TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL KREPON
FOUNDING PRESIDENT, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER
before the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 28, 2004
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:
THANK YOU FOR HOLDING THIS HEARING ON SOUTH ASIA, AND
ON WAYS TO REINFORCE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION
GENERATED BY PRIME MINISTER VAJPAYEE AND PRESIDENT
MUSHARRAF.
IN THE FIFTEEN YEARS SINCE AQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE EXPERIENCED HEAVY WEATHER. THE
LAST FIVE YEARS OF THIS STRETCH HAVE BEEN THE WORST. AFTER
TESTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN 1998, INDIA AND PAKISTAN FOUGHT A
LIMITED, HIGH-ALTITUDE WAR, AND IN 2002, THEIR ARMIES SPENT
MOST OF THE YEAR READY FOR BATTLE.
BEFORE WE PASS JUDGMENT ON THEIR BRINKSMANSHIP, WE
MIGHT RECALL THAT THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE NUCLEAR
STANDOFF BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
WERE ALSO VERY HARROWING. WE LOOKED DIRECTLY INTO THE
NUCLEAR ABYSS DURING CRISES OVER BERLIN AND CUBA. AFTER THIS
EXTREMELY DANGEROUS PASSAGE, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW
WERE FINALLY READY TO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGERS.
AFTER THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, WE AGREED TO ESTABLISH A
“HOTLINE” FOR SECURE COMMUNICATION IN CRISIS, AND WE
NEGOTIATED AN END TO NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE ATMOSPHERE.
THE NUCLEAR RIVALRY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SOVIET UNION WAS EVENTUALLY TAMED BY A LONG AND DIFFICULT
PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, ARMS
CONTROL, INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION, AND FINALLY, DEEP CUTS IN
NUCLEAR FORCES.
PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF AND PRIME MINISTER VAJPAYEE NOW
HAVE AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO ENGINEER A MOMENTOUS SHIFT
FROM RECURRING CRISES TO NUCLEAR SAFETY. MY TESTIMONY WILL
GIVE YOU A SENSE OF HOW THIS TRANSITION MIGHT TAKE SHAPE,
AND WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO HELP.
NUCLEAR DANGERS IN SOUTH ASIA HAVE BEEN LINKED TO
KASHMIR IN SEVERAL WAYS. TO BEGIN WITH, THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT
CONCENTRATION OF INDIAN AND PAKISTANI FORCES STATIONED
NEAR THE KASHMIR DIVIDE, WHERE THEY HAVE REGULARLY
ENGAGED IN ARTILLERY EXCHANGES AND MINOR SKIRMISHES. IN
ADDITION, PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY HAS RELIED HEAVILY ON
MILITANT GROUPS TO PUNISH INDIA AND TO LEVERAGE A FAVORABLE
OUTCOME. CONSEQUENTLY, ESCALATION CONTROL ON THE
SUBCONTINENT HAS DEPENDED HEAVILY ON TWO RISKY
ASSUMPTIONS: FIRST, THAT JIHADI GROUPS WOULD REFRAIN FROM
SUCH HORRENDOUS ACTS OF VIOLENCE AS TO SPARK A WAR; AND
SECOND, THAT THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD REFRAIN FROM
ATTACKING PAKISTAN IN RESPONSE TO LESSER GRIEVANCES.
NUCLEAR SAFETY CANNOT POSSIBLY REST ON THESE TWO
ASSUMPTIONS. SINCE ESCALATION CONTROL AND NUCLEAR RISK
REDUCTION BEGIN ALONG THE KASHMIR DIVIDE, THIS IS A KEY AREA
FOR PAKISTAN AND INDIA TO FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS. PROSPECTS FOR
NUCLEAR SAFETY ARE NOW BRIGHTER BECAUSE THERE IS A CEASEFIRE
ALONG THE KASHMIR DIVIDE AND BECAUSE THE LEVEL OF
INFILTRATION ACROSS THIS DIVIDE BY JIHADI GROUPS BASED IN
PAKISTAN IS WAY DOWN.
TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT OPPORTUNITY TO
REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGERS ON THE SUBCONTINENT, THE
FOLLOWING STEPS APPEAR ESSENTIAL:
1) FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, TO SUSTAIN THE CURRENT
CEASEFIRE AND TO CONTINUE TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING
MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFILTRATION.
2) FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE
DISAFFECTED KASHMIRIS AND TO TAKE SPECIFIC MEASURES
DEMONSTRATING RESPECT FOR THEIR HONOR AND DIGNITY.
3) FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, TO CHANGE ITS PAST
PRACTICE OF HOLDING NUCLEAR RISK-REDUCTION MEASURES
HOSTAGE TO A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE KASHMIR
ISSUE. INSTEAD, IT IS CRUCIAL TO DEMONSTRATE RESPONSIBLE
NUCLEAR STEWARDSHIP BY NEGOTIATING AND PROPERLY
IMPLEMENTING MEASURES TO PROMOTE NUCLEAR SAFETY.
4) FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, TO DEMONSTRATE
RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR STEWARDSHIP BY ENGAGING IN
SUBSTANTIVE AND SUSTAINED DIALOGUE WITH PAKISTAN OVER
THE KASHMIR ISSUE.
WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES DO TO HELP IN THIS REGARD?
THERE ARE SEVERAL STEPS WE CAN TAKE TO FACILITATE AN
HONORABLE OUTCOME TO THIS TRAGIC, LONGSTANDING IMPASSE.
1) WE CAN PROVIDE MORE, AND MORE EXPEDIENT, HELP TO THE
GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO SECURE THEIR
BORDERS.
2) WE CAN PROVIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, IF BOTH
GOVERNMENTS SO DESIRE, FOR INITIATIVES THAT PROVIDE
HUMANITARIAN, DEVELOPMENTAL, AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO
THOSE WHO HAVE GREATLY SUFFERED OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN
YEARS OF VIOLENCE.
3) WE CAN HELP THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN, IF
THEY SO DESIRE, TO MONITOR AGREEMENTS THEY MIGHT
CHOOSE TO CONCLUDE REGARDING THE PULLBACK OF
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT, FORCES, AND TRAINING
FACILITIES AWAY FROM THE KASHMIR DIVIDE.
AS I MENTIONED, NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION BEGINS, BUT
CERTAINLY DOES NOT END, IN KASHMIR. MR. CHAIRMAN, YOU AND
OTHER MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE UNDERSTAND THAT THE FIRST
ACT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM WILL BE A MOMENTOUSLY BAD EVENT.
EVEN THOUGH AN ACT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM MIGHT PRODUCE
RELATIVELY FEW CASUALTIES, IT COULD GENERATE SIGNIFICANT
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS. THE CROSSING OF THIS
NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IS ALSO LIKELY TO TRIGGER COPYCATTING. IN
TENSE REGIONS LIKE SOUTH ASIA, THE DETONATION OF A “DIRTY
BOMB” COULD SCUTTLE A PEACE PROCESS AND GENERATE SEVERE
PRESSURES FOR ESCALATION.
MATERIAL THAT CAN BE USED TO MAKE DIRTY BOMBS RESIDES
IN MANY POORLY GUARDED HOSPITALS AND CIVILIAN RESEARCH
LABS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. THESE FACILITIES ARE VERY
SUSCEPTIBLE TO “INSIDER” THREATS, SUCH AS A SECURITY GUARD OR
A HOSPITAL WORKER WHO IS SYMPATHTIC TO AN EXTREMIST GROUP
AND WHO AIDS IN THE THEFT OF THIS MATERIAL.
LIKE THE UNITED STATES, INDIA AND PAKISTAN ARE VERY
VULNERABLE TO THREATS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM. IT IS VITAL THAT
WE HELP EACH OTHER TO PREVENT SUCH ACTS.
HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES HELP IN THIS REGARD?
1) BY EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF U.S. COOPERATIVE THREAT
REDUCTION PROGRAMS TO ENCOMPASS EFFORTS TO
SAFEGUARD DANGEROUS MATERIALS THAT COULD BE USED FOR
NUCLEAR TERRORISM. MUCH CAN BE GAINED BY ENGAGING
INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN EFFORTS TO DESIGN SECURITY
MEASURES AND TO DISCUSS BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS
LEARNED FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM.
2) BY PROVIDING PAKISTAN AND INDIA WITH DEVICES TO IMPROVE
SECURITY AT FACILITIES SUCH AS HOSPITALS AND RESEARCH
LABS, IF THEY SO DESIRE.
3) BY EXCHANGING IDEAS ON PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAMS
TO HELP SAFEGUARD DANGEROUS MATERIALS AT THESE
FACILITIES.
4) IF THEY SO DESIRE, TO OFFER WIDE-RANGING TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO GUARD AGAINST THE
ENTRY OF RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS AT BORDER CROSSINGS
AND PORTS OF ENTRY.
ASIDE FROM KASHMIR AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM, WHAT ELSE
COULD BE DONE TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGERS ON THE
SUBCONTINENT AND TO REINFORCE POSITIVE MOMENTUM IN INDIAPAKISTAN TALKS?
EXPERTS IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE THOUGHT A GREAT DEAL
ABOUT NUCLEAR RISK-REDUCTION MEASURES THAT COULD BE
NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED QUICKLY, ONCE POLITICAL
CONDITIONS PERMIT. MY SENSE IS THAT MUCH COULD BE
ACCOMPLISHED IN THIS REGARD IF, AS I HOPE, PAKISTAN STOPS
HOLDING THESE MEASURES HOSTAGE TO A KASHMIR SETTLEMENT,
AND IF INDIA ENGAGES PAKISTAN AND DISSIDENT ELEMENTS IN
KASHMIR ON A SERIOUS AND SUSTAINED BASIS.
