“Ethnic Context and Immigration Policy Preferences among Latinos and Anglos”
Contact author: Rene R. Rocha
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
The University of Iowa
341 Schaeffer Hall
Iowa City, Iowa 52242
(319) 335-2528
rene-rocha@uiowa.edu
Thomas Longoria
Texas Tech University
Robert D. Wrinkle
University of Texas, Pan American
Benjamin R. Knoll
Centre College
Jerry L. Polinard
University of Texas, Pan American
James Wenzel
University of Texas, Pan American
Abstract
Objective. We examine how the immigration policy preferences of Anglos and Latinos vary
according to ethnic context. Specifically, we hypothesize that immigration policy attitudes are a
product of both Latino immigrant and Latino native-born group size. In contrast to previous
work which found that Latinos and Anglos react to contextual forces in an identical manner, we
argue that Latino group size produces opposite reactions for Anglos and Latinos. Methods. These
hypotheses are tested using an original state-wide survey of Anglos and Latinos in Texas
conducted during 2006 which is supplemented with data from the 2000 census. Results. Our
findings show that residing in a heavily Latino area produces more liberal immigration attitudes
among Latinos and more conservative attitudes among Anglos. However, this result is driven not
by the size of the foreign-born Latino population, but rather the size of the native-born Latino
population. Conclusion. Anti-immigrant sentiments among Anglos appear to result, at least in
part, from ethnic concerns.
CITATION: Rene R. Rocha, Thomas Longoria, Robert D. Wrinkle, Benjamin R. Knoll, J.L.
Polinard, and James P. Wenzel. 2011. “Ethnic Context and Immigration Policy Preferences
among Latinos and Anglos.” Forthcoming: Social Science Quarterly.
1
“Ethnic Context and Immigration Policy Preferences among Latinos and Anglos”
Immigration policy has emerged as a salient issue in American political discourse over
the past several years. Even with the endorsement and strong backing of President George W.
Bush, the U.S. Congress failed twice in as many years (2006 and 2007) to come to a compromise
on proposed immigration reform measures. Immigration reform also turned out to be a
significant issue in the 2008 presidential primary campaign, although it was eclipsed by the
economic crisis during the 2008 general election campaign. With the recent passage of SB1070
in Arizona in 2010, immigration reform has again been placed on the national political agenda.
Thus, research investigating the determinants of attitudes toward immigration policy is not only
timely and relevant, but also gives scholars an excellent opportunity to further investigate how
individual attitudes on salient issues are shaped by environmental factors.
Specifically, this study seeks to more fully explore how racial/ethnic context determines
attitudes toward immigration policy. We hypothesize that attitudes toward immigration are a
product of both Latino immigrant as well as native-born group size. We argue that Latinos tend
to react to the presence of a large foreign-born population in a manner opposite to that of Anglos.
This differing expectation is derived from Bledsoe, et al.‟s (1995) argument that increased spatial
density among African Americans results in increased levels of racial solidarity. Adapting this
argument to Latinos, we submit that as the geographic concentration of foreign-born and nativeborn Latinos increases, Latinos will become more supportive of liberal immigration policies.
This hypothesis stands in contrast to previous studies which found that Latinos and Anglos react
to contexts in an identical manner, i.e. becoming more anti-immigrant in high Latino density
areas (see Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997 and Hood and Morris 1998).
2
These hypotheses are tested using an original state-wide survey of Anglos and Latinos in
Texas conducted in 2006, supplemented with contextual data gathered from the 2000 Census.
The results of this analysis confirm our hypotheses and indicate that residing in areas with higher
Latino populations (specifically populations comprised primarily of native-born Latinos, but not
undocumented Latino immigrants) produces more liberal immigration attitudes among Latinos
and more conservative attitudes among Anglos. This finding suggests a change in racial/ethnic
dynamics surrounding immigration policy attitudes in Texas and also suggests repercussions
nationally.
Ethnic Context and Anglo Attitudes toward Immigration Policy
Attitudes toward immigration have long been thought to be a product of individual-level
characteristics such as ideology, age, gender, education, and economic vulnerability (Binder,
Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997, Citrin, et al. 1997). However, scholars have also hypothesized that
the racial/ethnic context in which a person lives is a key determinant of attitudes toward
immigration. Indeed, social scientists have long speculated that racial attitudes and public policy
preferences are at least partially a product of the residential environments in which individuals
find themselves.
The link between social context and policy preferences can perhaps best be explained
through social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) which posits that human beings are
psychologically hard-wired to automatically sort the world into “in-groups” and “out-groups.”
Since race is a salient physical characteristic, the formation of strong in-group/out-group
distinctions based on racial differences is relatively effortless and therefore very common.
Social identity theory further hypothesizes that an individual‟s identity and sense of selfworth are partially dependent upon the perceived favorability of his or her in-group identity.
3
Thus, individuals are highly motivated to maintain a strong and positive in-group evaluation.
