Bibliography on Dumping and Antidumping
I. Overviews of Dumping and Antidumping
A. Surveys of the Economics
Viner, Jacob (1923). Dumping: A Problem in International Trade. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Viner, Jacob (1931). “Dumping”. In Edwin Seligman and Alvin Johnson, eds. Encyclopaedia of
Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan, pp. 275-278.
Haberler, Gottfried (1936). “Dumping Cartels, Monopolies and Export Bounties”. Chapter XVIII
in The Theory of International Trade with its Application to Commercial Policy. London:
William Hodge and Company, pp. 296-333.
Corden, W. Max (1974). “Dumping”, Section VII of Chapter 8 in Trade Policy and Economic
Welfare. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 235-247.
Wares, William (1977). The Theory of Dumping and American Commercial Policy. Lexington:
D.C. Heath.
Ethier, Wilfred (1987). “Dumping”. In The New Palgrave. New York: Stockton, pp. 937-938.
Deardorff, Alan (1989). “Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law”. In John Jackson and
Edwin Vermulst, eds. Antidumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, pp. 23-39.
Balassa, Bela (1989). “Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Economic Considerations”.
Journal of World Trade, V.23-#2, pp. 63-79. [also in Balassa (1993), Policy Choices for the
1990s.]
Tharakan, P.K. Matthew ed. (1991). Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Hindley, Brian and Patrick Messerlin (1996). Antidumping Industrial Policy: Legalized
Protection in the WTO and What to do About It. Washington, DC: AEI.
Clarida, Richard (1996). “Dumping: In Theory, in Policy, and in Practice”. in J. Bhagwati and R.
Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 357389.
Niels, Gunnar (2000). “What is Antidumping Really About?”. Journal of Economic Surveys;
V.14-#4, pp. 467-492.
Blonigen, Bruce and Thomas Prusa (2003). “Antidumping”. In E.K. Choi and J. Harrigan, eds.
Handbook of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 251-284.
B. Surveys of Legal Issues
Bello, Judith and Alan Holmer, eds. (1987). The Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws:
Key Legal and Policy Issues. Washington, DC: American Bar Association.
Barshefsky, Charlene and N. Zucker (1988). “Amendments to the Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988”. North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation;
Horlick, Gary and Geoffrey Oliver (1989). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law
Provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988”. Journal of World Trade;
V23-#3, pp. 5-49.
Jackson, John (1989). “Unfair Trade and the Rules on Dumping”. Chapter 10 of The World
Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press,
pp. 217-247.
Jackson, John (1989). “The Perplexities of Subsidies in International Trade”. Chapter 11 of The
World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT
Press, pp. 249-273.
Jackson, John and Edwin Vermlust, eds. (1989). Anti-Dumping Law and Practice: A
Comparative Study. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Barceló, John (1991). “A History of the Gatt Unfair Trade Remedy Law: Confusion of
Purposes”. World Economy; V.14-#?, pp. 311-333.
Barceló, John (1991). “An Analytical History of Gatt Unfair Trade Remedy Law”. In Brian
Hindley, ed. The Regulation of Trade. London: Trade Policy Research Centre.
Horlick, Gary and E.C. Shea (1995). “The World Trade Organization Antidumping Agreement”.
Journal of World Trade; V.29-#1, pp. 5-31.
Palmeter, N. David (1995). “United States Implementation of the Uruguay Round Antidumping
Code”. Journal of World Trade; V.29-#?, pp. 39-82.
Miranda, Jorge (1996). “Should Antidumping Law be Dumped”. Law and Policy in International
Business; V.28-#1, pp. 255-288.
Salonen, E. (1997). “‘One Tomato, Two Tomato, ...’: Selection of Trade Remedy Laws in the
Florida-Mexico Tomato Conflict”. Florida Journal of International Law; V.11-#?, pp. 371-397.
Schoenbaum, Thomas (1997). “An Assessment of the Antidumping Laws After the Uruguay
Round Reforms”. Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts; V.45 (Neue Folge), pp. 137-144.
Cass, Ronald, Richard Boltuck, Seth Kaplan, and Michael Knoll (1998). “Antidumping”. Peter
Newman, ed. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. London: Macmillan.
Horlick, Gary and Steven Sugarman (1999). “Antidumping Policy as a System of Law”. In
Miguel Mendoza, Patrick Low and Barbara Kotschwar, eds. Trade Rules in the Making:
Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations. Washington, DC: Brookings/OAS, pp.
341-364.
Clough, M. and F. Randolph (1996). “Recent Developments in EC Antidumping Practice and the
GATT”. In N. Emiliou and D. O’Keeffe, eds. The European Union and World Law: After the
GATT Uruguay Round. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 218-252.
Waer, Paul and Edwin Vermulst (1999). “EC Antisubsidy Law and Practice After the Uruguay
Round: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?”. Journal of World Trade; V.33-#3, pp. 19-43.
Komuro, N. (1997). “Evolution of Japan’s Antidumping Law and Practice”. World Competition;
V.21-#1, pp. 5-49.
C. Broader Scope
Dale, Richard (1980). Antidumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order. New York: St. Martins.
Caine, Wesley (1981). “A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act of
1930”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.13-#3, pp. 681-725.
Stegemann, Klaus (1985). “Antidumping Policy and the Consumer”. Journal of World Trade
Law; V.19-#5, pp. 466-484.
Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Leidy (1989). “Dumping, Anti-dumping, and Emergency
Protection”. Journal of World Trade; V.23-#1, pp. 27-44.
Grinols, Earl (1989). “Procedural Protectionism: The New American Trade Bill and the New
Interventionist Mode”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.125-#3, pp. 501-521.
Cass, Ronald (1990). “Trade Subsidy Law: Can Foolish Inconsistency Be Good Enough for
Government Work?” Law and Policy in International Business; V.21-#4, pp. 609-661.
Finger, J. Michael, ed. (1993). Antidumping: How it Works and Who Gets Hurt. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Leidy (1993). “Antidumping and Market Disruption: The
Incentive Effects of Antidumping Laws”. In Robert Stern, ed., The Multilateral Trading System:
Analysis and Options for Change. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 155-181.
Stiglitz, Joseph (1997). “Dumping on Free Trade: The U.S. Import Trade Laws”. Southern
Economic Journal; V.64-#2, pp. 402-424.
Broude, Tomer (2003). “An Anti-dumping ‘To Be or Not To Be’ in Five Acts: A New Agenda
for Research and Reform”. Journal of World Trade; V.37-#2, pp. 305-328.
Lowenfeld, Andreas (1980). “Fair or Unfair: Does it Matter?”. Cornell International Law
Journal; V.13-#?, pp. 205-219.
Finger, J. Michael (1992). “Dumping and Antidumping: The Rhetoric and Reality of Protection
in Industrial Countries”. World Bank Research Observer; V.7-#2, pp. 121-143.
Lindsey, Brink (2000). “The US Antidumping Law: Rhetoric versus Reality”. Journal of World
Trade; V.34-#1, pp. 1-38.
II. The Economic Analysis of Dumping
A. The Traditional Analysis: International Price Discrimination
1. On Price Discrimination: Characterization and Welfare
Phlips, Louis (1981). The Economics of Price Discrimination. Cambridge: CUP.
Tirole, Jean (1988). “Price Discrimination”. Chapter 3 In Theory of Industrial Organization.
Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 133-168.
Varian, Hal (1989). “Price Discrimination”. In R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds. Handbook of
Industrial Organization, V.I. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 597-654.
Pigou, Arthur (1928/2000). “Discriminating Monopoly”. Chapter XVII of The Economics of
Welfare. New Brunswick: Transaction, pp. 275-289. [also Appendix III, Section 8, pp. 810-812.]
Robinson, Joan (1933). “Price Discrimination”. Book V of The Economics of Imperfect
Competition. New York: St. Martins, pp. 179-208.
Simkin, C.G.F. (1947/8). “Some Aspects and Generalisations of the Theory of Discrimination”.
Review of Economic Studies; V.15-#1, pp. 1-13.
Edwards, Edgar (1950). “The Analysis of Output under Discrimination”. Econometrica; V.18-#2,
pp. 163-172.
Enke, Stephen (1964). “Some Notes on Price Discrimination”. Canadian Journal of Economics
and Political Science; V.30-#1, pp. 95-109.
Greenhut, M.L. and H. Ohta (1976). “Joan Robinson’s Criterion for Deciding Whether Market
Discrimination Reduces Output”. Economic Journal; V.86-#341, pp. 96-97.
Schmalensee, Richard (1981). “Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third Degree
Price Discrimination”. American Economics Review; V.71-#1, pp. 242-247.
Varian, Hal (1985). “Price Discrimination and Social Welfare”. American Economics Review;
V.75-#4, pp. 870-875.
Schwartz, Marius (1990). “Third Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a
Welfare Result”. American Economics Review; V.80-#5, pp. 1259-1262.
Malueg, David (1993). “Bounding the Effects of Third Degree Price Dispersion”. American
Economics Review; V.83-#4, pp. 1011-1021.
Katz, Michael (1987). “The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in
Intermediate Good Markets”. American Economic Review; V.77-#1, pp. 154-167.
Hausman, Jerry and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason (1988). “Price Discrimination and Patent Policy”.
RAND Journal of Economics; V.19-#2, pp. 253-265.
Nahata, Babu, Krzysztof Ostaszewski, and P.K. Sahoo (1990). “Direction of Price Changes in
Third Degree Price Discrimination”. American Economics Review; V.80-#5, pp. 1254-1258.
DeGraba, Patrick (1987). “The Effects of Price Restrictions on Competition Between Local and
National Firms”. RAND Journal of Economics; V.18-#3, pp. 333-347.
2. On Predation
Brodley, Joseph and George Hay (1981). “Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and
the Evolution of Legal Standards”. Cornell Law Review; V.66-#4, pp. 738-803.
Hay, George (1981). “A Confused Lawyer’s Guide to Predatory Pricing”. In Steven Salop, ed.
Strategy, Predation and Antitrust Analysis. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, pp.
155-202.
Ordover, Janusz and Garth Saloner (1989). “Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust”. in R.
Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization--V.I. Amsterdam: NorthHolland, pp.537-596.
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1990). “New Theories of Predatory Pricing”. in Bonanno and
Brandolini, eds. Industrial Structure in the New Industrial Economics. New York: Oxford
University Press, pp. 112-137.
Phlips, Louis (1995). “Predatory Pricing”. Part IV of Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic
Perspective. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 185-255.
Telser, Lester (1966). “Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse”. Journal of Law &
Economics; V.9-#2, pp. 81-94.
Areeda, Philip and Donald Turner (1975). “Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act”. Harvard Law Review; V.88-#4, pp. 697-733.
Scherer, Frederick (1976). “Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment”. Harvard Law
Review: V.89-#5, pp. 869-890. [A&T reply and Scherer responds, pp. 891-903.]
Williamson, Oliver (1977). “Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis”. Yale Law
Journal; V.87-#2, pp. 284-340. [A&T comment, V.87-#7, pp. 1337-1352 , and Williamson
replies 1353 and V.88-#6, pp. 1183-1201.]
Baumol, William (1979). “Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of
Predatory Pricing”. Yale Law Journal; V.89-#1, pp. 1-26.
Joskow, Paul and Alvin Klevorik (1979). “A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing
Policy”. Yale Law Journal; V.89-#2, pp. 213-270.
McGee, John (1980). “Predatory Pricing Revisited”. Journal of Law & Economics; V.23-#2, pp.
289-330.
Ordover, Janusz and Robert Willig (1981). “An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and
Product Innovation”. Yale Law Journal; V.91-#1, pp. 8-53.
Easterbrook, Frank (1981). “Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies”. University of Chicago
Law Review; V.48-#2, pp. 263-337.
