The Idealistic Tendency in Ch’eng
Hao
程顥：唯心論的趨勢
Wing-tsit Chan
陳榮捷
“idealistic?”
「唯心論(型態)的」？「觀念論(型態)的」？
問題：
以類似的術語為中國哲學（某派、某家）
定位、定性是否恰當？
抑或是一時權宜運用、「得意忘言」？
程頤較之程顥是（更）唯理些，而程顥較
之程頤是（更）唯心些…程顥開啟儒家的
唯心派，其弟則開啟了唯理派。
Ch’eng I is so much more rationalistic than
Ch’eng Hao and Ch’eng Hao is so much more
idealistic than Ch’eng I that it is permissible to
say that Ch’eng Hao inaugurated the idealistic
wing of Neo-Confucianism while his brother
inaugurated the rationalistic wing,…
「唯心派」？「唯理派」？
「唯心派」（idealism）似指「心學」，即陸
王心學；
「唯理派」（rationalism）似指「理學」，即
程朱理學。
此「判教」似已成中國哲學史的定論。二程
兄弟兩人各開啟一派，此是中國哲學史的
實況乎？
二程哲學的基本調性
[T]heir fundamental agreement, which
forms the keynote to their philosophy in
particular and to Neo-Confucianism in
general, namely, the concept of principle
(li), must be pointed out…
程顥哲學的基本內容
More especially for Ch’eng Hao, principle
is the Principle of Nature (Tien-li, Principle
of Heaven). As conceived and understood
by the brothers, principle is self-evident and
self-sufficient, extending everywhere and
governing all things. It cannot be
augmented or diminished. It is many but it
is essentially one, for all specific principles
are but principle. It is possessed by all
people and all things. Even a very small
thing has principle. It is laid before our very
eyes.
程顥哲學的基本內容（續）
Man and all things form one body because all
of them share this principle. To be sincere is to
be sincere to it, and to be serious is to be
serious about it. In short, it is one and all. It is
identical with the mind and it is identical with
the nature. All things exist because of it and
can be understood through it. It is universal
truth, universal order, universal law. Most
important of all, it is a universal process of
creation and production. It is dynamic and vital.
二程哲學在哲學史上的意義
It can easily be seen that to the Ch’eng brothers this
principle means both natural principles and moral
principles, and both general principles and specific
principles. They were not much concerned with
abstract reality, for they were primarily interested in
the meaning of principle for man. Thus they turned
Neo-Confucianism from speculation on cosmology to
concentrate on the problems of principle and human
nature, thereby making Neo-Confucianism truly a
School of Nature and Principle.
將新儒家哲學
從玄思默想的宇宙論脫離出來
「玄思默想的宇宙論」（speculation on
cosmology）所指為何？
周濓溪的太極哲學？
邵雍的象數哲學？
張載的氣與太虛的哲學？
T’ien-li, [according to] Hu Shih,
stands for the Natural Law.
「何謂『天理』？依胡適，天理代表 Natural
Law」（自然法，自然律，自然法則
[Stoicism] ？）
「理」、「天理」（Principle, “the Principle
of Nature”）vs. Natural Law
[S]o far as the concept of the Principle of
Nature is concerned, he got no help from them.
The term T’ien-li appears in the Book of Rites.
However, there it means the principle endowed
in man by Heaven and does not have the
connotation of universal truth or natural law.
Ch’eng himself once said, “Although I have
learned some of my doctrines from others, the
concept of the Principle of Nature, however,
has been realized by myself.” What is said of
Ch’eng Hao could have been said of Ch’eng I.
就「 天理」概念而論 [中譯本作「性理」，
有誤]，《易傳》與〈中庸〉殊無多助益。
「天理」一詞出於《禮記》[〈樂記〉]，其
意僅指理為天所賦予人者，並無普遍真理
與普遍法則的意涵。謝良佐記程顥之言曰：
「吾學雖有所受，『天理』二字，卻是自
家體貼出來』。」
「體貼」，英譯為 “realize”。
二程分合異同
[I]t was the Ch’eng brothers’ own idea to
make principle the central focus of their
philosophy. While the two brothers
shared common ideas about it, they also
had different emphases
Ch’eng I stressed the doctrine that principle
is one but its manifestations are many.
