treaties disad
1nc
Uruguay, Colorado, and Washington have created tension but the US is still in
compliance – creates momentum for reform in 2016
Lopez, 10/1/14 – writing fellow at Vox (German, “How much of the war on drugs is tied to
international treaties?” http://www.vox.com/cards/war-on-drugs-marijuana-cocaine-heroinmeth/war-on-drugs-international-treaties)
There is a lot of disagreement among drug policy experts, enforcers, and reformers about the stringency of the treaties. Several sections of the
conventions allow countries some flexibility so they don't violate their own constitutional protections. The US, for example, has never enforced
penalties on inciting illicit drug use on the basis that it would violate rights to freedom of speech. Many
argue that any move
toward legalization of use, possession, and sales is in violation of international treaties. Under this
argument, Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay are technically in violation of the treaties because they
legalized marijuana for personal possession and sales. Others say that countries have a lot of flexibility due to the
constitutional exemptions in the conventions. Countries could claim, for instance, that their protections for right to privacy
and health allow them to legalize drugs despite the conventions. When it comes to individual states in the US, the federal government
can also argue that America's federalist system allows states some flexibility as long as the
federal government keeps drugs illegal . "It's pretty clear that the war on drugs was waged for political reasons and some
countries have used the treaties as an excuse to pursue draconian policies," said Kasia Malinowska-Sempruch, director of the Open Society Global Drug
Policy Program. "Nevertheless, we've seen a number of countries drop criminal penalties for minor possession of all drugs. We've seen others put drugs
into a pharmaceutical model, including the prescription of heroin to people with serious addictions. This seems completely possible within the
treaties." Even if a country decided to dismantle prohibition and violate the treaties, it's unclear how the international community would respond. If
the US, for example, ended prohibition, there's little other countries could do to interfere; there's no international drug court, and sanctions would be
very unlikely for a country as powerful as America. Still, Martin Jelsma, an international drug policy expert at the Transnational Institute, argued that
ignoring or pulling out of the international drug conventions could seriously damage
America's standing around the world. "Pacta sunt servanda ('agreements must be kept') is the
most fundamental principle of international law and it would be very undermining if countries
start to take an 'a-la-carte' approach to treaties they have signed; they cannot simply comply
with some provisions and ignore others without losing the moral authority to ask other
countries to oblige to other treaties," Jelsma wrote in an email. "So our preference is to acknowledge
legal tensions with the treaties and try to resolve them." To resolve such issues, many critics of the
war on drugs hope to reform international drug laws in 2016 during the next General Assembly
Special Session on drugs. "There is tension with the tax-and-regulate approach to marijuana in
some jurisdictions," Malinowska-Sempruch said. "But it's all part of a process and that's why we hope the
UN debate in 2016 is as open as possible, so that we can settle some of these questions and, if necessary,
modernize the system."
unilateral treaty violation wrecks legitimacy of the entire system – their alt
causes are just link uq
Bewley-Taylor 3 (David R. Bewley-Taylor, “Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and possibilities”,
International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171-179, mjb)
Another strategy would be for
Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could
institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis
and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining
support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected
components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The
possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten
the stability of the entire treaty system . As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international
lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances
has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem
since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the
selective application of
such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions. D.R. BewleyTaylor / International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179 177 This ‘‘collective responsibility for global order’’
argument would of course be more persuasive were it not for the selective approach to
international law adopted by the United States of America. Washington’s withdrawal from the Kyoto
Treaty and repudiation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had already gone a long way to
threaten the treaty system before its recent announcement to ‘‘unsign’’ itself from the
convention to establish an International Criminal Court (Teather, 2002; Lewis, 2002). In facilitating this
unprecedented move the administration of George W. Bush seems to have asserted that the US is also no longer bound by the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. Under the 1969 Convention, a country that has signed a treaty cannot act to defeat the purpose of that treaty, even if it does not
intend to ratify it. Thus, having
set this precedent on the basis of national interest, Washington
that causes extinction
Dyer, 4 - London-based independent Canadian journalist, syndicated columnist and military
historian; PhD in military and Middle Eastern history at King's College London; was employed as
a senior lecturer in war studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (Gwynne, Toronto Star,
“The End of War” The Toronto Star, 12/30, lexis)
The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well
over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the
stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others,
and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India
grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out
of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century
without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war , but the potential certainly exists for a major
die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide.
It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system
that we have been building
since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than
one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history
will repeat itself and everybody loses. Our
hopes for mitigating the severity of the coming environmental crises also
depend on early and concerted global action of a sort that can only happen in a basically co-operative
international system. When the great powers are locked into a military confrontation, there is simply not enough spare attention, let alone
enough trust, to make deals on those issues, so the highest priority at the moment is to keep the multilateral
approach alive and avoid a drift back into alliance systems and arms races. And there is no point in
dreaming that we can leap straight into some never-land of universal brotherhood; we will have to confront these challenges and solve the problem of
war within the context of the existing state system. The solution to the state of international anarchy that compels every state to arm itself for war was
so obvious that it arose almost spontaneously in 1918. The wars by which independent states had always settled their quarrels in the past had grown so
monstrously destructive that some alternative system had to be devised, and that could only be a pooling of sovereignty, at least in matters concerning
war and peace, by all the states of the world. So the victors of World War I promptly created the League of Nations. But the solution was as difficult in
practice as it was simple in concept. Every member of the League of Nations understood that if the organization somehow acquired the ability to act in
a concerted and effective fashion, it could end up being used against them, so no major government was willing to give the League of Nations any real
power. Instead, they got World War II, and that war was so bad - by the end the first nuclear weapons had been used on cities - that the victors made a
second attempt in 1945 to create an international organization that really could prevent war. They literally changed international law and made war
illegal, but they were well aware that all of that history and all those reflexes were not going to vanish overnight. It would be depressing to catalogue
the many failures of the United Nations, but it would also be misleading. The implication would be that this was an enterprise that should have
succeeded from the start, and has failed irrevocably. On the contrary; it was bound to be a relative failure at the outset. It was always going to be very
hard to persuade sovereign governments to surrender power to an untried world authority which might then make decisions that went against their
particular interests. In the words of the traditional Irish directions to a lost traveller: "If that's where you want to get to, sir, I wouldn't start from here."
