Somalia: The Emerging Terror Threat
The Internationalization of al Shabaab
Presented by Frederick W. Kagan and Christopher Harnisch
of the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project
Slides Prepared by Christopher Harnisch
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, March 10, 2010
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Map of the Horn of Africa
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, March 10, 2010
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Somalia Basics: Geography
• Slightly smaller than Texas, Somalia is situated strategically in the Horn of
Africa near the important Gulf of Aden and Bab al Mandeb shipping routes
(connecting the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea)
• Key Neighbor to the West: Ethiopia
– Ethiopia and Somalia have historically been bitter rivals – they fought wars over the
ethnically-Somali Ogaden region in 1964 and 1977-78 (hostilities and a propaganda
campaign continued until 1988); Ethiopia conducted a military campaign in 1996 to oust
Islamists from its borders; Ethiopia invaded in 2006 to disband the Islamist ICU and to
install the legitimate UN-backed government; it reportedly committed numerous human
rights violations during the campaign
– Ethiopia is currently supportive of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), but
al Shabaab still portrays Ethiopia as a nemesis
• Other neighbors
– Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda have all supported the TFG
– Eritrea actively undermines the TFG by supporting al Shabaab
– Yemen is a place of refuge for those attempting to escape Somalia
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Somalia Basics: People
• Population is estimated to be between 8 and10
million
• World Bank describes it as “one of the poorest
countries in the world”
• UNHCR estimates there are 1.4 million internally
displaced people (IDPs) in Somalia
– More than 85,000 have been displaced in 2010
alone
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Somalia Basics: Culture
• 99% of Somalis are Sunni Muslims
• Sufi Islam (a moderate practice of mystical Islam) is widely practiced in Somalia
• Somalis generally consider Wahhabism as a foreign doctrine not compatible
with Somali culture
• Suicide – including suicide bombings – was generally considered taboo in
Somali culture; certain elements of the society began accepting it after al
Shabaab started using suicide attacks in 2006
• Clanism has historically played an important role in internal Somali conflicts
– For a foreigner to live in Somalia, he will generally need the protection of a clan
• Islamism has established roots in Somalia; Salafist Islamism in Somalia dates
back to the early 1970s
• Despite clanism and Islamism, Somali nationalism has always been strong
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Somalia Basics: Political Control
• The officially recognized and UN-backed government of Somalia
is the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), for which Sheikh
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is the president
• Most of central and southern Somalia is controlled by one of
three Islamist groups: al Shabaab, Hizb al Islam, and Ahlu Sunna wa
al Jama’a, with al Shabaab controlling by far the most territory
• Northern Somalia is divided into two polities: Somaliland and
Puntland; the Islamist influence in these regions is very limited
– Somaliland is a self-declared republic with a fully-operational government
– Puntland is a semi-autonomous region that has attempted to set up a
functioning government but has struggled with civil-strife, corruption, and
ties to piracy
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Somalia Basics: History
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Northern Somalia was a British protectorate from 1884-1960, known as British
Somaliland
Central and southern Somalia was an Italian colony from 1889-1941 and a United
Nations Trust Territory under Italian administration from 1950-1960, known as Italian
Somaliland
British and Italian Somaliland merged on July 1, 1960 to form the nation of Somalia, and
representatives of the two countries elected Aden Abdullah Osman to be the first
president of Somalia
In October 1969 General Mohamed Siad Barre executed a military coup on the
legitimate government and implemented an authoritarian socialist government
Siad Barre was overthrown by a warlord in January 1991, and the country has spent
the past two decades without a functioning central government ; instead warlords and
Islamists have ruled sections of the country
The UN has attempted to establish several interim and transitional governments – the
most recent of which is the current TFG established in 2004 (its mandate expires in
2011)
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What is Somaliland?