Areeda, Philip and Herbert Hovenkamp (1987). Antitrust Law. Boston: Little Brown.
Schwartz, Marius (1989). “Investments in Oligopoly: Welfare Effects and Tests for Predation”.
Oxford Economic Papers; V.41-#?, pp. 698-719.
Salop, Steven and David Scheffman (1983). “Raising Rivals Costs”. American Economics
Review; V.73-#2, pp. 267-271.
Krattenmaker, Thomas and Steven Salop (1986). “Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power over Price”. Yale Law Journal; V.96-#2, pp. 209-293.
Salop, Steven and David Scheffman (1987). “Cost Raising Strategies”. Journal of Industrial
Economics; V.36-#1, pp. 19-34.
Brennen, Timothy (1988). “Understanding Raising Rivals Costs”. Antitrust Bulletin; V.33-#1,
pp. 95-113.
Scheffman, David (1992). “The Application of Raising Rivals’ Costs Theory to Antitrust”.
Antitrust Bulletin, 37-#1, pp. 187-206.
Depken, Craig and Jon Ford (1999). “NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals’ Costs”. Review of
Industrial Organization; V.15-#2, pp. 103-113. [comment by Charles Sawyer, V.18-#1, pp. 127131.]
3. Effect of Dumping on the Exporting Nation
a. Dumping and Welfare
Viner, Jacob (1923). “The Influence of Dumping on Prices in the Dumping Country”. Chapter VI
of Viner (1923), pp. 94-109.
Graham, Frank (1924). “Review of Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International Trade”.
American Economics Review; V.14-#2, pp. 321-324.
Yntema, Theodore O. (1928). “The Influence of Dumping on Monopoly Price”. Journal of
Political Economy; V.36-#6, pp. 686-698.
Lofgren, Karl-Gustaf (1977). “Dumping, Devaluation and Monopoly Prices: A Generalization of
Yntema’s Results”. Revista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali; V.24-#8, pp.
658-677.
Leontief, Wassily (1940). “The Theory of Limited and Unlimited Discrimination”. Quarterly
Journal of Economics; V.54-#3, pp. 490-501.
Enke, Stephen (1946). “Monopolistic Output and International Trade”. Quarterly Journal of
Economics; V.60-#2, pp. 233-249.
Meade, James (1955). “The Second Best Argument for Trade Control: (4) Dumping as a
Complex Case”. Chapter XV in Trade and Welfare. London: Oxford University Press/RIIA, pp.
244-253. [also Section XV of the Mathematical Supplement.]
Cocks, R.A. and Harry Johnson (1972). “A Note on Dumping and Social Welfare”. Canadian
Journal of Economics; V.5-#1, pp. 137-140.
Wares, William (1977). “The Effect of Dumping on Welfare in the Exporting Country”. Chapter
2 of Wares (1977), pp. 27-55.
Rieber, William (1982), “Discriminating Monopoly and International Trade”, Economic Journal.
V.92-#366; pp. 365-376.
Das, Satya and Aadwait Mohanty (1984). “Dumping in International Markets and Welfare: A
General Equilibrium Analysis”. Journal of International Economics; V.17-#1/2, pp. 149-157.
Das, Satya and Aadwait Mohanty (1987). “Welfare of the Dumping Country: A Comprehensive
Ranking of Policies”. Journal of Quantitative Economics; V.3-#1, pp. 13-34.
b. Domestic Economic Conditions/Policy and Dumping
Pigou, Arthur (1904). “Pure Theory and the Fiscal Controversy”. Economic Journal; V.14-#53,
pp. 29-33. [Problem 6, pp. 32-33].
Pigou, Arthur (1905). “Professor Dietzel on Dumping and Retaliation”. Economic Journal; V.15#59; pp. 436-443.
Viner, Jacob (1923). “The Profitability of Dumping to the Dumper”. Chapter VII in Dumping: A
Problem in International Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 110-131.
Corden, W. Max (1967), “Monopoly, Tariffs and Subsidies”, Economica. V.34-#1; pp. 50-58.
Basevi, Giorgio (1970), “Domestic Demand and the Ability to Export”, Journal of Political
Economy. V.78-#2; pp. 330-337.
Frenkel, Jacob (1971). “On Domestic Demand and the Ability to Export”. Journal of Political
Economy; V.79-#3, pp. 668-672.
Pursell, Gary and Richard Snape (1973), “Economies of Scale, Price Discrimination and
Exporting”, Journal of International Economics. V.3-#1; pp. 85-92.
Snape, Richard (1977), “Trade Policy in the Presence of Economies of Scale and Product
Variety”, Economic Record; V.53-#144; pp. 525-534.
Curtis, Douglas (1983), “Trade Policy to Promote Entry with Scale Economies, Product Variety,
and Export Potential”, Canadian Journal of Economics; V.16-#1; pp. 109-121.
Stegemann, Klaus (1984), “Trade Policy to Promote Entry with Scale Economies: Orthodoxy
Restored”, Canadian Journal of Economics; V.17-#4; pp. 774-777.
Dutton, John (1990). “Targeted Export Subsidies as an Exercise of Monopoly Power”. Canadian
Journal of Economics; V.23-#3, pp. 705-710.
Auquier, Antoine and Richard. Caves (1979), “Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and
Optimal Competition Policy”, Economic Journal; V.89-#?; pp. 559-581.
Katrak, Homi (1980). “Multinational Monopolies and Monopoly Regulation”. Oxford Economic
Papers; V.32-#3, pp. 453-466.
Donnenfeld, Shabtai (1982). “Domestic Regulation and the Preservation of Monopoly Power in
Foreign Markets”. Southern Economic Journal; V.49-#4, pp. 954-965.
c. Market Entry Dumping where Consumers are Uncertain about Quality
Bond, Eric (1984). “International Trade with Uncertain Product Quality”. Southern Economic
Journal; V.51-#1, pp. 196-207.
Donnenfeld, Shabtai (1986). “Intra-Industry Trade and Imperfect Information about Product
Quality”. European Economic Review; V.30-#2, pp. 401-417.
Donnenfeld, Shabtai, Shlomo Weber and Uri Ben-Zion (1985). “Import Controls under Imperfect
Information”. Journal of International Economics; V.19-#3/4, pp. 341-354.
Donnenfeld, Shabtai and Wolfgang Mayer (1987). “The Quality of Export Products and Optimal
Trade Policy”. International Economic Review; V.28-#1, pp. 159-174.
Chiang, Shih-Chen and Robert Masson (1988). Domestic Industrial Structure and Export
Quality”. International Economic Review; V.29-#2, pp. 261-270.
Mayer, Wolfgang (1984). “The Infant-Export Industry Argument”. Canadian Journal of
Economics; V.17-#2, pp. 249-269.
Flamm, Harry (1987). “Reverse Dumping”. European Economic Review; V.31-#1/2, pp. 82-88.
Falvey, Rod (1989). “Trade, Quality Reputations and Commercial Policy”. International
Economic Review; V.30-#3, pp. 607-622.
Grossman, Gene and Henrik Horn (1988). “Infant Industry Protection Reconsidered: The Case of
Informational Barriers to Entry”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.103-#4, pp.767-787.
Bagwell, Kyle and Robert Staiger (1989). “The Role of Export Subsidies when Product Quality
is Unknown”. Journal of International Economics; V.27-#1/2, pp. 69-89.
Bagwell, Kyle (1991). “Optimal Export Policy for an New Product Monopoly”. American
Economic Review; V.81-#5, pp. 1156-1169.
Chen, Mah-Lih (1991). “The Role of R&D Subsidies when Incomplete Information is an Entrybarrier”. Journal of International Economics; V.31-#3/4, pp. 251-270.
Rodrik, Dani (1994). “Industrial Organization and Product Quality: Evidence from South Korean
and Taiwanese Exports”. in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade
Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 195-210.
Wojcik, Charlotte (2000). “Strategic Trade Policy in the Presence of Consumer Learning”.
Economica; V.67-#266, pp. 283-295.
4. Effect of Dumping on the Importing Country
Viner, Jacob (1923). “The Consequences of Dumping to the Importing Country”. Chapter VIII of
Viner.
Yarrow, George (1987). “Economic Aspects of Antidumping Policies”. Oxford Review of
Economic Policy; V.3-#1, pp. 66-79.
Boltuck, Richard (1987). “An Economic Analysis of Dumping”. Journal of World Trade Law;
V.21-#5, pp. 45-54.
Boltuck, Richard (1991). “Assessing the Effects on the Domestic Industry of Price-Dumping”. In
P.K.M. Tharakan, ed. Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures. Amsterdam: NorthHolland, pp. 99-141.
Murray, Tracy and Donald Rousslang (1989). “A Method for Estimating Injury Caused by Unfair
Trade Practices”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.9-#2, pp. 149-164.
Monti, G. (1995). “When Does Dumping Cause Injury?”. World Competition; V.18-#3, pp. 97114.
Kelly, Kenneth and Morris Morkre (1998). “Do Unfairly Trade Imports Injure Domestic
Industries?”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#2, pp. 321-332.
Kravis, Irving and Richard Lipsey (1977). “Export Prices and the Transmission of Inflation”.
American Economics Review; V.67-#2, pp. 148-163.
B. Dumping under Perfect Competition: Intertemporal Linkage
Ethier, Wilfred (1982). “Dumping”. Journal of Political Economy; V.90-#3, pp. 487-506.
Anderson, James (1992). “Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters”. American Economic
Review; V.82-#1, pp. 65-83.
Clarida, Richard (1993). “Entry, Dumping and Shakeout”. American Economics Review; V.83#1, pp. 180-202.
C.Dumping with Market Uncertainty and Adjustment Costs: Cyclical dumping
Ethier, Wilfred (1982). “Dumping”. Journal of Political Economy; V.90-#3, pp. 487-506.
Davies, Stephen and Anthony McGuinness (1982). “Dumping at Less than Marginal Cost”.
Journal of International Economics; V.12-#1/2, pp. 169-182.
Katz, E., J. Paroush and N. Kahana (1982). “Price Uncertainty and the Price Discriminating Firm
in International Trade”. International Economic Review; V.23-#2, pp. 389-400.
Blair, Roger and Leonard Cheng (1984). “On Dumping”. Southern Economic Journal; V.50-#3,
pp. 857-865.
Lahiri, Sajal and Jeffrey Sheen (1990). “On Optimal Dumping”. Economic Journal; V.100#400, pp. 127-136.
Bernhardt, Dan (1984). “Dumping, Adjustment Costs and Uncertainty”. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control; V.8-3, pp. 349-370.
Hillman, Arye and Eliakim Katz (1986). “Domestic Uncertainty and Foreign Dumping”.
Canadian Journal of Economics; V.19-#3, pp. 403-416.
Das, Satya (1992). “Market Uncertainties and Cyclical Dumping”. European Economic Review;
V.36-#1, pp. 71-82.
Eldor, Rafael and Itzhak Zilcha (1987). “Discriminating Monopoly, Forward Markets and
International Trade”. International Economic Review; V.28-#2, pp. 459-468.
Eldor, Rafael and Itzhak Zilcha (1990). “Oligopoly, Uncertain Demand and Forward Markets”.
Journal of Economics and Business; V.42-#1, pp. 17-26.
Hartigan, James (1996). “Predatory Dumping”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#1, pp.
228-239.
Aizenman, Joshua (1996). “Foreign Direct Investment, Employment Volatility and Cyclical
Dumping”. International Journal of Finance and Economics; V.1-#2, pp. 117-131.
Tarr, David (1979). “Cyclical Dumping: The Case of Steel Products”. Journal of International
Economics; V.9-#1, pp. 57-63.
Aspe, Pedro and Francesco Giavazzi (1982). “The Short Run Behavior of Prices and Output in
the Exportables Sector”. Journal of International Economics; V.12-#1/2, pp. 83-93.
