The diversity of truths
SUSAN HAACK
<shaack@law.miami.edu>
“The truth is rarely
pure and never
simple. Modern life
would be intolerable if
it were either.” –
Oscar Wilde
1. ONE TRUTH, MANY TRUTHS
2. TRUTH IN SCIENCE
3. TRUTH IN HISTORY
4. TRUTH IN LAW
5. TRUTH IN FICTION
1. One Truth, Many Truths
what I mean when I say that there is “one
truth” is
not that there is one all-important true
proposition, THE TRUTH
but that there is one non-ambiguous, nonrelative truth-concept
i.e.
that, whether we are talking about
propositions of natural science, of social
science, of history, of law, of literature, etc.
when we say that a proposition is true,
what we mean is the same:
that it is the proposition that p, and p
&
what I mean when I say that there are
“many truths” is
not that there are many truth-concepts
but that there are many propositions,
beliefs, theories, etc, that are true
& that
these many truths differ very significantly
among themselves
in their epistemological status (how we
know they are true)
& in their metaphysical status (what makes
them true)
2. Truth in Science
a good way to think of the sciences: as a
loose federation of kinds of inquiry
roughly characterizable by subject-matter
which differs from (but sometimes
overlaps) that of historical, legal, literary,
etc., inquiry
my picture is synechistic
no sharp line between e.g., cosmology &
metaphysics, or psychology & philosophy
of mind
historical sciences like evolutionary
biology have some affinities with historical
inquiry, social sciences with legal
scholarship, etc.
“synechism”
is Peirce’s word
for the
methodological
principle: look for
continuities, not
sharp
dichotomies
the goal
of scientific inquiry as of ALL inquiry
is to discover the answer(s) to some
question(s) – the true answer(s)
this doesn’t mean scientists seek THE
TRUTH, nor that they collect truths, as
someone might collect stamps
only
(as we saw last time) that they want to end
up believing
 that p, if p
 that not-p, if not-p
 and that it’s more complicated than that
if it is more complicated that that!
of course
many (most) scientific claims and theories
eventually turn out to be false
i.e., there have been many scientific
“truths,” as well as scientific truths
& no scientific claims are certain; all are
fallible
moreover
many scientific claims and theories have
eventually turned out
to be only approximately true
and/or to be true only in a more restricted
field than formerly supposed
every scientific theory
is the result of scientists’ intellectual work
so in one sense, scientific truths are made
by scientists
but whether a scientific theory is true or is
false does not depend on what scientists
do, or believe, but on how the world is
natural-scientific theories are (mostly)
about natural phenomena, things, &
events – which are not of our making
social-scientific theories are about human
societies, roles, rules – which are of our
making
yet
both, if true, are (normally) objectively so
in that whether they are true or false does
not depend on whether you, or I, or
anyone believes they are true
(there are social-science exceptions – selffulfilling & self-undermining prophesies)
of course
not all scientists are objective (= unbiased,
impartial) – far from it
they may be partisans of one theory,
enemies of another; blind to certain
evidence; etc.
evidence in the sciences
is always complex, often ambiguous
invariably incomplete (& hence potentially
misleading)
this is why scientists themselves hesitate
to claim truth, preferring to say “probably,”
“possibly,” or “this is the best model,” etc.
for example, Watson
preferred to write of
“solving the structure of
DNA” – i.e., getting the
right model … but that
would be equivalent to
giving a true account of
the structure of DNA
3. Truth in History
like all inquiry, historical inquiry aims at
finding true answers to its questions
but historians are even more reluctant
than scientists to claim truth
& these days many prefer to speak not of
truth but of “truth”
why so?
some, probably, have been made nervous
by post-modernist and other forms of
cynicism about the concept of truth
but there are also other (& somewhat
better) reasons
like all inquiry, historical inquiry is fallible
like social-scientific inquiry, historical
inquiry requires interpretation of people’s
belief, desires, hopes, fears, etc.
which is even harder with distance in time,
culture, etc.
moreover, historical inquiry
must rely on evidence that itself needs to
be shown authentic
which is also even harder with distance of
time, etc. – and requires interpretation of
records, & so forth
&
this evidence may be skewed, because
those who left the records often had their
own agenda
&, like evidence in the sciences, evidence
is history is always incomplete
for example
an account of a battle will probably tell us
which side won, what he consequences
were for the war, how many were killed
possibly how many tanks, planes, etc.
