late-Night Comedy in Election 2000:
Its Influence on Candidate Trait Ratings
and the Moderating Effects of Political
Knowledge and Partisanship
Dannagal Goldthwaite Young
This paper examines the effects of exposure to late-night comedy programming on trait ratings of the candidates in the 2000 Presidential
election and the moderating effects of political knowledge and partisanship. The study includes a content analysis of late-night jokes, an analysis
of the predictors of late-night exposure, and several tests of the relationship between late-night exposure and candidate trait ratings. Results did
not reveal direct effects of late-night exposure on subjects' ratings of the
candidates' caricatured traits, though findings did suggest differential
effects of exposure to late-night as a function of the partisanship and
political knowledge of the viewer.
Throughout the 2000 Presidential election, journalists, politicians, and comedians
debated the nature of the relationship between late-night comedy and public
opinion. Marshall Sella, author of a New York Times article entitled, "The Stiff Guy
vs. the Dumb Guy," suggested that "part of what turns random episodes like the
RATS controversy' into icons, what inflates them into pivotal campaign events, is
late-night comedy" (Sella, 2000, p. 72). Democratic strategist Mandy Grunwald
stated, "If Len0 or lmus or Dennis Miller are making jokes about you, you have a
serious problem. Whatever take they have on you i s likely to stick much more solidly
than what is in the political ads in papers like the Washington Post" (Grenier, 1999,
p. 103).
Dannagal Goldfhwaite Young (MA, University of Pennsylvania) is a doctoral candidate in Communication
at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research interests include
the psychology of humor, political satire, and the effects of nontraditional forms of political information on
public opinion and political knowledge.
The Electronic Dialogue 2000 Project, from which individual level data were obtained, was supported by
grants to Dr. Joseph Cappella and Dr. Vincent Price from the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Annenberg Public
Policy Center of fhe University of Pennsylvania. Data for use in the late-night joke content analysis was
obtained from the Center for Media and Public Affairs (CMPA). The views expressed here are those of the
author alone and do not reflect the views of the funding agencies or of the organizations from which data
were obtained. Thank you to CMPA's Research Director, Dan Amundson, for the use of CMPA's late-night
joke database, Lela Jacobsohn for assistance in the content analysis as well as joseph Cappella, Vincent Price,
and several anonymous reviewers for helpful suggesfions. Any errors or oversights are the responsibility of the
author alone.
0 2004 Broadcast Education Association
lournal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 48(1), 2004, pp. 1-22
1
2
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic MedidMarch 2004
Meanwhile, political comedians argued that since jokes are based on what the
public already believes, their influence on public opinion was inconsequential.
While speaking to AI Gore’s class at the Columbia Journalism School, David
Letterman, host of CBS’s The Late Show, downplayed his role in the election, stating,
“I would guess that very few votes were cast based on a joke that either I or Jay Len0
made’’ (Berner, 2001, p. 3). Jon Stewart, host of Comedy Central’s The Daily Show,
argued that it was unlikely that people were influenced by such content since
“[writers and comedians] need [viewers] to know something before they even make
a joke about it” (Bettag, 2000). Similarly, Jay Leno, host of NBC‘s The Tonight Show,
stated, “we (writers and comedians) reinforce what people already believe” (Shaap,
2000, p. 75).
In spite of this debate’s high profile in the popular press, its presence in the
academic literature i s far less prominent. This analysis i s an attempt to assess the
effects of exposure to late-night programming on perceptions of the candidates in the
2000 campaign. The paper includes a content analysis of late-night jokes and a brief
examination of the late-night audience. It also includes an analysis of the relationship
between late-night exposure and ratings of the candidates on their caricatured traits.
Here I explore the moderating roles of political knowledge and partisanship, assessing whether the effects of exposure varied with the knowledge or partisanship of the
viewer.
Political Humor, Persuasion, and learning
Early studies assessing the persuasiveness of satire, such as editorial cartoons,
hinted at satire‘s capacity to affect opinion, but with inconsistent results (Annis,
1939; Brinkman, 1968; Cruner, 1971). After the 1992 election, during which Clinton
explored such nontraditional outlets as MTV, talk shows, and late-night programs,
scholars became increasingly interested in the impact of such ”new news,” particularly on learning (Chaffee, Zhao, & Leshner, 1994; Davis and Owen, 1998;
Hollander, 1995; McLeod et al., 1996). While some of this literature suggested
audiences may learn about candidates’ positions through exposure to such programming (Chaffee et al., 1994; McLeod et al., 1996), other studies suggested that
exposure might enhance viewers‘ perceived knowledge without increasing their
actual knowledge (Hollander, 1995).
Pfau, Cho, and Chong (2001) extended this research beyond learning as an
outcome of exposure, to attitude change as an outcome, assessing the impact of
exposure and attention paid to late-night as a source of campaign information on
evaluations of candidates and views of the democratic process. Their results indicate
a significant positive relationship between late-night exposure and perceptions of
Gore and a nonsignificant negative relationship in the case of Bush. The authors
speculate that jokes portraying Gore as wooden may have led viewers to see him as
more human. But as Pfau et al. admit, ”The [reason why television entertainment talk
Young/LATE-NIGHT COMEDY
3
shows mainly worked to Gore's advantage] probably lies in the content of Letterman's and Leno's jokes and thus lies outside the purview of this investigation" (Pfau
et al., p. 97). The first goal of the following analysis, then, i s to explore the content
of the jokes made by Len0 and Letterman throughout the 2000 campaign.
RQ1: Which aspects of Gore and Bush's personalities were caricatured most by Len0
and Letterman in the 2000 election?
The Late-Night Audience
Two recent studies by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2000,
2002) have helped scholars better understand trends in late-night viewing and the
makeup of the late-night audience. Their most recent study (Pew Research Center,
2002) assessed predictors of late-night exposure by asking respondents how often
they watched late-night television shows such as Letterman and Leno. The results
indicated large differences by age group with 47% of respondents age 18-29
reporting watching regularly or sometimes compared to 34% of 30-44 year olds,
28% of 45-64 year old, and only 23% of respondents over age 65.
