David Shambaugh
China Goes Global: The Partial Power (NY: Oxford University Press, 2013)
GUIDING QUESTIONS & RESPONSES
I.
Introduction & Chapter 1 – Understanding China’s Global Impact (Thesis & Arguments)
1. What is the author’s principal argument (thesis)? [pp. x, 7]
a. The elements of China’s global power are actually surprisingly weak and very uneven. China is
not as important, and it is certainly not as influential, as conventional wisdom holds.
b. China’s appeal as a model to others is weak to non-existent. China’s global posture is beset by
multiple weaknesses—not the least of which are domestic…
c. It is a lonely power, possessing no allies.
d. Despite these limitations, global publics already perceive China as a global power & expect China
to overtake the US as the world’s leading power sometime in the next 25 years.
2. When did the Chinese path to global expansion begin? [5]
a. At the 1978 Communist Party’s Third Plenary Session, which determined China would engage in
“reform and opening.”
3. To become a “genuine multidimensional power,” China has cultivated power across what sectors? [6]
a. Economy, science, technology, education, culture, values, military, governance, diplomacy.
4. Which six spheres or dimensions of power does this author assess? [6]
a. Perceptual, diplomatic, global governance, economic, cultural, security.
5. How does he define “power”? [8]
a. Shambaugh argues that China is a global actor without (yet) being a true global power—the
distinction being that true powers influence other nations and events.
b. Power is the ability of A to make B do what it would otherwise not do.
c. Only in some sectors does China exercise global influence: global trade patterns, global energy &
commodity markets, global tourism industry, global sales of luxury goods, global real estate
purchases, and cyber hacking.
6. Why is the United States a “superpower,” according to the author? [10]
a. China remains a long way from becoming a global superpower (some might say “hyperpower,”
although Shambaugh does not use the term) like the United States
b. The US has comprehensive power and global influence across economic, cultural, diplomatic,
security, governance, and other realms.
c. Over time China may gain these attributes, but for the time being it remains very much a partial
power.
II.
Chapter 2 – China’s Global Identities
1. What identity has been created by historic discourses of Chinese power & nationalism? [17]
a. Denials of global power; acknowledgement of regional power.
b. Modern Chinese nationalism founded on the belief that China has been an “aggrieved nation”
“victimized” by the West & Japan.
c. China should return to its historic great power status.
2. How have Chinese scholars viewed American power since the 1970s? i.e., steady or declining? [22-23]
a. Declining in the late 1970s, mid-1980s, and 2001-5, finally falling from superpower status in
2008-10 simultaneously challenged by the BRICS & G20.
3. Why are many Chinese officials & commentators wary of global governance & multilateralism? [23-24]
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a. They suspect that these are Western traps to retard China’s growth, undermine its sovereignty,
contain China, or tie China down.
4. How does the Chinese government feel about the United Nations? [25]
a. It is a strong advocate of the UN.
5. What were the attributes of former President Hu Jintao’s concept of a “harmonious world”? [25]
a. Effective multilateralism with a strong role for the UN
b. Development of a collective security mechanism
c. Prosperity for all through mutually beneficial cooperation
d. Tolerance & enhancement of dialogue among diverse civilizations.
6. Define “hegemony”. [26]
a. When one nation dominates all the others.
7. What brought about a sense of triumphalism among Realists in 2008-10? [33]
a. They felt the Chinese development model of mixed state capitalism and socialism has been
vindicated, while the Western laissez-faire system has been vanquished.
8. Why was priority placed on maintaining harmonious ties with the US during the presidencies of Jiang
Zemin and Hu Jintao? [35]
a. Because the US and the West in general were a source of advanced technology, capital and
investment.
b. Since 2003, as Chinese power has increased & frictions with Washington multiplied many
Chinese observers are calling on their government to take a harder stance vis-à-vis the US.
9. How does geography dictate that China should “protect its own yard” through an “Asia First” foreign
policy? [37]
a. It borders 14 countries by land and many more by sea.
10. How does Chinese foreign policy express its allegiance to developing countries in what was formerly
known as the “Global South”? [38]
a. Strong support for the UN Millennium Development Goals.
b. Doctrine of nonintervention
c. “no strings attached” aid programs & debt relief
d. placing the global climate change burden on developed countries.
11. How does identifying itself as a developing country pay dividends in terms of diplomatic support from
other developing countries? [39]
a. China can fend off the West on issues such as Tibet, human rights, Taiwan & climate change.
b. Finds allies in the BRICS group
c. Supports the G20 to advance multipolarity in international relations.
d. Strategy for redefining & redistributing power from the “North” to the “South” in global
institutions.
12. What do “Globalists” believe China must do, given its global rise? [41]
a. Contribute much more to global governance & act as a “responsible power” in the international
arena.
b. Strong advocates of the UN & China’s role on the security council.
13. What interactions occur in Chinese government, military and society to generate multiple international
identities? [43]
a. The People’s Liberation Army is dominated by realism (preserve state sovereignty) and nativism
(China First isolationism/ xenophobia).
b. Government officials in foreign affairs prefer the perspectives of maintaining good relations with
major powers (US-Russia-EU) or aligning with developing countries.
c. The government must take into consideration the nativist & realist voices in society, the military
and the Communist Party.