Brannlund, Runar and Karl-Gustaf Lofgren (1995). “Cyclical Dumping and Correlated Business
Cycles in Imperfect Markets: Empirical Applications to the Canadian Pulp and Paper Industry”.
Applied Economics; V.27-#11, pp. 1081-1091.
D. Oligopolistic Interaction and Dumping
1. Oligopolistic Interaction and Dumping
Helpman, Elhanan and Paul Krugman (1985). “Oligopoly”. Chapter 5 of Market Structure and
Foreign Trade: Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition and the International Economy.
Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 86-111.
Brander, James (1981). “Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities”. Journal of
International Economics; V.11-#1, pp. 1-14.
Brander, James and Paul Krugman (1983). “A ‘Reciprocal Dumping’ Model of International
Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.15-#3/4, pp. 313-321.
Pinto, Brian (1986). “Repeated Games and the ‘Reciprocal Dumping’ Model of Trade”. Journal
of International Economics; V.20-#3/4, pp. 357-366.
Anderson, Simon and Ronald Fischer (1989). “Multi-Market Oligopoly with Production before
Sales”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.38-#2, pp. 167-182.
Weinstein, David (1991). “Competition and Unilateral Dumping”. Journal of International
Economics; V.32-#3/4, pp. 379-388.
Collie, David (1992). “International Trade and Cournot Equilibrium: Existence, Uniqueness and
Comparative Statics”. Bulletin of Economic Research; V.44-#1, pp. 55-66.
Dastidar, Krishnendu (1998). “Reciprocal Dumping and Trade Policy”. Journal of International
Trade and Economic Development; V.7-#4, pp. 439-449.
Murray, Tracy and Nurlan Turdaliev (1999). “Universal Dumping of Homogeneous Products”.
Review of International Economics; V.7-#4, pp. 580-589.
Calmette, Marie-Francoise (2002). “A Two Way Trade Model without Reciprocal Dumping”.
Economia Internazionale; V.55-#3, pp. 297-310.
Kong, Ying (2003). “Persistent Dumping, Competition, and Welfare”. Journal of International
Trade and Economic Development; V.12-#1, pp. 19-37.
Fung, K.C. (1991). “Collusive Intra-Industry Trade”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.24-#2,
pp. 391-404.
Neven, Damien, George Norman and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1991). “Attitudes Toward
Foreign Products and International Price Competition”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.24#1, pp. 1-11.
Baye, Michael and Casper de Vries (1992). “Mixed Strategy Trade Equilibrium”. Canadian
Journal of Economics; V.25-#2, pp. 281-293.
Dei, Fumio (1990). “A Note on Multinational Corporations in a Reciprocal Dumping Model”.
Journal of International Economics; V.29-#1/2, pp. 161-171.
Baldwin, Richard and Gianmarco Ottaviano (2001). “Multiproduct Monopolists and Reciprocal
FDI Dumping”. Journal of International Economics; V.54-#2, pp. 429-448.
Coldwell, Daniel and John Reid (1994). “Some Evidence Regarding the Reciprocal Dumping
Hypothesis”. International Economic Journal; V.8-#3, pp. 11-18.
Bernhofen, Daniel (1998). “Intra-industry Trade and Strategic Interaction: Theory and Evidence”.
Journal of International Economics; V.45-#1, pp. 77-96.
Bernhofen, Daniel and Zahid Hafeez (2001). “Oligopolistic Competition and Intra-Industry
Trade: Evidence from the OECD”. Australian Economic Papers; V.40-#1, pp. 77-90.
Feenstra, Robert, James Markusen, and Andrew Rose (2001). “Using the Gravity Equation to
Differentiate Among Alternative Theories of Trade”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.34-#2,
pp. 430-447.
Goldberg, Pinelopi and Michael Knetter (1997). “Goods Prices and Exchange Rates: What Have
We Learned?”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.35-#3, pp. 1243-1272.
Kirman, Alan and Louis Phlips (1996). “Exchange Rate Pass-through and Market Structures”.
Journal of Economics; V.64-#2, pp. 129-154.
Hens, Thorsten, Eckart Jäger, Alan Kirman and Louis Phlips (1999). “Exchange Rates and
Oligopoly”. European Economic Review; V.43-#3, pp. 621-648.
Gil-Pareja, Salvador (2002). “Export Price Discrimination in Europe and Exchange Rates”.
Review of International Economics; V.10-#2, pp. 299-312.
Gil-Pareja, Salvador (2003). “Pricing to Market Behaviour in European Car Markets”. European
Economic Review; V.47-#6, pp. 945-962.
2. International Competition with Vertical Industry Links
Bernhofen, Daniel (1995). “Price Dumping in Intermediate Goods Markets”. Journal of
International Economics; V.39-#1/2, pp. 159-173.
Bernhofen, Daniel (1996). “Vertical Integration and International Predation”. Review of
International Economics; V.4-#1, pp. 90-98.
Cheng, Leonard and Mordechai Kreinin (1996). “Supplier Preferences and Dumping: An
Analysis of Japanese Corporate Groups”. Southern Economics Journal; V.63-#1, pp. 51-59.
Hamilton, Stephen and Kyle Stiegert (2000). “Vertical Coordination, Antitrust Law and
International Trade”. Journal of Law & Economics; V.43-#1, pp. 143-156.
Roy, Santanu and Jean-Marie Viaene (1998). “On Strategic Vertical Foreign Investment”.
Journal of International Economics; V.46-#2, pp. 253-279.
McLaren, John (2000). “Globalization and Vertical Structure”. American Economics Review;
V.90-#5, pp. 1239-1254.
Perry, Martin (1989). “Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects”. in R. Schmalensee and R.
Willig, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization--V.I. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 183-255.
Rey, Patrick and Jean Tirole (2003). “A Primer on Foreclosure”. In M. Armstrong and H.M.
Porter, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming.
Rey, Patrick and Jean Tirole (1986). “The Logic of Vertical Restraints”. American Economic
Review; V.76-#5, pp. 921-939.
Salinger, Michael (1988). “Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure”. Quarterly Journal of
Economics; V.103-#2, pp. 345-356.
Ordover, Janusz, Garth Saloner and Steven Salop (1990). “Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure”.
American Economics Review; V.80-#1, pp. 127-142. [comment and reply, V.82-#3.]
Hart, Oliver and Jean Tirole (1990). “Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure”. Brookings
Papers on Economic Analysis; Microeconomics, pp. 205-286.
Bolton, Patrick and Michael Whinston (1991). “The ‘Foreclosure’ Effects of Vertical Mergers”.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.147-#1, pp. 207-226.
Riordan, Michael (1998). “Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm”. American
Economic Review; V.88-#5, pp. 1232-1248.
Sibley, David and Dennis Weisman (1998). “Raising Rivals’ Costs: The Entry of an Upstream
Monopolist into Downstream Markets”. Information Economics and Policy; V.10-#4, pp. 451470.
Kühn, Kai-Uwe and Xavier Vives (1999). “Excess Entry, Vertical Integration and Welfare”.
RAND Journal of Economics; V.30-#4, pp. 575-603.
Linnemer, Laurent (2003). “Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm”. Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy; V.12-#2, pp. 231-259.
3. Incomplete Information and Dumping
Eaton, Jonathan and Leonard Mirman (1991). “Predatory Dumping as Signal Jamming”. in A.
Takayama, et al. eds. Trade, Policy, and International Adjustments. San Diego: Academic Press,
pp. 60-76.
Hartigan, James (1993). “Dumping and Signalling”. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization; V.23-#1, pp. 1-22.
Fischer, Ronald and Leonard Mirman (1994). “Learning about Enforcement: A Model of
Dumping”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 214-220.
4. Dumping with Learning and Dynamic Competition
Gruenspecht, Howard (1988). “Dumping and Dynamic Competition”. Journal of International
Economics; V.25-#?, pp. 225-248.
Berck, Peter and Jeffrey Perloff (1990). “Dynamic Dumping”. International Journal of Industrial
Organization; V.8-#2, pp. 225-243.
Finan, William and Chris Amundsen (1986). “Modelling US-Japan Competition in
Semiconductors”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.8-#3, pp. 305-326.
Mody, Ashoka and David Wheeler (1987). “Prices, Costs, and Competition at the Technological
Frontier”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.9-#2, pp. 367-382.
Krugman, Paul (1987). “Market Access and Competition in High Technology Industries”. in H.
Kierzkowski, ed. Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.
128-142.
Baldwin, Richard and Paul Krugman (1987). “Market Access and Imperfect Competition: A
Simulation Study of 16K Random Access Memory”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Research in
International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 171-197.
Dick, Andrew (1991). “Learning-by-doing and Dumping in the Semiconductor Industry”.
Journal of Law and Economics; V.34-#1, pp. 133-159.
Flamm, Kenneth (1993). “Forward Pricing v. Fair Value: An Analytical Assessment of
‘Dumping’ in DRAMs”. In T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. Trade and Protectionism. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 47-93.
Irwin, Douglas and Peter Klenow (1994). “Learning by Doing Spillovers in the Semiconductor
Industry”. Journal of Political Economy; V.102-#6, pp. 1200-1227.
III. Law and Economics of Administered Protection
A. Analysis of Trade at Less than Fair Value
Brandt, J. and W. Zeitler (1980). “Unfair Trade Practice Jurisdiction: The Applicability of
Section 337 and the Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Laws”. Law and Policy in
International Business; V.12-#1, pp. 95-116.
Holmer, A., S. Haggerty and W. Hunter (1984). “Identifying and Measuring Subsidies under
Countervailing Duty Law: An Attempt at Synthesis”. The Commerce Department Speaks on
Import Administration and Export Administration, 1984. Washington, DC: Practicing Law
Institute, pp. 301-460.
Goetz, C., L. Granet and W. Schwartz (1986). “The Meaning of ‘Subsidy’ and ‘Injury’ in
Countervailing Duty Law”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.6-#?, pp. 17-32.
Diamond, R. (1989). “Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law”. Virginia Journal of
International Law; V.29-#?, pp. 767-812.
Diamond, R., M. Trebilcock, and J. Jackson (1990). “A Search for Economic and Financial
Principles in the Administration of US Countervailing Duty Law”. Law and Policy in
International Business. V.21-#4, pp. 507-607.
Sykes, Alan (1990). “Second Best Countervailing Duty Law: A Critique of the Entitlement
Approach”. Law and Policy in International Business. V.21-#4, pp. 699-722.
Palmeter, N. David (1986). “Torquemada and the Tariff Act: The Inquisitor Rides Again”.
International Lawyer; V.20-#?, pp. 641-657.
Palmeter, N. David (1988). “Exchange Rates and Anti-Dumping Determinations”. Journal of
World Trade Law; V.22-#?, pp. 73-80.
Coursey, M. and D. Binder (1989). “Hypothetical Calculations under the US Antidumping Law:
Foreign Market Value, US Price and Weighted-Average Dumping Margins”. American
University Journal of International Law and Policy; V.4-#?, pp. 537-553.
Bollom, W. and D. Simons (1990). “The Use of Accounting Data in Antidumping Cases: A
Public Policy Perspective”. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy; V.9-#1, pp. 1-18.
Boltuck, Richard and Robert Litan, eds. (1992). Down in the Dumps: Administration of the
Unfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Finger, J. Michael (1992). “The Meaning of ‘Unfair’ in US Import Policy”. Minnesota Journal of
Global Trade; V.1-#1, pp. 35-56.
Lindsey, Brink (2000). “The US Antidumping Law: Rhetoric versus Reality”. Journal of World
Trade; V.34-#1, pp. 1-38.
Vandenbussche, Hylke (1996), “Is European Antidumping Protection Against Central Europe
Too High?”, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.132-#1, pp. 116-138.
