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Glossary ..................................................................................................................................... 3
1NC Terrorism Disadvantage ................................................................................................ 4-7
Uniqueness
Uniqueness – Surveillance Increasing .................................................................................... 8
Links
Link – Surveillance solves terrorist plots .......................................................................... 9-10
Link – Surveillance is necessary for timely response ......................................................... 11
Link – Surveillance solves meta-data intelligence ............................................................... 12
Link – Surveillance solves bulk intelligence......................................................................... 13
Link – Surveillance solves SIGNIT intelligence ................................................................. 14-5
Link – Surveillance solves terrorist financing ...................................................................... 16
Link – Surveillance solves counter-terror efforts ................................................................. 19
Link – Surveillance solves Al Qaeda sleeper cells............................................................... 20
Link – Surveillance solves cyber attack ................................................................................ 21
Answer to: Surveillance fails at solving a terrorist attack ................................................ 22-4
Specific Case Links
Link – Immigration Surveillance ......................................................................................... 25-7
Link – NSA Reform – Generic ............................................................................................. 28-9
Link – PATRIOT Act ................................................................................................................ 30
Impacts
Impact – Terrorism is the most important security threat ................................................... 31
Impact – Terrorism causes death .......................................................................................... 32
Impact – Terrorism threatens freedom .................................................................................. 33
Impact – Terrorism hurts psychological well-being ............................................................. 34
Answer to: Terrorist attack is unlikely .................................................................................. 35
Answer to: Terrorists aren’t a threat ..................................................................................... 36
Impact – Terrorist attack causes human rights violation .................................................... 37
Impact- ISIS is a Threat ........................................................................................................... 39
Impact – AQAP is a threat ...................................................................................................... 40
Impact – Al Qaeda is a threat ................................................................................................. 41
Impact – Cyber Attacks threaten national security ........................................................... 42-3
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Affirmative Answers
Surveillance does not solve terror plots ............................................................................... 44
Surveillance does not solve terror plots - extensions ......................................................... 45
Surveillance does not solve terror plots - extensions ......................................................... 46
Surveillance does not solve terrorist attack ......................................................................... 47
Intelligence gathering does not matter ................................................................................. 48
Financial data tracking does not matter ............................................................................... 49
Terrorist attack isn’t a national security threat .................................................................... 50
Terrorist attack is unlikely ...................................................................................................... 51
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Glossary
NSA – The National Security Agency – this is a government agency that is responsible for
monitoring, collection, and processing of information for foreign intelligence. The NSA was one of
the agencies exposed by Edward Snowden in 2013 as an agency conducting surveillance on
domestic (and foreign) populations for counter-terror efforts
SIGINT – Signal intelligence – this is a type of intelligence that is largely collected by the NSA.
SIGINT is the process of collecting telecommunication data for counter-intelligence purposes
Bulk Surveillance – this is the collection of massive amounts of telecommunication information that
isn’t all individual monitored, but bits and pieces are collected and pieced together by computer
systems to monitor certain activity
AUMF – The Authorization for Use of Military Force – this is a piece of legislation signed by
congress after the attacks of 9/11 and authorizes the use of United States Armed Forces against
those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. The authorization granted
the President the authority to use all "necessary and appropriate force" against those whom he
determined "planned, authorized, committed or aided" the September 11th attacks, or who harbored
said persons or groups.
Al Qaeda – Al Qaeda is one of the largest terrorist networks in the world that is a radical
fundamentalist group often held responsible for the 9/11 attacks. They have networks operating all
across the globe in various countries in Africa, Europe and Central Asia.
AQAP – Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – it is considered one of Al Qaeda’s most active
branches and operates primarily in Yemen and Saudi Arabia
ISIS – The Islamic State of Iraq – this is an extremist terrorist organization that occupies territory in
Syria and Iraq. While many folks that subscribe to Islam denounce the activities of ISIS, they are
held responsible for war crimes, genocide, and massive ethnic cleansing in the region and are one
of the most active terrorist groups attempting to retaliate against the United States
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A. Uniqueness – Domestic surveillance activities are expanding with no expectation to
decline
Dahl, Assistant Professor at Nataval Postgraduate School, 2011
Erik. “Domestic Intelligence Today: More Security but Less Liberty?.” Homeland Security Affairs 7,
10 Years After: The 9/11 Essays (September 2011). https://www.hsaj.org/articles/67
Unless the threat situation changes dramatically, we are not likely to see a new American
domestic intelligence agency anytime soon. In the place of an “American MI-5,” however, a
huge and expensive domestic intelligence system has been constructed. This system has
thus far succeeded in keeping America safer than most experts would have predicted ten
years ago, but it has also reduced civil liberties in ways that many Americans fail to understand.
Precisely because it was unplanned and is decentralized, this domestic intelligence system has not
received the oversight it deserves. In the long run, American liberty as well as security will gain
from a fuller discussion of the benefits and risks of homeland security intelligence.
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B. Link – curtailing domestic surveillance prevents intelligence agencies from stopping a
terrorist attack – this is empirically true
Inserra, Research Associate from the Heritage Foundation, 2015
("68th Terrorist Plot Calls for Major Counterterrorism Reforms,"
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/05/68th-terrorist-plot-calls-for-major-counterterrorismreforms
This 68th Islamist terrorist plot or attack is the 57th homegrown terrorist attack or plot and
the 10th targeting a mass gathering, the third most common target. The attack also comes as
part of a recent wave of attacks and plots, as this is the sixth Islamist terrorist plot or attack
in 2015. All of the plots and attacks this year have been perpetrated by individuals who claim
to support the Islamic State to varying degrees. The FBI has stated that Simpson wanted to
commit jihad with ISIS, and press reports indicate that he may have been in secret communications
with ISIS members.[6]
Regardless, with these attacks and the increasing numbers of individuals in the U.S. seeking
to support or join ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, the U.S. is currently facing what is arguably
the most concentrated period of terrorist activity in the homeland since 9/11. Director James
Comey of the FBI has recent warned that “hundreds, maybe thousands” of individuals across
the U.S. are being directly solicited by ISIS and urged to attack. Other senior officials, including
Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper,
and the director of the National Counterterrorism Center Nicholas Rasmussen have also noted the
increasing threat of terrorism here at home.[7]
Strengthening the Counterterrorism Enterprise
In light of these warnings, the U.S. cannot be passive. Heritage has recommended numerous
counterterrorism policies for Congress to address, including:
Streamlining U.S. fusion centers. Congress should limit fusion centers to the approximately 30
areas with the greatest level of risk as identified by the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Some
exceptions might exist, such as certain fusion centers that are leading cybersecurity or other
important topical efforts. The remaining centers should then be fully funded and resourced by UASI.
Pushing the FBI toward being more effectively driven by intelligence. While the FBI has
made high-level changes to its mission and organizational structure, the bureau is still
working to integrate intelligence and law enforcement activities. This will require overcoming
cultural barriers and providing FBI intelligence personnel with resources, opportunities, and
the stature they need to become a more effective and integral part of the FBI.
Ensuring that the FBI shares information more readily and regularly with state and local law
enforcement and treats state and local partners as critical actors in the fight against terrorism. State,
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[The Evidence Continues]
local, and private-sector partners must send and receive timely information from the FBI. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should play a role in supporting these partners’ efforts by
acting as a source or conduit for information to partners and coordinating information sharing
between the FBI and its partners.
Designating an office in DHS to coordinate countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts. CVE efforts
are spread across all levels of government and society. DHS is uniquely situated to lead the federal
government’s efforts to empower local partners. Currently, DHS’s CVE working group coordinates
efforts across DHS components, but a more substantial office will be necessary to manage this
broader task.
Supporting state, local, and civil society partners. Congress and the Administration should not lose
sight of the fact that all of the federal government’s efforts must be focused on empowering local
partners. The federal government is not the tip of the spear for CVE efforts; it exists to support local
partners who are in the best position to recognize and counter radicalization in their own
communities.
Maintaining essential counterterrorism tools. Support for important investigative tools is
essential to maintaining the security of the U.S. and combating terrorist threats. Legitimate
government surveillance programs are also a vital component of U.S. national security and
should be allowed to continue. The need for effective counterterrorism operations, however, does
not relieve the government of its obligation to follow the law and respect individual privacy and
liberty. In the American system, the government must do both equally well.
