Chapter 24—Part III
The U. S. initially remained neutral, i.e., technically allied with neither side.
•
1914—Allied Victories
•
1915—Allied Reversals
•
1916—Stalemate
•
1917—U. S. Entry into the War on April
6, 1917
The rise of Paul von
Hindenburg (left) and
Erich Ludendorff (right) to direct the German war effort made a monumental difference. For the remainder of the war, these two men guided the
German war effort and, if not for the eventual participation of the
American Expeditionary
Force, might well have succeeded in bringing the
Kaiser victory.
For the first three years of the conflict,
Uncle Sam remained relatively detached, observing the family conflict amongst cousins (the monarchs of England,
Germany, and Russia shared common ties of blood). On April 6, 1917, President
Wilson asked Congress for a Declaration of War and received his request with only six senators and fifty members of the
House opposing it.
General John “Black Jack” Pershing chats with French
Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch and British Field Marshal
Douglas Haig after the arrival of the American
Expeditionary Force in France. Pershing resisted Foch’s efforts to use American troops as replacements for the fallen Allied forces. In so doing, he preserved the identity of
American soldiers. Between volunteers and draftees, 24.2 million men entered the U.S. armed forces.
REASONS OF SELF-INTEREST — The
"Realists“** 23A-2
• Vindicate the cause of democracy through a crushing victory—realists like Theodore Roosevelt were dismayed over the lack of fighting spirit in the U. S.
•
Think in terms of using war to gain position for the next war (i.e., they didn't think in terms of a "War to End All
Wars" but rather a war to make the world safe for ourselves)
•
Technological advances made isolation untenable
REASONS OF SELF-
INTEREST**
Continued
Wilson was aware that U. S. prosperity depended on movement of surplus products into the mainstream of foreign commerce—this found expression in U. S. concern over "freedom of the seas," challenged by Germany and thus endangering U. S. capitalism
•
Under international law, neutral countries could trade non-military goods with all belligerents
• Britain blockaded German ports stopping shipments of foodstuffs and most raw materials
•
The U.S. economy boomed due to sales and loans to the Allies
•
German submarine warfare violated the principle of “freedom of the seas
REASONS OF SELF-
INTEREST**
Continued
Intervention was necessary in the national interests, i.e., for self-preservation
• British naval supremacy and the Atlantic community were vital to U. S. security
•
A German victory was tantamount to invasions of North and South America
• Isolationism was made obsolete by unrestricted submarine war—military preparedness was the solution
•
Idealism was equated with stupidity by the realists
• Withdrawal of Russia from the war, tipping balance in favor of Central Powers
Lenin actually returned to
Russia courtesy of
Hindenburg and Ludendorff who sent him home in an armored train car through neutral Sweden to the
Finnish-Russian border.
They sent him into Russia just as they would send poison gas against enemy soldiers. Their ploy succeeded. Once in power,
Lenin’s program of “Peace,
Land, and Bread” led to
Russian withdrawal from the war through the treaty of
Brest-Litovsk.
REASONS OF SELF-
INTEREST**
Continued
Senator George Norris believed that they U. S. went to war on the command of gold, i.e.:
• The money which she had loaned to the Allies was considerable and an Allied victory would ensure its repayment
•
Munitions makers made money off the war, all the more so if the U. S. was drawn into the fight
• In this regard, war “violated the very spirit of progressive reform.”
George Norris (1861-1944) served as a Republican
Senator from Nebraska from 1913-1943. Trained as an attorney, Norris not only served as a legislator but practiced law and held positions as county attorney and district judge.
Idealism—the belief in the linear development of history in a progressive direction toward a world without war, and with harmony, abundance, and happiness—was a strong current in 19th century U. S. thought. Many cast the explanation in terms of "misguided idealism."
• To make the world safe for democracy, rights of man, future peace, world security. Wilson viewed U. S. participation in the war as an opportunity to reform the world order into a liberal-capitalist-democratic system.