B. Analysis of Injury
Perry, W. (1985). “Administration of Import Trade Laws by the US ITC”. Boston University
International Law Journal;
Jameson, P. (1986). “Recent ITC Practice Regarding the Material Injury Standard: A Critique”.
Law and Policy in International Business; V.18-#3, pp. 517-577.
Grossman, Gene (1986). “Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the US Steel Industry”.
Journal of International Economics; V.20-#3/4, pp. 201-223.
Pindyck, Robert and Julio Rotemberg (1987). “Are Imports to Blame? Attribution of Injury
Under the 1974 Act”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.30-#1, pp 101-122.
Kelly, Kenneth (1988). “The Analysis of Causality in Escape Clause Cases”. Journal of
Industrial Economics; V.37-#2, pp. 187-207.
Rousslang, Donald (1988). “Import Injury in US Trade Law: An Economic View”. International
Review of Law and Economics; V.8-#1, pp. 117-122.
Morkre, Morris and H. Kruth (1989). “Determining Whether Dumped Or Subsidized Imports
Injure Domestic Industries: The ITC Approach”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.7-#3, pp. 78-95.
Knoll, M. (1989). “Legal and Economic Framework for Analysis of Injury by the US ITC”.
Journal of World Trade; V.23-#3, pp. 95-107.
Knoll, M. (1989). “An Economic Approach to the Determination of Injury under US
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law”. NYU Journal of International Law and Policy;
V.22-#?, pp. 37-116.
Palmeter, N. David (1987). “Injury Determinations in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases--A Commentary on US Practice”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.21-#1, pp. 7-45.
Palmeter, N. David (1987). “Dumping Margins and Material Injury: The USITC is Free to
Choose”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.21-#?, pp. 173-175.
Cass, Ronald and W. Schwartz (1990). “Causality, Coherence and Transparency in the
Implementation of International Trade Laws”. in M. Trebilcock and R. York, eds. Fair
Exchange: Reforming Trade Remedy Laws. Toronto: C.D. Howe, pp. 24-90.
Kaplan, Seth (1991). “Injury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations: Five Recent
Approaches”. in Tharakan, ed.
Sykes, Alan (1996). “The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases”.
International Review of Law and Economics; V.16-#1, pp. 5-26.
Sykes, Alan (1997). “The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases”.
In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions in International Law. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 83-125. [comment by R. Cass and M. Knoll, pp. 126-165.]
Boltuck, Richard (1997). “Innovations in Support of the Unitary Injury Test in U.S. Unfair Trade
Cases”. In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions in International Law.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 166-185.
Steen, B. (1987). “Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative to Defining ‘Like Product’
and ‘Domestic Industry’ under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979”. Virginia Law Review;
Arguea, N. and R. Harper (1994). “Industry Definition and Less Than Fair Value Pricing: An
Analysis of ITC Practice”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#1, pp. 106-127.
Cladouhos, W.P. (1994). “The multi-purpose vehicle reclassification and minivan dumping
disputes between the United States and Japan and their consistency with United States
obligations under the GATT”. American University Journal of International Law and Policy;
V.10-#?, pp. 1109-1166.
Mock, W. jr. (1986). “Cumulation of Import Statistics in Injury Investigations Before the ITC”.
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business; V.7-#3, pp. 433-479.
Hansen, Wendy and Thomas Prusa (1996). “Cumulation and ITC Decision-making: The Sum of
the Parts is Greater than the Whole”. Economic Inquiry; V.34-#4, pp. 746-769.
Prusa, Thomas (1998). “Cumulation and Anti-dumping: A Challenge to Competition”. World
Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1021-1033.
Tharakan, P.K. Matthew, David Greenaway, and Joseph Tharakan (1998). “Cumulation and
Injury Determination of the European Community in Antidumping Cases”. Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv; V.134-#2, pp. 320-339.
Prusa, Thomas and D. Sharp (2001). “Simultaneous Equations in Antidumping Investigations”.
Journal of Forensic Economics; V.14-#1, pp. 63-78.
C. Administrative/Sunset Reviews
DeVault, James (1996). “US Antidumping Administrative Reviews”. International Trade
Journal; V.10-#2, pp. 247-267 .
Stewart, Terrence and Amy Dwyer (1998). “Sunset Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Measures: US Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments”. Journal of World Trade;
V32-#5, pp. 101-135.
Boltuck, Richard and Setu Kaplan (1998). “An Economic Approach to ITC Sunset Reviews”. in
R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 219-239.
Moore, Michael (2002). “Commerce Department Antidumping Sunset Reviews: A First
Assessment”. Journal of World Trade; V.36-#2, pp. 675-698.
D. The Relationship between Antidumping and Anti-trust Law
Epstein, B. (1973). “The Illusionary Conflict Between Antidumping and Antitrust”. Antitrust
Bulletin; V.18-#?, pp. 1-22.
Applebaum, H. and D. Grace (1987). “US Antitrust Law and Antidumping Actions under Title
VII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979”. Antitrust Law Journal; V.56-#2, pp. 497-518.
Elzinga, Kenneth (1987). “The Interface of Trade/Competition Law: An Economist's
Perspective”. Antitrust Law Journal; V.56-#2, pp. 439Davidow, Joel (1980). “Competition, Trade and the Antitrust Division”. Northwestern Journal of
International Law and Business; V.2-#2, pp.300-316.
Davidow, Joel (1982/83). “Cartels, Competition Law and the Regulation of International Trade”.
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, V.15-#2, pp. 351-376.
Victor, A. Paul (1982/3). “Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the Inconsistencies be Removed”.
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, V.15-#2, pp. 339-350.
Wood, D. (1989). “‘Unfair’ Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach”. Stanford Law
Review; V.41-#5, pp. 1153-1200.
Davidow, Joel (1991). “The Relationship between Anti-Trust Laws and Trade Laws in the US”.
World Economy; V.14-#1, pp. 37-52.
Feinberg, R. (1991). “Antitrust Policy and International Trade Liberalization”. World
Competition; V.14-#4, pp. 13-19.
Warner, P. (1992). “Canada-United States Free Trade: The Case for Replacing Antidumping with
Antitrust”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.23-#4, pp. 791-890.
Cass, Ronald (1993). “Price Discrimination and Predation Analysis in Antitrust and International
Trade: A Comment”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 877-888.
Kelly, Kenneth (1993). “Empirical Analysis for Antitrust and International Trade Law”.
University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 889-902.
Boltuck, Richard and Seth Kaplan (1993). “Conflicting Entitlements: Can Antidumping and
Antitrust Regulation be Reconciled”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 903-
917.
Morkre, Morris and K. Kelly (1993). “Perspectives on the Effects of Unfair Imports on Domestic
Industries”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 919-944.
Messerlin, Patrick (1994). “Should Antidumping Rules Be Replaced by National or International
Competition Rules?”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.49-#2/3 pp. 351-374.
Schoenbaum, T. (1994). “The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need
for a Synthesis with Antitrust”. North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation; .V.19-#?, pp. 393-436.
Barbuto, C.M. (1994). “Towards Convergence of Antitrust and Trade Law: An International
Trade Analogue to Robinson-Patman”. Fordham Law Journal; V.62-#?, pp. 2047-2094.
Lloyd, Peter and Gary Sampson (1995). “Competition and Trade Policy: Identifying the Issues
After the Uruguay Round”. World Economy; V.18-#5, pp. 681-705.
Victor, A. Paul and M. Friedman (1995). “Antidumping and Antitrust: Pricing Schizophrenia?”.
International Business Lawyer; V.23-#1, pp.
Hoekman, Bernard and Petros Mavroidis (1996). “Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust”.
Journal of World Trade; V.30-#?, pp. 27-52.
Trebilcock, M. (1996). “Competition Policy and Trade Policy–Mediating the Interface”. Journal
of World Trade; V.30-#4, pp. 71-105.
Lipstein, R. (1997). “Using Antitrust Principles to Reform Antidumping Law”. In E.M. Graham
and J.D. Richardson, eds. Global Competition Policies. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 405-438.
Niels, Gunnar and Adriaan ten Kate (1997). “Trusting Antitrust to Dump Antidumping:
Abolishing Antidumping in Free Trade Agreements without Replacing it With Antidumping
Law”. Journal of World Trade; V.31-#?, pp. 29-43.
Sykes, Alan (1998). “Antidumping and Antitrust: What Problems Does Each Address?”. in R.
Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 1-43.
Sykes, Alan (1999). “Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade”. University
of Chicago Law Review; V.66-#1, pp. 1-46.
Katsuyuki, Y. (1999). “Thirty Years of Being a Respondent in Antidumping Proceedings: Abuse
of Economic Relief Can Have a Negative Impact on Competition Policy”. Journal of World
Trade; V.33-#5, pp. 31-47.
Vandenbussche, Hylke (2000). “Trade Policy versus Competition Policy: Substitutes or
Complements”. De Economist; V.148-#5, pp. 625-642.
IV. Economic Consequences of Administered Protection
A. Basic Economic Analysis of Antidumping
Viner, Jacob (1923). “Ordinary Protective Tariffs as Safeguards against Dumping”. Chapter IX
of Viner.
Viner, Jacob (1923). “Comparative Analysis of Antidumping Law”. Chapter XIV of Viner.
Wares, William (1977). “How the Importing Nation Should Regulate Dumping”. Chapter 3 of
The Theory of Dumping and American Commercial Policy. Lexington: D.C. Heath, pp. 57-91.
Stegemann, Klaus (1982). “The Efficiency Rationale of Anti-Dumping Policy and other
Measures of Contingency Protection”. In John Quinn and Philip Slayton, eds. Non-Tariff
Barriers After the Tokyo Round. Quebec: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, pp. 21-69.
Rousslang, Donald and John Suomela (1988). “Calculating the Welfare Costs of Import
Restrictions in the Imperfect Substitutes Model”. Applied Economics; V.20-#5, pp. 691-700.
Jones, Michael (1993). “The Geometry of Protectionism in the Imperfect Substitutes Model: A
Reminder”. Southern Economic Journal; V.60-#1, pp. 235-238.
Webb, Michael (1987). “Anti-Dumping Laws, Production Location and Prices”. Journal of
International Economics; V.22-#3/4, pp. 363-368.
Leidy, Michael and Bernard Hoekman (1990). “Production Effects of Price- and Cost- Based
Anti-dumping Laws Under Flexible Exchange Rates”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.23-#4,
pp. 873-895.
Staiger, Robert and Frank Wolak (1992). “The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the
Presence of Foreign Monopoly”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#3/4, pp. 265-287.
Willig, Robert (1998). “Economic Effects of Antidumping Policy”. in R. Lawrence ed.
Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 57-79.
B. Antidumping Under Oligopoly
1. Basic Analysis
a. Homogeneous Products
Eichengreen, Barry and Hans van der Ven (1984). “US Antidumping Policies: The Case of
Steel”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US. Trade
Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 67-109.
Webb, Michael (1992). “The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Laws”. Economic
Inquiry; V.30-#3, pp. 437-448.
Ethier, Wilfred (1993). “An Antidumping Law with a Distorted Home Market”. in H. Herberg
and N.V. Long, eds., Trade, Welfare and Economic Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, pp. 279-297.
Reitzes, James (1993). “Antidumping Policy”. International Economic Review; V.34-#4, pp.
745-763.
b. Differentiated Products
Dixit, Avinash (1988). “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Under Oligopoly”. European
Economic Review; V.32-#1, pp. 55-68.
Prusa, Thomas (1994). “Pricing Behavior in the Presence of Antidumping Laws”. Journal of
Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 260-289.
Anderson, Simon, Nicholas Schmitt, and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1995). “Who Benefits from
Antidumping Legislation?”. Journal of International Economics; V.38-#3/4, pp. 321-337.