二程兄弟分享理的公同觀念，
但側重不同
Compared with his brother, Ch’eng Hao
has emphasized more strongly the idea of
production and reproduction as the chief
characteristic of the universe. He saw the
spirit of life in all things. To him, this
creative quality is jen (humanity), which
removes all distinctions between the self
and the other and combines Heaven,
Earth, and man as one.
討論
如何研究二程哲學？
其分合、異同如何？
陳榮捷論程顥哲學
As the great virtue of Heaven and Earth is to
produce, whatever is produced in man, that is,
whatever is inborn in him, is his nature. To him
this is identical with material force (ch’i). In its
original, tranquil state, human nature is neither
good nor evil. The distinction arises when
human nature is aroused and is manifested in
feelings and actions, and when these feelings
and action abide by or deviate from the mean.
The chief task of moral and spiritual cultivation
is to calm one’s nature, through absolute
impartiality and the identification of internal
and external life. Any opposition between the
internal and the external, he said, must be
forgotten. In fact, he rejects dichotomy of any
kind, whether between the human mind and
the moral mind, between the Principle of
Nature and human desires, or between human
nature and feelings. To achieve unity, he
advocated sincerity and seriousness (ching),
that is, concentrating on thing and not getting
away from it.
Quietism, but not tranquility?
There can be no denial that in advocating such a
method of moral cultivation he tended to
quietism. Whether he was influenced by Chou
Tun-i or by Zen Buddhists of both is a moot
point. We must not forget, however, that he
looked upon Chou Tun-i’s doctrine of
tranquility as unbalanced and substituted for it
seriousness.
Moreover, to him the universe is a great current
of production. Whatever quietism there is in
him, then, is not Buddhist emptiness and
silence but a vital, if gentle and quiet, process.
Like the Buddhists, however, he almost
exclusively emphasizes the mind. To him,
“Principle and the mind are one,” and he
stresses holding on to the mind with
seriousness and preserving the mind as
fundamental steps to moral perfection. In thus
stressing the mind, he and his brother, who
stressed more strongly the extension of
knowledge, moved in different directions.
Dynamic Idealistic in
Wang Yang-Ming
力動的唯心論：王陽明
Wing-tsit Chan
陳榮捷
朱子哲學那種對根本原理進行理性
探索與純粹研究的精神，在陽明時
代，已漸腐蝕瑣屑，而成為王陽明
所謂 『支離破碎』。
[Chu Hsi’s philosophical] spirit of rational
inquiry and genuine search for fundamental
principles had, by Wang’s time, degenerated
into trifling with what Wang called
“fragmentary and isolated details and broken
pieces.”
－朱學的沒落，王學興起的契機
To Wang, the source of the trouble was the
erroneous theory of the investigation of things
propagated by Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi. In
insisting that every blade of grass and every
tree possesses principle and therefore should
be investigated, the theory diverted people
from the basic principles of things and the
fundamentals of life.
Moreover, by saying that the mind should go to
things to investigate the principles inherent in
them, the theory considered things as external
and separated the mind and principle. As a
result, according to Wang, the mind lost its
direction and its motivating power. If
principles were outside the mind, he said, then
the principle of filial piety and therefore the
desire to be filial would cease to be as soon as
the parents die. To him, principle and the mind
are one and the principle of filial piety is
nothing but the exercise of the mind.
依陽明，困局源於程頤與朱熹所倡的格物謬
說。程朱堅稱一草一木皆有理，皆需格，
此說使得人遠離事物的基本之理與人生根
本。不僅此也，程朱說心應即物（中譯作
「及」，誤也）而窮內存於事物之理時，其
說以物為外且析心理為二。其歸也，陽明
以為，心失其方向與其動力；若理在心外，
陽明說，則親歿之後，便沒了孝敬之理以
及其孝親之念。故依陽明，理與心為一，
孝親之理無它，此心之發揮運行。物（與
事）非在外也，心外無物也。
「所謂『心』，陽明主要指意志。除非
心決定予以實現，則無所謂理與事…」
By the mind Wang meant essentially the
will. There would be no principle or
things unless the mind were determined
to realize it. This is the reason why Wang
insisted that the sincerity of the will must
precede the investigation of things.