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III.
Chapter 3 – China’s Global Diplomatic Presence
1. What opportunities does China possess to exercise power? [45]
a. UN Security Council & G20 & all major international summits.
2. Why is it a “partial power,” according to the author?
a. Apart from the Six-Party talks re: North Korea, Chinese officials remain reactive & passive in
these venues.
b. It is not actively involved in trying to solve any major global problem.
c. It does not shape international diplomacy, drive other nations’ policies, forge global consensus, or
solve problems.
3. Why does Shambaugh consider the Chinese role in North Korean talks a failure? [46]
a. Because North Korea has continued developing nuclear weapons and engaged in more provocative
behavior.
4. Why does the author conclude that China is an international “actor,” rather than a “power”? [46]
a. It enters into bilateral accords (300 currently), but does not exercise influence/ impose its will,
which deprives it of status as a global power.
5. Historical background since 1949: What ten phases of diplomatic history does the author identify? [4752]
a. 1949-57: China was isolated & dependent on the USSR; caught up in Korean War against the US
& UN, crisis over the Taiwan Straits; sought an “intermediate zone” in the cold war bipolar war
during the “Bandung phase” (1954-57).
b. 1958-65: tensions w/ USSR; rupture (1959-60), followed by open split in 1962; launched a border
war w/ India, confronted the US in Vietnam, 2nd Taiwan Crisis. In 1964, China called for global
liberation movements & provided arms to insurgencies.
c. 1966-70: China recoiled in another isolationist phase. Eruption of xenophobic Cultural
Revolution. Suspension of normal diplomatic relations; embassies closed abroad; stepped up
support for insurgent communist movements abroad; brief border war with USSR in 1969;
d. 1971-78: strategic opening to the US; PRC’s admission to the UN; normalization of diplomatic
relations with states.
e. 1979-82: Deng Xiaoping ousted Mao’s radical disciples (Gang of Four), consummated full
normalization of diplomatic relations with US (President Carter) & engineered a tight alignment
with the US to counterpressure Moscow in the wake of Afghan invasion. Deng increased Chinese
aid to rebel groups in Africa to oppose groups supported by USSR.
f. 1982-89: recalibration to pursue a more “independent foreign policy” less tightly aligned with US
& initiated a 7-year rapprochement to the USSR, which was in a weakened state. Culmination =
Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing in May 1989.
i. 1980s: China’s diplomatic lens focused on how relations with industrialized states in
Europe, North America & Asia could benefit its own modernization through FDI, access to
international financial institutions, and technology transfers, managerial expertise, etc.
g. 1989-97: China is isolated by many Western states following Tiananmen Square massacres.
h. 1992: Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Sojourn” reignited economic reforms launching prolonged
economic growth;
i. this was one of China’s lessons from the collapse of Eastern European communist states &
the Soviet demise.
ii. 1997: EU & President Clinton determined isolating China was unsustainable &
unproductive.
i. 1998-2008: Jiang Zemin & Hu Jintao opened a “truly global” Chinese foreign policy: relations
with US & Russia stabilized; diplomatic attention showered on Europe, Africa, Central Asia &
Latin America.
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j. Mid-2009-2010: more combative stance with confrontations bolstered by Chinese nationalism &
confidence fueled by its own economic success, whereas the West had crashed.
i. Territorial disputes with Japan.
ii. Irritated South Korea, Vietnam, India, ASEAN, EU & US.
iii. Rejected international agreement on capping greenhouse gases at the 2009 Copenhagen
Climate Change Conference.
k. PRESENT PHASE (2011-12): attempts to mend frayed relations; however, tensions persist:
i. over maritime claims in East & South China Seas
ii. energy-driven diplomacy in Africa & Middle East
iii. strategic mistrust with the US.
6. What are the historical features of Chinese diplomacy? [54-55]
a. Sensitive to border security: it is imperative to maintain territorial integrity.
b. Difficult relations with neighbors: Russia, Japan & Vietnam, in particular.
c. Ambivalence toward the West, but willingness to borrow ideas & technologies.
d. Obsession with maintaining China’s status, ritualistic practices, and saving “face” in dealing with
foreigners—so as to legitimate Chinese leaders in the eyes of their own people.
e. Intense nationalism—often negative, xenophobic, and directed against the foreign “other”
7. Why did Mao turn to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and the US & Japan in the 1970s, which Deng
deepened after 1978?
a. China needed Soviet economic assistance to establish a communist state.
b. China needed American & Japanese aid out of security concerns vis-à-vis the USSR, but also
sought access to Western technology & economic aid.
8. Where did China’s diplomatic attention shift after its economic boom took off in the 1990s & 2000s? [55]
a. Toward Latin America, Africa, Central Asia & the Middle East to satisfy its appetite for energy &
raw materials.