• Somaliland is a self-declared republic in northern Somalia seeking international
recognition for its independence
• It is an Islamic entity that administers a functioning democracy
– It has a president, parliament, cabinet, security services, and an intelligence service
• It was a British protectorate from 1884 until June 26,1960
• It was an independent country for five days before it joined with the Italian
Somaliland to form the new nation of Somalia
• After the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, northern clans declared in May 1991 a
return to an independent Somaliland and set up a functioning administration
• Today, Somaliland receives support, including military training and assistance, from
Ethiopia, and Ethiopia has a consulate in Somaliland
• Israel has reportedly indicated a willingness to recognize Somaliland as an
independent state
• The TFG opposes an independent Somaliland
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The Terror Threat from Somalia: Key Players
BLUE FORCES
• The Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
• African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
• Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a
RED FORCES
• Hizb al Islam
• Al Shabaab
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The Transitional Federal Government
(TFG)
• The TFG formed in 2004 after two years of negotiations and is
backed by the UN and the African Union
• The government relies heavily on international support for survival
and for the provision of basic goods to citizens
• The TFG controls only a few strategic locations in Mogadishu and
has a troop presence in strategic cities and towns throughout
Somalia
• The current president, President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed,
assumed his position in January 2009. He had been a moderate
leader within the Islamic Courts Union and was brought back into
power through a UN-backed peace process
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African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM)
• The African Union authorized the mandate for AMISOM in Jan. 2007,
which calls for 8,000 troops to be deployed to Somalia for a peacekeeping
mission; the first troops arrived in Mogadishu in Mar. 2007
• The mandate is for the troops to support government infrastructures,
implement a security plan, train Somali forces, and assist in creating an
environment for the delivery of aid
• Uganda and Burundi are the only countries to have contributed troops to
the mission, though other countries have pledged to do so
• As of Feb. 2010, only about 5,300 AMISOM troops were deployed and
were located in strategic locations around Mogadishu protecting
government interests
• Al Shabaab and Hizb al Islam militants have targeted AMISOM troops
because they are a foreign presence on Somali soil
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Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a
• Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a is a moderate Sufi Islamist organization that
originally formed in 1991 to unite the Sufi brotherhoods
• The group is generally opposed to violence and favors national unity.
It tends to align itself with the government, both local and national
• It works closely with the central administration in the Galmudug
region and is strongest in central Somalia
• Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a took up arms after the desecration of the
tombs of Sufi saints and has clashed with both Hizb al Islam and al
Shabaab militants
• In Feb. 2009, Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a entered into talks with the
TFG regarding cabinet posts for Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a leaders
• The group is on good terms with the Ethiopian government
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Hizb al Islam
• Militant Islamist group formed by several former Islamic Courts Union
leaders after the June 2007 Djibouti accord
• Hassan Dahir Aweis, the former military commander of the Islamic
Union and a prominent leader of the Islamic Courts Union, is the
current leader of Hizb al Islam
• Analysts report that Hizb al Islam is more moderate in its ideology
than al Shabaab; however, the group has carried out public executions
and has justified the execution of suicide bombings
• It maintains a strong presence in central Somalia, including the strategic
town of Beledweyne and the Afgoi district outside of Mogadishu
• Hizb al Islam has both partnered with and fought against al Shabaab
depending on circumstances
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Al Shabaab Basics
• The group began operating as an independent entity in early 2007
(before that, it served as the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union)
• It controls much of southern and central Somalia and operates shadow
governments called “Islamic Provinces”
• Most estimates of al Shabaab’s man power range from 2,000 to 5,000
• The group includes between 800 and 1,100 foreign fighters, including
dozens from the US and Europe
• The US, UK, Canada, and Australia have all designated al Shabaab as a
terrorist group
• Eritrea is al Shabaab’s leading state-sponsor
• The group has proven adept at following through on threats
• The group has threatened to attack the United States
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Origins of al Shabaab