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C. Impact – an attack on US soil is imminent and this inflicts suffering and death against
innocent people
Kephart, Researcher at Center for Immigration Studies, 2005 [Janice Kephart, Moving Beyond
the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, http://cis.org/articles/2005/kephart.html]
Al Qaeda operatives discussed here were strategically positioned throughout the United
States -- often in places not previously associated with terrorist activity, such as Peoria and
Chicago, Illinois; Columbus, Ohio; Baltimore, Maryland, and its suburbs; Seattle, Washington;
Portland, Oregon; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and upstate New York. A couple of al Qaeda operatives
covered in this report are still at large and currently unindicted, including Adnan Shukrijumah and
Aafia Siddiqui, yet are included here because they are high on the FBI's list for questioning and
spent long periods of time in the United States. The lists found throughout this report (under
immigration benefit subject headings at the end of each section) begin with Mir Aimal Kansi, who
in January 1993 opened fire outside CIA headquarters in McLean, Virginia; the most recent
cases, from 2004, involve the surveillance cases in New York City; in Charlotte, North Carolina;
Nashville, Tennessee; Las Vegas, Nevada; and southern California. All told, 21 of these terrorists
committed five attacks against U.S. interests causing a total of 3,341 deaths and 8,463
injuries; 29 were involved in 12 unexecuted plots. Five hijackers from 9/11 had clear
immigration violations, while one (Marwan Al-Shehhi), had a possible violation; thus, 13
hijackers are not included in the chart below. I do not discuss the 9/11 plotters in this report or other
earlier terrorists in detail, as each is covered in 9/11 and Terrorist Travel. In 47 instances,
immigration benefits sought or acquired prior to 9/11 enabled the terrorists to stay in the
United States after 9/11 and continue their terrorist activities. This includes three terrorists
whose visas or entries into the United States were on 9/2/01, 9/6/01 and 9/10/01. In three instances,
terrorists sought immigration benefits after 9/11. One political asylee associated with the 9/11
hijackers was denied and deported after having previous immigration violations. The second
managed to maintain his student status in the United States through mid-2002. A third gained legal
permanent residency status in 2002. Although each of these 94 terrorists had committed an
immigration violation of some kind, criminal charges alone were brought in at least 37
instances and immigration charges in 18. Indictments in 50 cases included both immigration and
criminal charges. There have been a total of 15 deportations and 23 criminal convictions. In 16
instances, individuals were not convicted (e.g., the six 9/11 hijackers), are being held as an enemy
combatant (e.g., Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), or have fled the United States (e.g., Anwar Al-Aulaqi,
an imam associated with the 9/11 hijackers and believed to be now in Yemen.)
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Uniqueness – Surveillance Increasing
(__)
(__) FBI terrorism surveillance activities are increasing now and effective in the status quo
Dahl, Assistant Professor at Nataval Postgraduate School, 2011
Erik. “Domestic Intelligence Today: More Security but Less Liberty?.” Homeland Security Affairs 7,
10 Years After: The 9/11 Essays (September 2011). https://www.hsaj.org/articles/67
The FBI is expanding its domestic intelligence and surveillance operations in other ways, as
well. It is changing its own internal rules to give its agents more leeway to conduct
investigations and surveillance, such as by searching databases or sorting through a
person’s trash.35 And it appears to be making greater use of undercover informants in
intelligence investigations, leading in some cases to successful arrests and prosecutions,
but in others to controversy.36
(__) Newest government reports show surveillance is increasing by the government and is
effective
Gilens, ACLU Speech, Privacy and Technology Project, 2012
(Naomi, ACLU, "New Justice Department Documents Show Huge Increase in Warrantless
Electronic Surveillance," https://www.aclu.org/blog/new-justice-department-documents-show-hugeincrease-warrantless-electronic-surveillance
Justice Department documents released today by the ACLU reveal that federal law
enforcement agencies are increasingly monitoring Americans’ electronic communications,
and doing so without warrants, sufficient oversight, or meaningful accountability. The
documents, handed over by the government only after months of litigation, are the attorney
general’s 2010 and 2011 reports on the use of “pen register” and “trap and trace” surveillance
powers. The reports show a dramatic increase in the use of these surveillance tools, which
are used to gather information about telephone, email, and other Internet communications.
The revelations underscore the importance of regulating and overseeing the government’s
surveillance power. (Our original Freedom of Information Act request and our legal complaint are
online.)
(__) Data shows electronic surveillance is on the rise
Gilens, ACLU Speech, Privacy and Technology Project, 2012
(Naomi, ACLU, "New Justice Department Documents Show Huge Increase in Warrantless
Electronic Surveillance," https://www.aclu.org/blog/new-justice-department-documents-show-hugeincrease-warrantless-electronic-surveillance
Electronic Surveillance Is Sharply on the Rise The reports that we received document an
enormous increase in the Justice Department’s use of pen register and trap and trace
surveillance. As the chart below shows, between 2009 and 2011 the combined number of
original orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices used to spy on phones increased
by 60%, from 23,535 in 2009 to 37,616 in 2011.
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Link – Surveillance solves terrorist plots
(__) Domestic surveillance solves terrorist plots – since 9/11, the NSA program has prevent
50 homeland threats
New York Times, 2013
(Charlie Savage, "N.S.A. Chief Says Surveillance Has Stopped Dozens of Plots,"
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/us/politics/nsa-chief-says-surveillance-has-stopped-dozens-ofplots.html?_r=0
WASHINGTON — Top national security officials on Tuesday promoted two newly
declassified examples of what they portrayed as “potential terrorist events” disrupted by
government surveillance. The cases were made public as Congress and the Obama
administration stepped up a campaign to explain and defend programs unveiled by recent
leaks from a former intelligence contractor.
One case involved a group of men in San Diego convicted of sending money to an extremist
group in Somalia. The other was presented as a nascent plan to bomb the New York Stock
Exchange, although its participants were not charged with any such plot. Both were described by
Sean Joyce, deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at a rare public oversight
hearing by the House Intelligence Committee.
At the same hearing, Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency, said
that American surveillance had helped prevent “potential terrorist events over 50 times since
9/11,” including at least 10 “homeland-based threats.” But he said that a vast majority of the
others must remain secret.
(__) The plan prevents the government from accessing critical information to prevent a
terrorist attack on US soil
Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?,"
June 5, 2013, the Guardian broke the first story in what would become a flood of revelations
regarding the extent and nature of the NSA’s surveillance programs. Facing an uproar over the
threat such programs posed to privacy, the Obama administration scrambled to defend them as
legal and essential to U.S. national security and counterterrorism. Two weeks after the first
leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden were published, President Obama defended the
NSA surveillance programs during a visit to Berlin, saying: “We know of at least 50 threats
that have been averted because of this information not just in the United States, but, in some
cases, threats here in Germany. So lives have been saved.” Gen. Keith Alexander, the
director of the NSA, testified before Congress that: “the information gathered from these
programs provided the U.S. government with critical leads to help prevent over 50 potential
terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the world.” Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.),
chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said on the House floor
in July that “54 times [the NSA programs] stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here
and in Europe – saving real lives.”
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Link – Surveillance solves terrorist plots
(__) Domestic surveillance data mining capabilities prevents a terrorist attack before it is too
late
Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE
CONSTITUTION," SSRN
It seems that critics are mostly interested in blindly limiting the powers of the government,
even as it fights a tough war. They presume the American government to be acting in bad
faith, and so all of its activities must be treated with the highest possible level of suspicion.
Meanwhile, data mining technology and databases are exploding in the private sector.121 It
would be ironic if al Qaeda and private individuals were permitted greater legal access to
new data technology than our own government, especially in wartime. Overreaction and plain
scare tactics killed TIA, a potentially valuable tool to counter al Qaeda’s offensive within the
United States.122 It made little sense to cut off TIA at the research and development stage
out of sheer anti-government paranoia. There was no chance to see what computer technology
could even do, no discussion of whether adequate safeguards for privacy could be installed, and no
opportunity to evaluate whether data mining would yield leads on terrorist activity that would
be worth any costs to privacy. No analysis could be done on the legal issues. Perhaps worst of
all, we could never explore the ways that computers could be used to protect privacy. Data mining
scans many perfectly innocent transactions and activities, but this in itself does not make
the search illegal; even searches of homes and businesses or wiretaps with warrants will
encounter many items or communications that are not linked to criminal activity.123 The
understandable concern is that much innocent activity will come under scrutiny by data (discussing
the need for an attenuated probable cause requirement in the national security context,
because “intelligence officers will often not have a good idea . . . what they are looking for”)..
21 mining, unless controlled in some way by a warrant requirement.124 But if computers are
doing the primary scanning, privacy might not be implicated because no human eyes would
ever have seen the data.125 Only when the computer programs highlight individuals who fit
parameters that reasonably suggest further study for terrorist links—say a young man who
has traveled from Ohio to Pakistan several times, has taken flight lessons in the U.S., has
received large deposits of cash wired into his account from abroad, and has purchased
equipment that could be used for bomb-making—would a human intelligence officer view the
records
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Link – Surveillance is necessary for timely response
(__)
(__) The plan prevents a swift and timely response to a terrorist attack – domestic
surveillance is key to act upon attacks on the US before it is too late
Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE
CONSTITUTION," SSRN
Yet, when Congress delegates broad authority to the President to defend the nation from
attack, critics demand that Congress list every power it wishes to authorize.192 While the
threats to individual liberty may be greater in this setting, it makes little sense to place
Congress under a heavier burden to describe every conceivable future contingency that
might arise when we are fighting a war, perhaps the most unpredictable and certainly most
dangerous of human endeavors. Rather, we would expect and want Congress to delegate
power to that branch, Executive, which is best able to act with speed to combat threats to
our national security.193 War is too difficult to plan for with fixed, antecedent legislative
rules, and war also is better run by the executive, which is structurally designed to take
quick, decisive action. If the AUMF authorized the President to detain and kill the enemy,194
the ability to search for them is necessarily included.
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Link – Surveillance solves meta-data intelligence
(__)
(__) Domestic surveillance is necessary for the collection of meta-data. This data is critical to
stopping terrorist plots
Lewis, CSIS Fellow, 14, "Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate,"
csis.org/files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf
NSA carried out two kinds of signals intelligence programs: bulk surveillance to support
counterterrorism and collection to support U.S. national security interests. The debate over
surveillance unhelpfully conflated the two programs. Domestic bulk collection for
counterterrorism is politically problematic, but assertions that a collection program is
useless because it has not by itself prevented an attack reflect unfamiliarity with intelligence.
Intelligence does not work as it is portrayed in films—solitary agents do not make startling
discoveries that lead to dramatic, last-minute success. Success is the product of the efforts of
teams of dedicated individuals from many agencies, using many tools and techniques,
working together to assemble fragments of data from many sources into a coherent picture.
