Nathan DeProspo
Paradigm Shift Essay
CAS 137
10/21/12
The Paradigm Shift in Attitudes Toward the Tobacco Industry
In the first episode of the television series Mad Men, a frantic conference call
ensues between Don Draper and the CEO of Lucky Strike over the regulation of cigarette
advertising. Frank Gifford, New York Jets football star, can no longer endorse Lucky
Strike cigarettes because of laws restricting athlete testimonials for tobacco products.
The restriction detailed in the episode would be among the first in a long list of
regulations placed on the tobacco industry, and like subsequent rules, it would
ultimately be weakened by adjustments and compromises. Draper’s response is a
metaphor for the ineffectual legislation; he comes to the rescue of his firm, reassuring
America that Lucky Strike’s product is not poisonous but “toasted,” as if health were
merely a matter of semantics. Tobacco companies continued to insist that they were
free to promote their products through advertising up until the 1990s, when, finally,
there was a public movement—signifying a paradigm shift—that resulted in restricting
the industry’s commercial privileges (Madmen Wikia).
Big Tobacco defined America in the 1950s and 1960s. The industry was the
public’s friend, supplying a product that was portrayed as cool and relaxing. Tobacco
users were imbued, by extension, with coolness. Much of this former credibility
stemmed from the industry’s insistence on the ambiguity and inconsistency of the era’s
scientific research into the dangers of smoking. For example, in 1950 the major cigarette
company Lorillard based an ad campaign on the claim that Lorillard’s cigarettes
contained the least nicotine, which was true, but misleading, since any level of nicotine
would turn out to be dangerous. Lorillard itself seemed implicitly to confirm this fact by
insisting not only that the nicotine levels in its cigarettes was low, but also that nicotine
did not constitute a health hazard. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) took Lorillard to
court for violation of truth-in-advertising laws, but did so only after the campaign had
run its course; as a result, the FTC’s action turned out to be irrelevant. The Consumers
Union Report on Smoking and the Public Interest complained that "like astronomers
studying stars millions of light years away, the FTC commissioners were constantly
coming to conclusions about phenomena that were no longer in existence." The
Lorillard episode represented one of many instances in which public health
organizations were frustrated by the FTC’s inability to capitalize on opportunities to
prosecute tobacco companies for their misrepresentation of the facts (Tobacco.org).
The corporate power of tobacco companies relied heavily on conjecture,
repeatedly claiming that smoking cigarettes “may not” be a health risk. Even when a
significant number of epidemiological studies connected smoking to lung cancer, the
companies continued to deny the science, thereby convincing smokers that their habits
were not life threatening. This might have been a consequence of tobacco companies’
corporate influence on, well, nearly aspect of the culture in the 1950s. During this
period, Lucky Strike sponsored America’s first pop music series, “Your Hit Parade.” Later
that year, Lucky Strike won an advertising award for having the best cigarette
campaigns. While labs were confirming the health detriments of tobacco, cigarette
companies went so far as to make claims of the health benefits of smoking. Celebrities,
athletes, and even doctors endorsed cigarette brands in the 1950s. This was the
“Golden Age” for tobacco. While the industry’s positive images were beginning to be
tainted by science and regulation, this did not yet decrease sales. The paradigm clearly
had not yet shifted. Where conversion of top anti-smoking attitudes was concerned, the
kairos moment had not yet arrived (Tobacco.org).
Finally, in 1964, an inclusive report of seven thousand scientific studies released
by the Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health definitively linked smoking with
cancer and a number of other diseases. It led to a surge of anti-smoking legislation,
including legislation requiring warning labels on packs of cigarettes and a ban on
cigarette advertising on radio and television (Keck, Kristi).
Despite these regulations, cigarette companies continued to thrive. Recall how
Madmen’s Don Draper managed to counteract negative scientific reports by associating
Lucky Strikes with healthy comfort food: the cigarettes, he said, were “toasted.” Many
companies began to mount fun-loving campaigns geared towards the younger
generation. Instead of acknowledging the scientific evidence, tobacco corporations
ignored it, aggressively refining and enhancing their promotional campaigns. Because of
the size and economic capacity of the tobacco industry, as well as the legions of tobacco
lobbyists in Washington, it took nearly thirty years for policymakers, scientists,
consumer activists, personal injury lawyers, and judges to begin to thwart the power of
Big Tobacco.