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Al Shabaab grew out of an Islamist group formed in the early 1980s called the Islamic Union
(or al Itihaad al Islamiya), which sought to establish an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa and
seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia
After the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, the IU controlled several cities throughout
southern Somalia for varied periods of time, until the Ethiopians recognized them as a threat
and used military force to expel them from towns and forced them to operate underground
In the early 2000s, a small group dedicated to protecting al Qaeda in East Africa figures and
striking foreign targets inside Somalia, broke off from the IU
This small group, which eventually took the name al Shabaab, became the military wing of an
emerging political force in Somalia known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)
– The ICU was a union of administrations throughout southern Somalia that sought to impose
various interpretations of shari’a law; individual courts were established as early as the mid-90s, but
the union was formalized in 2004
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Ethiopia invaded Somalia in Dec. 2006 to disband the ICU, and its political leadership fled
The ICU’s military wing, al Shabaab, remained to fight the Ethiopians, and it began operating
as an autonomous entity by early 2007 (Ethiopia withdrew forces in January 2009)
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Tactics of al Shabaab
• From 2007 through the present, al Shabaab has used various forms of
violence to target its enemies (i.e. the Ethiopians, the TFG, AMISOM,
tribal leaders, and occasionally Hizb al Islam). Below are the tactics
used by al Shabaab:
1)Guerilla insurgency
2)Roadside IEDs
3)Vehicle-born IEDs
4)Mortar attacks
5)Political assassinations
6)Suicide bombings
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Al Shabaab Areas of Control
• Al Shabaab has set up governing administrations called “Islamic Provinces”
throughout most of southern and some of central Somalia
• It currently controls nearly all of Middle and Lower Jubba regions, Gedo region, Bay
region, Bakool region, and parts of Lower Shabelle region. This includes control of
the key port cities of Kismayo and Marka and the Kenya border town of Diif. It
also controls large parts of Mogadishu
• The group wields significant influence in Middle Shabelle and Hiraan regions
• The group is relatively de-centralized
– In some parts of the country (i.e. Mogadishu), it works closely with Hizb al
Islam, and in other parts of the country (i.e. Kismayo and Diif) it has battled
Hizb al Islam for territory
– Al Shabaab governs with local administrations: region-by-region and city-by-city
– Al Shabaab’s military units are commanded at a local level
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Al Shabaab’s Shadow Governments
• One way al Shabaab has maintained control of areas is
through its Islamic administrations that provide services
generally provided by the state. These administrations:
1) Collect taxes – from aid organizations, imports at ports under their control, citizens
in the form of zakat , and at checkpoints in their territory
2) Censor media
3) Build and repair roads
4) Influence the education system
5) Regulate the distribution of foreign aid
• By regulating foreign aid from organizations such as the UN’s World Food
Program, al Shabaab is able to portray itself as the legitimate authority in a
region and as the defender of the people against a US plot to undermine Somali
farmers
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Al Shabaab’s Enforcement of Shari’a Law
• Al Shabaab uses violence to enforce a draconian interpretation of
shari’a, thereby instilling fear into the people in order to maintain
stability and define itself as an area’s sole authority
• The group has banned playing and watching soccer, watching
movies, dancing at weddings, listening to music, proselytizing
anything but Islam, branding animals, and the wearing of bras by
women
• In some districts, men are forced to wear beards and women are
forced to veil
• The group has publically stoned to death “adulterers” (including a
13-year-old rape victim), executed “spies” and converts to
Christianity, and amputated the hands and feet of thieves
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Al Shabaab’s Global Ideology
• Al Shabaab views itself as part of the global jihad led by al Qaeda
• Al Shabaab seeks to establish an Islamic state in Somalia to be part of a
global Islamic Caliphate
• Al Shabaab commander Abu Mansour al Amriki: “Al Shabaab had a global
goal including the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate”
• Al Shabaab leaders have referred to bin Laden as their “emir” and Taliban
leader Mullah Omar as the “Emir al Mu’mineen” or Commander of the
Faithful
• In Sept. 2009, al Shabaab released a video entitled “At Your Service Osama”
pledging allegiance to bin Laden
• In early 2010, al Shabaab released a statement that the “jihad in the Horn of
Africa must be combined with the international jihad led by the al Qaeda
network”
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Al Shabaab’s Links with al Qaeda:
Training and Fighting Abroad
• Many al Shabaab leaders and mid-level operatives have trained or fought
abroad with al Qaeda or the Taliban
• The group’s first leader, Aadan Haashi ‘Ayro (killed in 2008), and his
