IDENTITY PROCESSES AND SOCIAL STRESS*
PETER J.BuIRKE
WashingtonState University
Social stress can be understood by incorporating interruptiontheory as developed in research on stress into a model of identityprocesses drawnfrom identity theory. From this
perspective, social stress resultsfrom interruptionof thefeedback loop that maintains identityprocesses. I discussfour mechanisms of interruptionof identityprocesses: broken identity loops, interference between identity systems, over-controlled identity systems, and the
invocation of episodic identities. Each of these four mechanisms is associated with conditions known to produce feelings of distress. Finally, I discuss how personal evaluation relates to identityprocesses and distress, and how distress can lead to changes in identity.
T
hirtyyearsagoinldentityandAnxiety,Stein,
VidichandWhite(1960)expressedtheconcernthatthe adventof a mass society wouldlead
to a "loss of identity"and hence to widespread
anxietyor stress.Today,researchon social stress
is more likely to emphasize the excessive demandsandpressuresarisingfromthemanyroles
andidentitiesthatpeople maintain(Holroydand
Lazarus1982; House 1974). While the implicit
contradictionbetween these contrastingthemes
of too few ortoo manyidentitieshas notyet been
resolved,interestin therelationship
betweenstress
or anxietyandidentityhas grown.
Inthispaper,I proposea modelof therelationshipbetweenstressandidentity.I show thatin a
varietyof situationsknowntoproducestress,stress
resultsfroma commonmechanism:disruptionof
theidentityprocess.The importanceof thiscommonmechanismis two-fold.First,fromthepoint
of view of identitytheory,it underlinesthe importanceof understanding
identityas a continuous process ratherthan as a state or traitof an
individual.Second,it gives a focusto researchon
coping and problemsolving as mechanismsfor
dealingwith anxietyand distress.While Thoits
(1991) has recentlysuggestedthatlife eventsrelatedto identitiesaremorelikely to producedistressthanotherlife events,thepresentpaperpresents a model thathelps to clarifythis link.
Stressis oftenthoughtof as demandson individualsthattax or exceed theirresourcesformanaging them.' In contrastto the conceptof stressas
overload,a recentcognitiveview of stressfocuses on interruptionandsubsumestheideaof overload (Mandler1982).The basicpremiseof interruptiontheoryis thewell-documented
findingthat
autonomicactivityresultswheneversome organized action or thoughtprocess is interrupted.
Interruption
is the disconfirmationof an expectancy or the noncompletionof some initiatedaction.The autonomicactivity(distressor anxiety)
instigatedby interruption
(stress)servesas a sig-
*Directcorrespondence
to PeterJ. Burke,Departmentof Sociology4020,Washington
StateUniversity, Pullman,WA99164-4020.I wouldliketo thank
JanE. Stets,LeeFreeseandIrvingTallmanforcommentson an earlierdraftof thispaper.A versionof
attheMeetingsof theMidthispaperwaspresented
west SociologicalAssociation,April6 to 9, 1989.
Thisworkwaspartially
fundedbya grantfromNIMH
(MH46828).
IInaddition,
we needto separate
socialstressfrom
environmental
stress(noise,pollution,carcinogens,
etc.).Socialstress,I argue,operatesthroughidentity
processes.Environmental
stressoperatesthroughbiologicalsystems.Somestressorsmaybe bothenvironmental
andsocialproducing
distressthrough
identitiesas wellas throughothermechanisms.
A holdup
or a rape,forexample,maythreaten
onesbiological
existenceas wellas one'ssenseof whooneis.
836
Although some researchers use the terms
"stress"and "anxiety"to referto the same phenomenon(cf., Spielberger1976),manynow prefer to use the termanxiety(or distress)to referto
the subjectivefeelings associatedwith stress.In
the latterinterpretation,
anxiety(distress)results
fromstress(EndlerandEdwards1982). Stressis
a relationshipbetween externalconditionsand
the currentstate of the person; and distress or
anxietyis theinternal,subjectiveresponseto that
relationship.Throughoutthe paperI use "stress"
and "anxiety"in this way, and I generallyfavor
the termdistressover anxiety.
THE CONCEPTOF STRESS
AmericanSociological Review, 1991, Vol. 56 (December:836-849)
IDENTITYAND STRESS
naling system thatdemandsattention.This can
resultin the adaptiveresponseof increasingattentionto crucialeventsor,in moreextremesituations,of drawingattentionawayfromotherneeded areas(Baddeley1972).
Thedifferencebetweenoverloadandinterruptionis documentedby Kirmeyer(1988).She studied policeradiodispatcherswhose completionof
taskson thejob is frequentlyinterruptparticular
ed as new calls come in. She showed that the
amountof distressdispatchersexperienceis directlyrelatedto thenumberof objectiveinterrupThetotalworkload(numtionsthatoccurperhour.
ber of all tasksper hour),while correlatedwith
distress,appearsto affect distresslevels entirely
throughthe rate of interruptionsthatoccur.This
view of distressas the resultof interruptionhas
also been fruitfullyappliedby Berscheid(1983)
in herstudyof emotionalarousal.She pointedto
a numberof studiesthatdemonstrated(a)theattention-gettingpropertiesof interruption,(b)the
and(c)theanalarousalthatfollows interruption,
of themeaningof theinterysis andinterpretation
ruptingeventwhichhelpsindividualsunderstand
theyareexperiencingandwhat
which"'emotion"
they can do aboutit. She showed, for example,
with respectto romanticlove, that interruptive
obstaclesseem to act to heightenpassion(arousal) ratherthandecreaseit.
The degree of autonomicactivity caused by
the interruptionof organizedprocessesdepends
both on the degree of organizationof the interruptedprocess and the severityof the interruption (Mandler1982). The interruptionof a highly-organizedactivity or cognitive process will
resultin a highlevel of autonomicactivity.Also,
thatis the processof repeatsevereinterruption,
edly initiatingan activityin a situationwith reor theinterruption
of a highpeatedinterruptions
ly salientactivityor cognitiveprocess,will result
in a high level of autonomicarousal.Strongautonomic arousalin response to interruptionis
experiencedsubjectivelyas distress.
This view of stress from interruptiontheory
relatesvery well to an identitytheoryapproach
of stress
to stressas well as to the understanding
processesas describedby sociologists(e.g.,Pearlin, Lieberman,Menaghan,and Mullan 1981;
House andHarkins1976).
