Better Deals Through Level II
Strategies: Advance Your
Interests by Helping to Solve
Their Internal Problems
James K. Sebenius
Working Paper
14-091
March 19, 2014
Copyright © 2014 by James K. Sebenius
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and
discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working
papers are available from the author.
BetterDealsThroughLevelIIStrategies:
AdvanceYourInterestsbyHelpingtoSolveTheirInternalProblems
JamesK.Sebenius1
March19,2014v1.0
Manynegotiatorshaveconstituenciesthatmustformallyorinformallyapprovean
agreement.Traditionally,itistheresponsibilityofeachnegotiatortomanagetheinternal
conflictsandconstituenciesonhisorherownside.Farlessfamiliararethemanyvaluable
waysthatonesidecanmeetitsowninterestsbyhelpingtheothersidewiththeother’s
“internal,”“behind‐the‐table,”or“LevelII”constituencychallenges.Sebenius(2013)offered
amoderatelytheoreticaltreatmentofthischallenge.Movingfromtheorytopracticeand
fromsimpletocomplex,thepresentpaperbuildsonthatwork.Itillustratesseveralclasses
ofpracticalmeasuresthatnegotiatorscanusetoadvancetheirowninterestsbyfocusingon
theotherside’sLevelIInegotiations.Beyondtailoringthetermsofthedealforthispurpose
(e.g.,with“compensationprovisions”),onesidecanhelptheother,andviceversa,viaa
numberofdevices,aloneorincombination.Theseincludea)shapingtheformofthe
agreement(e.g.tacitv.explicit,processv.substantive);b)tailoringtheformofthe
negotiatingprocessitself(tosendausefulsignaltoconstituencies);c)avoiding(ormaking)
statementsthatinflame(ormollify)theotherside’sinternalopponents;d)helpingtheother
sideattractivelyframethedealforLevelIIacceptability;e)providingtheingredientsforthe
othersidetomakeanacceptanceoreven“victoryspeech”aboutwhysaying“yes”tothedeal
youwantissmartandintheotherside’sinterests.f)constructiveactionsatthebargaining
tableinformedbyknowledgeoftheotherside’sinternalconflicts(e.g.,notescalatingwhen
theothersidemainlyspeaksfordomesticpurposes);g)havingthefirstsideworkwiththe
othersidetotacitlycoordinateoutsidepressureontheotherside’sLevelIIconstituentsto
acceptthedealthatthefirstsideprefers;andh)inextraordinarycases,bydirectly
negotiatingwithone’scounterpartstodesignmeasuresthatthwartitsLevelIIopponents.
Keywords:negotiation,bargaining,two‐levelgames,internalnegotiations,constituency
negotiations,conflictresolution
You’remorelikelytosay“yes”tomyproposalifitmeetsyourinterests.Frequently,
yourinterestsentailsatisfying,oratleastnotannoying,“behindthetable”constituencies.
Thesemayincludeaboss,spouse,client,unionmembership,communitygroup,NGO,political
party,ortheU.S.SenatethatmustratifythetreatyyounegotiateonbehalfofthePresident.A
potentbarriertosuccessinnegotiationisoftentheprospectofconstituencyrejectionofthe
deal.Giventhisthreat,ifIamyourcounterpartinnegotiation,onewaytoadvancemy
interestscanbeformetohelpyousolveyourinternalconstituencyproblems—inamanner
consistentwithmyinterests.
Ofcourse,thereverseholdsaswell:youmaybeabletohelpmewithmyconstituencies
atlowcosttoyourinterests.Itturnsoutthatsophisticatednegotiatorshavebeenamazingly
inventiveincomingupwithpracticalandhighlyvaluableapproachestothisoften‐unexplored
challenge.Thispaperdevelopsandillustratesseveralsuchapproaches.
Thischallengeishardlynew.Anumberofanalystshaveexploredhownegotiatorscan
productivelysynchronize“external,“at‐the‐table”or“LevelI”negotiationswith“internal,”
“behind‐the‐table,”or“LevelII”negotiations.2Theusefulterms,“LevelI”and“LevelII,”come
fromRobertPutnam(1988),whodevelopedtheconceptof“two‐levelgames”inthecontextof
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diplomacyanddomesticpolitics.3InthesimplestversionofPutnam’sconception,theLevelI
gamefocusesontraditional“at‐the‐table”diplomaticagreements,whiletheLevelIIgame
focusesontheformalorinformaldomesticratificationofsuchagreements“behindthetable.”
Followingthisusage,butventuringwellbeyonditsdiplomaticorigins,thispaperusesLevelI
torefertointernational/external/at‐the‐tablenegotiations.LevelIIrefersto
domestic/internal/behind‐the‐tablenegotiations.Ofcourse,evenwhereLevelIIpartiesdonot
haveformalratificationpower,theycanoftenfacilitatetheimplementationofagreementsthat
theylikeandeffectivelyblockthosethattheydonot.
InanexamplecitedbyRobertMnookinandEhudEiran(2005)fromIsraeli‐Palestinian
negotiations,theLevelII“behindthetable”challengesmaybeevengreaterthantheLevelI
“across‐the‐table”ones.SettlersandtheirpoliticaladvocatesontheIsraelisideaswellas
militantfactionsanddiasporaPalestiniansmayforseparatereasonsmakegenerallydesirable
dealsimpossibletoreach—oreventoproposepublicly—whenleadersestimatethatthey
wouldnotbeabletogainsufficientpublicsupportfor,andovercomeoppositionto,the
necessarycompromises.