A report published by Pew during the 2000 campaign (Pew Research Center,
2000) indicated that the number of people who reported learning about the campaign from late-night programs had increased slightly from 1996 to 2000. These
increases were most notable among young people and those low in political
knowledge. According to the study, America's youngest eligible voters (age 18-29),
who reported the lowest use of newspapers and network news, reported receiving
more campaign information from late-night than any other age group. And almost
half of respondents low in knowledge reported learning about the campaign regularly from late-night, compared to only 20% of the high knowledge group. (Pew
Research Center, 2000). As these statistics are based on self-reported learning, rather
than on a correlation of exposure with actual knowledge gains, they should be
considered measures of perceived rather than actual learning. Nonetheless, the Pew
studies suggest that late-night i s watched more by young people and that the young
and politically uninformed consider late-night to be a valuable source of political
information. To extend Pew's findings and better understand what variables ought to
be held constant when testing for late-night effects, the second question explores the
demographic and sociopolitical characteristics of the late-night audience.
RQ2: Who is in the late-night audience?
The
Psychology of Humor and its Cognitive Implications
Late-night jokes are unlike traditional forms of political information as they require
active audience participation. The incongruity theory of humor posits that since
jokes introduce two incompatible "frames of reference" which the listener must
4 Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic MedidMarch 2004
reconcile by applying the appropriate cognitive rule, listener participation is necessary to construct a joke's meaning (Suls, 1972). To see a joke, Koestler (1 964) writes,
"a listener has to work out by himself what is implied in the laconic hint; he has to
make an imaginative effort to solve the riddle" (Koestler, p. 84), a process he refers
to as interpolation.
The fact that audience participation is required by this process points to important
implications beyond the mere understanding of the joke. Several scholars have
described the process of joke appreciation in terms of cognitive elaboration
(Schmidt, 1994,2001; Wyer & Collins, 1992). Schmidt's experimental studies (1 994,
2001) indicate that memory for sentences and cartoons i s enhanced by the presence
of humor, a finding he attributes to the process of "sustained attention and subsequent elaborative processes" (Schmidt, 2001, p. 31 1) that occurs in the face of
humorous stimuli. According to network models of knowledge and memory (Higgins, 1989; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985), when information i s brought from
long-term into working memory it is said to be "activated." Once activated, constructs are temporarily excited, and through frequent activation become more
accessible and more likely to be used in later judgments (Bargh, Lombardi, &
Higgins, 1988; Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Applying these concepts to the humor
reconciliation process, it would seem that the activation of information to understand
a joke is likely to increase the subsequent accessibility of that piece of information.
Duai process models of attitude formation and change, such as the Elaboration
Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986) suggest that information
processing can be conceptualized as taking a less effortful, peripheral route, or a
more cognitively taxing, central route. According to ELM, the act of centrally
processing a message and elaborating the information presented, increases the
likelihood of recall and long-term attitude change. As the incongruity mechanism in
humor mandates a form of cognitive elaboration on the part of the receiver to bridge
the gap and see the joke, it would seem that recall and even attitude change should
be enhanced as a result.
In addition to these cognitive processes, the repetitiveness of late-night jokes
renders their potential influence quite consequential. As explained by The Daily
Show's John Stewart, audiences need to "know something before [comedians can]
even make a joke about it" (Bettag, 2000). As a result, the candidate portraits
received through late-night jokes highlight just a handful of traits with which viewers
are already familiar. In a content analysis of political jokes made by late-night hosts
from 1996 through 2000, Niven, Lichter, and Amundson (2003) found that most
jokes are directed at the executive branch of government and that "the major
late-night shows exhibit quite similar patterns in choice of targets, the partisan ratio
of targets, and the subject matter of jokes" (Niven et al., p. 130). The study also found
that jokes were predominantly aimed at the personal failings of politicians rather
than public policy. Given the processes involved in understanding humor, it would
follow that high exposure to such repetitive, simplified representations of the
candidates would enhance accessibility, recall, and even persuasion in the direction
Voung/LATE-NIGHT COMEDY
5
of these simplistic representations. Hence, exposure to late-night ought to move
viewers' perceptions of the candidates in the direction of the gist of late-night
candidate jokes. It is important to note that this study i s not a crucial test of the
psychological mechanism underlying this process, but rather is designed to examine
outcomes consistent with these theoretical mechanisms.
HI: Individuals with greater exposure to late-night comedy programs will rate the
candidates more consistently with their caricatured traits over time than individuals
with less exposure to late-night programs, controllingfor demographics (age, gender,
race, and education), political variables (partisanship and political knowledge), and
media use (national news, local news, and newspaper).
Political Knowledge and Partisanship
As discussed earlier, research suggests that politically uninformed individuals
report receiving more information through late-night comedy than individuals with
higher levels of knowledge (Pew Research Center, 2000). Political knowledge has a
notable history as an individual-level variable with the capacity to moderate communication effects (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; McGuire, 1968, 1972; Zaller,
1992). Speaking in terms of general intelligence, McGuire posited that intelligent
individuals are more likely to receive a message, but less likely to yield to it.
Similarly, Zaller argued that the "politically aware," defined as those individuals who
"pay attention to politics and understand what [they] have encountered" (p. 21), are
more likely to be exposed to political messages but are also more likely to exercise
resistance to their persuasive content. Delli Carpini and Keeter suggested that
better-informed citizens have a greater capacity to evaluate political messages, either
to retain the information if it is important or ignore it if it is not. If late-night viewers
are less politically knowledgeable than traditional news viewers, then those viewing
late-night programs may be receiving political information without the knowledge
store to exercise such resistance, and hence may show stronger effects of exposure.
H2: The relationship between late-night exposure and candidate trait ratings is
stronger among those low in political knowledge than among those high in political
knowledge.
Political knowledge has been conceptualized and measured several different ways
by political communication scholars (see Price, 1999). In an attempt to capture the
presence and availability of general political information in long-term memory, Delli
Carpini and Keeter (1 996) and Zaller (1 992) tested individuals' civics knowledge and
knowledge of national political parties and leaders. In contrast, hoping to capture
knowledge gains throughout the course of a campaign, Patterson and McClure
(1 976) measured political campaign information by testing knowledge of presidential candidates' stands on various political issues. In general, these different measures
are highly correlated (Price, 1999) but they do capture distinct knowledge constructs,
with one's understanding of civics knowledge likely stored in long-term memory,
6
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic MedidMarch 2004
and one‘s knowledge of presidential candidates increasing throughout a campaign,
hence representing newly acquired information. An additional research question
addressed by these analyses concerns how different types of political knowledge
might vary in the extent to which they moderate late-night effects.