Since in-group identities can only be formed in comparison with relevant out-groups, however,
individuals are also motivated to maintain a proportionally strong and negative evaluation of outgroups. It follows that as the size of the relevant out-group increases, the proportional size of the
in-group decreases. In turn, this threatens the dominant status of the in-group and thus also
threatens the perceived value of the in-group identity. Individuals are thus motivated to
strengthen their negative out-group evaluation which manifests itself in punishing behavior,
specifically by not supporting political policies that could potentially benefit members of the outgroup (see Tajfel 1970, e.g.).
These social-psychological effects are manifested in specific theoretical mechanisms
through which residential environments are thought to influence attitudes and policy preferences.
The first of these is the power-threat hypothesis (also known as the “racial threat” hypothesis). In
its simplest form, the hypothesis suggests that “a superordinate group (e.g. whites) becomes
more racially hostile as the size of the proximate subordinate group increases, which punitively
threatens the former‟s economic and social privilege” (Oliver and Wong 2003). In other words,
as the size of the racial minority group in an individual‟s area increases, he or she will feel
threatened and respond by engaging in punishing behavior as manifested in lowering or
withdrawing support for pro-minority public policies.
The contention that racial attitudes and policy preferences vary in accordance with the
size of the minority population within a given geographical unit has grown largely out of an
observation made in Southern Politics where Key ([1949] 1984) observes that counties with
substantial African-American populations were also the ones in which conservative gubernatorial
candidates enjoyed the most support. Key‟s initial observation was advanced, although
4
sometimes in a modified form, by other scholars of the era (e.g. Keech 1968). Since that time,
several works have provided a plethora of empirical evidence for the power-threat hypothesis
(e.g. Giles 1977; Giles and Buckner 1993; Glaser 1994; Tolbert and Grummel 2003).1
In contrast, scholars of racial and ethnic politics have provided a significant amount of
empirical evidence for the notion that racial attitudes are a product of direct contact with
minority group members (Aberbach and Walker 1973; Ellison and Powers 1994; Meer and
Feedman 1966; Schuman and Hatchett 1974; Tsukashima and Montero 1976; Williams 1964;
Sigelman and Welch 1993; Welch and Sigelman 2000). This social contact hypothesis argues
that increased interracial contact makes it difficult for groups to accept typically negative racial
stereotypes and also increases the probability of both groups holding shared values (Forbes
1997). The effects of social contact appear to be a robust predictor of racial attitudes among
Anglos within the United States, often washing out the effects of sociological variables such as
education (Welch et al. 2001).
The social contact argument has led some scholars to argue that Anglos are more likely to
develop favorable attitudes toward racial/ethnic minorities in areas where minorities make up a
large proportion of the population (Voss and Miller 2001). This occurs because contact, while
technically an individual-level variable, is greatly influenced by contextual factors. Presumably,
areas with large minority populations are also ones in which one would expect Anglos and
minorities to come into regular contact, whereas homogenous communities tend not to provide
forums for interracial contact. This contact is crucial because, according to social identity theory,
increased interaction and contact can eventually break down perceived in-group/out-group
barriers and distinctions. As the out-group eventually comes to be considered part of the ingroup, punishing behavior toward minorities is eventually replaced with reward behavior,
5
thereby increasing support for public policies that stand to benefit members of the minority
group.
Working within this power-threat vs. social contact framework, Hood and Morris (1998)
examine how environmental factors influence Anglo attitudes on immigration. They find that
Anglos residing in contexts with large illegal immigrant populations tend to possess more
negative attitudes regarding immigration, a finding which would seem to support the powerthreat hypothesis. However, they also find that as the relative size of the legal immigrant
population increases, Anglos become more supportive of liberal immigration policies.
Interestingly, these contextual variables have been found to influence Latino attitudes in a similar
manner (Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997).
Thus, Hood and Morris (1998) do not offer unconditional support for either the powerthreat or social contact hypotheses. They do suggest the presence of another interesting
dimension to contextual theories of political behavior. That is, Hood and Morris‟s (1998) work
indicates that Anglos react to the presence of certain segments of the Latino population (e.g.
legal versus illegal immigrants) differently. Other scholars have suggested that economic
heterogeneity within racial/ethnic groups can influence racial attitudes (see Branton and Jones
2005, Gay 2004). Branton and Jones (2005) show that when the disparity between Anglo and
minority economic status is large, Anglos tend to react negatively to the presence of a large
minority population. As the economic gap between the two groups narrows, however, Anglos
may instead respond to minorities favorably, developing more liberal policy preferences. Hood
and Morris (1998) suggest that Anglos make distinctions between the minorities based upon
social, cultural, or legal considerations. Studies of racial attitudes in the South, where the Latino
population is heavily foreign-born, show that Anglos‟ feelings of commonality with Latinos is
6
relatively low, despite the presence of a large black population (McClain, et al. 2006). This is an
idea explored relatively less in the literature and forms the basis of our first line of inquiry.