Oftenimplicitinmuchofthistwo‐levelnegotiationworkistheviewthat,ifa(LevelI)
dealisreachedacrossthetable,eachside’sleadershipisbestpositionedtomanageitsown
internal(LevelII)conflicts.Traditionally,anegotiatordoesthisby1)pressingfordealterms
thatwillattractsufficientinternalsupportandmeetinternalobjections,and2)effectively
“selling”theagreementtokeyconstituencies.
Farlessfamiliararethemanywaysthatonesidecanmeetitsowninterestsbyhelping
theothersidewiththeother’s“behind‐the‐table”orLevelIIchallenges(andviceversa).
Sebenius(2013)offeredamoderatelytheoreticaltreatmentofthischallenge.Movingfrom
theorytopractice,fromsimpletocomplex,andfromwell‐knowntoremarkablycreative,the
presentpaperdrawsheavilyandbuildsonthatwork.Itillustratesseveralclassesofpractical
measuresthatnegotiatorscanusetoadvancetheirowninterestsbyfocusingontheother
side’sLevelIInegotiations.Itconcludeswithabriefcapstonecasestudythatdescribesthe
elegantLevelIIstrategiesofformerU.S.SecretaryofStateJamesBakerandGeorgeH.W.Bush
indealingwiththethen‐SovietUnionoverGermanreunificationwithinNATO.
I.Shapethetermsofthedealtorespondtotheirconstituencyconcerns.
Initsmostfamiliarform,thedealitselfcandirectlyaddressconstituencyconcerns.
Termscanbecraftedtomeettheinterestsorovercomeobjectionsofenoughinternalplayers
topermitadealtobereachedand,ideally,implementedandsustained.Forexample,free
tradeagreementprovisionsmaybedesignedtocompensatethedomestic“losers”(harmedby
tradeliberalization)whomightotherwiseblockthebroaderagreement.Or,atleastoptically,
thedealmaybestructuredtomakeoneorbothnegotiators“lookgood”totheirbossesor
constituents.
Inaninventiveexample,earlyinhiscareer,formerNYPDdetectiveandhostage
negotiatorDominickMisinofacedapotentiallyexplosivesituation.Onaswelteringsummer
nightinSpanishHarlem,300to400peoplestoodoutsideacrowdedtenementinwhicha
youngmanwithaloadedshotgunhadbarricadedhimself.Duringthetensenegotiationswith
Misino,theyoungman,aparoleviolatorbutnotamurderer,toldMisinothathewantedto
surrenderbutcouldn’tbecausehewouldlookweak.AccordingtoMisino(2002),
2
Itoldhimthat...ifheletmecuffhim,IwouldmakeitlookasifIhadtouseforce.He
putdownhisgunandbehavedlikeaperfectgentlemanuntilwegottothestreet,
wherehestartedscreaminglikecrazyandraisinghell,aswehadagreed....thecrowd
waschanting“José!José!”inwildapproval,andwethrewhimintothebackofthecar,
jumpedonthegas,andspedoff.Twoblockslater,Josésatup,brokeintoahugegrin,
andsaidtome,“Heyman,thankyou.”HerecognizedthatIhadgivenhimawayout
thatdidn’tinvolvekillingpeopleandbeingkilledinturn.4
Atonelevel,thisisasimplelessonbyasavvynegotiatorhelpinghiscounterpartsave
facewithanimportantconstituencyinapotentiallylethalsituation.Insettingsfromlabor
relationstohighdiplomacy,however,manynegotiationsdisplaymorecomplexversionsof
thissameunderlyingstructure:you(inthisexample:Misino)negotiate“externally”withyour
counterpart(here:José)whomustsomehowdealeffectivelywithhisorher“internal”
constituencies(here:thecrowd,José’scommunity)—inorderforyoutobesuccessful(here:to
avoidashootout,bloodshed,andwiderriskstothepolice,crowd,andneighborhood).
Importantconstituenciesononesideoftenplacehighvalueonaprinciplewhosefull
practicalimplementationwouldbeunacceptabletotheotherside.Insuchcases,theprinciple
maybeenshrinedinagreement,butitspracticaleffectdrasticallyreduced.Forexample,in
Israeli‐Palestiniannegotiations,some“rightofreturn”ofPalestinianrefugeesmaybeagreed,
butlimitedinpracticetoatokennumberofrefugeeswhomayactuallysettlewithinIsrael
properwiththemajoritytosettleinthebordersofanewPalestinianstate.
II.Shapetheformofthedeal—fromexplicittotacitorfromsubstantivetoprocess—to
avoidconstituencyproblems.
LevelIIcostsmaybesometimesbereducedbychangingtheformofthedeal.For
example,makingagreementtacitratherthanexplicitmayavoidconstituencyproblems.
FormerU.S.SecretaryofStateGeorgeShultzremarkedaboutcommondiplomaticsituationsin
whichoneofthepartieseffectivelysays“IcanlivewiththataslongasIdon’thavetoagreeto
it,butifyoumakemeagreewithit,Iwon’tbeabletolivewithit.”5
Similarly,thePresidentsoftwoneighboringcountrieswithalongstanding,emotional
borderdispute,mayprivatelyconcurthatresolutionwouldbevaluable—andmaywellagree
onacceptabletermsofaborderdeal.Yettoovertlynegotiateandbeseento"concede"
anything,foreitherorbothsides,maybetoocostlyintermsoftheinternaloppositionitwould
arouse.However,submittingthedisputetoaninternationalarbitrationprocess,
appropriatelyconstituted,maybeanacceptable"willingnesstogoalongwithinternational
law,"withanarbitrator'sawardoutsidethewillofthetwopresidents.Bythisdevice,thetwo
presidentsmayreduceconstituencycosts.Strictlyspeaking,thisapproachalsochangesthe
contentofthedeal—fromdirectresolutionoftheissuetoagreementonaprocessforresolving
it—butitsobjectisreducingLevelIIcosts.