837
appliedto the self in a social role or situationdefiningwhatit meansto be who one is (Burkeand
Tully 1977).2 This set of meanings serves as a
standardor referencefor who one is. When an
identityis activated,a feedbackloopis established
(Burke1991;Powers 1973).As indicatedin Figure 1, this loop has fourcomponents:a standard
or setting(thesetof self-meanings);aninputfrom
the environmentor social situation (including
one's reflectedappraisals,i.e.,perceptionsof selfrelevantmeanings);a process thatcomparesthe
input with the standard(a comparator);and an
outputto theenvironment(meaningfulbehavior)
that is a result of the comparison.The system
worksby modifyingoutput(behavior)to the social situationin attemptsto changethe input(reflectedappraisals)to matchtheinternalstandard.
In this sense, the identitycontrolsystem can be
thoughtof as havinga goal - matchingthe enWhatthis
vironmental
inputsto internalstandards.
systemattemptsto controlis the input.As a basically homeostaticmodel, this view of identities
is similarto views such as cognitivedissonance
theory. However, it is more specific since this
model is explicit aboutwhatmust be congruent
(the inputand the identitystandard)and, as discussed later,what the consequencesare if congruencedoes not exist.
An easy way to think about this model is to
apply the functionalanalogy of the thermostat.
The thermostathas a standardor setting (let us
Built
say 70 degrees)andan input(temperature).
into the thermostatis the abilityto comparethe
inputwith the setting.Outputsare a functionof
this comparison.If the inputis 65 degrees (five
degrees less than the setting), the comparison
resultsin an outputthatturnsthe furnaceswitch
on. Thermostatoutputto the furnaceswitchcontinues until there is a match between the input
(currenttemperature)and the standard(70 degrees in ourexample).
In termsof theidentityprocess,the standardor
settingis scaled not in degreesbut in the meanings personshold for themselvesin a role. For
example,a person'sgenderidentitymightbe set
at a certaindegreeof masculinity;or a person's
college studentidentity might be set simultaneouslyat certaindegreesof academicresponsi-
2As BurkeandFreese(1989) havepointedout,this
set of meaningsincludesbothsymbolic andnonsymbolic components.The symboliccomponentincludes
IDENTITIES
ourusualnotionof meaningsas involvedin symbolic
Accordingto identitytheory,the identityprocess interaction.The nonsymboliccomponentincludesthe
is a control system (Burke 1991; Carver and variousresourcesthatare controlledby a personin a
Scheier1981).An identityis a set of "meanings" role.
838
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
Identity
Standard
.?@
41"i~
|Comparator 2
h
Environment.
q11P~Social
|Situation|
Figure 1. The Control-SystemView of the IdentityProcess:The Cycle of MeaningShowing Possible Points of Interruption at A and B
sionalvectorof perceivedmeaningsof who one
is as impliedby the social setting- thereflected
appraisals.Since-boththe inputandthe standard
consist of similarcontent,the comparisonprocess evaluatesthe degree to which they correspond. When the inputmeaningsare incongruent with the identitymeanings,(1) a subjective
feeling of distressoccursthatincreaseswith the
degreeof incongruence(ZannaandCooper1976),
and (2) becauseof the distress,outputsfromthe
identitysystemto the environmentwill change.
The environmentis a socialinteractionsystem
I These were the dimensionsof symbolic meaning thatincludesresourcesandthe behaviorsof othare meanfound by Burke and Reitzes (1980) to distinguish ers. The outputsto the environment
that
these
resourcmay
modify
ingful
behaviors
among the role/identities of college student, high
school student, graduatestudent, college graduate, es and the behaviors(Burkeand Reitzes 1981).
non-collegepeer.
Normally,the effect of these outputs(social ac-
bility, intellectualism,sociability,and personal
assertiveness.3Whateverthe settings,these standards within the identityprocess establish the
meaning of the person's "identity."Using Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum's(1957) view of
meaningsas mediationalresponses,the identity
standardcan be thoughtof as a "set"or N-dimensionalvector of meanings.These are "fundamentals"in the language of Affect Control
Theory(Smith-LovinandHeise 1988).
Identitytheoryalso considersthe inputsto the
identityprocessto be in the formof anN-dimen-
IDENTITYAND STRESS
tions)on the social interactionsystemcompletes
the feedbackloop, resultingin new inputsto the
identitysystem (reflectedappraisalsor perceptionsof self-meaningsin thesocialsetting).These
new inputstendtowardcongruencewiththestandardand resultin decreaseddistress.However,
congruenceis not automatic.Rather,peoplecontinue to vary their outputsto maintaincongruence, attemptingto keep the behaviorof others
reflecting the identity standardthey possesses
(Swannand Hill 1982). This processof achieving and maintainingcongruencemay become
relativelyefficient and automaticover time as
the individuallearnsthe patternsof the interaction system and how to effectively manipulate
them.It is the inputsthatarethe controlledvariablein theidentitycontrolsystem.It is the inputs
thatarealtered(by changingoutputbehavior)to
matchthe standard.The input meaningsthemselvesdo notcausebehavior,nordoes the identity standarditself cause behavior.Outputbehaviorresultsfromthecomparisonof theinputmeanings with the identitystandard.
As anexampleof theidentityprocess,consider
a woman whose identityas a motherincludes,
among other components, a certain degree of
powerfulness(a generalanduniversaldimension
of connotativemeaning-cf., Osgoodetal. 1957;
Osgood,May,andMiron1975).Supposethatfor
somereasonher"motheridentity"is importantto
herandit is activatedin a situation.Assume,further,thatthe inputsshe is receiving(perceptions
of her self impliedin the behaviorsof others)do
notmatchthedegreeof powerfulnessthatis set in
her motheridentity.The identityprocessmodel
suggeststhatshe will feel distressas a resultof
To relievethisdistressshewill,
thisincongruence.
therefore,changeherbehavior,therebychanging
the situationandalteringthe inputsshe receives.