But here is where we must start from, for it is states that run the world. The present international system, based on heavily armed and jealously
independent states, often exaggerates the conflicts between the multitude of human communities in the world, but it does reflect an underlying
reality: We cannot all get all we want, and some method must exist to decide who gets what. That is why neighbouring states have lived in a perpetual
state of potential war, just as neighbouring hunter-gatherer bands did 20,000 years ago. If we now must abandon war as a method of settling our
disputes and devise an alternative, it only can be done with the full co-operation of the world's governments. That means it certainly will be a
monumentally difficult and lengthy task: Mistrust reigns everywhere and no nation will allow even the least of its interests to be decided upon by a
collection of foreigners. Even the majority of states that are more or less satisfied with their borders and their status in the world would face huge
internal opposition from nationalist elements to any transfer of sovereignty to the United Nations. The U.N. as presently constituted is certainly no
place for idealists, but they would feel even more uncomfortable in a United Nations that actually worked as was originally intended. It is an association
of poachers turned game-keepers, not an assembly of saints, and it would not make its decisions according to some impartial standard of justice. There
is no impartial concept of justice to which all of mankind would subscribe and, in any case, it is not "mankind" that makes decisions at the United
Nations, but governments with their own national interests to protect. To envision how a functioning world authority might reach its decisions, at least
in its first century or so, begin with the arrogant promotion of self-interest by the great powers that would continue to dominate U.N. decision-making
and add in the crass expediency masquerading as principle that characterizes the shifting coalitions among the lesser powers in the present General
Assembly: It would be an intensely political process. The decisions it produced would be kept within reasonable bounds only by the need never to act in
a way so damaging to the interest of any major member or group of members that it forced them into total defiance, and so destroyed the
fundamental consensus that keeps war at bay. There is nothing shocking about this. National politics in every country operates with the same
combination: a little bit of principle, a lot of power, and a final constraint on the ruthless exercise of that power based mainly on the need to preserve
the essential consensus on which the nation is founded and to avoid civil war. In an international organization whose members represent such radically
different traditions, interests, and levels of development, the proportion of principle to power is bound to be even lower. It's a pity that there is no
practical alternative to the United Nations, but there isn't. If the abolition of great-power war and the establishment of international law is truly a
hundred-year project, then we are running a bit behind schedule but we have made substanial progress. We
have not had World War
III, and that is thanks at least in part to the United Nations, which gave the great powers an excuse to
back off from several of their most dangerous confrontations without losing face. No great power has fought
another since 1945, and the wars that have broken out between middle-sized powers from time to time - Arab-Israeli wars and Indo-Pakistani wars,
mostly - seldom lasted more than a month, because the U.N.'s offers of ceasefires and peacekeeping troops offered a quick way out for the losing side.
impact 1nr
a) Great power conflict is only possible when international legal compliance is
breaking down
Heath Pickering 14, MA, International Relations, Melbourne School of Government, 2/4/14,
“Why Do States Mostly Obey International Law?,” http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/04/why-dostates-mostly-obey-international-law/
All states in the contemporary world, including great powers , are compelled to justify their
behaviour according to legal rules and accepted norms. This essay will analyse the extent to which states
comply and the reasons for their compliance. Essentially, the extent to which states follow their international obligations has
developed over the past 400 years. From a historical perspective, international obligations and accepted norms were founded
following two key developments in European history. In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War by
acknowledging the sovereign authority of various European princes.[1] This event marked the advent of traditional international law,
based on principles of territoriality and state autonomy. Then in 1945, again following major wars initiated in Europe, states began
to integrate on a global scale.[2] The UN Charter became the international framework for which norms of sovereignty and nonintervention were enshrined. Now, as a result of modern technology, communication, transport, and more, the evolving process of
Globalisation, “The internationalization of the world”,[3] has provided an opportunity for international law
and accepted norms to reach every corner of the globe. However, the development of international law and
accepted norms has not compelled states to comply all the time. Instead, the trend over the past 400 years has shown that states
have been mostly compelled to justify their behavior according to legal rules and accepted
norms. The emphasis on mostly should be stressed. Even though the UN Charter does not permit violating sovereignty through
the use of aggression, the extent to which states follow their international obligations varies. Louis Henkin’s book, How Nations
Behave, articulates the extent of compliance.[4] He said, “Almost all
nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time”.[5] As such, the trend
in contemporary international relations is that war remains possible , but it is much less
acceptable now than it was a century or even half a century ago.[6] The benefit of the trend is that almost full
compliance is said to lead states into a pattern of obedience and predictable behaviour.[7]
Therefore, conflict only arises when countries fail to comply. States attempt to manage the friction
with ongoing compliance through the principle of pacta sunt servanda – the adherence to agreements.[8]
Over time, such agreements to norms and treaties have diminished sovereignty, increased international institutions, given rise to
non-state actors, and rapidly developed the contemporary customary and treaty based rules system.[9] The evolution of the
dispute-settlement procedures of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
and the establishment of numerous global treaties illustrate states agreeing voluntarily to give up a portion of their sovereignty.
b) That triggers great power nuclear war
Harald Müller 2K, Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of
International Relations at Goethe University, Summer 2000, “Compliance Politics: A Critical
Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement,” The Nonproliferation Review,
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf
A third very crucial condition is a sufficient commonality of interest and commitment among the
major powers with regard to both the treaty in general and the compliance issue in question in particular. The
great powers act on the basis of a multiplicity of interests, commitments, and orientations. If the major powers' broader political,
economic, and security concerns turn out to be contradictory or even antagonistic, a non-multilateral compliance action by one or
more of them becomes more likely. Such action
outside the multilateral context will affect the great
power relationship and, in turn, the prospects for continued institutionalized cooperation. In short,
power relations do not develop in an ahistorical and context-free way, following quasi-natural laws. They depend rather
on habits, conventions, and perceptions that are shaped by experience. The constraints and relations in
the international system are thus not immutable, but rather malleable.12 When a treaty regime creates
expectations of multilateral compliance policies, unilateralist behavior can thus cause one of two
difficulties: • It may push other powers (and possibly their followers, proxies, allies, and partners) to rally around the accused
party. This may occur either because the accused party is a close ally, or to deter the power(s) acting unilaterally from further
unilateral actions out of fear that such actions may lead to an adverse change in the balance of power. Such a course of events
would seriously diminish
the chances for pursuing further the road towards a world order based on
cooperative security,13 rather than balance of power principles. Moreover, such confrontations
include a risk of escalation , which could lead to another confrontation like the Cuban missile
crisis, by far the most dangerous event so far in the nuclear age . • Alternatively, the aggrieved powers may
abstain from a direct confrontation out of concern for these risks, but freeze their cooperation in the arms control field as a sort of
reprisal. Such a development, while less dangerous on the surface, would risk the erosion of multilateral arms control and
nonproliferation in the long run. Would-be rule-breakers could be tempted to play off great powers against each other, making it
possible for them to pursue their rule-breaking activities with less risk and a greater likelihood of getting away unscathed with their
deviant course of action. In either mode, arms agreements suffer, the
prospects of cooperative security policy as
an ordering principle of world politics decline, and the risk of a major confrontation among
great powers increases . This trajectory is a reflection of the pivotal role of treaty community
cohesion . Because of the particular importance of major powers within that community —the
presumption of legal equality notwithstanding—antagonisms among them are particularly likely to sunder
that community and prevent it from maintaining and strengthening the treaty when it is challenged
by deviant behavior.