According to this approach, one might also suspect that attitudes and policy preferences
are influenced by differences within the Latino community based upon nativity. One of the most
obvious differences between the African-American and Latino populations within the United
States is the heterogeneity of the Latino community which the immigration process produces,
specifically native-born vs. foreign-born populations. Indeed, this heterogeneity within the
Latino community may be one of the critical factors that highlight the way in which theories of
racial context apply differently to Latinos and African-Americans. Failing to account for
differences in the Latino population based upon nativity could lead to the misleading conclusion
that Anglos are reacting to the presence of all Latinos similarly, regardless of the level of
acculturation within the Latino population in their neighborhoods. Accounting for the
complexities of the relationship in the racial/ethnic context and political behavior also allows for
a better response to critics who argue that the power-threat hypothesis is historically and
geographically contingent, applicable only to African-Americans residing within the American
South before the onset of the civil rights movement (see Voss 2000).
While Hood and Morris (1998) argue that Anglos make distinctions based upon the
residential legality of the Latino immigrant population, we are skeptical about the ability of
Anglos to easily or accurately discern the legal or illegal status of Latino immigrants. We ask
instead whether Anglos react differently to foreign-born versus native-born Latinos. Foreignborn residents tend to generate ethnic enclaves and engage in other practices that make their
presence more visible to native-born Latinos and Anglos. Many of these visible manifestations of
the growth in the foreign-born Latino population (congregating day laborers, Latino
7
supermarkets, Spanish radio advertisements, etc.) may represent a form of contact as well as
threat. The visible presence of an ethnic enclave produces the mechanism for how Anglos and
native-born Latinos are able to determine an increase in the foreign-born population as well as
form and reinforce impressions of ethnic and racial difference.
This also offers a direct test of the argument made by Rocha and Espino (2009) that
Anglos react in a manner consistent with the power-threat hypothesis when they reside in
contexts that are populated by a substantial number of foreign-born Latinos, but that they do not
vary their attitudes toward English language or immigration policies depending upon the size of
the native-born Latino population within their area.
Ethnic Context and Latino Attitudes toward Immigration Policy
With few exceptions (e.g. Gay 2004; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Leighley 2001;
McClain et al. 2006; Oliver 2001; Welch et al. 2001), most work on the political implications of
racial environments is concerned with the political behavior of Anglos. In recent years, this
literature has become increasingly interested with the behavior of African-Americans. As we
alluded to earlier, Hood, Morris, and Shirkey (1997) find that Latinos tend react to the presence
of immigrants in a manner similar to Anglos. This finding, however, is somewhat at odds the
spatial density hypothesis proposed by Bledsoe et al. (1995; see also Welch et al. 2001).
Bledsoe, et al.‟s (1995) study of racial attitudes in Detroit argues that spatial density
works to increase feelings of African-American solidarity. Assuming that this relationship holds
for Latinos, high levels of in-group size should work to foster a greater sense of Latino group
identity, generating liberal policy preferences regarding immigration instead of the conservative
preferences that the power-threat hypothesis would predict Anglos to possess. Likewise,
Leighley (2001) argues that minority group size elicits different reactions from Anglos and
8
minorities, the former viewing it as a threat and the later viewing it a signal that political
participation can be turned into social and political gains.
It remains unclear whether individual Latinos will react to the presence of a large native
or foreign-born Latino population in a different manner than Anglos, as suggested by Leighley
(2001). Thus, we investigate whether and how local demographic context plays a significant role
in the political views and perceptions of Latinos.
Data and Methods
The data used in this analysis comes from a public opinion survey conducted by the
“Survey Research Center” at Texas Tech University. This survey was in the field during the
summer of 2006 and sampled respondents living in Texas. Similar forms of the questionnaire
were administered to a statewide random sample (random digit dialing) of Latinos and Anglos in
Texas with a Latino oversample from border counties.2 Both studies used the same instrument
and the Spanish translations for those conducted in Spanish were done by native Spanish
speakers. Latinos comprised 45% of our final sample (N=252), while Anglos comprised 55% of
all respondents (N=362). While this is a single state study, we believe that it speaks to the issue
of immigration in a significant manner because Texas has the third largest immigrant population
in the United States, ranking only behind New York and California, as well as its status as a
prominent border state.
We are primarily interested in the policy-related attitudes of respondents. To that end, we
estimate a series of models using three policy-related questions as dependent variables. We
attempt to capture different elements of immigration policy with these variables.3 These
questions are:
9
1) Do illegal immigrants help or hurt the U. S. economy? (Help the economy by providing
low-cost labor, Hurt the economy by driving wages down)
2) Should the number of new legal immigrants be increased or decreased? (Increased a lot,
Increased a little, Neither increased or decreased, Decreased a Little, Decreased a Lot)
3) Do you agree or disagree with the building of a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border?
(Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree or Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree)
Table 1 contains a summary of descriptive statistics for each of these variables. Question
1 is a binomial variable and Questions 2 and 3 are 5-point ordinal variables. Each variable is
coded so that higher values correspond with more liberal preferences. Appendix A contains full
question wordings of the key variables employed in this analysis.