III.ChangethenegotiationprocessitselftoenhanceLevelIIacceptability.
Acloselyrelatedapproachinvolvesagreementonanegotiationprocessthatsendsa
valuablesignaltoLevelIIplayers.Aprominentlabornegotiatoroncedescribedasimple,if
cynical,measureofthiskindaimedatswayingunionconstituents.Inthisinstance,given
economicrealities,bothunionandmanagementnegotiatorsclearlyunderstoodthefeasible
3
dealtermsfromtheoutset.Yet,tooquickandeasyanagreementwouldhaveraisedunion
members’suspicionsthattheirinterestshadnotbeenvigorouslyadvocated.
Assuch,thetwonegotiatorstacitlyagreedtomakeashowoflockingthemselvesintoa
roomfrommid‐afternoonuntiltheweehoursofthemorning.Thoseoutsidetheroomwould
oftenhearangryshoutsandtablesbeingpounded.Inside,therealitywascongenial:withnice
mealsorderedin,plentyofalcohol,friendlyreminiscences,andknowingchucklesasthetwo
sideswouldperiodicallymanufactureloudtheatricalsoundstodramatizethenegotiating
“battle”being“fought”‐‐forthebenefitofoutsideconstituencies.Finallyemerging,haggard,in
predawnhours,thetwosides’“hardwon”agreementhadafargreaterchanceofacceptance
amongunionmembers—givenaprocessthatmollifiedtheirsuspicionsofasellout,without
alteringthetermsofthenegotiatedcontractitself.
IV.Agreetoavoidmakingstatementsthatcauseproblemswiththeother’sconstituents.
InanexampleofinadvertentnegativehandlingofLevelIIissues,considertheGeneva
Accord,aprominent,unofficialefforttocraftanIsraeli‐Palestinianpeacedeal.Afteran
importantnegotiatingsession,akeyIsraeliparticipantsoughttoindicateprogresstokey
Israeliconstituents.Hewasquotedtotheeffectthatthe“Palestinianshadgivenuptherightof
return.”Thisclaim,echoednegativelyamongPalestinianpublics,generatednearlyinstant
denialsanddamagedprospectsforwidersupportofthisinitiative.6
Morebroadly,leadersoneachsidemaymakestatementsinArabicorHebrewabout
peacetalksoragreementsthatareintendedfor“domesticconsumption.”Inevitably,however,
suchstatementsrapidlyfindtheirwaytotheotherside,generatingsuspicionand
underminingwhatmaybegenuineprogressatthetable.Inamediaandinternet‐intensive
age,hoped‐for“acousticseparation”—separatelyconveyingcontradictorymessagesto
differentpublics—oftenprovesfutile.
Assuch,LevelInegotiatorsmayexplicitlyworktogethernotonlyonthetermsofthe
dealitselfbutonwhateachsidewillsay—ornotsay—aboutittoLevelIIparties.For
example,PresidentReaganmadehumanrightsatoppriorityinhisnegotiationswiththe
Soviets.Inaglaringillustrationofthisissue,somesixtyPentecostalswereholedupintheU.S.
embassyinMoscowseekingsanctuary.IndealingwiththeSovietAmbassadorAnatoly
Dobryninonthisissue,Reagansaid“Letthememigrate.Youwon’thearanycrowingfrom
me.”Withthisassurance,U.S.SecretaryofStateGeorgeShultzandDobryninnegotiated,
eventuallyagreeingonthereleaseofthePentecostalstoIsrael.AsShultzreported,“Despite
thegreatpoliticaltemptationtodoso,[Reagan]neverboastedaboutthesuccessofthisdeal,
sotheSovietslearnedthathecouldbetrusted.”7
InpredictablyrancorousnegotiationswiththeSovietsoverwithdrawalfrom
Afghanistan,whichthatcountryhadinvadedin1979,GeorgeShultzreportedthatforeign
ministerEduardShevardnadzepulledhimasideprivately.ShevardnadzetoldShultz“Weare
goingtogothroughfamiliarargumentsouttherebutIwantyoutoknowthatwehavedecided
toleaveAfghanistan.Therewillbenoimmediateannouncement,butwe’vemadethedecision;
it’sbehindus.Wewanttogetoutbytheendof1988.HowtheUnitedStatesactswillmakea
differencebecausethequickerwe’reout,thelessbloodwillbeshed.”Thoughitwas
controversialwithintheU.S.administration,ShultzreportedthattheU.S.governmentwas
“abletomaneuverinsuchawaythattheSovietsleftAfghanistansoonerthananyonehad
expectedandmuchbloodshedwasavoidedasaresult.”8
4
V.HelptheothersideattractivelyframethedealforLevelIIacceptability;providethe
ingredientsfortheothersidetomakeanacceptanceoreven“victoryspeech”aboutwhy
saying“yes”tothedealyouwantissmartandintheotherside’sinterests.