MORE SPECIFICALLY, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ANALYSTS IN SOUTH ASIA HAVE INDICATED THAT
THEY CAN DEMONSTRATE RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR STEWARDSHIP BY
NEGOTIATING AND ESTABLISHING NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION
CENTERS. THERE IS ALSO A PRESSING NEED TO NEGOTIATE AND
PROPERLY IMPLEMENT MEASURES TO REDUCE RISKS ASSOCIATED
WITH BALLISTIC MISSILE FLIGHT TESTS, PARTICULARLY DURING
PERIODS OF CRISIS.
MANY OTHER ITEMS COULD BE ADDED TO THIS MINIMAL LIST.
WHILE THE UNITED STATES CAN SURELY ENCOURAGE BOTH
COUNTRIES TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH MEASURES THAT REINFORCE
RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR STEWARDSHIP, TAKING THESE STEPS IS
OBVIOUSLY THEIR JOB, NOT OURS. LOOKING FURTHER AHEAD, THERE
ARE MANY IMPORTANT SUBJECTS THAT COULD BENEFIT FROM
DIALOGUE, INCLUDING DISCUSSIONS OF NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND
WAYS TO REINFORCE STABLE DETERRENCE ON THE SUBCONTINENT.
A FOURTH GENERAL AREA TO PROMOTE NUCLEAR SAFETY
RELATES TO STEPS THAT PAKISTAN AND INDIA COULD TAKE TO
STRENGTHEN DOMESTIC CONTROLS AGAINST PROLIFERATION. WHILE
NEITHER COUNTRY IS A PARTY TO THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
TREATY, BOTH HAVE PLEDGED NOT TO INITIATE THE RESUMPTION OF
NUCLEAR TESTING. IF, HOWEVER, ANOTHER NATION GOES FIRST, ONE
OR BOTH COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO JOIN IN A CHAIN REACTION OF
UNDERGROUND TESTING. I HOPE THAT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WILL
CONSIDER THIS WHEN CONTEMPLATING THE POSSIBLE RESUMPTION
OF U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING AND THE MERITS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
TEST BAN TREATY.
CONTROLS AGAINST PROLIFERATION WOULD ALSO BE
ADVANCED IF INDIA AND PAKISTAN STOPPED PRODUCING FISSILE
MATERIAL FOR THEIR WEAPONS. A GLOBAL, VERIFIABLE BAN
DESIGNED TO DO SO, CALLED THE “CUTOFF” TREATY, WILL BE
DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE AS LONG AS INDIA AND PAKISTAN FEEL THE
NEED TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. A
PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION ON THE SUBCONTINENT CAN HELP
REMOVE THIS IMPEDIMENT TO A CUTOFF TREATY. ANOTHER
IMPEDIMENT IS THE RELUCTANCE OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION TO
CONSENT TO A RESUMPTION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.
EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE OUTLIERS TO THE NONPROLIFERATION
TREATY, INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE PLEDGED NOT TO HELP OTHERS
ACQUIRE THE BOMB. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION IN THIS REGARD
APPEARS TO BE INADEQUATE IN BOTH COUNTRIES. THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE STRENGTHENING MEASURES IN INDIA A
CONDITION FOR UPWARD MOVEMENT ON THE GLIDE PATH FOR
INCREASED COOPERATION ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS.
PAKISTAN’S PROLIFERATION PRACTICES ARE OF GREAT
CONCERN. WE WILL KNOW MORE ABOUT THE EXTENT OF HELP
PROVIDED TO LIBYA AND IRAN THROUGH A PROCESS OF
INERNATIONAL VERIFICATION THAT IS NOW UNDERWAY. PUBLIC
REPORTS INDICATE FAR MORE EXTENSIVE NUCLEAR COMMERCE WITH
NORTH KOREA. WE CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER
TRANSACTIONS WILL COME TO LIGHT.
WHAT ARE WE TO MAKE OF THESE REPORTS? FIRST, THESE
TRANSACTIONS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INITIATED AT DIFFERENT
TIMES AND FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM WAS AN EXPENSIVE UNDERTAKING. THE POLITICAL
LEADER WHO INITIATED THE PROGRAM, ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO, SAID
THAT HIS PEOPLE WOULD “EAT GRASS,” IF NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO
PAY FOR IT. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM, PERHAPS FROM LIBYA, MIGHT HAVE BEEN WELCOMED –
AND MIGHT HAVE COME WITH STRINGS ATTACHED.