In practice, analysts must simultaneously explore many possible scenarios. A collection
program contributes by not only what it reveals, but also what it lets us reject as false. The
Patriot Act Section 215 domestic bulk telephony metadata program provided information that
allowed analysts to rule out some scenarios and suspects. The consensus view from interviews
with current and former intelligence officials is that while metadata collection is useful, it is the least
useful of the collection programs available to the intelligence community. If there was one
surveillance program they had to give up, it would be 215, but this would not come without
an increase in risk. Restricting metadata collection will make it harder to identify attacks and
increase the time it takes to do this
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Link – Surveillance solves bulk intelligence
(__)
(__) NSA surveillance use bulk collection as key piece to the intelligence puzzle
Lewis, CSIS Fellow, 14, "Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate,"
csis.org/files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf
NSA carried out two kinds of signals intelligence programs: bulk surveillance to support
counterterrorism and collection to support U.S. national security interests. The debate over
surveillance unhelpfully conflated the two programs. Domestic bulk collection for
counterterrorism is politically problematic, but assertions that a collection program is
useless because it has not by itself prevented an attack reflect unfamiliarity with intelligence.
Intelligence does not work as it is portrayed in films—solitary agents do not make startling
discoveries that lead to dramatic, last-minute success. Success is the product of the efforts of
teams of dedicated individuals from many agencies, using many tools and techniques,
working together to assemble fragments of data from many sources into a coherent picture.
In practice, analysts must simultaneously explore many possible scenarios. A collection
program contributes by not only what it reveals, but also what it lets us reject as false. The
Patriot Act Section 215 domestic bulk telephony metadata program provided information that
allowed analysts to rule out some scenarios and suspects. The consensus view from interviews
with current and former intelligence officials is that while metadata collection is useful, it is the least
useful of the collection programs available to the intelligence community. If there was one
surveillance program they had to give up, it would be 215, but this would not come without
an increase in risk. Restricting metadata collection will make it harder to identify attacks and
increase the time it takes to do this
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Link – Surveillance solves SIGNIT intelligence
(__)
(__) Domestic surveillance are key to gathering SIGINT data which is the most important data
in combatting terrorist efforts to launch an attack on US soil
Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE
CONSTITUTION," SSRN
Gathering intelligence has long been understood as a legitimate aspect of conducting war;
indeed, it is critical to the successful use of force.134 Our military cannot attack or defend to
good 132 December 2005 Briefing, supra note 1; see also Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1. 133
See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1. 134 In the 1907 Hague Regulations, one of the first treaties on
the laws of war, the leading military powers agreed that “the employment of measures necessary for
obtaining information about the enemy and the country is 24 effect unless it knows where to aim.
America has a long history of conducting intelligence operations to obtain information on
the enemy. General Washington used spies extensively during the Revolutionary War, and as
President he established a secret fund for spying that existed until the creation of the CIA.135
President Lincoln personally hired spies during the Civil War, a practice which the Supreme
Court upheld.136 In both World Wars I and II, Presidents ordered the interception of
electronic communications leaving the United States.137 Some of America’s greatest
wartime intelligence successes have involved SIGINT, most notably the breaking of
Japanese diplomatic and naval codes during World War II, which allowed the U.S. Navy to
anticipate the attack on Midway Island.138 SIGINT is even more important in this war than in
those of the last century. Al Qaeda continues to launch a variety of efforts to attack the
United States, including acquiring and deploying weapons of mass destruction.139 The
primary way to stop those attacks is to locate and stop al Qaeda operatives who have
infiltrated the United States. One way to find them is to intercept their electronic
communications entering or leaving the country.
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Extension: SIGNIT intelligence is necessary
(__)
(__) SIGNIT intelligence is necessary to uncover terrorist plots
Dahl, 7 – (Erik, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Journal of Strategic Studies, “Warning of
Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorist,” Taylor and Francis)
Scholars and analysts of terrorism generally agree that good intelligence is critical: the
National Commission on Terrorism, for example, concluded that ‘no other single policy effort is
more important for preventing, preempting, and responding to attacks’ than intelligence. 17
But terrorism analysts tend to share several assumptions regarding intelligence that are not all held
by traditional scholars of intelligence failure. First, there is agreement that terrorism presents a
particularly difficult problem for intelligence (as well as for policy and operations). Because
terrorist groups are often small, dispersed and do not rely on the large infrastructure of a
conventional state-based threat, intelligence is limited in its ability to use traditional tools and
techniques to gain insight on terrorist intentions and capabilities Second, the primary limitation
for intelligence is believed to be its lack of Humint capability. For example, terrorism experts
still today frequently complain that decades ago, then-Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield
Turner turned the community away from Humint and toward technical intelligence. The importance
of Humint in the fight against terror, in fact, is one assumption that unites analysts of
intelligence, such as Richard Betts, and of terrorism, such as Paul Pillar. 18 Third, terrorist attacks
are not likely to be preceded by tactical warning. This has been the finding of several official
investigations following terrorist attacks, such as the Crowe Commission that studied the Kenya
and Tanzania US Embassy bombings and criticized the intelligence and policy communities for
having relied too much on tactical intelligence to determine threat levels. 19 And fourth, in a
point related to the stress on human intelligence, writers on terrorism tend to pay relatively little
attention to the importance of intelligence analysis. They focus instead on the need for better
collection, particularly from human sources, and for increased counter-terrorist operations
in the form of counter-intelligence and covert action.
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Link – Surveillance solves terrorist financing
(__)
(__) Domestic surveillance capabilities are key to find terrorist organizations and freeze their
assets
Lormel, 2 Chief of Financial Crimes, FBI, Before the House Committee on Financial Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/financing-patternsassociated-with-al-qaeda-and-global-terrorist-networks
As a participant on the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on terrorist
financing, chaired by Treasury Department General Counsel David Aufhauser, the FRG continues
to function in a leadership role in the efforts to target Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) believed to provide financial support to known Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)
and other affiliated terrorist cells. The FRG is currently actively involved in the coordination of
twelve multi-jurisdictional NGO investigations. In order to disrupt the terrorist financing
channels, the FRG has coordinated these and other FBI terrorist investigations with the
terrorist designation and asset freezing efforts of the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) and Operation Green Quest. These efforts have resulted in the freezing
of millions of dollars in foreign and U.S. bank accounts. Specifically, the joint efforts
targeting Al-Barakaat, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the Global
Relief Foundation, and the Benevolence International Foundation have resulted in the
execution of numerous search warrants and the disruption of the fund-raising and money
remittance operations of these and other NGOs. Financial investigations of these entities
have revealed that approximately $200 million in contributions passed through these
organizations each year. The FRG will also coordinate with the Department of the Treasury in its
other initiatives in order to help ensure their success.
(__) Finance and money are the lifeblood to terrorist efforts – the plan prevents the
governments ability to dismantle terrorist groups
Lormel, 2 Chief of Financial Crimes, FBI, Before the House Committee on Financial Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/financing-patternsassociated-with-al-qaeda-and-global-terrorist-networks
Identifying, tracking, and dismantling the financial structure supporting terrorist groups is
critical to successfully dismantling the organization and preventing future terrorist attacks.
As is the case in so many types of criminal investigations, identifying and "following the
money" plays a critical role in identifying those involved in the criminal activity, establishing
links among them, and developing evidence of their involvement in the activity. In the early
stages of the investigation into the events of September 11, it was financial evidence that
quickly established direct links among the hijackers of the four flights and helped identify
co-conspirators.
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Extension: Surveillance solves terrorist financing
(__)
(__) Domestic surveillance is critical to terrorism financing
Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE
CONSTITUTION," SSRN
Data mining is the best hope for an innovative counter-terrorism strategy to detect and
prevent future al Qaeda attacks. Rather than hope an agent will one day penetrate al Qaeda’s
inner circles—a dubious possibility—or that we will successfully seal our vast borders from
terrorists, data mining would allow us to see patterns of activity that reveal the al Qaeda
network’s activity before it can attack.92 Computerized pattern analysis could quickly reveal
whether anyone linked to al Qaeda made large purchases of chemicals or equipment that
could be used for explosives or chemical weapons. We could learn whether they traveled
regularly to certain cities, and we could discover where they stayed and who they called in
those cities. As civil libertarians complain, almost all transactions of this nature—calling,
emailing, spending money, traveling—are innocent.93 We engage in them every day. That is
exactly why al Qaeda has trained its operatives to use them as tools to conceal their plots.94
Al Qaeda’s leaders understand the difficulty in analyzing billions of transactions and
interactions every day to detect their cells, and they realize that western societies impose
legal obstacles on government access to such information.95 Civil libertarian critics don’t seem
to have noticed that our government already employs modest forms of data mining to track down
criminals and terrorists. In response to drug cartels and organized crime, our government has
used simple data mining to track and analyze money flows for years.96 Banks and financial
institutions provide records of financial transactions to the Department of the Treasury, which
searches the patterns for money laundering activity.97 While the great majority of the
transactions are legal, the information can piece together proof of criminal links after a
conspiracy has been stopped, or it can help indicate suspicious activity that demands
further investigation.98 Analyzing money flows has also proven to be an important tool in
detecting and breaking up terrorist networks.99 If civil libertarians are right, consumers
would also have an absolute right to privacy over their banking transactions and our
government would lose this valuable, commonsense tool to combat crime, as well as
terrorism. Two examples illustrate this point: (1) the NSA’s use of phone records and (2) the
Total Information Awareness program.