It took on the dimensions of a holy purpose.
•
The U. S. entered the war not out for profit but as God's chosen vessel; He made America strong so she could achieve selfless aims in a spirit of sacrifice, a rather selfflattering approach.
•
This was a "War to End All Wars" and enforce disarmament
•
The war was conceived as a struggle of good vs. evil
–
Autocracy vs. democracy
– Imperialism vs. self-determination
– Militarism vs. disarmament
Germany came to represent an obstacle in the way to peace, all things evil and immoral, a threat to civilization; the Kaiser a symbol of autocracy and militarism.
•
Wilson stood on principle for rule of law, international justice, the rights of man
•
Wilson saw the League of Nations as an independent force in the world capable of overriding old animosities, conflicts as a rallying point of world opinion.
•
N. Gordon Levin's notion of U. S. liberal exceptionalism
Professor N. Gordon Levin argued that the U. S. was unfettered by feudal traditions, power politics, and hence the obvious leader of a new world order based on U. S. values of free trade, liberalism, rule of international law, human rights—Germany threatened the hope for universal democracy.
N. Gordon Levin
Levin argues that Wilson acted to serve man with a combination of liberal antiimperialism and missionary nationalism—he equated universal human rights with the U. S. value system. He envisaged a worldwide
Liberal-Capitalist system with political liberalism, social mobility, constitutional government, capitalist production.
Debate on Whether the
U. S. Should Have
Entered the War 23A-3
#1—U. S. was pulled into the war thanks to slick
British propaganda** (for which there was no
German counterpart) stressing ties of heritage and history as well as German atrocities
• Common cultural ties and heritage
•
Resolution of Anglo-American differences
• Institutional similarities
•
Popular ideas about race, i.e., Anglo-Saxon superiority
• Common laissez-faire or Smithian economy
• Exit of Queen Victoria and Lord Salisbury
Queen Victoria (left) and Lord Salisbury (right) were symbolic of the old aristocratic order and the entrance of politicians like Joseph Chamberlain and
David Lloyd George with common origins.
Edward
VII—King in
Name
The British portrayed the Germans as barbaric invaders, using submarines and poison gas, and fighting in
Allied territory); the U.
S. was trapped into intervention through
British cleverness—it was a battle between
British shrewdness and
American naiveté, idealism. The British capitalized on the notions cited above.
#2—The Pro-British
Attitudes of Wilson,
Ambassador Page,
Colonel House**
Wilson with friend and adviser, Colonel Edward
M. House (right) and
English King George V
(lower right). As a student of political science, Wilson was a longtime admirer of the British parliamentary system. He had great respect for the leaders of the British Liberal Party.
In assessing the gravity of the
European conflict, he observed, “Everything I love most in the world is at stake.”
Moreover, “at the deepest level, a majority in the country, bound by common language and institutions, sympathized with the Allies and blamed Germany for the war. Like Wilson, many
Americans admired English literature, customs, and law. . .
. [Germany] seemed arrogant and militaristic .”
Debate on Whether the
U. S. Should Have
Entered the War**
Continued
• The U. S. Press created the illusion that the
British fought for the rights of small, weak nations against ruthless bullies aspiring to world domination
•
Submarine warfare was an attempt to save starving people, i.e., those hurt by the blockade,
and end the war quickly
•
The "Devil Theory of War" posited that the U.
S. was unwittingly drawn into the war economically until suddenly she had a stake in the outcome; the choice was between entering the war or an economic explosion at home
The “Revisionist”**
Argument—The
American View After the War
•
Intervention was an avoidable mistake
• Germany was no more responsible for the war than others
•
Wilson was a gullible super villain
The Revisionists expressed a post-war disillusionment when the liberal-capitalist-democratic "millennium" failed to follow the war. Their interpretation dominated most of the inter-war period until 1938-1939.