「心」指「意志」（will）？
In this he directly opposed Chu Hsi who
shifted the chapters of the Great Learning
so that that on the investigation of things
comes before that on the sincerity of the
will.
Wang rejected this rearrangement and
returned to the old text as it is found in
the Book of Rites where the chapter on
the sincerity of the will comes first.
朱熹 vs. 王陽明
The fundamental difference between Chu and
Wang lies in the fact that while Chu’s approach
is intellectual, Wang’s is moral. Chu Hsi
interpreted the term ko-wu as the rational and
objective investigation of things, but Wang
preferred to interpret it to mean to “eliminate
what is incorrect in the mind so as to preserve
the correctness of its original substance.” That
is to say, to investigate things or affairs is to do
good and to remove evil.
陳榮捷的評論
就實言之，陽明之學完全是主觀的，混
淆實在與價值。他的格物說令人難以
接受，因為假若格物一詞意指正心，
則為何不說『格心』而要說『格物』
呢？其解釋固然基於心物為一之說，
然此說奠基於不穩固的根據。
[岩中花樹]…其重點乃在強調道德價值。他
深信心若隔於外物或役於外物，則必陷於支
離而失其大本」。
Actually Wang’s theory is entirely subjective and
confuses reality with value. It is difficult to
accept his version of ko-wu, for if the term
means to rectify the mind, why should it be kowu (to ko things) instead of ko-hsin (to ko the
mind)? His interpretation is of course based on
the theory that the mind and things are one.
But this theory of his is founded on very shaky
grounds. …
The point, however, is that his whole emphasis is
on moral values. He was convinced that if the
mind is divided or devoted to external things,
it will be concerned only with fragmentary
details and will lack the essentials.
回應
陽明果真混淆事實與價值乎？
此評語用於朱熹哲學豈不更恰當？
陽明哲學之起點豈不正在此？
又陽明「心物為一」說基礎不固，豈非
無視於陽明對「物」的界定？
「致良知」之提出
What was Wang’s remedy for this sad situation?
The remedy is his greatest contribution to
Chinese philosophy, namely, the doctrine of
the extension of the innate knowledge of the
good (chih liang-chih). The idea of the
extension of knowledge comes from the Great
Learning and the idea of innate knowledge of
the good from Mencius. Wang’s theory is not
merely a combination of the two but it gives
them a new meaning which gives a new
complexion to Chinese thought.
『致良知』教為陽明對中國哲學最大貢獻。
『致知』源自〈大學〉，而『良知』出於
《孟子》。
• 「致良知」譯為 “the extension of the innate
knowledge of the good”
• 「致知」譯為 “the extension of knowledge”
• 「致知」譯為 “the innate knowledge of the
good”
良知之天理不僅是是非之理，也是自然
推擴之理。心之本體自然知道孝親之理，
故人之視其親，自然推之於行動…
It is the Principle of Nature (T’ien-li), which is
not only the principle of right and wrong but
also the principle that naturally extends. The
mind in its original substance naturally knows
the principle of filial piety, for example, when
one sees one’s parents, and naturally extends it
into action.
陳榮捷論「知行合一」
陳榮捷論「知行合一」
• This leads to another major contribution
he made to Chinese philosophy, namely,
the doctrine of the unity of knowledge
and action.
• Wang was the first to identify them as
one.
陳對「知行合一」的三種表述
1 “The mind […] naturally knows that …
and naturally extends it into action”
2 “The unity of knowledge and action”
3 “identify them as one”
王陽明論「知行」
「知是行之始，行是知之成」
循環定義？
fallacy of circular defining？
不知所云？
He was thinking only of a particular kind of
knowledge, but his total emphasis on the
will is clear.
「陽明所思考的，只及於知識的某一部
分，但他全部重點放在放在意志上，
則是很明顯的」。