This original survey of Anglos and Latinos residing in Texas is supplemented with
contextual data gathered from the 2000 U.S. Census. Specifically, we obtained the percentage of
Latino residents within each respondent‟s county. Respondents within our sample reside in
counties where the Latino population is as small as 2% and as large as 98%. Respondents are
drawn from 53 counties in total. Urban counties are represented nearly proportionally within the
data. For example, 13% of respondents reside in Harris County where 11% of the state‟s
population is located. The Census Bureau also provides data on the percentage of foreign- and
native-born Latinos at the county level, allowing us to test the argument that Anglos react
differently to distinct segments of the Latino population. It is important to note that while the
Texas shares a border with Mexico, not all areas of Texas are immigrant-receiving communities.
This variation in terms of immigrant context (e.g. communities with similar Latino population
percentages but with differing proportions of foreign- and native-born Latinos) is essential for
10
our analysis. The percentage of foreign-born Latinos varies from 1% to 37% in our data.4 (See
Table 1 for descriptive summary statistics).
Another important variable we must account for is the structural pattern of residence
between Latinos and Anglos. The conflict between the power-threat and social contact
hypothesis is predicated upon the assumption that increased group size leads to more interracial
contact. This assumption is tenuous in highly segregated areas. Therefore, we control for the
level of Anglo-Latino segregation within each respondent‟s Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area.5
In order to measure the structural pattern of residence between Anglos and Latinos, we
use a statistic, known as the Dissimilarity Index, long used by demographers to measure levels of
segregation in an area. This index, taken from the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative
Urban and Regional Research at SUNY-Albany, measures whether one racial group is
distributed across census tracts in an area the same way as another racial group. The Mumford
Center also provides distinct measures that capture the level of segregation between Anglos,
native-born Latinos, and foreign-born Latinos. When examining which Anglos react specifically
to the presence of native- or foreign-born Latinos, we use the corresponding dissimilarity index
as a control variable.
We further include additional control variables measuring individual-level characteristics
that have been shown to shape attitudes toward immigration policy. These include standard
socio-economic and demographic controls such as household income, sex, and education
(Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997). In addition, we control for individual partisan affiliation
and approval of President Bush. Lastly, we control for respondents‟ religious affiliation by
including a control for Roman Catholic religious affiliation. Aside from the fact that many
11
Latinos are Catholic, previous research has shown that members of minority religions are more
likely to feel empathy for, and thus more supportive of, policies that favor racial and ethnic
minorities (see Fetzer 1998 and Knoll 2009). Additionally, prominent cardinals of the Catholic
Church publicly supported the liberal immigration reform measures proposed by the Senate in
2006 and 2007. The Catholic Church also played a significant role in the mobilization of Latinos
in opposition to punitive immigration reform measures during this same period (see Pomfret
2006).
While we expect Anglos to prefer more restrictive immigration policies, general status
may impact levels of support for liberal policies among Latinos. Specifically, native-born
Latinos may be less likely to support liberal immigration policies than their foreign-born
counterparts. It is also possible that native-born Latinos react to ethnic context in a distinct
manner. In short, accounting for in-group heterogeneity if critical when studying Latino attitudes
as well as those held by Anglos. Unfortunately, only a trivial number of non-Latinos or nonAnglos were sampled (30 blacks, 3 Asian-Americans, and 6 American Indians). Due to this
small sample size, these groups are excluded from the study.
Findings
Descriptive statistics for our dependent variables and our key contextual measures are
presented in Table 1. Before presenting our full models, we attempted to determine whether
Anglos and Latinos held distinct preferences regarding immigration policies without accounting
for ethnic context. Our analysis (results not shown but available from the authors) shows that
Anglos are generally more likely than Latinos to express anti-immigrant sentiments.6 In fact,
ethnicity is the only variable to predict each of the three dependent variables used in our analysis.
Native-born Latinos are no more or less likely than the foreign-born to believe the number of
12
legal immigrants allowed into the US should be increased. However, the native-born are less
likely to believe that immigration has a positive economic impact and are less likely to oppose
the construction of a border fence. Catholics are significantly more likely to believe that illegal
immigrants help the U.S. economy and oppose the construction of a border fence. Highly
educated respondents tend to feel that the number of legal immigrants allowed into the U.S.
should be increased.
[Table 1 About Here]
Table 2 presents the findings for second series of models, which account for contextual
forces.7 For each of these models, standard errors are clustered by county.8 In this analysis, we
test to see whether the percentage of Latinos (total native-born and foreign-born) within each
respondent‟s county influences their policy views, controlling for individual-level characteristics.
While our contextual measures are fairly robust predictors of respondents‟ opinions, most of the
individual-level variables fail to consistently predict attitudes on immigration. In fact, no
individual-level variable is significant across all three of our dependent variables.