Although litigation has been filed against different tobacco businesses since the
early 1950s, the industry did not lose a battle in Congress until as recently as 1983. This
may have seemed like a turning point, but out of the 180 cases against tobacco
companies filed from the late 1980s until the early 1990s, only two were successful. It
was not until 1996 that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sought regulatory
control over the industry. That year marked a rise in public disapproval of Big Tobacco,
as well as the beginning of an investigation of tobacco company fraud that would lead
to the biggest judgment against a corporation in U.S. history (CorpWatch). As public
awareness of the dangers of tobacco rose, the credibility of the industry declined. The
stasis in favor of tobacco was at an end, and an opposite one against tobacco came to
prevail. Tobacco companies could no longer try to finesse smoking’s health risks which
turned out, of course, to be severe: lung cancer, mouth cancer, bronchitis, emphysema,
and many other diseases and ailments, including America’s biggest killer, heart disease.
Perhaps even more damaging was the evidence that second-hand smoke was equally
dangerous, even to non-smokers. The kairos moment of transforming smoking from an
innocent and harmless pastime into a deadly obsession would seem to have arrived
(James, Randy, and Scott Olstad).
With awareness have come smoking bans in cities around the world, with
restrictions sometimes including public parks and multi-family dwellings (Cohen,
Ronnie). The logical final step might be simply to ban tobacco altogether. If a product
kills people, it would seem to follow that the product should be outlawed. Recently, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission convinced retailers to stop selling Buckeyballs, a
popular desk toy for adults, because of the risks that the tiny magnetic balls pose to
children. Surely a government that seeks to ban an office toy would be even more
determined to prevent the production of tobacco. This has not proven to be the case,
however. Even after the record-breaking $206 billion lawsuit Medicaid successfully filed
against the top tobacco companies, the industry was still powerful enough not only to
survive but to thrive.
Smoking may be in decline in the U.S., but it is on the rise in developing countries,
largely as a result of American tobacco companies having essentially exported the
consumption of tobacco. Almost more insidious than its own success, however, is the
lesson that Big Tobacco has imparted to other industries. One need only look at the
success of contemporary energy giants and their lobbyists to see the ability of
corporations to deny scientific evidence. These companies and their political allies
continue to sow dissent about global warming, a threat that is potentially a much more
urgent universal risk even than the health dangers of cigarettes. Despite the paradigm
shift from glamorizing to demonizing cigarettes, the ultimate legacy of the tobacco
industry may be less about smoke and more about smoke and mirrors.
Works Cited
Cohen, Ronnie. "California City Bans Smoking in Multi-family Homes." Reuters.
Thomson Reuters, 16 Oct. 2012. Web. 28 Oct. 2012.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/16/us-usa-california-smokingidUSBRE89F05W20121016>.
"CorpWatch: The Tobacco Industry and Dirty Politics." CorpWatch: The Tobacco
Industry and Dirty Politics. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2012.
<http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=3995>.
James, Randy, and Scott Olstad. "Breaking News, Analysis, Politics, Blogs, News
Photos, Video, Tech Reviews." Time. Time, n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2012.
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1905530,00.html>.
Keck, Kristi. CNN. Cable News Network, n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2012.
<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/19/tobacco.decline/>.
"Smoke Gets in Your Eyes." Madmen Wikia. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2012.
Strom, Stephanie. "After Tobacco, Lawyers Set Their Sights on Food Industry." The New
York Times. The New York Times, 19 Aug. 2012. Web. 28 Oct. 2012.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/lawyers-of-big-tobacco-lawsuitstake-aim-at-food-industry.html?pagewanted=all>.
"Tobacco.org." Tobacco Timeline: The Twentieth Century 1950. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Oct.
2012. <http://archive.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_History20-2.html>.