After the first dialogue, Hylas admits, he is
a skeptic—but so are you, he says to
Philonous
Phil: Not so! Skepticism only follows if you
start by assuming mind independent
objects.
Hylas what are objects if they are not mind
independent?
Material things are collections of ideas
Each perception is one part of a much larger
bundle. Ordinary physical objects are just these
bundles of ideas.
In this way Berkeley preserves the “direct” part
of direct realism by rejecting the “realism” part.
He is not denying the reality of material things—
He is giving a new definition of what is to be a
thing.
What happens when we leave the
room?
Objects still exist when human beings and
animals are not perceiving them. Also there is
much in the universe that is not perceived by
any human being or animal.
How can this be? I
Berkeley: there needs to be a perceiver, but the
perceiver for most things in the universe is God.
In perceiving God sustains the being of the
whole natural world.
An argument for God’s
existence
Some of my ideas are caused by me, some are
not (the perceptual ideas)
All ideas require a cause.
It does not make any sense to suppose that
mind independent material things cause my
ideas (think of the critique of indirect realism)
But minds CAN cause ideas. (we know this from
our own case, when we think or imagine)
Proof of God cont.
Therefore, there is a mind that is causing my
perceptual ideas.
But my perceptual ideas are much more vivid
and coherent than any ideas I create.
Therefore the cause of my perceptual ideas
must be correspondingly greater than me
It must be a very wise, powerful mind, that is,
God.
Philonous: “To be plain, it is my opinion
that the real things are those very things I
see and feel, and perceive with my
sensess… A piece of sensible bread, for
instance, would stay my stomach better
than ten thousand times as much of that
insensible, unintelligible, real bread you
speak of” ( p. 63)
But minds are the only causes
Sensible bread, therefore, cannot really
have any effect on hunger.
The true cause of all our ideas, is never an
idea, but always a mind (either God or
some finite mind)
What about these minds?
Hylas asks Philonous: can you frame an idea of
a mind?
Philonous says: No.
Hylas: therefore, on your own principles you
should deny that there are any minds, just as
you deny that there is matter.
You should think what we call mind is just a
bundle of ideas.
Philonous’ response
I am aware of my mind, but not in the
same way as I am aware of ideas.
When I think or will, I am aware of any
activity. This activity is what gives me the
notion (not idea) of a mind.