RQ3: Do the moderating effects of a) political knowledge measures designed to
capture the availability of general political knowledge in long-term memory differ
from b) political knowledge measures that include constructs that have likely been
acquired more recently?
Research in the area of priming and agenda setting suggests that partisanship
mitigates media effects (lyengar & Kinder, 1987; McLeod, Becker, & Byrnes, 1974,
a phenomenon which might be explained by the enhanced accessibility of partisan
attitudes that accompanies strong partisanship, leading to outcomes like selective
perception and stronger attitude-behavior relationships (Fazio & Williams, 1986).
Partisanship has been found to play several mediating roles in the context of the
Elaboration Likelihood Model. One such role is to foster biasedprocessing (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986). In this capacity, strong partisans with accessible attitudes and
extensive attitude-relevant knowledge may be better versed in their own belief
systems, and hence more likely to generate favorable cognitive responses to messages consistent with their opinion, and unfavorable responses to messages that
contradict that opinion. This phenomenon might explain past findings in humor
research indicating that people find jokes disparaging their own reference group less
humorous than jokes disparaging others’ reference groups (La Fave, Haddad &
Maesen, 1976; Priest, 1966; Weise, 1996). I would argue that the attitude-specific
knowledge and enhanced attitude accessibility accompanying strong partisanship
foster biased processing of political jokes, resulting in strong Democrats rating Bush
(R) more consistently with late-night content than Republicans, and strong Republicans rating Gore (D) more consistently with late-night content than Democrats as
late-night exposure increases.
H3: Strong Democrats will rate Bush (R) more consistently with late-night content
than Republicans; and strong Republicans will rate Gore (D) more consistently with
late-night content than Democrats as late-night exposure increases.
Late-Night Joke Content Analysis
Methods
To determine which aspects of Gore and Bush’s personalities were caricatured
most in late-night content, a content analysis of late-night candidate jokes was
completed using the late-night data base maintained by the Center for Media and
Public Affairs, a nonprofit organization that tracks media coverage of politics and
social issues. The sample includes texts of all Len0 and Letterman jokes about Bush
and Gore made from January 1 through November 30, 2000.
YounglLATE-NIGHT COMEDY 7
Coding scheme. The coding scheme consisted of a Bush variable and a Gore
variable, each with 13 mutually exclusive categories, including 12 caricature
categories and one "other" category' (see Appendix A). Categories were based on a
preliminary qualitative analysis of late-night jokes by the author. Each joke was
allowed one code per candidate. If a joke mentioned more than one trait of a
particular candidate, only the first trait mentioned received a code, hence forcing
mutual exclusivity on the categories. While some episodes were rerun, each joke
was coded only once.
The reliability of the coding scheme was tested between the author and a trained
graduate student coder. Before coding, the author trained the graduate student in the
details of the coding scheme, after which the author and student coder independently coded a random sample of 35 jokes, obtaining a Cohen's kappa of .74 for
Gore caricatures and .67 for Bush caricatures. After a second meeting to clarify areas
of systematic disagreement, they each independently coded a second random
sample of 35 jokes, obtaining a Cohen's kappa of .81 for the Bush caricatures and .93
for the Gore caricatures. When a joke mentioned only one candidate, the other
candidate variable was assigned a zero. Zeros were excluded before running
reliability estimates.
Consistent with Niven et al.'s (2003) observations, the results of the content
analysis (see Table 1 ) indicate that most late-night jokes focused on the personal
failings of the candidates, and were quite consistent across both programs. Jokes
about Gore as stiff and dull were the most frequent Gore jokes made by both hosts,
contributing 20% of the Gore jokes made by Len0 and 17% of the Gore jokes made
by Letterman. Jokes painting Bush as unintelligent were the most common in both
programs, contributing 24% of the Bush jokes made by Len0 and 34% of the Bush
jokes made by Letterman. Overall, Letterman made half as many candidate jokes as
Leno. There were 521 jokes made about Bush, 177 by Letterman, 344 by Leno; and
383 jokes made about Gore, I21 by Letterman and 262 by Leno.
In addition to the boring-Gore and stupid-Bush caricatures, Gore's honesty and
Bush's stand on the death penalty both received attention from late-night hosts. Jokes
about Gore's tendency to exaggerate (14% of all Gore jokes), reinvent himself (7%)
and engage in illegal fundraising practices (7%) all centered on questions of Gore's
honesty. Meanwhile 17% of all Bush jokes raised the issue of his stand on the death
penalty. It seems that while Niven et al. (2003) are correct in their observation that
late-night jokes focus more on personality than public policy, their contention that
"late-night humor i s determinedly non-issue oriented" (p. 130) is slightly complicated by the finding that Bush's death penalty position received considerable
attention in 2000. In contrast, however, it is interesting to note that policy rarely
emerged in Gore jokes, with only 2% of Gore jokes mentioning his stand on the
environment.
8
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic MedidMarch 2004
Table 1
Results of late-Night Joke Content Analysis
Bush
Total
Percent
Gore
Total
Percent
IntelIigence
Death penalty
Drugs
Alcohol
Other
Swearing
Foreign affairs
Malapropisms
Failing campaign
Silver spoon
Smirk
Friend of the rich
Florida
142
82
60
48
47
35
27
22
12
10
4
3
2
28.74
16.60
12.15
9.72
9.50
7.09
5.47
4.45
2.43
2.02
.81
.61
.40
Stiff/boring/robotic
Exaggerator
Other
DNC kiss
Failing campaign
Reinvents himself
Illegal fundraising
Makeup
Florida
Aggressivdrude
Lieberman
Environment
Silver spoon
71
49
45
40
29
25
24
23
21
13
8
7
4
19.78
13.65
12.53
11.10
8.08
6.96
6.69
6.40
5.85
3.62
2.22
1.95
1.11
TOTAL
494
100.00
359
100.00
TOTAL
Note. For descriptions of caricature categories see Appendix A.
