TARNAK FARM BOARD
OF INQUIRY
COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTE
DE TARNAK FARM
Final Report
Rapport Final
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Letter from the President
Minister of National Defence (via Chief of the Defence Staff)
National Defence Headquarters
Major-General George R. Pearkes Building
Ottawa, ON K1A 0K2
19 June 2002
Minister,
Please find enclosed the Final Report for the Board of Inquiry convened to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the friendly fire incident of April 17, 2002 at Tarnak Farm, Afghanistan.
Building upon the Interim Report submitted to your office on May 13, 2002, and having completed its formal
proceedings, the Board now submits for your consideration a comprehensive response to all finding objectives
assigned within the Terms of Reference. Given the extensive amount of information required to arrive at these
findings, it was neither possible nor desirable to include all examined documents and material with the Final
Report. Please be assured, however, that all evidence gathered has been catalogued and will be submitted for
proper archival storage.
As previously indicated to the Chief of the Defence Staff, much of the supporting material is classified for
operational security reasons, as is the main text of the Final Report itself. Nevertheless, to facilitate open and
transparent communication with the affected families, the men and women of the Department of National
Defence and the Canadian Forces, and the greater Canadian public, the included Executive Summary has been
crafted to communicate the essential elements and findings of the investigation in an unclassified manner.
I hope you will agree with me that the unsevered release of this portion of the investigation will reaffirm the
commitment of this Board and the Canadian Forces to submit the particulars of this tragic event to the broadest
possible public scrutiny, consistent with operational imperatives. I trust also that this approach will balance the
need of the families to understand what befell their loved ones with the desire of the wider public for
information on this important national issue, in the most compassionate yet pragmatic manner.
In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the excellent administrative support
that has been provided by all of the staffs with which we have come in contact. I would also like to highlight
the outstanding nature of the cooperation provided to the Board by our comrades-in-arms in the military of the
United States of America. Their sensitivity and compassion in the face of this incident has again demonstrated
the unique and valuable quality of our close relationship with our Southern neighbour.
Finally, I wish to express to you in the strongest possible terms the enduring sense of pride that I have in the
men and women of the Canadian Forces. It is truly in times of adversity that the military is most tested, and this
investigation has reconfirmed to me that it is often only the strength of character and purpose that is bequeathed
upon soldiers by their families and friends that allows them to carry the day. If there is any good to come of
such a sad occurrence, it is surely this: that the personnel of the Canadian Forces remain unbowed, strengthened
by the remembrance of those fallen, and ever committed to the service of our country.
Original signed by
General Maurice Baril (Retired)
President, Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry
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Executive Summary
Introduction
Late on the night of 17/18 April 2002, a section from “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry BG (3 PPCLI BG) were conducting a live-fire exercise in
the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, when they were mistakenly engaged by two American
F-16 fighter aircraft.
At the time of the attack, the two aircraft were returning to their home base in the Arabian
Gulf area after a long patrol over Afghanistan. As they transited through the Kandahar
region, ground fire from the Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range Complex (hereafter
abbreviated as the Tarnak Farm Range) attracted their attention. This site, formerly one of
the main Al-Queda training installations, had been partially converted into a multi-purpose
firing range. In this regard, it was used regularly by local coalition forces to conduct muchneeded training, both during the day and at night.
As part of the planned night exercise, “A” Company personnel were conducting a variety of
firing drills, encompassing a range of weapons from personal side arms up to and including
shoulder-fired anti-tank munitions. Though visible from the air, the armament being
employed was of no threat to the aircraft at their transit altitude. Nevertheless, one of the
F-16s invoked the right of self-defence and released a Mark 82 500-lb Guided Bomb Unit
(GBU-12) Laser-Guided Bomb (LGB) on the soldiers’ firing position. The resulting blast
killed four soldiers and injured eight others, one very seriously. Following their attack, the
aircraft recovered at their home base without further incident.
Formation of the Board of Inquiry
From the outset, it was clear that this was the most serious case of fratricide or “friendly fire”
to have been experienced by the Canadian Forces (CF) in Coalition operations since the
Korean War. Accordingly, at the direction of the Minister of National Defence, a fivemember Board (referred to as the Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry) chaired by General
Maurice Baril (retired) was formed. Board members initially included Brigadier-General
Marc Dumais, Colonel Greg Matte, Colonel Mark Hodgson, and Chief Warrant Officer
Denis Levesque. The Board was augmented by specialist advisors in air operations
(including an F-16 pilot from the United States Air Force), legal, medical, and police
personnel, as well as public affairs, support and administrative staff.
In parallel, an American investigation (eventually called the Coalition Investigation Board or
CIB) was initiated to probe the incident from an American perspective.
it was determined that the work of the American Board would be greatly
facilitated with Canadian participation. Consequently, in an unprecedented move, BrigadierGeneral Dumais was seconded to the American group in the position of co-president, with
rank and position equivalent to the senior American officer. This reduced the Canadian
Board to four members, but provided a degree of visibility for Canadian authorities into the
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proceedings of the CIB, commensurate with the coalition nature of the incident and the need
to maintain a high level of public confidence in the proceedings.
Conduct of the Investigation
As quickly as possible following its formation, the Canadian Board traveled to the theatre of
operations and commenced its work. This early initial visit to the area, undertaken to
establish the exact nature of the ground situation in as comprehensive a fashion as possible,
was characterized by tremendous support by local American military authorities. During
visits to deployed Canadian forces in Kandahar and Bagram, the Board recorded testimony
from 14 Canadian witnesses. It also received voluntary sworn statements from five
American service personnel, including the Commander of Task Force (TF) Rakkasan, to
which 3 PPCLI BG is attached. In addition to receiving verbal and physical submissions of
evidence, the Board made an extensive inspection of the incident site at the Tarnak Farm
Range.
While working in the Arabian Gulf area, the Board established and maintained regular
contact with the American CIB, primarily with respect to process and travel issues, but also
in terms of transfer of collected evidence. Concerns over how best to maintain the autonomy
of both investigations while dealing with the same evidentiary sources were addressed by
direct Board-to-Board legal consultations. This resulted in the enactment of a rigorous
protocol for the exchange of raw, unanalyzed evidence, thereby enabling both boards to
ensure that all analysis was completely independent, that any findings would be made
without prejudice or influence of the other Board.
Since the American CIB had begun its investigation from the air side and was dealing mainly
with US service personnel and military assets, it was able to amass a preponderance of
technical data relatively early in the process. With the nature of events on the ground rapidly
becoming clearer to the Canadian Board, it was evident that early access to this body of
technical data would be critical for purposes of the Interim Report, due to the Minister of
National Defence on 13 May 2002. Accordingly, through an intense effort by the CIB to
process and collate the required material, the Canadian Board was delivered a very
comprehensive collection of data prior to departing the theatre of operation.
Upon its return, Board staff focused their attention on producing the Interim Report, while
Board members and some advisors continued to Edmonton to conduct the first of two
planned visits, which consisted of a series of interviews with injured personnel in the region.
During the initial Edmonton visit, and shortly after his return to Ottawa, the Board President
was able to meet with all of the victims’ next-of-kin (NOK), following through on his
personal pledge to pass them information on the progress of the Board in as timely a fashion
as possible. After roughly a week in Ottawa, the Board again returned to Edmonton to
conduct its second set of interviews. This period coincided with the acceptance and partial
release of the completed Interim Report by the Department of National Defence, and the
Board was able to make some of its findings public from the Edmonton Garrison, the home
station of 3 PPCLI.
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Following the submission of the Interim Report, the Board began a methodical reexamination of all information received to date to determine the degree to which the interim
findings would need additional documentation or evidentiary support to be rendered final.
Continued liaison with the American CIB supported this effort, and a number of additional
information exchanges took place. By now, it had become clear that the Board still lacked
sufficient evidence and information to accurately reconstruct all aspects of the air picture.
In particular, a number of questions concerning the doctrinal and functional controls over
theatre air operations remained unresolved. Some of these might have been addressed
through interviews with the pilots involved, but it was not yet evident whether these
individuals would consent to appear before the Board. Accordingly, the Board elected to
gather as much supporting information as possible from in-theatre sources. This necessitated
a return to the Arabian Gulf region, with the intent of conducting additional interviews and
fact-finding visits to key locations.
The Board returned to Ottawa on 4 June 2002 and commenced drafting the Final Report,
which was due to the Minister on 21 June 2002. During the course of its investigation, the
Board conducted 26 direct interviews, received sworn testimony from 65 others, and
independently generated over 800 pages of information and transcripts. Through the
assistance of the American CIB, it was provided with imagery and technical data of the most
sensitive nature, including
,
recorded radio transmissions, and all applicable orders and directives surrounding the
conduct of the relevant air and ground operations in the Afghanistan campaign.
To gather additional information, the Board intended to visit the Combined Air Operations
Centre (CAOC) in the Arabian Gulf region, but were not issued with visas by the appropriate
national authorities within sufficient time to conduct the visit. On return to Canada, the
Board was able to arrange for a video-teleconference with CAOC members that adequately
met the requirement.
The sole area where the Board was ultimately unable to gather direct evidence was from the
two F-16 pilots. By virtue of their nationality, these individuals could not be compelled to
appear before the Canadian Board; in fact, they chose not to testify before either the
Canadian Board or the CIB. The pilot who actually dropped the bomb did make a limited
written response to questions posed to him by the Board, but the Board members would have
preferred a direct interview.
Even so, the Board membership is collectively satisfied that the evidence and testimony
received over the past 60 days is entirely sufficient to allow an accurate reconstruction of the
events prior to, during, and after the incident. This has permitted the Board to make
conclusive findings in all areas as assigned by the Terms of Reference, and to make
recommendations that both seek to prevent recurrence and to highlight other areas for
improvement for future coalition operations.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Board Findings
In accordance with the Terms of Reference the Board makes the following findings:
What were the circumstances surrounding the injuries and deaths? Beyond the introductory
narrative included here and the extensive detail contained within the full report, the Board
has concluded that the members of 3 PPCLI BG who were undertaking live-fire training at
the Tarnak Farm Range on the night of the incident had done nothing wrong by way of
coordination procedures or safety regulations.
From an air operations point of view, however, the F-16 pilots involved were not aware of
the Tarnak Farm
, nor the planned live-fire exercise. There
were a number of reasons why this was the case. Lacking this critical information, it seems
clear that the F-16 pilots mistakenly interpreted the live fire as a threat to their formation, and
engaged upon a decision-making process that led to the declaration of self-defence and the
release of a weapon on friendly troops.
What caused the injuries and deaths? All injuries and deaths have been attributed to the
blast and shrapnel effects created by the explosion of a Mk-82 500-lb GBU-12 LGB dropped
by an American F-16 fighter plane. The seriousness of each injury was relative to several
factors, such as proximity to the explosion, position within the Eastern wadi (drainage ditch)
and surrounding area, and degree of protection from flying shrapnel. In general, those
members who were in closest proximity to the point of impact received the gravest of
injuries; certainly, had the bomb impacted in even a slightly different location, many more
casualties might have been incurred.
Were the deceased and injured non-commissioned members on duty at the time the incident
occurred? It has been confirmed that all of the deceased and injured non-commissioned
members were on duty at the time of the incident.
Were the deceased and injured non-commissioned members to blame for the injuries or
deaths? None of the deceased, injured or other members of the 3 PPCLI BG who planned,
coordinated or participated in the subject live-fire exercise at the Tarnak Farm Range can be
blamed in any way for the injuries or deaths that occurred as a result of the subject incident.
Were any other person(s), to blame for the injuries or deaths? The Canadian Board has
determined that the actions of the Coffee 51 Flight are the primary cause for the injuries and
deaths. Despite the initial misinterpretation of the live-fire exercise as a threat to their
formation, there exists a series of related disturbing contradictions between their perceptions,
their actions and accepted procedures.
It is the conclusion of the Board that the pilot’s actions were not consistent with either the
expected practice for a defensive threat reaction or the existing published procedures,
including the SPINS. This represented a failure of leadership, airmanship and technique.
Furthermore, their actions contravened the published Commander’s direction with respect to
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
reaction to AAA and employment of ordnance outside of engagement zones. Finally, even
though it is reasonable to believe that the ground firing exercise at Tarnak Farm might have
been perceived as enemy surface to air fire, a longer, more patient look from a safe altitude
and range, combined with a good knowledge of the airspace and the threat in the area, should
have confirmed that the event observed was neither a direct threat to their formation or
enemy activity of a significant nature.
Were the injuries and deaths attributable to military service? The injuries and deaths
resulting from the incident were entirely attributable to military service. At the time of the
accident, the individuals involved were on continuous duty in a theatre of operations and
were undertaking authorized and necessary continuation training in preparation for an
upcoming mission, as part of ongoing Coalition operations.
What was the nature and quality of the planning and conduct of the live fire exercise? The
planning of the exercise was appropriate for the established objectives (section level night
fire training) and the simulated tactical scenario. The planning and subsequent conduct of
the live fire exercise was entirely consistent with established regulations and coordination
procedures, as directed by the CF and the Commander of TF Rakkasan.
Were the safety procedures applicable to the exercise properly followed? In general, the
safety procedures considered and employed during the conduct of the live fire exercise on the
evening of 17 April 2002 were in accordance with CF directives. Minor procedural
irregularities regarding the use of ricochet danger area templates and the drills during
preparation of the
were noted by the Board, but these
had no bearing on the incident and immediate recommendations have been made to address
these shortcomings. In fact, precautionary measures taken with respect to in-place accident
response were particularly commendable.
What was the nature and quality of the co-ordination between Canadian and United States
authorities surrounding the exercise? Use of the range for night, live-fire exercises was
common practice within TF Rakkasan, and was coordinated through a variety of scheduling,
communications, and procedural measures. These measures included a dedicated
communications net and the stationing of a sentry in the Kandahar Airfield Facility (KAF)
control tower. The conduct of the training at the Tarnak Farm Range on the night of the
incident was entirely in accordance with all established procedures for the TF.
What was the nature and quality of the co-ordination between ground and air forces
surrounding the incident? It is clear to the Canadian Board that a number of systemic
shortcomings existed in the quality and nature of the co-ordination between ground and air
forces, as well as between the CAOC and the tactical flying units. Had they been corrected,
the incident might have been prevented. In light of these deficiencies, the Board submitted
several corrective recommendations with the Interim Report, some of which have already
been implemented; further recommendations are included in this Final Report.
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What was the quality of in-theatre post-incident response and incident reporting? In all
respects, the medical response to the incident was exceptional, and saved the life of at least
one of the injured. From the initial actions taken in the field through to the medical
evacuation of some of the injured out of theatre to American hospital facilities at Landstuhl,
Germany, the Coalition medical response was appropriate. The reporting of the incident by
the 3 PPCLI BG to the Canadian and the Coalition chains of command was timely and
adequate, complete with follow-up reports as additional, relevant details became known.
Are there any other issues of relevance to this investigation? As part of its investigation, the
Board has commissioned a study on the current and evolving state of air-ground combat
identification (CID) technologies. This study has produced a number of pertinent
recommendations and is available to the public at the Board Web Site.
The Board also noted a worrisome trend with respect to operational security surrounding the
details of the incident. Specifically, in the days and weeks following the event, several of the
troops communicated openly on the internet and to the media about the existence and tactical
use of
in the close-quarter ground environment. In the future, the
chain of command must place additional emphasis on identifying and protecting the release
of classified information and procedures, particularly while operations are ongoing.
Conclusion
Until the bomb struck their position, the troops involved had no idea that they were being
targeted or that they were in serious danger. Though demanding, the training undertaken that
evening was of a routine and well-understood nature, was being carried out in a known
location under controlled conditions, and had been organized and authorized properly
through the local chain of command. While Afghanistan remained a combat zone under
conditions of Coalition air supremacy there was no apparent need for ground troops of any
nationality to indulge in exceptional force protection activity to prevent air attack, either from
friendly or enemy forces.
Notwithstanding the chain of events leading to the decision to deviate from the homeward
transit and the eventual reaction to perceived events on the ground, it remains a fact that
highly qualified and experienced pilots, in continuous contact with an airborne controller,
made the fateful decision to escalate an essentially benign but ambiguous situation to the
point that a weapon was released and Canadian troops were killed.
Accordingly, it is the overall conclusion of the Board that the proximate fault for the outcome
of the attack lies with the two F-16 pilots of Coffee 51 Flight. Furthermore, there are a
number of secondary deficiencies that, if corrected, may have prevented the accident. These
are largely but not limited to systemic shortcomings in air coordination and control
procedures, as well as mission planning practices by the tactical flying units. The effects of
these shortcomings are compounded by expectancy on the part of both ground and air
authorities that all Airspace Control Measures would be understood and applied.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Corrective action has already taken place in a number of instances; other proposed changes
will require additional study to address, and some areas of weakness may only be resolved in
the long-term. What is certain, however, is that this event has opened a new chapter on the
study and understanding of the mechanisms and preconditions surrounding fratricide.
Furthermore, it is a study that is being undertaken in the context of ongoing joint and
combined operations, wherein Coalition forces of vastly differing capabilities and methods of
operation are coming face to face with both the vast potential and the great peril implied by
high-speed, high-technology warfare in a fluid and uncertain environment.
Many observers have called “friendly fire” a military fact of life – some argue that it is
inevitable, especially in the evolving “network centric” style of modern Western warfare.
These opinions aside, the Board strongly recommends that Canada must continue to actively
engage her allies in a concerted effort to understand why and how fratricide incidents occur,
with the aim of prevention and with the ultimate goal of preserving our scarce and
increasingly valuable operational resources.
Reaffirmation of Intent
From its inception, the Board set and demonstrated a strong commitment to the highest
standards of openness and transparency, consistent with operational imperatives and the
sensitive nature of the incident. This approach, consistent with the current operating
philosophy of the Department of National Defence, was taken to ensure that the families of
the deceased and injured, the personnel of the CF, and the people of Canada were sufficiently
informed as to the circumstances and causes of this unfortunate event.
General Maurice Baril (Retired), President
Colonel Greg Matte, Member
Colonel Mark Hodgson, Member
Chief Warrant Officer Denis Levesque, Member
Ottawa, June 19, 2002
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Table of Contents
Letter from the President
i
Executive Summary ii
Table of Contents
ix
Reader’s Guide to the Final Report x
Part I - Conduct of the Investigation 1
Chronology of Investigative Activities ..............................................................................................................1
The Coalition Investigation Board .....................................................................................................................3
Collected and Received Evidence ......................................................................................................................3
Part II - Chronology of Events
Part III - Narrative Analysis 11
6
Land Events ..................................................................................................................................................... 11
Air Events ........................................................................................................................................................ 20
Post-Incident Events ........................................................................................................................................ 31
Part IV - Detailed Findings
35
Circumstances .................................................................................................................................................. 35
Proximate Cause .............................................................................................................................................. 36
Duty Status of Members .................................................................................................................................. 38
Blame ............................................................................................................................................................... 38
Connection to Military Service ........................................................................................................................ 41
Planning and Conduct ...................................................................................................................................... 42
Safety Procedures ............................................................................................................................................ 42
Canadian - American Coordination ................................................................................................................. 43
Air - Ground Coordination .............................................................................................................................. 44
Post-Incident Activities ................................................................................................................................... 47
Other Relevant Issues ...................................................................................................................................... 48
Part V - Recommendations
49
Previously Submitted Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 49
Additional Recommendations.......................................................................................................................... 51
The Leggat Study............................................................................................................................................. 54
Annexes
1
Annex A - Terms of Reference ..........................................................................................................................1
Annex B - Visual Timeline Chart (21:16Z to 21:36Z) ......................................................................................3
Annex C - Time Interpretation Table.................................................................................................................4
Annex D - Area Map of Kandahar Airfield Facility and Tarnak Farm ..............................................................5
Annex E - Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range Complex...................................................................................6
Annex F - Tank Stalk Range Photos ..................................................................................................................8
Annex G - Troop Disposition and Wadi Profile at Bomb Impact .................................................................... 11
Annex H - Flight Path Reconstruction ............................................................................................................. 12
Annex I - Transcript of Air to Air Radio Communications ............................................................................. 14
Annex J - Relevant Air Orders and Instructions .............................................................................................. 19
Annex K - The Leggat Study ........................................................................................................................... 20
Glossary
1
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Reader’s Guide to the Final Report
Though the unfortunate events of 17 April 2002 took only a few minutes to unfold, the
multifaceted nature of modern military operations renders any investigation of such an
incident extremely complex. When describing and analyzing events, any investigation of this
sort must consider not only the direct operational activities of individuals involved, but also
such elements as equipment, command and control organizations, doctrine and training,
environmental factors, and even attitudes and beliefs. It is a difficult task to bring these
elements together in such a way as to paint an accurate and compelling picture of what
happened, yet remain accessible to a broad military and civilian readership.
To accomplish this goal, in the face of upwards of 2200 pages of verbal testimony, over 40
exhibits, and numerous supporting submissions, the following interpretive structure has been
adopted:
Chronology of Events
Factual elements only, no interpretation beyond that required to understand the ongoing activities
Narrative Analysis
Of Ground Events
Predeployment
Phase
Preparation for
Live-Fire
Live Fire
Exercise
Post-Incident
Activities
Exercise
Narrative Analysis
Of Air Events
Mission
Preparation
Mission
Execution
Phase
Phase
Post-Incident
Activities
Summary of Causal Factors
Including identification of standards of performance, degree of breach(es) of standard
Findings & Conclusions
IAW Terms of Reference (Annex A)
Recommendations
In addition to other areas for future consideration
To account for the very substantial quantity of evidence and testimony developed by the
Board, elements of the above structure are expanded across 13 volumes to support the
content of the Final Report. Specifically;
Volumes 1 to 7
Volumes 8 and 9
Volumes 10 to 13
- Testimony
- Exhibits
- Supporting Material
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Part I - Conduct of the Investigation
Chronology of Investigative Activities
On 19 April 2002, at the instruction of the convening authority, the Minister of National
Defence, a Board of Inquiry was formed to investigate the injury and death of Canadian
Forces personnel during live fire training at or near Kandahar, Afghanistan on or about
17:21:40Z 17 April 2002. The initial terms of reference are included at Annex A.
The Board conducted its first formal meeting at 0800 hours on 22 April 2002 in the Chief of
Staff J3 Conference Room, at National Defence Headquarters. The Board was provided
copies of the Air Tasking Order (ATO), the Airspace Coordination Order (ACO), Special
Instructions (SPINS) and various documents. Later in the day, J3 International staff provided
a theatre situational awareness briefing, which included the following areas:

a background brief on Afghanistan;

an intelligence brief; and

a review of the pre-deployment training, deployment and mission of 3 PPCLI BG in
Afghanistan.
During the ensuing days, an initial work plan was developed and refined in preparation for
the first overseas deployment. The Board departed late on 24 April and arrived in
on 25 April. After receiving a series of orientation briefings on the
morning of 26 April in
, the Board moved to the location of the National Support Unit
at
to view and set up its base of operations for staging into
Afghanistan. Major S. Schrieber, Officer Commanding (OC) Administration Company,
3 PPCLI BG provided the Board with background information on the following aspect of the
BG’s mission:

pre-deployment training;

the mission;

the deployment; and

operations to date.
On 27 April, Captain J. MacEachern, Officer Commanding Canadian Forces National
Investigative Service (OC CFNIS) Detachment Kandahar, provided an overview of his
ongoing investigation into the friendly fire incident. The next day, Major
, an F16 pilot from the 27th Fighter Wing, United States Air Force (USAF), arrived to join the
Board. Major
role was to assist the Board in its understanding of the procedural and
technical aspects of the F-16 operations and to aid in effecting liaison with American units.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
On 29 April, the Board departed
at 09:00 hours (local) by C-130 for the Kandahar
Airfield Facility (KAF) in Afghanistan. Of note, all times are expressed in Greenwich Mean
Time and abbreviated as “Z”; a chart to aid in interpretation of “Z” versus local times in
Kandahar, Ottawa and Edmonton is included at Annex C. Upon arrival at the 3 PPCLI BG
lines in KAF, the Board received a general brief on the Camp including force protection
measures. An initial 15-minute orientation brief was also provided by Major
, the
TF Rakkasan Safety Officer. From 11:35Z until 17:56Z, four witnesses were interviewed by
the Board.
Early the next morning, the Board proceeded under armed escort to the Tarnak Farm Range,
the site of the friendly fire incident. Starting at 04:00Z, the Board commenced a walk
through of the site with testimony provided by Captain J. Jasper, the Range Safety Officer on
the night in question. After returning to the KAF at about 06:30Z, the Board resumed its
proceedings by taking additional evidence from Captain Jasper in order to clarify
observations made at Tarnak Farm. Before adjourning later that day, sworn testimony was
taken from another eight witnesses.
The Board’s proceedings recommenced the next morning 1 May at 06:00Z. Sworn testimony
was taken from three more witnesses after which the Board members traveled by air to
Bagram Air Base, near Kabul. The trip to Bagram was necessitated by the fact that key
witnesses from the 3 PPCLI BG had deployed to Bagram in preparation for other operations.
In addition to the re-examination of Captain J. Jasper, a total of five witnesses were
interviewed that same day.
The Board interviewed its last witnesses in the theatre of operations on 2 May in Bagram.
Returning to
later that day, the Board remained there until departing for Canada
in the early hours of 6 May.
Upon its return to Canada, the Board and several advisors traveled to Edmonton and
interviewed four of the injured servicemen on 8 May. Unfortunately, the health of Sergeant
L. Ford necessitated a later return of the Board. This took place on 14 May, the day after the
Board submitted its Interim Report.
While work continued on the writing of the Final Report, preparations were made to return to
the Middle East to interview Major
(the Mission Control Commander aboard the
AWACS at the time of the incident) and to visit the Coalition Air Operations Centre (CAOC)
at the
. While the Board traveled to
and
interviewed Major
on 2 June, it was prevented from entering
when visas
could not be arranged within the time constraints of the Board’s tight schedule for
completion of the Final Report. The Board returned to Canada on 03 June. The last of the
sworn testimony was taken by the Board on 12 June, with the attendance of LieutenantColonel M. Simpson in Ottawa.
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The Coalition Investigation Board
Both Canadian and American authorities ordered separate, independent investigations of the
friendly fire incident. While the activities of the American investigation board, known as the
CIB, was concurrent with the Board, the CIB was governed by different rules and served
different purposes. The primary role of the CIB was to inquire into the facts and
circumstances surrounding the friendly fire (fratricide) incident so as to obtain and preserve
all available evidence for later use in litigation, claims, disciplinary action or adverse
administrative actions. United States (US) personnel must appear when called to testify
under oath unless they assert the privilege, under the US law, against self-incrimination. In
that event, they may exercise the right to remain silent and decline to testify once sworn
under oath. This protection is afforded in all such investigations which may lead directly to
disciplinary or criminal proceedings.
US authorities cooperated to the fullest extent possible, within the limits of their national
legal restrictions, throughout the course of their investigation. The convening order and
initial guidance for the CIB are contained in two source documents dated 24 and 26 April
2002 respectively (see Vol 10, Tabs 4 and 5). Canadian participation on an American
investigation board was unprecedented. In addition to the appointment of Brigadier-General
M. Dumais as Co-President, seven other Canadian servicemen were assigned roles on the
CIB. Direction to the CIB provided for the following:

the American Co-President was to collaborate with the Canadian Co-President on
opinions as to the cause of the incident and was to seek his recommendations as to the
corrective measures to the extent the measures address combined or Coalition
military activities;

the possibility of individual findings of fact, opinions, or reserved concurrence on
specific matters as deemed appropriate;

the assessment of fault or neglect and recommendations concerning administrative
and disciplinary actions involving US personnel were only to be made through
American Board members; and

the Canadian Co-President was authorized to act as a liaison with the Canadian
Board.
Collected and Received Evidence
The Board examined the chronology of circumstances surrounding the friendly fire incident
from two different perspectives; first from the ground and second from the air. Initially, the
Board focused its efforts and activities in examining the sequence of events on the ground
that led to the tragic events on 17 April 2002. As part of its investigative activities, the Board
availed itself of the opportunity to visit the site of the incident and took testimony from
individuals in the theatre of operations. Having completed the initial examination of
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circumstances at the ground level, the Board turned its attention to determine the facts and
sequence of events from the air perspective.
Although the Board had already interviewed American witnesses during its visit to the KAF
in the late April time period, a message issued by United States Commander in Chief Central
Command (USCINCCENT) on 01 May 2002 (enclosed as Vol 10, Tab 6) specified the terms
of the protocol concerning the passage of information from the CIB and access by the Board
to American witnesses. In particular, the following key points were established:

all information requested by the Board was only to be released through the CIB;

the testimony of any US witness requested by the Board was to be provided through
the transfer of sworn affidavits or transcripts of sworn testimony;

information released to the Board was not to be publicly disclosed or provided to
Canadian officials outside of the Board and reviewing chain without the prior written
consent of the US Government;

classified information released to the Board was to be safeguarded in the same
manner and to the same degree as corresponding Canadian classified information; and