WilliamUry(1991)observesthat“yourcounterpart’sconstituentsmayattackthe
proposedagreementasunsatisfactory.Sothinkabouthowyourcounterpartcanpresentitto
theminthemostpositivelight,perhapsevenasavictory.”9Uryoffersthefollowingexample
fromtheCubanmissilecrisis(aboveandbeyondKennedy’stacitagreementtoremove
“obsolete”U.S.missilesfromTurkey):
...Kennedyandhisadvisers...searchedforawaytomakeiteasierforSoviet
PremierNikitaKhrushchevtowithdrawSovietmissilesfromCuba.Kennedy
decidedtoofferKhrushchevhispersonalpledgethattheUnitedStateswould
notinvadeCuba.SinceKennedyhadnointentionofinvadinganyway,the
promisewaseasytomake.ButitallowedKhrushchevtoannouncetohis
constituentsintheCommunistworldthathehadsuccessfullysafeguardedthe
CubanrevolutionfromAmericanattack.Hewasabletojustifyhisdecisionto
withdrawthemissilesonthegroundsthattheyhadservedtheirpurpose.10
UrylatercounselsSideAtothinkabouthelpingtoequipSideBtowriteB’s
“acceptancespeech”—inamannerthatmeetsA’sinterests—directedtowardB’s
constituencies.Asatooltohelpcrafttheotherside’sacceptancespeech,Ury(2007)suggests
makingachartlistingseveralkeyfactors,embellishedfromtheoriginal,below:
 PreciselywhoB’sconstituenciesarealongwiththeirlikelyinterestsand
perceptionsofthenegotiation;
 Keythemesandframingofthe“acceptancespeech”oreven“victoryspeech”
thatwillmakeitpersuasive;
 Mostlikelycriticismsandquestionssuchas“Whatexactlydidyougiveupand
why?”“Younevershouldhavemadethatconcession,whichgivesawayour
vitalinterests!”“Thatmakesuslookweakandsetsaterribleprecedent!”“You
shouldpushbackhardratherthangivingin!”
 Bestanticipatoryandsubsequentresponsestothemostimportantsuch
criticisms.11
Infact,ifAhasprobedandunderstoodB’sinterests,perspectives,andconstituencies
inenoughdepthtohelpcraftacredibleacceptancespeechforB,therangeofactuallyfeasible
dealsshouldbemuchclearertoA.Andobviously,theeasieratimeBforeseeshavingwithhis
orherconstituencies,themorelikelyBistodoadealwithA.Thisapproachshould,
paraphrasingthewordsofItaliandiplomatDanielVare,permit“BtohaveA’sway.”
5
VI.Goingbeyondmereframingandsuggestedspin,havethefirstsideactuallywork
withtheothersidetotacitlycoordinateoutsidepressureontheotherside’sLevelII
constituentstoacceptthedealthatthefirstsideprefers.
Itispossibletogowellbeyondthestatementseachsidecanmake,orrefrainfrom
making,abouthowadealcanbeframedfordomesticconsumption,orhowonesidecanhelp
theotherwriteitsvictoryspeech.Indeed,SideAcansometimesarrangewithSideBtobring
outsidepressuretobearonSideA’sownLevelIIconstituentstochangetheirviewsinline
withSideB’spreferences.
Forexample,U.S.AmbassadorStuartEizenstatnegotiatedwithGermanyinthemid‐
1990soverHolocaust‐eraassetsandslavelaborusedbytheNazisandGermanfirms.Key
issuesinthistense,emotionalprocessincludedcompensationamountstosurvivingvictimsas
wellas“legalpeace”oranendtofurtherclaimsagainstGermancompaniesafterany
agreement.EizenstatandhisGermancounterpart,CountOttoLambsdorff,hadknowneach
otherformanyyearsandcultivatedarelationshipthatmeant,inEizenstat’swords,that “we
wereabletoshareconfidenceswitheachother.Wewereabletosharewitheachotherwhat
ourconstituencieswerepressingustodo.”EizenstatelaboratedhowLambsdorffhelpedto
orchestratePresidentialpressureontheGermanChancellortobemoreforthcomingin
negotiation:
AndsoIhadaverygoodideafromLambsdorffofthefactthathiscompanieswere
beingrecalcitrantonlegalpeace,[andwhytheywere]notcomingupwithenough
money.Hegavemeadviceastohowtodealwiththat,inthesamewayIgavehim
adviceastohowtodealwithmydomesticconstituents.HesuggestedthatIget
PresidentClintontosend[Chancellor]Schroederaletter.Itwasnotmy
suggestion.Andthat[letter]helpedunlockalotofmoneythatotherwisewouldn’t
havebeenforthcoming.Sothefactthatwehadknowneachotherliterallyfor25years,
hadkeptincontactwitheachother,andhadcompleteanduttertrustineachother
helpedusunderstandeachother’sconstituenciesandwheretheredlineswereand
wheretherewasroomforgive.12
Inamoreelaborateexample,duringthepreparationsforthe1978Bonneconomic
summit,therewassignificantinternalU.S.oppositiontooilpricedecontrol,apolicystrongly
favoredbyAmerica’skeyeconomicpartnersaspartofapackageinvolvingGermanand
Japanesestimulus,policiesthemselvesopposedbypowerfulGermanandJapanesefactions.In
aconventionalinterpretation,ultimateinternationalagreementonthesedecontroland
stimulusmeasures‐‐whichwereactuallyimplementedineachcountry—simplyresultedfrom
mutuallybeneficialtradeoffsinapackagedeal.(Putnam,1988,PutnamandBayne,1987)A
closerlook,however,revealsactionsbyeachsidetohelpotherswiththeirLevelIIdomestic
challenges.Forexample,toovercomepotentU.S.domesticoppositiontooilpricedecontrol,
Putnamreportsthat“Americannegotiatorsoccasionallyinvitedtheirforeigncounterpartsto
putmorepressureontheAmericans[athome]toreduceoilimports.”Ultimately,such
interventionsaimedatinfluencing(LevelII)U.S.opponentsprovedsuccessful.13
Similarly,tointernaladvocatesofeconomicstimulusinGermanyandJapan,external
pressureforsuchactions—insomecasesorchestratedbytheseadvocatesandwillingly
suppliedbyforeigncounterparts—overcameoppositionandtippedtheinternalbalance.As
Putnamdescribesit,“WithinGermany,apoliticalprocesscatalyzedbyforeignpressureswas
surreptitiouslyorchestratedbyexpansionistsinsidetheSchmidtgovernment....Publicly,
6
HelmutSchmidtposedasreluctanttotheend.Onlyhisclosestadvisorssuspectedthetruth:
thatthechancellor"lethimselfbepushed"intoapolicythatheprivatelyfavored....”14Andin
Japan,“withouttheexternalpressure,itisevenmoreunlikelythattheexpansionistscould
haveoverriddenthepowerfulMOF[MinistryofFinance]."Seventypercentforeignpressure,
30percentinternalpolitics,"wasthedisgruntledjudgmentofoneMOFinsider."Fifty‐fifty,"
guessedanofficialfromMITI[MinistryofTradeandIndustry].”15
TheseexamplesbegintofleshoutthemeansbywhichaLevelInegotiatorcanhelp
withtheotherside’sLevelIIchallenges.Yetaswewillseeviatheextendedexampleinthenext
section,thesemethodshardlyexhausttheremarkablerepertoireofsuchdevicesthatcanbe
usedsinglyorinappropriatecombination.