Debate on Whether the
U. S. Should Have
Entered the War
Continued
•
House believed if Germany won it would deprive the U. S. of moral leadership so he cast the struggle in terms of democracy vs. autocracy
•
Statesmen like Lansing saw America's public indignation as a tool to end
• isolationism
Secretary of
There is no such thing as a "just war"
•
The Versailles Treaty was unjust
• Such a policy conformed to traditional avoidance of foreign entanglements
• Given America’s “Melting Pot”— an ethnic and national mix from peoples on both sides of the conflict, neutrality seemed the wisest course to take
Wilson’s campaign slogan, “He
Kept Us Out of War,” reflected
American enduring sentiment favoring neutrality in the year.
Wilson’s opponents attacked him from both directions.
“Preparedness” advocates like
Theodore Roosevelt charged him with cowardice; pacifists assailed his efforts to prepare America militarily. Republican candidate
Charles Evans Hughes (right) campaigned for a tougher line taken against Germany. Roosevelt found Hughes little better than
Wilson, alleging that he was a
“bearded iceberg” who lacked dynamism and wavered on the critical issues. 23B
Candidate Popular Vote
Wilson (D) 91. million
Hughes (R) 8.5 million
Recently enfranchised women voted heavily for Wilson.
Hughes’ success in the East gave the impression on election night that the Republicans had gained the White House.
Wilson was surprised the following morning that he had swept the West and won.
Some newspapers called the election wrong.
#1—The Sinking of the
Lusitania—May 7, 1915**
23A-1
German Ambassador to the U.S., Count Christian von Bernstorff vilified in wartime propaganda
New York Times headline announcing the sinking of the Lusitania by German Unterseeboot U-20. Wilson sharply warned the Germans to cease from such future “deliberately unfriendly” actions. Nevertheless, in August 1915, a German U-Boat sank the British passenger liner Arabic.
When President
Wilson issued a series of diplomatic notes demanding
Germany to change its submarine warfare policies,**
Wilson’s pacifist
Secretary of State,
William Jennings
Bryan, resigned.
23B
England blockaded the
German fleet and cut off trade; in response, Germany made Uboat attacks on shipping without warning the targets in advance (a violation of international law). On May 15,
1915 the German government published the warning to the right in the New York World.
Less than a week later, it made good on its promise that travelers sailing in war zones did “so at their own risk.” At issue was the “right of
Americans to sail on ships of belligerent nations.”
May 7, 1915—a German
U-boat U-20 sank the
Lusitania, a British passenger ship; 128
Americans died, including millionaire Cornelius
Vanderbilt (upper left) and popular writer Elbert
Hubbard (lower left). The boat sank in 18 minutes.
Wilson demanded cessation of U-boat attacks and W. J. Bryan resigned.
Not wishing to pull the U.
S. into war, Germany suspended her unannounced attacks.
German U-boat Deutschland (left) with commander Captain Koening in
November 1916. In February 1917,
Germany informed Secretary of State,
Robert Lansing (right) that it would sink on sight all boats in waters around
England and France.
Lansing--a lawyer and counselor in the U.S. State
Department--had replaced
Bryan. Subsequently,
Wilson severed relations with Germany.
March 1917—The
Zimmerman Telegram
This was a secret message from German
Foreign Secretary
Arthur Zimmerman
(left) to German envoy in Mexico. In exchange for Mexican support,
Germany promised to restore to them New
Mexico, Texas, and
Arizona. The British publicized the note to draw the U. S. into the war.
#2—The
Zimmerman
Note**
When Wilson divulged the contents of the Zimmerman
Telegram, a wave of indignation swept the country. This information, compounded by the fact that German U-boats sunk five U.S. ships between March 12-21 made American entry into the war inevitable.
When Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war on
April 2, 1917, he somberly observed: “It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts,--for democracy, . . . for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal domination of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.” On
April 6th, Congress declared war.