the American CIB Co-President could prescribe such conditions and restrictions
deemed appropriate, consistent with and subject to US laws and regulations.
The Board’s first written request for specific information was forwarded to the CIB on 2
May. The Board received the first delivery of documentation on 5 May. Additional
information was forwarded on 17, 27 and 30 May with the final acceptance of information
and transcripts of testimony occurring on 7 June.
By way of explanation, a board of inquiry may receive any evidence that it considers is
sufficient to establish any relevant fact either taken alone on consideration with other
evidence. Direct evidence is preferred and in this regard witnesses who have first hand
knowledge should normally be called to testify. The testimony of a number of American
servicemen was initially considered essential in order to fully appreciate the events of 17
April 2002. With the knowledge that the Board would eventually have access to the
transcripts of testimony given before the CIB, the Board initially considered it essential to
request the voluntary attendance of certain American service personnel in order to properly
weigh the testimony and draw the most appropriate conclusions.
Outside of Canada, the Board had no statutory authority to compel the attendance of
American citizens. By letter dated 12 May, the Board requested the voluntary attendance of
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the following persons from the AWACS aircraft crew:
Requested Crewmember
Major
(Canadian Exchange Officer)
Captain
1st Lieutenant
1st Lieutenant
1st Lieutenant
Technical Sergeant
Staff Sergeant
Senior Airman
Position
Mission Crew Commander
Senior Director
Air Weapons Officer (Site Controller)
Air Weapons Officer (Strike Assist)
Air Weapons Officer (Check-in Controller)
Weapons Director (Tanker Controller)
Communications Technician
Communications System Operator
At the same time, the Board requested the voluntary attendance of the two F-16 pilots
involved in the incident. In response, the CIB reiterated its intention to provide the
transcripts of all testimony taken before the CIB. As the two F-16 pilots had already
attended before the CIB and declined to answer questions, the CIB did provide contact
information for the legal counsel representing the two American service personnel. A written
request to attend was subsequently forwarded to each of the respective counsel.
By letter, dated 5 June, counsel for Major
advised that his client was unwilling to
testify but would consider responding to any written questions. A list of questions was
forwarded by facsimile on 12 June. A facsimile response was provided by Major
on
14 June. A copy of the written questions and Major
response are enclosed at Vol
13, Tab 48. Major
the second pilot involved, declined the invitation to be
interviewed or respond to written questions.
Lastly, in order to thoroughly and accurately analyze the sequence of events leading to the
incident on 17 April 2002, the Board also needed to develop an understanding of the air
coordination and control procedures in effect at the time. To do so, the Board was interested
in visiting CAOC at
and receiving an information brief
on applicable air coordination procedures in the theatre of operations. While American
authorities granted permission to visit the CAOC, the Board was not able to make
arrangements to travel to the CAOC during any of its visits to the Middle East due to
difficulties encountered in obtaining entry visas for
. However, the Board did
benefit from a video teleconference (VTC) brief provided by military authorities from the
CAOC on 12 June. Later that same day, Board members heard sworn testimony from
Lieutenant-Colonel M. Simpson describing the procedures in place at the CAOC.
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Part II - Chronology of Events
The following is a chronological breakdown of the significant events leading up to and after
the impact of the bomb at 21:26:01Z on 17 April 2002. The narrative is restricted to a basic
explanation of factual events only; much more detailed analysis is included in Part III of the
report; a visual representation of the key timeline can be found at Annex B. All times are
expressed in Greenwich Mean Time and abbreviated as “Z”; a chart to aid in interpretation of
“Z” versus a local times in Kandahar, Ottawa and Edmonton is included at Annex C.
The primary participants are as follows:
“A” Company - one of three companies within the 3rd Battalion of the PPCLI,
attached to the American-led TF Rakkasan
3 Section - the element of 3 Platoon, “A” Company conducting the tank stalk portion
of the night’s range; accompanied by Sergeant Leger
Coffee 51 - call sign of the lead F-16 in the two aircraft element; also, the collective
call sign of Coffee 51 and Coffee 52 (Coffee 51 Flight)
Coffee 52 - call sign of the wingman F-16 of Coffee 51
- call sign of the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft
providing tactical and administrative direction to Coffee 51 Flight
- call sign of the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC); the unit
responsible for overall airspace control in the region, under command of the
Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC)
Time
Early April,
2002
Unit (s)
Commander TF
Rakkasan
Event
Transfers security task at
from a US
Company to 3 PPCLI, to commence 20 April 2002.
Commanding
Officer 3 PPCLI
“A” Company is selected for the airfield defence task,
training begins.
6 -14 Apr 02
Training Officer 3
PPCLI
Request to use Tarnak Farm Range for purposes of
night live-fire training is submitted and approved.
approx 1 wk
prior to
exercise
“A” Company
2 I/C
Completes range booking and planning requirements as
specified in TF Rakkasan Range Standing Operating
Procedures for the Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range.
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Time
17 Apr 02
Approx
15:05Z
15:20Z
Unit (s)
“A” Company
Coffee 51, 52
15:30Z
“A” Company
16:01Z
“A” Company
20:35Z
KAF Control
Tower
Approx
21:00Z
Coffee 51, 52
Approx
21:15Z
3 Section
Approx
21:21Z
Coffee 51, 52
21:22:38Z
Coffee 51, 52
21:22:52Z
Coffee 52
21:23:34Z
Coffee 52
21:23:42Z
21:23:45Z
Coffee 51
21:24:48Z
Coffee 51,52
Event
A convoy of five trucks plus an ambulance and
escorting armoured units departs the KAF en route for
the Tarnak Farm Range (4.5km south).
Coffee 51 Flight departs
in
for a planned
mission (
transit,
hours on station) over the northeastern part of
Afghanistan. The mission is classified as “On-Call
Interdiction” wherein the aircraft provides an on-station
presence for unforecast close air support requirements.
Company arrives at the range, begins preparations.
Live-fire exercise begins; weapons are grouped and
zeroed, followed by simultaneous use of a Close
Quarter Battle range and a Tank Stalk range.
Control tower imposes a “check fire” at the Range to
allow for incoming aircraft. This is carried out by
radio, through a Control Tower Sentry. The “check
fire” is cancelled at 20:51Z and firing resumes.
The F-16 sortie departs its area of operations in
northeast Afghanistan, heading south-west towards
Kandahar, en route to a rendezvous with tanker aircraft.
3 Section begins its exercise on the Tank Stalk range,
moving up the drainage ditch (wadi) under the
command of MCpl Clark (Section 2I/C), monitored by
Sgt Ford (Section I/C) with Sgt Leger acting as Range
Safety Officer.
The transiting F-16 aircraft observe ground fire and
report it to
.
Aircraft
–
in both aircraft.
Coffee 52 attempts to “mark” (determine target location
thru a sensor) the target and send this information to the
lead aircraft.
Coffee 52 makes his initial request to attack the target
with 20mm cannon.
tells Coffee 51 Flight to “standby” while
relaying the initial details of the situation and the
request to
.
Coffee 51 reminds Coffee 52 of the need to ensure that
the target is not a friendly force.
Both aircraft align their
and laser
designators to the same position on the ground, roughly
on the centre mass of individuals in the wadi.
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Time
21:24:50Z
Unit (s)
3 Section
21:25:00Z
21:25:04Z
Coffee 52
21:25:14Z
21:25:17Z
Coffee 51
21:25:39Z
Coffee 52
21:26:01Z
3 Section
21:26:11Z
21:26:44Z
“A” Company
21:27Z
Ctrl Tower Sentry,
3 PPCLI CP
Event
The fifth and last round of the
anti-tank weapon
is fired; firing plume is visible on the targeting pod
video from Coffee 51.
passes Coffee 51 Flight direction to “hold
fire” and requests additional details for the SAFIRE
(surface - air fire) report to
.
Coffee 52 calls that he has sighted men on a road and a
piece of artillery that is firing at them. He immediately
invokes self-defence and initiates his attack.
acknowledges Coffee 52’s transmission.
Coffee 51 assists Coffee 52 by reminding him to verify
his weapons settings.
Coffee 52 releases one GBU-12, 500-lb bomb. Postrelease, his aircraft descends to an altitude of 13,210 ft
MSL (10,550 ft above ground).
Bomb impacts on the Western edge of the wadi, close
to the lip of the ditch and slightly to the left of the
group comprising Sgt Leger, Corporal Dyer, and Pte
Smith.
All three are killed, as is Pte Green, whose body is
thrown to the southeast. All of the six remaining
3 Section personnel within the wadi are injured, as are
two other soldiers waiting in an adjacent area near the
support vehicles.
Remaining troops disperse from vehicles in case of a
re-attack by the aircraft, which is heard to pass
overhead.
directs Coffee 51 Flight to disengage, stating
“Friendlies Kandahar”; Coffee 51 acknowledges.
directs Coffee 51 Flight to depart the area to
the south; Coffee 51 Flight departs the area.
Range reports to 3 PPCLI Command Post that it has
been attacked by fast air. Uninjured troops begin to
triage casualties, administer first aid, and account for
personnel.
Simultaneously, the tower (acting through the 3 PPCLI
command post) attempts to impose a “check fire” for an
incoming transport aircraft.
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Time
Unit (s)
21:27:15Z
21:28:01Z
Coffee 52
Approx
21:28 - :29Z
Coffee 51, 52
21:29:10Z
Coffee 51
21:31:05Z
Coffee 51
21:31:30Z
Coffee 51, 52
21:35Z
TF Rakkasan
21:36Z
TF Rakkasan
21:56Z
22:03Z
Medevac
Medevac
22:20Z
Medevac
22:24Z
“A” Company
22:48Z
“A” Company
23:05Z
“A” Company
23:45Z
3 PPCLI
Event
requests coordinates of target and asks
whether any weapons were expended. Coffee 52
confirms that one bomb was dropped, and passes an
estimated position (actually 5-6 nm from Tarnak Farm).
Coffee 52 asks
whether he would like him to
return to the target site to get the correct position;
declines.
The two pilots discuss what they saw on the ground.
At the close of the discussion Coffee 52 states “I hope
that was the right thing to do;” Coffee 51 agrees.
Coffee 51 confirms that it was a GBU-12 that was
dropped, and partially updates his SAFIRE report.
Coffee 51 asks
to confirm that there was no
in effect in the area.
agrees with
this assessment.
Aircraft recording systems deactivated; Coffee 51
Flight proceeds to waiting air refueler and continues on
to home base
.
TF Rakkasan vvv
confirms that the coalition aircraft had felt threatened
and had dropped ordnance in self-defence.
Air Medical Evacuation (Air Medevac) helicopter is
ordered to launch.
Medevac helicopter launches.
Medevac helicopter arrives at Tarnak Farm Range.
Helicopter departs Range with most seriously injured
patients; arrives at the KAF in four minutes.
Commanding Officer of “A” Company stops the search
of the incident site, owing to danger from unexploded
ordnance.
All “A” Company personnel are accounted for.
Remaining injured are transported to the KAF via
armoured ambulance.
Canadian Forces National Investigative Service
(CFNIS) personnel arrive at incident site to begin
investigation.
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Time
Unit (s)
TF Rakkasan
18 April 02,
00:26Z
“A” Company
01:30Z
TF Rakkasan
05:44Z
TF Rakkasan
06:39Z
“A” Company
11:32Z
TF Rakkasan
Event
US personnel dispatched from TF Rakkasan arrive at
Tarnak Farm to secure the site and relieve “A”
Company.
Decision is made to redeploy all junior “A” Company
personnel; key leaders remain to control the incident
site.
US Disaster Mortuary Affairs Response Team
(DMART) arrives at site to begin forensic
investigation.
US Criminal Investigation Division is dispatched to
support CFNIS investigation.
All remaining “A” Company personnel depart Tarnak
Farm for KAF
All casualties requiring additional medical treatment
depart from KAF via US Air Medical Evacuation for
US facilities in Landstuhl, Germany.
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Part III - Narrative Analysis
Land Events
General
This section presents a detailed analysis of ground activities prior to, during, and after the 17
April 2002 incident. The analysis will briefly describe pre-deployment preparation, review
the ground situation in Afghanistan at the time, and then will explore relevant aspects of
troop disposition and command and control in and around the KAF, the main operating base
of TF Rakkasan. The narrative will then address pre-exercise preparation and training, the
conduct of the live-fire exercise up to the bomb impact, and ground activities in the
immediate aftermath of the event. Content of this section is based upon evidence collected
by the Board, testimonies received under oath, exhibits submitted, and information supplied
by the CIB according to formal protocol.
Pre-deployment Preparation
At the time of the September 11 terrorist attack, 3 PPCLI was already tasked as the
Immediate Reaction Force (Land) (IRF(L)) BG, maintaining a high level of readiness at all
times. The Key Company was at 72 hours notice to move and the Main Body was at 10 days
notice to move. In October and early November, plans were initiated for the deployment of
the IRF (L) BG to Afghanistan. The potential employment options were for security or
combat tasks. Several missions were considered, with the final decision made in late
December, to deploy the 3 PPCLI BG for potential combat tasks.
Prior to the BG’s deployment to Afghanistan, Level Four/Five/Six Collective Training was
conducted from September-December 2001. The 3 PPCLI BG was declared “Operationally
Ready” by the Commander Land Force Western Area, on 31 October 2001. Specifics of this
process can be found in the supporting material under Director Land Force Requirements
(Plans) Training Summary dated 19 April 2002 (Vol 12, Tab 47).
The BG Reconnaissance Party departed Ottawa en route to Afghanistan on 11 January 2002,
arriving in Afghanistan on 14 January. The BG began deployment to Kandahar on 3
February 2002, while “C” Company deployed to Kandahar on 8 March. The BG, less C
Company, was declared “Operationally Ready” by the 3 PPCLI Commanding Officer on 12
February 2002. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) authorized full employment on 15
February. “C” Company would be declared “Operationally Ready” later in March.
The 3 PPCLI BG was placed under “Operational Control” of an American Brigade, Task
Force Rakkasan. Initially the BG was employed as the KAF Security Force. The BG
participated in combat operations from 2-18 March, with elements participating in Operation
ANACONDA and the BG (less one infantry company and the reconnaissance squadron)
participating in Operation HARPOON. During Operation HARPOON, 3 PPCLI personnel
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
engaged in a very arduous, high-altitude reconnaissance in force to clear Al Quaida and
Taliban forces.
Afghanistan Ground Situation
After the completion of Operation ANACONDA on 23 March 2002, the Commander of TF
Rakkasan elected to rotate his battalions (including 3 PPCLI) through the brigade tasks of
Early in April 2002,
During the previous four to six weeks the
had encountered a series of hit
and run night attacks (small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars). Therefore night
fighting skills would be of great importance to the deploying Canadian troops. In order to
develop and refresh acquired night fighting skills, “A” Company planned and coordinated, a
section level, night live-fire training exercise on the Tarnak Farm Range, 17 April 2002 (see
Annex D).
The primary intent of the Night Live Fire Exercise was to build on the existing night-fighting
skill sets to ensure soldiers were comfortable with using their equipment to its full extent.
Using battle simulation targeting (pop-up targets), the range included a tactical scenario to
build on section level instinctive shooting techniques, and incorporated section and platoon
support weapons in an anti-armour role from a completely separate range for added realism.
3 PPCLI BG soldiers were equipped with
It is normal practice for military units in an operational theatre to conduct training that will
enhance or maintain required skill sets. A six-month tour (or longer) is an extremely long
period to deploy without incorporating a plan to refresh skills that can deteriorate over time.
This practice is common in all modern armies; Canadian soldiers trained this way during the
Second World War and have conducted training in the Balkans operational area for over a
decade (Brigadier-General Ernest B. Beno, OMM,CD (ret’d), Training To Fight and Win:
Training in the Canadian Army, 2nd ed. May 2001).
Pre-Exercise Preparations
The Tarnak Farm Range (Annex E) was a former Al Qaeda training area, and had been used
by Coalition Forces since late 2001. The range was established to provide a venue for tactical
training scenarios, including live-fire manoeuvre using small arms, heavy machine guns,
anti-armour weapons, and mortars. This was not the first time the 3 PPCLI BG had used
these ranges - they had been conducting safe, comprehensive, realistic training, consistent
with the tactical realities of the theatre, since February.
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In accordance with the Tarnak Farm Range Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), the
3 PPCLI Training Officer submitted the Range Request Form for consideration at the weekly
Resource Planning Conference. In addition, the “A” Company Second in Command (2 I/C),
Captain Jasper, completed the requirements listed in the Range Planners Check List, details
of which can be found in the Tarnak Farm Range Standing Orders. The Range SOPs do not
delegate any responsibility to the unit for coordination higher than the Task Force, or with
the Coalition Force Air Component Command; this was and is, clearly a US responsibility.
The Task Force had established a
and was confident that proper Airspace Control
Measures had been coordinated with the Air Component. (Testimony of
29 April 2002 and Colonel
30 April 2002).
The exercise planners developed the range practices based on the “A” Company operational
tasks and the Commanding Officer’s guidance to OCs (Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel
Stogran, 29 April 2002). The subsequent conduct of the live fire exercise was consistent
with established regulations, as directed by the Canadian Forces (Canadian BGL 381-018001-TS/000 DAT 2001) and Task Force Rakkasan Tarnak Farm Range SOPs.
Conduct of the Exercise
At approximately 1505Z, 17 April 2002, “A” Company departed Kandahar Airfield (KAF)
en-route to the Tarnak Farm Range, 4.5 km to the southwest. The convoy consisted of five
Medium Logistics Vehicles, an ambulance and escort vehicles. The convoy arrived at the
range at approximately 1530Z, at which time “A” Company began to prepare the range.
The night live fire exercise was to be conducted on two separate and independent ranges
running simultaneously. In the Corral area, a Close-Quarter Combat Range had been
established, with the approach through Wadi South. Wadi East (the site of the incident) was
both the line of approach and the firing line for the Tank Stalk Range. The Officer In Charge
(OIC) of both ranges was Major Hacket, Officer Commanding (OC) “A” Company. The
Range Safety Officer (RSO) for the Close-Quarter Combat Range was Captain Jasper, 2 I/C
“A” Company, while the RSO for the Tank Stalk was Sergeant Leger, from company
headquarters.
The Company Sergeant Major, Master Warrant Officer Whitehall, supervised the
Administrative Area. He was responsible for controlling the form-up of relays and the
movement of soldiers forward to meet up with the RSOs to start the range process. The
Company Quartermaster Sergeant, Warrant Officer Boland, was responsible for ensuring that
all participants had the required amount of ammunition to conduct the range activity.
Overall, the conduct of both live-fire ranges was in accordance with Task Force Rakkasan
Tarnak Farm Range Standard Operating Procedures. Training also adhered to the Canadian
publication BGL 381-001-TS/000 DAT 2001 (Training Safety), with two minor exceptions.
During the preparation of range traces, Weapon Ricochet Danger Area Templates were not
utilized when range arcs were prepared. Secondly, during preparation of the
at the ammunition point, electric detonators were inserted before
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
moving forward to the range and remained inserted during the conduct of the range. The
detonator should not be inserted in the
until the time that the weapon will be used
(BGL 320-010 FP-001 Mines and Booby Traps, Vol 13, Tab 55). These omissions played no
role in the incident itself.
The Close-Quarter Combat Range
The Close-Quarter Combat Range incorporated primary and secondary weapons allocated to
each individual within “A” Company, depending on their position within a section. These
included the
. All engagements were conducted in Wadi South, a drainage
ditch traveling east to west parallel with the perimeter wall of the former Al-Queda terrorist
training camp.
Under the supervision of Captain Jasper, two to five soldiers would move through the
ammunition collection point to a designated start line in Wadi South. From this point the
soldiers would engage targets as they appeared while moving west through the wadi and up
to the Corral. The RSO was there only to intervene in case of safety violations; not to control
fire. The pop-up targets were installed in the wadi and the Corral, and incorporated small
explosive charges to simulate enemy fire. Once the tactical movement from the wadi into the
Corral had been completed and all targets had been engaged and weapons were cleared,
soldiers were debriefed, and returned to the administrative area. This process took about 30
minutes.
The Tank Stalk Range
Under the supervision of the RSO, Sergeant Leger, the Tank Stalk Range employed heavier
platoon and section weapons,
.
The range was conducted in Wadi East, the drainage ditch running north to south and
intersecting with Wadi South at the ammunition collection point. Sergeant Leger controlled
the movement of the section weapons detachment from the administration area, through the
ammunition collection point, to the start line in the Wadi East, facing north. The total
ammunition allocated for each serial of the Tank Stalk Range was:
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Upon being directed to commence, sections were to move north in the wadi until the first
target was presented. This was a “Figure 11” (man-sized) target at the top of the wadi, which
simulated a guard detecting and firing upon the detachment. The first man in the detachment
was to engage the target. The position of the target indicated that the section had advanced
as far as safety allowed up the wadi. The section would then climb the sloping walls of the
wadi, tactically deploy as laid out previously by the section 2 I/C, adopt firing positions, and
await fire orders (see Annex F). Orders would then be passed, indicating target, weapon
selection, and rates of fire.
Targets were engaged according to standard operating procedures using night vision sights.
For weapons without night sights, targets were designated with tracer from machine gun fire.
At the end of each serial, the RSO would clear all weapons.
would then be set to
cover the section’s withdrawal down the wadi to the south. The detonation of the
marked the end of each section’s participation. The section was then debriefed and returned
to the administrative area. The entire Tank Stalk exercise was planned to take about 35
minutes per serial.
Conduct of Live Firing
One communications were established between the range and the 3 PPCLI Command Post,
the TF Rakkasan Tactical Operations Centre, and the KAF Tower Sentry at approximately
16:01Z, permission was granted for the ranges to start live fire. The exercise began with a
weapons zeroing practise to confirm the accuracy of the troops’
prior
to beginning the simultaneous conduct of the Close-Quarter Combat Range (15 serials
planned) and the Tank Stalk Range (7 serials planned). The serials participating on the
ranges were all part of “A” Company.
The exercise proceeded without interruption until 20:35Z, when the KAF Control Tower
imposed a “Check Fire” through the Control Tower Sentry due to an inbound transport
aircraft. The “Check Fire” was cancelled at 20:51Z, after the transport aircraft had landed,
and firing resumed. At 21:15Z, the Close-Quarter Combat Range had just completed the
current serial and personnel were in the process of moving off the range.
On the Tank Stalk Range, 3 Section, 3 Platoon, “A” Company were moving to their firing
positions under the command of Master Corporal Clark, 3 Section 2 I/C. Allowing the 2 I/C
to direct section fire is normal practice, providing him with valuable experience should he
have to assume the command role. Sergeant Ford, the actual Commander of 3 Section,
accompanied the section on the range.
The 3 Section Tank Stalk range began at approximately 21:15Z with Corporal Paquette firing
approximately three or four bursts from his
into the “Figure 11” target.
These rounds would have been fired from the bottom of the wadi toward the top of the wadi;
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the tracer would have traveled at a sharp angle into the sky. The section then deployed along
the top of the wadi, facing west according to the diagram at Annex G, and began engaging
the near tank target with anti-armour weapons and machine gun fire. For those section
weapons without night sights, the tank target position was indicated with tracers.
During the next ten minutes, 3 Section would fire one
Between 21:10Z and 21:20Z, a flight of two American helicopters approaching Kandahar
Airfield from the east observed weapons at the Tarnak Farm Range, approximately six miles
from their flight path. The fire was described by the helicopter mission commander, Major
, as small arms fire, with two bright flashes, approximately two seconds apart,
followed by more small arms fire. The fire was described as “surface to surface” ground fire
and the rate of small arms fire was described as constant. Some ricochets were observed with
the highest burnout between 500ft and 1000ft Above Ground Level (AGL), as estimated by
the TF Rakkasan helicopter pilots.
Analysis of the weapons systems being utilized, as well as witness testimony indicated that
the range would likely have appeared very active initially, with the rate of fire tapering off
after the first few minutes. The range would have been clearly visible from the air, however
the weapon systems used presented no threat to high-flying aircraft. The maximum burnout
for the tracer rounds used is
. The maximum range for the
and
machine guns, even in an anti-aircraft role, is
, respectively.
The
and the
would display a flash signature when fired, as well as upon
impact with the tank target. The maximum templated ranges of these weapons are
respectively. The anti-tank weapons would not display what could be described
as a tracer. It should be emphasized that all weapons were being fired in the surface-tosurface mode, not surface-to-air.
The rate of fire was reduced during the latter minutes leading up to the incident to conserve
ammunition and ensure target indication for the
. During the last two minutes
prior to the bomb impact, the rate of fire on the range had slowed dramatically and could be
described as sporadic. Range participants stated the above in their testimony.
At approximately 21:21Z, at the same time the transiting F-16s were observing and reporting
the ground fire to the AWACS, some members of “A” Company reported hearing jets fly
overhead. 3 Section continued to fire, not knowing what was transpiring in the skies above
them.
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Bomb Impact
3 Section fired its fifth
round at 21:24:50Z,
Less
than 15 seconds later, Coffee 52, now manoeuvring less than five nm to the south of the
firing,
that he had sighted men on a road and
what looked like an artillery piece on the road and was under anti-aircraft fire. Invoking the
right of self-defence, he initiated his attack almost immediately, releasing the weapon less
than 35 seconds after invoking self defence Rules of Engagement (ROE).
The bomb impacted at 21:26:01Z, just as Sergeant Leger was climbing up the west wall of
the wadi behind Corporal Dyer and Private Smith, the crew of the
. When
the bomb exploded, the 3 Section firing position was engulfed by a large flash, followed by a
blast/heat wave and a cloud of smoke and dust. Some members of “A” Company reported
hearing a jet fly at low level over the company position immediately after or coinciding with
the impact of the bomb. Personnel standing in the administrative area and near vehicles took
immediate cover to avoid a possible second attack.
The bomb struck near the Western lip of the wadi, heading roughly 055 degrees at an impact
angle of at least
degrees from the horizontal. The impact point was to the left of the
crew and to the right of Private Green. Sergeant Leger, Corporal Dyer, and
Private Smith were killed in place; the force of the blast threw Pte Green’s remains some
distance to the southeast. The rest of the section as well as two other members of the
company received blast and shrapnel-related injuries; specific details can be found in the
Findings portion of the report.
Post-Impact Activities
Immediately following the explosion, company personnel assessed the situation and began
taking appropriate action. Triage, first aid, and accounting for personnel were the priorities.
A radio report was sent at 21:27Z to the 3 PPCLI Command Post, stating that fast air had
attacked the company position. Simultaneously, the KAF Control Tower Sentry imposed a
“Check Fire” with Call Sign Zero attempting to pass the order to “A” Company. This second
tower-initiated “Check Fire” was in fact related to an outbound C-130 transport aircraft,
departing from KAF, and not to Coffee 51 Flight.
At 21:35Z, the Task Force Rakkasan
confirmed on its net that the
F-16 aircraft had felt threatened and had dropped ordnance on Task Force Devil (the brevity
codeword for “A” Company, 3 PPCLI). During this period “A” Company continued to
provide updates on the casualty situation.
At 21:36Z, TF Rakkasan initiated call-out of the Air Medical Evacuation helicopter; they
would be airborne and en-route within 20 minutes of notification. Around this time, the first
reports of fatally injured casualties were transmitted to the 3 PPCLI Command Post. The Air
Medical helicopter arrived at Tarnak Farm at 22:03Z, and an additional ground ambulance
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was dispatched from KAF at 22:14Z. Air Medical Evacuation departed Tarnak Farm with
two priority 1, one priority 2 and two priority 3 patients at 22:20Z and arrived at KAF by
22:24Z.
The OC of “A” Company stopped the search activity by his troops of the incident site due to
the danger from unexploded ordnance at 22:24Z. His intent was to secure the site in
preparation for the investigation. At 22:35Z, OC “A” Company reported that there were a
total of four priority “4” casualties, and that all casualties were from 3 Platoon. Note that the
3 PPCLI BG consistently used “priority 4” to refer to a fatality; this is technically not correct
(see Glossary). The decision was then made to redeploy all “A” Company personnel to
KAF, except for key leadership, who would remain at the Range to control the incident site.
By 22:48Z, the OC “A” Company was able to confirm that all “A” Company personnel are
accounted. The remaining 3 priority 3 patients were moved to KAF by Bison ambulance at
23:05Z. The casualties were reported as follows:
2 x priority “1” (critically injured)
1 x priority “2” (seriously injured)
5 x priority “3” (slightly injured)
4 x priority “4” (fatality)
- Sergeant Ford, Corporal Paquette;
- Master Corporal Hollister;
- Master Corporal Clark, Corporal Perry,
Corporal Declare, Corporal Brennan, Private
Link
- Sergeant Leger, Corporal Dyer, Corporal
Smith, Private Green.
An Explosive Ordinance Demolitions (EOD) Team was requested through the chain of
command at 23:24Z. The Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) Officer,
Capt MacEachern, arrived at Tarnak Farm at 23:45Z, escorted by Coyote reconnaissance
vehicles. In addition, TF Rakkasan dispatched additional American troops to secure the site
and to relieve “A” Company of this task. These personnel arrived at Tarnak Farm at 00:26Z
on 18 April 2002. The EOD Team and an American Disaster Mortuary Affairs Response
Team (DMART) arrived at approximately 01:30Z and immediately began forensic
investigation work under the control of the CFNIS Officer. At 05:44Z an American Criminal
Investigation Division Team departed KAF to support the CFNIS Team.
At 06:39Z, all remaining “A” Company personnel departed Tarnak Farm, escorting the
remains of the four priority “4” casualties. Other Canadians who remained at Tarnak Farm
Range were either conducting or supporting the investigative work. By 11:32Z on 18 April
2002 all of the priority “1”, “2”, and “3” casualties (less Corporal Brennan and Master
Corporal Clark, who remained in Kandahar) had departed KAF via US Air Medical
Evacuation, en-route to Landstuhl, Germany.
Summary
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
The Tarnak Farm Range was a former Al Qaeda training area, and had been used by
Coalition Forces since late 2001. The range was established to provide a venue for tactical
training scenarios, including live-fire manoeuvre using small arms, heavy machine guns,
anti-armour weapons, and mortars. This was not the first time the 3 PPCLI BG had used
these ranges - they had been conducting safe, comprehensive, realistic training, consistent
with the tactical realities of the theatre, since February.
The 3 PPCLI BG completed all required coordination procedures. The Range SOPs do not
delegate any responsibility to the unit for coordination higher than the Task Force, or with
the Coalition Force Air Component Command, this was and is, clearly a US responsibility.
The Task Force had established
and was confident that proper coordination had been
completed with the Air Component.
The Range SOPs were appropriate and consistent with Canadian regulations for the conduct
of a live fire range. Further, the actions taken by “A” Company and the BG Staff leading up
to and during the conduct of the live fire training were in accordance with the Range SOPs.
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Air Events
This section presents a detailed analysis of the flight operations that took place within the
Afghanistan Combined Operations Area (COA), as related to the events that occurred at the
Tarnak Farm Range near the KAF, in Afghanistan, on 17 April 2002. The analysis will deal
mainly with the activities of the key Coalition aircraft involved in the incident, and will touch
briefly on mission preparation issues, rules, regulations, and special instructions that existed
at the time. Content of this section is based upon evidence collected by the Board,
testimonies received under oath, exhibits submitted, and information supplied by the CIB
according to formal protocol.
Aircraft and Units Involved
Based on the material reviewed, the events that took place in the airspace above the KAF
including the Tarnak Farm Range involved the following significant Coalition members (of
the call signs shown below) on the air side:
Callsign
Coffee 51
Coffee 52
Collectively called
Coffee 51 Flight
Unit Type
Details
F-16 Fighter Aircraft
Each armed with four GBU-12 Laser-LGBs
E-3B/C AWACS
KC-135 Tanker
Combined Air Operations
Centre (CAOC) located at
Airborne Warning and Control platform;
controlling authority for Coffee 51 Flight
Awaiting Coffee 51 Flight in a predesignated area to conduct air-air refuelling
(AAR)
Central controlling authority for all airspace
in the region; under command of the
Combined Force Air Component
Commander (CFACC)
Although other airborne assets were present in the vicinity, none of them were involved in
the events that took place at Tarnak Farm.
Coffee 51 Flight was under the tactical control of
prior to, during and after the
events that took place in the Tarnak Farm area. This E3-B/C AWACS platform was onstation approximately nautical miles (nm) east-southeast of the KAF. The tanker
controller, responsible for the coordination between fighter aircraft and air-to-air refueling
(AAR) assets, was aboard this aircraft and was in direct communications with Coffee 51
Flight.
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Pre-Incident Mission Details
, 17 April 2002, Coffee 51 Flight took off from
tasked to conduct an on-call interdiction mission in the northeastern section of
Afghanistan. In this role, Coffee 51 Flight was to transit to the assigned area, loiter for
hrs, and then return to its home base. A KC-135 tanker aircraft call sign
was
assigned to support this mission with pre- and post-strike AAR. The refueling was to take
place in an area located approximately nm southwest of the Tarnak Farm / KAF area.
Evidence and mission logs confirm that Coffee 51, after its pre-strike AAR, proceeded deep
into Eastern Afghanistan to an area approximately
northeast of Kandahar. At
21:16Z, Coffee 51 Flight was returning from their tasked area of operations and was
approximately 32 nm east-northeast of the Kandahar area. The formation was at
approximately
proceeding in a southwesterly direction. At
that point, Coffee 51 Flight was preparing to rendezvous with its fueling aircraft,
,
then located approximately
from their position. By that time, the two F-16s had been
airborne for approximately
In preparation for the planned AAR, the formation switched from a tactical Strike Control
frequency to an administrative Tanker Control frequency, primarily used for traffic and airto-air refueling coordination. This is significant because it marks a transition from the
combat phase to the transit phase of the mission, both physically in terms of communications
used, and psychologically in terms of the pilots’ expectation of the nature of activity they
would be facing. From that point onwards, all significant action that was captured by various
on-board recording devices occurred on two frequencies;
frequency
used for administrative Tanker Control activities, and
frequency
used by the two F-16 aircraft for cockpit to cockpit communications that was not monitored
by anyone else involved.
Kandahar Area Events
To better describe the air events that took place around the Kandahar area, a detailed diagram
of the F-16 flight paths has been created based on
radar returns and
of both F-16’s involved. This reconstruction can be found at Annex H and will aid in
interpretation of the following events. In addition, Annex I contains the transcript of all the
radio communications made by the stations involved taken from the audio portions of the
above tapes.
At 21:20Z, the
radar picture shows Coffee 51 Flight roughly
nm to the southeast
of the KAF. At around 21:21Z, based on the testimony of Major
, Coffee 51 Flight
made an unrecorded radio call to
stating that they had observed some form of
ground fire. The aircraft commander of
, listening on the same frequency, stated
in his personal written account that Coffee 51 Flight had reported that they saw tracer fire,
and that they asked if they should turn back and mark the position. As confirmed by
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
account and by the testimony of the AWACS Mission Crew Commander’s (MCC) in charge
of the mission aboard
, the marking of the position was acknowledged and duly
authorized. This meant that
had received the initial report of a visual contact of
interest, and that they had cleared Coffee 51 Flight to alter its course to more precisely
identify the position of interest on the ground. According to
, during that same
time period, Coffee 51 also informed
that they had ordnance available to drop. The
exact wording of that statement is unknown.
By 21:22:38Z, the time at which the recording equipment was turned on in both F-16’s, the
two aircraft had already turned toward the north and evasively split themselves
approximately four to five nm apart. Coffee 51 (the lead aircraft in the F-16 formation)
established himself in a
Of note, there was little
ambient or artificial light in the surrounding area. The moon had already set, creating a very
dark night environment. The sky was clear with excellent visibility in all directions and very
little ambient moisture was present. Consequently, the tracer fire originating from Tarnak
Farm was visible to Coffee 51 Flight at the altitude they were transiting the area (Testimony,
CIB interview with Master Sergeant
, Vol 12, Tab 36).
At that same time, Coffee 52 (the wingman aircraft in the F-16 formation), having received
implied authorization from
to deviate from the original track, was in the process of
visually marking the target
Once the
target designation was complete, Coffee 52 initially began to establish himself in a
pattern similar to Coffee 51.
During the next four minutes, Coffee 51 remained in a shallow right hand turn at an average
speed of
Knots Indicated Airspeed (KIAS) and an average altitude of
No extraordinary maneuvers or any type of evasion were performed. Throughout the entire
engagement, the lead pilot remained busy discussing the situation with his wingman and
trying, with the use of his targeting
pod, to identify a
location on the ground that matched what his wingman was describing. During that fourminute period, Coffee 51 basically flew a single arcing orbit around the Tarnak Farm range
area, at an average range of
nautical miles from the point on the ground where
the soldiers were firing on the Tank Stalk range.
Coffee 52s flight path over same time interval is irregular, flown at a slower average speed
and a lower average altitude than his lead. Like Coffee 51, Coffee 52 did not maneuver his
aircraft in an aggressive fashion (that would reflect defensive threat reactions) at any time
during the subsequent three minutes. Judging by the flight inputs, the work being done with
the targeting pod, and the radio calls made, it seems apparent that Coffee 52 spent
considerable time focusing his attention outside the cockpit at the observed ground fire below
(which was in fact the planned night live fire exercise).
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
A few seconds after his transmission at 21:25:04Z, Coffee 52 initiated a sharp right-hand turn
His starting speed was
, with an
altitude of
with the
bomb release occurring at the very limit of the release envelope. The lowest altitude he
reached during this process was
as measured by Coffee 52’s
The recovery was to level flight, with no clear
attempt to gain additional altitude.
For the 45 seconds following the explosion of the bomb, Coffee 52 arced around the point of
impact in a shallow right hand turn with his
to the target area. During this
time he was in a slow climb, which placed him just above
by
the time the “Scram South!” directive call was passed by
. Prior to this
transmission, no real attempt was made by either of the F-16 aircraft to leave the target area
in an expeditious manner.
This is surprising, considering the pilot’s earlier assessment that the perceived threat
necessitated invoking self-defence. As per the testimonies of other F-16 pilots from
senior members of the CAOC and the CFACC’s instructors, Coffee 51
Flight should have immediately sought to distance themselves from the perceived threat,
both in range and altitude as soon as possible after the GBU-12 LGB had guided to impact.
By contrast, it is only when ordered by the AWACS to depart the area, nearly five minutes
after initially entering the perceived threat area, that Coffee 51 Flight finally starts building
separation between them and the Tarnak Farm range.
At 21:27Z, after approximately five minutes of maneuvering above the Tarnak Farm range,
the formation steered to rendezvous with
to begin AAR. Once the refueling
phase was completed, Coffee 51 Flight returned to its home base without further incident.
Documents and Special Instructions
In order to get a clear understanding of all the planning and coordination elements involved
in the air campaign part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), a thorough review of
key documents was completed very early in the inquiry. These included the Air Tasking
Order (ATO) and the Airspace Control Order (ACO) in effect at the time, and the supporting
Special Instructions (SPINS). These are the main documents used by aircrew in the
operational theatre for purposes of mission tasking, planning, coordination and execution.
Air Tasking Order ATO
for 17 Apr 02 (Vol 10, Tab 8), contained
all of the details required by Coffee 51 Flight to carry out their mission, and was valid for the
period of
18 April 2002. After its initial release (most
likely around 17:00Z on 16 Apr 02 to allow for mission planning and to update any SPINS),
ATO
underwent up to seven changes, each affecting the ATO version currently in
effect. Change number 4 (Vol 10, Tab 8), although the most significant amendment for
Coffee 51 since it changed the mission from Close Air Support (CAS) to On-call Interdiction,
(XINT), had no impact on the incident.
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Airspace Control Order ACO
for 17 Apr 02 (Vol 10, Tab 9)
contained all airspace control details that had to be used or considered by all participating
aircrew in order to effectively and safely carry out their mission. Published daily to adapt to
the ongoing ATO-tasked missions for the particular period, the ACO is a living document
that needs to be consulted in order to safely and effectively adhere to the numerous Airspace
Control Measures (ACMs) in effect. Similar to the ATO process, up to three changes were
released modifying that original ACO
none of any significance to Coffee 51 Flight’s
mission.
Within ACO
the following important information was available for mission planning
by all Coalition aircrew prior to their missions:

A Terminal Movement Area (TMA) was in effect for the Kandahar area for the
period. It extended to
Aircraft
operating within this area were to contact the KAF tower in advance of entry;

A
was in effect for Tarnak Farm at location 31 27 18 N, 65 49 39 E. Its size
was
The
was identified as a “Small Arms Range” and was quoted as “not
continuously active”. Kandahar tower was to be contacted for status: and

A Terminal Control Area (TCA) was in effect for the Kandahar area at the beginning
of Feb 02. It consisted of a
around the airport of Kandahar,
extending from
No details were given on the radio procedures
to be applied.
Special Instructions: The SPINS, updated regularly, were also available to all aircrew to
guide them in the conduct of their mission. SPINS are theatre-specific and were written
specifically for OEF. Updated daily via the ATO and Weekly SPINS Updates, they contain
essential information indispensable for the conduct of the mission. The following aspects of
the 17 Apr 02 SPINS were significant:

The SPINS remind aircrew that information on
would be published in the daily
ATO/ACO or promulgated by a variety of other means, including alerting by
AWACS or other C2 agencies.
would be published in the daily ACO;
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report

The SPINS explain in detail how Surface-to-Air Fire (SAFIRE) sightings will be
reported. Since the events around the Tarnak Farm area were triggered by a SAFIRE
occurrence, the article is reproduced in Annex J;

They explain in detail the rights and the conditions under which aircrew may use
armed force in self-defense. Again, the relevant article is reproduced in Annex J;

The SPINS cover defense against Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), stating that aircraft
always have the right of self-defense against AAA,

The SPINS also deals with the minimum operating altitude in Afghanistan for fixed
wing aircraft.

It discusses how friendly positions would be transmitted in situation where Close Air
Support (CAS) would be required. This portion indicates that specific land force
entities were responsible for providing friendly positional data updates on a daily
basis for inclusion into the ATO or as required as the ground situation changes. It
also describes the procedure by which changes would be provided to the CAOC
Director of Combat Operations (DCO), and communicated to AWACS