Again, the candidate personality traits most frequently caricatured in late-night
content were Bush’s intelligence, Gore’s stiff appearance and dull personality, and
Gore’s tendency to exaggerate or lie5. The dependent variables in the final section of
the manuscript were selected to correspond with each candidate’s most caricatured
trait(s). Hence, these analyses assume that knowledgeability reflects Bush’s intelligence, inspiringness reflects Gore’s stiff appearance and dull personality, and
honesty captures Gore‘s image as an exaggerator or liar. Though one might argue
that these traits are not identical to the caricatures portrayed in the jokes, the data
limits the investigation to these variables.
The Predictors and Effects of Late-Night Exposure
Methods
Survey data from the Electronic Dialogue 2000 project, designed to assess the role of
electronic discussion during the 2000 presidential election, was used to assess the
predictors of late-night exposure (RQ2) and to test the three causal hypotheses (Hl, H2,
and H3). In February 2000, a random sample of American citizens 18 and older ( N =
3967) was selected from a nationally representative sample of respondents maintained
by Knowledge Networks, Inc., of Menlo Park, California. The sample included households that had agreed to accept free WebTV equipment and service in exchange for
YoungAATE-NIGHT COMEDY
9
completing surveys online. Participants were invited either to discuss politics online and
complete monthly surveys (discussants), complete monthly surveys but not discuss
politics online (control), or complete the baseline and final surveys only (set aside).
Comparisons were made to be certain that late-night exposure was not confounded with
experimental manipulations or group-level characteristics.
Measures
Late-night comedy exposure was obtained on the September survey (in the field
from August 25-September 4,2000) from 64% of the discussants (N = 580) and 63%
of the control group (N = 88) due to panel attrition over the course of the project.
Respondents were asked, "Do you happen to watch any of the following entertainment programs on television?" followed by a list of programs including Jay Len0 and
David Letterman. The options were: "NO" (Coded as 0), "Yes, but not very often"
and "Yes, much of the time" (Coded as 2). Late-night exposure i s the
(Coded as l),
sum of Leno and Letterman viewing. While literature indicates that a combined
index of exposure and attention is a superior measure of reception compared to
exposure alone (Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986; McLeod & McDonald, 19851, this
analysis is limited to the measures available, and hence only self-reported exposure
i s used. Almost half of the sample (48%) reported not watching either program, and
about one-third reported watching either program, but not very often. Less than one
in ten respondents reported watching Leno or Letterman much of the time.
Full political knowledgewas measured by combining three knowledge scales and
was calculated as the percent correct for respondentswith valid responses on at least
12 of the 24 items. Correct answers were coded one and incorrect answers were
coded zero. (For a complete list of items, see Appendix B.) The first battery consisted
of seven questions regarding the candidates' backgrounds (four Democrat, three
Republican). The second consisted of seven questions about the candidates' issue
positions (four Democrat, three Republican) similar to Patterson and McClure's
(1976) measure of candidate issue knowledge. The third battery consisted of 10
civics knowledge questions, similar to Delli Carpini and Keeter's (1996) and Zaller's
(1992) political knowledge scales. The three batteries were combined into one full
knowledge battery, with values ranging from 0-1, and with a Cronbach's a of 32.
Civics knowledge was measured with 10 civics knowledge items (same as the
civics knowledge component of the full political knowledge measure described
above). The measure was calculated as the proportion correct for subjects with at
least 5 out of 10 valid responses and a Cronbach's a of 31. For item details, see
civics knowledge under Appendix B.
Partisanship was obtained on the baseline survey in February. The scale ranges
from 1 to 7 where 1 is strong Republican, 7 i s strong Democrat, and 4 independent.
Evaluations of candidate traits were obtained from closed-ended questions. The
July measure was obtained on a survey in the field from June 24 through July 19, and
10 Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic MedidMarch 2004
the October measure from October 7 through October 18. Respondents were asked
how well various traits described the candidates. The traits-inspiring, knowledgeable, and honest-were issued in randomized order. Options were: Extremely well
(3), quite well (2), not too well (I), and not well at all (0). These analyses use Bush‘s
knowledgeable rating and Gore’s inspiring and honesty ratings to correspond with
their late-night caricatures. Changes in trait ratings from July to October were
calculated by subtracting the ]uly rating from the October rating. Of those subjects
with valid late-night exposure measures, 41 6 also had valid July to October change
scores.
Analytical Procedure
To determine who is in the late-night audience and hence what variables ought to
be controlled when testing for late-night’s potential influence (RQ2), a regression
model was run using predictors obtained on the February baseline survey to predict
late-night exposure. Predictors included: age, gender (male = 1, female = O), race
(white = 1, other = O), years of education, student (student = 1, non-student = O),
partisanship (1 = strong Republican, 7 = strong Democrat), political efficacy3,
cynicism4, follow politics (1 = never, 5 = almost all the time), full political
knowledge (discussed above), and days in the past week respondent watched
national news, local news, cable news, read the newspaper, and listened to political
talk radio. Results are illustrated in Table 2.
The relationship between late-night exposure and trait ratings (H1) was estimated
using simultaneous OLS regression with listwise deletion. The dependent variables
were changes in trait ratings from July to October. If a direct effect of late-night
exposure were taking place, exposure would be a significant predictor in the models.
For instance, if exposure to late-night were associated with decreases in Gore’s
inspiring rating from July to October, a significant negative coefficient of late-night
exposure should be found. The control variables included in the models were based
on previous literature and on the results of RQ2. They include age, gender, race,
education, partisanship, political knowledge, national and local news exposure, and
newspaper reading. The results of the models testing H1 are illustrated in Model 1 in
Tables 3 (Bush knowledgeable), 4 (Gore honest), and 5 (Gore inspiring).
To assess the extent to which late-night’s influence on trait ratings was contingent
upon the Partisanship of the viewer, the product of partisanship and late-night
exposure was added to the models. Interaction terms assess nonlinear relationships
in which the effects of one predictor variable on the dependent variable depend
upon the level of some third predictor. For instance, if the effects of late-night on trait
ratings depend upon a viewer’s partisanship, the product term (late-night * partisanship) will be significant. To reduce problems posed by multicolinearity (when two
predictors in a model are so highly correlated that they inflate standard errors and
mask significant relationships) product terms were centered by subtracting their
means (Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller, & Nizam, 1998).