#1—Mobilization 23C
•
The U.S. Army was far from prepared for war in 1917**
• Selective Service Act of May 1917
– Wilson believed conscription to be both efficient and democratic
– Some 24.2 million men registered for the draft
– Of those, 2.8 million were inducted into the military service
•
The first American soldiers reached France in June 1917
• American soldiers saw their first action at the
Battle of the Marne,
March 1918
•
They blocked the
German advance at
Chateau-Thierry (right)
Second Battle of the
Marne
U.S. Marines held their ground at the Belleau
Wood, June 6-25, 1918
Country singer
Garth Brooks’
Belleau Wood plays fast and loose with historical fact.
American and French soldiers drove the German army from St. Mihiel,
September 12, 1918
“Victory at the front depended on economic and emotional mobilization at home. . . . Wilson moved quickly in 1917 and 1918 to organize war production and distribution. An idealist who knew how to sway public opinion, he also recognized the need to enlist American emotions. To him, the war for people’s minds, the ‘conquest of their convictions,’ was as vital as events on the battlefield.”
•
Committee on Public Information
Committee on Public
Information
• Espionage Act of 1917**—imposed sentences of up to 20 years for aiding the enemy, obstructing recruitment of soldiers, or aiding the enemy
•
Trading-with-the-Enemy Act of 1917—Authorized government censorship of foreign language press
• Sedition Act of 1918—imposed harsh penalties for using “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language” about the government, flag, or armed forces uniforms
Headed by George Creel (left), the
CPI publicized the war. Through use of the film industry, Americans saw Germans depicted as bloodthirsty Huns with plans for world conquest. The campaign went so far as re-naming traditional
German items like sauerkraut
(which became “liberty cabbage”).
The propaganda campaign was quite successful in spawning anti-
German sentiment throughout the country. Citizens gave lectures and encouraged the purchase of Liberty
Bonds. Even the president himself encouraged repression and promote unity by force. RQ24
One editor of the period observed, “We must make the world safe for democracy even if we have to
‘bean’ the Goddess of liberty to do it.” The government took advantage of these wartime sentiments to launch a frontal assault on American socialism, not to mention dispatching some 15,000
American troops to overturn the Bolshevik
Revolution in Russia after Lenin orchestrated
Russian withdrawal from the Allied war effort. The president authorized an economic blockade against
Russia and refused to recognize Lenin’s Bolshevik government. In doing all these things, Wilson and the government helped to promote the “Red Scare” that arose after the war.
Set up in 1917 by Wilson to increase production and control limited resources (rationing). The board’s tasks included:
•
Oversight of production in all American factories
•
Determination of production priorities
•
Allocation of raw materials
•
Set output quotas for steel
•
Fixing of prices
Bernard Baruch (left) served as director of the
War Industries Board.
“Working closely with business,
Baruch for a time, acted as the dictator of the American economy. .
. . As never before, the government intervened in American life. . . . The partnership between government and business grew closer. As government expanded, business expanded as well, responding to wartime contracts.”
National War Labor
Board 23C-3
•
Created April 1918 to prevent strikes during the war
•
Sided with management some, but more often with workers
•
The war brought organized labor into partnership with government
Working man—work conditions improved**
•
8 hour work day established in some industries
•
Set standards of employment for women, children
•
Demanded fair wages for workers
Felix Frankfurter (right) headed the War Labor
Relations Board
“ Hoping to encourage production and avoid strikes, Wilson adopted many of the objectives of the social-justice reformers.
”
•
Standardized wages and hours
•
Protected the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively
•
Ordered equal pay for equal work by women in the war industries
The draft created a shortage of male labor in industry. Both
African-American and Mexican-American workers stepped in to fill the gap. The former, who resided largely in the South, embarked upon a major northern exodus. There, they found jobs and made new homes.