Reverse-causally---an effective international treaty system maintains global
stability---solves their impacts
David Knowlton 13, professor of anthropology at Utah Valley University, 7/27/13, “Knowlton:
Disregarding international law,” http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/5657903382/international-snowden-countries-law.html.csp
Global stability depends on checks and balances on power in the relationships among
countries as well as a fragile set of norms, often called international law, established through
treaties . Both have been thrown out of whack, at a time when the world's institutions are stressed. The Snowden effect — his
leaks and subsequent reporting — opened eyes everywhere on the ordinary surveillance of communications throughout the world
carried out by the United States and allies with the aid of U.S.-based global telecommunication corporations. It also is leading to
diplomatic fallout, and increasing tension in international relationships. In a telling example, on July 3 the plane of Bolivian President
Evo Morales was denied permission to fly over several European countries and, as a result, was forced to land in Vienna, Austria,
where it was delayed for 18 hours and searched. The European countries suspected Snowden was on board and wanted to catch
him. In the process, international law and treaties were violated. This could be seen as an act of war. It suggests the desire to
capture Snowden took precedence over the legal structure of national sovereignty and inviolability of heads of state. As a result,
Bolivia is calling for the structure of international relations to be reexamined and renegotiated, especially if a handful of nations
(probably at the insistence of the United States) could freely violate the norms of international respect and sovereignty. Generally,
such a call from a small country would not be heeded. However, the circumstances today are different. Morales' call comes when,
at one level, the power of the United States has never been greater (as the NSA scandal illustrates). On
another level, the set of organizations that guaranteed stability are shifting in ways that no
longer guarantee the maintenance of the standard order. The detention of a president of a sovereign country
has been condemned by almost all South American countries, except for the two or three in the pocket of the United States. Even
among them, serious concerns have been expressed. These have been taken to The Union of South American Nations. Interestingly,
UNASUR already has taken the unusual step of openly breaking with the United States. In 2008, it supported Morales against a coup
attempt — widely seen as having U.S. support — aimed at checking the spread of leftist governments in the region. The Monroe
Doctrine that had been at the base of hemispheric stability became tattered as a result. Furthermore, on July 9, the Permanent
Council of the Organization of American States condemned the detention of Morales as an illegal action against the inviolability of a
head of state. The OAS has generally been seen as one of the keys of building hemispheric stability and U.S. power in the Americas.
Instead of being ignored, Bolivia's call for a
reconsideration of international treaties, and hence the order
keeping the world stable, is more likely to be heeded. As a result, U.S. power may be more and
more simply military and economic, instead of being grounded in a bevy of treaties and
organizations that made this country less overwhelming and violent.
Solves all heg impacts- their solvency is based off of bandwagoning, we access
that better, also we ensure
Graeme P. Herd 10, Head of the International Security Programme, Co-Director of the
International Training Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2010, “Great
Powers: Towards a “cooperative competitive” future world order paradigm?,” in Great Powers
and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century, p. 197-198
Given the absence of immediate hegemonic challengers to the US (or a global strategic catastrophe that could
trigger US precipitous decline), and the need to cooperate to address pressing strategic threats - the real
question is what will be the nature of relations between these Great Powers ? Will global order be
characterized as a predictable interdependent one-world system , in which shared strategic
threats create interest-based incentives and functional benefits which drive cooperation between Great Powers?
This pathway would be evidenced by the emergence of a global security agenda based on nascent similarity
across national policy agendas . In addition. Great Powers would seek to cooperate by strengthening
multilateral partnerships in institutions (such as the UN, G20 and regional variants), regimes (e.g.,
arms control, climate and trade), and shared global norms, including international law . Alternatively, Great
Powers may rely less on institutions, regimes and shared norms, and more on increasing their
order-producing managerial role through geopolitical-bloc formation within their near neighborhoods. Under
such circumstances, a re-division of the world into a competing mercantilist nineteenthcentury regional order emerges 17 World order would be characterized more by hierarchy and balance
of power and zero-sum principles than by interdependence. Relative power shifts that allow a return to multipolarity - with three
or more evenly matched powers - occur gradually. The transition from a bipolar in the Cold War to a unipolar moment in the post-Cold War has been
crowned, according to Haass, by an era of non-polarity, where power is diffuse — "a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but
Multilateralism is on the rise , characterized
by a combination of stales and international organizations, both influential and talking shops,
formal and informal ("multilateralism light"). A dual system of global governance has evolved. An embryonic division of labor emerges, as
rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power"18
groups with no formal rules or permanent structures coordinate policies and immediate reactions to crises, while formal treaty-based institutions then
legitimize the results.'9 As powerfully advocated by Wolfgang Schauble:
Global cooperation is the only way to master the
new, asymmetric global challenges of the twenty-first century. No nation can manage these tasks on its own, nor can the entire
international community do so without the help of non-state, civil society actors. We must work together to find appropriate security policy responses
to the realities of the twenty-first century.20 Highlighting the emergence of what he terms an "interpolar" world - defined as "multipolarity in an age of
interdependence" — Grevi suggests that managing
existential interdependence in an unstable multipolar
world is the key.21 Such complex interdependence generates shared interest in cooperative
solutions, meanwhile driving convergence, consensus and accommodation between Great
Powers.22 As a result, the multilateral system is being adjusted to reflect the realities of a global
age - the rise of emerging powers and relative decline of the West: "The new priority is to maintain a complex
balance between multiple states."23 The G20 meeting in London in April 2009 suggested that great and rising powers will reform global financial
architecture so that it regulates and supervises global markets in a more participative, transparent and responsive manner: all countries have
contributed to the crisis; all will be involved in the solution.24
at: states/uruguay
just a brink argument – that’s the 1nc lopez evidence
All the pressures on the international drug regime make reform within the
Convention structure absolutely vital to preserve international law---the plan is
the last nail in the coffin
Dave Bewley-Taylor 14, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea
University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, March 2014, “The Rise
and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition: the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and
options for reform,”
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf
The political reality of regulated cannabis markets in Uruguay, Washington and Colorado
operating at odds with the conventions makes it unavoidable to discuss options for treaty
reform or approaches that countries may adopt to adjust their relationship with the regime. As
explained in detail in the final chapter in this report, there are no easy options; they all entail procedural
complications and political obstacles. Possible routes to move beyond the existing framework
and create more flexibility at the national level include: the rescheduling of cannabis by means of a WHO
review; treaty amendments; modifications inter se by a group of like-minded countries; and
the individual denunciation of the Single Convention followed by re-accession and a
reservation, as recently accomplished by Bolivia in relation to the coca leaf.