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Extension: Financing is key to terrorist efforts
(__)
(__) Financing is the key to terrorist efforts to launch an attack on US soil
Lormel, 2 Chief of Financial Crimes, FBI, Before the House Committee on Financial Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/financing-patternsassociated-with-al-qaeda-and-global-terrorist-networks
Cutting off the financial lifeblood of individuals and organizations responsible for acts of
terrorism is a vital step in dismantling the organization and preventing future terrorist acts.
The FBI is leading law enforcement efforts to accomplish this mission. The USA PATRIOT
Act has provided law enforcement with powerful new tools to assist in accomplishing this
mission. The FBI welcomes the opportunity to work with this Subcommittee and others to
ensure that law enforcement efforts can be the most effective. I would welcome any questions
you may have at this time. Thank you.
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Link – Surveillance solves counter-terror efforts
(__)
(__) The plan prevents the government from having access to data that is critical to counterterror and troops on the ground combat
Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE
CONSTITUTION," SSRN
Critics of the NSA program want to overturn American historical practice in favor of a new
and untested theory about the wartime powers of the President and Congress.257 We should
encourage innovation and creativity in our intelligence and military—and the NSA program is
precisely that—to confront the unprecedented challenges of al Qaeda. For too long, our
system retarded aggressive measures to pre-empt terrorist attacks.258 But seeking to give
Congress the dominant hand in setting wartime policy would render our tactics against al
Qaeda less, rather than more effective. It would slow down decisions, make sensitive
policies and intelligence public, and encourage risk aversion rather than risk taking. It
ignores the reality of the al Qaeda challenge to require the President to seek, every time he
wants to make an important policy change, congressional permission first.
(__) Domestic surveillance is the foundation for all counter-terror strategies
Yoo, 7
John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE
CONSTITUTION," SSRN
Congress also implicitly authorized the President to carry out electronic surveillance to
prevent further attacks on the United States.179 Congress’s September 18, 2001 Authorization
for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) is sweeping; it has no limitation on time or place—the only
directive is that the President pursues terrorists, such as al Qaeda.180 Although the President
did not need, as a constitutional matter, Congress’s permission to pursue and attack al Qaeda
after the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon,181 AUMF’s passage shows that the
President and Congress fully agreed that military action would be appropriate. Congress’s
support for the President cannot just be limited to the right to use force, but to all the
necessary subcomponents that permit effective military action.182 Congress’s approval of
the killing and capture of al Qaeda must obviously include the tools to locate them in the
first place
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Link – Surveillance solves Al Qaeda sleeper cells
(__)
(__) Domestic Surveillance is key to combat necessary to track and thwart Al Qaeda sleeper
cells
Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE
CONSTITUTION," SSRN
These privacy concerns are exaggerated. The Supreme Court has found that such
information does not receive Fourth Amendment protection because the consumer has
already voluntarily turned over the information to a third party.108 It is not covered by FISA
because no electronic interception or surveillance of the calls has occurred.109 Meanwhile, the
data is potentially of enormous use in frustrating al Qaeda plots. If our agents are pointed to
members of an al Qaeda sleeper cell by a U.S. phone number found in a captured al Qaeda
leader’s cell phone, call pattern analysis would allow the NSA to determine the extent of the
network and its activities.110 It could track the sleeper cell as it periodically changed phone
numbers.111 This could give a quick, initial database-generated glimpse of the possible size
and activity level of the cell in an environment where time is of the essence
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Link – Surveillance solves cyber attack
(__)
(__) Ending domestic surveillance hampers the ability of the government to secure networks
against cyber attacks
Goldsmith, Professor at Harvard Law, 13 "We need an Invasive NSA,"
www.newrepublic.com/article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyber-attacks
The Times editorial board is quite right about the seriousness of the cyber- threat and the
federal government’s responsibility to redress it. What it does not appear to realize is the
connection between the domestic NSA surveillance it detests and the governmental
assistance with cybersecurity it cherishes. To keep our computer and telecommunication
networks secure, the government will eventually need to monitor and collect intelligence on
those networks using techniques similar to ones the Timesand many others find
reprehensible when done for counterterrorism ends.
The fate of domestic surveillance is today being fought around the topic of whether it is needed to
stop Al Qaeda from blowing things up. But the fight tomorrow, and the more important fight,
will be about whether it is necessary to protect our ways of life embedded in computer
networks
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Answer to: Surveillance fails at solving a terrorist attack
(__)
(__) Surveillance capabilities are an integral part to preventing a terrorist attack – it’s the
foundation of all other counter-terror capabilities
Roberts, 15 Martin, "Intelligence leaders cite Texas attack before deadline on NSA surveillance,"
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/10/nsa-surveillance-domestic-texas-isis
“This threat is like finding a needle in a haystack and it’s going to get worse, not better,”
McCaul added. “I think the threat environment today is one of the highest I have ever seen.”
Controversial NSA powers to monitor suspicious communication by collecting all American
phone records are due to expire at the end of the month, a circumstance that was
dramatically complicated by a US appeal court judgment on Thursday ruling the practice first
revealed by Edward Snowden to be unlawful. A number of lawmakers warned on Sunday the
Garland attack showed why it was essential Congress face down opposition to the so-called
“bulk collection” programme and reauthorise the original Patriot Act provision, despite
Thursday’s legal challenge. “I hope that the reality of the situation, the reality of the threats we
face, will actually play a great part in terms of exactly how Congress responds,” Senate
homeland security chairman Ron Johnson told CNN. “Our first line of defence is an effective
intelligence-gathering capability,” the Wisconsin Republican added. “I think the demagoguery
and the revelations of Edward Snowden have done a great deal of harm to our ability to
gather that information.” Richard Burr, Republican chair of the Senate intelligence committee,
also insisted the Patriot Act provision should be reauthorised rather than amended when it expires
on 1 June. “It’s very effective at keeping America safe,” he told ABC, claiming the alternative
USA Freedom Act, which would rely on phone companies to keep records rather than the
NSA, “turns us back to pre-9/11” days.
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Answer to: Surveillance fails at solving a terrorist attack
(__)
(__) The utility of domestic surveillance in combatting terrorism is empirically proven – there
have been over 50 plots thwarted since 9/11
Savage, reporter for NYT, 13, "N.S.A. Chief Says Surveillance Has Stopped Dozens of Plots,"
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/us/politics/nsa-chief-says-surveillance-has-stopped-dozens-ofplots.html?_r=0
WASHINGTON — Top national security officials on Tuesday promoted two newly
declassified examples of what they portrayed as “potential terrorist events” disrupted by
government surveillance. The cases were made public as Congress and the Obama
administration stepped up a campaign to explain and defend programs unveiled by recent
leaks from a former intelligence contractor.
One case involved a group of men in San Diego convicted of sending money to an extremist
group in Somalia. The other was presented as a nascent plan to bomb the New York Stock
Exchange, although its participants were not charged with any such plot. Both were described by
Sean Joyce, deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at a rare public oversight
hearing by the House Intelligence Committee.
At the same hearing, Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency, said
that American surveillance had helped prevent “potential terrorist events over 50 times since
9/11,” including at least 10 “homeland-based threats.” But he said that a vast majority of the
others must remain secret.
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Extension: Surveillance is necessary for stopping a terrorist attack
(__)
(__) NSA surveillance is critical for information to stop a terrorist attack – this has
empirically been proven
Sterman, masters from Georgtown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/do-nsasbulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/
June 5, 2013, the Guardian broke the first story in what would become a flood of revelations
regarding the extent and nature of the NSA’s surveillance programs. Facing an uproar over the
threat such programs posed to privacy, the Obama administration scrambled to defend them as
legal and essential to U.S. national security and counterterrorism. Two weeks after the first
leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden were published, President Obama defended the
NSA surveillance programs during a visit to Berlin, saying: “We know of at least 50 threats
that have been averted because of this information not just in the United States, but, in some
cases, threats here in Germany. So lives have been saved.” Gen. Keith Alexander, the
director of the NSA, testified before Congress that: “the information gathered from these
programs provided the U.S. government with critical leads to help prevent over 50 potential
terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the world.” Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.),
chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said on the House floor
in July that “54 times [the NSA programs] stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here
and in Europe – saving real lives.”
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Link – Immigration Surveillance
(__)
(__) Terrorist will use exploit a lax immigration system in order to get in the U.S
Kephart, Researcher at Center for Immigration Studies, 2005 [Janice Kephart, Moving Beyond
the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, http://cis.org/articles/2005/kephart.html]
The report highlights the danger of our lax immigration system, not just in terms of who is
allowed in, but also how terrorists, once in the country, used weaknesses in the system to
remain here. The report makes clear that strict enforcement of immigration law -- at American
consulates overseas, at ports of entry, and within the United States -- must be an integral part of
our efforts to prevent future attacks on U.S. soil. Among the findings: Of the 94 foreign-born
terrorists who operated in the United States, the study found that about two-thirds (59)
committed immigration fraud prior to or in conjunction with taking part in terrorist activity.