9. How does the Chinese Communist Party situate its claims to power based on past “shame and
humiliation” endured at the hands of foreigners (Westerners & Japanese)? [56]
a. The CCP anchored its legitimacy on restoring the nation’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and
its (inter)national dignity.
b. Rivalry with the regime in Taiwan to claim the existence of “one China”
c. “No Chinese Communist Party, no New China” = propaganda.
SKIP: pp. 61-72.
10. How are the United States & China interconnected? [73]
a. They are one another’s second-largest trading partners.
b. The growth of American exports to China is the highest in the world.
c. US is the third-largest source of FDI in China
d. China is the largest foreign creditor of the US
e. In 2011-12: 160,000 Chinese students studied in American universities; 20,000 Americans studied
in China.
f. 300 million Chinese are learning English & 200,000 Americans are learning Chinese
11. What “titanic struggle” appears in the relations between China & the US? [74]
a. Competing visions of world order:
i. The US seeks to expand the liberal order & number of democratic states.
ii. China is highly ambivalent & often opposed to the liberal order & seeks to protect
authoritarian regimes.
12. What is the difference between the global Sino-American relationship today and the cold war between the
US & USSR from 1945-1991? [76]
a. The cold war relationship between the superpowers was “strategically competitive” as each side
fashioned its diplomacy in reaction to the other to win allies & spread its economic & governance
model around the world.
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13. How did China provoke an “American pivot” or reorientation of global foreign, economic, and security
policies toward Asia in 2011? [77]
a. In 2009-10, China’s regional assertiveness, picking fights or irritating Australia, ASEAN, India,
Japan, Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, provoked these nations to turn to Washington to
strengthen ties.
14. How has China interpreted the “American pivot”?
a. As American policy of “containment” of China.
15. Does the author agree?
a. No. He claims it is untrue and impossible, given China’s integration into the globalized
international system.
16. What are American concerns? [78]
a. Chinese currency manipulation; disregard for intellectual property rights & theft; Chinese
industrial espionage; cyber hacking of American companies.
17. What is the heart of the Sino-Russian geostrategic axis in the UN Security Council? [83]
a. Anti-Americanism & anti-interventionism.
18. What is the EU-China relationship anchored in? [86]
a. Commerce. Total two-way trade totaled 464.8 billion euros in 2011; Europe has become the
largest source of technology & equipment transfer to China.
19. What was the turning point in China-EU relations? [88-89]
a. EU dropped all sanctions on China (except military arms sales & defense technology transfers).
b. EU Commission offered a benign view of China’s rise & identified areas for collaboration.
c. No Taiwan lobby, so eurocrats subscribe to the “one China principle”
d. No security interests in the regions; therefore, there are no security tensions.
e. End of cold war dispelled the shadow of US-Soviet rivalry that was cast over Asia.
20. What issues have caused turmoil in China-EU relations? [90-93]
a. Chinese unfair market competition denounced by the EU Commission (2006)
b. European heads of state meeting with the Dalai Lama (2007-8), then (Angela Merkel, Vaclav
Havel, and Nicolas Sarkozy) boycotted opening ceremonies of 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing.
c. Tibetan independence movements supported by Europeans.
d. China’s human rights record & crackdowns on protestors in Tibet.
21. In the late 1990s in a move to reassure Asian neighbors at the ASEAN Regional Forum, how did China
articulate a “New Security Concept” that in fact borrowed heavily from the “Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence” articulated by Zhou Enlai at the Afro-Asian People’s Conference in Bandung, Indonesia
(1955)? [97]
a. In addition to the 5 principles (mutual respect for territorial integrity & sovereignty,
nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence), the core purpose of the NSC is “to conduct dialogue, consultation, and
negotiation on an equal footing… to solve disputes & safeguard peace.”
22. What is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? [104]
a. It is a regional “comprehensive security” organization founded in 2001 to address nontraditional
security threats, such as terrorism; it is also a Chinese post-cold war riposte to American
“collective security” approaches through alliances.
23. How does China successfully manage diplomatic relations with all Middle Eastern countries? [107]
a. It follows a policy committed to offending no one and attaching no strings to bilateral accords.
24. How did Mao’s PRC engage Africa from 1949 to 1976? [109]
a. Fought with Taiwan for recognition at the UN.
b. Supported African anticolonial and anti-imperialist “liberation struggles”
c. Sought to spread communist revolution & Maoist ideology through the continent
d. Mao saw Africa as an “intermediate zone” in the cold war struggle between superpowers.
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e. 1960ff. Beijing competed w. Moscow for followers in Africa as part of the Sino-Soviet global
competition.
f. Africa became a testing ground for Chinese diplomatic & foreign aid principles.
g. Ended with reorientation to national economic growth by Deng after 1978. Opening to the West &
Japan.
25. In 1995, China’s attention returned to engagement with Africa because its economy boomed. What three
factors became apparent in its position vis-à-vis Africa? [109]
a. Active bilateral & multilateral diplomacy.
b. Heavy commercial presence oriented around the import of raw materials and energy supplies in
exchange for exports of a range of manufactured good
c. Increased developmental aid assistance.
d. Culminated in the 2006 creation of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation, which increased
Chinese development aid, investment in Africa, trade and exchanges of students, laborers, and aid
workers.
e. Trade grew from <$5B in 1995 to $127B in 2011.