The chosen path for reform would be dependent upon a careful calculation around the nexus
of procedure, politics and geopolitics . The current system favours the status quo with efforts
to substantially alter its current form easily blocked by states opposing change. That group
remains sizeable and powerful , even in light of the U.S. federal government’s awkward position after the Colorado and
Washington referenda. A coordinated initiative by a group of like-minded countries agreeing to
assess possible routes and deciding on a road map seems the most likely scenario for change
and the possibility for states to develop legally regulated markets for cannabis while
remaining within the confines of international law. Such an approach might even lead to
the ambitious plan to design a new “single” convention. Such an option would address far more than
the cannabis issue and could help reconcile various inconsistencies within the current regime such as
those related to scheduling. It could improve UN system-wide coherence relative to other UN
treaty obligations, including human rights and the rights of indigenous peoples . A new
convention could borrow from other UN treaties and institute much-needed inbuilt review and
monitoring mechanisms. Cannabis might be removed from the drug control apparatus
altogether and placed within an instrument modelled on the WHO Tobacco Convention. Another
option would be to encourage the UN General Assembly to use its authority to adopt treaty amendments, all the more interesting in
light of the upcoming UNGASS on drugs in 2016.
State legalization remains within the letter of the treaties
Humphreys, 13 - Professor of Psychiatry and Director of Mental Health Policy, Stanford
University (Keith, “Can the United Nations Block U.S. Marijuana Legalization?” 11/15,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-humphreys/can-the-united-nations-bl_b_3977683.html)
1. Is the
U.S. currently in violation of the UN treaties it signed agreeing to make marijuana illegal? No. The
U.S. federal government is a signatory to the treaty, but the States of Washington and
Colorado are not. Countries with federated systems of government like the U.S. and Germany can only make international
commitments regarding their national-level policies. Constitutionally, U.S. states are simply not required to make
marijuana illegal as it is in federal law. Hence, the U.S. made no such commitment on behalf of the 50 states in signing the UN
drug control treaties. Some UN officials believe that the spirit of the international treaties requires the U.S.
federal government to attempt to override state-level marijuana legalization. But in terms of the letter of the
treaties, Attorney General Holder's refusal to challenge Washington and Colorado's marijuana
policies is within bounds.
State actions don’t violate the treaties
Hawken and Kulick, 14 - School of Public Policy, Pepperdine University; The authors were part
of the BOTEC team advising the Washington State Liquor Control Board on regulations
implementing the Washington marijuana-legalization initiative. (Angela and Jonathan,
“TREATIES (PROBABLY) NOT AN IMPEDIMENT TO ‘LEGAL’ CANNABIS IN WASHINGTON AND
COLORADO” Addiction, 109, 352-259)
Room raises the challenges that Washington and Colorado present for international drug treaties, noting that legal non-medical
markets ‘clearly contravene the 1961 and 1988 drug conventions’ [emphasis added]. The author mistakenly conflates the states of
Washington and Colorado with the country of Uruguay: Uruguay is a party to the international drug treaties; the states of
Washington and Colorado are not. That ‘treaties “are superior to state law” ’ follows from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
which prohibits states from preventing the federal government from enforcing federal law that contradicts state law; indeed, federal
law enforcement agencies continue to act, selectively, against medical marijuana operators who are in compliance with their
respective states’ laws. The
Constitution does not, however, allow the federal government to compel
the states to enforce federal law, nor do federal laws automatically pre-empt discordant state
laws (pre-emption requires the finding of a ‘positive conflict’ between state and Federal law, to which courts have been disinclined
in drug-law cases). In our own research, we surveyed more than a dozen leading scholars on the mutual
implications of state-level legalization and the international drug-control regime. Whether the
Single Convention requires federal preemption is not evident from a plain reading, and is much disputed.
The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), empowered with keeping the drug treaties and long opposed to drug legalization,
has expressed its concern about marijuana legalization in Washington and Colorado, advocating in its most recent annual report that
‘the Government of the United States . . . take necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the international drug control
treaties in its entire territory’. In December 2012 Attorney General Holder affirmed that changes in state laws had no bearing on the
status of marijuana under federal law; the INCB President called Holder’s statement ‘good but insufficient’; but most
constitutional and international law scholars maintain that the Conventions do not bind
member states with federal systems of government to over-ride legalization in their
constituent political units, no matter that the spirit of the treaties does.1
ilaw uq
U.S. foreign policy is effectively implementing multilateral cooperation and
upholding global rules now
Michael A. Cohen 14, former speechwriter in the State Department, fellow at the Century
Foundation, 7/9/14, “Obama’s Understated Foreign Policy Gains,”
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/opinion/obamas-understated-foreign-policygains.html?_r=0
It’s been a pretty good couple of weeks for American foreign policy. No, seriously.
On June 23, the
last of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile was loaded onto a Danish freighter to be
destroyed. The following day, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia asked his Parliament to rescind the
permission that it had given him to send troops into Ukraine. Meanwhile, there is still cautious
optimism that a nuclear deal with Iran is within reach.
What do these have in common? They were achieved without a single American bomb being dropped and they relied
on a
combination of diplomacy , economic sanctions and the coercive threat of military force. As policy makers and pundits remain
focused on Iraq and the perennial but distracting discussion about the use of force, these modest but significant achievements have,
perhaps predictably, been ignored. Yet they
hold important lessons for how American power can be most
effectively deployed today.
Obama has restored support for UN treaties but unilateral defection unravels
the system
Bewley-Taylor, 12 - Department of Political and Cultural Studies, College of Arts and
Humanities, Swansea University, UK (David, International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured, p.
315-316)
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way, they could
institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the regulation of the cannabis
market and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties,
however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control . The possibility of nations
unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the
entire treaty system . As a consequence states may be wary of simply opting out. Drawing on provisions within the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of
circumstances has occurred since the time of signing or when an ‘error’ of fact or situation at the time of conclusion has later been identified by a
party.89 Both are lines of reasoning pursued in 1971 by Leinwand in relation to removing cannabis from the Single Convention. Bearing in mind the
dramatic changes in circumstances in the nature, extent and understanding of the ‘world drug problem’ since the 1960s, the fundamental change of
circumstances approach could be applied to the drug conventions or parts thereof. It has been noted how this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has largely
fallen into misuse, probably due to the general availability of the option to denounce. That said, the case for both this and ‘error’ at time of founding
may be useful rationales for reform-minded states to note when pursuing the denunciation option. Once again the selective
application of
call into question the validity of many and varied treaties. This remains an
area of concern for many, particularly European, states that in general maintain a high regard for
international law. This stands in stark contrast to the selective approach towards international
law displayed by the administration of George W. Bush, particularly during its first term. Such disdain for multilateralism
generated an atmosphere within which reformist states may have been able to defend a simple
disregard for parts of the drug control treaties. As the most capable and energetic supporter of the GDPR, the USA was
still best placed to enhance the benevolent appeal of the control system and where necessary dispense
such principles alone would
costs for defection beyond those of the reputational variety. Nonetheless, such a position would have been difficult to sustain when defecting states
could justify action on the grounds that they were merely emulating the habits of a hegemony. The likelihood of any significant state simply
disregarding the international legal framework for the control of drugs has always been slim. Yet the election of Barack Obama
and a resultant
re-engagement with the UN made this possibility even slimmer. In an effort to rebuild bridges
with the organization, the Obama administration has in many ways attempted to reverse the policies of its
predecessor.90
at: no spill over
The plan triggers other countries treaty violations in a host of other areas –
prevents global coop on every major issue
Koh, 3 – professor of international law at Yale (Harold, “On American Exceptionalism” 55 Stan. L.