[Table 2 About Here]
Table 2 offers evidence for the contention that the size of the total Latino population is a
partial determinant of immigration attitudes. Unlike Hood, Morris, and Shirkey (1997) who
found that Latinos react to contextual variables in the same way as Anglos, our evidence
suggests that Latinos react in a dissimilar manner. That is, Anglos residing in contexts with a
large Latino population are more likely to develop restrictionist attitudes, while Latinos residing
in contexts with a large Latino population are more likely to develop liberal feelings toward
immigration. This result offers further support of the power-threat hypothesis within the context
of immigration politics and may be viewed as similar to Bledsoe et al.‟s (1995) assertion that
13
African-American solidarity increases in areas of high in-group exposure. The influence of
racial/ethnic context on levels of immigration attitudes also appears to be quite robust, with
Latino population size proving a significant predictor across all three of our dependent variables.
One contextual measure, the level of residential segregation between the Anglo and Latino
populations, appears to be the only influence on attitudes regarding increasing legal immigration
(p-value = .08). Contrary to our expectations, respondents are more likely to favor increasing the
number of legal immigrants in more segregated areas.
In order to illustrate the substantive impact of racial/ethnic context, Table 3 presents a
series of predicted probabilities. We see that the probability of an Anglo respondent who lives an
area with few Latinos (2%) agreeing with the idea that immigration has positive economic
consequences is relatively high (.45). An Anglo residing in a predominately Latino area (94%
Latino) is much less likely to hold this belief (predicated probability of agreement = .27). The
opposite is true for Latinos. Latinos residing in areas where few other Latinos live (2%) are less
likely to believe that immigration has positive economic consequences than those who live in
heavily Latino areas. Note that native-born Latinos living in predominately non-Latino counties
are actually less likely than Anglos to believe that immigration has positive economic
consequences. Unlike Anglos, native-born Latinos respond positively to the presence of Latinos
and tend to view immigration favorably in heavily Latinos areas.9
[Table 3 About Here]
We see a similar pattern regarding the predicted probability that Anglo or Latino
respondents will believe that the number of legal immigrants allowed into the U.S. should be
increased. The preferences of Anglos and Latinos (both native and foreign-born) are virtually
identical in predominately non-Latino areas. In heavily Latino areas, however, Anglo and Latino
14
preferences diverge by a substantial margin. The probability that a native or foreign-born Latino
will believe that the number of legal immigrants allowed into the US should be increased in a
county that is 94% Latino is approximately .50. The probability that an Anglo respondent
residing in the same context will express the same position is .05.
Lastly, we turn to the probability that a respondent will oppose the construction of fence
along the US-Mexican border. Once again, attitudes among Anglos and foreign-born Latinos are
indistinguishable in predominately non-Latino counties. In such contexts, native-born Latinos are
actually the least likely to oppose the construction of a border fence. As Latinos make up a larger
proportion of the population, native and foreign-born Latinos are more likely to oppose
construction, while Anglos are less likely to do the same.
Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of our interaction term on responses regarding the
economic impact of immigration. The figure shows the derivate of the index of our dependent
variable. Again, we see that Anglo attitudes do not differ from those of Latinos in non-Latino
areas. As an area becomes increasingly populated by Latinos, Anglo preferences diverge.
[Figure 1 About Here]
Next we turn to the hypothesis posed by scholars that Anglos make distinctions between
certain segments of the Latino population when reacting to contextual forces. The results
demonstrate the Anglos do react differently to foreign and native-born Latinos, but in a manner
opposite to that suggested by Rocha and Espino (2009). In Table 2, where we accounted for the
percentage of Latinos within a respondent‟s area without concern as to their nativity, our
contextual measures predicted immigration attitudes across each of our dependent variables.
However, for only one of our three indicators (belief that the number of legal immigrants should
15
be increased) do we find evidence of contextual effects when limiting our analysis to the impact
of foreign-born Latinos.
We also included an interaction term between our “native-born” variable and the size of
the Latino foreign-born population (results not shown but available from the authors). The
inclusion if this term proved to be insignificant. We take this as evidence that Latinos are
generally more supportive of liberal immigration policies in areas of high in-group size, although
the base level of liberalism is lower for native born Latinos.
[Table 4 About Here]
The null results presented in Table 4 would imply that our previous findings are being
driven by reactions to the presence of native-born Latinos. Indeed, Table 5 shows that the
presence of native-born Latinos within a respondent‟s area successfully predicts immigration
attitudes in a manner consist with the results produced in Table 2. This stands in direct contrast
to Rocha and Espino (2009) who argue that the presence of native-born Latinos does not
influence Anglo preferences on immigration policy. The presence of native-born Latinos, at least
in our sample of Texas residents, does matter, perhaps more so than the presence of foreign-born
Latinos.