Young/LATE-NIGHT COMEDY
11
Once an interaction term is added to a model, the main effects (representedby the
coefficient of either variable involved), illustrate each variable's effect on the
dependent variable when the other is zero. Hence, the coefficient of late-night in a
model that includes late-night * partisanship represents the effect of late-night on
change in trait rating when partisanship is zero. As partisanship ranges from one to
seven, this main effect i s not interpretable. To interpret the statistically significant
interaction terms, predictor variables were set at their means and various levels of
late-night and partisanship were substituted into the equations. Doing so produces
predicted trait rating change scores for subjects with different combinations of
partisanship and late-night exposure. The results of H3 are illustrated in Model 2 in
Tables 3, 4, and 5.
The extent to which late-night's effects were contingent upon the full political
knowledge of the subject was tested by adding a product term (late-night * full
political knowledge) to the original model (Model 3 in the tables). If H2 were correct,
the interaction of full political knowledge and late-night would be significant such
that the relationship between late-night and trait ratings would be stronger and more
consistent with the caricatured depiction among individuals lower in knowledge.
To explore how different forms of political knowledge interact with late-night in
affecting trait ratings (RQ3), a fourth set of models added the product of late-night *
civics knowledge. If H2 were correct, the interaction of civics knowledge and
late-night would be significant such that the relationship between late-night and
change in trait ratings would be stronger and more consistent with the caricatured
depiction among those lower in civics knowledge. If civics knowledge (designed to
capture availability of political information in long-term memory) provides a stronger
defense against the influence of late-night than knowledge of candidate issue stands,
biographies, and civics knowledge (which includes more recently acquired information), then the coefficient of civics knowledge * late-night will be stronger than the
coefficient of full political knowledge * late-night.
ResuIts
While the coefficients in Table 2 do not suggest that full political knowledge was
a significant predictor of late-night exposure, they do corroborate the Pew finding
(2000, 2002) that younger people are more likely to tune into late-night than older
people. The relationship between political knowledge and late-night that emerged in
Pew's 2000 study (which i s not found in these data) can likely be attributed to the fact
that their dependent measure was not exposure, but perceived learning from
late-night, arguably a different construct altogether. According to Table 2, other
significant predictors of late-night exposure were local news exposure, newspaper
reading, and to a lesser extent, national news exposure. While one might explain the
positive correlation between local news and late-night as an audience carry-over
effect between the 11:OO p.m. news and the 11:30 p.m. airing of Len0 and
12
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic MedidMarch 2004
Table 2
OLS Regression Predicting late-Night Comedy Exposure ( N = 577)
B
SE B
(Constant)
Demographic variables
1.68
0.41
Age
Gender
Race
Education
Student
Political variables
Partisanship
Efficacy
Cynicism
Follow politics
Full political knowledge
Media use variables
National news exposure
Local news exposure
Cable news exposure
Newspaper reading
Political talk radio exposure
-.01
.oo
-.03
Predictor
- .04
.09
.13
- .04
.03
.03
.20
- .02
.05
-.I6
.02
-.03
.05
,
.04
.05
.01
.04
.02
.05
.18
.05
.30
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
P
-.20***
-.02
-.02
-.07
.01
-.04
.04
- .04
- .03
.01
.1 O#
.12*
.03
.lo*
.05
Note. Adjusted R2 = .05. ***p< ,001, **p < .01, *p < .05, #p < .l.
Letterman, it i s more difficult to explain the correlation between newspaper reading
and late-night. Perhaps both items capture general media use.
As illustrated in Tables 3, 4, and 5, in none of the regression models is late-night alone
a significant predictor of change in trait ratings, suggesting that late-night did not directly
affect perceptionsof Bush and Gore in terms of their caricatured traits. Turning to H2, it
appears that the extent to which late-night was associated with changes in Gore's
inspiring rating varied with the political knowledge level of the viewer (see Table 5). This
finding emerged both when using the full political knowledge scale and the civics
knowledge scale alone. Although the coefficient of the civics knowledge interaction is
slightly larger than that of the full political knowledge interaction, in general, the two
measures of knowledge perform quite similarly as moderators of this effect (RQ3).
Figure 1 illustrates the interaction with the full knowledge battery, indicating that
subjects with various levels of political knowledge and no late-night exposure were
similar in their change from July to October in how inspiring they found Gore,
increasing an average of about .I 7 on the 4 point scale. When late-night exposure
was high, on the other hand, the low knowledge respondents' inspiring ratings of
Gore did not experience that positive shift over time, but rather stayed the same,
YoungLATE-NIGHT COMEDY
13
Table 3
0 1 s Regression Predicting Changes in Knowledge Ratings of Bush from July to
October
Model 1
p
B (SE B)
(Constant)
Demographics
Age
.32
(.35)
Race
Education
Political variables
Partisanship
Political knowledge”
p
B (SE 8)
Model 3
p
B (SE B)
.26
(.35)
.oo
.oo
(.OW
Gender
Model 2
.oo
.oo
.oo
.oo
-.01
-.01
.oo
(.OB)
-.12
-.05
(.W
-.02
-.05
(.02)
-.lo
-.05
(.I2)
-.02
-.04
(.02)
- .05
-.05
-.14**
(.02)
.17
.04
-.04
-.13*
(.02)
.20
.05
(.08)
-.05
Local news
Newspaper
Late-night
.01
(.02)
.03
-.04
-.01
(.02)
.01
(.02)
.oo
.05
.oo
(.04
lnteraction terms
Late-night X
Partisanship
Late-night x
Full knowledge
Late-night X
Civics knowledge
Adjusted R2
N
.01
(.02)
-.14**
.04
.02
-.03
-.01
(.02)
.01
(.02)
.oo
.oo
-.01
LOO)
-.02
(.08)
-.12
-.06
(.I 2)
-.03
-.08
-.03
(.02)
(.24)
Media use
National news
p
B (SE B)
.37
(.35)
LOO)
-.01
Model 4a
.03
-.04
.04
,05
.oo
.oo
(.04)
-.04
-.13*
(.02)
.36
.12*
(.18)
.oo .02
(.02
-.03
-.01
(.02)
.01
.03
(.02)
.oo
.oo
(.W
-
.04
.13*
-
-
-
-
-
(.02)
-
-
.01
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
.oo
389
.01
389
.oo
389
-.08
-.03
(.I 6 )
.01
391
Note. ***p< ,001, **p< .01, *p < .05, #p < . l . lnteraction terms are centered by subtracting
means.