were destroyed
but
certainly not how many flowers were
trampled (or even, probably, how many
horses were killed)
quite likely not about the famine or the
epidemic that ensued
& of course
if the now-available records all come from
whichever side or party or sect or class or
race, etc., prevailed in some conflict
this will very likely introduce bias
hence the saying …
“history is written by the
winning side”
for example
Donald Kagan argues
that Thucydides’s history
of the war between
Athens and Sparta
presented a complex,
messy conflict in a
partisan manner – while
purporting to be
definitive, “a thing for all
time”
all that said
that a historical account is only part of the
truth doesn’t mean that it is not true, so far
as it goes
& to say that a historical claim is true is to
say that it is the claim that p, and p
4. Truth in Law
the word “law” suffers the same kind of
ambiguity as “truth”
it may refer to the concept of law (as in
“law is distinct from morality”)
or to specific laws & legal systems (as in
“there ought to be a law against it”)
there are truths about law, the concept
& truths about legal systems and laws
here, I focus on the latter
legal truths (in this sense)
are relative to a legal system, and a time
e.g., in U.S. federal law between 1923 &
1975 the Frye Rule governed the
admissibility of scientific testimony
in 1975 the Federal Rules of Evidence
(Rule 702) provided a different standard
&
they are gappy (answers to some legal
questions are indeterminate)
e.g., between 1975 & 1993 it was neither
true nor false that the Federal Rules of
Evidence had superseded Frye
&
legal truths can be changed by the action
of legislators or of judges interpreting the
law
As, in 1993, when the Supreme Court
ruled in Daubert, it became true, in virtue
of their decision, that FRE 702
superseded Frye
of course
a legal system is not itself (like science
and history) a kind of inquiry
though legal proceedings will involve
inquiry, of roughly two kinds:
 into questions of fact (e.g., was there a stop
sign?)
 into questions of law (e.g., what is the legal
standard here?)
indeed
the latter kind of inquiry is what “legal
scholarship” refers to
in practice, however, this scholarship
always involves interpretation, and often
shades into advocacy
&, like historians, many law professors
prefer to speak of “truth” than truth
nevertheless
there are true and false answers to (some)
questions about what the law is in system
S at time t
& it is true that the law in S at t provides
that x, y, z just in case the law in S at t
does provide that x, y, z
5. Truth in Fiction
like legal systems, novels, plays, cartoons,
etc., are not themselves forms of inquiry
though they involve imaginative
exploration of scenarios, characters, etc. –
somewhat like the imaginative thinking
required by scientific inquiry
though novels, etc., may be set in real
places, and/or apparently include real
people among their characters
statements in a work of fiction about
fictional places, persons, etc., are not true
– “fictional” is the opposite of “real”
nevertheless
there are truths about novels, etc., of two
types
external: about the author, the
circumstances of the writing, the history of
the book, etc.
internal: about the contents of the novel
examples
internal: “Conan Doyle wrote the Sherlock
Holmes stories”
external: “In Doyle’s stories, Holmes was a
detective, lived in Baker Street, solved the
Case of the Speckled Band,” etc.
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle -with Sherlock Holmes
this “graphic novel” translation of Doyle’s
The Case of the Speckled Band, was
published in Vancouver, Canada
“true in the novel”
raises some good philosophical questions
about what is “implied” in the novel, and
what indeterminate
but these are not as interesting (to me) as
the questions about truths conveyed by
works of fiction
for many fictional works
illustrate, and thereby convey obliquely,
truths that they do not state explicitly; for
example:
Samuel Butler’s The Way of All Flesh
conveys, without stating, truths about the
human weakness for self-deception,
hypocrisy, & sham reasoning
This work of his is one of
the finest epistemological
novels” of all time (in
English; you can
probably think of Chinese
examples)
one hard question is
exactly what kind of “speech” act is
involved in “conveying, but not stating”?
it is like hinting, or suggesting, that p,
without actually saying it – but not exactly
as e.g., “I have another appointment”
might convey “Let’s do this quickly”
& another
are there special ”literary’ truths”?
my answer: no, fiction conveys perfectly
ordinary truths, in the ordinary sense of
the word
what is special is the conveying
e.g.
Butler’s novel conveys the truth that
intellectual integrity is a hard-won virtue,
not something inborn
& this is true – yes! -- just in case
intellectual integrity is a hard-won virtue,
and not something inborn
thank you
for your
invitation,
and for
your
attention!