Bian, Jiang and Gerard Gaudet (1997). “Anti-dumping Laws and Oligopolistic Trade”. Journal
of Economic Integration; V.12-#1, pp. 62-86.
Tivig, Thusnelda and Uwe Walz (2000). “Market Share, Cost-based Dumping and AntiDumping Policy”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.33-#1, pp. 69-86.
Pauwels, Wilfred, Hylke Vandenbussche, and Marcel Weverbergh (2001). “Strategic Behaviour
under European Antidumping Duties”. International Journal of Economics of Business; V.8-#1,
pp. 101-122.
c. Spatial Models
Neven, Damien, George Norman and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1991). “Attitudes Toward
Foreign Products and International Price Competition”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.24#1, pp. 1-11.
Anderson, Simon, Nicholas Schmitt, and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1995). “Who Benefits from
Antidumping Legislation?”. Journal of International Economics; V.38-#3/4, pp. 321-337.
Barros, Pedro and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999). “On the Effects of Antidumping Legislation”.
Regional Science and Urban Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 53-72.
Andaluz, Joaquin (2001). “The Effects of Antidumping Legislation on the Degree of Product
Variety and Social Welfare”. Annals of Regional Science; V.35-#4, pp. 561-575.
2. Antidumping and Collusion
Calvani, Terry and Randolph Tritell (1986). “Invocation of US Import Relief Laws as an
Antitrust Violation”. Antitrust Bulletin; V.31-#?, pp. 527-550.
Krishna, Kala (1989). “Trade Restrictions as Facilitating Devices”. Journal of International
Economics; V.26-#?, pp. 251-270.
Stegemann, Klaus (1990). “EC Anti-Dumping Policy: Are Price Undertakings a Legal Substitute
for Illegal Price Fixing?”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.126-#2, pp. 268-297.
Staiger, Robert and Frank Wolak (1991). “Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit
International Collusion”. ms: Stanford University.
Hartigan, James (1995). “Collusive Aspects of Cost Revelation Through Antidumping
Complaints”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.151-#3, pp. 478-489.
Veugelers, Reinhilde and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999). “European Anti-Dumping Policy and
the Profitability of National and International Collusion”. European Economic Review; V.43-#1,
pp.1-28.
Pierce, Richard (2000). “Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization”. Antitrust
Law Journal; V.67-#?, pp. 725-743.
Hartigan, James (2000). “An Antidumping Law Can Be Procompetitive”. Pacific Economic
Review; V.5-#1, pp. 5-14.
Zanardi, Maurizio (2004). “Antidumping Law as a Collusive Device”. Canadian Journal of
Economics; V.37-#1, pp. 95-122.
Taylor, Christopher (2004). “The Economic Effects of Withdrawn Antidumping Investigations:
Is there Evidence of Collusive Settlements?”. Journal of International Economics; V.62-#2, pp.
295-312.
3. Antidumping with Vertical Market Structure
Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Leidy (1992). “Cascading Contingent Protection”. European
Economic Review; V.36-#4, pp. 883-892.
Feinberg, Richard and Seth Kaplan (1993). “Fishing Downstream: The Political Economy of
Effective Administered Protection”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.26-#1, pp. 150-158.
Sleuwaegen, Leo, Rene Belderbos, and Clive Jie-A-Joen (1997). “Cascading Contingent
Protection and Vertical Market Structure”. International Journal of Industrial Organization;
V.16-#6, pp. 697-718.
Bernhofen, Daniel (1995). “Price Dumping in Intermediate Goods Markets”. Journal of
International Economics; V.39-#1/2, pp. 159-173.
Bernhofen, Daniel (1996). “Vertical Integration and International Predation”. Review of
International Economics; V.4-#1, pp. 90-98.
Durling, James and Thomas Prusa (2003). “Using Safeguard Protection to Raise Rivals Costs”.
Japan and the World Economy; V.15-#1, pp. 47-68.
Spencer, Barbara and Ronald Jones (1991). “Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade
Policy”. Review of Economic Studies; V.58-#1, pp. 153-170.
Spencer, Barbara and Ronald Jones (1992). “Trade and Protection in Vertically Related
Markets”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#1/2, pp. 31-55.
Rodrik, Dani and Chang-Ho Yoon (1995). “Strategic Trade Policy with Potential for Import
Substitution”. Journal of Economic Development; V.20-#1, pp. 37-56.
Chang, Winston and Ki-Hong Park (1995). “Intermediate Input Dependency and Strategic Trade
Policy”. in W. Chang and S. Katayama, eds. Imperfect Competition in International Trade.
Boston: Kluwer, pp. 121-141.
Ziss, Steffen (1997). “Strategic Trade Policy and Vertical Structure”. Review of International
Economics; V.5-#1, pp. 142-152.
Bernhofen, Daniel (1997). “Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry”. Review of
International Economics; V.5-#3, pp. 429-433.
Ishikawa, Jota and Ki-Dong Lee (1997). “Backfiring Tariffs in Vertically Related Markets”.
Journal of International Economics; V.42-#3/4, pp. 395-423.
Ishikawa, Jota and Barbara Spencer (1999). “Rent-Shifting Export Subsidies with an Imported
Intermediate Good”. Journal of International Economics; V.48-#2, pp. 199-232.
Fargeix, Andre and Jeffrey Perloff (1989). “The Effect of Tariffs in Markets with Vertical
Restraints”. Journal of International Economics; V.26-#1/2, pp. 99-117.
Nagaoka, Sadao and Akira Goto (1996). “Vertical Restraints and Market Access”. Empirica;
V.24-#1/2, pp. 21-36.
Krishna, Kala and John Morgan (1998). “Implementing Results-Oriented Trade Policies: The
Case of the US-Japanese Auto Parts Dispute”. European Economic Review; V.42-#8, pp. 14431467.
C. Antidumping with FDI
1. Tariff Jumping in General
Smith, Alasdair (1987). “Strategic Investment, Multinational Corporations and Trade Policy”.
European Economic Review; V.31-#1/2, pp. 89-96.
Brander, James and Barbara Spencer (1987). “Foreign Direct Investment with Unemployment
and Endogenous Taxes and Tariffs”. Journal of International Economics; V.22-#3/4, pp.257279.
Horstmann, Ignatius and James Markusen (1991). “Endogenous Market Structures in
International Trade (natura facit saltum)”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#1/2, pp.
109-129.
Rowthorn, Robert (1992). “Intra-industry Trade and Investment under Oligopoly: The Role of
Market Size”. Economic Journal; V.102-#?, pp. 402-414.
Levy, Santiago and Sean Nolan (1992). “Trade and Foreign Investment Policy under Imperfect
Competition: Lessons for Developing Countries”. Journal of Development Economics; V.37#1/2, pp. 31-62.
Motta, Massimo (1992). “Multinational Firms and the Tariff Jumping Argument: A Game
Theoretic Analysis with Some Unconventional Conclusions”. European Economic Review;
V.36-#8, pp. 1557-1771.
Flam, Harry (1994). “EC Members Fighting About Surplus: VERs, FDI and Japanese Cars”.
Journal of International Economics; V.36-#1/2, pp. 117-131.
Sanna-Randaccio, Francesca (1996). New Protectionism and Multinational Companies”. Journal
of International Economics; V.41-#1/2, pp. 29-51.
Horn, Henrik and Lars Persson (2001). “The Equilibrium Ownership of an International
Oligopoly”. Journal of International Economics; V.53-#2, pp. 307-333.
Dehejia, Vivek and Alfons Weichenrieder (2001). “Tariff Jumping Foreign Investment and
Capital Taxation”. Journal of International Economics; V.53-#1, pp. 223-230.
Xu, Yingfeng (2001). “Can Tariff-jumping Foreign Investment be Beneficial?”. Journal of
Economic Development; V.26-#1, pp. 161-177.
Chaudhuri, Sarbajit and Ujjaini Mukherjee (2002). “Removal of Protectionism, Foreign
Investment and Welfare in a Model of Informal Sector”. Japan and the World Economy; V.14#1, pp. 101-116.
Hwang, Hong and Chao-cheng Mai (2002). “The Tariff Jumping Argument and Location
Theory”. Review of International Economics; V.10-#2, pp. 361-368.
Neary, Peter (2002). “Foreign Direct Investment in the Single Market”. Manchester School;
V.70-#3, pp. 291-314.
Neven, Damien and G. Siotis (1996). “Technology Sourcing and FDI in the EC: An Empirical
Evaluation”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.14-#5, pp. 543-560.
2. Antidumping jumping
Blonigen, Bruce and Robert Feenstra (1997). “Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct
Investment”. In R. Feenstra, ed. Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 55-80.
Belderbos, Rene (1997). “Antidumping and Tariff Jumping: Japanese Firms’ DFI in the
European Union and the United States”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.133-#3, pp. 419-457.
Belderbos, Rene and Leo Sleuwaegen (1998). “Tariff Jumping DFI and Export Substitution:
Japanese Electronics Firms in Europe”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.16#5, pp. 601-638.
Haaland, Jan and Ian Wooton (1998). “Antidumping Jumping: Reciprocal Antidumping and
Industrial Location”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.134-#2, pp. 340-362.
Barrell, Ray and Nigel Pain (1999). “Trade Restraints and Japanese Direct Investment Flows”.
European Economic Review; V.43-#1, pp. 29-45.
Girma, Sourafel, David Greenaway and Katherine Wakelin (2002). “Does Antidumping
Stimulate FDI? Evidence from Japanese Firms in the UK”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.138#3, pp. 414-436.
Blonigen, Bruce (2002). “Tariff Jumping Antidumping Duties”. Journal of International
Economics; V.57-#1, pp. 31-49.
Belderbos, Rene (2003). “Antidumping and Foreign Divestment: Japanese Electronics
Multinationals in the EU”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.139-#1, pp. 131-160.
Belderbos, Rene, Hylke Vandenbussche, and Reinhilde Veuglers (2004). “Price Undertakings
and Anti-Dumping Jumping in the European Union”. European Economic Review; V.48-#?, pp.
429-453.
D. Antidumping under Incomplete/Asymmetric Information
Fischer, Ronald and Leonard Mirman (1994). “Learning about Enforcement: A Model of
Dumping”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 214-220.
Kohler, Philippe and Michael Moore (1998). “Design of an Antidumping Rule with incomplete
Information about Material Injury”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.13-#1, pp. 62-88.
Kohler, Philippe and Michael Moore (2001). “Injury-based Protection with Auditing under
Imperfect Information”. Southern Economic Journal; V.68-#1, pp. 42-59.
Kohler, Philippe and Michael Moore (2004). “The Safeguard Clause, Asymmetric Information
and Endogenous Protection”. Review of International Economics; forth.
Kolev, Dobrin and Thomas Prusa (2002). “Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness
of Cost-based Trade Policy under Incomplete Information”. International Economic Review;
V.43-#3, pp. 895-918.
Cheng, Leonard, Larry Qiu, and Kit Pong Wong (2002). “Antidumping Measures as a Tool of
Protectionism: A Mechanism Design Approach”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.34-#3, pp.
639-660.
E. Economic Analysis of Countervailing Duties
1. Basic Analysis with Competitive Markets
Viner, Jacob (1923). “Countervailing Measures against Official Export Subsidies”. Chapter X in
Dumping: A Problem in International Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 163-191.
Sykes, Alan (1989). “Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective”. Columbia Law
Review; V.89-#2, pp. 199-263.
Francois, Joseph (1992). “Countervailing the Effects of Subsidies: An Economic Analysis”.
Journal of World Trade; V.26-#1, pp. 5-13.
Morkre, Morris (1993). “The Effect of Subsidized Imports on Domestic Industry: A Comparison
of Market Structures”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.15-#1, pp. 49-61.
2. Oligopolistic Markets
Dixit, Avinash (1988). “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Under Oligopoly”. European
Economic Review; V.32-#1, pp. 55-68. [Comment by Collie, 1991, V.35-#5, pp. 1185-87.]