For example,she might standup for her rights,
behave more firmly,be more assertive,acquire
moreresources,etc. If theseoutputsresultin perceptionsof herself (throughothersas her looking-glass)thatmatchthepowerfulcomponentof
"motheridentity,"herdistresswill abateandthe
It is the pernew behaviorswill be maintained.4
ceptions that must match the identity standard
whena particularidentityis activated.Achieving
a matchbetweenperceptionsof self andidentity
839
mayinvolveextensivenegotiationsand
standards
symbolicinteractionwith others;it may involve
exchanges and the controlof resources(Burke
andFreese1989).Butthecontrollingmechanism
for each individualin these negotiationsis that
perceptionsof theself in thesituationmustmatch
the identitystandard.
thismechSwannandHill (1982)demonstrated
anism in an experiment:Personswho identified
themselvesas dominantactedin even moredominant ways if they received feedbackthat they
were seen as submissive.Similarly,personswho
identifiedthemselvesas submissiveacted even
moresubmissivelyif theyreceivedfeedbackthat
they were seen as dominant.
This model of the identityprocess builds on
currentevidence that people feel some level of
distress when they receive feedbackthat is incongruentwith their identity,even if thatfeedback is morepositive than their identity.While
this conclusionmay seem somewhatcounterintuitive,it has been documentedrelativelyextensively. Forexample,earlyexperimentalevidence
showedthatpeoplewho expectfailurearesomewhatdiscomfitedby success (AronsonandCarlsmith 1962; Brock, Adelman, Edwards, and
Schuck 1965;Deutschand Solomon 1959). Recent surveyresearchhas shownthatpositivelife
events have negative health consequences for
persons with low self-esteembut not for those
withhigh self-esteem(BrownandMcGill 1989).
researchhasshown
Andotherrecentexperimental
thatpeople seek positive feedbackif they have
positive self-conceptsbut prefernegative feedbackif theyhavenegativeself-concepts(Swann,
PelhamandKrull1989).In general,the thrustof
currentand past researchsupportscongruence
theoriesratherthanenhancementtheoriesof the
self.5
IDENTITIESAND STRESS
Given this model of the identityprocess,I now
examine how interruptiontheorycan be linked
to identitytheoryto yield a betterunderstanding
of stress.The key is to remember:(1) when an
identityis activated,identityprocesses operate
continuouslythroughtime to maintaincongruence betweenthe identitystandardandreflected
self-appraisals;(2) the outputof the identitysys-
4CarverandScheier(1990) suggest thatthe rateat
whichcongruenceis restoredis an importantdetermi5Swann (1990) has begun to develop an integranantof affect. If it is restoredquickly therewill be a
positive subjectivefeeling and an increase in self- tion of self-enhancementand self-congruencetheoconfidencethatmay act to reinforcethe new behav- ries whichnotes theconditionsunderwhicheachprocess may dominatemotivation.
ior.
840
tern(meaningfulbehavior)is linkedto its input
(perceivedself-meanings)primarilythroughthe
socialenvironment.An identityprocessis a continuouslyoperating,self-adjusting,
feedbackloop:
individualscontinuallyadjustbehaviorto keep
their reflected appraisalscongruentwith their
identitystandardsor references.In familiarsituations,thisadjustment
processis nearlyautomatic,
requiringlittleor no attention.Since the identity
processis continuous,theamountby whichone's
reflected appraisalsdiffers from one's identity
standardis kept small. The existence of a relatively largediscrepancyis likelyto indicatesome
type of interruptionin the identityprocess that
has suspendedthe normalconditionof continuous congruencebetweenreflectedappraisalsand
identitystandard.
As the incongruencebetween one's reflected
appraisalsand one's identitystandardis created
andgrowsbeyondtheminimaldiscrepanciesthat
are handledautomatically(or perhapsignored),
first,one's attentionis directedto thediscrepancy
as theidentityprocessis broughtunderconscious
control. If the incongruenceincreases,distress
increases providingboth an alarm system and
motivationtoremediatetheproblemdiscrepancy.
To the extent that an identity is well-established there is better organizationof the feedback process. In addition,the more salient the
identity,the moreimportantthisprocessis. Both
of these conditions,organizationand salience,
are important.Interruption
theory suggests that
the interruptionof more organizedand salient
processes (such as identityprocesses) leads to
the heightenedautonomicactivity experienced
as distress(Mandler1982).
Consideragaintheexampleof themotherwho
fails to perceiveherselfin a situationas being as
powerfulas her identitystandardindicates.Suppose herratherautomaticeffortsto establishherself as morepowerfulin the situationby modifyingherbehaviorsmeetwithno success.HeridenBecausethese
tityprocessesfailorareinterrupted.
establishedand importantidentityprocessesare
the model suggestsshe will feel disinterrupted,
tress.Social stress resultsfrom the interruption
of thecontinuouslyadjustingidentityprocesses.6
6It is possible that in the future we may need to
distinguishinterruption
fromprolongedfailureof congruencebetweenidentityperceptionsandidentitystandard.The lattermightbe exemplifiedby occupational
stresswhenperformancecan neverbe up to whatone
wantsor othersdemand(cf., House 1974) or by people with stigmatizedidentitieswhere the person receives feedback that they are not good even though
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
Any processor eventthatpreventsa personfrom
outputtingbehaviors that change the reflected
appraisalsof others to be congruentwith their
identitystandard(interrupting
the cycle at point
A of Figure 1) or that prevent a person from
being able to perceivethe reflectedappraisalsof
others(interruptingat point B of Figure 1) constitutean interruption
of the identityprocess.
This model is most similarto Brown's identity disruptionmodel(cf.,BrownandMcGill1989)
which suggests that the negative effects of life
events operatethroughthe process of creating
alterationsin self-concepts - alterationsthat
have a negativeimpacton health.Brown,however, did not clearlyspecify the natureof identity disruptionsandthemechanismsby whichsuch
disruptionsinfluencehealth.He definedidentity
disruptionsas any change to existing identities:
abandoningold identities,adoptingnew identities, or changing the structureof the self-concept.The negativeeffectsof suchidentitychanges are broughtabout in the Brown model as a
resultof the loss of efficiencyin processingselfrelevantinformationand in making behavioral
decisions.
The identitymodel I presenthereis concerned
less with changesto existingidentitiesandmore
withdisruptionor interruption
of thecontinuously operatingidentityprocess.Severeinterruption
of this continuousprocess, i.e., repeatedinterruptionor interruptionof salientprocesses,produces the heightenedautonomicactivity that is
distress.Distresscomes not fromthe loss of efficiency as in the Brown model (thoughloss of
efficiency may contributeto furtherstress if it
creates more interruptionsof the identity process). The problemis the distressand its consequences.