26. What critiques have been raised about Chinese aid & development projects in Africa? [110]
a. China provides aid to repressive & corrupt regimes, “no strings attached.”
b. Hard infrastructure (roads, rails, stadiums, buildings) are built by Chinese construction companies
employing Chinese workers with contracts from the Chinese government.
c. China’s obsessive focus on extractive industries & raw materials has led to charges of “neocolonialism” (Oil comprises 80% of African exports to China, followed by timber, diamonds,
copper, iron ores.)
27. What is the growing impression of China across the developing world? [120]
a. It is perceived as a mercantilist trader & neocolonial extractor due to its investments in the natural
resource & raw materials sectors and dumping of low-end manufactured goods on Latin markets.
IV.
Chapter 4 – China & Global Governance (Hesitations in Integrating International Institutions)
1. How is “global governance” defined? [122]
a. Collective management of common problems at the international level
b. Or “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their
common affairs…” according to the Commission on Global Governance (1995)
2. What instances of global governance have prevailed in the 20th century? [123]
a. League of Nations to prevent a world war & preserve collective security (1920-1939)
b. International Court of Justice, which survived the LON.
c. United Nations and its constituent agencies:
i. UN Development Program
ii. International Atomic Energy Agency
iii. International Maritime Organization
iv. UN High Commissioner on Refugees
v. World Health Organization
vi. Bretton Wood institutions, which monitor & regulate international commerce & finance
and provide development assistance:
1. World Bank, IMF, Organization of Economic Cooperation & Development, WTO.
d. 1990s: new impetus to global governance emerged at the end of the cold war bipolarization, which
led to greater instability in the new world order.
e. Globalization, which initially denoted, “economic interdependencies” has assumed a wider
meaning to include a broader range of functional issues that penetrated across sovereign national
borders:
i. Global climate change/ biodiversity
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
ii. Peace, security, conflict resolution
iii. Development & commerce
iv. Human rights
v. Public health
vi. Transnational crime
How are Western & Chinese visions of global governance distinct? [124-25]
a. The global governance agenda & its institutional history exhibit a Western liberal cast rooted in
Western liberal societies, civil law & democratic politics. G. John Ikenberry: “At its most basic,
liberal internationalism offer a vision of an open, rules-based system in which states trade and
cooperate to achieve mutual gains.”
b. Challenges to global governance come from developing nations that upheld state sovereignty &
rejected many liberal assumptions. State-centric and authoritarian governments such as China
reject liberalism & view it as a ruse for Western intervention.
What four phases does Shambaugh identify for China’s evolving approach to and role in, global
governance & international institutions? [125]
a. 1950s-70s: opposition
b. 1980s-90s: seeking membership in institutions, learning & respecting rules.
c. Early 2000s: selective & activist role with China being more confident & outspoken.
d. Since 2008: China seeks to alter rules, actors & balance of influence from within institutions,
while simultaneously establishing alternative institutions & norms of global governance and
redistribute power and resources within the international system.
What is China’s contribution to concepts of reorganizing global finance? [126-27]
a. Phasing out the dollar as the world’s principal reserve currency.
b. Replace dollar hegemony with RMB & basket of currencies.
c. World Bank expects the euro & RMB to establish a new “multicurrency” international monetary
& reserve system.
i. But 61% of world’s $5.3 trillion in currency reserves were still in dollars in 2011 (IMF).
d. China has used newfound global financial power to become more active in the G-20, World Bank
& IMF.
e. China is a newcomer, first using the term “global economic governance” at the G-8 summit in
2009.
China and global governance at the UN and via the UN Security Council (133-44).
How does the author argue that Chinese political culture constrains its potential future contributions to
global governance? [154-55]
a. Hobbesian assumption that leads most Chinese to believe that they live in a highly unpredictable
& predatory domestic environment. Every interaction is seen as power-maximizing & zero-sum
(e.g., “I win, you lose; you win, I lose”). A lack of commonly shared social values—in the
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution & 3 decades of high-speed economic growth—has produced
a society of individual indifference and lack of collective responsibility. As a result a moral void
pervades Chinese society.
i. Consequence on global governance = a society composed of self-seeking, powermaximizing individuals who are dismissive of domestic social responsibilities and public
goods are certainly in no position to embrace arguments concerning international
responsibilities & public goods.
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b. 2 constraint: “transactional” feature deriving from the central role played by guanxi (reciprocal
obligations) in Chinese society. Every day…everyone in China turns normal social interactions
into transactional ones whereby reciprocal provision of goods & services is the norm. It is hardwired into the DNA of Chinese culture, society and business. This is one reason why corruption
will never be controlled or eliminated in China, because Chinese expect business to be done on the
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basis of favoritism and personal ties. Chinese constantly calculate the qualitative or monetary
equity of every exchange.
i. One does not do things for the simple betterment of the community (public goods).
ii. This transactional mentality also explains China’s cost-benefit approach to diplomacy,
whereby every diplomatic situation is carefully weighed on a narrow national opportunitycost basis.
c. In China, there exists a universal belief in a strong state that provides for society (or at least
should do so). Partly due to the PRC’s 60+ year experience with socialism, but is also goes back to
the imperial Chinese state. No concept of a Lockean social contract between citizens complying
with state laws or contributing taxes for the common good.
i. Many Chinese do not understand why they must pay individual or corporate taxes; they do
their best to avoid paying them and just assume that, somehow, the state will accrue
resources and provide public service to society.
ii. This is beginning to change as citizens realize that tax avoidance is difficult (Xi Jinping).