Spencer, Barbara (1988). “Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies to Imperfectly Competitive
Industries”. in Baldwin, et al., eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press/NBER; pp. 313-334.
Spencer, Barbara (1988). “Capital Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in Oligopolistic
Industries”. Journal of International Economics; V.25-#1/2, pp. 45-69.
Gasiorek, M., Alasdair Smith and Anthony Venables (1989). “Tariffs, Subsidies and
Retaliation”. European Economic Review; V.33-#2/3, pp. 480-489.
Collie, David (1991). “Export Subsidies and Countervailing Tariffs”. Journal of International
Economics; V.31-#3/4, pp. 309-324.
Collie, David (1992). “Export Subsidies, Entry Deterrence and Countervailing Tariffs”.
Manchester School; V.60-#2, pp. 136-151.
Collie, David (1994). “Strategic Trade Policy and Retaliation”. Japan and the World Economy;
v.6-#1, pp. 75-88.
Collie, David (1994). “Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use
Countervailing Duties?”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.130-#1, pp. 191-209.
Qiu, Larry (1995). “Why Can’t Countervailing Duties Deter Export Subsidization?”. Journal of
International Economics; V.39-#3/4, pp. 249-272.
F. Empirical Research on Scope and Consequences of ADD/CVD
1. Scope
Gard, Linda and James Riedel (1980). “Safeguard Protection of Industry in Developed Countries:
Assessment of Implications for Developing Countries”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.116-#3,
pp. 471-492.
Finger, J. Michael (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US
Import Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#5, pp. 260-279.
Hansen, Wendy and Thomas Prusa (1995). “The Road Most Taken: The Rise of Title VII
Protection”. World Economy; V.18-#2, pp. 295-313.
Nagaoka, Sadao (1996). “Antidumping Policy and Competition”. Private Sector Development
Department Occasional Paper; #13, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Miranda, Jorge, Raul Torres, and Mario Ruiz (1998). “The International Use of Antidumping,
1987-1997”. Journal of World Trade; V.32-#1, pp. 5-71.
Finger, J. Michael, Frances Ng, and Sonam Wangchuk (2000). “Antidumping As Safeguard
Policy”. Ms: The World Bank.
Bown, Chad, Bernard Hoekman and Caglar Ozden (2003). “The Pattern of U.S. Antidumping:
The Path from Initial Filing to WTO Dispute Settlement”. World Trade Review; V.2-#3, pp. 349371.
Zanardi, Maurizio (2004). “Antidumping: What Are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?”. World
Economy; V.27-#3, pp.403-433.
Niels, Gunnar and Adriaan Ten Kate (2004). “Antidumping Protection in a Liberalising Country:
Mexico’s Antidumping Policy and Practice”. World Economy; forthcoming.
2. Consequences for home firm/industry
a. Multi-Sector
Hartigan, James, Philip Perry and Sreenivas Kamma (1986). “The Value of Administered
Protection: A Capital Market Approach”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.68-#4, pp. 610617.
Hartigan, James, Sreenivas Kamma and Philip Perry (1989). “The Injury Determination Category
and the Value of Relief from Dumping”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.71-#1, pp. 183186.
Hansen, Wendy and Thomas Prusa (1993). “Does Administrative Protection Protect? A
Reexamination of the US Title VII and Escape Clause Statutes”. Regulation; V.16, pp. 35-43.
Shin, Hyun Ja (1998). “Possible Instances of Predatory Pricing in Recent U.S. Antidumping
Cases”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 8197.
Nieberding, James (1999). “The Effect of US Antidumping Law on Firms’ Market Power: An
Empirical Test”. Review of Industrial Organization; V.14-#1, pp. 65-84.
Asche, Frank (2001). “Testing the Effect of an Antidumping Duty: The US Salmon Market”.
Empirical Economics; V.26-#?, pp. 343-355.
Messerlin, Patrick (1989). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.125-#3, pp. 562-587.
Bourgeois, Jacques and Patrick Messerlin (1998). “The European Community’s Experience”. in
R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 127-145.
Konings, Jozef and Hylke Vandenbussche (2005). “Antidumping Protection and the Markups of
Domestic Firms”. Journal of International Economics; V.65-#1, pp. 151-165.
Dutz, Mark (1998). “Economic Impact of Canadian Antidumping Law”. in R. Lawrence ed.
Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 99-125.
b. Steel
Adams, Walter and Joel Dirlam (1979). “Unfair Competition in International Trade”. in Tariffs,
Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism. San Francisco: ICS, pp. 95-107.
Dirlam, Joel and Hans Mueller (1982). “Import Restraints and Reindustrialization: The Case of
the US Steel Industry”. Journal of International Law; V.14-#3, pp. 419-446.
Cline, William (1986). “US Trade and Industrial Policy: The Experience of Textiles, Steel and
Automobiles”. in P. Krugman, ed. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics.
Cambridge: MIT, pp. 211-239.
Hartigan, James, Sreenivas Kamma and Philip Perry (1990). “Bifurcated vs. Single Injury
Determination in USITC Antidumping Investigations”. Journal of International Economic
Integration; V.5-#1, pp. 47-63.
Hartigan, James, Sreenivas Kamma and Philip Perry (1994). “Are Subsidies More Dangerous
than Dumping: Evidence From the Wealth Effects for the Steel Industry”. Journal of Economic
Integration; V.9-#1, pp. 45-61.
Lenway, Stefanie, Kathleen Rehbein and Laura Starks (1990). “The Impact of Protectionism on
Firm Wealth: The Experience of the Steel Industry”. Southern Economic Journal; V.56-#4, pp.
1079-1093.
Lenway, Stefanie, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung (1996). “Rent Seeking, Protectionism and
Innovation in the American Steel Industry”. Economic Journal; V.106-#435, pp. 410-421.
Chung, Jae (1998). “Effects of U.S. Trade Remedy Law Enforcement under Uncertainty: The
Case of Steel”. Southern Economic Journal; V.65-#1, pp. 151-159.
Prusa, Thomas and David Sharp (2001). “Simultaneous Equations in Antidumping
Investigations”. Journal of Forensic Economics; V.14-#1, pp. 63-78.
c. Chemicals
Krupp, Corinne and Patricia Pollard (1996). “Market Responses to Antidumping Laws: Some
Evidence from the US Chemical Industry”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 199227.
d. Semiconductors
Flamm, Kenneth (1992). “Strategic Arguments for Semiconductor Trade Policy”. Review of
Industrial Organization; V.7-#3/4, pp. 295-325.
Flamm, Kenneth (1996). Mismanaged Trade? Strategic Policy and The Semiconductor Industry.
Washington, DC: Brookings.
Mahdavi, Mahnaz and Amala Bhagwati (1994). “Stock Market Data and Trade Policy: Dumping
in the Semiconductor Industry”. International Trade Journal; V.8-#2, pp. 207-221.
Hughes, John, Judy Rayburn and Stefanie Lenway (1997). “Stock Price Effects of US Trade
Policy Responses to Japanese Practices in Semiconductors”. Canadian Journal of Economics;
V.30-#4, pp. 922-942..
Messerlin, Patrick and Yoshiyuki Noguchi (1998). “Antidumping Policies in Electronic
Products”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp.
147-171.
Gruber, Harald (1998). “Antidumping Actions in High Technology Industries: The Case of
Semiconductors”. In Gary Cook, ed. Freedom and Trade, V.II: The Economics and Politics of
International Trade. New York: Routledge, pp. 169-184.
Irwin, Douglas (1998). “The Semiconductor Industry”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade
Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 173-200.
3. Consequences for the home economy
Finger, J. Michael and Tracy Murray (1990). “Policing Unfair Imports: The US Example”.
Journal of World Trade; V.24-#4, pp. 39-53.
DeVault, James (1990). “The Administration of US Antidumping Duties: Some Empirical
Observations”. World Economy; V.13-#1, pp. 75-88.
Anderson, Keith (1993). “Antidumping Laws in the United States–Use and Welfare
Consequences”. Journal of World Trade; V.27-#2, pp. 99-117.
DeVault, James (1993). “The Impact of US Unfair Trade Laws: A Preliminary Assessment”.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.129-#4, pp. 735-751.
Lichtenberg, Frank and Hong Tan (1994). “An Industry Level Analysis of Import Relief Petitions
Filed by US Manufacturers, 1958-1985”. In Hong Tan and Haru Shimada, eds. Troubled
Industries in the United States and Japan. New York, St. Martins, pp. 161-188.
Staiger, Robert and Frank Wolak (1994). “The Trade Effects of Antidumping Law: Theory and
Evidence”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global
Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 231-261.
DeVault, James (1996). “The Welfare Effects of US Antidumping Duties”. Open Economies
Review; V.7-#1, pp. 19-33.
Marvel, Howard and Edward Ray (1995). “Countervailing Duties”. Economic Journal; V.105#433, pp. 1576-1593.
Messerlin, Patrick and Geoffrey Reed (1995). “Antidumping Policies in the US and the EC”.
Economic Journal; V.105-#433, pp. 1565-1575.
Prusa, Thomas (1997). “The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions”. In R. Feenstra, ed.
The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press/NBER, pp. 191-213.
Lloyd, Tim, Oliver Morrissey, and Geoffrey Reed (1998). “Estimating the Impact of AntiDumping and Anti-Cartel Actions using Intervention Analysis”. Economic Journal; V.108-#448,
pp. 458-476.
Konings, Josef, Hylke Vandenbussche, and Linda Springael (2001). “Import Diversion under
European Antidumping Policy”. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade; V.1-#3, pp. 283299.
Lasagni, A. (2000). “Does Country Targeted Antidumping Policy by the EU Create Trade
Diversion?”. Journal of World Trade. V.34-#4, pp. 137-159.
Brenton, Paul (2001). “Anti-dumping Policies in the EU and Trade Diversion”. European
Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#?, pp. 593-607.
Vandenbussche. Hylke and Xavier Wauthy (2001),”Inflicting Injury Through Product Quality:
How EU Antidumping Policy Disadvantages European Producers”, European Journal of
Political Economy, V.17-#?, pp. 101-116.
Vandenbussche, Hylke, Reinhilde Veuglers, and Jozef Konings (2001). “Union Wage Bargaining
and EU Antidumping Policy”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.53-#2, pp. 297-317.
Conway, Patrick and Sumana Dhar (1994). “The Economic Effects of Widespread Application of
Anti-dumping Duties to Import Pricing”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 172-197.
Gallaway, Michael, Bruce Blonigen, and Joseph Flynn (1999). “Welfare Cost of the US
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law”. Journal of International Economics; V.49-#2, pp.
211-244. [erratum in V.52-#1.]
Prusa, Thomas (2001). “On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping”. Canadian Journal of
Economics; V.34-#3, pp. 591-611.
Blonigen, Bruce and Thomas Prusa (2003). “The Cost of Antidumping: The Devil is in the
Details”. Journal of Policy Reform; V.6-#4, pp. 233-245.
4. Consequences for foreign firms
Herander, Mark and J. Brad Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of
US Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. Southern Economic Journal; V.51-#1, pp.
59-79.
Tarr, David (1987). “Effects of Restraining Steel Exports from the Republic of Korea and Other
Countries to the US and the EEC”. World Bank Economic Review; V.1-#3, pp. 397-418.
Rehbein, Kathleen and Laura Starks (1995). “Changes in US Trade Policies: The Wealth Effects
on Japanese Steel Firms”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#3, pp. 309-327.
Melvin, Michael and Qian Sun (1997). “U.S. protectionist policy and stock prices of U.S. importcompeting and Korean and Taiwanese export-oriented firms”. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,
V.5-#1, pp. 1-23.