Of the 59 terrorists who violated the law, many committed multiple immigration violations -79 instances in all. In 47 instances, immigration benefits sought or acquired prior to 9/11
enabled the terrorists to stay in the United States after 9/11 and continue their terrorist
activities. In at least two instances, terrorists were still able to acquire immigration benefits
after 9/11. Temporary visas were a common means of entering; 18 terrorists had student visas and
another four had applications approved to study in the United States. At least 17 terrorists used a
visitor visa -- either tourist (B2) or business (B1). There were 11 instances of passport fraud and 10
instances of visa fraud; in total 34 individuals were charged with making false statements to
an immigration official. In at least 13 instances, terrorists overstayed their temporary visas. In 17
instances, terrorists claimed to lack proper travel documents and applied for asylum, often at a port
of entry. Fraud was used not only to gain entry into the United States, but also to remain, or
"embed," in the country. Seven terrorists were indicted for acquiring or using various forms of
fake identification, including driver's licenses, birth certificates, Social Security cards, and
immigration arrival records. Once in the United States, 16 of 23 terrorists became legal
permanent residents, often by marrying an American. There were at least nine sham marriages. In
total, 20 of 21 foreign terrorists became naturalized U.S. citizens.
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Link – Immigration Surveillance
(___)
(___) Effective immigration surveillance could have prevented 9/11
Kobach, Professor of Law, University of Missouri (Kansas City), 2005 [THE QUINTESSENTIAL
FORCE MULTIPLIER: THE INHERENT AUTHORITY OF LOCAL POLICE TO MAKE
IMMIGRATION ARRESTS. Albany Law Review, 69(1), 179-235.
Of critical importance is the fact that all four of the hijackers who were stopped by local
police prior to 9/11 had violated federal immigration laws and could have been detained by
the state or local police officers. Indeed, there were only five hijackers who were clearly in
violation of immigration laws while in the United States— and four of the five were
encountered by state or local police officers.'' These were four missed opportunities of tragic
dimension. Had information about their immigration violations been disseminated to state
and local police through the NCIC system, the four terrorist aliens could have been detained
for their violations. Adding even greater poignancy to these missed opportunities is the fact
that they involved three of the four terrorist pilots of 9/11. Had the police officers involved
been able to detain Atta, Hanjour, and Jarrah, these three pilots would have been out of the
picture. It is difficult to imagine the hijackings proceeding without three of the four pilots.*
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Extension : Domestic surveillance of immigrants is necessary to
prevent a terrorist attack
(__) Surveillance of undocumented immigrants is key to preventing another terrorist attack
such as the one that occurred on 9/11/
Kobach, Professor of Law, University of Missouri (Kansas City), 2005 [THE QUINTESSENTIAL
FORCE MULTIPLIER: THE INHERENT AUTHORITY OF LOCAL POLICE TO MAKE
IMMIGRATION ARRESTS. Albany Law Review, 69(1), 179-235.
The fact that the 9/11 terrorists had been able to exploit weaknesses in the enforcement of
immigration laws was not surprising to those engaged in the execution of federal immigration law.
Enforcing the immigration laws is one of the most daunting challenges faced by the federal
government. With an estimated 7 to 10 million illegal aliens already present in the United States"
and fewer than 2000 interior enforcement agents at its disposal, the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a Herculean task on its hands—one that it cannot easily
accomplish alone.^ After 9/11, it became clear that an effective domestic war against terrorism
would require improvements in the enforcement of immigration laws. On June 6, 2002,
Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
(NSEERS), a program that would require high-risk alien visitors to provide fingerprints and
extensive biographical information. It would also require such aliens to re-register with U.S.
immigration officials periodically a n d would, for t h e first time, impose real-time departure
controls on such high-risk visitors.* Violators of the NSEERS requirements would be listed in
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, accessible in the squad cars of most
local police departments, allowing local law enforcement officers to make arrests of such
high-risk immigration law . Had local police officers had access to the names of the five 9/11
hijackers who violated civil provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prior to
the attack, they might have been able to arrest and detain one or more of the hijackers. The
assistance of state and local law enforcement agencies can also mean the difference
between success and failure in enforcing the nation's immigration laws generally. The nearly
800,000 police officers nationwide represent a massive force multiplier.' This assistance need
only be occasional, passive, voluntary, and pursued during the course of normal law enforcement
activity. The net that is cast daily by local law enforcement during routine encounters with
members of the public is so immense that it is inevitable illegal aliens will be identified.
When a local police officer establishes probable cause to believe that an alien is in violation
ofU.S. immigration law, he may contact the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center in Williston,
Vermont, to confirm that ICE wishes to take custody of the alien."*
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Link – NSA Reform – Generic
(__)
(__) Reforming the NSA still prevents critical data gathering to thwart a terrorist attack and
hampers the ability for the government to effectively respond in a timely manner
Schneier, computer security and intelligence specialist, 13 "The NSA-Reform Paradox: Stop
Domestic Spying, Get More Security," www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/the-nsa-reformparadox-stop-domestic-spying-get-more-security/279537/
Any solution we devise will make the NSA less efficient at its eavesdropping job. That's a
trade-off we should be willing to make, just as we accept reduced police efficiency caused
by requiring warrants for searches and warning suspects that they have the right to an
attorney before answering police questions. We do this because we realize that a too-powerful
police force is itself a danger, and we need to balance our need for public safety with our aversion
of a police state.
The same reasoning needs to apply to the NSA. We want it to eavesdrop on our enemies, but
it needs to do so in a way that doesn’t trample on the constitutional rights of Americans, or
fundamentally jeopardize their privacy or security. This means that sometimes the NSA won’t
get to eavesdrop, just as the protections we put in place to restrain police sometimes result in a
criminal getting away. This is a trade-off we need to make willingly and openly, because
overall we are safer that way.
28
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Link – NSA Reform – NSA Reform collapses secrecy
(__)
(__) NSA needs to maintain its secrecy to not compromise classified data – the plan
collapses that by forcing agencies to disclose classified info about counter-terror efforts that
allows organizations like Al Qaeda to continue
Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE
CONSTITUTION," SSRN
If ever there were an emergency that Congress could not prepare for, it was the war brought upon
the United States on 9/11. FISA was a law written with Soviet spies working out of their embassy in
Washington, D.C. in mind.221 No one then anticipated war with an international terrorist
organization wielding the destructive power of a nation. The Presidency was the institution
of government best able to respond quickly to the 9/11 attacks and to take measures to
defeat al Qaeda’s further efforts. While the certainty and openness of a congressional act
would certainly be desirable, the success of the NSA surveillance program depends on
secrecy and agility, two characteristics Congress as an institution lacks.
29
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Link – PATRIOT Act
(__)
(__) The PATRIOT Act is necessary to get key info for terrorist finances
Lormel, 2 Chief of Financial Crimes, FBI, Before the House Committee on Financial Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/financing-patternsassociated-with-al-qaeda-and-global-terrorist-networks
Cutting off the financial lifeblood of individuals and organizations responsible for acts of
terrorism is a vital step in dismantling the organization and preventing future terrorist acts.
The FBI is leading law enforcement efforts to accomplish this mission. The USA PATRIOT
Act has provided law enforcement with powerful new tools to assist in accomplishing this
mission. The FBI welcomes the opportunity to work with this Subcommittee and others to
ensure that law enforcement efforts can be the most effective. I would welcome any questions
you may have at this time. Thank you.
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Impact – Terrorism is the most important security threat
(__)
(__) An attack on US soil would devastate populations and poses the greatest threat to
security
Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of
Counterterrorism,"
archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counter
terrorism-2.pdf
According to current counterterrorism rhetoric, non-state terrorism threatens many things:
security, lives, values, freedom, democracy, and the existence of civilization itself, and
poses a greater threat than the threats posed by war, invasion, accident, natural disasters,
and criminal activity. Several government ministers have claimed that the magnitude of the
terrorist threat is so great that it imposes a positive moral duty on governments to protect
the individual’s right to security even at the expense of many basic civil liberties. The
German Interior Minister Otto Schily, for example, argued that the government had an obligation to
“protect the “basic right to security” of all German Citizens.”7 Similarly the Australian AttorneyGeneral Phillip Ruddock said that “I believe that some protagonists fail to recognise a national
government’s obligation under Article 3 of the human rights convention—that is, that governments
have an obligation to protect human life.”8 The need to counter the threat of terrorism is
claimed to both justify and require radical infringements of civil liberties such as the right to
privacy, the right to due process, and the right not to be detained without just cause. Yet despite
these strong claims there has been little clear explanation of how and why terrorism
threatens lives, values, and freedom. Perhaps it is meant to be obvious, but the author does not
find it so. How does terrorism threaten security? What kind of security does it threaten?
31
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Impact – Terrorism causes death
(__)
(__) Terrorism causes countless deaths for innocent civilians
Moon, 9 Ban-Ki, Secretary General of the UN, "United Nations Efforts to Address Terrorism Threat
‘Crucial to Global Security’, Says Secretary-General, in Message to Vienna Meeting,"
www.un.org/press/en/2009/sgsm12544.doc.htm
Terrorism is a major security threat in today’s world. Countless innocent civilians and the
United Nations itself have suffered heinous terrorist acts. Our efforts to address this
problem comprehensively are crucial to global security. I attach great importance to your work.