•
Women stepped into traditional male work roles
•
Minorities—benefited from shortage of white male workers; shift of Black
Americans to North for employment opportunities
•
Meatless and breadless days
• planting “victory gardens” in backyards
Committee for
Public Information
23C-4
•
Citizen lecturers gave pro-war speeches
•
Encouraged Americans to buy Liberty
Bonds
“Like most wars, World War I affected patterns at home as much as abroad. Business profits grew, factories expanded, and industries turned out huge amounts of war goods. Government authority swelled, and people came to expect different things of their government. Labor made some gains, as did women and blacks. Society assimilated some of the shifts, but social and economic tensions grew, and when the war ended, they spilled over in the strikes and violence of the Red
Scare that followed.”
Chapter 24—Part IV
”The Allies won the war but lost the peace.”
This saying captures the essence of the failings of the Treaty of Versailles which, rather than bringing to consummation the
“war to end all wars,” merely initiated the
“long armistice” (1919-1939). It has often been cast in terms of the failure of American idealism to prevail over hardheaded
European nationalism.
Making Peace: The
Treaty of
Versailles 23D-1
Armistice and Ending the War
•
Armistice—a truce or cessation of hostilities; it was signed November 11, 1918 at 11 p.m.
•
The last comparable meeting was in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna
Opening of the Paris
Peace Conference,
January 18, 1919
The Major Players and Their Respective Aims
The So-Called Big Four of the Versailles Peace Conference
• Wilson was the acknowledged leader of the conference, imbued with a capacity to interpret the aspirations of the peoples of Europe. He thrust the U. S. into the moral leadership of the world, making America the symbol of hope to the people of Europe.
• Wilson envisioned a “Peace Without Victory”
• Wilson’s 14 points—the key ideas of his
“liberal” peace play
Underlying Principles of
Wilson’s Fourteen Points**
23D
• No secret treaties—“public diplomacy” (the
Versailles Conference itself violated this principle, its treaty terms negotiated in secret)
•
Limitations of national armaments
•
Principle of self-determination followed for all national groups (not universally followed by the terms of Versailles)
• Establishment of a League of Nations (the only one of these 4 which seemed achievable)
Announced before Congress on January 8, 19188,
Wilson’s far-reaching, non-punitive terms “were generous and farsighted, but they failed to satisfy wartime emotions that sought vindication. England and France distrusted Wilsonian idealism as the basis for peace. They wanted Germany disarmed and crippled; they wanted its colonies; and they were skeptical of the principle of self-determination.” While
Wilson’s European counterparts were far from cooperative, he proved a clever negotiator, trading small concessions for his major objectives: selfdetermination, a reduction of international tensions, and the establishment of a League of Nations.
He desired a fairly moderate peace but had just won an election based on promises of a harsh peace
The working chairman of the conference—he hated the
Germans and his foremost aim was to weaken them in every way. He felt revenge was just.
He played a minor role in comparison to his foreign minister Sidney
Sonnino; they were determined to hold the
Allies to the promises they made to Italy in
1915
1860-1952
Sonnino
Those Excluded: neither the Central
Powers nor Russia were represented at the conference.
Germany had no voice in the peacemaking process
(contrast to France at the Congress of
Vienna in 1815)**
No one seemed to know how to establish a lasting peace, even though it was desired
External Problems :
• Many secret treaties were made by the Allies—this violated the basis for Wilson’s proposed peace
•
Many foreign and domestic disturbances came in the wake of the war’s end. Indeed, statesmen hurried to convene the conference because of the threat of
Bolshevism, and numerous disturbances took place while the conference was in session
•
The clamor in Allied countries for a speedy settlement and return to everyday life. There was a general and popular assumption that peace making was easy.
When wars end, people want to stop worrying, to celebrate
•
The general physical and nervous strain under which the delegates labored
Internal Problems— questions on which the
Allies did not see eye-toeye
• Germany’s colonies
•
The Rhineland
•
Reparations
The issue here was how to make good the damage done to the civilian populations of the Allies. To justify a large penalty imposed for even pensions to victims of war and allowances to their families, “War Guilt” was placed on
Germany for her aggression in starting the war. In the final analysis, the Allies imposed both responsibility for the war and crippling reparations that came to a whopping
$33 million.