Let us considera numberof ways thatdisruption or interruptionof the identityprocess can
lead to distress.Interruption,
as outlinedin interruptiontheory,must be distinguishedfrom the
continuousadjustmentsthatoccurin the normal
is notjust
identitycontrolprocesses.Interruption
a lack of congruencebetween the reflectedappraisals and the identity standard.Rather,the
normal,continuouslyoperatingcontrolprocess
is preventedby interruption
frommakingits usuthey want to be - i.e., their identity says they are
good. Currently,the only difference between interruptionandprolongedfailurewould be in the degree
of distressexperiencedand the greaterlikelihood of
identitiesbeingchangedunderconditionsof prolonged
failure of congruence. See section on "Identity
Change"below.
IDENTITYAND STRESS
ally automaticadjustments,thusputtingthe person in a distressedstate.'
Interruptionof the normalidentityprocesses
can leadto varyinglevels of distress.The magnitude of distressexperienceby an individualis a
itself,
functionof the severityof the interruption
the degreeto whichthe interruptedidentityprocess is highlyorganized,the degreeto whichthe
individualis committedto the identity,and the
significanceto the individualof an interrupted
source of input (feedback).Specifically, I hyof anidentity,once
pothesizethattheinterruption
thatidentityhas been activated,leads to higher
levels of stressin the following situations.
of theidenH1: Repeatedorsevereinterruptions
tityprocesscausegreaterdistressthanoccasionalor infrequentinterruptions.
H2: Interruptionof the identityprocess causes
identity
greaterdistresswhentheinterrupted
is highlysalientthanwhen it is less important,i.e., higherlevels of distressareassociated with the interruptionof identitiesthat
aremost importantto a person.8
H3: Interruptionof the identityprocess causes
identity
greaterdistresswhentheinterrupted
is one to whichthe personis highlycommitted,i.e., higherlevels of distressareassociatof a highlycommited withthe interruption
ted identitybecause the individualis more
dependenton it.9
H4: Interruptionof the identityprocess causes
greaterdistresswhen the sourceof the perceived identity(input)is significantto the
of feedbackfrom
individual,i.e.,interruption
a significantother is more distressfulthan
froma casualacquaintance.
interruption
I While the discussion here concerns interruption
of the cycle of meaning in identity processes, one
might also ask if distress could result from, say, a
difficult task. The presentdiscussion would be relevant only if performanceof the task were underthe
controlof an identity;failurein the task would have
identityimplicationsthatare partof the inputthat is
monitored.Theoretically,the issue wouldbe whether
behavioralperformancesexist thatare not underthe
control of an identity. Interruptionof those performances would then be a source of distress that is
outsidethe domainof the presentdiscussion.
I The "salience"of an identityis its relativelikelihood of being activatedin a particularsituationas
comparedto anotheridentity(Stryker1980). Identities that are more salient are also more likely to be
centralor importantto the individual.
9 "Commitment"refers to the strengthof the re-
841
With respectto hypothesis4, significantothers are people aroundwhom the individualhas
habituallybuilt a cycle of meaningas a tightly
organizedprocess.Interruption
of such a tightly
organizedprocess would producemore distress
thaninterruption
of a less organizedprocess.
IDENTITYINTERRUPTION
Baseduponthemergerof interruption
theoryand
identitytheory,I considerfourgeneralconditions
that should lead to feelings of distress.Within
eachof thesefourconditionstheremaybe one or
morerelatedconditionsthatproducedistress.
TheBrokenLoop
First, the identityprocess can be interruptedif
the loop of the identitycontrolprocess is broken
by externaleventsinterruptingthe normal,continuous,automaticadjustmentprocess.Theidentityprocessis a closed loop throughthe situation
or social environmentfrom inputto outputand
backto input.Whenthatloop is broken,theidentity process ceases to functionnormally.I considertwo ways in which the loop can be broken.
First,theloop canbe brokenat thepointwhere
the output (behavior) enters the environment
(pointA in Figure 1). An individual'sbehavior
in a situation(environment)mayhavelittleor no
effect on that situation- it may not influence
the way othersbehavetoward,label,or treathim
or her. Attemptsat meaningfulinteractionmay
fail. Othersmay not recognize the individual's
efforts.Othersmaynotpayattention.Othersmay
imposea meaningon the individualindependent
of the his or her wishes or behavior.All of these
situationslead to feelings of low self-efficacy,
andthelike
alienation,disaffection,estrangement
on the partof the individual(cf., Blauner1964;
BurkeandTully 1977;GecasandSchwalbe1983;
Seligman 1975).
Such lack of effect of the individual'sbehavior on thesituationwouldalso be associatedwith
the loss of identity,or the loss of a sense of self
("it's as if I don't exist").This is the source of
distress identifiedby Stein, Vidich, and White
(1960). It is also the sourceof distressassociated
with the loss of a job (Gross 1970) or the loss of
a loved one (Croog 1970) where one's identity
(standard)is no longerapplicable.In suchcases,
sponse an individualmakes to restoreperceptionsof
the self (inputs)to matchthe identitystandardwhen
there is a discrepancybetween them (cf., Burkeand
Reitzes 1991).
842
thefeedbackto maintainthe identityis not forthcoming from othersno matterwhat behavioris
output- one can no longeract in the usualway
to control reflected appraisals.For example,
Strobe,GergenandGergen(1982) notedthatthe
deathof a spousedisruptsmanyongoingaspects
of one's life as the partneron whom one has
dependedfor manysharedresponsesequencesis
lost. And, thatdisruptionis a sourceof distress
interferingwith post-deathadjustment.Remondet, Rule, and Winfrey (1987) find that those
widows with advancedwarningof a spouse's
impendingdeath who began to plan and make
decisionsfor theirfuture(housing,financialand
legal affairs), and who began to do things on
theirown before the deathsufferedless disruption and less distress.
Second, the loop of the identitycontrolprocess can be brokenat the pointat which inputis
receivedfrom the environment(pointB in Figure 1). The individualmay not be able to perceive (understand)the meaningsin the situation
(environment),or mayperceive themincorrectly. Herewe deal withthe individual'sperception
of the situation(inputside) ratherthanhis or her
behavior in the situation(outputside). In this
case the individual'sbehaviorhas effects but he
or she does not perceive those effects, or misreadsor misunderstandsthem for some reason.