VII.CapstoneCase:UsingMultipleLevelIIStrategiesinNegotiationsoverGermanRe‐
unificationwithinNATO.16
AmoreelaborateepisodeinvolvedthedelicateU.S.diplomacywiththethen‐Soviet
UnionoverGermanreunificationwithinNATOafterthefalloftheBerlinWall.17Soviet
PresidentMikhailGorbachevfacedpowerfulinternalopponentsofhispoliciesofperestroika
ingeneralaswellashisincreasingwillingnesstogoalongwithAmericanadvocacyofGerman
unification—especiallywithinNATO.TheKGB,thePolitburo,conservativepoliticians,aswell
muchofthemilitaryfeltGorbachevwasconcedingfartoomuchtotheWest.Withalmost
400,000SoviettroopsinEastGermanyandpotentFourPowerlegalrightsearnedatthe
conclusionofWorldWarII,theSovietshadseveralpotentmethodsattheirdisposaltoblock
GermanreunificationwithinNATO.
WantingperestroikatosucceedandGermanytobereunifiedwithinNATO,then‐
PresidentGeorgeH.W.BushandhisSecretaryofState,JamesBaker,provedthemselvestobe
extremelyskilledLevelIInegotiatorsinatleastfourways:1)consciouslyavoidingactionsthat
wouldcausedomesticproblemsfortheirreformistSovietcounterparts,2)helpingtheSoviets
craftaconvincingdomesticexplanationofthedirectionthatnegotiationsoverGermanywere
taking,3)choosingnottoescalatearoundinflammatorynegotiatingstatementsmadebythe
Sovietsfordomesticconsumption,and4)directlyworkingwiththeirSovietat‐the‐table
counterpartstohelptheSovietreformersovercometheirpowerfuldomesticopponents.Their
actionsinthisimportant,evensingular,casecarrybroaderimplications.
First,astheBerlinWallfell,BushandBakerrealizedthattheAmericanresponsecould
exacerbatealreadyhugedomesticproblemsforGorbachevandhisForeignMinisterEduard
Shevardnadze.EchoingReagan’sagreementnotto“crow”abouthishumanrightsdeal,Robert
Zoellick,counselortoBakerandhimselfakeyAmericannegotiatorduringthereunification
talks,citedthevaluetotheprocessof“Gorbachev’s[correct]beliefthat[President]Bush
wouldnotexult...orconveyanysenseoftriumphalism.”Bakerobservedthat
[PresidentBush]gotalotofgriefatthetimetheWallfellfornotgloatingandpounding
thechestandbeingmoreemotionalaboutthefactthatfinally,after40years,theWest,
ledbytheUnitedStates,hadwontheColdWar.AndIrememberwe’dsitinthese
meetingsandhe’dsay...Idon’twanttohearanybodygloatingaboutthis,because
we’vegotalotofbusinesstodostillwithGorbachevand[SovietForeignMinister
Eduard]Shevardnadze.[Bushadopted]thatpositioninthefaceofalotofdomestic
criticism.Ineverwillforgetahugepressconference...andwehadatonofpress
there,andtheywerebeatinguponhim,asking‘whycan’tyoubealittlemore
7
emotional?’Hefinallylookedupatthemandhesaid,look,we’vegotsomebusiness
stilltodo.We’renotgoingtodanceontheruinsoftheWall.[emphasissupplied]18
Baker(1995)laterreportsanencounterbetweenBushandGorbachevatwhichBush
notedthestingingpubliccriticismintheU.S.thatBushhadtakenforseemingtolack“the
visionthing”inthecontextofGermanreunification.Bushstated“‘Ihopeyou’venoticedthatas
changehasacceleratedinEasternEuroperecently,wehaven’trespondedwithflamboyanceor
arrogancesoastomakeyoursituationdifficult.Theysay,‘Bushistootimid,toocautious.’...