As you know, I have appointed Jean-Paul Laborde to lead the Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force [CTIFTF], and have established a CTITF Office in the Department
of Political Affairs. These measures should allow you to build on your already considerable
accomplishments. I congratulate Task Force members for bringing together more than two dozen
entities. Some are focused directly on terrorism, while others bring expertise on non-proliferation,
disarmament, education, cultural and inter-religious dialogue, human rights, peacekeeping, health
and other issues. This range of experience allows the United Nations to address terrorism as part of
our broader mission to promote development, human rights and peace. It also promotes synergies
and information-sharing, and allows each entity to maximize its comparative advantage
32
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Impact – Terrorism threatens freedom
(__)
(__) Even in the face of privacy concerns, terrorism is still a comparatively larger threat to
combat
Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of
Counterterrorism,"
archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counter
terrorism-2.pdf
According to current counterterrorism rhetoric, non-state terrorism threatens many things:
security, lives, values, freedom, democracy, and the existence of civilization itself, and
poses a greater threat than the threats posed by war, invasion, accident, natural disasters,
and criminal activity. Several government ministers have claimed that the magnitude of the
terrorist threat is so great that it imposes a positive moral duty on governments to protect
the individual’s right to security even at the expense of many basic civil liberties. The
German Interior Minister Otto Schily, for example, argued that the government had an obligation to
“protect the “basic right to security” of all German Citizens.”7 Similarly the Australian AttorneyGeneral Phillip Ruddock said that “I believe that some protagonists fail to recognise a national
government’s obligation under Article 3 of the human rights convention—that is, that governments
have an obligation to protect human life.”8 The need to counter the threat of terrorism is
claimed to both justify and require radical infringements of civil liberties such as the right to
privacy, the right to due process, and the right not to be detained without just cause. Yet despite
these strong claims there has been little clear explanation of how and why terrorism
threatens lives, values, and freedom. Perhaps it is meant to be obvious, but the author does not
find it so. How does terrorism threaten security? What kind of security does it threaten?
33
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Impact – Terrorism hurts psychological well-being
Terrorism inflicts psychological harm by causing populations to live in fear and anxiety
Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of
Counterterrorism,"
archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counter
terrorism-2.pdf
Although the threat of terrorism to individual lives is less than many other threats, terrorism
does not only threaten lives; it threatens psychological well being. Terrorism causes deep
anxiety and fear in the target population. Indeed, causing fear and anxiety is often part of the
very definition of terrorism.32 Furthermore, the fear induced by terrorist attacks is different
from the fear and anxiety felt about other threats to lives for several reasons. First, terrorist
attacks are often highly visible and shocking. Unlike car accidents, for instance, terrorist attacks can
kill thousands of people instantly. The graphic nature of terrorist attacks and their apparent
randomness (from the victims’ point of view) greatly contributes to the terror they instill. According to
psychological research on terror management theory events such as terrorist attacks forcefully
remind us of our mortality. Because of this, we desire reassurance and a sense of security
that we do not require for less visible threats that pose a greater objective threat to our lives
and well being.33 Terrorist attacks make human fragility and vulnerability highly salient.
Second, new threats are feared far more than old. For many people, the fear of contracting the
SARS virus was greater than the fear of contracting tuberculosis, a disease more prevalent and far
more fatal than SARS.34 For Americans and Australians, therefore, the threat of terrorism is both
relatively new and highly visible. Citizens of countries like Israel who have lived with terrorist
violence for years probably do not feel nearly the same level of anxiety or fear as citizens of
America
34
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Answer to: Terrorist attack is unlikely
(__)
(__) Even if it the risk of the attack is unlikely, the magnitude of the impact means it’s a
relevant concern to act upon
Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of
Counterterrorism,"
archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counter
terrorism-2.pdf
Despite the relatively low statistical threat to life posed by non-state terrorism, government
officials have portrayed the threat as both immediate and of great magnitude. So there are
statements from Phillip Ruddock and the Australian Prime Minister John Howard claiming that
“there is “high probability” of a terrorist attack occurring sooner rather than later.”18 Similarly, in
the United States officials have claimed that “Terrorism is a clear and present danger to
Americans today” and “The threat of international terrorism knows no boundaries.”19 This
view is shared by the general population. Opinion polls in the United States and in Australia
show that the majority of the population believe that the threat of terrorism is both an imminent and
far greater threat than other threats.20 But perhaps the discrepancy between the actual
statistical threat of terrorism and the claims of politicians is not based just on what terrorists
might do now, but also on what they might do in the future. A supporter of radical
counterterrorism measures might accept that the statistical threat of being killed in a
terrorist attack is, at present, less than many other threats but point out that the future threat
of what might be called super-terrorism is significant enough to justify the suspension of
civil liberties and the massive spending on defense and other counterterrorism
organizations. Because it is possible that a single act of terrorism could wipe out hundreds
of thousands of people instantly, the mere existence of that possibility is sufficient to make
the threat of terrorism far more significant than the threat posed by crime, disease and
poverty
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Answer to: Terrorists aren’t a threat
(__)
(__) There is a growing threat of a terrorist attack on US soil due to resentment generated by
US presence abroad
Lewis, CSIS Fellow, 14, "Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate,"
csis.org/files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf
The echoes of September 11 have faded and the fear of attack has diminished. We are
reluctant to accept terrorism as a facet of our daily lives, but major attacks—roughly one a
year in the last five years—are regularly planned against U.S. targets, particularly passenger
aircraft and cities. America’s failures in the Middle East have spawned new, aggressive
terrorist groups. These groups include radicalized recruits from the West—one estimate puts
the number at over 3,000—who will return home embittered and hardened by combat.
Particularly in Europe, the next few years will see an influx of jihadis joining the existing
population of homegrown radicals, but the United States itself remains a target. America’s
size and population make it is easy to disappear into the seams of this sprawling society.
Government surveillance is, with one exception and contrary to cinematic fantasy, limited
and disconnected. That exception is communications surveillance, which provides the best and
perhaps the only national-level solution to find and prevent attacks against Americans and
their allies. Some of the suggestions for alternative approaches to surveillance, such as the
recommendation that NSA only track “known or suspected terrorists,” reflect both deep
ignorance and wishful thinking. It is the unknown terrorist who will inflict the greatest harm
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Impact – Terrorist attack causes human rights violation
(__)
(__) Another terrorist attack would usher in a police state and expansive war powers – public
would demand it
Ignatieff ‘4 (Michael, Director of the Carr Center at the Kennedy School of Gov. @ Harvard, May 9,
Edmonton Journal, “How the war on terror can be won--or lost”)
It has taken nearly three years, but the 9/11 commission and the Supreme Court hearings on
enemy combatants have given Americans our first serious public discussion about how to balance
civil liberties and national security in a war on terror. Even so, we have not begun to ask the really
hard questions. The hardest one is: Could we actually lose the war on terror? Consider the
consequences of a second major attack on the mainland United States -- the detonation of a
radiological or dirty bomb, perhaps, or a low-yield nuclear device or a chemical strike in a subway.
Any of these events could cause death, devastation and panic on a scale that would make 9/11
seem like a pale prelude. After such an attack, a pall of mourning, anger and fear would hang
over our public life for a generation. An attack of this sort is already in the realm of possibility.
The recipes for making ultimate weapons are on the Internet, and the materiel required is available
for the right price. A democracy can allow its leaders one fatal mistake -- and that's what 9/11
looks like to many observers -- but Americans will not forgive a second one. Once the zones
of devastation were cordoned off and the bodies buried, we might find ourselves living in a
national-security state on continuous alert, with sealed borders, constant identity checks
and permanent detention camps for dissidents and aliens. Our constitutional rights might
disappear from our courts, while torture might reappear in our interrogation cells. The worst
of it is that government would not have to impose tyranny on a cowed populace. We would
demand it for our own protection. And if the institutions of our democracy were unable to protect
us from our enemies, we might go even farther, taking the law into our own hands. That is what
defeat in a war on terror looks like. We would survive, but we would no longer recognize ourselves.
We would endure, but we would lose our identity as free peoples.
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Extension: Terrorist attack causes human rights violation
(__)
(__) Terror attack turns the entire case---fear would cause public acquiescence to rightsviolations and government crackdowns that outweigh the case by an order of magnitude
Peter Beinart 8, associate professor of journalism and political science at CUNY, The Good Fight;
Why Liberals – and only Liberals – Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again,
110-1
Indeed, while the Bush administration bears the blame for these hor- rors, White House officials
exploited a shift in public values after 9/11. When asked by Princeton Survey Research Associates
in 1997 whether stopping terrorism required citizens to cede some civil liberties, less than one-t hird
of Americans said yes. By the spring of 2002, that had grown to almost three- quarters. Public
support for the government’s right to wire- tap phones and read people’s mail also grew
exponentially. In fact, polling in the months after the attack showed Americans less concerned that
the Bush administration was violating civil liberties than that it wasn’t violating them enough.
What will happen the next time? It is, of course, impossible to predict the reaction to any particular
attack. But in 2003, the Center for Public Integrity got a draft of something called the Domestic
Security Enhance- ment Act, quickly dubbed Patriot II. According to the center’s executive director,
Charles Lewis, it expanded government power five or ten times as much as its predecessor.
One provision permitted the government to strip native-born Americans of their citizenship, allowing
them to be indefinitely imprisoned without legal recourse if they were deemed to have provided
any support—even nonviolent support—to groups designated as terrorist. After an outcry, the bill
was shelved. But it offers a hint of what this administration—or any administration—might do if the
United States were hit again. ¶ When the CIA recently tried to imagine how the world might look in
2020, it conjured four potential scenarios. One was called the “cycle of fear,” and it drastically
inverted the assumption of security that C. Vann Woodward called central to America’s national
character. The United States has been attacked again and the government has responded with
“large- scale intrusive security measures.” In this dystopian future, two arms dealers, one with
jihadist ties, text- message about a potential nuclear deal. One notes that terrorist networks have
“turned into mini-s tates.” The other jokes about the global recession sparked by the latest attacks.
And he muses about how terrorism has changed American life. “That new Patriot Act,” he writes,
“went way beyond anything imagined after 9/11.” “The fear cycle generated by an increasing
spread of WMD and terrorist attacks,” comments the CIA report, “once under way, would be one of
the hardest to break.” And the more entrenched that fear cycle grows, the less free America will
become. Which is why a new generation of American liberals must make the fight against this new
totalitarianism their own.