Appendix 4 of the SPINS discusses procedures to follow with the airfields in
Afghanistan. For the KAF, the traffic procedures listed confirm that all aircraft
transiting Kandahar area are to maintain two-way radio contact with Ground Control
Approach (GCA) when operating between
of the airfield, and that they
are to contact Kandahar Tower directly if intending to operate within
and
Mission Planning
From the testimonies reviewed, it quickly became evident to the Canadian Board that
AWACS and F-16 aircrew knowledge about the presence of the Tarnak Farm Range near the
Kandahar Airport was lacking. In the case of the 170th Fighter Squadron, the F-16 unit
deployed to
to which the F-16 aircrew belonged, a
Mission Planning Cell (MPC) was in charge of the mission planning process. Led by aircrew
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
from the unit and manned according to a rotation schedule, the MPC had the responsibility of
reviewing and consolidating the information from the ATO, the ACO and the SPINS in order
to create mission data readily available to the aircrew. The MPC was assisted in this process
by the unit intelligence section, who also contributed to the preparation of the mass briefings
given to the aircrew prior to each mission.
Various testimonies received by the CIB revealed disturbing information concerning the
quality of the MPC process. As an example, it is evident (based on testimonies by
intelligence and MPC personnel from the 170th Fighter Squadron) that the ACO breakdown
responsibilities were not clearly understood by the individuals involved in the mission
planning process. This led to an inefficient process and significant oversights.
Since everyone in the unit involved with the ACO felt the document was cumbersome and
difficult to work with, the unit relied very heavily on a software package called
to graphically brief the ACO content to the users, and prepare the maps that were carried by
the aircrew in their Smart Packs. Many testimonies have confirmed that, although
facilitates the representation of the ACO, the volume of the information is often
unmanageable and can lead to confusion. For this reason, several witnesses have confirmed
that all the information on the airspace below
was intentionally removed from
the mission data given to the aircrew in order to simplify the information provided in their
mass briefs and flight maps.
This fact alone contributed significantly to the lack of knowledge of the Tarnak Farm range
and its associated
. Pilots flew their missions with no depicted
on their tactical
map mainly because “the MPC cell decided that you cannot plot all those and have it be
usable” (as per the testimony given by Captain
, Vol 12, Tab 34). Although the Tarnak
Farm range was the area of interest for this inquiry, the same lack of knowledge applied to
most of the ranges located in Afghanistan.
The mission planning process used by the AWACS detachment was similar to that used by
the fighter forces. Because of very long mission duration and the limitations imposed by the
crew duty day, the aircrew and controllers on board the AWCS had to rely on the support of
a mission planning team to prepare the data required for their mission. Again,
software was used extensively, albeit with the text versions of all pertinent documents carried
aboard the aircraft for consultation. As acknowledged by the AWACS MCC (Major
)
the mission planning team would filter some of the airspace coordination to make it a little
bit more user friendly for the mission.
As in the previous case, testimonies received confirms that most of the AWACS crew
members were not aware of the Tarnak Farm Range,
or the
activity that was taking place at the time.
It is common knowledge that ACOs and ATOs have never been easy to work with. Their
size and the intricate airspace coordination that is contained within, reflect the complexity of
modern airspace battle management requirements, a fact of life that has to be dealt with in
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
modern aerial conflict. Nevertheless, it is clear that in this instance, a possibly arbitrary
decision within the MPCs of disparate units to filter information led to the unintended
consequence of excising critical mission data. Regrettably, such unintended oversights were
not detected due to the lack of a feedback loop to ensure that key elements did not slip
through the cracks.
In addition to the deficiencies in the mission planning process described above, the Board
noted other factors that led to the F-16 aircrew flying combat missions with incomplete
knowledge of the mission area. With respect to crew rest and mission planning, several
testimonies have confirmed that due to the extreme mission length the aircrew never
prepared their own missions. Rather, the MPC prepared and briefed the mission to the
aircrew, who would only arrive at the unit in time to attend their mass brief. This practice
resulted in the aircrew only having a minimal amount of time to study the mission and brief
themselves on key points before proceeding to their jets. Consequently, many F-16 pilots
adopted the practice of attempting to digest the mission material during their transit to the
mission area (often under night conditions).
With respect to general mission and document knowledge, a scheduled familiarization visit
to the CAOC for new aircrew in theatre was not common practice. The purpose of this visit,
as seen in other operations such as in the Balkans, is to increase the individual’s knowledge
of the theatre, his understanding of the various mechanisms in place to support him, and to
give the CAOC leadership the chance to reinforce the key messages such as the Commanders
Intent and the ROE. From the testimonies received, the board members suspect there was no
procedure in place, either at the unit level or above, to ensure that all aircrew were familiar
with or clearly read all the documents at their disposal to effectively carry out their missions.
Aircrew Pre-Flight Training and Medical Status
After reviewing the various documents describing the training and qualifications of both
pilots of Coffee 51 Flight, the board members have no doubt that these individuals were fully
qualified to execute the missions expected of them. Major
(Coffee 51) was an
experienced command pilot with over 3100 hours of military flying time, 1700 of which
were on F-16 fighters. His qualifications included Instructor Pilot, Mission Commander,
Supervisor, and Supervisor of Flying in the 183rd Fighter Wing. By way of responsibilities,
he was the Commanding Officer of the 170th Fighter Squadron based at
Armed with a very solid background, his wingman, Major
, (Coffee 52), was seen as a key individual who possessed above average flying
capabilities as well as outstanding qualifications and fighter experience. With over 3000 total
hours of military flying time, Major
had completed both the United States Navy Top
Gun Course as well as the United States Air Force Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, for
which he later became an instructor. In addition to these impressive qualifications, he also
had over 200 contingency hours to his credit. Consequently, he had been assigned as the
Chief of the MPC.
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Copies of the medical and dental records of the pilots of Coffee 51 (Major
) and
Coffee 52 (Major
) were thoroughly reviewed by the CIB Medical Advisor
(Lieutenant-Colonel
- Vol 13, Tab 41). He reported that for both pilots there
were no significant pre-existing medical, dental, or mental health conditions and both had
current flight physicals at the time of the incident. Both pilots were medically qualified to
fly. There was no evidence that human factors (personal habits and behaviour patterns)
contributed to the incident. Blood and urine tests and a drug screen done after the incident
were normal for both pilots, with the only remarkable result being a low level positive in
Major
drug screen that confirmed his stated use of “Go Pills”.
“Go Pills” or Dexedrine have been in use by the United States Air Force for over 30 years to
manage fatigue and increase alertness in pilots. The use of “Go Pills” is strictly regulated
and requires thorough ground testing to evaluate the benefits that each pilot derives and to
determine if there are any side effects that would negate the benefits of using the this
pharmaceutical. In accordance with set policies, Major
and Major
were
ground tested and both were without side effects and were medically cleared for operational
use of “Go Pills”.
It was the assessment of the CIB Medical Advisor that the operational use of the “Go Pill”
had no adverse effect on the Coffee 51 Flight aircrew (Vol 13, Tab 41). Along with this it
was stated (Vol 13, Tab 42) that acute fatigue may have been a minor contributing factor in
the incident but that cumulative fatigue did not appear to be a factor.
The medical and dental records of Major
(AWACS Mission Crew Commander),
Captain
(AWACS Senior Director), and Technical Sergeant
(AWACS
Weapons Director) were examined by a flight surgeon at Tinker Air Force Base who
concluded that none of the three had any significant pre-existing medical, dental, or mental
health conditions, all had current flight physicals, and all were medically qualified to fly as
AWACS aircrew.
Mission Execution - Coffee 51 Flight
When both pilots observed the ground activity near the Kandahar airport, the weather
conditions were very favorable for an air-to-ground mission with no obstructions to visibility.
At approximately 21:21Z (Major
testimony), Coffee 51 Flight initiated the report of
a SAFIRE event to AWACS. With no recording available at that time, the communication
that took place for the following minute or two is unclear. What is certain from the
testimonies received is that a request to mark the location of the activity by Coffee 51 Flight
was granted by
A thorough review and analysis
reveal information that conflicts with the
testimonies of the pilots. In written testimonies, (twice by Major
), it is clearly stated
that the actions taken by the pilot were because he felt himself and his flight lead (Major
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, call sign Coffee 51) felt threatened by what appeared to be surface-to-air fire from
below. That said, neither aircraft was flown as if there was any threat below.
For example, the area of interest was approached in a routine fashion with the lead aircraft
establishing himself in a
at approximately
Although the SPINS permitted him to descend
below 15,000 ft AGL to perform the “mark”, such a descent is considered highly imprudent
(as indicated through several testimonies) given the nature of the perceived threat. If indeed
a plausible threat had been present under his position,
would not have been a safe maneuver to undertake, as this would have
unnecessarily exposed him to a greater degree of threat. Rather, he should have achieved
either increased separation from the perceived threat to perform the
designation by
moving outside the probable, maximum threat range and altitude, or instead used another
designation technique to achieve the “mark” as had been accomplished by his lead,
Coffee 51.
After the attempt at marking the target was completed, both aircraft maneuvered around the
observed SAFIRE location in a calm and relaxed fashion. Coffee 51 remained above
while Coffee 52 remained at approximately
During the final few
minutes preceding 21:25:10Z, time at which Coffee 52 claimed self-defense, no calls with
regards to a ground threat, muzzle flashes or missile firing were made by either pilot.
Similarly, the aircraft radar warning receivers remained quiet. Both aircraft continued to
circle the observed area and no attempts were made at creating a safe distance between what
was observed on the ground and their location. No chaff or flares were used and no directive
calls were made by either pilot to instruct the other to leave the area or to defend against
possible enemy fire. In general, no attempts were made by any of the aircrew to evade the
perceived threat they were observing. As confirmed by the testimony of Col David C.
Nichols (Commander of the 332nd Air Expeditionary Group), should there have been a
situation of enemy fire below Coffee 51 Flight, it is certain that Coffee 52 exacerbated the
situation by his maneuvering, and would have forced himself into a self-defense situation (an
endangered? situation) had there been a real threat.
During the period of time the flight remained in the Tarnak Farm area, several other aspects
are worth discussing. With respect to SAFIRE reports, testimonies confirm that, prior to
weapon release, the aircrew most likely failed to complete the report as per the format
described in the SPINS, section 5 paragraph 9.4 (S). The category of the SAFIRE was never
transmitted and the exact position of the SAFIRE and the F-16 aircraft (Coffee 51 Flight)
were never clearly stated. Consequently, very little or sporadic information was available to
to help in the decision making process.
The SAFIRE report was partially completed after the event. In that incomplete report
(category of SAFIRE missing), the aircrew reported that the top of the observed trace was in
the vicinity of 10,000 ft AGL. Testimony provided by a KAF-based helicopter pilot flying in
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the local vicinity at the time of the night live fire exercise estimated that, at most, the top of
the ricochets observed went no higher than 1000 ft AGL. Many testimonies received from
individuals experienced with the use of night vision goggles confirmed that ranges and
heights are very hard to evaluate at night, and that a great deal of experience is required to
accurately estimate the height of observed phenomena. It is very likely that the apex of the
tracers observed by Coffee 51 Flight appeared much higher than reality. That said, since
neither aircraft took evading action, that height was still most likely well below their comfort
level for observed AAA.
Mission Execution The radio communications transcript at Annex G depicts the involvement of
in the
process. Transcripts of the communication between
and
(the CAOC) on
reveal that there were multiple
communication exchanges between them from 21:22:40Z and the time of impact. These
exchanges reveal that
, according to its prescribed responsibilities, was reporting the
event to higher authorities in order to get the proper clearances for the requests made by
Coffee 51 Flight. Testimony by the night time CAOC Director (Brigadier-General Wood)
confirmed that in such cases
On the night of 17 April, this request process was ongoing between
and
.
Unfortunately, the call made by
at 21:26:11Z relaying
direction to Coffee
51 to “disengage” from the area came in ten seconds after the bomb impacted, and only two
minutes after
was made aware of the SAFIRE report. The MCC on board the
AWACS repeatedly limited the actions of Coffee 52, even in the face of multiple requests to
employ weapons in the observed area. Based on a “hunch” that there were “friendlies” in the
area of Kandahar and the fact that the described threat was inconsistent with his impression
of the threat level and usual tactics, the MCC negated all requests for weapon employment
until the self-defence call was made. The instant that call was made, the MCC, with good
reason, felt he could not influence the issue any further, or at least until the self-defence
situation was resolved.
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Post-Incident Events
For clarity, this portion of the narrative is broken into sections covering immediate command
response and reporting, medical response, and post-incident response and investigative
activities.
Command Response and Reporting
All levels of command were quick to respond and were very effective following the incident.
As Range Safety Officer (RSO), Captain Jasper quickly assessed the situation and began to
take control, aided by Master Warrant Officer Whitehall and Warrant Officer Bolan. He sent
the Casualty Situation Report to the 3 PPCLI BG Command Post; ordered a helicopter
medical evacuation request to be sent (it had already been done); gave instructions for the
security perimeter that was then set up around the area; organized searches to identify
remains and equipment; and stayed behind to take charge of the personnel who were
completing the search and recovery. Within TF Rakkasan
, a Crisis Action Team was
convened within three hours of the incident. Prior to that, various levels of command had
already made arrangements for explosives ordnance disposal personnel, the DMART, the
CFNIS, and site security.
With respect to notification of the chain of command, it is the judgement of the Board that
correct and expeditious procedures were followed. Almost immediately, the 3 PPCLI Rear
Party was notified by direct call from the theatre alerting them to the general nature of the
incident. The Commanding Officer of the Rear Party, Major S. Bland, was immediately
informed, as was the Land Force Western Area (LFWA) Headquarters and then the
Commander 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG), Colonel S. Beare, who was
on exercise at Canadian Forces Base Suffield.
At 22:43Z, TF Rakkasan Commander, Colonel
, notified the Commander of
Coalition Joint Task Force Afghanistan, Major-General Hagenback, of the incident.
Subsequently, the Coalition Force Land Component Command Headquarters, based in
, was notified. They then notified Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida.
Shortly after 01:00Z on 18 April 2002, the names of the casualties were transmitted to the
Rear Party, with a temporary hold on releasing the names to the NOK, until the Commanding
Officer of the BG had spoken to the Commander 1 CMBG. As the details on each deceased
and injured soldier were being confirmed by Rear Party staff, the Commanding Officer of the
Rear Party formulated a plan to inform all NOK of both the injured and deceased. Given the
emotional and time-sensitive nature of this task, a notification team was quickly assembled at
Rear Party Headquarters.
News of the incident was known by media sources and as a direct result, there was increased
pressure on the Rear Party to complete all notifications. The LFWA Public Affairs Officer
announced that a news release would be forth coming at 22:00 hrs Mountain Daylight
Savings Time. Shortly before 02:00Z 18 April (20:00 hrs on 17 April 2002 in Edmonton,
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approximately 4 ½ hrs after the bomb explosion), authority was granted to the Rear Party to
commence notifications of the NOK.
Concurrently, the 3 PPCLI BG made its formal notification to the Canadian and Coalition
chains of command by including the Op APOLLO National Command Element (Tampa), the
Commander of Op APOLLO (Tampa) and the NDCC as addressees on a Significant Incident
Report (SIR 004). This SIR was transmitted at 03:37Z, 18 April, approximately 5 hours after
the bomb explosion. A copy of the same SIR was sent to LFWA at 03:58Z on 18 April.
Generally, each notification team consisted of a senior officer (from the PPCLI where
possible) and a Padre. All notifications were conducted in person, which ensured a caring,
sensitive approach to impart the news of the tragedy. Within the Edmonton area, the
Commanding Officer of the Rear Party performed two notifications of death, while the
Commander of LFWA and the Area G1 Management (LFWA Personnel Branch) each
performed one notification of death. Within the Edmonton area, a regimental officer from
the LFWA Headquarters conducted notification of injury with the assistance of the Senior
Brigade Chaplain. Outside of the Edmonton area, notifications of death or injury to both
primary and secondary NOK were conducted by regimental officers or RCMP officers with
padre support where possible.
The notification process was complete at approximately 09:00Z 18 April (03:00 hrs local
Edmonton time), 11 hours and 34 minutes after the incident.
Medical Response
The on-site medical response was exceptionally good. As part of the pre-deployment
training, all soldiers had received first aid training. Immediately after the explosion, noninjured soldiers began to provide “buddy first aid” in a timely and effective manner.
Dedicated medical support to the live-fire exercise was provided by three Medical Assistants
(Med As), operating from a Light Support Vehicle Wheeled (LSVW) ambulance. Within
approximately 90 seconds, two of the Med As were providing the injured with advanced first
aid and life saving measures in order to prepare them for evacuation. The third Med A
brought the ambulance closer to the casualties and then quickly began taking care of patients.
In particular, Corporal De La Bourdonnaye (Med A) has been credited with saving the life of
Sergeant Ford by using a tourniquet when pressure dressings were not sufficient to stop
bleeding. Sergeant Wilson (Med A) checked the treatment provided by the other Med As
and by the first aiders, treated patients himself, triaged patients for both treatment and
evacuation priority, and provided information to the chain of command for the casualty
report. The bodies of the deceased were covered and guarded to ensure that evidence was
protected and, more important to all of the soldiers, to treat their fallen comrades with respect
and dignity.
In witness statements there is some difference of opinion as to whether the helicopter
casualty evacuation was timely. The helicopter medical evacuation (medevac) was requested
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10 minutes after the explosion. It was on site at Tarnak Farm 27 minutes later and after 17
minutes on the ground it departed with five patients. Three patients on stretchers and two
ambulatory patients were transported to the US surgical facility at the KAF. The Board
considers this response time to have been within the expected standard.
Ground casualty evacuation was carried out using a Bison armoured ambulance, escorted by
two Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) Coyotes. Following the helicopter evacuation, this
ambulance evacuated the remaining three casualties to the 3 PPCLI BG Unit Medical Section
at the KAF. The LSVW ambulance remained at the Tarnak Farm Range with two Med As
while a sweep of the area was being conducted. The ground ambulances were used in a
manner that was organized, well thought out and timely. Transport of the three priority 3
casualties by ground ambulance was completely appropriate.
A review of the medical documentation showed that the medical care that was given at the
KAF was timely, appropriate and of a very high standard. Of those patients evacuated by
helicopter to the US surgical facility, two went directly to surgery and three were assessed,
treated and admitted. Surgical specialists in the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC)
in Landstuhl, Germany credit the US surgeon in Kandahar with saving Sergeant Ford’s leg
by performing a technically difficult vascular procedure. The remaining three patients
evacuated by ground ambulance went to the Canadian Unit Medical Station, where they were
seen by a Medical Officer. Two of the patients were treated and returned to duty and the
third was sent to the US Surgical Facility for further tests and treatment.
All patients seen at the US military Surgical Facility were medically evacuated to the LRMC
in Germany on 18 April 2002. The patients were transported by an American C-17
Globemaster aircraft which had an Intensive Care Unit configuration. The American
aeromedical evacuation team included a physician. A review of the medical records showed
that the in-flight medical care was both appropriate and thoroughly documented. A Canadian
Medical Assistant (Corporal De La Bourdonnaye) also attended the patients as a medical
escort.
The patients arrived in Ramstein at approximately 2200 hours local, on 18 April. They were
met by Major McLeod (the Medical Officer at the Canadian Forces Support Unit Europe in
Geilenkirchen, Germany), a US vascular surgeon, and specialized medical teams. Sergeant
Ford underwent surgery for vascular and eye injuries, Corporal Paquette went to the
Intensive Care Ward, and the rest of the patients went to the ward. Treatment was provided
by specialists in the areas of Anaesthesiology, Surgery, Neurosurgery, Orthopaedic Surgery,
Internal Medicine, Ophthalmology, and Ear Nose and Throat Surgery. The process was very
thorough and all the patients were extremely well cared for.
Patients were monitored for their psychological well-being, and underwent Critical Incident
Stress Debriefing (CISD). Throughout this period, Major McLeod was able to keep both the
families and the chain of command up to date as to the soldier’s condition. On 23 April
2002, the patients were discharged to the care of Canadian Forces Aeromedical Evacuation
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
personnel and were medically evacuated to Canada aboard a Canadian Forces CC-150
Polaris aircraft.
Within the 3 PPCLI BG at Kandahar, the CISD Peer Support Response Team was
immediately activated, meeting “A” Company personnel when they returned to camp at
about 23:30Z. Personnel were provided with the information that was known at the time and
a brief overview of the range of normal reactions following a traumatic event. One peer was
assigned to the FST and one to the morgue in support of the casualty collection teams and
soldiers concerned about their friends. They were assisted by two US Mental Health
Specialists.
The personnel of “B” Company and “C” Company were debriefed early on 18 April 2002.
Individual and group defusing was done with the personnel who had been involved in the
“clean-up” at Tarnak Farm. Then, 48 hours after the incident, peer support personnel were
debriefed and reassigned as required for further defusing and debriefing activities.
Post-Incident Response and Investigative Activities
With respect to on-scene investigation, a Canadian Forces National Investigative Service
(CFNIS) representative, Captain J. MacEachern, was on-scene within three hours of the
incident and began a taped, on-site interview with the RSO (Captain J. Jasper). By
coincidence, the United States Army Europe Disaster Mortuary Affairs Team (DMART) was
in Kandahar on an unrelated investigation. By 24:00Z 17 April 2002, two DMART team
members, the Armed Forces Regional Medical Examiner (Dr.
) and DMART
Chief of Search and Recovery Team (Mr.
), were in discussion regarding a formal
request from the Canadian Forces for medical legal and forensic investigation support at the
scene to conduct a scene investigation and search and recovery of the remains.
With the immediate approval of Commander TF Rakkasan, the DMART team deployed to
the range to conduct an on-site investigation under control of the CFNIS Officer. By all
accounts, the support provided by the DMART was exemplary, independent of the fact that
their proximity allowed them to be on-scene by 01:30Z 18 April 2002.
In addition to the DMART investigation, 3 PPCLI BG quickly identified the requirement for
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support. After the casualties had been evacuated, it
was identified that damaged explosive portions of the
and fragmented
had been found. Because of this hazard, the final sweep of the area was stopped.
Again, support was provided in a very timely manner by TF Rakkasan, and an EOD Team
completed the clearing process by 03:32Z on 18 April 2002.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Part IV - Detailed Findings
This section provides extensive amplifying detail surrounding the Board’s primary findings,
according to the assigned Terms of Reference attached at Annex A. Each finding consists of
a narrative summary leading to one or more concluding statements.
Circumstances
What were the circumstances surrounding the injuries and deaths?
Beyond the introductory narrative included here and the extensive detail contained within the
full report, the Board has concluded that the members of 3 PPCLI BG who were undertaking
live-fire training at the Tarnak Farm Multi Purpose Range on the night of the incident had
done nothing wrong by way of coordination procedures or safety regulations.
By contrast, it has been determined that a number of issues were involved in this incident. In
particular, it was determined that the mission planning process used by the 170th Fighter
Squadron was deficient, in that it unnecessarily filtered ACM material which, had it been
present for Coffee 51’s mission, might have prevented fratricide from occurring.
Furthermore, it was determined that the manoeuvres performed by Coffee 51 Flight, in
reaction to the perceived threat caused by the live night fire exercise at Tarnak Farm, was
directly causal to the fratricide incident.
Perhaps most central to the tragedy was the simple, initial fact that Coffee 52 did not
recognize the observed ground fire event as a surface-to-surface training exercise, instead
perceiving it as enemy surface-to-air fire. This failure of perception was the initiating factor
that started the ensuing sequence of missed cues and hasty, imprudent actions that led to the
premature release of the weapon. Expectation appears to have played a significant role, in
that Coffee 52 incorrectly identified elements of a dismounted infantry section as an AAA
weapon system, when in fact no such system actually existed at that location
of Coffee 52 at Vol 10 Tab 14). Although impossible to confirm, it would seem by the
testimonies received by the CIB that there was some discrepancy in the briefed threat levels
(see testimony of Captain
Lieutenant Colonel
and Brigadier General Wood).
Regardless, given the complex nature of the ground order of battle and the widely dispersed
friendly forces
aircrew should have erred on the
side of caution in attempting to discern the type and source of observed ground fire.
Additionally, the failure of Coffee 51 Flight to transmit the required information for the
SAFIRE event to
either prevented or delayed a more accurate decision by
controlling authorities. In particular, due to poor technique, Coffee 52 failed to properly
“mark” the target area during his
designation, and was thus unable to relay the
coordinates of the observed ground fire in his SAFIRE report. This lack of information
impeded the AWACS and CAOC from potentially correlating the SAFIRE report with the
night live fire exercise being conducted at Tarnak Farm.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
The incomplete mission planning information provided to Coffee 51 Flight and
