Policies for
Pandemic Influenza:
Animal/Public Health
Barrett D. Slenning
MS, DVM, MPVM
Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group
Population Health & Pathobiology Dept
College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC
Agriculture Disaster Research Institute
Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics
• Introductory
comments
• Summary of
Kelley/Weiner
presentations
• Additional
comments from
a veterinarian’s
perspective
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Animal and Public Health?
• 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging”
Diseases are Zoonotic
(dangerous to people)
• The food US consumers eat
in one day, on average,
comes from 30 +/- countries
• The typical city has less than
3 days’ food supply
• In US, there are ~750K MDs
and 75K DVMs

Of which 80%+ are companion
animal oriented
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Animal and Public Health?
Definite Zoonotics
13.
1.
SARS
2.
BSE (Mad Cow)
3.
Psittacosis
4.
Rift Valley Fever
15.
Hi-Path Avian
Influenza
Monkeypox
16.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Hanta virus
West Nile virus
Q Fever
Anthrax
Plague
Tularemia
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
14.
17.
Viral Hemorrhagic
Fevers
Viral Encephalitis
Diseases
Brucellosis
Food/H2O Safety
Threats
Retroviruses
Likely Zoonotics
1.
Ebola/Marburg
Human Health
Impact in Question
1.
Swine Vesicular
Disease
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Value of Poultry to North Carolina
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics
• Introductory
comments
• Summary of
Kelley/Weiner
presentations
• Additional
comments from
a veterinarian’s
perspective
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Pandemic Influenza:
Take Homes via Kelley/Weiner
• [Both] Claiming to know periodicity of
influenza pandemics is fantasy

Doesn’t guide us, or help us

Argument from ignorance; poor policy basis
• [Both] Linear extrapolation of 40-90 yr ago
is dubious


Should we base plans on a single worst-case event?
Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding,
health care, medical tools and practices are false
• [Both] Simple sound bites poor risk
communication

Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance to
the ‘next’ pandemic?
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Pandemic Influenza:
Take Homes via Kelley/Weiner
• [Kelley] Response planning too dependent
on medical intervention during last phase
of pandemic

Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested antivirals and vaccinology
• [Weiner] Genomics too imprecise to
understand differing genetic changes


How quick, how bad, how severe?
We don’t understand all that we know, and we don’t
know all we need to understand
• [Kelley] Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event
are bad enough, and worthy of extra effort


2nd order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be massive
Not socially neutral
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics
• Introductory
comments
• Summary of
Kelley/Weiner
presentations
• Additional
comments from
a veterinarian’s
perspective
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Additional comments
• Refreshing to hear people
worried about BIRDS in
today’s AVIAN pandemic, as
opposed to PEOPLE in
potential ‘future’ outbreaks

DHHS has captured the entire
agenda, to the detriment of us all
• I agree with some things
you’ve heard
• I am not as sanguine about
some comments
• Most, however, I just do not
know about
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Hi Path AI – Clinical Disease
High morbidity, high
mortality
12 hours into disease...
(Most get ill, most die)
six days after onset of signs...
24 hours into disease...
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Chicken Food-Chain
Major Flows
Minor Flows
Green lines/font = feed segment
Red lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment
Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Non-food, non-feed
Products & uses
Feed Producer
Industrial use
(rendering, oils, fertilizer)
Feed Brokers
Feed Milling and
Distribution
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Chicken Food-Chain
Major Flows
Minor Flows
Green lines/font = feed segment
Red lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment
Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Non-food, non-feed
Products & uses
Feed Producer
Industrial use
(rendering, oils, fertilizer)
Feed Brokers
Exports
Feed Milling and
Distribution
‘Spike Male’ Lines
(1o Breeder, Genetics)
‘Grandparent’ Lines
(1o Breeder, Genetics)
Cull Hen Market
(culls; incl chicks)
Broiler Breeders
(2o Breeder, Prod’n hens)
Grower Unit
(Commercial Chicks)
Hatchery Unit
(Commercial Chicks)
Out-of-State Growing
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Chicken Food-Chain
Major Flows
Minor Flows
Green lines/font = feed segment
Red lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment
Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Non-food, non-feed
Products & uses
Imports
Feed Producer
Industrial use
(rendering, oils, fertilizer)
Exports
Feed Brokers
Exports
High processed meats/protein
(sausages, deli prod’s, protein
suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)
Feed Milling and
Distribution
‘Spike Male’ Lines
(1o Breeder, Genetics)
‘Grandparent’ Lines
(1o Breeder, Genetics)
Distributor
Cull Hen Market
(culls; incl chicks)
Broiler Breeders
(2o Breeder, Prod’n hens)
Packer & Processor
(includes value-added
processing)
Grower Unit
(Commercial Chicks)
Hatchery Unit
(Commercial Chicks)
Out-of-State Growing
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Chicken Food-Chain
Major Flows
Minor Flows
Green lines/font = feed segment
Red lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment
Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Non-food, non-feed
Products & uses
Imports
Feed Producer
Industrial use
(rendering, oils, fertilizer)
Exports
Feed Brokers
Exports
High processed meats/protein
(sausages, deli prod’s, protein
suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)
Feed Milling and
Distribution
‘Spike Male’ Lines
(1o Breeder, Genetics)
‘Grandparent’ Lines
(1o Breeder, Genetics)
Distributor
Cull Hen Market
(culls; incl chicks)
Broiler Breeders
(2o Breeder, Prod’n hens)
Packer & Processor
(includes value-added
processing)
Retailer, Restaurant,
Institutional
Grower Unit
(Commercial Chicks)
Hatchery Unit
(Commercial Chicks)
Out-of-State Growing
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
Consumer
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Katrina and Agriculture
• 60-70% of US corn and soy
go through the port of New
Orleans