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Impact- ISIS is a Threat
ISIS is growing in power – all tools are necessary to mitigate their strength
Rojas June 19, 2015 (Nicole; US State Department: Isis knocks off al-Qaeda as leading terrorist
oganisation; www.ibtimes.co.uk/us-state-department-isis-knocks-off-al-qaeda-leading-terroristoganisation-1507091; kdf)
The Country Reports on Terrorism by the US State Department, released on 19 June, reveals Isis
has beaten al-Qaeda as the world's leading terrorist organisation. The new report found that
the Islamic State in the Middle East, as well as its partner Boko Haram in Africa, has led to the
decline of al-Qaeda's power. It reported that al-Qaeda leadership "appeared to lose momentum as
the self-styled leader of a global movement in the face of Isil's [Isis] rapid expansion." However, the
report noted that al-Qaeda continued to have an impact on terrorism. "Though AQ central
leadership was weakened, the organisation continued to serve as a focal point of 'inspiration'
for a worldwide network of affiliated groups, including al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula—a
long-standing threat to Yemen, the region, and the United States; al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb;
a;-Nusrah Front; and al-Shabaab," the report said. The report also found that nearly 33,000 people
were killed and another 34,700 were injured in about 13,500 terrorist attacks around the
world last year. According to NBC News, that equates to a 35% increase in terrorist attacks and an
81% rise in fatalities since 2013. CNN reported that 24 Americans died last year in terrorist attacks,
specifically in Afghanistan, Jerusalem and Somalia. The attacks, which were dominate in Iraq,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Nigeria and Syria, happened in 95 countries total. More aggressive
and ruthless attacks Terrorist groups were conducting more aggressive attacks, which
included "ruthless methods of violence such as beheadings and crucifixions intended to
terrify opponents". Isis and Boko Haram also employed tactics such as "stoning, indiscriminate
mass casualty attacks, and kidnapping children for enslavement".
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Impact – AQAP is a threat
AQAP has the intent and capability to strike the US homeland
Zimmerman 2012 (Katherine Zimmerman, senior analyst and the al Qaeda and Associated
Movements Team Lead for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, October 19,
2012, “Al Qaeda in Yemen: Countering the Threat from the Arabian Peninsula,” AEI Critical Threats,
http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-qaeda-yemen-countering-threat-arabianpeninsula-october-19-2012)
The evolution of AQAP into an insurgent group aiming at controlling and governing territory
in Yemen could seem to indicate that the threat the group poses to the U.S. directly is
declining. The devotion of resources to AQAP’s internal operations, it could be argued, subtracts
resources from its efforts to attack Americans outside of Yemen. One might even suggest that
American interests could be served by encouraging AQAP, in a sense, to focus on its insurgent
activities. Events do not support such a conclusion, however. AQAP has demonstrated that it
retains both the will and the capability to attempt attacks on the U.S. homeland even as it
seeks to expand territorial control within Yemen.¶ AQAP operatives mailed bombs disguised as
printer cartridges to a Chicago synagogue in October 2010 while the campaign against
Yemeni military and security targets was picking up speed.[13] The bombs were discovered after
they were already en route to the U.S. AQAP attempted another attack in May 2012, improving on
the bomb design used in the December 25, 2009 attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (which
AQAP had also planned, resourced, and directed).[14] The attempt shows that AQAP still seeks
to conduct international attacks, even though the details of the attack were purported to be
known to American and other intelligence agencies before it became fully operational.[15]
Should AQAP succeed in holding a significant territorial safe haven in Yemen, of course, its
ability to plan and conduct attacks abroad could increase considerably.
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Impact – Al Qaeda is a threat
Al Qaeda’s actions, statements, and internal documents prove they want nuclear weapons
and mass casualty attacks---if the US relents, it guarantees nuclear attacks
Larry J. Arbuckle 8, Naval Postgraduate School, "The Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism through an
Attribution Capability", Thesis for master of science in defense analysis, approved by Professor
Robert O'Connell, and Gordon McCormick, Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval
Postgraduate School, June
However, there is evidence that a small number of terrorist organizations in recent history, and at
least one presently, have nuclear ambitions. These groups include Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and
Chechen separatists (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Of these, Al Qaeda appears to have
made the most serious attempts to obtain or otherwise develop a nuclear weapon. Demonstrating
these intentions, in 2001 Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and two other al Qaeda operatives
met with two Pakistani scientists to discuss weapons of mass destruction development (Kokoshin,
2006). Additionally, Al Qaeda has made significant efforts to justify the use of mass violence to its
supporters. Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, an al Qaeda spokesman has stated that al Qaeda, “has the right
to kill 4 million Americans – 2 million of them children,” in retaliation for deaths that al Qaeda links
to the U.S. and its support of Israel (as cited in Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Indeed Bin
Laden received a fatwa in May 2003 from an extreme Saudi cleric authorizing the use of weapons
of mass destruction against U.S. civilians (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Further evidence of
intent is the following figure taken from al Qaeda documents seized in Afghanistan. It depicts a
workable design for a nuclear weapon. Additionally, the text accompanying the design sketch
includes some fairly advanced weapons design parameters (Boettcher & Arnesen, 2002).
Clearly maximizing the loss of life is key among al Qaeda’s goals. Thus their use of
conventional means of attack presently appears to be a result of their current capabilities and
not a function of their pure preference (Western Europe, 2005).
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Impact – Cyber Attacks threaten national security
(__)
(__) Impact – cyber attacks are one of the largest threats to US infrastructure and security
Goldsmith, Professor at Harvard Law, 13 "We need an Invasive NSA,"
www.newrepublic.com/article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyber-attacks
Such cyber-intrusions threaten corporate America and the U.S. government every day.
“Relentless assaults on America’s computer networks by China and other foreign
governments, hackers and criminals have created an urgent need for safeguards to protect
these vital systems,” the Times editorial page noted last year while supporting legislation
encouraging the private sector to share cybersecurity information with the government. It cited
General Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, who had noted a 17-fold increase in cyberintrusions on critical infrastructure from 2009 to 2011 and who described the losses in the
United States from cyber-theft as “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” If a
“catastrophic cyber-attack occurs,” the Timesconcluded, “Americans will be justified in asking
why their lawmakers ... failed to protect them.”
(__) Cyber threat is massive and creates a cascading effect
Goldsmith, Professor at Harvard Law, 13 "We need an Invasive NSA,"
www.newrepublic.com/article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyber-attacks
The first is that the cybersecurity threat is more pervasive and severe than the terrorism
threat and is somewhat easier to see. If the Times’ website goes down a few more times and
for longer periods, and if the next penetration of its computer systems causes large
intellectual property losses or a compromise in its reporting, even the editorial page would
rethink the proper balance of privacy and security. The point generalizes: As cyber-theft and
cyber-attacks continue to spread (and they will), and especially when they result in a
catastrophic disaster (like a banking compromise that destroys market confidence, or a
successful attack on an electrical grid), the public will demand government action to remedy
the problem and will adjust its tolerance for intrusive government measures.
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Answer to: Cyber-attacks aren’t a threat
(__)
(__) There is growing access to cyber terror capabilities
Goldsmith, Professor at Harvard Law, 13 "We need an Invasive NSA,"
www.newrepublic.com/article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyber-attacks
Anyone anywhere with a connection to the Internet can engage in cyber-operations within
the United States. Most truly harmful cyber-operations, however, require group effort and
significant skill. The attacking group or nation must have clever hackers, significant
computing power, and the sophisticated software—known as “malware”—that enables the
monitoring, exfiltration, or destruction of information inside a computer. The supply of all of
these resources has been growing fast for many years—in governmental labs devoted to
developing these tools and on sprawling black markets on the Internet. Telecommunication
networks are the channels through which malware typically travels, often anonymized or
encrypted, and buried in the billions of communications that traverse the globe each day.
The targets are the communications networks themselves as well as the computers they
connect—things like the Times’ servers, the computer systems that monitor nuclear plants,
classified documents on computers in the Pentagon, the nasdaq exchange, your local bank, and
your social-network providers. To keep these computers and networks secure, the government
needs powerful intelligence capabilities abroad so that it can learn about planned cyberintrusions. It also needs to raise defenses at home. An important first step is to correct the
market failures that plague cybersecurity. Through law or regulation, the government must
improve incentives for individuals to use security software, for private firms to harden their defenses
and share information with one another, and for Internet service providers to crack down on the
botnets—networks of compromised zombie computers—that underlie many cyber-attacks. More,
too, must be done to prevent insider threats like Edward Snowden’s, and to control the stealth
introduction of vulnerabilities during the manufacture of computer components—vulnerabilities that
can later be used as windows for cyber-attacks. And yet that’s still not enough. The U.S.
government can fully monitor air, space, and sea for potential attacks from abroad. But it has
limited access to the channels of cyber-attack and cyber-theft, because they are owned by
private telecommunication firms, and because Congress strictly limits government access to
private communications. “I can’t defend the country until I’m into all the networks,” General
Alexander reportedly told senior government officials a few months ago.