successor, Abu Zubair, trained with al Qaeda in Afghanistan prior to 9/11
• Al Shabaab senior official and spokesman Robow Ali fought against the
Americans in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2002
• Reports suggest that dozens of veterans from the wars in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq have gone to Somalia to fight with al Shabaab
• Leaders and militants who have fought or trained with al Qaeda offer al
Shabaab:
– Contacts in al Qaeda
– Technical expertise in endeavors ranging from setting up training camps to bomb-making
– Battle-hardened militants
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Al Shabaab’s Links with al Qaeda:
Providing Sanctuary
• Al Shabaab has provided and continues to provide sanctuary for al Qaeda
in East Africa leaders and operatives, including those responsible for
carrying out the 1998 US embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania and the
2002 Mombasa hotel attack and attempt to take down an Israel airliner
• The group provided shelter to the following deceased al Qaeda in East
Africa leaders partially responsible for those attacks: Abu Talha al Sudani
and Saleh Ali Nabhan
• The group currently provides shelter for the al Qaeda in East Africa leader,
Najeh Fazul Abdullah, also a co-conspirator in the 1998 and 2002 attacks
• In return for the shelter, al Shabaab has received technical expertise and
recruiting assistance from the al Qaeda in East Africa leaders. In some
cases, the al Qaeda leaders have also led al Shabaab units
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Al Shabaab’s Links with al Qaeda:
Common Messaging
• Dating back to 2008, al Shabaab has released numerous statements
pledging loyalty to al Qaeda’s leaders and placing its efforts in the
context of al Qaeda’s global jihad
• Al Qaeda’s leaders, including bin Laden, Zawahiri, and al Libi, have
responded by releasing statements comparing the fight in Somalia with
that of Iraq and Afghanistan and calling on Muslims everywhere to
support the mujahideen of Somalia:
– Zawahiri, Jan. 2007: “America and its slaves will be defeated…in Somalia as Allah
defeated it in Afghanistan and Iraq.”
– Al Libi, June 2008: “Accept nothing short of an independent Islamic state [in
Somalia].”
– Bin Laden, March 2009: “The war taking place [in Somalia]…is a war between Islam
and the international Crusade.”
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The Operational Link Between al
Shabaab and al Qaeda
• On Dec. 10, 2009, a US drone strike killed a senior al Qaeda leader in North
Waziristan, Pakistan named Saleh al Somali, who was reportedly responsible
for transferring fighters from Pakistan to Somalia and Yemen
• In the aftermath of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Christmas Day attack,
al Shabaab offered to send militants to Yemen
• In Jan. 2010, the Somali Defense Minister accused Yemeni “rebels” of sending
shiploads of arms to al Shabaab through the al Shabaab-controlled port of
Kismayo
• In Feb. 2010, the deputy leader of AQAP thanked al Shabaab for its willingness
to send fighters to Yemen, but urged it to stay “in its battleground.”
• At least two of the al Qaeda in Yemen terrorists who escaped from a Yemeni
prison in February 2006 – Ibrahim al Muqri and Mansur al Bayhani – escaped
to Somalia
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Al Shabaab’s International Recruiting
Targeted Recruiting through the Internet:
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Well-produced recruiting videos often use a combination of Arabic and English and have
Arabic and English sub-titles
The videos have featured English speakers, including the American-born Abu Mansour al
Amriki, appealing directly to Westerners and putting al Shabaab’s efforts in the international
context
Some videos include English hip-hop, as opposed to Arabic Qur’anic chants
The videos have clips of militant training camps reminiscent of those in Afghanistan at around
the time of 9/11
Grassroots Recruiting Abroad Targeting the Diaspora:
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Al Shabaab sympathizers at mosques and youth groups indoctrinate Somali-Americans about
the duty to fight infidels
Surrogate recruiters convince young recruits to join al Shabaab
Al Shabaab sympathizers threaten the families of the recruits about speaking publically
regarding the whereabouts of their sons
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The Impact of al Shabaab’s
International Recruiting Efforts
• The groups has between 800 and 1,100 foreigners in its ranks,
including Arabs, Africans, Pakistanis, Bengalis, Europeans, and
Americans
• Up to 100 young ethnically Somali Brits have joined al Shabaab
– Many have studied at prestigious universities, such as the London School of
Economics and King’s College
– Some join al Shabaab to serve as doctors and engineers for the group
• Over 20 Americans – nearly all of whom were ethnically Somali
– have joined al Shabaab
– Most hail from Minnesota
– An American al Shabaab operative became the first American suicide bomber in
October 2008
– At least 6 Americans are believed to have died fighting for al Shabaab
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Al Shabaab’s Threats to the United States
• Al Shabaab’s first threat to US interests came in Feb. 2008: “Al Shabaab
will give them [America] a taste…of hardship in all regions where they
are present in the east and west of Somalia.”