exacerbated the deteriorating situation. Specifically, neither the F-16 nor the AWACS
aircrew were aware of
the Tarnak Farm Range. The result
was that the crew of
, lacking or unaware of this essential data, did not transmit this
vital airspace coordination information to Coffee 51 Flight in order to enhance their decisionmaking process.
In summary, with respect to the circumstances of the incident, it is the overall conclusion of
the Board that had Coffee 51 Flight transmitted a complete and accurate SAFIRE report, and
had either the F-16 or the AWACS aircrew known of the existence of the Tarnak Farm Multi
Purpose Range Complex and
this knowledge may have dramatically altered the
decision making process thereby precluding the fratricide incident.
Proximate Cause
What caused the injuries and deaths?
All injuries and deaths that occurred at the Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range on 17 April
2002 have been attributed to the blast and shrapnel effects created by the explosion of a
500-lb GBU-12 LGB, which impacted near the firing position of 3 Section, 3 Platoon, “A”
Company at 21:26:01Z.
Primary Evidence
Reference
Details
Significant Incident Report 004
Capt B. Hynes, Comd LO
JTFSWA
Statement of Maintenance
Capt
USAF, CIB F-16
Advisor
Vol 8, Exhibit 4
Initial significant incident report passed via
TITAN to NDCC, Comd OP APOLLO.
Vol 13, Tab 57
Maintenance review package detailing the
state of the F-16 aircraft involved (Tail # 870324) upon inspection following mission.
The GBU-12 LGB is designed primarily to produce a blast/fragmentation effect rather than
an evenly distributed pattern of small pieces of shrapnel. As a result of this, both the size and
the distribution pattern of the shrapnel produced can be unpredictable. For each person killed
or injured in this incident, the extent of injury was determined by numerous variables
including, but not limited to: proximity to the explosion; the individual’s location within
Wadi East or surrounding area; whether the individual was standing, kneeling or prone; the
direction the individual was facing; and the degree of physical protection (both equipment
and terrain) from shrapnel and concussive effects.
In general, those members who were in closest proximity to the point of impact received the
gravest of injuries; certainly, had the bomb impacted in even a slightly different location,
many more casualties might have been incurred.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
The following table describes the effects of the blast on the personnel involved, in
approximate order of severity:
Personnel
Injury Sustained / Effect
Primary Evidence
Reference
Details
Statement of Events - 17 Apr 02
Capt J. Jasper
Statement of Events
Sgt W. Wilson (Med A)
Examination Reports - 19 Apr 02
US DMART Team
NIS Investigative Synopsis
Capt J. MacEachern
Coroner’s Report, cases 2002 - 14,
15,16,17A, Chief Coroner Ontario
Testimony - 01 May 02
WO W.A. Bolen
Testimony - 01 May 02
MCpl S. Clark
Testimony - 01 May 02
Maj D. Vouriot (3 PPCLI MO)
Vol 8, Exhibit 6
Vol 3, Page 504
Describes casualty sitreps - of note, Pri “4”
used consistently to describe fatality.
Describes personal and medical team activities
in the immediate aftermath of the blast.
Details medico-legal examination process and
findings, including death certificates.
Summarizes particulars of casualty reporting
and identity determination process.
Reports post-mortem examination results for
deceased members.
Details immediate post-impact actions,
including casualty assessment.
Describes effects of the explosion.
Vol 3, Page 452
Describes participation in medical treatment.
Vol 8, Exhibit 15
Vol 8, Exhibit 24
Vol 9, Exhibit 36
Vol 13, Tab 50
Vol 3, Page 439
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Duty Status of Members
Were the deceased and injured non-commissioned members on duty at the time the incident
ocurred?
All of the deceased and injured non-commissioned members were on duty at the time of the
incident and were present at the Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range on 17 April 2002 at
21:26:01Z.
Primary Evidence
Reference
Details
Significant Incident Report 004
Capt B. Hynes, Comd LO
JTFSWA
Statement of Events - 17 Apr 02
Capt J. Jasper
Testimony - 01 May 02
MCpl S. Clark
Diagram of Tank Stalk Team
MCpl S. Clark
Testimony - 08 May 02
Cpl R. Paquette
Diagram of Tank Stalk Team
Cpl R. Paquette
Diagram of Tank Stalk Team
Cpl B. Decaire
Testimony - 14 May 02
Sgt L. Ford
Testimony - 08 May 02
Pte N. Link
Vol 8, Exhibit 4
Initial Significant Incident Report includes
details of personnel involved.
Vol 8, Exhibit 6
First paragraph confirms the timing and
location of the live fire exercise.
Describes personnel composition of section.
Vol 3, Page 504
Vol 9, Exhibit 40
Vol 4, Page 533
Vol 9, Exhibit 41
Depicts lineup of Tank Stalk Team as they
were engaging the targets.
Describes personnel composition of section.
Vol 5, Page 639
Depicts lineup of Tank Stalk Team as they
were engaging the targets.
Depicts lineup of Tank Stalk Team as they
were engaging the targets.
Describes personnel composition of section.
Vol 4, Page 623
Describes personnel composition of section.
Vol 9, Exhibit 42
Blame
Were the deceased and injured non-commissioned members to blame for the injuries or
deaths?
None of the deceased, injured or other members of the 3 PPCLI BG who planned,
coordinated or participated in the subject live-fire exercise at the Tarnak Farms range can be
blamed in any way for the injuries or deaths that occurred as a result of the subject incident.
Were any other person(s), to blame for the injuries or deaths?
The Canadian Board has determined that the actions of the Coffee 51 Flight are the primary
cause for the injuries and deaths. Despite the initial misinterpretation of the live-fire exercise
as a threat to their formation, there exists a series of related disturbing contradictions between
their perceptions, their actions and accepted procedures. These are outlined in the following
table:
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Disturbing Contradictions
Observations/Facts
Board’s Conclusion
Approximately 4 minutes prior to invoking
self-defence, and prior to splitting the
formation, Coffee 51 Flight informs
that they have ordnance onboard.
It is unusual for a fighter formation to make such a
comment to the controlling authority given the fact that
they were proceeding home out of the mission area. This
comment is inappropriate and the reason for it is unclear.
Approximately 90 seconds prior to invoking
self-defence Coffee 52 requests permission to
employ his gun against the observed ground
fire location.
Based on the SPINS as well as numerous testimonies, such
a request seems to contravene accepted logic and
procedures. Combined with the previous call to
Coffee 52’s intentions are suspect. In addition neither of
the aircraft in the formation had taken appropriate evasive
action to counter the perceived threat.
Coffee 51 Flight’s description of the ground
fire depicts significant rapid fire activity
up towards their position at altitude.
Actual ground fire consisted of anti-tank rounds being
fired individually every 30 to 45 seconds for a total of 6
rounds. This was supported by small arms fire which
included tracers. All ground fire was directed in a level
plane in a westerly direction towards a single target about
200 meters away.
Both pilots of Coffee 51 flight were highly
qualified pilots with previous combat
experience, which included seeing hostile
surface to air fire.
As testified by a TF Rakassan helicopter pilot flying in the
local vicinity just prior to the incident, the few ricochets
that did occur never exceeded an altitude of approximately
1000 feet AGL. Given the unrestricted visibility and
experience of these pilots, it is surprising that their
perceptions (rate, direction and angle of ground fire) would
be so inaccurate.
Coffee 52 not only remains within the
immediate vicinity of the perceived threat,
but increases the risk by descending lower to
the threat while allowing his airspeed to
occasionally decrease below optimal
maneuvering speed.
It is quite surprising and contrary to both SPINS and
accepted defensive reactions that Coffee 52 would
willingly allow himself to be exposed to a higher threat
envelope through such actions. While the altitude
minimums published may have permitted him to get this
low to accomplish a “mark”, better airmanship would have
dictated remaining at altitude or performing the
designation at a greater distance from the perceived threat.
Throughout the 4 minute period prior to
invoking self-defence, neither pilot’s voice
reflect concern for their own safety.
In reviewing their submitted statements as well as their
post-flight testimony, it seems very clear that the perceived
threat was both immediate and grave (perceived to be
under ambush), that would have warranted concern in their
voice, directive defensive calls and aggressive defensive
maneuvers.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Coffee 51 Flight remains in the perceived
threat area for an unusually long time, both
before and after bomb release, without ever
attempting to escape the perceived envelope.
It is particularly alarming that neither of these experienced
fighter pilots ever initiated a defensive reaction after the
bomb had impacted, but rather continued to circle within
the perceived threat area until AWACS directed to “Scram
South”.
Coffee 52 invokes self-defence ROE based
on his assessment that Coffee 51 was in
imminent danger.
Such an assessment defies the documented facts. Coffee
51 remains at a safe altitude and distance from the
perceived threat throughout entire incident. Furthermore,
Coffee 51 is in visual contact with the ground fire, yet
never demonstrates (through calls or maneuvers) that he
feels personally threatened. Finally it is doubtful that
Coffee 52 truly had continuous visual contact with his lead
considering the relative position of Coffee 51 to him (an
average of
above and over
behind his
aircraft) as well as the other tasks he was performing
(
visually monitoring ground fire and flying
his aircraft).
Coffee 52 never provides a defensive
directive call to his lead after deciding that
self-defence of the formation was essential.
Despite repeated claims that the invoking of the selfdefence ROE was necessary to protect his lead, Coffee 52
never provided his lead with a directive call to take
defensive action (ie: break L/R) or provide description of
the threat direction and range.
Both on
and in
recorded statements, Coffee 52 attests to the
existence of an artillery piece firing towards
them.
It is common knowledge amongst the F-16
pilots, reinforced by their mission briefs, that
KAF was an active Coalition airfield with a
large concentration of friendly troops
Coffee 51 becomes aware of the
formations proximity to KAF over 1 minute
prior to the bomb release.
Once Coffee 51 and Coffee 52 have focused their
on
the ground fire location, only a few men are ever seen and
no attempt is made by either pilot to positively discern and
identify the perceived artillery piece.
It is unusual that Coffee 52 would not have visually
acquired the KAF given the significant artificial lighting at
the camp on the runway. Given the close proximity of the
ground fire to this significant feature should have given
concern to the probable presence of “friendlies” (TF
Rakassan personnel,
and Afghanistan Military
Forces) in and around the general area. Further
complicating the issue was the lingering concern amongst
the F-16 pilots about the uncertain location of “friendlies”
in Afghanistan.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Throughout the period prior to and
immediately after the bomb release Coffee 51
does not take positive control of the
formations actions.
Not only is Coffee 51 the flight lead for the mission, he is
also the Commanding Officer of the 170th Fighter
Squadron. Despite the extended period of exposure to the
perceived threat, the calls and maneuvers by his wingman,
and his knowledge of their position relative to KAF,
Coffee 51 fails to take control of the situation. Given his
position throughout the incident, in reference to the
perceived threat and Coffee 52, he should have either
directed the formation away from the threat or queried
Coffee 52’s maneuvering into the higher threat envelope.
17 seconds after the bomb impacts, Coffee 51
queries
as to whether the perceived
ground threat was “shooting at us?”
It is extremely unusual that a fighter aircraft would make
such a request of an AWACS that was over
away
from the scene of the incident, and could not have possibly
seen the ground fire. Furthermore, given the fact that
Coffee 52 was so convinced that his lead was being fired at
that he invoked self-defence ROE, this request
demonstrates a significant difference in appreciation of the
perceived threat between the two F-16 pilots, and is
inconsistent with Coffee 51’s post flight statements.
It is the conclusion of the Board that the pilot’s actions were not consistent with either the
expected practice for a defensive threat reaction or the existing published procedures,
including the SPINS. This represented a failure of leadership, airmanship and technique.
Furthermore, their actions contravened the published Commander’s direction with respect to
reaction to AAA and employment of ordnance outside of engagement zones. Finally, even
though it is reasonable to believe that the ground firing exercise at Tarnak Farm might have
been perceived as enemy surface to air fire, a longer, more patient look from a safe altitude
and range, combined with a good knowledge of the airspace and the threat in the area, should
have confirmed that the event observed was neither a direct threat to their formation or
enemy activity of a significant nature.
Connection to Military Service
Were the injuries and deaths attributable to military service?
The injuries and deaths resulting from the incident were entirely attributable to military
service. At the time of the accident, the individuals involved were on continuous duty in a
theatre of operations and were undertaking authorized and necessary continuation training in
preparation for an upcoming mission, as part of ongoing Coalition operations.
Primary Evidence
Reference
Details
Statement of Events - 17 Apr 02
Capt J. Jasper
Statement of Events
Vol 8, Exhibit 6
Describes casualty sitreps - of note, Pri “4”
used consistently to describe fatality.
Describes personal and medical team activities
Vol 8, Exhibit 15
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Primary Evidence
Sgt W. Wilson (Med A)
Examination Reports - 19 Apr 02
US DMART Team
NIS Investigative Synopsis
Capt J. MacEachern
Coroner’s Report, cases 2002 - 14,
15,16,17A, Chief Coroner Ontario
Testimony - 01 May 02
WO W.A. Bolen
Testimony - 01 May 02
MCpl S. Clark
Testimony - 01 May 02
Maj D. Vouriot (3 PPCLI MO)
Reference
Details
Vol 3, Page 504
in the immediate aftermath of the blast.
Details medico-legal examination process and
findings, including death certificates.
Summarizes particulars of casualty reporting
and identity determination process.
Reports post-mortem examination results for
deceased members.
Details immediate post-impact actions,
including casualty assessment.
Describes effects of the explosion.
Vol 3, Page 452
Describes participation in medical treatment.
Vol 8, Exhibit 24
Vol 9, Exhibit 36
Vol 13, Tab 50
Vol 3, Page 439
Planning and Conduct
What was the nature and quality of the planning and conduct of the live fire exercise?
The planning of the exercise was appropriate for the established objectives (section level
night fire training) and the simulated tactical scenario. The planning and subsequent conduct
of the live fire exercise was entirely consistent with established regulations and coordination
procedures, as directed by the CF and the Commander of TF Rakkasan.
Primary Evidence
Reference
Details
DCDS Directives for International
Operations, Chapter 4 Trg
TF Rakkasan Range SOPs – Range
Planner’s Check List
Testimony - 29 Apr 02
LCol P. Stogran
Testimony - 30 Apr 02
Maj S. Hackett
Testimony - 30 Apr 02, 1 May 02
Capt J. Jasper
Testimony - 30 Apr 02
Capt T. Walshaw
Testimony – 30 Apr 02
Col
Vol 10, Tab 47
In theatre training guidance Section 4, 404.
Vol 9, Exhibit 34
Vol 1, Page 2
All planning requirements for the conduct of a
live fire range at Tarnak Farm.
Explains requirement for training.
Vol 2, Page 213
Explains range requirement for training.
Vol 2, Page 144
Vol 3, Page 378
Vol 2, Page 283
Explains range preparation.
Vol 2, Page 322
Explains how battalion submitted range
request to TF Rakkasan.
Explanation of coordination measures
ground/air.
Safety Procedures
Were the safety procedures applicable to the exercise properly followed?
In general, the safety procedures considered and employed during the conduct of the live fire
exercise on the evening of 17 April 2002 were in accordance with CF directives. In fact,
precautionary measures taken with respect to in-place accident response were particularly
commendable. Minor procedural irregularities regarding the use of ricochet danger area
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
templates and the drills during preparation of the
were noted by the Board, but
these had no bearing on the incident and immediate recommendations have been made.
Primary Evidence
Reference
Details
BGL 381-001-TS/000 DAT 2001
BGL381-001/TS-000DAT200101-15
BGL 320-010/FP-001 Chap 5
Annex B Appendix 3
TF Rakkasan Tarnak Farm Range
SOPs
Range Trace, RSO Brief 17 Apr 02
Testimony - 30 Apr, 1 May 02
Capt J. Jasper
Testimony - 2 May 02
Maj S. Hackett
Testimony - 2 May 02
MCpl S. Clarke
Testimony - 8 May 02
Cpl Paquette
Vol 13, Tab 54
Vol 13, Tab 54
Training Safety.
Ricochet Danger Area Template Procedures.
Vol 13, Tab 55
Mines and Booby Traps – Proper procedure
for preparation of C-19 ADW.
Safety procedures, communications and
coordination measures.
Used by Capt Jasper on 17 Apr 02.
Explanation of how ranges were conducted.
Vol 9, Exhibit 34
Vol 9, Exhibit 25
Vol 2, Page 114
Vol 3, Page 378
Vol 3, Page 500
Vol 3, Page 504
Vol 4, Page 533
Explanation of the chain of command for the
live fire range 17 Apr 02.
Explanation of conduct of Tank Stalk range by
3 Sect, 3 Pl, “A” Coy on 17 Apr 02.
Review of his role on the range and use of
C-19 ADW.
Canadian - American Coordination
What was the nature and quality of the co-ordination between Canadian and United States
authorities surrounding the exercise?
Use of the range for night live-fire exercises was common practice within the TF, and was
coordinated through a variety of scheduling, communications, and procedural measures.
These measures included a dedicated communications net and the stationing of a sentry in the
KAF control tower. The conduct of the training at the Tarnak Farm Range on the night of
the incident was entirely in accordance with all established procedures for TF Rakkasan.
Primary Evidence
Reference
Details
Testimony - 30 Apr 02
Col
Testimony - 29 Apr 02
Capt
Testimony - 30 Apr 02
Capt T. Walshaw
Vol 2, Page 322
Testimony - 30 Apr, 1 May 02
Capt J. Jasper
Testimony - 30 Apr
Cpl C. Laroque
Vol 2, Page 144
Vol 3, Page 378
Vol 2, Page 250
Review of coordination measures
implemented by TF Rakkasan.
Review of control measures around KAF and
Tarnak Farm.
Review of actions and coordination between 3
PPCLI and the TF Rakkasan for utilization of
the range on 17 Apr 02.
Review of coordination and submissions by
“A” to 3 PPCLI Trg O.
Review of duties of KAF Tower LO.
Vol 1, Page 70
Vol 2, Page 283
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Air - Ground Coordination
What was the nature and quality of the co-ordination between ground and air forces
surrounding the incident?
Air operations in the modern battlespace are extraordinarily complex by any measure, and
require constant coordination between line operational aircrew and their chain of command at
all levels. In this particular instance, as much as the F-16 pilots bear final responsibility for
the fratricide incident, there existed other systemic shortcomings in air coordination and
control procedures, as well as mission planning practices by the tactical flying units, that may
have prevented the accident had they been corrected. In light of these systemic deficiencies,
the Board has submitted several corrective recommendations, some of which have already
been implemented
In this regard, the Board has concluded that oversight of a number of factors implicated in
this incident properly reside within the existing command structure. For example, at the level
of the 170th Fighter Squadron, it appears that failures with regard to leadership in terms of
training, standards, and expectancy occurred, in that no process appeared to have been in
place to confirm that all aircrew read and understood all applicable documents prior to
mission execution. This shortfall extended as far as the CFACC organization, which did not
appear to have a defined process in place to familiarize incoming aircrew with the theatre
organization, the existing command and control facilities, or the overall Commander’s Intent.
These processes, important in any operation, were even more critical in this case, given the
relatively short (six week) rotation period for units (reserve and regular) moving in and out of
the theatre.
Additionally, the 170th Fighter Squadron is implicated in regards to leadership, organization
and expectancy, in that some confusion existed with the mission planning responsibilities of
the mission planning Chief, or his representatives, and those of the Intelligence section of the
unit. Such confusion led to significant differences in opinions regarding the surface-to-air
threat level in Afghanistan between the following key individuals: the Commander of the
332nd Fighter Wing
, the Expeditionary Operational Support
Squadron Commander
, and the Intelligence Officer of the 170th
Fighter Squadron
.
The general nature of this shortfall is revealed by the gap between what aircrews in the
region were ultimately briefed, and the actual air control measures that had been properly
requested by the airspace managing authorities of TF Rakkasan.
As is now clear, much of the information concerning ground force movements, perceived
spans of airspace control, and live fire intentions were edited or truncated from flight
briefings and mission packs in an effort to keep the air and ground picture manageable.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
. In this particular
instance, the information supplied to Coffee 51 Flight regarding the existence of the Tarnak
Farm Range, as well as its projected use on the night in question (as duly requested and
authorized through TF Rakkasan) was either completely lacking, or was not presented in
such a way as to alert the aircrew of a potential area of interest.
Nevertheless,
Afghanistan has only two significant airfields, so it is not unreasonable to assume that
transiting aircraft (even those not able or expected to recover at the field in question) would
have at least a passing familiarity with the region.
In essence, there were multiple airspace control measures in place in and around the KAF.
Though the aircraft were unlikely to penetrate the established Terminal Management Area
(TMA) which was topped at
, the fact that a TMA existed should have been a
reminder of the proximity of transiting aircraft to friendly ground forces. There was a
that was permanently established and was identified as “in effect” in the ACO
. This
should have caused the pilots to question at least their weapon employment, if not their
positioning.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Primary Evidence
Reference
Details
Air Tasking Order (ATO)
Vol 10, Tab 8
ATO
/ April / CHG
Airspace Coordination Order (ACO)
Vol 10, Tab 9
ACO
/ April / CHG
Testimony - 3 May 02
Col D. Nichols (Comd 332nd AEG)
Testimony - 11 May 02
LCol
(Comd Exp. OSS)
Vol 12, Tab 32
Testimony - 28 Apr 02
Capt
(IntO, 170 th EFS)
Special Instructions (SPINS) –
Section 1 Commanders Guidance
Vol 11, Tab 28
Special Instructions (SPINS) –
Section 3 Communication
Article 8.6.2
Special Instructions (SPINS) –
Section 4 Airspace Article 4.3
Special Instructions (SPINS) –
Section 5 ROE Article 5.2.2
Vol 10, Tab 10
Describes theatre
at
the time of the incident.
Describes theatre
,
which is as briefed to Coffee 51 Flight prior
to the incident.
Describes theatre
at the
time of the incident.
This section details CFACC’s guidance to
all aircrew participating in OEF. Such
guidance addresses operational objectives,
commanders intent and mission tasks and
priorities.
This article explains the Surface-to-air Fire
(SAFIRE) reporting requirements.
Special Instructions (SPINS) –
Section 5 ROE Article 9
Vol 10, Tab 10
Special Instructions (SPINS) –
Section 5 ROE Article 10
Vol 10, Tab 10
Special Instructions (SPINS) –
Section 6 Operations Article 2.6
Vol 10, Tab 10
Vol 11, Tab 27
Vol 10, Tab 10
Vol 10, Tab 10
Vol 10, Tab 10
– Coffee 51
Vol 10, Tab 14
– Coffee 51
Vol 10, Tab 14
– Coffee 52
Vol 10, Tab 14
– Coffee 52
Vol 10, Tab 14
Testimony - 29 Apr 02
Capt
Kandahar IAP Airspace Presentation
Capt
Vol 1, Page 70
Vol 8, Exhibit 5
Defines and provides the details on where
information on
will be published.
This article describes the concept of self
defence and how it will be applied in
theatre.
This article provides the details on how
ROE will be applied for defence against
SAM’s and AAA threats.
This article provides the details on how
ROE will be applied in the case of Air to
Ground Attacks. It includes details on the
right to Self Defence.
This article provides details on the
minimum operating altitudes in Afghanistan
for fixed wing aircraft.
for
Coffee 51 from 212238Z to 213130Z.
for
Coffee 51 from 212238Z to 213130Z .
for
Coffee 52 from 212238Z to 212714Z.
for
Coffee 52 from 212238Z to 212714Z.
Review of control measures around KAF
and Tarnak Farm.
Explains the air control measures for TF
Rakkasan.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Post-Incident Activities
What was the quality of in-theatre post-incident response and incident reporting?
In all respects, the medical response to the incident was exceptional, and certainly saved the
life of at least one of the injured (Sergeant Ford). From the initial actions taken in the field
through to the medical evacuation of some of the injured out of theatre to American hospital
facilities at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) at Landstuhl, Germany, the
Coalition medical response was very timely and appropriate. The reporting of the incident
by the 3 PPCLI BG to the Canadian and Coalition chains of command was timely and
adequate, complete with follow-up reports as additional, relevant details became known.
Primary Evidence
Reference
Details
Testimony - 30 Apr 02
Capt J. Jasper
Duty Officer’s Log, TF Rakkasan
17 - 18 Apr 02
Significant Incident Report 004
Capt B. Hynes, Comd LO
JTFSWA
Letter from Maj Bland, OC Rear
Party dated 10 May 02
Testimony - 30 Apr 02
Major S.A. Hackett
Testimony - 29 Apr 02
LCol P. Stogran
Testimony - 01 May 02
Maj D. Vouriot (3 PPCLI MedO)
Email from Captain N. Deringer 5
May 2002
Email from Major S. McLeod 12
June 2002
Email from Major S. McLeod 12
June 2002
Email from Major S. McLeod 12
June 2002
Statement of Events
Sgt W. Wilson (Med A)
Statement of Events - 17 Apr 02
Capt J. Jasper
Duty Officer’s Log, TF Rakkasan
17 - 18 Apr 02
NIS Investigative Synopsis
Capt J. MacEachern
Vol 2, Page 144
Vol 3, Page 378
Vol 8, Exhibit 26
Describes initial command response, casualty
situation report, other coordinating actions.
Event and casualty reports, with timings.
Vol 8, Exhibit 4
Initial significant incident report passed via
TITAN to NDCC, Comd OP APOLLO.
Vol 13, Tab 51
Next of Kin notification process.
Vol 3, Page 500
Vol 1, Page 2
Details supervisory activities for casualty care
and evacuation.
Describes on-scene medical response.
Vol 3, Page 452
Describes participation in medical treatment.
Vol 13, Tab 53
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD)
details (local area).
CISD debriefing details, LRMC, Germany.
Vol 13, Tab 52
Vol 13, Tab 52
Vol 13, Tab 52
Vol 8, Exhibit 15
Vol 8, Exhibit 6
Vol 8, Exhibit 26
Vol 9, Exhibit 36
Details of medevac from Kandahar, including
in-flight medical care.
Details of care at LRMC, including surgical
interventions.
Describes personal and medical team activities
in the immediate aftermath of the blast.
Describes state of incident site with repsect to
unexploded ordnance.
Request for EOD clearing team is logged.
Summarizes casualty reporting process as well
as activities of EOD team.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Other Relevant Issues
Are there any other issues of relevance to this investigation?
As part of its investigation, the Board has commissioned a study on the current and evolving
state of air-ground combat identification (CID) technologies. This study has produced a
number of pertinent recommendations and is available to the public at BOI Web Site
(http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/boi/)
At no time during the course of its proceedings did the Board receive information that any of
the injured or representatives of the deceased had received, been offered, claimed or intended
to claim compensation from any of the persons at fault in the fratricide.
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Part V - Recommendations
The following represents the various recommendations the Canadian Board of Inquiry would
like to submit for consideration. Varying from the specific to the general in nature, they are
based on the received evidence and testimonies, the analysis performed with the help of the
Board specialist advisors, and are presented according to the categories previously covered.
Previously Submitted Recommendations
The following recommendations were identified during the course of the investigation and
submitted to the DCDS for immediate consideration prior to the completion of the Final
Report:
Airspace Coordination Issues (submitted 13 May 2002)
It is the opinion of the Board that current procedures between Coalition Ground Forces and
Coalition Air Forces require review. More specifically, the way in which
activation
and deactivation procedures are dealt with during combat operations need to be reviewed. If
such procedures are currently in place, it would appear from the evidence collected to date
that their use was incomplete. The Board believes that if the procedures had been more
stringently enforced, the chain of events that led to the incident at Tarnak Farm on 17 April
2002 could possibly have been avoided. If such measures are not sufficient to the task, then
a review of those procedures should address in detail the following:

The Coalition Air Forces Command and Control (C2) nodes and how they are
informed of the activation and deactivation of
by Friendly Coalition Ground
Forces during the course of extended Combat Operations in a timely and accurate
manner;

If this activation/deactivation process exists, a review of the Live Fire information
transmitted to include calibre/type of munitions as well as duration and expected
concentration of fire;

The communication links (if any) that are available to aircrew to expedite critical
information during wartime operations and if those communication links are available
to aircrew within the theatre of operations; and

As
change in location and use, the process by which the information is updated
and passed to ensure accuracy and timeliness of the information.
If not already put into effect, and until the procedures related to
the Board recommends the following immediate actions:

are closely reviewed,
Section 4 (Airspace) to the existing Special instructions (SPINS) to Operation
Enduring Freedom should have an additional section named COALITION FORCES
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
RANGES IN AFGHANISTAN. That section should explain all the pertinent details
related to the existence and the use of all the small arms ranges currently in use by
Coalition Forces in the Afghan theatre of operations;

All future Airspace Coordination Orders (ACO) should contain a detailed list,
including but not limited to timings, weapons to be used, altitude restrictions and
coordinating agencies, of all the live firing exercises scheduled to take place, on any
given day, on any of the existing small arms ranges currently in use by Coalition
Forces in the Afghan theatre; and

Daily, through Air Tasking Orders (ATO) Special Instructions/Banners, the details of
all live firing exercises scheduled to take place in the Afgan theatre of operations
during the ATO period need to be reported in order to increase the awareness of all
those involved in that theatre.
Ricochet Danger Area Templates (submitted 23 May 2002)
During the conduct of the investigation it became evident that Ricochet Danger Area
Templates had not been utilized during the production of safe arcs of fire for the ranges
(Captain J. Jasper, 30 April 2002). This omission did not result in an unsafe range, but future
live fire ranges, especially those utilizing a variety of weapons, should follow the procedures
directed in Canadian Land Force BGL 381-001 /TS-000 DAT 2001-10-15. This observation
was brought to the attention of the DCDS/J3 International Staff, who directed that Ricochet
Danger Area Templates shall be utilized during future live fire training events, 23 May 2002.
During testimony it was learned that the electric detonator for the
was inserted
during preparations at the ammo point. The soldier carrying the
then moved forward
with the section and waited for the end of the serial to complete wiring and attachment of the
Clacker.
The proper procedure as per BGL-320-010/FP-001 Chapter 5, Annex B, Appendix 3 (Mines
and Booby Traps) states that the weapon preparation is to be completed at the time of use.
Detonators should not be inserted ahead of time. This procedure was confirmed with
Directorate of Army Training (Pioneers and Engineers).
It is clearly understood that the 3 PPCLI BG is in a combat zone and that some procedures
need to be modified to allow training to be as realistic as possible. Therefore, following an
appraisal of the procedure for the use of the
, the BOI recommends that the
procedures currently in use be reviewed to ensure that requirements of both combat and
safety are being met appropriately and equally. This procedural observation had no impact
on the actual incident of 17 April 02.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Additional Recommendations
The following recommendations are submitted for immediate consideration, and are in
addition to the previously submitted recommendations detailed above.
Personal Emergency Notification (PEN) Forms
There were some issues that surfaced during the days that followed the initial notification
process to the families. As background, the notification process was carefully studied on an
earlier occasion with the unit adjutants of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. During
that conference, it was decided that the military was responsible to notify the individuals that
the member had listed as the primary and secondary Next of Kin (NOK) as well as the
emergency contact listed on the PEN form. The initial notification on all cases was to be the
person identified as the emergency contact followed by the primary and then the secondary
NOK. In some occasions during the notification process by the teams it was determined that
the person being notified wished to inform the rest of their families. Those wishes were of
course honoured. However, when this course was followed, some family members were
upset that they were not also notified by the military.
There was at least one instance in which a member’s parents were not included on the PEN
as other people had been listed under “Emergency Notification” and “Primary” and
“Secondary” NOK. The Rear Party was not at liberty to guess the member’s wishes or
relationships. They acted on the information available which is strictly based on the PEN
form that the member completes prior to deployment. There is no other document available
that provides further information on their family members (e.g. address and phone number of
both parents).
Given the changing nature of the modern family structure in which separated parents are not
uncommon it is suggested that the PEN form be revised to allow for additional NOK entries
for notification.
Operational Security (OPSEC)
The Board was in a fact-finding/analysis mode for over two months, during which time the
membership became concerned with specific security of information issues. In particular,
there seemed to be a lack of consideration given to OPSEC. As an example,
was included on a
CF member’s personal web site. One site named snipers and their home units. Another
offered information on in- theatre procedures, CF Immediate Operational Requirements
(IORs), delivery timelines, deployment numbers, procurement problems for deploying units,
costs, and even deployment strategies.
Much of this information is not classified in a military sense, but when summarized by an
authoritative source and published on the Internet, formerly innocuous information can
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
become an operational liability. With the threat of terrorist activities today and for the
foreseeable future, a tighter rein on OPSEC matters is required within the CF.
Members of the CF who assemble or operate a personal website on the Internet must be
educated as to the OPSEC issues associated with discussing military related matters in such a
public forum.
Tactical Air Mission Planning Process
It is the opinion of the Board that the existing mission planning procedures at the F-16 unit
(170th Fighter Squadron) and the AWACS squadron (960th Airborne Air Control Squadron)
need to be reviewed. More specifically:

If not already in place, a system needs to be developed whereby all aircrew flying
combat missions in OEF are briefed on the valid ACO and on all the subsequent
changes that could potentially apply to their missions. Associated with that process, a
“Read File” applicable to ACOs, ATOs and SPINS, with clearly defined reading
requirements (every mission, every day, or every edition) and customers (all aircrew,
all controllers, tasked individuals or any combination thereof), needs to be reviewed
for improvement at the unit level to ensure better information dissemination.

If not already in existence, a control and standardization method needs to be
developed to ensure that all aircrew fly with accurate airspace coordination
information. More specifically, the information that aircrew will have with them
while flying, as well as the format in which the information is presented (maps,
diagrams, briefing cards) needs to be clearly defined.

On the same topic, aircrew need to be better informed on the
or any
other ATO-visualization software, and need to be reminded of its limitations.