The individualmay have feelings of being misunderstood.The individual'seffortsmay be ineffective becausehe or she does not know how
to read or understandthe meaningsthat others
display.Thismighthappenwhenone is in a new
cultureor subculturewith which one is not familiar.It may happenbecauseone distortsperbiasceptionsfor some reason(e.g., attributional
es, cf., Bradley1978;KruglanskiandAjzen 1983)
or does not fully understandthe implicationsof
thoseperceptions(BrownandHarris1978).
The differencebetweena brokenloop at point
B andpointA in Figure1 is thatat pointA one's
behaviorhas no effect - at pointB one can see
the effects of one's behaviorbut the effects are
unexpected.The perceivedmeaningscannotbe
broughtinto congruencewith the identitystandard. This creates the distress associated with
beingin new andstrangeenvironments,meeting
new people, or enteringinto new roles such as
gettingmarriedor startinga new job.
The resultof eitherof these forms of disruption (on theoutputside,A, or the inputside,B) is
the repeatedinabilityof the identityprocess to
properlymatchthe inputand the standard,thus
puttingthe person in a state of distress.This is
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
illustratedin an old studyby Harvey,Kelley,and
Shapiro(1947) on the reactionsof college students to unfavorablepersonalevaluations.Subjects ratedthemselves on a series of important
social attributes.In a latersession they ratedanotherpersonin theircollege class - sometimes
a personwho knew them and sometimesa person who did not know them. The subjectswere
then shown fictitiousratingsof themselvesthat
were ostensiblymade by the otherperson.For
some these ratingswere very much lower than
their self-evaluationsand for others they were
only slightlylower.In neithercase werethe subjects able to do anythingto alteror controlthe
other'sratingsof them. The resultsshowed that
the "level of tension"experiencedby the subjects variedwith the degreeto which the ratings
theyreceiveddifferedfromtheirself-ratings,and
whetherthe personratingthem was an acquaintance or a stranger.This latterresult illustrates
the importanceof identitysalience and significantothersin the identityprocess.Incongruence
between perceived self-meaningsand a highly
salientidentityor an identityinvolvinga significantotherled to high levels of distress.
InterferenceFrom OtherIdentities
A secondsourceof distressis thattheremaybe a
negative connection between (among) two (or
more)identitiessuchthatincreasingthe congruence with respectto one identity,decreasesthe
congruencefor the another,i.e., if one identityis
maintained,then other identitiesmust be interrupted.Forexample,theremaybe timeconstraints
(one can't be in two places at the same time), or
theremaybe meaningcontradictions
(beingamale
may mean acting tough while being a minister
may mean acting tender),or one may be overcommittedto a particular
identityandpulledaway
from engaging otherrole identities.In the role
literature,theseprocesseshavebeentalkedabout
in terms of role conflict or role strain (Gross,
Mason,andMcEachem1958;Goode1960;Marks
1977). Both arewell-knownsourcesof distress.
HereI suggestthatinterruption
theorycanhelp
us understandrole conflictas previouslydefined
by identitytheory.Feelingsof distressoccurbecause one identity adjustmentprocess is interrupted while anotheris maintained- one is
caughtin a cycle of interruptingone identityto
maintainthe other and then reversingthe process. Such a "juggling"process could account
for the high distresslevels of homemakersand
employedwomenrelativeto employedmen (cf.,
IDENTITYAND STRESS
Gove 1984). Indeed,the varyinglevels of distressnotedforemployedwomen(sometimescloser to the levels for homemakersand sometimes
closer to the levels for employedmen) may be
accountedfor by-the specific identitieseach has,
andmoreimportantly,by the degreeof-interruptionof one identityby another.As Thoits(1986)
haspointedout,havingmoreidentities,to a point,
does not generatemore distressand may even
reduceit. However,particularidentitycombinations are likely to producedistress, especially
combinationsthatinterrupteach other with demands.Thoitsnoted,for example,thatfor women the combinationof employment,marriage,
andparenthoodis particularlystressful.
With some identitycombination,one identity
may dependupon anotherfor resources,and if
the "resource"identity is interrupteda "chain
reaction"of interruptionscan result.For example, disruptionof a job identityandthemeanings
andresourcesthatarecontrolledby thatidentity
may have a disruptiveor interruptiveimpacton
one's maritalor family identitiesto the extent
thattheselatteridentitiesdependuponresources
fromtheformer.Theresultingdistressis thenthe
cumulativeeffect of the interruptionof several
identities.
Thus,the issue may well not be the numberof
identities,butthedegreeto whichparticularidentities are likely to interruptothers.The stressful
natureof incongruentordependentidentitycombinationscanbe understoodwhenexaminedfrom
theory.
the perspectiveof interruption
An Over-ControlledIdentitySystem
843
For example,considergenderidentity.A person with a stronggenderidentitymight closely
controlhis or her gender-relevantreflectedappraisals.In this case, a personwith a strongmasculine identityis not necessarilyextremelymasculine, but he cannottoleratebeing in situations
where he is perceived10as very much different
from "masculine"as his identityhas defined it;
any perceptionthatdoes not stronglyagreewith
his identitystandardmustbe corrected.
On the otherhand, a personwith a more androgynousgenderidentityis more flexible and
does not need to controlhis reflectedappraisals
as much as the personwith a sex-typedidentity.
In this case, androgynyis viewed not as having
bothmasculineandfemininetraits,butas having
an open andflexible identitythatallows an individualto behavein ways thatareto theiradvantage, even thoughhe or she may be sometimes
perceivedas more masculineand sometimesas
more feminine. In this sense, the androgynous
persondoes not needto workas hardto maintain
his or hergenderidentityas the sex-typedperson
andis thereforeless likely to have an interrupted
identityprocess or have the identityprocess interruptotheractivities.The resultis less distress.
This mechanismcould accountfor the findings
thatpersonswith androgynousgenderidentities
tend to have higherfeelings of self-esteemand
self-efficacy(SpenceandHelmreich1978;Spence andHelmreich1979).