[Table 5 About Here]
Some findings do vary across the three dependent variables and these distinctions shed
additional light on the impact of population context and attitudes. Using three questions
demonstrates that immigration policy attitudes are multidimensional. A Catholic respondent, for
example, is more likely to express a view that immigrants help the economy and oppose a border
fence but not more likely to report support for increasing legal immigration. We suspect that this
is due to the influence of the Catholic Church‟s teachings on the rights of immigrants and affinity
16
for fellow Catholics to the extent that they are less likely to differentiate legal from illegal
immigration. Self-reported membership in the Republican Party is only a statistically significant
predictor of attitudes toward the border fence but not of the other dependent variables.
Republican respondents in Texas may be more influenced by the national rhetoric surrounding
the border fence than Democrats. Republicans also tend to be located in non-border areas
whereas Democrats in Texas are more likely to be from the border region. We also find that
education is a statistically significant predictor of support for increased legal immigration across
all four models and that education is not a statistically predictor of the other dependent variables.
Those respondents with higher levels of education may be more willing to accept a pluralistic
America.
Conclusion
This study has extended previous research investigating the impact of ethnic context on
individual attitudes toward racial public policies. We hypothesized that immigration policy
attitudes are influenced by the size of the native-born and/or foreign-born Latino population in an
individual‟s county. We further hypothesized that Anglos and Latinos form immigration-related
policy preferences differently based on the ethnic context in which they live.
Our results suggest that Anglos residing in areas with a higher proportion of Latinos are
more likely to have restrictionist immigration policy preferences and that Latinos in these same
areas are more likely to have liberal immigration policy preferences. We further found that this
result is not driven by the size of the foreign-born Latino population, but rather by the size of the
native-born Latino population. This finding does not necessarily disconfirm previous work, but
does suggest a change in ethnic dynamics surrounding immigration policy in Texas and possibly
nation-wide as well.
17
The finding that higher levels of native-born Latinos in an area produce more liberal
policy preferences among Latinos demonstrates that Bledsoe, et al.‟s (1995) finding that spatial
density contributes to solidarity among African-Americans in Detroit also holds for Latinos in
Texas. Again, racial/ethnic context matters in shaping policy preferences. This suggests that
Latinos surrounded by fellow Latinos (in this case, native-born Latinos) are more likely to
extend their in-group circle to include other foreign-born Latinos and consequently favor more
liberal immigration policies.
Furthermore, the results of this study are important for the implications they have on the
current public debate regarding immigration policy. Those in favor of more “hard-line”
immigration approaches often cite the importance of following proper immigration procedures as
well as the risk of terrorists sneaking over the U.S.-Mexican border, while eschewing the
suggestion that these attitudes are motivated by culturally nativist or ethnic-based factors. These
results, however, demonstrate that anti-immigration sentiment is largely a product of the size of
the native-born Latino population, but not the foreign-born Latino population. We conclude,
therefore, that racial- or ethnic-based concerns may trump worries about legal procedures or
national security when it comes to the formation of immigration policy attitudes.
Future studies could build upon on the findings presented herein by extending this
analysis to the nation as a whole and/or investigating the effect of native-born Latino population
size on the issue preferences of other racial groups such as African-Americans or AsianAmericans. Examining other geographic areas would also allow researchers to consider how
relationships might vary for other Latino sub-groups or in areas where the Latino population is
more heterogeneous in terms of national origin. 85% of Latinos in Texas are of Mexican origin,
allowing us little leverage on this question. It is possible that the way in which Anglos react to
18
ethnic context is contingent upon the national origin of the nearby Latino population. Such
studies will undoubtedly add to our understanding of this highly salient issue, as well as to our
understanding of inter-group attitude formation more generally.
19
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23
Table 1. Descriptive Summary Statistics of Policy and Social Context Variables
Immigrants help/hurt economy?
Anglos only
Latinos only
Legal immigration increase/decrease?
Anglos only
Latinos only
Agree/disagree with border fence?
Anglos only
Latinos only
% Latino population
% native-born Latino population
% foreign-born Latino population
24
Min
Max
Mean
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
5
5
5
5
5
0.58
0.42
0.69
2.81
2.89
3.77
3.11
2.75
3.40
Std.
Dev.