Blonigen, Bruce and Stephen Haynes (2002). “Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through
of Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates”. American Economic Review; V.92-#4, pp. 1441061.
Blonigen, Bruce and Jee-Hyeong Park (2004). “Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Antidumping
Policy: Theory and Evidence”. American Economics Review; V.94-#1, pp. 134-154.
V. Political Economy of Administered Protection
A. Lobbying for Administered Protection
1. Indirect Lobbying
Leidy, Michael (1994). “Trade Policy and Indirect Rent Seeking: A Synthesis of Recent Work”.
Economics & Politics; V.6-#2, pp. 97-118.
Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Leidy (1990). “Policy Responses to Shifting Comparative
Advantage: Designing a System of Emergency Protection”. Kyklos; V.43-#1, pp. 25-51.
Hillman, Arye, Eliakim Katz and Jacob Rosenberg (1987). “Workers as Insurance: Anticipated
Government Assistance and Factor Demand”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.39-#4, 813-820.
Leidy, Michael and Bernard Hoekman (1991). “Spurious Injury as Indirect Rent-Seeking: Free
Trade under the Prospect of Protection”. Economics & Politics; V.3-#2, pp. 111-137.
Ethier, Wilfred and Ronald Fischer (1987). “The New Protectionism”. Journal of International
Economic Integration; V.2-#2, pp. 1-11.
Fischer, Ronald (1992). “Endogenous Probability of Protection and Firm Behavior”. Journal of
International Economics; V.32-#1/2, pp. 149-163.
Fischer, Ronald and Leonard Mirman (1994). “Learning about Enforcement: A Model of
Dumping”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 214-240.
Anderson, James (1992). “Domino Dumping I: Competitive Exporters”. American Economic
Review; V.82-#1, pp. 65-83.
Reitzes, James (1993). “Antidumping Policy”. International Economic Review; V.34-#4, pp.
745-763.
Cassing, James (1994). “Strategic Responses to Antidumping Laws and Legal Interpretations:
Producing for Export Markets using Lawyers and Other Factors of Production”. Journal of
Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 156-171.
Leidy, Michael (1994). “Quid Pro Quo Restraint and Spurious Injury: Subsidies and the Prospect
of CVDs”. In Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the
Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 263-305.
Prusa, Thomas (1994). “Pricing Behavior in the Presence of Antidumping Laws”. Journal of
Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 260-289.
Blonigen, Bruce and Yuka Ohno (1998). “Endogenous Protection, Foreign Direct Investment and
Protection Building Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.46-#2, pp. 205-227.
2. Direct Lobbying
a. Basic Theory
Das, Satya (1990). “Foreign Lobbying and the Political Economy of Protection”. Japan and the
World Economy; V.2-#2, pp. 169-179.
A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1988). “Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International
Trade Policy”. AER; V.78-#4, pp. 729-745. [comment by Hofer/Woodruf, AER; V.84-#5, pp.
1474-1475.]
Steagall, Jeffrey (1995). Strategic Behavior and the United States Unfair Trade Statutes. New
York: Garland.
Cassing, James and Ted To (2003). “Antidumping, Signaling and Cheap Talk”. Ms: US-BLS.
Kohler, Philippe and Michael Moore (2004). “The Safeguard Clause, Asymmetric Information
and Endogenous Protection”. Review of International Economics; forth.
b. Lobbying with VER
Anderson, James (1993). “Domino Dumping II: Anti-dumping”. Journal of International
Economics; V.35-#1/2, pp. 133-150.
Anderson, James (1994). “Strategic Lobbying and Antidumping”. Journal of Economic
Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 129-155.
Moore, Michael and Steven Suranovic (1992). “Lobbying vs. Administered Protection:
Endogenous Industry Choice and National Welfare”. Journal of International Economics; V.32#3/4, pp. 289-303.
Moore, Michael and Steven Suranovic (1994). “Welfare Effects of Introducing Antidumping
Procedures in a Trade-Liberalizing Country”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 241229.
Schuknecht, Ludger and Joerg Stephan (1994). “EC Trade Protection Law: Produmping or
Antidumping?”. Public Choice; V.80-#1/2, pp. 143-156.
Rosendorff, B. Peter (1996). “Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure and
Domestic Politics”. American Economics Review; V.86-#3, pp. 544-561.
c. Lobbying with settlement
Prusa, Thomas (1991). “The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination”. in R.
Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press/NBER, pp. 47-71.
Prusa, Thomas (1992). “Why are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn”. Journal of
International Economics; V.33-#1/2, pp. 1-20.
Panagariya, Arvind and Poonam Gupta (1998). “Anti-Dumping versus Price Negotiation”. World
Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1003-1019.
Gupta, Poonam (1999). “Why Do Firms Pay Antidumping Duty?”. IMF Working Paper;
WP/99/166.
3. Empirics on Filing
a. Macroeconomic Determinants
(1) Escape Clause Cases
Takacs, Wendy (1981). “Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis”. Economic
Inquiry; V.19-#4, pp. 687-693.
Feigenbaum, Susan, Henry Ortiz and Thomas Willett (1985). “Protectionist Pressures and
Aggregate Economic Conditions: Comment on Takacs”. Economic Inquiry; V.23-#1, pp. 175-
182. [Response by Takacs, V.23-#1, pp. 183-184.]
Feigenbaum, Susan and Thomas Willett (1985). “Domestic versus International Influences on
Protectionist Pressures in the US”. in S. Arndt, R. Sweeney and T. Willett, eds. Exchange Rates,
Trade and The US Economy. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 181-190.
Shughart, William and Robert Tollison (1985). “The Cyclical Character of Regulatory Activity”.
Public Choice; V.45-#3, pp. 303-311.
Salvatore, Dominick (1987). “Import Penetration, Exchange Rates, and Protectionism in the US”.
Journal of Policy Modelling; V.9-#1, pp. 125-141.
Grilli, Enzo (1988). “Macro-economic Determinants of Trade Protection”. World Economy;
V.11-#3, pp. 313-326.
Grilli, Enzo (1991). “Contemporary Protectionism in an Unstable World Economy”. In Gerhard
Fels and George Sutija, eds. Protectionism and International Banking. London: Macmillan, pp.
144-172.
Coughlin, Cletus, Joseph Terza and Noor Kahlifah (1989). “The Determinants of Escape Clause
Petitions”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.71-#2, pp. 341-347.
(2) Antidumping Cases
Feinberg, Robert (1989). “Exchange Rates and ‘Unfair Trade’”. Review of Economics and
Statistics; V.71-#4, pp. 704-707.
Salvatore, Dominick (1989). “A Model of Dumping and Protectionism in the United States”.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.125-#4, pp. 763-781.
Leidy, Michael (1997). “Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection under
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the US”. IMF Staff
Papers; V.44-#1, pp. 132-144.
Knetter, Michael and Thomas Prusa (2003). “Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings:
Evidence from Four Countries”. Journal of International Economics; V.61-#1, pp. 1-17.
Francois, Joseph and Gunnar Niels (2003). “Business Cycles, the Current Account, and
Administered Protection in Mexico”. Review of Development Economics; forth.
b. Micro determinants
(1) Correlates of Filing
Feinberg, Richard and Barry Hirsch (1989). “Industry Rent-Seeking and the Filing of ‘Unfair’
Trade Complaints”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.7-#3, pp. 325-340.
Lenway, Stefanie and Kathleen Rehbein (1989). “Rent Seekers in the U.S. International Trade
Commission Escape Clause Investigations”. International Trade Journal; V.4-#2, pp. 119-142.
Hansen, Wendy (1990). “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protection”.
American Political Science Review; V.84-#1, pp. 21-46.
Lichtenberg, Frank and Hong Tan (1994). “An Industry-Level Analysis of Import Relief Petitions
Filed by US Manufacturers, 1958-1985”. In Hong Tan and Haru Shimada, eds. Troubled
Industries in the United States and Japan. New York: St. Martins Press, pp. 161-188.
Sabry, Faten (2000). “An Analysis of the Decision to File, the Dumping Estimates, and the
Outcome of Antidumping Petitions”. International Trade Journal; V.14-#2, pp. 109-145.
Gilligan, Michael (1997). “Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade”. International
Studies Quarterly; V.41-#3, pp. 455-474.
Olson, Kara (2004). “Free Riders Among Rent-Seekers: A Model of Firm Participation in
Antidumping Petitions”. Ms: American University.
Krupp, Corinne (1994). “Antidumping Cases in the US Chemical Industry: A Panel Data
Approach”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.42-#?, pp. 299-311.
Chung, Jae (1999). “Insights into Trade Protection under U.S. Trade Remedy Laws”. Journal of
Policy Modeling; V.21-#3, pp. 375-387. [steel]
Lenway, Stefanie and Douglas Schuler (1991). “The Determinants of Corporate Political
Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry”. In R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical
Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.
Morck, Randall, Jungsywan Sepanski, and Bernard Yeung (2001). “Habitual and Occasional
Lobbyers in the U.S. Steel Industry: An EM Algorithm Pooling Approach” Economic Inquiry;
V.39-#3, pp. 365-78.
(2) Process filing v. outcome filing
Finger, J. Michael (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US
Import Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#2, pp. 260-279.
Herander, Mark and J. Brad Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of
US Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. Southern Economic Journal; V.51-#1, pp.
59-79.
Staiger, Robert and Frank Wolak (1994). “Measuring Industry-specific Protection: Antidumping
in the US”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; 1994: Microeconomics, pp. 51-118.
Staiger, Robert and Frank Wolak (1996). “Differences in Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law
Across Import Sources”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 385-415.
4. Empirics on Final Outcomes
a. The ITA’s LTFV Decision
Finger, J. Michael, H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982). “The Political Economy of
Administered Protection”. American Economics Review; V.72-#3, pp. 452-466.
Herander, Mark and J. Brad Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of
US Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. Southern Economic Journal; V.51-#1, pp.
59-79.
Baldwin, Robert and Michael Moore (1992). “Political Aspects of the Administration of the
Trade Remedy Law”. in R. Boltuck and R. Litan, eds. Down in the Dumps: Administration of the
Unfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 253-280.
Hansen, Wendy and K. O. Park (1995). Nation-state and pluralistic decision making in trade
policy: The case of the international trade administration. International Studies Quarterly; V.39#2, pp. 181-211.
Sabry, Faten (2000). “An Analysis of the Decision to File, the Dumping Estimates, and the
Outcome of Antidumping Petitions”. International Trade Journal; V.14-#2, pp. 109-145.
Moore, Michael (2004). “An Econometric Analysis of U.S. Sunset Reviews”. Ms: George
Washington University.
b. The ITC’s Injury Decision
(1) Final decision
(a) Regulation Theoretic Framework
Finger, J. Michael (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US
Import Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#2, pp. 260-279.
Finger, J. Michael, H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982). “The Political Economy of
Administered Protection”. American Economics Review; V.72-#3, pp. 452-466.
Herander, Mark and J. Brad Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of
US Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. Southern Economic Journal; V.51-#1, pp.
59-79.
Baldwin, Robert (1985). The Political Economy of US Import Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hansen, Wendy (1990). Regulatory Theory and Its Application to Trade Policy: A Study of ITC
Decision Making, 1975-1985. New York: Garland Press.
Rehbein, Kathleen and Stefanie Lenway (1993). “Industry Structure or Managerial Discretion:
The Determinants of Industry Political Success in the U.S. International Trade Commission’s
Escape Clause Investigations”. In J. Post, ed. Research in corporate social performance and
policy. Volume 14. Greenwich, Conn: JAI press, pp. 3-18.
Czinkota, Michael and Masaki Kotabe (1997). “A Marketing Perspective on the US ITC’s
Antidumping Actions: An Empirical Inquiry”. Journal of World Business; V32-#2, pp. 169-187.