Similarly,"Type A" personalitiesmay have
moretightlycontrolledidentitysystemswithmore
rigid,and thereforeeasily interrupted,organizations(cf.,House1974;Jenkins1971).Suchtightly
controlledidentity systems are not only more
easily interrupted,but interruptionscause more
disruptionthanfor moreloosely controlledidentity systems. In the study of police dispatchers,
Kirmeyer(1988) showsthatTypeA personsfeel
moredistressthanothers,even whenthe number
of theirjobperformance
of objectiveinterruptions
is controlled.Authoritarianism
(AdornoFrenkelBrunswik. Levinson, and Sanford 1950) and
closed-mindedness(Rokeach 1960) may represent other manifestationsof this sort of tightly
controlledidentity system. This would explain
higherdistresslevels for people with these characteristics.
Relatedto the tightnessof the controlsystem
governing the identity process is the effect of
time constraintson role performance.EarlierI
The tightnessof the identitycontrolsystemis a
thirdfactorthatcan determinelevels of distress
andanxiety.A "tightly"controlledidentityis one
thatattemptsto matchthereflectedappraisals(inputsignal)to theactualidentity(standard)almost
exactly. A "loosely"controlledidentity,on the
otherhand,allowsthereflectedappraisalsto vary
to a degreebefore indicatinga discrepancyand
alteringthe output.A tightlycontrolledidentity
is likely to lead to greaterfrequencyand higher
levels of distress,especiallyin environmentswith
variablereflectedappraisalsor resourceflows.
Individeals who havea tightlycontrolledidentity mustmonitorand adjusttheiridentityprocess
frequently,andbecauseconsciousattentionis limadjustmentcan interruptother
ited,thisfr-equent
processes or be interruptedby otherprocesses.
10Strictly,wherethe personsees himself/herselfas
by theprocessitself
Thesefrequentinterruptions
reflectedin the actionsof others.
areassociatedwith distress.
844
discussedthepotentialconflictbetweentwo identities thatmay be competingfor time, for examidentityanda famiple a work/profession-based
ly-basedidentity.However,time constraintson
theroleperformanceof a singleidentitycanhave
muchthesameeffect.Withtimeconstraintsproper performancemaynotbe possibleso thatsome
controlover meaningfulperformanceis lost and
the identitysystemis disrupted(cf., French,Tupper, and Mueller1965). In addition,the identity
systemmaybecomemoretightlycontrolledwith
the increaseof time pressure,resultingin other
(timeforfamilygives
processesbeinginterrupted
way as work demandsincrease)or in the interruptionof the tightlycontrolledidentityprocess
(failuresbecome moredisruptivebecauseof the
have greater
time pressures,minorinterruptions
impactandlead to moredistress).
EpisodicIdentities
A fourthsourceof interruptionresultsfrom the
episodicperformanceof a role. The interruption
of the identityprocess in this case is caused by
the lack of performancefeedbackduringtimes
when the role is being rehearsed,but not being
performed.Peopleneedpracticeandfeedbackto
learnhow to change incongruentself-meanings
to matchtheiridentitystandards.However,when
a role is episodic,continuouspracticeand feedback is not possible, and it is more difficult to
maintainclose congruencebetweenself-perceptions andidentity.In a sense,all rolesareepisodic in naturebecausewe move fromroleto roleon
a cyclic basis.Thus,thisis an issue of degreeand
not of kind.Forthoserolesandidentitiesthatare
takenup episodicallyand irregularly,distressis
in
likely to occurbecauseextendedinterruptions
feedbackoccurover time.
Peoplein episodicrolesmaymentallyrehearse
what to do to controltheirperformanceso that
properself-meaningsare perceived.They may
play out "whatif' scenarios."Whatif this happens?" "Whatif that happens?"To the extent
thata personis "into"the identitywhilefantasizing, this mentalactivitymay generatea certain
amountof distress.This interruptivementalactivity wouldbe especiallylikely if the role is not
learnedwell enoughthatthebehaviorrequiredis
automatic.In thatcase thereis trueinterruption
of the identityprocess(in fantasy).
For example,people who areperformingin a
play for thefirsttimebecomeanxiousabouttheir
Andpeoplebecomeanxupcomingperformance.
ious when their performanceis evaluatedonly
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
episodically,as in contestsandcompetitions,annual reviews, tenurereviews, and so on. When
evaluationis episodica continuousfeedbackprocess is not possible andthusepisodicevaluation
constitutesinterruption
of thenormalidentityprocesses.
STRESSAND EVALUATION
It is commonlyunderstoodthatpeople feel anxious and distressedwhen they know they areeitherbeing evaluatedor areaboutto be evaluated
(HolroydandLazarus1982). Why does evaluation producestress,and how does this relateto
identityprocesses?I outlineseveralpossibilities
from the point of view of the model of identity
theoryI havepresentprocessesandinterruption
ed here.
First,considerthe case wherea negativeevaluation has been made (relativeto the person's
own self-meaning).While this discrepancyis itself not necessarilyan interruption,
therearetwo
ways it is usually considered. Several writers
(Kaplan1975;Pearlinetal. 1981)havesuggested
thatpeoplestriveforself-enhancement.
Negative
evaluationsinterruptor precludereachingthis
goal, resultingin distress.In themodelpresented
here, however, a self-enhancementgoal is not
necessaryto predictdistress.Instead,the present
modelnotesthatthenegativeevaluationpresents
a definitionof the self thatis incongruentwiththe
identitystandard.In fact, a lack of congruence
would exist whetherthe evaluationwas positive
or negativerelativeto the self-evaluation.In eithercase, distressdiminishesonly when modificationsinbehavioreffectivelyrestorecongruence
(in this case, by securinga good evaluation).
Thedebatebetweensupporters
of self-enhancement (e.g., Kaplan1975) and congruence(e.g.,
Swann 1987) explanationsof stressis fairlyextensivein the literature.However,most research
supportingthe self-enhancementgoal as an explanationfails to considerthe initiallevel of selfesteem (e.g., Tesser 1986) andtendsto focus on
persons with high initial levels of self-esteem.