Wilson urged “peace without victory” and the rejection of reparations.
•
Fiume Crisis
•
Shantung
Issue
•
Treaty signed June 28, 1919
–
Intended as an ironic twist, this was five years to the day from the assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand. It was a settlement dictated to the vanquished, the Germans
•
Imposition of territorial, military, and economic restrictions
–
Territory Germany lost:
•
A third of her pre-war territory
•
15% of her coal
•
Almost 50% of her iron
•
19% of her iron and steel industries
•
She gave up her colonies
•
She recognized the independence of
Austria
Many Allied powers wished to punish Germany and prevent it from becoming a world power again.
• Reduced its army to 100,000 volunteers
•
Limited its navy to 6 battleships of 10,000 tons and a few smaller ships
•
Agreed to have no offensive weapons (e.g., submarines, aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery)
•
Dissolved its General Staff
•
Submitted to the supervision of an Allied
Military Control Commission to monitor those provisions
• Had to pay reparations with no exact amount set
(a Reparations Commission was to decide; in the meantime, Germany was to pay $5 billion in cash or kind)
•
France received large amounts of coal to compensate for the wanton destruction of her mines
• England received ships to compensate for losses of over 5,000 ships to submarine warfare
•
Most German rivers were internationalized
•
German foreign assets of $7 billion were confiscated
•
Many German patents were seized
•
Germany was prohibited from raising her tariffs above the pre-war level
Finally, there was the call for punishment of war criminals including the Kaiser
•
Nations struggle to overcome the effects of war
• The defeated countries smart over
– The harshness of the treaty terms
– The violation of several of the 14 Points
– The fact that the principle of self-determination was ignored in many Slavic areas creating new nations with large alien populations (mostly Germans or
Hungarians which would be vindictively answered by
Adolf Hitler)
•
Establishment of democratic governments
Establishment of
Democratic Governments
•
Unfortunately, this was associated with the defeat in war (i.e., Germany, Austria, Hungary,
Turkey)
• In the tense, tumultuous postwar atmosphere, democracy did not consolidate or function wellInexperienced parliamentary governments in Eastern and Central Europe could not handle arising problems
• In their place arose a new kind of dictatorial, totalitarian regime better suited to cope with the emergencies of world crisis
•
The victors
•
The vanquished
•
Russia, i.e., the
Bolsheviks
Wilson envisioned the
League as a world conscience, an organized moral force**—a parliament of nations in which international problems could be discussed and solved (shades of the
Concert of Europe of 1815)
Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations— required member nations to protect one another against aggression, to guarantee mutual independence and territorial integrity.
Americans like Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge feared this would entangle the U.
S. in war **
•
Promote international cooperation
•
Achieve international peace and security
•
It was founded on the concept that collective security with peace maintained by the community of nations rather than a
“balance of power
•
Specific Goals:
• International disarmament
–
In this, the League failed. Verification of disarmament violations (e.g., Iraq after the Gulf War) were difficult to prove; secret treaties were made; it was hard to find a valid basis for determining the military power of a nation
•
Arbitration of international disputes
– Provision for the League Council were vague and necessitated unanimous approval. It was effective for settling disputes among the smaller powers, but when big power interests collided, the League proved quite powerless
•
Sanctions against aggression
– To be effective, these sanctions needed the approval of all the big powers (and not all were members of the
League). The League had not military troops to put teeth into its actions. Military sanctions were left to the discretion of each individuals member.
• Treaty revision
– Article 18 was intended to prevent secret diplomacy;
Article 19 allowed for changes in treaties once the hatred of war cooled. . . but the powers did not use this opportunity fully
Several big, important nations were not members
•
Germany entered in 1926
• USSR entered in 1934
• USA never entered due to strong isolationist sentiment in postwar America—an “America for Americans” sentiment
–
The US failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles
– In its absence, the League was dominated by the
European victors without an impartial arbiter which the US could have been
The big powers would not act selflessly except in fields that did not effect their national interests
•
It improved the standard of colonial administration
•
It raised the status of workers everywhere by an international labor organization
•
Its concern with matters of health
•
Its concern with illicit drug traffic
•
Its concern with the international arms trade
Many of these important institutions were precursors of United
Nations organizations for which they set important precedents.