Rev. 1479, lexis)
Similarly, the oxymoronic concept of "imposed democracy" authorizes top-down regime change
in the name of democracy. Yet the United States has always argued that genuine democracy
must flow from the will of the people, not from military occupation. n67 Finally, a policy of
strategic unilateralism seems unsustainable in an interdependent world. For over the past two
centuries, the United States has become party not just to a few treaties, but to a global
network of closely interconnected treaties enmeshed in multiple frameworks of international
institutions. Unilateral administration decisions to break or bend one treaty commitment thus
rarely end the matter, but more usually trigger vicious cycles of treaty violation. In an
interdependent world, [*1501] the United States simply cannot afford to ignore its treaty
obligations while at the same time expecting its treaty partners to help it solve the myriad
global problems that extend far beyond any one nation's control: the global AIDS and SARS
crises, climate change, international debt, drug smuggling, trade imbalances, currency
coordination, and trafficking in human beings, to name just a few. Repeated incidents
at: alt causes
Perceived violations aren’t cut and dry if it’s still possible to remain in technical
compliance – and as long as the US has a legal case, it doesn’t harm diplomacy
Koplow 13—David, is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Applied Legal Studies at
Georgetown University Law Center. He was Special Counsel for Arms Control to the General
Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, from 2009 to 2011.“Indisputable
Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?,” The
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37(1): http://www.fletcherforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf
Debates about putative treaty violations are also often inconclusive because international
law, like domestic U.S. law, is frequently contestable. For example, the rules for demarcating a
disputed land or maritime boundary or the interpretation of a World Trade Organization
obligation about improper barriers to international trade can be obscure, ambiguous, and
debatable. Often, the United States (or any other country) adopts a certain interpretation of
the treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre, the United States might “win” or “lose” the
debate over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could
reasonably disagree, there may not be much embarrassment for a country that has in good
faith advanced what subsequently turns out to be only a minority position.
Three, Outright violations like the plan are qualitatively different and wreck US
diplomatic capability to uphold the entire treaty regime – this also proves the
US is key and treaty compliance is still relatively high
Koplow 13—David, is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Applied Legal Studies at
Georgetown University Law Center. He was Special Counsel for Arms Control to the General
Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, from 2009 to 2011.“Indisputable
Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?,” The
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37(1): http://www.fletcherforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf
So what? Why
shred of
does it matter that the United States violates treaties, and occasionally does so without a
legal cover? Perhaps that is the realpolitik privilege of the global hegemon: to be able to sustain hypocrisy, asserting
that its unique international responsibilities and its “exceptional” position in the world enable the United States explicitly to welch
on its debts, fudge on its obligations, and adopt a “do as we say, not as we do” approach with other countries. However, there
is
a cost when the world’s strongest state behaves this way. One potential danger is that other
countries may mimic this disregard for legal commitments and justify their own cavalier
attitudes toward international law by citing U.S. precedents . Reciprocity and mutuality are fundamental
tenets of international practice; it is foolhardy to suppose that other parties will indefinitely continue with treaty compliance if they
feel that the United States is taking advantage of them by unilateral avoidance of shared legal obligations. So
far, there has
not been significant erosion of the treaties discussed in the three examples. !e United States and Russia will fall
years short of compliance with the CWC destruction obligations, but other parties, with the notable exception of Iran, have reacted
with aplomb, comfortable with the two giants’ unequivocal commitment to eventual compliance. Likewise, the VCCR is not
unraveling, even if other states lament the asymmetry in consular access to detained foreigners. And while many states pay their UN
dues late and build up substantial arrearages, that recalcitrance seems to stem more from penury than from a deliberate choice to
follow the U.S. lead. But that persistent
flouting undermines the treaties—and by extension, it jeopardizes the entire
fabric of international law. Chronic noncompliance—especially ostentatious, unexcused, unjustified
noncompliance— also sullies the nation’s reputation and degrades U.S. diplomats’ ability to
drive other states to better conform with their obligations under the full array of treaties and
other international law commitments from trade to human rights to the Law of the Sea. The
United States depends upon the international legal structure more than anyone else: Americans have the biggest interest in
promoting a stable, robust, reliable system for international exchange. It is shortsighted and self-defeating to publicly and
unblushingly undercut the system that offers the United States so many benefits. It
is especially damaging when,
following an indisputable violation, the United States acknowledges its default, participates in an
international dispute resolution procedure, and apologizes— but then continues to violate the treaty . The CWC
implementation bodies, the International Court of Justice, and even the UN General Assembly and Security Council are unable to
effectively do much to sanction or penalize the mighty United States, but it is still terrible for U.S. interests to disregard those
mechanisms.
cea counterplan
1nc CEA
The fifty states and District of Columbia should eliminate their prohibitions on
and establish regulation for the possession, cultivation and sale of marihuana.
The United States Attorney General, the fifty states and the District of Columbia
should enter into and implement cooperative enforcement agreements under
section 873 of the Controlled Substances Act that bind the states and the
District of Columbia to enforcement against illegal production and sales in
return for federal acquiescence to state initiatives. These agreements should
create formal safe harbor provisions for industries that do business with legal
marihuana businesses, and require compliance by all federal agencies.
The United States should propose amendments to international drug
conventions to authorize signatories to legalize marihuana.