0.49
0.50
0.46
1.21
1.44
1.14
1.44
1.44
1.36
2.54
0
1.30
94.28
65.28
29.50
25.07
16.40
8.65
21.83
17.03
7.09
Table 2. Latino Context and Anglo Attitudes toward Immigration
Logit Analysis for “Positive Economic Impact”;
Ordered Logit Analysis for “Increase Legal Immigration” and “Oppose Border Fence”
Dependent Variable=
Positive Economic
Impact
Increase Legal
Immigration
Oppose Border
Fence
Anglo Respondent
-.735
(.494)
-.015 (.365)
.045
(.452)
Latino Group Size
.014**
(.005)
.013** (.004)
.007
(.004)
Anglo Respondent "X"
Latino Group Size
-.023*
(.011)
-.019* (.008)
-.024* (.001)
Native-born Latino Respondent
-1.286** (.260)
-.056 (.195)
-.689** (.185)
Anglo-Latino Segregation
.000
(.018)
.025± (.015)
-.006
(.013)
Education
-.047
(.119)
.203** (.074)
.127
(.084)
Income
.020
(.042)
-.042 (.045)
-.011
(.033)
Democrat
.152
(.184)
-.175 (.160)
.067
(.199)
Republican
.095
(.225)
-.302 (.296)
-.630** (.200)
Bush approval
-.049
.064
.006
(.028)
.022
(.024)
Female
.078
(.193)
-.179 (.162)
.208
(.143)
Catholic
.361
(.219)
.116
(.160)
.356*
(.145)
Cut 1
.197
(.821)
-1.701 (.812)
Cut 2
1.169 (.857)
-.302
(.822)
Cut 3
2.732 (.867)
.111
(.826)
Cut 4
4.195 (.873)
1.402
(.797)
N
469
474
505
2
Wald χ
164.27
96.55
139.45
Prob > Wald χ2
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
PRE
.17
.06
.10
Note: ±p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by county.
Constant coefficients not presented.
25
Table 3. The Conditional Effect of Latino Context on Attitudes toward Immigration
Predicted Probability Calculations
Probability of Agreement for:
Positive Economic
Impact
Increase Legal
Immigration
Oppose Border
Fence
Anglo Respondents
Residing in areas with few Latinos
(Set to minimum value of 2% Latino)
.45
.23
.48
Residing in areas with many Latinos
(Set to maximum value of 94% Latino)
.27
.05
.16
Residing in areas with few Latinos
(Set to minimum value of 2% Latino)
.64
.24
.49
Residing in areas with many Latinos
(Set to maximum value of 94% Latino)
.87
.51
.65
Residing in areas with few Latinos
(Set to minimum value of 2% Latino)
.33
.23
.33
Residing in areas with many Latinos
(Set to maximum value of 94% Latino)
.65
.50
.48
Foreign-Born Latino Respondents
Native-Born Latino Respondents
26
Table 4. Foreign-born Context and Anglo Attitudes toward Immigration
Logit Analysis for “Positive Economic Impact”;
Ordered Logit Analysis for “Increase Legal Immigration” and “Oppose Border Fence”
Dependent Variable=
Positive Economic
Impact
Increase Legal
Immigration
Oppose Border
Fence
Anglo Respondent
-.1.403* (.556)
.111
-.255
(.486)
Latino Foreign-born Group Size
.030
(.024)
.049* (.020)
.021
(.013)
Anglo Respondent "X"
Latino Foreign-born Group Size
-.005
(.028)
-.055* (.023)
-.027
(.024)
Native-born Latino Respondent
-1.300** (.250)
-.055 (.197)
-.689** (.181)
Anglo- FB Latino Segregation
-.006
(.024)
.018
-.006
(.011)
Education
-.045
(.116)
.199** (.076)
.134
(.084)
Income
.012
(.041)
-.046 (.046)
-.012
(.035)
Democrat
.155
(.182)
-.168 (.158)
.065
(.206)
Republican
.101
(.229)
-.245 (.288)
-.619** (.198)
Bush approval
-.056
.062
.007
(.028)
.022
(.025)
Female
.092
(.192)
-.149 (.157)
.197
(.143)
Catholic
.362
(.209)
.101
(.157)
.349*
(.129)
Cut 1
.317
(1.235)
-1.681 (.812)
Cut 2
1.288 (1.278)
-.293
(.867)
Cut 3
2.847 (1.296)
.117
(.879)
Cut 4
4.307 (1.311)
1.402
(.835)
(.411)
(.016)
N
469
474
505
2
Wald χ
143.55
105.88
116.00
Prob > Wald χ2
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
PRE
.11
.05
.07
Note: ±p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by county.
Constant coefficients not presented.
27
Table 5. Native-born Context and Anglo Attitudes toward Immigration
Logit Analysis for “Positive Economic Impact”;
Ordered Logit Analysis for “Increase Legal Immigration” and “Oppose Border Fence”
Dependent Variable=
Positive Economic
Impact
Increase Legal
Immigration
Oppose Border
Fence
Anglo Respondent
-.839* (.397)
-.270 (.330)
-.187
(.456)
Latino Native-born Group Size
.019** (.006)
.014** (.004)
.009*
(.006)
Anglo Respondent "X"
Latino Native-born Group Size
-.038** (.013)
-.021* (.009)
-.030** (.013)
Native-born Latino Respondent
-1.296**(.262)
-.075 (.204)
-.698** (.184)
Anglo- NB Latino Segregation
-.005
(.021)
.023
-.007
(.016)
Education
-.051
(.119)
.191* (.074)
.125
(.083)
Income
.018
(.042)
-.040 (.045)
-.014
(.031)
Democrat
.154
(.194)
-.185 (.158)
.071
(.201)
Republican
.090
(.244)
-.321 (.303)
-.631** (.200)
Bush approval
-.048
.065
.005
(.029)
.019
(.024)
Female
.071
(.196)
-.169 (.159)
.206
(.141)
Catholic
.360
(.217)
.117
(.160)
.351** (.083)
Cut 1
-.256 (.805)
-1.876 (.863)
Cut 2
.712
(.831)
-.477
(.872)
Cut 3
2.269 (.842)
-.063
(.876)
Cut 4
3.730 (.856)
1.228
(.865)
(.016)
N
469
474
505
2
Wald χ
165.60
83.30
131.02
Prob > Wald χ2
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
PRE
.16
.07
.09
Note: ±p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by county.