V.
Chapter 5 – China’s Global Economic Presence (Economic Power & Limitations)
1. How does China measure up to being a global economic powerhouse? [156-57]
a. World’s 2nd largest economy ($5.87B in 2011)
b. Highest average growth rate over two decades (10.2%)
c. World largest energy consumer
d. Largest merchandise exporter
e. Second-leading recipient of foreign direct investment.
f. 4/10 of the world’s top ten banks.
g. Possessed largest foreign exchange reserves ($3.2 trillion)
h. World’s largest # of millionaires (1,020,000) and billionaires (115)
i. World’s largest foreign holder of American government debt ($1.6 trillion)
2. By what measures does China remain a partial economic power? [157]
a. Exports are dominated by generally low-end consumer products. (WTO reports 93.6% of exports
were manufactured goods in 2009)
b. Financial services sector & knowledge-intensive industries lag behind Western & other East Asian
nations.
c. Has few leading MNCs & poor brand presence in international markets.
d. Its overseas direct investment (ODI – ranked 5th globally) and overseas development assistance
(ODA – not in the global top ten) both are limited in comparison to other major powers.
3. China is the world’s largest producer of what products? [158]
a. Household & office furniture, machine tools, lithium ion batteries, Christmas ornaments,
footwear, cameras, computers, televisions, textiles, plastics, steel, washing machines, watches,
mobile phones, consumer durables.
4. Draw a schematic diagram (schéma) entitled “China’s Top Trade Partners (2010)” to illustrate
heuristically the data provided in Table 5.1. [158]
5. Who was China’s largest trading partner in 2010? [158-59]
a. United States ($385B)
b. European Union ($550B)
6. How did China’s overseas direct investment originate & progress? [174-178]
a. No ODI or FDI until 1978 “reform & opening” by Deng Xiaoping.
b. Jiang Zemin formulated & developed the “going out” policy between 1992 and 2000.
c. Premier Zhu Rongji officially launched the policy in 2000.
d. China joined the WTO in 2001
e. State decrees issued to regulate & encourage firms to invest overseas between 2000-2002.
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f. 2010: Chinese ODI = $68.81B. (American ODI = $328.9B as a point of comparison)
g. Predictions: China’s ODI will grow to between $1-2 trillion by 2020.
7. What problems do Chinese MNCs encounter in conducting global business? [191]
a. Incompatibility in corporate cultures
b. Nonglobalized nature of Chinese MNC management
c. Lack of understanding of foreign regulatory & legal environments, resulting in failed ventures.
d. Difficulties with foreign environmental standards.
8. What explains the anti-China backlash in developing countries? [201]
a. There is resentment over domestic unemployment, due to low-cost Chinese good proliferating in
countries where Chinese merchants offer easy targets for the discontent.
b. China’s vast mining of natural resources in Africa and Latin America raise historical memories of
colonialism and exploitation.
9. What is the author’s concluding argument? [206]
a. China is certainly an economic superpower and the world’s second-largest economy, yet its
domestic economy still faces many challenges to move up the value chain, maintain employment,
continue to grow GDP, and broaden its international impact.
VI.
Chapter 6 – China’s Global Cultural Presence (Soft Power Evaluated)
1. What was the Chinese Communist Party’s official communiqué in 2011? [208]
a. It was a national goal to “build our country into a socialist cultural superpower.”
2. How did President Hu Jintao explain the threat to China’s “cultural security”? [208]
a. He asserted that China was under cultural assault from abroad: “…international hostile forces are
intensifying the strategic plots to Westernize and divide us…they commit long-term infiltration.”
3. How does the “father” of the concept of soft power, Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye, define soft power?
[209]
a. The “ability to shape preferences of others” and “to get others to want the outcomes you want.”
b. Soft power relies on cooptation rather than coercion. It is the intrinsic ability of a country to attract
others.
c. Soft power “grows out of a country’s culture, political values, and foreign policies.”
d. It is the capacity of a society to attract others, rather than a government to persuade others.
e. Thus soft power largely originates from society…
4. What did Joshua Cooper Ramos argue in The Beijing Consensus (2004) in comparing the China model to
the American model? [214]
a. China’s unique blend of authoritarian politics and a mixed state/market economic model offered
the developing world an appealing alternative to the “Washington Consensus” of democracy and
free market capitalism.
5. How did journalist Ding Gang (People’s Daily/ Global Times) lament China’s lack of soft power? [215]
a. Mediocre product quality, low brand recognition, poor global advertising, no exportable religion,
poor commercial reputation owing to the gift-giving guanxi business culture, academic bribery to
attain degrees abroad, nonuniversal China-specific popular culture.