I’vetriedtoconductmyselfinawaysoasnottocomplicateyourdifficulties.’...Gorbachev
saidthathe’dnoticedthatandappreciatedit.”19
Second,asRobertZoellickemphasized“WeevenhelpedourSovietcounterpartsto
developapublicexplanationofhowtheoutcometookaccountofSovietinterestsand
sensitivities.”20Bakerelaborateshowthiswasdone,inpartwithreferencetodeliberate
Westernactionsonsecurity,political,andeconomicissues:“Wehadalreadyplannedtotake
allthesestepsindividually,butbywrappingtheminapackageandcallingthemthe“nine
assurances,”wegreatlyenhancedtheirpoliticaleffectandassuredtheKremlinthatitwould
seetheirfullimpact.Thepackagewasdesignedsothat...theSovietswouldnotbehandedan
abjectdefeat.Aboveall,itwasaneffortonourparttostandinGorbachev’sshoesandhelp
frametheissuesothathewouldhaveadomesticexplanation.”21
Third,understandingtheotherside’spoliticalsituationmayleadtoprogressvia
restraintatthebargainingtableinthefaceofapparentprovocationandbacksliding.Asthe
internaltug‐of‐warbetweentheSovietreformers,GorbachevandShevardnadze,andtheir
conservativeopponentsheatedup,at‐thetableprogresswasthevictim.Forexample,the
crucial(positive)turningpointinthereunificationnegotiationsoccurredataWhiteHouse
meetingduringwhichGorbachevagreedtorespectGermansovereigntyafterreunificationand
topermitGermanytochooseitsalliance.Asapracticalmatter,thismeantNATO.Weekslater,
however,inBerlintalks,Shevardnadzemadealengthy,confrontationalstatementinwhichhe
harshlyrepudiatedthesecoreconcessions.Bakersuspectedthattherehadbeenareversalin
Moscowagainstthereformers.Choosingtorespondfirmly,butnottoescalateandforcethe
issue,whichcouldhaveledtoadamagingstandoff,hesenthistopstaffer,DennisRoss,
DirectoroftheStateDepartment’sPolicyPlanningStaff,tofindoutwhathappened.Ross
privatelyconfrontedhiscounterpart,SergeiTarasenko,withwhomhehadestablishedaclose
“backchannel”relationship.“Thisisatotalreversal,”Rosssaid.“Youguysjustscrewedus.
Whatthehellisgoingon?”22
RosslearnedthatShevardnadzehadbeenforcedtopresentaPolitburo‐prepared
document,whichcouldnotbereversed(was“frozen”)atleastuntiltheendoftheupcoming
PartyCongress.ItsoonbecameapparenttoBaker“that[Shevardnadze]wasposturingforthe
benefitofhismilitary,andthatwhathewassayingreallywasn’twhathebelieved.”23Atthis
point,however,inBaker’seyes,Shevardnadzewas“asbeleagueredasI’deverseenhim,”“the
domesticsituationwasclearlyoverwhelminghim,”andhe“couldn’tpredict”whether
GorbachevwouldbeabletomaintainhisstatusasPartyGeneralSecretary.24
Fourth,inlightofthisperiloussituation,BushandBakertookextraordinary
negotiatingmeasures.TheyworkeddirectlywithShevardnadzetoequiphimandGorbachev
withammunitiontomeettheirupcomingPartyCongresschallengers.Inpartforthispurpose,
PresidentBushandSecretaryBakernegotiatedinternalU.S.governmentagreementonstrong,
specificmeasures—armscontrolandnuclearstrategicdoctrine‐‐thatwouldincreasingly
8
transformNATOmoretowardapoliticalthanamilitaryalliance.AsBakerstated,“Itold
ShevardnadzethatwewereproposingtheadoptionofadeclarationattheLondonNATO
Summitthatwouldhighlightthealliance’sadaptationtoanew,radicallydifferentworld.”25
Bakerdescribedtheunorthodoxprocessandobjectiveofthisaction:
“[TheDeclaration]wasjusttwenty‐twoparagraphslong—exactlythekindofsuccinct
politicalstatementthatwouldplaywellinMoscow.Butfirstwehadtogainagreement
fromtheotherfifteenmembersofNATO.Breakingwithtradition,wedecidedtohold
thetextclosely,andhavethePresidentsendittofellowheadsofstatejustdaysbefore
thesummit,andtoallowittobenegotiatedonlybyforeignministersandleadersatthe
summititself.NATO,likeanyinstitution,hasitsownbureaucracy,andwecouldn’t
affordtoallowbureaucratstowaterdownwhatwasacriticalpoliticaldocument.