The CP causes treaty reform and allows legalization down the road
Don, 14 - University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. candidate 2015 (Allison, “Lighten Up:
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” 23 Minn. J. Int'l L. 213, Hein Online) The
Board = The International Narcotics Control Board
3. Amending the Single Convention is the Best Option In light of the newly passed legislation within the United States concerning
recreational marijuana and proposed legislation in the international community, the
best means of aligning the Single
Convention with evolving norms is to amend the treaty.153 Amendments allow for formal
changes to be made to a treaty while maintaining the treaty's existence. 154 This allows for adjustment
as "parties' understanding of the issue"' change or circumstances surrounding the issue change without requiring the drafting of a
new treaty or termination of an existing one. By
amending the Single Convention to allow for the recreational use of
marijuana, the United States and other countries considering such legislation would be able to continue the
legislative process without any international obligations impeding the progression towards
marijuana legalization. Article 47 within the Single Convention provides instructions for amending the treaty, stating that
"[any [p]arty may propose an amendment to this Convention.156 In order to make such a proposal, the amendment itself and the
reasons behind the amendment must be transferred to the Secretary- General of the United Nations in writing who will then
disseminate the proposed amendment to the other parties of the treaty and the Commission. At this point, the Commission has the
power to decide if a conference should be held to discuss the proposal or if the parties should simply be asked if they are willing to
accept.157 If
there is no objection within 18 months, the amendment becomes fully adopted; if
there is an objection, the Commission may then choose to hold a conference to review the
proposal.158 With 153 current parties to the Single Convention, arriving at a consensus may prove difficult.
This does not preclude the option to amend as "amendments require agreement between
treaty parties, but not necessarily between all parties." Once an amendment has been
proposed and adopted, parties are free to decide if they will become a party to the
amendment.159 Those who opt not to join the amendment remain bound by the treaty's
original obligations.160 By proposing an amendment that would permit the use of marijuana
for recreational purposes, those countries who wish to pursue such legislation would be
permitted to do so and those countries who remain in opposition would be able to remain
parties to the original treaty preventing the use of recreational marijuana.161
Safe harbor provision solves legal uncertainty and chilling effect despite federal
illegality
McDermott, 13 (Ryan, “Fed crackdown legal marijuana states could create larger black market”,
4/16, http://www.fiercegovernment.com/story/fed-crackdown-legal-marijuana-states-couldcreate-larger-black-market/2013-04-16)
If the federal government cracks down on the marijuana industry in states that have legalized it, it could create an unregulated
market even more saturated and uncontrollable than before legalization, Brookings Fellow Stuart Taylor said during a think tank talk
on the collission between federal and state drug laws. The
federal government should declare a safe harbor in
Washington and Colorado, states that have outright legalized marijuana. An additional 14 other states have legalized
marijuana for medical purposes with varying degrees of permissiveness over what constitutes a medical condition. Safe harbor
would give a federal guarantee to state regulations intended to prevent the sale of marijuana to minors and its
sale outside of a legalized area, Taylor said. States are developing those rules on their own, but without
safe harbor, federal law enforcement could destabilize state enforcement of them. In Colorado,
there are two tiers to the marijuana market, a legal, regulated side where marijuana is bought and sold as well as a personal grow
side that is unregulated other than the amount that is allowed to be grown and used personally. The two tiered systems allows
Colorado to regulate most of the marijuana growth in the state, and keep the unregulated market smaller, Taylor said. "If
Obama
shuts down regulated sector, the unregulated sector will expand to huge proportions. Criminals
could bend unregulated sector to its will," Taylor said. "The black market would proliferate." But to make the agreement
between the state and federal government, a state must show it can contain marijuana sales
and transport within the state where the drug is legal. "This isn't just the federal government giving a free ride
to states," Taylor said. "States must regulate." Even if there is a cooperative enforcement agreement
between the state and federal governments, it would still technically be illegal to grow and
sell marijuana in those states where marijuana is legal, noted Mark Kleiman, a public policy professor at the
University of California-Los Angeles.
solves
Contractual certainty is distinct from proposals that merely rely on admin
discretion – the CP is legally binding
Kleiman, 13 - Professor of Public Policy in the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs (Mark,
“Cooperative Enforcement Agreements and Policy Waivers: New Options for Federal
Accommodation to State-Level Cannabis Legalization” JDPA 2013; 6(1): 41–49 doi 10.1515/jdpa2013-0001)
One approach to reconciling federal actions with state-level cannabis legalization would be the stance initially taken by the
Administration with respect to the “medical” marijuana systems in many states: the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to deemphasize cases against small-scale activity in compliance with state law (though still formally banned by federal law) (Barrett 2009). This approach
was embodied in what has come to be known as the “Ogden Memo” (Ogden 2009). But, as that experience has shown (Hoeffel 2011), such
an
approach can create great ambiguity about who is, and who is not, in the sights of federal prosecutors, and can lead to
boundary-pushing by the industry, with a relatively few participants finding themselves unexpectedly facing long federal prison terms for actions in
accord with state law. Even if the prosecutorial guidance were explicit and clear, it could not
be made binding on a future
administration; every participant in the industry would face the risk of federal prosecution should the political winds shift. Such policy
ambiguity also complicates the work of state-level lawmakers and regulators. The Congress could endorse such discretion through a “sense-of-theCongress” resolution, or even command its exercise (in the short term) with a “no-funds” rider forbidding the use of appropriated monies to prosecute
marijuana cases where the underlying activity is consistent with state law, would leave industry participants legally vulnerable for currently protected
actions should the rider not be extended in some future year (Eddy 2010). Formalizing administrative discretion: cooperative enforcement agreements
The vast bulk of drug law enforcement is carried out by state and local, rather than federal, authorities. That is especially true for cannabis, where the
federal effort is concentrated on relatively high-level dealing and the federal government makes fewer than 10% of the arrests for growing or selling
and an even smaller fraction of arrests for mere possession. Accordingly, the
CSA2 provides that: The Attorney General shall
cooperate with local, State, and Federal agencies concerning traffic in controlled substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled substances. To
this end, he is
authorized to … notwithstanding any other provision of law, enter into contractual agreements with
State and local law enforcement agencies to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory
activities under this chapter. [emphasis added] Note the mix of mandatory and permissive language. The Attorney General is commanded to
cooperate and authorized to enter into contractual cooperation agreements “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” Whether this authority
could extend to an agreement not to enforce the federal law under specified circumstances remains an open question. But there is a completely
straightforward argument to be made that such
agreements could advance the cause of “suppressing the
abuse of controlled substances”; if Colorado or Washington were to cease the enforcement of the laws against unlicensed cannabis
production and against sale for shipment out of state, the federal government would find it difficult – perhaps impossible – to close the resulting gap
a cooperative agreement
binding the state and its localities to vigorous enforcement against exports in return for federal
acquiescence in intra-state sales regulated and taxed under state law would plausibly advance
the purposes of the Act better than any alternative available to the Attorney General. A less explicit form of such an
agreement might list joint enforcement priorities in order, leaving state-legal activities off the list or placing them at its end. Either version of the
written-agreement approach would have substantial advantages, in terms of certainty for
and prevent an explosion of exports, perhaps leading to a national collapse in cannabis prices.3 Thus,
state officials and industry participants , over semi-formalized administrative discretion. It might
also do more to encourage vigorous state efforts to suppress production and sale for sales out of state than could be accomplished with a nod and a
wink. To the immediate objection that the Executive Branch – charged by the Constitution with the “faithful execution” of the laws – has no authority
to acquiesce in the violation of some of those laws, there is an equally immediate rejoinder; those laws are now being violated and will continue to be
violated, in ways the Executive is practically powerless to prevent in any case and still more powerless without the active engagement of state and local
enforcement agencies. If
“the abuse of controlled substances” can be more effectively suppressed with
cooperative agreements than without them, then the mandate to cooperate for the purposes
of the Act might be best carried out by explicitly agreeing not to do what the federal
government cannot in fact do with or without such an agreement.