(b) Congressional dominance framework
Lenway, Stefanie, Carol Jacobson, and Judith Goldstein (1989). “To Lobby or to Petition: The
Political Environment of U.S. Trade Policy”. Journal of Management; V.16-#1, pp. 119-134.
Goldstein, Judith and Stefanie Lenway (1989). “Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into
Congressional-ITC Relations”. International Studies Quarterly; V.33-#3, pp. 303-327.
Hansen, Wendy (1990). “The International Trade Commission and the Poltics of Protection”.
American Political Science Review; V.84-#1, pp. 21-46.
Prusa, Thomas (1991). “The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination”. in R.
Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press/NBER, pp. 47-71.
Anderson, Keith (1993). “Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision Making at the US
ITC”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.36-#2, pp. 915-935.
Rowley, Charles and Willem Thorbecke (1996). “Congressional Influence over Decision-Making
at the ITC”. In F. Schneider and J. Casas Pardo, eds. Current Issues in Public Choice.
Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 189-199.
Hansen, Wendy and Thomas Prusa (1996). “Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of
the Parts is Greater than the Whole”. Economic Inquiry; V.34-#4, pp. 746-769.
Hansen, Wendy and Thomas Prusa (1997). “The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An
Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making”. Review of International Economics; V.5-#2, pp.
230-245.
Gasmi, Farid, Wendy Hansen, and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1997). “Une analyse empirique des
décisions en matière d’antidumping aux États-Unis”. L’Actualite Economique; V.73-#1/2/3, pp.
423-456.
Drope, Jeffrey and Wendy Hansen (2004). “Purchasing Protection? The Effect of Political
Spending on US Trade Policy”. Political Research Quarterly; V.57-#1, pp. 27-37.
Magee, Stephen and Leslie Young (1987). “Endogenous Protection in the United States, 19001984”. In R. Stern, ed. U.S. Trade Policy in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT Press,
pp. 145-195. [section 4.7, pp. 183-185.]
Goldstein, Judith (1986). “The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection”. American
Political Science Review; V.80-#1, pp. 161-184.
Cumby, Robert and Theodore Moran (1997). “Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process:
Antidumping and the ‘New Issues’”. In R. Feenstra, ed. The Effect of U.S. Trade Protection and
Promotion Policies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 161-190.
(2) Commissioner votes
Moore, Michael (1992). “Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of Antidumping Decisions”.
Economic Inquiry; V.30-#3, pp. 449-466.
Baldwin, Robert and Jeffrey Steagall (1994). “An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisions
in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguards Cases”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv;
V.130-#2, pp. 290-307.
DeVault, James (1993). “Economics and the International Trade Commission”. Southern
Economic Journal; V60-#2, pp. 463-478.
DeVault, James (2002). “Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission”.
Public Choice; V.110-#1/2, pp. 1-22.
Butler, David (1995). Does ‘Independent’ Mean ‘Free From Influence’?: Escape Clause
Decision Making at the U.S. International Trade Commission. New York: Garland Press.
Liebman, Benjamin (2004). “ITC Voting Behavior on Sunset Cases”. Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv; V.140-#3, pp. 446-475.
Mah, Jai (2000). “Antidumping Decisions and Macroeconomic Variables in the USA”. Applied
Economics; V.32-#13, pp. 1701-1709.
Mah, Jai (2000). “The United States’ Antidumping Decisions Against the Northeast Asian
Dynamic Economies”. World Economy; V.23-#5, pp. 721-732.
Lee, Kyung-Ho and Jai Mah (2003). “Institutional Changes and Antidumping Decisions in the
United States”. Journal of Policy Modelling; V.25-#6/7, pp. 555-565.
c. Presidential Preferences and Discretion
Baldwin, Robert (1981). “US Political Pressures Against Adjustment to Greater Imports”. in W.
Hong and L. Krause, eds. Trade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of the
Pacific Basin. Seoul: Korea Development Institute.
Boadu, Fred, Fred Ruppel and Amy Angel (1992). “An Empirical Model of Presidential
Popularity and Presidential Discretion in Trade Restrictions”. European Journal of Political
Economy; V.8-#2, pp. 281-293.
d. Case Studies of High Track Politics
Nelson, Douglas (1989). “On the High Track to Protection: The US Automobile Industry, 19791981”. in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. Pacific Dynamics. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 97128.
Hamilton, Carl (1989). “The Political Economy of Transient ‘New’ Protectionism”.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.125-#3, pp. 522-546.
Krueger, Anne, ed. (1995). The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press/NBER.
Baron, David (1997). “Integrated Strategy and International Trade Disputes: The Kodak-Fujifilm
Case”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.6-#2, pp. 291-346.
Brook, Douglas (2003). “Trade Policy Strategies and Enforcement Choices: An Examination of
the 1992 Steel Antidumping Cases”. International Trade Journal; V.17-#1, pp. 81-100.
e. Comparative Analysis
Messerlin, Patrick (1990). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.126-#3, pp. 562-587.
Thrakan, P.K. Matthew (1991). “The Poltical Economy of Antidumping Undertakings in the
European Communities”. European Economic Review; V.35-#6, pp. 1341-1359.
Thrakan, P.K. Matthew and Jean Waelbroeck (1994). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Decisions in the EC and in the US: An Experiment in Comparative Political Economy”.
European Economic Review; V.38-#1, pp. 171-193.
Thrakan, P.K. Matthew and Jean Waelbroeck (1994). “Determinants of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Decisions in the European Communities”. In M. Dewatripont and V.
Ginsburgh, eds. European Economic Integration: A Challenge to a Changing World.
Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 181-199.
Eymann, Angelika and Ludger Schuknecht (1996). “Antidumping Policy in the European
Community: Political Discretion or Technical Determination”. Economics & Politics; V.8-#2,
pp. 111-131.
Feaver, Donald (1997). “A Regulatory Analysis of Australia’s Anti-Dumping Law and Policy:
Statutory Failure or Regulatory Capture?”. Australian Journal of Public Administration; V.56#4, pp. 67-77.
Feaver, Donald and Kenneth Wilson (1998). “Unlocking Australia’s Contingent Protection Black
Box”. Economic Record; V.74-#224, pp. 62-73.
Feaver, Donald and Kenneth Wilson (1999). “Unravelling Causation: An Empirical Analysis of
Contingent Protection in Australia”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.135-#4, pp. 692-708.
Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka (2001). “Trade Policy in Transition? The Political Economy of
Antidumping in Japan”. Journal of Asian Pacific Economy; V.6-#1, pp. 22-46.
Francois, Joseph and Gunnar Niels (2004). “Political Influence in a New Antidumping Regime:
Evidence from Mexico”. MS: Tinbergen Institute.
B. Explaining the Existence and Aggregate Effects of Antidumping Law
1. Citizen Centered Models: Domestic Political Economy
Hall, H. Keith and Douglas Nelson (1989). “Institutional Structure and Time Horizon in a Simple
Political-Economy Model: The Lowi Effect”. International Spectator; V.24-#3/4, pp.153-173.
Hall, H. Keith and Douglas Nelson (1992). “Institutional Structure in the Political Economy of
Protection: Legislated versus Administered Protection”. Economics & Politics; V.4-#1, pp. 6177.
Mayer, Wolfgang (1999). “The Political Economy of Administering Trade Laws”. in J. Piggott
and A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp.
245-262.
Moore, Michael (1992). “Bureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a Repeated Game”. Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.148-#4, pp. 607-627.
Anderson, James and Maurizio Zanardi (2004). “Political Pressure Deflection”. NBER Working
Paper; #10439.
Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Leidy (1990). “Policy Responses to Shifting Comparative
Advantage: Designing a System of Emergency Protection”. Kyklos; V.43-#1, pp. 25-51. [also in
Robert Stern, ed., The Multilateral Trading System: Analysis and Options for Change. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 255-275.]
2. State Centered Models
a. Fairness and the Conservative Social Welfare Function
Corden, W. Max (1974). Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford: OUP. pp. 104-112.
Corden, W. Max (1986). “Policies Towards Market Disturbance”. In Richard Snape, ed. Issues in
World Trade Policy. London: Macmillan.
Deardorff, Alan (1993). “Safeguards and the Conservative Social Welfare Function”. In Henryk
Kierzkowski, ed. Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 2240. [also in Robert Stern, ed., The Multilateral Trading System: Analysis and Options for
Change. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 233-254.]
Fischer, Ronald and Thomas Prusa (2003). “WTO Exceptions as Insurance”. Review of
International Economics; V.11-#5, pp. 745-757.
b. Liberalization centered models
Bagwell, Kyle and Robert Staiger (1990). “A Theory of Managed Trade”. American Economic
Review; V.80-#4, pp.779-795.
Hansen, Wendy and K. O. Park (1995). Nation-state and Pluralistic Decision Making in Trade
Policy: The Case of the International Trade Administration. International Studies Quarterly;
V.39-#2, pp. 181-211.
Anderson, Simon and Nicolas Schmitt (2003). “Nontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization”.
Economic Inquiry; V.41-#1, pp. 80-97.
c. Retaliation centered models
Anderson, Simon, Nicholas Schmitt, and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1995). “Who Benefits from
Antidumping Legislation?”. Journal of International Economics; V.38-#3/4, pp. 321-337.
Bian, Jiang and Gerard Gaudet (1997). “Anti-dumping Laws and Oligopolistic Trade”. Journal
of Economic Integration; V.12-#1, pp. 62-86.
Furusawa, Taiji and Thomas Prusa (1996). “Antidumping Enforcement in a Reciprocal Model of
Dumping: Theory and Evidence”. Ms: Rutgers.
Gawande, Kishore (1995). “Are U.S. Nontariff Barriers Retaliatory? An Application of Extreme
Bounds Analysis in the Tobit Model”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.77-#4, pp. 677-
688.
Gawande, Kishore (1997). “A Test of a Theory of Strategically Retaliatory Trade Barriers”.
Southern Economic Journal; V.64-#2, pp. 425-449.
Gawande, Kishore and Wendy Hansen (1999). “Retaliation, Bargaining and the Pursuit of ‘Free
and Fair’ Trade”. International Organization; V.53-#1, pp. 117-159.
Prusa, Thomas and Susan Skeath (2002). “The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping
Filings”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.138-#3, pp. 389-413.
Blonigen, Bruce and Chad Bown (2003). “Antidumping and Retaliation Threats”. Journal of
International Economics; V.60-#2, pp. 249-273.
Bown, Chad (2004). “Trade Disputes and the Implementation of Protection under the GATT: An
Empirical Assessment”. Journal of International Economics; V.62-#2, pp. 263-294.
Prusa, Thomas and Susan Skeath (2004). “Modern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade or
Retaliation?”. in E. Kwan Choi and James Hartigan, ed. Handbook of International Trade, II:
Economic and Legal Analyses of Trade Policy Institutions. London: Blackwell, forthcoming.
Feinberg, Robert and Kara Olson (2004). “The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of
Retaliation in Filings”. Ms: American University.
C. The GATT/WTO and Antidumping
Baldwin, Robert (1998). “Imposing Multilateral Discipline on Administered Protection”. in A.
Krueger, ed. The WTO as an International Organization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
pp. 297-327.
Finger, J. Michael and K.C. Fung (1994). “Will GATT Enforcement Control Antidumping”.
Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 198-213.
Finger, J. Michael and Sumana Dhar (1994). “Do Rules Control Power? GATT Articles and
Arrangements in the Uruguay Round”. In Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern, eds. Analytical and
Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp.
195-226.
Prusa, Thomas (2001). “On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping”. Canadian Journal of
Economics; V.34-#3, pp. 591-611.
Bown, Chad (2004). “On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement”. Review of
Economics and Statistics; V.86-#3, pp. 811-823.
Bown, Chad (2002). “Antidumping Against the Backdrop of Disputes in the GATT/WTO
System”. Ms: Brandeis.