6. How does the Chinese government manage foreign correspondents in China? [224-24]
a. No more minders to guide them in China (abolished in 2008).
b. Scrutiny of their content, hacking computers, suggestions that visas may not be renewed, request
for interviews not granted. Telephones & email are monitored.
c. Shambaugh argues that through these tactics, the Chinese government is turning a very valuable
potential soft power asset into a liability.
7. Consult major Chinese English-language media outlets to discover how the Chinese state is attempting to
project its image abroad:
a. Xinua News Agency: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/
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b. China Network Corporation – CNC World: http://www.cncworld.tv/news/
c. China Central Television – CCTV International: http://english.cntv.cn/01/index.shtml
d. “Dialogue” program:
i. Co-host Yang Rui’s segments: http://cctv.cntv.cn/lm/dialogue/host/yangrui/
ii. Co-host Tian Wei’s segments: http://cctv.cntv.cn/lm/dialogue/host/tianwei/
e. China Daily newspaper: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
f. Global Times newspaper: http://www.globaltimes.cn/index.html
8. What two international events promoted China’s image on the world stage? [240-41]
a. 2008 Beijing Olympics & 2010 Shanghai World Expo
9. How many Chinese students have studied in international universities since 1978? [241]
a. 1.39 million
10. How many returned to China? [241]
a. 230,000 (or 1/7)
11. Which Chinese universities are globally ranked? [243]
a. University of Hong Kong, Peking University, Tsinghua University, Hong Kong University of
Science & Technology Business School MBA program.
12. How many Americans studied in China in 2010-11? [242]
a. 18,650
13. What is President Obama’s “100,000 Strong Initiative”? [242]
a. To send 100,000 American students to China over the next five years.
b. Watch New York University market its study abroad center in Shanghai:
i. http://www.nyu.edu/global/global-academic-centers/shanghai.html
14. In 2008, China surpassed the US in awarding the most what in the world? [243]
a. Ph.D.s
15. What have been some obstacles to developing basic research in China? [244]
a. Culture of academic corruption, which is corrosive & widespread. Academic plagiarism,
favoritism & false credentialism are rampant, and intellectual property theft is endemic.
b. Educational pedagogy has yet to escape rote memorization of knowledge.
16. What are Confucius Institutes? [245]
a. Modeled on the Alliance Française to promote Chinese language & culture around the world; they
exist on the university level (Confucius Institutes) or secondary level (Confucius Classrooms).
17. Who is Ai Weiwei? [250-51]
a. Chinese artist, architectural designer, political activist & social commentator with a global
following; his satirical & direct criticism of the Chinese govt. has led to his detention &
harassment, which has tarnished China’s state in the eyes of Western observers.
18. How does China present its history selectively in the National Museum of Beijing? [252]
a. There are gaps in PRC history from 1956-64 and 1964 to 1976 when Mao wrought havoc on the
nation. (Up to 30 million people died during the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) and the country
suffered chaos & educational disruptions during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).
19. How do Chinese tourists leave their mark on the world? [255-61]
a. 20 Million Chinese tourists traveled abroad in 2011.
b. 60% of Chinese earning $1.6 million or more have begun or are planning to emigrate.
c. SHOPPING!!! Luxury goods, shoes, handbags, jewelry.
d. Real estate acquisitions (homes, apartments & vineyards)
i. Chinese banks invested $1B in NY real estate in 2010.
e. Chinese authorities launched a campaign to educate tourists.
20. What claims do Chinese officials, scholars, and citizens make about foreign (especially Western)
misunderstandings of China? [262-65]
a. Foreigners do not respect “China’s national conditions” or “Chinese characteristics”
b. Lack of respect for China’s way of doing things.
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i. EX. Tibet & Dalai Lama
c. Shambaugh argues that “to not agree with Chinese official policy or to be critical of it is seen as
misunderstanding China.
d. Chinese Communist spokesman: “China is seen as ‘communist’ or ‘authoritarian’ or a ‘police
state’ or assister of ‘rogue states’… Causes of Western misunderstanding of China…
e. Vice Foreign Minister Mme Fu Ying (diplomat): “The West is too arrogant and must stop
lecturing us and trying to change China. Unless you can accept China as it is, there is no basis for
a relationship.”
f. Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu of the PLA’s National Defense University wrote a book entitled China
Dream to identify American myths about China propagated in the West:
i. “China rise” theory, “China collapse” theory, “China threat” theory, “China responsibility”
theory.
21. How does Shambaugh analyze Western media portrayals of China having lived there & studied China for
years? [266]
a. Western media representations of China are quite accurate, if often critical.
b. But in Chinese culture & official thinking, criticism equals misunderstanding, and agreement
equals understanding.
c. In Chinese society and culture, to be criticized publicly is one of the worst things that can happen
to anyone, as the person loses face.
d. Imprisoning high-profile dissidents & artists such as Liu Xiabo (Nobel Peace Prize, 2010) and Ai
Weiwei hardly helps China’s international image.