Under these conditions,the predictionsof the
self-esteemenhancementmodelandthe congruence model are the same. It is only when selfesteemis low thatthe two modelsmakedifferent
predictions.Recent,as well as olderresearch,in
whichinitialself-esteemlevel is considered,suggests that at least in the cognitive domain the
congruencemodelas representedhereis themost
effective and substantiatedmodel (Deutschand
Solomon 1959; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi,
IDENTITYAND STRESS
andGilbert1990).11Brown,Collins,andSchmidt
(1988), for example,show thatpeople with low
self-esteemtend to act in ways to mitigateselfenhancement.And,as statedearlier,positivelife
eventshave been shownto have negativeconsequencesforpersonswithlow self-esteem(Brown
andMcGill 1989).Epstein(1980) pointsoutthat
"to note that some individualsare motivatedto
maintainlow levels of self-esteemis not to suggest that self-esteem can not be raised, but to
indicatethat, for good motivationalreasons, it
tendsto be resistantto change"(p. 107)
A second way thatevaluationcreatesstressis
thatthe processor impendingprocessof evaluation itself may interruptnormalidentitymaintenance processesand producedistress.Consider
thecase whentheevaluationis knownto be forthcoming.'2Fromthe time the impendingevaluation is known aboutuntil it occurs,people may
interrupttheprocessingof normalimmediatecues
abouthowtheyare doingin a particularidentity,
and shifttheirattentionto theforthcomingevaluation.Thisinterruption
mayalso extendto other
identities(thatare not underimpendingevaluation)so thattheseidentityprocessesareinterrupted as well. This self-preoccupation
(interruption
of normalidentityprocess to considerways of
dealingwith an impendingevaluation)has been
shown to be characteristicof test-anxiety(Sarason 1988).Interruption
andidentitytheorieshelp
us to understandthis sourceof distress.In addition,evaluationsthatarenotcontinuousbutoccur
do not allow the identityproonly intermittently
cess to makeits normalcontinuousadjustments.
In this sense one looses controlandthe situation
This loss of controlin the
appearsunpredictable.
face of animpendingevaluationis a formof interruptionof the continuousidentityprocess.
Also, in becomingsensitiveto the impending
evaluation,people may become aware of their
own misattributionsand perceptualbiases that
are part of the normalprocessing of meanings
"I Even so, it is possible thatthe effects of discrepancy differ dependingupon the directionof the discrepancy.
12 A potentialsource of confusionhere is that one
may be evaluatedon severaldimensionsof meaning.
One dimensionof meaningon which evaluationmay
takeplace is the evaluationdimension(Osgoodet al.
1957). It is this dimensionto which I referredin the
paragraphabove. Other dimensions of meaning on
which one may be evaluatedincludeactivity,masculinity,etc. Careshouldbe takento distinguishevaluation as a process from the evaluationdimension of
meaning.
845
from the environment.In doing so, they may become awareof discrepanciesbetweentheir"newly perceived"self-meaningsand theiridentities.
People cannottotallymake up theirown inputs
independent
of environmental
conditions- mentalhealthrequires"realitychecks."Thatis not to
say, however,thatperceptualdistortionsof environmentalmeaningsneveroccur(Bradley1978).
Usually, these distortionsare in the directionof
agreementwith the identitystandard.If they are
interrupted,
distressensues (Harveyet al. 1947).
Finally, in becoming sensitive to an impending evaluation,people may tighten the control
systemsfor the identitybeing evaluated in an
effort to make sure their performanceis up to
standards.In doing so, theymustdeal with those
problemsintegralto tight control systems: the
need to constantlymonitorthe identityprocess
of otherprocessesor
thatmay causeinterruption
be morefrequentlyinterrupteditself. Again, the
resultis distress.
To summarize,the evaluationprocess- being evaluatedby an externalagent- can place
stresson the identitysystemof people. This can
happenduringthe evaluationprocess itself, but
is more likely to occur in anticipationof being
evaluated.However,I suggestthatthe way evaluation producesdistressdoes not involve new
principles. The basic mechanism remains the
same: Distress results from the interruptionof
normalidentityprocesses.
IDENTITYCHANGE
ThusfarI havediscussedhowpeoplechangetheir
behaviorwhen their self-perceptionsare incongruentwiththeiridentities.Whenchangesin behaviordo notresultin greatercongruencebetween
andidentities,feelingsof distress
self-perceptions
result. However, if congruence cannot be
achieved by changingoutputsand inputs,then
the identityor standardof comparisonitself may
be changed.In the identitymodel,this is accomplished througha second-orderfeedback loop
(Burke1991).
The model of identityprocessesillustratedin
Figure1 is incomplete- no sourceis shownfor
the identitystandard.A more completeillustration of the identityprocesswould show thatthe
identitystandardis itself an outputfroma higher
level controlprocesswithits own standard,comparator,and input (Powers 1973). The inputto
this higher level control loop comes from the
environmentand some partof thatinputmay be
the sameas to thelowerlevel identityprocess.In
846
this way, the higherlevel processmonitorscertain aspectsof the environment,and adjustsits
outputas a functionof the comparisonof its inputwithits standard.
Sincetheoutputof thehigher
level processis the identitystandardin Figure1,
suchadjustmentsarein the formof changingthe
identitystandardin the lower level process.
Thus,one's identitymay changeas a resultof
the higherlevel processtryingto matchits input
to its standard.While we do not know, at this
point, what the higherlevel processreceives as
input,one possibilityis thatit may use information from both the outputand the input of the
lower level identityprocess in the form of the
ratioof thesetwo quantities.A highoutput/input
ratiomay indicateproblems,i.e., a lot of effortis
necessaryto maintainconsistentinput.If thehigher level process "perceives"the magnitudeof
this ratio to go above its standard,a change in
identitystandardwill occur.
In this way, if the lower level processcannot
createcongruencebetweenthe inputself-meanings and the identitystandard,stressoccursand
the output/inputratiogoes up. The higherlevel
process,in effect, notes this conditionas partof
its input.Sucha condition,as partof the inputat
this level, makethe inputdifferfrom the higher
Thehigherordercomparator
notes
orderstandard.
this incongruence.As a consequence,the output
of the higherordercomparatorchanges(thatis,
the identitystandardin the lower orderprocess
changes). If this change in the identity setting
resultsin increasedcongruencebetweenthe(new)
identitystandardandreflectedappraisalsandthe
output/inputratiofalls off, then the outputfrom
the higherorderprocesswill be maintainedwith
the new identity.