Moreover,wedidn’twantanyleaks.Wewantedthemaximumpoliticalimpactin
Moscowwhenthedeclarationwouldfinallybereleased,andthatmeantfollowingthis
unusual,andsomewhathigh‐riskstrategy.”26
NotonlydidBakerleadthenegotiationsforNATOmemberstoadoptthisdocumentin
London,hecoordinatedtheprocesscloselywithhisSovietcounterparts:“Tohelp
Shevardnadze,Isenthimadraftofthedeclaration,hopingtoputthereformersastepaheadof
thereactionariesasthePartyCongressheatedup.”27RobertZoellicklaterelaborated:This
was“extremelyhelpful,Shevardnadzewentontosay,becauseitwouldenablehimtopre‐
emptopponentslikeMarshallAkhromeyev...Andthatispreciselywhathedid.Wehad
progressedtothepointwheretheAmericanandSovietforeignministerscouldplansecretly
howtousetentativeNATOlanguagetopersuadetheSovietUniontoacceptaunifiedGermany
withinNATO.”28
ConfirmingtheeffectsoftheseLevelIIactionsafterthePartyCongress,Shevardnadze
toldBaker,“Withoutthe[LondonNATO]declaration,itwouldhavebeenaverydifficultthing
forustotakeourdecisionsonGermany.…Ifyoucomparewhatwe’resayingtoyouandto
KohlnowwithourBerlindocument[thebasisofShevardnadze’sapparenthardlinereversal],
it’slikedayandnight.Really,it’slikeheavenandearth.”29
Ofcourse,theAmericannegotiatingstrategywasnotlimitedtohelpingSoviet
reformerswiththeirbehind‐the‐tablechallenges,thoughthatisthefocusonthepresent
paper.AsDennisRossemphasizes,acomplementaryseriesofAmericanactionswasintended
to“leavenodoubtthatitwouldbefutileandcounterproductive[fortheSoviets]totryto
preventreunification.”30AnditwouldbetheheightofmisinterpretationtoimaginethatBush
andBakerweremotivatedbyaltruismorprimaryconcernfortheotherside.Rather,these
LevelIIactionsandunderstandingswereaimedataccomplishingacentralgoalofAmerican
foreignpolicyattheLevelItable.AsBakerstressedataparticularlycontentiousmomentin
negotiatingNATOacceptanceofitsextraordinarydeclaration:
“Gentlemen”,Iwasforcedtosayatonepoint,“weshouldkeepoureyeontheball.The
reasonwearehere,thereasonweareworkingonthisdeclaration,istogetGermany
unified.Wedonotneedtowaterdownthisdocument.Itwouldbeamistake.Wehave
oneshotatthis.Thesearedifferenttimes.Thisisnotbusinessasusual.”31
9
VIII.SummaryandSynthesis:HelpingtheOtherSidewithItsLevelIIBarriers
Tohelptheothersidewithitsbehind‐the‐tablechallengesrequiresfirstandforemost
thatoneunderstandtheothersideandthebarriersitfaces.AsJamesBakerstressedinhis
remarksuponreceivingHarvard’s2012GreatNegotiatorAward,“Iftherewasasinglekeyto
whateversuccessI’veenjoyedinbusinessanddiplomacy,ithasbeenmyabilitytocrawlinto
theotherguy’sshoes.Whenyouunderstandyouropponent,youhaveabetterchanceof
reachingasuccessfulconclusionwithhimorher.Thatmeanspayingattentiontohowheor
sheviewsissuesandappreciatingtheconstraintstheyface.”BeyondGermanreunification,
Bakerelaborated:“thisapproachhelpedusbuildtheGulfWarcoalitionthatejectedSaddam
HusseinfromKuwaitin1991.EffectiveU.S.leadershipdependedonourabilitytopersuade
otherstojoinwithus.Thatrequiredustoappreciatewhatobjectives,arguments,andtrade‐
offswereimportanttoourwould‐bepartners.”32
Inpart,thismeantdirectunderstandingviahigh‐levelpersonaldiplomacy,backedby
expertstaffworkdrawingonregionalexperts.Yetcarefullycultivatingclosebackchannel
relationships—suchastheonebetweenDennisRossandSergeiTarasenko(Shevardnadze’s
chiefassistantandconfidant)—alsoprovedvital.Similarbackchannelrelationshipswere
consciouslydevelopedbetweenAmericansandGermans:RobertBlackwillattheNational
SecurityCouncilwithHorstTeltschik,Kohl’snationalsecurityadvisor,andRobertZoellick
withFrankElbe,right‐handmantoHans‐DietrichGenscher,Germany’sforeignminister.33
Theadmonitiontounderstandtheothersideis,ofcourse,standardnegotiationadvice.
Yetthemostcommonobjectiveofmutualunderstandingliesinfiguringoutacreativedeal
designthatmeetseachside’sinterests.TheactionsofBakerandhisteamwithrespectto
Germanreunification,however,highlightanotherrationalefordevelopingsuchan
understanding:helpingtheothersideovercomeitsconstituencybarriers.
AsRossputit“IwouldcoordinatewithTarasenkobeforethemeetingstoavoid
surprisesortofindoutwheretherewereproblemsthatwouldhavetobemanaged....[these]
madeitpossibletounderstandaSovietmoveandhowU.S.orGermanresponsesmightaffect
themaneuveringsinMoscow...italsopermittedustodesignthewordsandactionsthateach
ofuscouldusetohelptheother.”34
Tosuccessfullycraftactionsforthispurpose,onesidecannotlimititsknowledgeofthe
othertotheinterestsofat‐the‐tablenegotiators.Rather,onesidemustdeeplyunderstandthe
contextinwhichitscounterpartisenmeshed:theweboffavorableandopposing
constituenciesaswellastheirrelationships,perceptions,sensitivities,andinterests.Recallthe
valueforthispurposeofdirect,trustingrelationshipssuchasthatnurturedbyU.S.Stuart
EizenstatwithhisGermancounterpart,OttoLambsdorff,innegotiationsoverHolocaust‐era
assetsandslavelabor.
Armedwiththisunderstanding,itbecomespossibleforonesidetohelptheotherside
withitsLevelIIchallenges.BeyondtailoringthetermsoftheLevelIdealforthispurpose(e.g.,
with“compensationprovisions”),onesidecanhelptheother,andviceversa,viaanumberof
devices,aloneorincombination:
 bytheformoftheagreement(e.g.tacitv.explicit,processv.substantive);
 bytheformofthenegotiatingprocessitself(tosendausefulsignalto
constituencies);
10
 byavoiding(ormaking)statementsthatinflame(ormollify)theotherside’s
internalopponents;
 byhelpingtheothersideattractivelyframethedealforLevelIIacceptability;
 byprovidingtheingredientsfortheothersidetomakeanacceptanceoreven
“victoryspeech”aboutwhysaying“yes”tothedealyouwantissmartandin
theotherside’sinterests.
 byconstructiveactionsatthebargainingtableinformedbyknowledgeofthe
otherside’sinternalconflicts(e.g.,notescalatingwhentheothersidemainly
speaksfordomesticpurposes);
 bythefirstside’sworkingwiththeothersidetotacitlycoordinateoutside
pressureontheotherside’sLevelIIconstituentstoacceptthedealthatthefirst
sideprefers;and
 inextraordinarycases,bydirectlynegotiatingwithone’sLevelIcounterparts
todesignmeasuresthatthwartitsLevelIIopponents.