22. What confusion did Joseph Nye observe in Chinese policies? [266-67]
a. “What China seems not to appreciate is that using culture and narrative to create soft power is not
easy when they are inconsistent with domestic realities.”
b. Soft power is also not something that can be bought with money or built with investment.
c. It is earned.
23. What advice did Shambaugh give the State Council Information Office (SCIO) Minister Wang Chen?
[267]
a. “Just get the government out of your own people’s way. China has an enormously talented
society—just let it speak for itself.”
b. Minister Wang’s job involves repressing & channeling China’s creative sectors, while showcasing
them, too.
VII.
Chapter 7 – China’s Global Security Presence (Hard Power Assessed)
1. What is the “traditional” form of establishing power, which China has eschewed (avoided) thus far? [269]
a. Establishing alliances, acquiring bases & dispatching troops abroad, building global power
projection capabilities, sailing its navy around the world, coercing others or fighting in conflicts
directly or via surrogates (proxy wars).
2. How is China a regional military power & a partial power in the military/ strategic realm? [269-70]
a. Its military is deployed on its own sovereign territory, its Asian maritime littoral.
b. It has no foreign bases or troops stationed abroad.
c. Naval forces have limited deployment capacity beyond China’s “near seas”
d. It has no global power-projection capabilities other than cyber warfare, its space program &
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
3. When does China deploy its forces abroad, thus contributing to global governance? [270-71]
a. Chinese troops contribute to UN Peacekeeping Operations providing international security.
4. What factors could contribute to transforming China’s military power? [270]
a. China’s international commercial presence & energy needs are redefining the nation’s security
interests.
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b. Domestic voices, including the People’s Liberation Army, urge China to act like a big power &
become more assertive in protecting its interests abroad.
c. PLA Navy is beginning to sail outside its immediate littoral waters into the Western Pacific,
Indian Ocean & beyond. EX. Counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia.
5. How are Chinese officials attempting to “learn” from the collapse of the USSR? [274]
a. To limit state spending on military expenses & a distortion of the national economy toward the
military industrial complex, which contributed to the collapse of the USSR.
b. World’s 2nd largest defense budget in 2012 = $106B or 1.4% of GDP or 8.5% of state spending.
6. What factors have been catalysts in China’s drive to modernize its military power? [275-77]
a. 1979 humiliation when it invaded Vietnam and suffered 42,000 casualties in one month of
warfare.
b. 1991 Gulf War demonstrated American ability to project hard power with ground forces.
c. 1995+1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis to intimidate Taiwanese independence movement by
launching ballistic missiles into the nearby sea prompted the US to deploy two aircraft carrier
battle groups to the region in response.
d. 1999 NATO’s sustained air assault on Serbian targets
e. 2001 US & multinational forces prosecuted counterinsurgency operations in Iraq & Afghanistan
using special operations forces, unmanned aerial drones, etc.
f. Objective of being able to launch an amphibious assault on Taiwan & control airspace over the
island, while deterring American intervention in any potential conflict with Taiwan.
g. Desire to obtain comprehensive power.
h. Border security with 14 countries & 18,000km coastline.
7. What historic border conflicts engaged Chinese armed forces? [278]
a. Korea (1950-53)
b. Taiwan (1955, 1958)
c. India (1960-62)
d. Soviet Union (1969)
8. What did the US Pentagon assess the Chinese military capability in its 2010 report to Congress? [281]
a. “…China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance today remains limited.”
9. What is the size of China’s military? [284]
a. Total = 2.3 million troops, which includes 1.6 million ground forces
b. 600,000 additional reservists
c. 1 million paramilitary People’s Armed Police (Gendarmes)
d. nationwide militias = tens of millions.
10. Draw an annotated map (croquis) entitled “Chinese Naval Capability in the Pacific: 2013 and Beyond” to
represent three stages of Chinese naval expansion to project its power:
a. First Stage: 200 nautical miles from shore encompassing the Kurile Islands, the Senkaku Islands,
Taiwan and some of the South China sea.
b. Second Stage: 700 nautical miles & beyond encompassing all of the South China Sea down to
Indonesia & East Timor.
c. Third Stage (future): naval range will extend to Guam, Australia, and New Zealand & Western
Pacific
d. Fourth Stage (future): naval operations anywhere in the Pacific Ocean.
e. Fifth Stage (future): capability of operation in any sea or ocean worldwide.
11. What is China’s “Malacca dilemma,” as it was described by Hu Jintao? [291]
a. Potential for oil supplies, of which 40% comes to China by sea, to be disrupted at this key
strategic chokepoint in a time of conflict.
12. Why was the launch of an aircraft carrier in August 2011 so important? [292]
a. Assistant chief of the General Staff said, “All of the great nations in the world own aircraft
carriers—they are symbols of a great nation.”
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b. Another asset that could enable China to project its power globally.
13. What does the Chinese navy still lack en route to projecting comprehensive global military power? [293]
a. Access to neutral ports and airfields, naval bases on foreign soil, prepositioned equipment, long
logistics supply chains & communications, underway replenishment, extended deployments,
access to medical facilities & care, satellite communications, supply ships, and long-range air
replenishment supply.