Model 4, political knowledge is civics knowledge.
moving -.03from July to October. Meanwhile, the high knowledge, avid late-night
viewers found Gore slightly more inspiring over time, increasing about .19 on the 4point scale. As the interpretation of the interaction with civics knowledge produces
a graph almost identical to the interaction with full political knowledge, only the
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic MedidMarch 2004
14
Table 4
01s Regression Predicting Changes in Honesty Ratings of Gore from July to
October
Model 1
B (SE B)
(Constant)
.08
(.37)
p
Model 2
p
B (SE B)
Model 3
p
B (SE B)
Model 4"
( SEB)
p
.OO
.03
.06
(.37)
Demographics
.03
.02
Age
(.OO)
Gender
.04
.05
Race
.02
.02
-.07
Education
-.07
.06
(.08)
.06
.04
.03
-.03
-.07
(.03)
Political variables
.I 7**
Partisanship
-.01
Political
knowledge"
Media use
National news
.06
.16**
-.01
-.04
(.26)
.04
.04
.I 7***
.06
(.02)
.03
(.I%
.01
.03
.O1
03.2)
.02
.03
Local news
.03
.O1
(.02)
- .03
Newspaper
-.03
-.04
-.01
(.02)
-.06
Late-night
-.07
- .07
-.05
(.04)
Interaction terms
Late-night x
Partisanship
Late-night X
Full knowledge
Late-night x
Civics knowledge
.06
-
-
-
-
.06
Adjusted R2
.01
.01
.01
.01
N
390
390
390
392
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, * p < .05, #p < . I . Interaction terms are centered by subtracting
means.
Model 4, political knowledge is civics knowledge.
interaction with the full knowledge scale i s represented graphically. These findings
are consistent with H2 as subjects low in knowledge (whether measured exclusively
by civics knowledge, or as a combined index with biographical, issue, and civics
knowledge) shifted in a direction more consistent with late-night content than did
Young/LATE-NIGHT COMEDY
15
Table 5
0 1 s Regression Predicting Changes in Inspiring Ratings of Gore from July to
October
Model 1
p
B(SEB)
(Constant)
Demographics
Age
Model 2
-.27
(.36)
-.30
(.36)
.oo
-.06
.oo
-.08
-.04
LOO)
-.05
-.04
Loa)
(.08)
Race
Education
-.03
-.01
.02
(.02)
.05
p
B(SEB)
Model 4"
p
B (SEE)
-.38
(.36)
-.08
(.OO)
Gender
p
B (SE 6)
Model 3
-.04
-.02
(.la
.05
.02
(.02)
.OO -.07
(.OO)
-.05
-.04
(.08)
-.03
-.01
-.07
- .04
-.01
.03
(.02)
.06
.05
.06
(.02)
.26
.17***
.I 7***
Political variables
Partisanship
Political
knowledge"
Media use
National news
Local news
.16**
.05
(.02)
.24
.24
.06
(.24)
.02
(.02)
.08
-.02
-.01
(.02)
Newspaper
Late-night
lnferaction ferms
Late-night x
Partisanship
Late-night X
Full knowledge
Late-night x
Civics knowledge
Adjusted RZ
N
.oo .01
(.02)
-.05
-.03
(.04)
-
-
-
-
-
-
.02
390
.16**
.05
(.02)
.23
.05
(24)
.02
(.02)
.08
-.03
-.01
.01
(.02)
-.05
-.04
(.04)
-.05
-.02
(.02)
-
-
.02
390
.08
(.la)
.07
.07
.02
-.03
-.01
-.04
(.02)
(.02)
.oo
.06
(24)
.oo .01
(.02)
-.05
-.06
(.04)
-
.oo
- .05
-
.44
(.22)
.03
390
.lo*
-
.12*
.03
392
Note. ***p< ,001, **p< .01, *p < .05, # p < .1. Interaction terms are centered by subtracting
means.
Model 4, political knowledge is civics knowledge.
high knowledge viewers. It is important to note that this effect i s indeed small, and
was not found with Bush's knowledgeability or Gore's honesty ratings.
Hypothesis three posited that the effects of late-night exposure would be stronger
among strong partisans of the opposite party of the candidate being judged. This
16
Journal of Broadcasting& Electronic MedidMarch 2004
Figure 1
Gore's inspiring rating: The interaction of full political knowledge
and latenight exposure
+Low
knowledge
-Medium
knowledge
- A -High
knowledge
None
Moderate
High
Late-night
Note. Late-night's effects on Gore's inspiring rating are contingent on the level of full political
knowledge of the respondent. Consistent with H2, subjects high in knowledge do not vary
much in their rating of Gore with increased late-night exposure. Low knowledge subjects,
however, rate Gore as less inspiring as their level of late-night exposure increases. Results of the
civics knowledge * late-night interaction shown in Model 4 of Table 5 also follow this pattern.
hypothesis is complicated by these findings. The interaction of partisanship and
late-night is only significant in the model predicting changes in Bush's knowledgeability rating (see Table 3). When the product term i s interpreted, the pattern that
emerges does not support H3, but instead shows strong Democrats and strong
Republicans with similar changes in their judgments of Bush at higher levels of
exposure to late-night. Among those subjects who did not watch late-night, Democrats rated Bush less knowledgeable over time- and Republicans rated him more
knowledgeable over time. But partisans who were high consumers of late-night
appeared identical in the extent to which their ratings of Bush's knowledgeability
changed from July to October. They shifted only slightly compared to their nonviewing cohorts, with a net change of -.04 (see Figure 2).