• March 2008: “We assure our Muslim brothers…that we are preparing
for America what will make them forget the blessed attacks in Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam.”
• May 2008 (from al Shabaab’s leader): “So wait, oh cursed America, for the
events of the coming September [i.e. the next major attacks]. For it is
not a strike, but strikes!”
• Intelligence agencies have referred to vague intelligence about an al
Shabaab plot focusing on the 2009 Inauguration Day ceremonies
• American and South African intelligence services have also mentioned al
Shabaab designs on American targets at the 2010 World Cup
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The Financing of al Shabaab
• A bulk of al Shabaab’s funds appear to come from
money transfers from the Somali diaspora
• The group taxes aid agencies, citizens, and imports
• The UN has accused Eritrea of funding and arming
the group
• Some unconfirmed reports suggest that al Shabaab
has charged pirates a “shelter fee” to operate out of
territory that al Shabaab controls
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The Danger of al Shabaab
• Currently al Shabaab has the geographic space to operate training
camps and prepare for attacks against the West
• The group has demonstrated the ability to conduct sophisticated
terror attacks, including double-car bombings on difficult-topenetrate targets
• The group has threatened to attack the US and actively seeks the
recognition of al Qaeda’s leadership, and it has demonstrated on
multiple occasions the ability to carryout threats
• The group has established a brigade for the sole purpose of liberating
Islamic holy places abroad – al Quds Brigade
• The group has militants with American and European passports that
will facilitate international travel
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Current US Policy to Combat al
Shabaab
• The US helps train TFG and AMISOM forces
• The US provides arms to TFG and AMISOM forces
– Over a six-week span in May and June 2009, the US sent
about 40 tons of weapons and ammunition to the TFG
• The US has launched targeted strikes on al Qaeda in East
Africa leaders that support al Shabaab, such as killing Saleh
Ali Nabhan with Special Forces in September 2009
• The US withholds humanitarian aid to parts of Somalia
controlled by al Shabaab
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Policy Considerations: What Have the AU
and AMISOM Countries Suggested?
• The AMISOM Force Commander has said that at least 20,000 troops
are needed to stabilize Somalia (the current AMISOM mandate calls
for 8,000 troops)
• Uganda – the top contributor to the AMISOM force – has requested
that the mandate be expanded to allow troops to go on the offensive
against enemies
• The Peace and Security Council of the AU has asked the UN to
impose a no-fly zone over all of Somalia and to block ports through
which insurgent groups receive arms (the measure targets Eritrea,
which has been accused of arming al Shabaab by flying arms into
southern Somalia and shipping them through the port at Kismayo)
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Policy Considerations: Should the US Target
Eritrea?
• The UN has found decisive evidence that Eritrea helps arm
and train al Shabaab
• In Dec. 2009 the UN Security Council voted to impose an
arms embargo on Eritrea and sanctions on specific Eritrean
leaders
• The US is yet to list Eritrea as a “state sponsor of
terrorism” or impose sanctions on it
• An alternative to sanctions could be to support Eritrea’s
moderate opposition groups
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Other Policy Considerations
• Incentivizing more African nations to contribute troops to
AMISOM
• Pressuring the AU to expand the AMISOM mandate
• Calling for a UN peace-enforcing mission to Somalia
• Increasing targeted drone strikes on al Shabaab leaders
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