Constant coefficients not presented.
28
-1
-.5
0
.5
Figure 1. The Marginal Effect of Ethnicity on Beliefs about the Economic Impact of
Immigration.
0
20
40
60
Percent_Latino
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
29
80
100
Appendix A. Survey Question Wording
Dependent variables

Economic Impact: “Some people say undocumented or illegal immigrants help the
economy by providing low-cost labor. Others say they hurt the economy by driving
wages down. Which is closer to your views?”

Immigration Levels: “Do you think the number of new legal immigrants allowed into
the United States each year should be increased a lot, increased a little, neither increased
nor decreased, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?”

Border fence: “Some both inside and outside of government have advocated the
construction of a border fence. What do you think? Do you strongly agree, agree, neither
agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree that a fence should be built?”
Control variables

Education: “What is the highest level of education you have received?”

Income: “What was your total household income last year before taxes? Just stop me
when I read the correct category.”

Partisanship: “Do you generally consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an
independent, or something else?”

Bush approval: “In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way in which the
President has been handling his job?”

Female gender: coded by surveyor.

Catholic religious affiliation: “What is your religious preference? That is, are you
Catholic, Protestant, some other religion? Or have no preference?”
30
1
This same effect has also been studied in other academic fields. For example, a number of
sociological studies have examined the effect of racial context on intermarriage rates. See Blau,
Blum, and Schwartz (1982) and Blau, Beeker, and Fitzpatrick (1984), e.g.
2
Unfortunately, the survey did not include questions asking for the respondent‟s citizenship
status. Thus, it is likely that the Latinos represented in this survey include both Latino-Americans
as well as some Latino immigrants.
3
The average inter-item covariance is .36. The scale reliability coefficient is .54. Based on this
information, we choose to analyze each of the items separately.
4
The percentage of Latino non-citizens correlates with the percentage of foreign-born Latinos at
.98. Our results are unchanged when accounting for citizenship instead of nativity.
5
Unfortunately, the Lewis Mumford Center offers data of Anglo-Latino segregation at the
SMSA or the state level. While other works have examined the effect of Latino group size on
Anglo attitudes using SMSA level data, we feel that the county level better captures a
respondent‟s residential context. The effect of Latino group size is similar in terms of direction,
significance, and substantive impact when replicating our findings using only SMSA level data.
6
While we argue that there is a theoretical reason to believe Anglos and Latinos react differently
to ethnic context, we do not argue that the relationship between any individual-level
characteristics, such as education, and immigration policy preferences differ according to
ethnicity. In order to confirm this, we ran separate models for our Anglo and Latino samples.
Our Chow test result did not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the
coefficients in the Anglo and Latino models is equal to zero. This provides some empirical
support for our theoretical contention that distinct processes do not underlie the relationship
31
between any individual-level characteristics and immigration policy preferences for Anglos and
Latinos.
7
While we argue that there is a theoretical reason to believe that the inclusion of an interaction
term between ethnicity and Latino group size will improve the model we also test to see if the
inclusion of the interaction improves the predictive capacity of the model. To do this we
conducted a joint F-test of the interactive term to determine if they were jointly significant. The
resulting F-statistic was significant at the .05 level for each of models we present, indicating that
the interactive variables belong in the model.
8
Relying on a series of logit and ordered logit models can result in inefficient estimation,
incorrect standard errors, and an increased probability of committing a Type I error due to the
multilevel nature of our data. Our models contain ~500 respondents spread over 48 counties. We
replicated our models using HLM 6. Our use of HGLM models presented an additional series of
complications as only 21 of the 48 counties have sufficient data for computation. Moreover, an
examination of the variance components in each of our models indicates that HLM is offering
little leverage. In line with that one would expect given the series of non-significant variance
components, our results do not change when relying on HGLM models (this is true even though
the HGLM analysis eliminates over 50% of our level 2 units).
9
We considered the argument that native-born Latinos might hold conservative preferences
when residing near a large foreign-born population. In order to test this hypothesis, we replicated
our analysis in Table 4 on our Latino subsample. We included an interaction term between our
“native-born” variable and the size of the Latino foreign-born population. We also created a
measure of the percentage of all Latinos who are foreign-born. In neither case was the interaction
term statistically significant. We take this as evidence that Latinos are generally more supportive
32
of liberal immigration policies in areas of high in-group size, although the base level of
liberalism is lower for native-born Latinos.
33