Harvests started mid-Sept
• Port regained partial
function by end of
September

Port personnel are an issue
• Limited river barge travel
started back by mid
October


CHANGE IN CORN PRICE
SINCE END OF AUGUST
STRONGER <2%
Unknown how river has
changed
Barge costs much higher via
competition with clean-up
needs
WEAKER >19%
UNCHANGED
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Avian Influenza H5N1 (now)
• Avian Influenza (H5N1)




1st seen 1997 Hong Kong
Late 2003 was the new AI in SE
Asia (called ‘chicken ebola’)
Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed >80
people in SE Asia, South Asia,
Eastern Europe, and Africa
Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via
destroying >1 Billion poultry
• But that isn’t the scary part
yet...
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Poultry is THE major high quality
protein source for the world
• Demand over 40
years for all
animal proteins
has grown




Ruminant meat by
100-150%
Pig meat by 250300%
Milk by 100-200%
Poultry meat by
almost 800%
• Is a major source
of economic
wealth as well
Livestock Demand – Global - % Change 1959-1999
Beef
Sheep/Goat
Pig
Poultry
Cow Milk
Buff Milk
Sheep Milk
Goat Milk
0%
200%
400%
600%
From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
800%
Poultry as Economic Underpinning:
Prior to 2004
From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
HPAI H5N1 World Consumption &
Export Changes
• Movement
of H5N1 to
Europe in
fall 2005
triggered a
major
disruption
in world
poultry
markets

Local
variations
occur, but
the trend
is bad
POULTRY MARKET % DECREASES
Prediction vs Revision, 2006
Oth
0%
4%
22%
Eur
Asia
12%
0%
2%
3%
Amer
Afr
1%
Export
0%
5%
Consump
2%
WORLD
3%
0%
5%
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
10%
15%
20%
Source: FAO, February 2006
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
25%
US Trade Exposure:
<15% of US Production
H5N1 in Russia
Hurricanes hit Gulf Poultry
H5N1 in
Croatia,
Romania,
Turkey
LoPath? AI
in Texas
BSE in USA
H5N1 in Ukraine
H5N1 in 18 more
Euro Area Countries
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Ultimate HPAI Costs to Industry Best Guesstimate
• Economic losses mounting


Waiting for others to make production adjustment
Time period before adjustment depends on how deep the
pockets of companies and governments
• Unusual situation where lower prices may not
stimulate increased consumption:
Lowered leg qtr prices
Lowered breast prices
Total
Loss
$142 M / mo
$104 M / mo
$246 M / mo
• Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing
U.S. pork and beef wholesale prices.
Estimates from : Bill Roenigk
Nat’l Chicken Council (Pers Communic)
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Response to Theoretical H5N1 in
US Poultry(Among those who eat poultry, 96%)
Stop eating that type of
chicken/poultry
46%
Reduce the amount of
chicken you eat
25%
Continue to eat
chicken/other poultry
27%
Note: “Don’t know” responses not shown.
Harvard School of Public Health Project on the Public and Biological Security, January 17-25, 2006.
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
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A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Lessons Learned : Avian Influenza
2005-6... maybe.
• Avian Influenza’s
(H5N1) spread
means animal
health & public
health are the
same
• But public health
will always be the
priority