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Surveillance does not solve terror plots
(__)
(__) No link – domestic surveillance doesn’t solve terrorist plots – empirically the NSA fails
at combatting threats
Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/do-nsasbulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/
However, our review of the government’s claims about the role that NSA “bulk” surveillance
of phone and email communications records has had in keeping the United States safe from
terrorism shows that these claims are overblown and even misleading. An in-depth analysis
of 225 individuals recruited by al-Qaeda or a like-minded group or inspired by al-Qaeda’s
ideology, and charged in the United States with an act of terrorism since 9/11, demonstrates
that traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips from local
communities, and targeted intelligence operations, provided the initial impetus for investigations
in the majority of cases, while the contribution of NSA’s bulk surveillance programs to these
cases was minimal. Indeed, the controversial bulk collection of American telephone
metadata, which includes the telephone numbers that originate and receive calls, as well as
the time and date of those calls but not their content, under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act, appears to have played an identifiable role in initiating, at most, 1.8 percent of these
cases. NSA programs involving the surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside of the United
States under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act played a role in 4.4 percent of the
terrorism cases we examined, and NSA surveillance under an unidentified authority played a
role in 1.3 percent of the cases we examined.
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Surveillance does not solve terror plots - extensions
(__) The judge should reject the negative teams evidence about the effectiveness of
surveillance – its biased and comes from government sources rather than backed up data
Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/do-nsasbulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/
Additionally, a careful review of three of the key terrorism cases the government has cited to
defend NSA bulk surveillance programs reveals that government officials have exaggerated
the role of the NSA in the cases against David Coleman Headley and Najibullah Zazi, and the
significance of the threat posed by a notional plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange.
In 28 percent of the cases we reviewed, court records and public reporting do not identify
which specific methods initiated the investigation. These cases, involving 62 individuals,
may have been initiated by an undercover informant, an undercover officer, a family member
tip, other traditional law enforcement methods, CIA- or FBI-generated intelligence, NSA
surveillance of some kind, or any number of other methods. In 23 of these 62 cases (37
percent), an informant was used. However, we were unable to determine whether the informant
initiated the investigation or was used after the investigation was initiated as a result of the
use of some other investigative means. Some of these cases may also be too recent to have
developed a public record large enough to identify which investigative tools were used.
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Surveillance does not solve terror plots - extensions
(__) You should prefer all of our evidence – newest studies prove the NSA is ineffective at
combatting a terrorist attack
Neal, 14 Meghan, January 13, Deputy Editor of Gizmodo citing New American Foundation report,
"You'll Never Guess How Many Terrorist Plots the NSA's Domestic Spy Program Has
Foiled,"motherboard.vice.com/blog/youll-never-guess-how-many-terrorist-plots-the-nsas-domesticspy-program-has-foiled
A new analysis of terrorism charges in the US found that the NSA's dragnet domestic
surveillance "had no discernible impact" on preventing terrorist acts. Instead, the majority of
threats over the last decade were detected by regular old intelligence and law enforcement
methods—tips, informants, CIA and FBI ops, routine law enforcement. The nonprofit think
tank New America Foundation published a report today after investigating the 227 Al Qaedaaffiliated people or groups that have been charged for committing an act of terrorism in the
US since 9/11. It found just 17 of the cases were credited to NSA surveillance, and just one
conviction came out of the government's extra-controversial practice of spying on its own
citizens. And that charge, against San Diego cab driver Basaaly -Moalin, was for sending
money to a terrorist group in Somalia. There was no threat of an actual attack. This is hardly
the first time experts have searched for a link between bulk metadata collection and foiled
terrorist plots and come up empty-handed. So far, the only real value in collecting and
monitoring billions of US phone records has been to provide extra support in investigations
already underway by the FBI or another agency, or to verify that a rumored threat isn't real (the
"peace of mind" metric), the report found.
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Surveillance does not solve terrorist attack
(__)
(__) Domestic surveillance isn’t NEARLY enough to solve terrorism – other programs are
necessary
Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/do-nsasbulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/
Surveillance of American phone metadata has had no discernible impact on preventing acts
of terrorism and only the most marginal of impacts on preventing terrorist-related activity,
such as fundraising for a terrorist group. Furthermore, our examination of the role of the
database of U.S. citizens’ telephone metadata in the single plot the government uses to
justify the importance of the program – that of Basaaly Moalin, a San Diego cabdriver who in
2007 and 2008 provided $8,500 to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia – calls into
question the necessity of the Section 215 bulk collection program. According to the
government, the database of American phone metadata allows intelligence authorities to
quickly circumvent the traditional burden of proof associated with criminal warrants, thus
allowing them to “connect the dots” faster and prevent future 9/11-scale attacks. Yet in the
Moalin case, after using the NSA’s phone database to link a number in Somalia to Moalin, the
FBI waited two months to begin an investigation and wiretap his phone. Although it’s
unclear why there was a delay between the NSA tip and the FBI wiretapping, court
documents show there was a two-month period in which the FBI was not monitoring
Moalin’s calls, despite official statements that the bureau had Moalin’s phone number and
had identified him. , This undercuts the government’s theory that the database of Americans’
telephone metadata is necessary to expedite the investigative process, since it clearly didn’t
expedite the process in the single case the government uses to extol its virtues.
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Intelligence gathering does not matter
(__)
(__) No link – the intelligence that domestic surveillance captures doesn’t matter because
government officials cannot interpret it correctly to act upon it and prevent an attack
Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/do-nsasbulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/
Finally, the overall problem for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that they need vaster
amounts of information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they don’t sufficiently
understand or widely share the information they already possess that was derived from
conventional law enforcement and intelligence techniques. This was true for two of the 9/11
hijackers who were known to be in the United States before the attacks on New York and
Washington, as well as with the case of Chicago resident David Coleman Headley, who
helped plan the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, and it is the unfortunate pattern we have
also seen in several other significant terrorism cases.
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Financial data tracking does not matter
(__)
(__) No link – Surveillance cannot track finances accurately and financing is a small and
insignificant part to resolving terrorism
Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/do-nsasbulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/
Surveillance of American phone metadata has had no discernible impact on preventing acts
of terrorism and only the most marginal of impacts on preventing terrorist-related activity,
such as fundraising for a terrorist group. Furthermore, our examination of the role of the
database of U.S. citizens’ telephone metadata in the single plot the government uses to
justify the importance of the program – that of Basaaly Moalin, a San Diego cabdriver who in
2007 and 2008 provided $8,500 to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia – calls into
question the necessity of the Section 215 bulk collection program. According to the
government, the database of American phone metadata allows intelligence authorities to
quickly circumvent the traditional burden of proof associated with criminal warrants, thus
allowing them to “connect the dots” faster and prevent future 9/11-scale attacks. Yet in the
Moalin case, after using the NSA’s phone database to link a number in Somalia to Moalin, the
FBI waited two months to begin an investigation and wiretap his phone. Although it’s
unclear why there was a delay between the NSA tip and the FBI wiretapping, court
documents show there was a two-month period in which the FBI was not monitoring
Moalin’s calls, despite official statements that the bureau had Moalin’s phone number and
had identified him. , This undercuts the government’s theory that the database of Americans’
telephone metadata is necessary to expedite the investigative process, since it clearly didn’t
expedite the process in the single case the government uses to extol its virtues.
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Terrorist attack isn’t a national security threat
(__)
(__) No impact – Terrorism and terrorist attacks aren’t major threats to countries
Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of
Counterterrorism,"
archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counter
terrorism-2.pdf
If the claim that terrorism threatens individual lives to such an extent that it justifies radical
counterterrorism measures is based on misleading claims about the extent of the terrorist
threat, the claim about the threat posed to national security is just as misleading. Historically,
non-state terrorist activity has not significantly undermined nor damaged the national
cohesiveness or integrity of liberal democracies. Israel, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom,
and many other countries have lived with terrorist activity for many years without such
activity seriously threatening their very existence, or even their “way of life.” As noted earlier,
greater threats to the existence and survival of states come from other human activities and
natural disasters.
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Terrorist attack is unlikely
(__)
(__) No impact – A catastrophic terrorist attack on US soil is unlikely
Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of
Counterterrorism,"
archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counter
terrorism-2.pdf
This is not to deny that terrorism poses a threat to the lives of individuals. Terrorism
currently does threaten lives and it is indeed possible that terrorists might be planning even
more destructive attacks then have hitherto occurred. But to realistically assess the threat to
security posed by terrorism is not enough to show that a threat exists and may continue to
exist. Justifying radical counterterrorism measures and massive counterterrorism budgets
requires more than postulating possibilities; it requires a clear assessment of the likelihood
of the possibility occurring, particularly compared to the likelihood of other future threats.
Merely claiming that terrorist could perform an act of super-terrorism because the means for
such an act (e.g., weapons and biological pathogens) are available is a truism, not a threat
assessment. In fact it is states, not non-state terrorists, that have the easiest access to weapons of
mass destruction and deadly biological agents. In the United States, for example, the Center for
Disease Control has estimated that there are “about 800 labs nationwide who work with so-called
select agents, the 49 toxins, on the government’s bioterrorism list” and Federal officials have
admitted that “policing these labs won’t be easy.”27 History has demonstrated that states cannot be
relied on not to use such weapons against their perceived enemies (as occurred in World War II
with the bombing of Hiroshima) and the deaths caused by state violence far outnumber those
caused by non-state terrorism.28 It is untenable to conclude that the possibility of non-state
terrorists using weapons of mass destruction or biological agents means that they are in fact going
to use such weapons. It is equally possible that a state will use such weapons, or that scientists
working in the 800 labs mentioned earlier will cause mass casualties through careless handling of
biological agents. Given that there have already been cases of what is known as “vial in
pocket” syndrome—where scientists carry vials of deadly viruses in their jacket pockets
while travelling on international and domestic flights—the possibility of a catastrophic
accident should not be ignored
51