Discussion
In 2000, Len0 and Letterman defined Gore and Bush's caricatures along simple
one-dimensional lines. Gore was the cardboard cut-out, programmable exaggerator
who wanted credit for everything. Bush was the guy who partied a little too hard in
college, the underachiever whose genius was less than stellar. While these themes
were consistent across both programs and repeated regularly throughout the cam-
YoungLATE-NIGHT COMEDY
17
Figure 2
Bush’s knowledgeable rating:
The interaction of partisanship and late-night exposure
-Q z
0.301
I
Q)
gs
g
Q)
0.20
e T: 0.00
x =:
J E
- + -Republicans
- +,
0.10
z o
0
-s-
L
Moderates
-0.10
m o
-0.40
None
Moderate
High
Late-night
Note. Late-night’s effects on Bush‘s knowledgeability rating are contingent on partisanship.
Democrats with high exposure to late-night are less critical of Bush’s knowledgeability over
time than Democrats with no exposure to late-night. Republicans with high exposure to
late-night do not experience the increases in Bush’s knowledgeability ratings over time
illustrated by non-viewing Republicans.
paign, any direct effects they might have exerted on public opinion are too small in
magnitude to find in the data, if they exist at all. In spite of the elaborate mechanism
proposed and the selection of dependent variables based on actual late-night
content, these data do not provide evidence of a direct effect of late-night viewing on
perceptions of political candidates. While it is possible that the impact of exposure
to late-night on public opinion occurred prior to July, and hence i s not captured by
the models, the low frequency of candidate jokes made in early 2000 suggests that
such an explanation i s quite improbable.
These findings do support the contention that viewers of different political affiliations and with different levels of political knowledge (whether measured as civics
knowledge or as a combination of candidate issue, biography and civics knowledge)
may experience distinct effects of late-night exposure. However, these trends do not
translate across candidates or across personality traits being judged. Rather, the
moderating roles of partisanship and political knowledge in the late-night effects
process appear to be both candidate and attitude-specific, a finding which complicates the proposed psychological mechanism.
Also, while political knowledge may hinder the influence of late-night exposure in
18
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media/March 2004
certain contexts (judgments of Gore’s inspiringness) consistent with H1, partisanship
does not appear to foster the biased processing that would result in party members
judging the opposing party’s candidate more consistently with late-night caricatures.
Instead, the trend that emerges is reminiscent of a mainstreaming effect (Gerbner,
Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1980), as heavy exposure erodes differences between
Democrats and Republicans in their candidate evaluations. Perhaps this trend
operates as a function of late-night exposure, or perhaps late-night i s confounded
with general media use, and general media use is responsible for the relationship.
Although no similar trend was found in the Gore models, future studies might benefit
from measuring general media use as well as late-night exposure to separate out
these effects.
There are numerous limitations that complicate these analyses. The first is posed
by panel attrition over the course of this highly political project, illustrated by the N
of 389 and 390 in the models; likely leaving us with a sample higher in higher
political interest and sophistication than the average subject. Second, the Electronic
Dialogue study, in which individuals were completing political surveys and/or
discussing politics throughout the campaign, renders these circumstances quite
unique. Third, as discussed in the measurement section, the key measure intended to
capture reception of late-night content only includes three levels of exposure and
ignores the role of attention to political information in late-night. It is impossible to
say what impact these factors may have had, but future studies ought to maximize
external and construct validity in a way that was not done here.
Future research ought to address the cognitive consequences of late-night exposure posited to occur through humor reconciliation, including enhanced recall,
salience, and persuasion. As the moderating roles of partisanship and political
knowledge may vary by candidate and by the kinds of judgments being made, a
detailed psychological mechanism to account for these variations is essential. In
addition, the use of experiments would enable the humorous texts to be crafted with
a desired outcome in mind, thereby establishing a closer link between content and
effect. While such studies lack in external validity, they are necessary to understand
the psychological channels through which humor might shape opinion. Finally,
given late-night‘s unique audience and the potential moderating effects of such
constructs as political knowledge and partisanship, individual differences ought to
play a prominent role in future studies of the effects of exposure to late-night comedy
programming.
How should political communication scholars assess the effects of late-night
humor in the campaign environment when its impact is diffused through other
sources, such as news magazines and morning programs (Jamieson & Waldman,
2003)? Niven et al. (2003) recently found that the tone of news stories parallels the
tone of late-night jokes when tracked over time. But should scholars assume that
news influences joke content or vice versa? One of the most important, albeit
discouraging, lessons to be learned through this exercise i s how the complexity of the
campaign environment complicates the analysis of late-night humor’s effects. Even
Young/LATE-NICHT COMEDY
19
including exposure to late-night programming in a model with extensive control
variables leaves one wondering, "What is left?" Once the effects of two sources of
information are "untied," hasn't one lost the very synergy that might make them
interesting? These are the questions that will haunt researchers in the realm of
entertainment and politics, particularly since the question of whether art imitates life
or life imitates art remains unanswered. Until it has been answered - and until the
debate between journalists, politicians, and comedians over the impact of political
humor has come to a close -scholars ought to pursue experimental studies to assess
underlying psychological processes involved, as well as macro-level analyses to
track late-night content, its coverage in traditional media, and simultaneous shifts in
public opinion.
Appendix A:
Coding Scheme for late-night Jokes
Bush Codes. 1) Malapropisms: Bush's speaking abilities, excludingjokes that refer to his verbal competence
in matters of foreign affairs, which are included under "Foreign affairs." (Letterman 9/14/00: GeorgeW. Bush
said he would've loved to be on the show, unfortunatelyhe was uniminavalable.) 2) Foreign affairs: Bush's
lack of knowledge in foreign affairs, the location of foreign countries and names of leaders. (Letterman
1/03/00: Boris Yeltsin's top ten New Year's resolutions:Wear a Hello My Name Is tag if he meets Bush.) 3)
Intelligence: includes jokes that do not fit into the categories above, but comment upon Bush's lack of
knowledge, or implied stupidity. (Leno 2/01/00: After the polls closed, networks declared McCain a big
winner in New Hampshire. I guess this is the biggest setback for George Bush since he took his SATs.) 4)
Alcohol: Bush's drinking problem, including references to his "party guy" past, unless they refer specifically
to drugs, in which case go in the "drug" category. 5) Drugs: Bush's drug history (stated or implied). Also
includes jokes suggesting that Bush cannot remember his college years. 6) Smirk Bush's smirk. 7) Friendof
the rich: Bush policy helping only the wealthy. 8) Silver spoon: Bush's comfortable upbringing and use of
father's name to obtain power. 9) Failing campaign: Bush's likely defeat and failing campaign. 10) Death
penaly. Bush's position on the death penalty. 11) Swearing Bush calling the New York Timer: Adam Clymer
a "major league asshole." 12) Florida: Post November 7'h references to Bush assuming that he is president
before the race has been called. 13) Oh
fe?'