at banks
Safe harbor solves access to the banking system
Vinik, 14 (Danny, Business Insider, Jan, The federal government may remove a major
impediment to growing a marijuana business”, http://www.businessinsider.com/new-federalguidelines-may-make-it-easier-for-marijuana-businesses-to-use-banks-2014-1)
While it is now legal to sell recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington state,
businesses looking to do so have run into a new problem: they don't have access to the
American banking system.
That's because selling marijuana is still illegal under federal law. While the Obama
administration has said it will not interfere with businesses selling weed for recreational
purposes in Colorado and Washington, it has not given the same assurances to banks. That
means banks could face charges of money laundering or even lose their charter for dealing with
marijuana businesses.
That could all change soon. Yesterday, Attorney General Eric Holder said that the administration
will soon release guidance for federal prosecutors "not to prioritize cases involving legal
marijuana businesses that use banks," according to the New York Times.
“You don’t want just huge amounts of cash in these places. They want to be able to use the
banking system,” Holder said. “There’s a public safety component to this. Huge amounts of cash,
substantial amounts of cash just kind of lying around with no place for it to be appropriately
deposited, is something that would worry me, just from a law enforcement perspective.”
It's unclear whether this guidance will be enough to convince banks to begin accepting deposits
and issuing credit cards to marijuana businesses. Banks had wanted strict legal guidelines from
the government - such as a safe harbor provision - that would have guaranteed that they
would not be prosecuted.
at: no agreement
US support is the defining factor behind their say no evidence – the CP is a
game changer
Bewley-Taylor, 12 - Department of Political and Cultural Studies, College of Arts and
Humanities, Swansea University, UK (David, “Governing the Global Drug Wars”, October,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR014/SR-014-FULL-Lo-Res.pdf)
Although it is ultimately a multilateral construct, the shape and operation of the current
treaty system is very much a result of American endeavour. The prohibitionist norm at the
heart of the regime owes much to the successful internationalisation of the United States’
domestic approach – namely, that the recreational use of certain substances is morally wrong. Furthermore, the near
universal levels adherence to the regime cannot be divorced from Washington’s support. States
obviously perceive benefits from regime membership. Yet a combination of the UN’s benevolent image and US
suasion, both at the annual sessions of the CND and through unilateral mechanisms such as certification, have helped
ensure nations become Parties to the conventions and not deviate from their prohibitive
ethos thereafter. Costs, both in terms of national reputation and good relations, particularly with
respect to economic ties with Washington, are important considerations. As one study noted in 1975,
[w]hen a ‘superpower’ exhibits [a high degree of involvement] there is unlikely to be much
resistance or unresponsiveness on the part of countries appealed to for support, unless such
support is contrary to national interests. Generally speaking, co-operation with the US in drug control matters does not conflict in
any significant way with the interests of other… countries and is therefore readily provided.3
US diplomatic and financial leverage means it can empirically change the UN
position
Kumah-Abiwu, 14 – Africana Studies Program, Eastern Illinois University (Felix, “The Quest for
Global Narcotics Policy Change: Does the United States Matter?” International Journal of Public
Administration, 37:53-64)
Clearly, the US has a strong influence in many issue areas, including narcotics within the global system.
Bullington (2004, p. 690) captures this assumption by noting that: The United States had been the prime mover of this early antidrug legislation, relying on diplomatic pressure and arm- twisting to forge a shaky consensus among nations that were generally
much less convinced of the need for international controls. This American triumph signaled the beginning of nearly a century during
which America literally dominated the direction of drug control and drag policy in the international arena. For Levine (2003, p. 148),
the global narcotics regime has been sustained for many years because the "US has used the UN as
the international agency to create, spread, and supervise world-wide prohibition." In a similar
argument, Bewley-Taylor (1999a) observes that the US employs key policy tools of influence in its effort to globalize the prohibition
approach to narcotics control. As previously noted, this article argues that the US to some extent shapes the global narcotics policy
through four major policy tools of influence. Table 3 provides a summary of the policy tools. First, the
US employs
diplomacy (bilateral and multi- lateral) as a key policy tool of influence in shaping the global narcotics
regime (Bullington, 2004; Levine, 2003). For Bewley-Taylor (1999a), the US employs its diplomatic strength
within the UN to pressure other countries in supporting its preferred prohibition approach to narcotics
control. In fact, Bewley-Taylor's (1999a) classic example is worth reiterating in support of my argument. According to him, an
independent research on the usefulness of drugs (legal and non-legal) was conducted between 1992 and 1994 by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and Program on Substance Abuse (PSA) in conjunction with the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research
Institute (UNICRI). Surprisingly, the findings of the study show- greater health problems associated with the use of legal drugs than
with occasional use of some narcotic drugs. Fearing that the findings might undermine the existing prohibition approach, the UN was
pressured by the US to issue a disclaimer on the report (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a, p. 169; Kumah-Abiwu, 2012). In fact, one of the
experts interviewed for this study shares a similar view by indicating that: The US plays very dominant role and has provided an
enormous amount of funding to UN anti-drug efforts. At one point when the World Health Organization (WHO) was planning to
issue a report on the lack of dangerousness of cannabis, the US pressured the WHO to kill the report ... . At another point when the
Liberal government of Canada under Prime Minister Chretien proposed to decrimi- nalize marijuana, the Bush Administration's drug
czar, John Walters, threatened trade retaliation against Canada regard- ing timber, fish, and other issues. (An official interviewed at
the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation. Also see Kumah- Abiwu. 2012) In the words of another policy expert: Latin American
lawmakers, for instance, have moved intel- lectually and also policy wise toward decriminalization in recent years, but have feared
going far because of their north- ern neighbor. In recent years, the US has also pressured Canada and the UK from moving ahead
with radical policy changes that would shift away from criminalization. The US fears that a radical drug policy change would
compromise the UN conventions. (An official interviewed at the Drug Policy Alliance. Also see Kumah-Abiwu. 2012) Derivative
control is another policy tool of influence at the disposal of the US. One of the ways the US employs this policy tool is to link nonnarcotic issues with narcotic ones at the UN. Explaining the policy, Bewley-Taylor (1999b, p. 151) observes that: By
tying the
acquiescence of other nations in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to American economic aid
and political support in other areas, the US was able to dominate the decision-making process
and play a central role in the instigation and design of anti-narcotics legislation. The third policy instrument is the certification policy.