Finally, aircrew need to be reminded by the chain of command (CAOC on down to
the unit level) that a thorough knowledge of the elements of the ATO and ACO
applicable to their mission is ultimately their responsibility. This can only be
guaranteed through careful mission preparation and study.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
CAOC Awareness Briefing
The reviewed testimonies have confirmed a certain lack of knowledge by the aircrews of the
functions of the CAOC, its capabilities and its limitations. It is the opinion of the Board that
air-fighting units at all levels would be better served if an initial familiarization briefing of
the CAOC was mandatory for all aircrew arriving in theatre. This briefing could take place
at the CAOC (ideally) or could be given by CAOC representatives at the various deployed
locations in the theatre.
CAOC Supervision
It is the opinion of the Canadian Board that the CAOC needs to introduce measures that
ensure adequate supervision of the quality of mission planning and execution by the tactical
units authorized to fly OEF missions. In particular, the CAOC leadership should insist on
periodically reviewing mission briefs (perhaps by VTC) to ensure that flight leads are
properly interpreting the Commander’s intent, the theatre threat, and the various flying
orders.
Procedure Verification Process
Although most likely already in place, the board strongly feels that a higher priority needs to
be given to the verification process in theatre. More particularly, this inquiry has revealed a
definite lack of knowledge or familiarity, at all levels, of basic ACMs (Airspace Control
Measures). Methods of control and verification have to be refined to ensure that the
information required for a safe and effective air campaign is passed and clearly understood,
from the planner to the flyer.
Combat Identification Briefing
Staff from Directorate Land Requirements, Directorate of Air Requirements and the
Directorate of Artillery Systems Project Management provided the Board with an overview
of current capabilities and an overview of future technology developments with respect to
“Combat Identification”.
In the short term, the Board recommends that a concerted effort be made to develop simple
but effective solutions for combat identification,
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
The Leggat Study
Almost immediately following the incident, once it was determined that a Board of Inquiry
was to be convened, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Science & Technology (Adm (S&T)),
Dr. J. Leggat, offered the services of his organization to assist the work of the Board in any
way possible. Upon consultation, it was determined that Dr. Leggat’s Group was ideally
positioned to conduct a scientific study of the current technical challenges, ongoing
initiatives, and potential new technologies surrounding air-to-ground combat identification
systems. These systems and the emerging technologies associated with their use are viewed
as a key component of the future CF approach to enhanced force protection and fratricide
prevention.
This study is included in whole at Annex K. Notwithstanding the security classification of
the rest of the Board of Inquiry Final Report, it is unclassified. Specific recommendations
that support or inform the Board’s findings are included in the “Other Relevant Issues”
section.
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Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annexes
Annex A - Terms of Reference
The following is the original terms of reference, as submitted for the consideration of the
Board President on 19 April 2002. These original terms were subsequently modified slightly
to reflect the reassignment of BGen Dumais from “Board Member” to “Specialist Advisor”
to permit his attachment to the American CIB.
Annex 1/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex 2/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex B - Visual Timeline Chart (21:16Z to 21:36Z)
Under leaf is a graphical representation of the air and ground events that transpired at the
Tarnak Farm Range on the night of 17/18 April 2002.
Annex 3/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex C - Time Interpretation Table
Annex 4/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex D - Area Map of Kandahar Airfield Facility and Tarnak Farm
The above map details the location of the Tarnak Farm Range, in relation to the position of
Kandahar Airfield Facility (KAF), the main operating base of coalition ground forces in the
theatre.
Visible in the Tarnak Farm Multi Purpose Range Complex is the main camp area in green.
The main range is bounded to the south by the
north wall of the main camp area, just below the circular structure (commonly called “the
corral”), and to the east by the Wadi East (drainage ditch). The Tank Stalk range was
stationed along this wadi, firing in a Westerly direction.
Annex 5/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex E - Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range Complex
The following diagram shows key details of the Tarnak Farm Range, including:
Drainage Ditch (Wadi East) - location of the firing point for the Tank Stalk range
Drainage Ditch (Wadi South) - location /approach path for the Close-Quarter Combat range
Administrative Area
- location of waiting troops, support vehicles
Ammunition Point
- area where individual relays received ammunition
Corral
- part of the Close-Quarter Combat range
Tank Targets (close / far)
- primary targets for Tank Stalk range firing
Training Compound
- southern limit of range area
Annex 6/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Of note are the relative locations of the two simultaneous ranges being conducted that
evening, as well as their arcs of fire. Depicted on the right of the
photo below is the
Tank Stalk range, which moved north from the Ammunition Point; at the bottom, running
east-west, is the Close-Quarter Combat range, which moved west and then up towards the
corral.
These two ranges were designed to be conducted simultaneously to allow for maximum
training value in terms of immersion in the tactical scenario. Accordingly, they have
intersecting arcs of fire at and beyond the northern edge of the corral structure. Additional
safety arcs were built into the scenario by a process called “templating” to ensure that troop
positions were not impinged upon by friendly fire.
Annex 7/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex F - Tank Stalk Range Photos
To aid in visualization, this section
contains a series of four photographs,
detailing the specifics of the Tank Stalk
range, roughly from north to south.
Each photo includes a small interpretive
diagram similar to the one on the right.
These diagrams show the approximate
location of the camera and the rough field
of view for each photo. Note that photos
with a long field of view (ie photo 4) tend
to distort depth, making distant objects
appear considerably closer than they
actually are.
Photo 1 - Wadi East, looking roughly
north. The Tank Stalk firing position was
along the west side of the wadi, firing
west, as depicted at the extreme left of the photo.
Photo 1
Annex 8/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex 9/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Photo 4 - Depicts the extreme left side of the Tank Stalk range, showing the leftmost point of
the field of fire looking towards the far tank target. The north edge of the corral is visible,
marking the right hand extremity of the field of fire for the Close-Quarter Combat range
which was being conducted in and along the southern drainage ditch (Wadi South).
Photo 4
Annex 10/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex G - Troop Disposition and Wadi Profile at Bomb Impact
The above diagram details the relative positioning of the various personnel engaged in the
Tank Stalk portion of the range, at or near the moment of impact. When correlated with the
injury list, it is evident that proximity to the impact point was a primary factor in determining
the severity of the harm sustained.
Sergeant Leger, Corporal Dyer and Private Smith, closest to the blast, sustained the bulk of
the concussive effect, although their body position along the upward slope of the wadi did
not vary significantly. Private Green, however, was at or above the lip of the ditch in a
crouched position. This may explain the fact that he was thrown some distance by the force
of the blast. Sergeant Ford was comparatively sheltered, though his proximity means that he
sustained significant injuries. On the other side of the section, Master Corporal Hollister and
Corporal Paquette were both seriously injured, while Master Corporal Clark, further down
the slope of the wadi, received only a minor fragmentation injury. To the north, Corporal
Perry and Corporal Decaire were slightly exposed, though distant, and both received shrapnel
injuries.
Annex 11/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex H - Flight Path Reconstruction
The following diagrams show the initial approach and subsequent tactical manoeuvring of
Coffee 51 Flight as it was transiting in the vicinity of the KAF on 17 Apr 02, between
approximately 21:15Z and 21:28Z.
Annex 12/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
During the engagement phase, data frequency for altitude, speed, heading, pitch angle, roll
angle, and position (relative to impact point) has been extracted from supplied materials with
a sampling frequency of one iteration per second. This yields a reconstruction of very high
positional fidelity.
Annex 13/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex I - Transcript of Air to Air Radio Communications
The following transcript is derived from recordings made aboard the two F-16 aircraft in
Coffee 51 Flight.
This accounts for
the short gap at the beginning of the transcript, between the time the initial contact report is
sent to the AWACS, and when the aircraft move into the engagement phase.
This is the only recorded evidence of the radio calls that were exchanged between
and Coffee 51 Flight between 21:22:38Z and 21:31:30Z, 17 Apr 02. At the time of this
report, no evidence was provided that could clearly identify the exchanges that occurred via
between
and
. Reference to
is made twice in the overall
exchanges between
and Coffee 51 Flight indicating that there is command and
control interaction between the AWACS and the CAOC. All the testimonies reviewed by the
Board confirm that fact.
For ease of interpretation, entries have been colour coded according to the transmitting unit:
Coffee 51
Coffee 52
TIME (Z)
FREQ
C/S
TRANSMISSION
21:22:38
51
Do you have good coordinate for a mark
or do you need me to roll in?
21:22:42
52
Euh, standby. I’ll mark it right now.
21:22:47
52
I’m in from the south-east.
21:22:52
51
REMARKS
In the previous minute, Coffee 52 has
made his initial contact report. Coffee 51
is asking whether he has input the
position into his computer to allow
aircraft-aircraft transfer, or whether he
personally should turn to identify the
target coordinates.
Coffee 52 tells Coffee 51 to wait; the
requested info will be forthcoming.
Coffee 52 attempts to update his position
to preserve his lead’s situational
awareness.
At 21:52:56, Coffee 52 recovers from his
designation to mark the target.
21:23:22
21:23:29
21:23:34
52
Euh, I suppose we might as well make a
left hand turn and stay in
until 51 is
ready.
Euh, Okay
. This Coffee52. I’ve got
a TALLY on the vicinity. Euh, request
permission to lay down some 20 mikemike.
recognizes that this situation will
delay the refuelling and manoeuvres to
stay in his assigned area.
Coffee 52 is in a shallow right hand turn,
going through a
heading of
.
Annex 14/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
TIME (Z)
FREQ
C/S
TRANSMISSION
REMARKS
Standby
21:23:42
with
21:23:45
51
Let’s just make sure that euh, that it’s not
friendly, that’s all.
21:23:51
51
When you got a chance, put on the
you got a good hack on it.
21:24:39
52
I’m gonna flow down here to the south
west.
21:24:42
52
from Coffee 52. Do you want
us to push to a different freq?”
21:24:48
51
Check my sparkle, check my sparkle to
see if it looks good.
21:24:55
51
Yeah, I’m contact your sparkle as well.
if
Coffee 51.
HOLD Fire, I need
details on SAFIRE…(the rest of the
sentence unconfirmed)…”for …”
21:25:00
21:25:17
51
21:25:23
52
Okay, I have got some men on the road
and it looks like a piece of artillery firing
at us. I am rolling in in SELFDEFENSE”.
copies
Check Master Arm, Laser Arm, and
check you are not in mark.
I’m in from the southwest.
21:25:37
51
Do you show him on a bridge?
21:25:39
52
Bomb’s away, cranking left.
21:25:49
51
Check (unrecognizable term, “LIVE?”),
deedle, deedle.
21:25:52
21:25:54
21:26:01
21:26:07
52
52
52
52
21:25:04
52
21:25:04
I am fine.
Laser’s on.
Shack !
is likely making initial contact
to request information.
Coffee 51 again requests the exact
position to be transmitted via air-air data
link.
Horizontal range from the target area to
Coffee 52 is slightly less than 2.5nm
shortly after this call.
Shortly after this transmission, sensors
from both aircraft are synchronized by
data link and are looking at the same area
on the ground.
Coffee 51 confirms that both laser spot
trackers are on the same target.
denies Cofee 52’s request to
open fire using 20mm cannon with a call
to the collective C/S og Coffee 51 Flight
(Coffee 51). The AWACS clearly
requires additional SAFIRE information
to relay to
and the MCC is
acting on a “hunch” to deny weapon
employment until the situation clears up
somewhat.
At 21:25:11, Coffee 52 initiates a sharp
right hand turn to initiate weapon
delivery. Starting speed is
starting altitude is
Coffee 51 supports Coffee 52s attack by
confirming his weapons release settings.
Situational awareness call.
Coffee 51 is still trying to correlate what
he sees on his
with what Coffee 52
is reporting.
Bomb release time.
The recovery is to level flight
with no clear attempt to get altitude
separation from the ground.
Bomb impact time.
….
Annex 15/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
TIME (Z)
FREQ
C/S
Coffee 51,
Disengage.
“Friendlies Kandahar”.
21:26:11
21:26:16
52
51
21:26:42
. How copy?
Copy euh… Can you confirm that they
were shooting at us?
Coffee 51,
. You are cleared
Self-Defence…
wants you to
work south …(some unrecognizable
words)…Kandahar.
21:26:31
51
REMARKS
By thies time
has issued clear
direction for Coffee 51 Flight to clear the
area due to their proximity to KAF and
friendly troops.
Copy… euh. Disengaging south.
Coffee 51,
21:26:18
21:26:21
TRANSMISSION
Is not sure whether Coffee
51 Flight has received the last call.
This question does not make sense;
Coffee 51 knows that
is distant
from the action and in any case has no
sensors that would be able to corroborate
his picture of the tactical situation.
This call reflects the confusion in the
AWACS over what has transpired since
the “self defence” call – it is worth noting
that none of the communications
surrounding the weapon setup or release
was transmitted on
.the primary
AWACS controlling frequency.
Okay. One is coming back left, steer 82.
All times extrapolated from this point on.
21:26:44
21:26:47
51
21:27:15
21:27:23
21:27:25
51
52
21:27:45
21:27:55
21:28:01
52
21:28:07
21:28:13
51
21:28:26
52
21:28:29
52
21:28:35
51
Coffee 51, Scram south!
, Coffee 51 scramming.
Coffee 51,
. I need coordinates
when able and I to know if any rounds
were fired.
Go ahead.
Yeah, I had one bomb dropped… in the
vicinity of euh, 31 24 N, point 78, 65 43
point 522. That’s an estimate euh, if you
are our general vicinity.
The coordinates repeated in this
transmission correspond to a point
approximately 5 to 6 miles away from the
Tarnak Farm area.
Coffee 51. Repeat east coordinate.
Yeah. I am not so sure it’s that accurate.
I don’t have an accurate coordinate right
now. Do you want me to go back and get
you one?
, negative.
Let’s go back safe.
Yeah! They were definitely shooting at
you.
It sure seemed that they were tracking
around and everything, and euh, trying to
lead.
Yeah. We had our lights on and it wasn’t
helping I don’t think.
Annex 16/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
TIME (Z)
FREQ
C/S
21:28:42
52
21:28:49
51
21:28:52
52
21:28:53
21:29:02
21:29:03
51
51
21:29:27
51
52
21:29:46
21:29:52
51
21:29:55
52
21:30:15
21:30:24
21:30:29
52
21:30:36
52
21:30:40
51
21:30:40
21:30:43
51
21:30:45
52
REMARKS
I had a group of guys on a road around a
gun and it did not looked organized like
it would be our guys”.
It seems like it was right on a bridge.
That’s kind of where I was at.
Yeah, not quite. (pause) I hope that was
the right thing to do.
Me too…
Coffee 51
Go ahead.
Yeah> I need type of bomb dropped.
Result, and, type of SAFIRE
21:29:04
21:29:10
TRANSMISSION
Even this late in the engagement. Coffee
51 Flight has still not completed the
requirements for the SAFIRE report.
That was a single GBU-12 dropped. It
was a direct hit on euh the artillery piece
that was firing. As far as the SAFIRE,
Coffee 52. 51, what do you have on that.
I’d say the same. It was euh, sort of
continuous fire, and euh… it appeared to
be leading us as we were flying by and
then as we came back around.
Do you get a top altitude of the SAFIRE?
Negative. They were burning out before
here.
I would estimate the top a approximately
10,000 ft. And just to let you know. We
split in azimuth, sending 51 to the south
and 52 went to the northeast. And euh,
one of the guns turned back around to the
east firing at 52, euh, as well.
copies. And if we could, could
you give me a routh longitude.
Yeah. I did not take a mark at the time.
Was that definitely the airfield that was
closer?
Yeah.
Coffee 51. Could you just repeat the
coordinate that you passed earlier?
He wants the coordinate again.
Yeah. I do not have the proper
coordinate for that
21:30:49
21:30:52
21:31:00
52
Would you estimate… I’d estimate about
3 miles to the south, maybe a 150…
Coffee 51,
Annex 17/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
TIME (Z)
21:31:05
FREQ
C/S
TRANSMISSION
51
Yeah
euh… There was no
effective in that area tonight as far as our
brief was concerned? Do you concur?
REMARKS
Only now is the possibility of a missed
being considered.
21:31:12
agrees that there is no
but in the time interval between
the question and the response, it is
doubtful that he had time to check the
paper copy of the ATO.
21:31:19
21:31:28
21:31:30
52
51
Yeah. Standby for the microscope huh!
Yeahhh.
Annex 18/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex J - Relevant Air Orders and Instructions
Description of the SAFIRE reporting requirement
Self-defence includes the action of a U.S. forces unit in defending itself, sub-units and other U.S. forces in the
vicinity, or, for national self-defence, the U.S., U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens, their
property, U.S. commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. [Coalition] forces, foreign nationals and their
property, against a hostile act or hostile intent.
As to both unit and national self-defence, the right to use armed force in self-defence depends upon two
elements: necessity and proportionality. The requirement of necessity, or present danger, normally arises when
a hostile act occurs. The right and obligation of self-defence may also involve using armed force against
hostile intent. In either case, proportionality requires that the use of force be limited in intensity, duration, and
magnitude to what is reasonably required to counter the hostile act or hostile intent.
Under the concept of self-defence in peacetime, force may NOT be used with a view to inflicting reprisal or
retaliation for acts already committed. Where acts already committed reflect a pattern of hostile acts which can
reasonably be expected to continue based on all valid indications, actions in self-defence may be taken to
eliminate the continuing threat.
It is critical, however, that coalition forces plan and execute such that they minimize the chance of a selfdefence situation. (emphasis added)
Annex 19/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Annex K - The Leggat Study
As described in the “Recommendations” section, under leaf is a scientific study of the current
technical challenges, ongoing initiatives, and potential new technologies surrounding air-toground combat identification systems conducted by Adm (S&T) personnel at the request of
the Board.
Annex 20/20
Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report
Glossary
AAA: Anti-Aircraft Artillery. Ground based
weapons system designed to shoot down aircraft
using rounds or exploding shells. Small Arms fired
at aircraft are commonly included within this
definition.
AL-QUEDA: An Arabic word meaning “the
base”. In approximately 1989, Osama bin Laden
and Muhammad Atef founded “Al Qaeda”, an
international terrorist group dedicated to opposing
non-Islamic governments with force and violence.
C-130 HERCULES: Considered to be one of the
most versatile tactical transport planes, it is used to
airlift troops, equipment and cargo, conduct Search
and Rescue (SAR) operations and in air-to-air
refueling of fighters certain helicopters.
CAOC: Combined Aerospace Operations Center.
It is the primary theatre command and control
facility responsible for orchestrating an air
campaign for a coalition effort.
ATO: Air Tasking Order. A representation of the
Joint Air Operations Plan. Details how joint forces
will be integrated and tasked, including specific
mission details.
AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System.
An aircraft that provides all-weather surveillance,
command, control and communications capabilities
to US, NATO and other allied air defence forces.
BAGRAM AIR BASE: Located in the Parvan
Province, Afghanistan, approximately 47
kilometres north of Kabul.
BATTLE GROUP (BG): A temporary grouping
of sub-units under one commander, formed for the
purpose of carrying out a specific operation or
mission.
BISON ARMOURED AMBULANCE: Is an
8X8 wheeled armoured ambulance for casualty
evacuation manufactured by the Diesel Division
General Motors; it entered service with the
Canadian Forces in the early 1990's.
CASUALTY PRIORITY SYSTEM: The four
categories of casualty triage are color-coded and
are recognized as follows:
Category I IMMEDIATE (RED TAG) includes all
compromises to a patient's Airway, Breathing and
Circulation. If immediate medical attention is not
provided, the patient will die.
Category II DELAYED (YELLOW TAG) includes
any injuries that may be serious and potentially life
threatening. They may require extensive and
intensive treatment.
Category III MINIMAL (GREEN TAG) also called
the "walking wounded." These individuals have
injuries that will still need treatment, however, are
unlikely to deteriorate over the next few days.
Category IV EXPECTANT (BLACK TAG) this
category is comprised of patients whose treatment
would be time consuming and extremely
complicated coupled with a low chance of survival.
Glossary 1/4
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CFACC:
Command.
Coalition Force Air
Component
unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to
friendly personnel.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: Air action by fixed or
rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets that are
in close proximity to friendly forces.
GBU-12 (LGB): Guided Bomb Unit-12 Laser
Guided Bomb. It utilizes a 500-pound generalpurpose warhead. The operator illuminates a target
with a laser designator and then the munition
guides free fall to a spot of laser energy reflected
from the target.
COLLECTIVE TRAINING:
Training that
focuses on producing cohesive, combat-capable
tactical groupings and involves the simulated
execution of battle tasks in realistic training
scenarios. Levels 4, 5, and 6 denote training at the
Company, Combat Team and BG levels
respectively.
COYOTE: An 8x8 light armoured vehicle. This
highly mobile, well-armed, and well-protected
reconnaissance variant of the Light Armoured
Vehicle (LAV) family is employed in the conduct
of battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance
missions at the battle group and brigade levels.
DMART: Disaster Mortuary Affairs Response
Team. In the US Army it covers the search for,
recovery,
identification,
preparation
and
disposition of remains of persons for whom the
Services are responsible by status and Executive
Order.
E3-B/C SENTRY:
Airborne Early Warning
aircraft. The E-3 Sentry is a modified Boeing
707/320 commercial airframe with a rotating radar
dome. It contains a radar subsystem that permits
surveillance from the Earth’s surface up into the
stratosphere, over land or water.
EOD TEAM:
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Team.
Responsible for the detection,
identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe,
recovery and final disposal of unexploded
explosive ordnance.
IRF(L): Immediate Reaction Force (Land). It is a
light, fully mobile force designed to respond
quickly to overseas missions, and highly suitable
for evolving operations.
KC-135 STRATOTANKER:
Based on the
Boeing 367-80 its principal mission is air refueling.
This unique asset greatly enhances the USAF’s
capability to accomplish its primary missions of
global reach and global power.
KC-10A EXTENDER:
An Air Mobility
Command advanced tanker and cargo aircraft
designed to provide increased global mobility for
US armed forces. Using either an advanced aerial
refuelling boom, or a hose and drogue centerline
refuelling system, the KC-10A can refuel a wide
variety of US and allied military aircraft within the
same mission. The aircraft is equipped with
lighting for night operations.
KANDAHAR: Capital of Kandahar province in
Southern Afghanistan, with a population of
250,000. The country’s second largest city and
chief trade center is the main base for Canadian,
US and Coalition military operations in the area.
F-16 FIGHTING FALCON: is a compact, multirole fighter aircraft. It is highly maneuverable and
has proven itself in air-to-air combat and air-tosurface attack.
FLIR: Forward-Looking Infrared camera. It is a
high-resolution, thermal-imaging system.
FRATRICIDE: The employment of friendly
weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the
enemy or destroy his equipment that results in
MLVW: Medium Logistic Vehicle Wheeled. The
backbone of the land force logistic support, these
vehicles are used throughout the battlefield in
command and control, troop and cargo transport,
maintenance and administrative functions.
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RSO: Range Safety Officer. An individual
specifically appointed by the commanding officer
to ensure that range exercises are conducted safely.
MSL: Mean Sea Level. Reference height system
in which the altitude of an aircraft is given to its
height above sea level.
NAUTICAL MILE (NM): Commonly used for
ships at sea and aircraft in flight. A nautical mile is
6080 ft long as opposed to the more commonly
used statute mile, which is 5280 ft long.
OPERATION ANACONDA:
During March
2002, members of the 3 PPCLI BG were in the
mountains of Paktia Province east of Gardez on a
US-led Coalition effort to search for Al-Qaeda and
Taliban fighters, capture them, and destroy their
SAM: Surface-to-air Missile. Rocket propelled,
ground based system designed to shoot down
aircraft. Such systems may be small and mobile
(shoulder launched) or large and stationary.
Guidance systems vary from optical through infrared (IR), laser to radar.
TALIBAN: Emerging from the disparate bands of
anti-communist Islamic militia known as the
Mujahideen they rapidly took control of most of
the country, including the capital Kabul, which was
taken in September 1996.
Their tough
interpretation of Islamic law has attracted
widespread criticism.
TARNAK FARM:
A multi-purpose range
complex located south of the Kandahar Airfield
Facility routinely used by the members of Task
Force Rakkasan.
OPERATION HARPOON: On 13 March 2002 a
joint Canadian–American assault using land and air
forces to eliminate a specific pocket of Taliban and
Al-Qaeda resistance. The land component was a
battalion-sized mixed Canadian and American
force under the tactical command of LieutenantColonel Pat Stogran, the commanding officer of
the 3 PPCLI BG. Operation HARPOON was
completed on 19 March 2002.
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF):
The US nickname for the military phase of the
campaign against terrorism which began on 7
October 2002. Operation APOLLO is Canada’s
military contribution to this international campaign
and includes the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry BG.
TASK FORCE DEVIL: Brevity code word for
“A” Company, 3 PPCLI Battle Group during its
range exercise on 17 April 2002 at the Tarnak
Farm Range.
TASK FORCE RAKKASAN: Brevity code
word for the brigade combat team based on the 3 rd
Brigade (187th Infantry Regiment) of the 101st (US)
Airborne Division (Air Assault) and is so named in
honour of the 187th’s regimental nickname. It is a
Coalition
formation
based
at
that includes 3 PPCLI BG.
TOC: Tactical Operations Centre. In the US
Army it serves as the unit’s command and control
hub, assisting the commander in synchronizing
operations. The TOC is the location where the
majority of the planning, staff coordination, and
monitoring of key events occurs.
TRACER ROUND: A tracer round contains a
pyrotechnic charge that permits visible observation
of a bullet's in-flight path to the impact point.
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UHF: Ultra High Frequency.
VHF: Very High Frequency. Frequencies from
VHF signals are widely
employed for television and radio transmissions.
WADI: Rocky watercourse, dry except in rainy
season.
ZULU: Military standard time reference system
that is based on the global time zone division
commonly referred to as the Greenwich Mean
Time (GMT) reference system. Zulu time system
is universally applied by all Coalition members
involved in OEF.
Glossary 4/4