ANOTHER POSSIBLE RATIONALE FOR NUCLEAR COMMERCE
MIGHT HAVE BEEN BOTTLENECKS IN PRODUCING A VIABLE NUCLEAR
DETERRENT AGAINST THE PROSPECT OF AN ADVANCING INDIAN
PROGRAM. THIS MIGHT WELL BE THE PRIMARY RATIONALE FOR
BARTER TRANSACTIONS WITH NORTH KOREA.
THE MOST PUZZLING CASE IS IRAN, BECAUSE THE SUNNI-SHIA
FAULT LINE WITHIN ISLAM IS SITUATED ON PAKISTAN’S BORDER WITH
IRAN. MOREOVER, A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN WOULD PRESENT
ISLAMABAD WITH A TWO FRONT NUCLEAR THREAT, REQUIRING
UNWELCOME ADJUSTMENTS TO PAKISTAN’S FORCE REQUIREMENTS,
BASING, AND DOCTRINE.
HELPING IRAN TO GO NUCLEAR WOULD BE SEVERELY
PREJUDICIAL TO PAKISTAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY. BUT THE
SITUATION MIGHT HAVE LOOKED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT AROUND
1990, WHEN WASHINGTON HAD CUT MILITARY TIES TO PAKISTAN,
WHEN PAKISTAN WAS FACING A WAR SCARE WITH INDIA OVER
KASHMIR, AND WHEN PAKISTAN’S ARMY CHIEF BELIEVED THAT IRAN
COULD BECOME A STRATEGIC ALLY.
WHILE THE STRATEGIC RATIONALES THAT I HAVE POSTULATED
FOR EACH OF THESE CASES VARY, THEY ALL SUGGEST SOME DEGREE
OF TOP-DOWN AUTHORIZATION. BUT AUTHORIZATION MIGHT NOT
HAVE BEEN COORDINATED AMONG THE COUNTRY’S TOP THREE
POSITIONS – THE ARMY CHIEF, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE PRIME
MINISTER. IN ADDITION, OVERSIGHT OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR
COMMERCE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SLACK IN SOME INSTANCES.
PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF HAS PUBLICLY INTIMATED THAT SOME
NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS ACTED IMPROPERLY FOR THEIR FINANCIAL
GAIN.
THE FULL DIMENSION OF THESE TRANSACTIONS AND THE
DECISION-MAKING BEHIND THEM ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN MURKY. IN
MY VIEW, A PUBLIC ACCOUNTING OF PAKISTAN’S MISDEEDS IS LESS
IMPORTANT THAN PRIVATE DECISIONS AND OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS
TO STOP PRACTICES THAT HAVE RESULTED IN GRIEVOUS NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION – INCLUDING TRANSACTIONS THAT HAVE INJURED
PAKISTAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY. FLAT DENIALS ARE NOT THE WAY
OUT OF THIS MESS, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN NOW
APPEARS TO ACKNOWLEDGE.
WE DO NOT HELP PAKISTAN BY OFFERING SIMPLE REMEDIES, BY
ISSUING THREATS, OR BY MAKING DIRE PREDICTIONS OF A FAILED
STATE. PAKISTAN HAS SHOWN REMARKABLE RESILIENCY DESPITE BAD
LEADERSHIP DECISIONS. PAKISTAN IS ALSO QUITE CAPABLE OF
REBOUNDING IN RESPONSE TO WISE LEADERSHIP DECISIONS.
PAKISTAN IS A TROUBLED STATE, BUT WITH GOOD DECISIONS AND
WITH OUR HELP, IT IS CAPABLE OF GETTING OUT OF TROUBLE.
MUCH THEREFORE DEPENDS ON THE ABILITY OF PAKISTAN’S
NATIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT TO RECOGNIZE DANGEROUS
POLICIES THAT HAVE MORTGAGED THE COUNTRY’S FUTURE. PART OF
THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE CLOSED NATURE OF THIS ESTABLISHMENT.
PART OF THE SOLUTION THEREFORE LIES IN STRENGTHENING
POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAKISTAN AND CREATING MORE BALANCE IN
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.
PRESIDENT BUSH HAS PROPOSED A LONG-TERM ASSISTANCE
PACKAGE FOR PAKISTAN. I SUPPORT THIS INITIATIVE. IF YOU DECIDE
TO CHANGE THE 50-50 BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND NONMILITARY ASSISTANCE PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT, I RECOMMEND
THAT YOU DO SO BY ADDITION AND NOT BY SUBTRACTION, WITH
ADDED FUNDS GOING TO THE NON-MILITARY SIDE OF THE LEDGER. I
UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT ADDING TO THE PRESIDENT’S
REQUEST – OR EVEN MAINTAINING IT – WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE
CONGRESS, UNLESS THERE IS CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN’S
LEADERS HAVE CHARTEREDA NEW, AND FAR BETTER FUTURE FOR
THEIR COUNTRY.