Anegotiator’sprimary(LevelI)task,ofcourse,istoworkoutagreatdealwithhisor
hercounterparts.Andeachnegotiatorbearsasubstantialresponsibilitytosuccessfully
managehisorherinternal(LevelII)constituencychallenges.Thesefamiliarsubjectshave
attractedlargeliteratures.Yetanotherpotentiallyvaluabletoolinthesophisticated
negotiator’stoolkitinvolveseachsidehelpingtheotherwiththeother’sLevelII,behind‐the‐
tableconstituencyconflictsandchallenges.Whileunder‐researchedandunderappreciated,
thisrichLevelIIdynamicdeservesfarmoreattentionfromresearchersandnegotiatorsthanit
hasthusfarreceived.
11
1
Harvard Business School and the Harvard Negotiation Project. I appreciate useful input from and most helpful
conversations with Max Bazerman, Nancy Buck, Shai Feldman, Alex Green, David Lax, Paul Levy, Robert Mnookin,
William Ury, Michael Wheeler, and participants in the Harvard Negotiation Roundtable. This paper draws directly and
heavily on Sebenius (2013). Contact the author at jsebenius@hbs.edu.
2See,e.g.,WaltonandMcKersie(1966),Chapter17ofLaxandSebenius(1986),orPutnam(1988).
3Putnam’s (1988) work built on a long tradition of “internal-external” negotiation analysis, starting with Walton and
McKersie (1965) in the field of labor relations, as well as Raiffa (1982) and Lax and Sebenius (1986), that extensively
analyzed games with multilevel structures. Mnookin and Eiran (2005) have more recently developed this theme in the
context of Israeli settlements.
4 Misino, p. 54. Bill Ury directed me to this example.
5Shultz(2010),p.100.
6
I learned about this incident from Shai Feldman.
7Shultz(2010),p.95.
8Shultz(2010),p.75.
9Ury (1991) 122
10Ibid.,123 11Ury(2007),222‐3.
12Eizenstat (2003).
13Putnam, 429.
14
Ibid., 428-429.
15
Ibid., 429.
16ThissectiondrawsdirectlyfromSebenius(2013).
17
This pivotal episode has generated a vast literature. Among the best accounts are Zelikow and Rice (1995) and Elbe and
Kiessler (1996). The following discussion relies heavily on these sources plus, especially, Baker (1995, 2012), Ross
(2007), and Zoellick (2000).
18
Baker (2012).
19
Baker (1995), 170.
20
Zoellick, 19.
21
Baker (1995), 251.
22
Baker, 256.
23
Baker (2012).
24
Baker, 257.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., 258.
27
Ibid., 259.
28
See Robert Zoellick (2000), 19, 25.
29
Baker (1995), 259.
30
Ross, 41.
31
Baker (1995), 259-260.
32
Baker (2012).
33Ross,45‐5.
26Ross, 44.
34
Ibid, 45.
References:
Baker, J. A. (1995) The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992, New York: Putnam.
Baker, J. A. (2012), transcript (electronic, without page numbers), Great Negotiator Awards Program, Program on
Negotiation, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University.
Eizenstat, Stuart E. (2003), transcript (electronic, without page numbers), Great Negotiator Awards Program, Program on
Negotiation, Cambridge, Mass: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Harvard
University.
Elbe, F. and R. Kiessler (1996). A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity. Baden-Baden,
Germany, Nomos.
Fisher, R., W. Ury, and B. Patton (1991). Getting to Yes. New York, Penguin.
Lax, D. A. and J. K. Sebenius (1986). The Manager as Negotiator. New York, The Free Press.
Misino, D. (2002). "Negotiating Without a Net: A Conversation with the NYPD's Dominick Misino." Harvard Business
Review (October): 49-54.
Mnookin, R. H. and E. Eiran (2005). "Discord 'Behind the Table': The Internal Conflict Among Israeli Jews Concerning the Future
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of Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza." Journal of Dispute Resolution (1):11-44.
Putnam, R. D. and N. Bayne (1987). Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits.
Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Putnam, R. D. (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." International Organization
42 no. 3: 427- 460.
Raiffa, H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, Belknap Press.
Ross, D. (2007). Statecraft. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Shultz, George (2010). Ideas & Action: Featuring the 10 Commandments of Negotiation. Erie, PA: Free to Choose Press.
Sebenius, James K. "Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its 'Behind-the-Table' Challenges."Negotiation
Journal 29, no. 1 (January 2013): 7–21.
Ury, W. (1991). Getting Past No. New York, Bantam.
Ury, W. (2007). The Power of a Positive No. New York: Bantam-Dell.
Walton, R. and R. McKersie (1965). A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. New York, McGraw-Hill.
Zelikow, P. and C. Rice, (1995). Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft. Cambridge, Mass.,
Harvard University Press.
Zoellick, R. B. (2000). "Two Plus Four: The Lessons of German Unification." National Interest (Fall): 17-28.
13