•
Allowed for withdrawal from the League
•
Recognition of the importance of the
Monroe Doctrine in the Western hemisphere
• The division of the spoils of war and creation of new nations created new minorities, cf., Finland,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary
• Wilson’s position was weakened by:
–
The mid-term election of a Republican
Congress in 1918**
– Wilson had neglected to include any major
Republicans in the American delegation he took to Paris; this impolitic exclusion came back to haunt him after the 1918 election**
Wilson arrived in Europe almost a messianic figure.
“Never before had such crowds acclaimed a democratic political figure.” Understandably, “Wilson was sure that the poeple of Europe shared his goals and would force their leaders to accept his peace.” When Lodge (below) and others obstructed treaty ratification, Wilson took his case directly to the American people. In September 1919, he set out on an aggressive speaking campaign to muster grass roots support. In Pueblo, Colorado, after making perhaps the most effective speech of his tour, he fell ill.
Upon his return to Washington, he collapsed on the
White House floor, the victim of a stroke. He remained at least partially incapacitated for the duration of his presidency, leaving himself open to the charge that his wife, Edith Bolling Wilson, was actually running the country.
• Wilson’s faux pas contributed to the
Congressional rejection of American participation in the
League of Nations, that aspect of
Wilson’s 14 Points that the president felt most important
Wilson’s omission of powerful
Republican Senator, Henry
Cabot Lodge (left) from
Massachusetts proved fatal for treaty ratification. Lodge shortly became head of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and did much to block passage of the treaty in the Senate.
League Appeared to be a
Threat to American
Sovereignty
Where Opinion
Divided
William E. Borah
(left—R-Idaho) was a key figure in the
Irreconcilables,”** a group that opposed
U.S. entry into the
League under any circumstances.
Frank B. Kellogg (right) from Minnesota was the leader of the “Mild
Reservationists,” a group of
12 that accepted the
Versailles Treaty with a few modest reservations. Lodge
(above) headed a group of 23
“Strong Reservationists.” He used his Senatorial power to drag out the debate over ratification and in the end, on November 9, the Senate voted down the treaty by 39 to 55.
Ernest Hemingway—
Hemingway’s Farewell to
Arms was a book that revealed the underside of war.
John Dos
Pasos published
Three
Soldiers in 1921.
Laurence
Stallings and
Maxwell
Anderson (right) produced the movie What Price
Glory? in 1924.
Collectively, the works produced by these authors showed was “as waste, horror, and death
“After 1919, there was disillusionment.
Would War I was feared before it started, popular while it lasted, and hated when it ended. To a whole generation that followed, it appeared futile, killing without cause, sacrificing without benefit.”
By participating in the Peace
Conference at Versailles, the
United States began a tentative effort to assume leadership in world affairs
(left). Versailles (above right), in contrast to the
Congress of Vienna (above) in 1815 failed to establish a durable peace.
The fact that the
European delegates at
Versailles were bent on sating their thirst for revenge condemned the peace settlement to failure. It sewed the seeds that would ultimately germinate in a second and even more destructive conflict only two decades later
As a graduate student at Harvard
University, Henry Kissinger (b. 1923, right) wrote a doctoral dissertation
(subsequently turned into the book, A
World Restored, left) that examined the
Congress of Vienna and why it proved so successful in preserving the general peace in Europe from 1815-1914. He argued that every party in a peace agreement
must have a stake in preserving the new status quo created by the treaty terms. If not, the nation or nations least satisfied with the resulting settlement will sooner or later act aggressively to overturn the newly established order. Kissinger served as Secretary of State under U.S. president
Richard Nixon.