Gore Codes: 1) Stiffiboring/robotic Gore's stiff, boring persona or stiff mannequin-likeappearance. (Leno
2/10/00: Computer hackers have been attackingWeb sites all week. -computer hackers actually shut down
AI Gore for two hours.) 2) Reinvents himself: Gore's changing personality and willingness to do or say
anything to get elected. (Letterman 3/09/00: And [Gorel changes with the wind. He's a clever politician, man.
Did you see him when he did the debate at the Apollo theater in Harlem?He was really trying to kiss up to
the crowd. He goes. . . (As Gore): "My homies will give their propers.") 3) Exaggerator: Includes Gore's
"misstatements" during the debates, and the notion that he invented the Internet. 4) Makeup: Gore's makeup
on stage at the DNC and the debates. 5) DNC Kiss: Tipper and Gore's kiss at the DNC and their inability to
keep their hands off of each other. 6) Environmental fanatic Gore's position on global warming and
reputation as a tree-hugger. 7) Rude debate etiquettdaggressive: Gore's aggressive behavior during the
debates, or elsewhere (E.g., references to Gore trying to be alpha male). References to the differences in
Gore's demeanor between debates falls under "Reinvents himself." 8) Silver spoon: Gore's comfortable
upbringing and use of his father's name or influence to obtain power. 9) Failing campaign: Gore's likely
defeat and failing campaign, exceptwhen the joke referencesFlorida. Jokesmade after Nov 7Lh,are included
under "Florida." 10) Lieberman: Joe Lieberman as a strategic choice, or references to Lieberman's religion.
11) //legal Fundraising Gore's Buddhist monk incident and campaign contributions from overseas. 12)
Florida: Gore's reluctance to "let go" of the election. 13)0the?
Appendix B:
Knowledge Batteries
Political knowledge. Each question was followed by randomized options. (In the case of biographies and
issue positions, AI Gore and Bill Bradley were the Democratic options, and George W. Bush and John
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic MedidMarch 2004
20
McCain were the Republican options.) "Full political knowledge" includes all 24 items and "civic knowledge'' includes only the 10 civics knowledge items.
Candidate Biographies: 1) Thinking about the Democrats, to the best of your knowledgewho a) Was a
professional basketball player (Bradley); b) Is the son of a former United States Senator (Core); c) Voted for
tax cuts proposed by President Reagan in 1981 (Bradley); d) Served in the United States Senate (Both). 2)
Thinking about the RepublicansUohn McCain and George W. Bush), to the best of your knowledge, who a)
Is a state governor (Bush); b) Is a United States Senator (McCain); c) Was a prisoner of war in Vietnam
(McCain).
Candidate lssue Positions: 1 ) Thinking about Democrats, to the best of your knowledge, who a) Supports
a universal health care program (Bradley); b) Favors increased government funding of political campaigns
(Bradley); c) Favors giving patients the right to sue their HMO (Both); d) Favors tax-free savings accounts to
help parents pay for college (Core). 2) Thinking about Republicans, to the best of your knowledge, who a)
Supports giving tax credits or vouchers to people who send their children to private schools (Both); b) Has
pledgedto cut federal income taxes by over $1 trillion in ten years (Bush); c) Supports a ban on soft money
campaign contributions (McCain).
Civics Knowledge: 1) Which one of the parties is more conservative than the other at the national level?
[Democrats, Republicans, DK] 2) Which one of the parties has the most members in the House of
Representatives in Washington?[Democrats, Republicans, DKI 3) Which one of the parties has the most
members in the U.S. Senate?[Democrats, Republicans, DKI 4) Who has the final responsibilityto decide if
a law is Constitutionalor not?[President, Congress, SupremeCourt, DK] 5 ) Which one of the following is the
main duty of Congress?[Write legislation; Administer the President's policies; Watch over the governments
of each state; DK] 6) Whose responsibilityis it to nominatejudges to the Federal Courts?[President, Congress,
Supreme Court, DK] 7) How much of a majority is needed for the U.S. Senate and House to override a
presidentialveto? [Bare majority (one more than half the votes), Two-thirds majority, Three-fourths majority,
DK] 8) Do you happen to know what job or political office is currently held by AI Gore?[U.S. Senator, US.
Vice President, Governor of Tennessee, DK] 9) What job or political office is currently held by Trent Lott?
[US. Senator, US. Ambassador to the United Nations, Chieflustice of the US. Supreme Court, DK] 10) What
job or political office is currently held by William Rehnquist?[U.S. Senator, US. Ambassador to the United
Nations, Chief Justiceof the U.S. Supreme Court, DKI
Notes
'
The "RATS" controversy refers to a political ad made by the Bush campaign in which the
word "RATS" flashed on the screen. Republicans argued it was part of the word "DEMOCRATS," while Democrats argued that the Bush campaign was engaging in subliminal advertising.
* The thirteenth "other" category consisted of jokes that either a) tapped into something
mentioned less than three times throughout the campaign, orb) mentioned the candidate in the
text, but did not make fun of him. For example, "Last Sunday [Gore] was in Washington at a
gay rights rally and spoke out in favor of gay rights. Yesterday, at the Atlanta YMCA, he unveiled
his new crime plan, calling for more police. Gore said if elected president, his top priority
would be to add a second cop to the village people."
The scale averages three items regarding whether the respondent has any say in what the
government does, whether public officials care what the respondent thinks, and whether
politics i s too complicated for the respondent (1 -5 scale where 5 is high efficacy, Alpha = ,636).
The scale averages 5 items about trust in government, what the candidates talk about, if
candidates tell the truth, how the candidates usually vote, and how honest the candidates are
with the electorate (each item is coded 0-1 where 1 is the cynical response, Alpha = .57).
While Bush's stand on the death penalty received considerable attention from late-night
hosts, these analyses are limited to perception of candidates' personality traits.
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