Public health response
can be deleterious to
animal agriculture
Prevention & response
is best responsibility
of industry
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Threats in Spread of H5N1:
Confusing, to say the least
Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006:
Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly
pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza virus [is
essentially only by] domestic and wild birds...”
www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006: “...A top bird flu
expert on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus
will not reach the United States this year via
migratory birds, but warned it will eventually arrive
-- possibly through infected birds smuggled into the
country...”
Science Magazine- 27 April 2006: “...The question is
what role wild birds now play as the virus hops
across continents. There's growing suspicion that
international smuggling of contaminated live
poultry or poultry products, such as fertilizer, may
be playing a bigger role...”
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
“Planned Mismanagement”?
Making enough vaccine
Vaccinating people against H5N1
before a pandemic starts is not yet a
practical possibility, because not
enough vaccine is available. This is
partly because all the vaccine factories
are being used to make vaccine for
ordinary flu.
There is, however, massive global
capacity for making flu vaccine for
chickens, and in April the WHO held
a meeting to explore the possibility
of using these facilities to make
human vaccine. It concluded that the
manufacturing processes and
standards are not that different, and it
should be possible to divert some
plants.
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Take Homes on Policy...
• Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’
can be disastrous


Over reliance on medical technology – what should be
the last step in several to protect the public
Ignoring where an agent is now means we have no idea
where it will be tomorrow
• Risk based, science based decisions are
the only ones that are defensible

Not, in reality, what we are doing now.
• All the same, there are cautionary tales of
importance.


H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs
around 35-40 years later. We’ve followed the Asian
H5N1 for only 10 years...
Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill...
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
UK Farmer who
committed suicide
when his animals
were buried too close
to water table, and
his household water
turned red.
UK April 2001
C. Brown, U GA CVM
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Policies for
Pandemic Influenza:
Animal/Public Health
Barrett D. Slenning
MS, DVM, MPVM
Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group
Population Health & Pathobiology Dept
College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC
Agriculture Disaster Research Institute
Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Understanding Pandemic Influenza
• Pandemics occur when
novel strain emerges
that is:
1.
2.
3.
readily transmitted between
individuals
genetically unique (pop’n
lacks preexisting immunity)
increased virulence
• Facilitated by modern
population densities
and movement of
people, animals, and
products

In spring 03, SARS
traveled to 5 countries w/in
24 hr after emerging in
rural China
7
400
350
300
DAYS TO
CIRCUMNAVIGATE
THE WORLD
6
5
250
4
200
GLOBAL
POP’N
150
100
3
2
50
1
0
0
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
1850
1900
1950
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
2000
Turkey Food-Chain
Major Flows
Minor Flows
Non-food, non-feed
Products & uses
Green lines/font = feed segment
Red lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment
Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Imports
Feed Producer
Industrial use
(rendering, oils, fertilizer)
Feed Brokers
Exports
Exports
High processed meats/protein
(sausages, deli prod’s, protein
suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)
Feed Milling and
Distribution
‘Grandparent’ Lines
(1o Breeder, Male)
‘ Grandparent' Lines
(1o Breeder, Female)
Production Breeders
(2o Breeder, Prod’n hens)
Distributor
Cull Hen Market
(culls; incl poults)
Packer & Processor
(includes value-added
processing)
Retailer, Restaurant,
Institutional
Grower Unit
(Commercial Poults)
Darkout Site
(2o Breeder, Hens)
Out-of-State Growing
Hatchery Unit
(Commercial Poults)
A N I M A L
B I O S E C
Agriculture Disaster
A GResearch
R I C U Institute
L T U R E
Consumer
U R I T Y
R I S K
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
Egg Food-Chain
Major Flows
Minor Flows
Non-food, non-feed
Products & uses
Green lines/font = feed segment
Red lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segment
Black lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Imports
Feed Producer
Industrial use
(rendering, oils, fertilizer)
Exports
Feed Brokers
High processed
meats/protein
(See Poultry
Meat Chain)
Feed Milling and
Distribution
‘Grandparent’ Lines
(Genetics, male/female)
Multiplier Lines
(Comm’l Layer Hens)
Processed Eggs
(Bakery, commercial)
Cull Hen Market
(culls; incl chicks)
Off-Line
Egg
Production
(Middlemen
)
Distributor
Retailer, Restaurant,
Institutional
Egg Handlers
and Brokers
Consumer
Out-of-State Egg
Handlers/Brooders
Layer Growout Site
(Comm’l Layer Hens)
Layer Unit
(Commercial eggs)
A N I M A L
B I O S E C
Agriculture Disaster
A GResearch
R I C U Institute
L T U R E
In-Line Egg Production (Direct Sale)
U R I T Y
R I S K
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
D I S A S T E R
M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
From Saif, Ohio State University, Current information on influenza virus infection. Feb 2006
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B I O S E C U R I T Y
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M A N A G E M E N T
G R O U P
R E S E A R C H
I N S T I T U T E
A N I M A L
B I O S E C U R I T Y
R I S K
A G R I C U L T U R E
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