14. In what domains does China possess global military capabilities? [294-98]
a. Missile Forces:
i. Indigenous missile development since Soviet Premier Khrushchev suspended support for
Chinese atomic weapons development in 1959.
ii. Today it possesses a large & diversified inventory of deployed ballistic missiles (1,370)
iii. Most in range of Taiwan, but many can reach locations in the continental US.
iv. 400-600 nuclear warheads.
v. Legitimate second-strike nuclear deterrant.
vi. 3rd largest missile force in the world (after the US & Russia)
b. Space Capabilities:
i. Sent humans into space orbit (2003) – taikonauts.
ii. 2011 – launched an orbiting space station.
iii. Has launched missiles to destroy space-based satellites.
iv. US DOD: “China is developing the ability to attack an adversary’s space assets,
accelerating the militarization of space.” (2010)
c. Cyber Forces:
i. Perpetrates cyber attacks on US corporations (corporate espionage) & US government
agencies.
ii. 90,000 attempted attacks on DOD computer systems in 2009 alone.
iii. Offensive information warfare = attacks on other nations’ critical military, intelligence,
government, infrastructural, and commercial infrastructure.
iv. Defensive information warfare = aimed at protecting China’s own military and
governmental computer systems, as well as critical infrastructure, commercial espionage,
in which foreign companies’ computer systems are penetrated and technologies and other
trade secrets stolen; computer hacking to penetrate, without disabling, other nations’
critical computer systems, penetration of private individual computers and financial
accounts.
v. 2010 – Google announced that Gmail had been hacked, its was no longer going to put up
with censorship of the China portal Google.cn, and was going to cease operations in
mainland China. In a compromise, limited mainland operations continued.
vi. China’s cyber warriors have certainly “gone global.”
15. What is China’s contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations? [298-99]
a. 17,390 military personnel in 19 missions.
b. Primarily in Africa
c. Definite “Net plus” for the UN, China & recipient countries.
d. Most tangible Chinese contribution to global governance.
16. What prediction does the author make for 2020? [306]
a. By 2020 China will advance to possess the second most comprehensively capable military in the
world after the US.
b. It will remain far behind the capabilities of the US
c. It will pull ahead of Russia, the UK, Japan, Germany, and France in term of military spending &
capabilities
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VIII.
Chapter 8 – Coping with a Globalized China (Prescriptions)
1. How has China dealt with foreigners since 1911? [308]
a. Since 1839, the Western world, followed by Japan, entered China, forcefully “opening” the
country to international commerce and religion.
i. Chinese communists call the period from 1793-1949 a period of “shame and humiliation”
ii. 1911 – Qing Dynasty disintegrated.
iii. 1912 – republican constitutional government did little to reverse foreign influence.
iv. Period of Chinese subjugation, which Mao called “semicolonialism” gave rise to modern
Chinese nationalism in the aftermath of the May 4th, Movement of 1919 leading ultimately
to the Communist victory in 1949.
b. PRC (1949-1978) – the world turned its back on China & China turned its back on the world
during the cold war slipping the country into insularity & autarky.
c. 1978 to today: Deng Xiaoping inaugurated policies of “reform and opening” leading to China’s
integration into the international system of trade, diplomacy, capital flows, etc.
d. Shambaugh argues that this remains a limited integration, because China is particularly
ambivalent about the international rules & norms largely set by the West after 1945. Beijing is not
comfortable with this “liberal international order”
2. If China is indeed a “partial power” and “not about to rule the world” to cite the author, then what risks do
he and Joseph Nye foresee, nonetheless? [311]
a. To quote Nye: “The greatest danger we have is overestimating China and China overestimating
itself. China is nowhere close to the US. So this magnification of China, which creates fear in the
US and hubris in China, is the biggest danger we face.”
3. What strategy did President Nixon advocate in 1967? [313-14]
a. “We simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its
fantasies, cherish its hates, and threaten its neighbors… to live in angry isolation.”
b. This perspective spurred Nixon to open America’s relations with the PRC in 1971-72.
4. Does the author endorse “containment” of China to resurrect cold war policy? [315]
a. No, he argues China could not be contained because it is already integrated in the international
system & no country would go along with a containment strategy.
5. What is his prescription for future action? [314]
a. He claims there is no alternative but to continue to engage China & integrate it into the
institutions, rules, laws, and norms of the international community.
6. What does Fareed Zakaria predict will complicate this approach in the future? [317]
a. He claims that “China’s rise will reinforce Chinese nationalism and a sense of uniqueness, and
actually make the country less likely to easily integrate into the global system.”
7. Ultimately, what are China’s objectives? [317]
a. Shambaugh: “More than anything, China wants to be prosperous, secure, respected, and left alone
in its own geocultural orbit. This has been its core national mission since the 1870s.”
b. Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying declared: “We don’t view ourselves as a superpower. You are not
going to see a culturally nourished country with a big population, being more content, being
happy, being purposeful—and it will be a friend to the world. There is no reason to worry about
China.”
8. Which view do you find most persuasive or credible?
a. Short essay to be assigned as an introductory assignment for Theme 3 – Chapter 2.
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