In this model, then, an individual'sidentity
can and will change, but it does so only if the
lowerlevel identityprocesscannotmaintaincongruenceof thereflectedappraisalsandthe identity standardover some periodof time or number
of disruptiveevents. As discussedabove, these
conditionsfor identitychangearethe same conditionsin which distressis felt. Indeed,distress
plays a majorrole in identitychanges.This has
been shown in studiesof mid-life crisis (Farrell
andRosenberg1981) as well as in the moreextreme settings of concentrationcamps (Bettelheim 1943) or prisonerof war camps (Schein
1957). For example, Schein (1957) pointedout
thattheeffectivenessof theRussianandChinese
indoctrinationtechniquesdependedon the destructionof the prisoner's"socialties andidentifications"andthe subsequentofferingof "anew
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
identity."Theformerinterrupted
normalidentity
maintenanceprocesses and producedimmense
distressandanxiety;the latterprovideda way to
reducedistressby reestablishingnormalidentity
processes, albeit with a new identity.Less extreme examples were offered by Farrell and
Rosenberg (1981) who indicatedthat identity
changes in midlife are often the resultof accumulateddiscrepancieswith formerself-conceptions. In addition,based on a longitudinalstudy
of adults over a period of eight years, Shanan
(1985) concluded that identity changes during
this period center aroundthe reorganizationof
thepersonalitytowardinternalconsistencywhen
thathad been lost.
CONCLUSION
Social stresshas traditionallybeen viewed as an
overload,where the demandsmade exceed existing abilities(House 1974). While the subjective andinterpretiveprocessesinvolvedin social
stresshave been widely recognized(cf., Lazarus
1966),few clearunderstandings
ormodelsof this
process have been presented.One exception,of
course,is the workof Pearlinet al. (1981) on the
stressprocess.The interruptiontheoryof stress
(Mandler1982) makes it possible to move beyond this impasse.
theBy incorporatingthe ideasof interruption
of the identityprocess
ory intotheunderstanding
fromidentitytheory,we can morefully comprehend the situationsand conditionsthat lead to
distress(anxiety).I have presentedan outlineof
that integration.AlthoughI have not identified
new sourcesof distressandanxiety,I haveshown
thata wide varietyof situationsshownto be anxhave one mechanism
iety- or distress-provoking
in common:They all involve disruptionsor interruptionsof identityprocesses.
Pearlinet al. (1981) pointto a similarconclusion in their theoreticaldiscussionof the stress
process,althoughtheyfocus on differentmechanisms. In their model, stress productionbegins
similarlywith"disruptiveevents"(disruptivejob
events in their model). These feed into depression'3(the stressreaction)directly,butalso indirectlythroughchangesin the self, specificallyin
reducedself-esteemand mastery.Fromthe per"The work of Higgins (1989) has shown thatdiscrepanciesbetweenthe reflectedappraisalsandone's
ideal self-image (what one would like to be) lead to
depression, while discrepancies between reflected
appraisalsandone's oughtself-image(whatone feels
one oughtto be) leadto anxietyanddistressreactions.
IDENTITYAND STRESS
spective of Pearlinet al., self-variablesare centralto understanding
distress.
While Pearlinet al. come to similarconclusions about the importanceof self-variablesin
the stressprocess,theirmodel is slightlydifferent fromthe identitytheorymodel.In contrastto
the Pearlinet al. model,the identitytheorymodel does not linkdisruptiveeventsdirectlyto selfesteem and mastery.Instead,disruptiveevents
causean interruptionof the normalidentityprocess and a failureto bringself-perceptionsinto
line with the underlyingidentitystandard.This
resultsin autonomicactivitysubjectivelyfelt as
distress.Anotherconsequenceof this failurein
the identitycontrolprocessis the lesseningof a
person'sfeelings of efficacy or masterybecause
he or she is not able to match inputswith the
identitystandard.Finally,theidentitymodelsuggests that a loss of masteryresults in a loss of
self-esteem, and perhaps,a rise in depression.
People feel good aboutthemselvesif and when
they can controlevents and actionsto maintain
the correspondencebetweeninputsandthe standard.Thus, identitytheory interposesinterruption of identityprocessesbetweenthe disruptive
life-event and the feelings of distress (depression) and lowered mastery. In addition,lower
self-esteem is seen as a consequenceof lower
feelings of mastery.'4
The presentmodel goes beyondthe Pearlinet
al. model by specifying the underlyingmechanisms for stress:interruptionof the identityprocess. It also goes beyondthe Pearlinet al. model
by suggestingadditionalsituationsthatmay lead
to stress via these same mechanisms:interruption of the identityprocess.
A second implicationof the presentmodel is
to reaffirma characteristicof identitiesthatwas
understoodwithinthe symbolic interactionperspectiveoutlinedby Blumer(1962), buthasbeen
relativelyneglectedwith the morerecentformulationsof structuralsymbolicinteraction(Strykis the"proer 1980).Thatneglectedcharacteristic
cessual"natureof identities.Identitiesare not
just statesor traitsof an individualthatarerelatively fixed. As we have seen, an identitycan be
conceptualizedas a feedbackprocess:a continuouslyoperatingloop of inputmeaningsto output
meaningsand outputmeaningsto input meanings. It is the interruptionor disruptionof that
continuousprocessthatconstitutesdistress.
847
This leads me to a final point thatflows from
the modelI havepresented.In futurediscussions
of coping and problem-solvingin response to
stress,the focus shouldbe on how to restorethe
interruptedidentityprocessor facilitateidentity
changeto restorecongruencebetweenthe identity standardand the inputmeanings.This focus
has the potentialof bringingcoherenceto many
of theanalysesof stressbuffersandcopingmechanisms that have alreadybeen discussed in the
literature(cf., Clausenand Kohn 1954; Lazarus
1970; Pearlinand Schooler 1978; Thoits 1983;
Lin, Woelfel andLight 1985).
PETER J. BURKE is Professor of Sociology and Scien-
tistat WashingtonState University.His recentempirical researchon identitytheoryincludesstudiesof the
effects of gender identityon school performance,the
effects of gender identityon imposingand receiving
physical and sexual abuse,and the effectsof academic identityon educationalaspirations.He currently
has afive-year NIMHgrantto studythe development
of marital roles, identities,and interactionpatterns
over thefirst threeyears of marriage.
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