members of the old
faction in Phnom
his ouster in March 1970.
they
the
Khmer Communist
only
Since that time,
their nominal
as
because he is
use
rallying point for people in the Cam
bodian countryside and as an international
mouthpiece. This cynical exploitation has been
only barely disguised, however, and Sihanouk
himself is well aware of it. He recently has
as
a
admitted
openly
that his relations with the
indigenous Communists, Stalinists,
are
very
poor, and claimed that it is thus unlikely that
he would ever return to Cambodia.
2.
to
Although
Sihanouks
the Communists
playing
any
opposed
significant future
are
role in Cambodia, the Prince is not without
support in the insurgency. The longstanding
ideologically committed Khmer Communists
who control the insurgency are but a fraction
of the total number of
military and political
insurgencys military and po
litical apparatus. The political structure and
front organizations in insurgent-controlled
areas of Cambodia
have drawn heavily on
displaced bureaucrats of the old Sihanouk
cadre within the
3. The
insurgents military structure also
or potential Sihanouk supporters.
The rank and file of the insurgent armed forces
harbors real
are
peasants, and it
is
the peasantry which is
the backbone of Sihanouks
genuine support
Cambodia. But it is
impossible to quantify
how many of these peasant-soldiers arc strong
backers of Sihanouk. It is similarly difficult
to tell how many insurgent military com
manders and units owe their principal allegi
ance to Sihanouk. In any case, reporting from
the countryside indicates clearly that there are
many insurgents who back Sihanouk. They
are often labeled the Khmer Rumdoh (Khmer
Liberation), a term that appears to signify a
political tendency or function rather than an
organizational entity. On occasion, friction
in
between Sihanouks
supporters and Commu
nist elements has resulted in
4.
Although
bloodletting.
troublesome to the
Communists,
there is little evidence to suggest that the
Sihanoukists in the insurgent apparatus will
directly
or
seriously challenge
the control that
the Communist leaders exercise
ment.
the contrary,
On
chances
are
gradually
the
as
over
be weeded
out
as
or
move
passes the
elements will
pro-Sihanouk
Communists. Even
the
time
assimilated
matters
now
by
the
stand, the
factionalism in the insurgency does not seem
to have had any signific~ant impact on insurg
military capabilities. Thus far, the insurg
have been able to submerge their political
differences and make common military cause
ent
ents
against the
Lon Nol government.
35
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