The policy mandates every US president to present a yearly report to Congress on the status of drug-producing countries. Any
country, especially in the Andean region, that falls within the decertified category could face serious sanctions from the US (BewleyTaylor, 1999a; Chepesiuk, 1999. p. 34; Hinojosa, 2007; Kumah-Abiwu, 2012). These sanctions range from the withdrawal of US
foreign aid, which may or not be directly linked to counter-narcotics policy issues (Bouley, 2001; Falcon, 1996). The US could also
employ its influence to prevent loans from multilateral development agencies to the so-called countries that fall within the
decertified category (Spencer, 1998). The
final policy tool of influence is the financial leverage of the US
on many UN agencies, including the UNODC. Essentially, the US is one of the top financial contributors
to the operations of many agencies within the UN system (Bewley-Taylor, 1999a). The Better World
Campaign (BWC) notes that the financial contribution of the US to major UN activities in 2011 alone was substantial as com- pared
to others. For instance, the US contributed about $1.884 billion toward peacekeeping operations, $516 million for UN regular
budgets, and $354 million (Kumah-Abiwu, 2012) toward other agencies including the UNODC (Bruun. Lynn, & Ingemar, 1975; BWC,
2012). Another interesting example that supports US dominance over the UNODC is worth mentioning as well. According to BewleyTaylor (2005. p. 429), the
former Executive Director of the UNODC, Mr. Antonio Costa, met with Mr. Robert
Charles, head of the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in 2004 to discuss
the possibility of a public health approach to global narcotics control. Fearing a possible threat to
its preferred prohibition approach, the head of the US Narcotics Bureau threatened to drastically
reduce the US financial support to the UNODC, unless Mr. Costa withdraws support of the UNODC for any public
health approach to global narcotics control. Mindful of a drastic cut in funding from the US, the head of the UNODC was said to
have succumbed to the US demands (Bewley-Taylor, 2005, p. 429; Kumah-Abiwu, 2012). This case provides another
good example of how the US continues to employ its policy tools of influence in shaping the global narcotics regime (Andreas &
Nadelmann, 2006; Bullington, 2004).
pharma
Small Pharma
Declining pharma industry is replaced by small pharma – that’s better for
innovation and solves the risks of big pharma
Castro and Westerhaus, 07 (Arachu, Department of Social Medicine at Harvard Medical
School and Michael, Department of Medicine at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, “Access to
generic antiretrovirals: inequality, intellectual property law, and international trade
agreements” Cadernos de Saude Publica, vol. 23,
http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S0102311X2007001300010&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en)
Examples such as this one raise questions about pharmaceutical company claims that patent protection and high drug costs are always necessary to
allow for the recouping of research expenditures. Additionally, recent reports
suggest that marketing costs, such as commercial
included by pharmaceutical companies in the research and
development costs of drugs 31. Others claim that only a small fraction of the financial benefits of
selling drugs is reinvested in research and development 32. Such information challenges the research expenditure
claims made by pharmaceutical companies. Activists also argue that there is little evidence that current intellectual
property law creates incentives for the development of new drugs. An analysis of a small
sample of pharmaceutical inventive activity before and after compulsory licensing showed no
uniform decline in scientific innovation 33, challenging the assumption that patent protection is necessary to foster the
advertisements and gifts to medical doctors, are
development of new drugs. Furthermore, current patent protections do not necessarily create financial incentives for the development of desperately
needed drugs, such as a malaria vaccine, in poor countries: between 1975 and 1997, only 13 out of 1,223 new drugs introduced globally were
specifically targeted towards diseases disproportionately affecting poor countries 34. In support of the research-based pharmaceutical companies,
some argue that patent laws have historically played very little role in inhibiting access to essential medicines in the developing world – instead
asserting that poverty and poor health infrastructure are the primary obstacles to ARV distribution 35,36. Additionally, poor drug quality, inadequate
public health infrastructure, understaffed clinics and hospitals, lack of political commitment, and underfinancing of HIV treatment programs are cited as
major factors obstructing the provision of ART. While recognizing the ability of these factors to impede access to ARV and working for their elimination,
health activists counter that patent law – because of its role in determining drug prices – also demands critical appraisal of its impact on access to
medicines. Health activists and academics argue that current
patent protection, by eliminating competition,
generally leads to higher prices 37,38, which directly obstructs the promotion of global health equity. Due to the enormity of the
AIDS pandemic, health activists and academics have recently focused on HIV treatment, charging that current intellectual property law and patent law
impede the purchase of ARVs in resource-poor settings and allow pharmaceutical companies to monopolize the markets of developing nations
7,39,40,41. As a result, the cost of ARVs far exceeds personal and national budgets, and the development of more affordable generic alternatives is
proscribed. In their view, alternatives to current patent law and incentive mechanisms, such as regulatory flexibility 38,42 or "pull" programs to
stimulate research for vaccine development 43, are crucial to alleviate the suffering of people living with treatable diseases in poor countries. Finally,
health activists assert that the
20-year conferred length of a patent monopoly was decided over a
century ago, at a time when drug development, production, marketing, and distribution occurred at a
different pace. Based on this observation, it could be argued that if the current length of monopolies
were shortened, the resulting increased competition could contribute to lowering the cost of
medications while creating incentives for innovation.
No Boost
Marijuana pharmaceuticals will be denied by the FDA
Armentano 8 (Paul, director of NORML (National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws) and the co-author of Marijuana Is Safer: So Why Are We Driving People to Drink (Chelsea
Green, 2009), Big Pharma Is in a Frenzy to Bring Cannabis-Based Medicines to Market,
http://www.alternet.org/story/90469/big_pharma_is_in_a_frenzy_to_bring_cannabisbased_medicines_to_market, Accessed 8/2/14, RRR)
Does Big Pharma's sudden and growing interest in the research and development of pot-based
medicines mean that the industry is proactively supporting marijuana prohibition? Not if they
know what's good for them. Let me explain. First, any and all cannabis-based medicines must be granted
approval from federal regulatory bodies such as the US Food and Drug Administration -- a process that
remains as much based on politics as it is on scientific merit. Chances are that a government that is
unreasonably hostile toward the marijuana plant will also be unreasonably hostile toward
sanctioning cannabis-based pharmaceuticals. A recent example of this may be found in the
Medicine and Health Products Regulatory Agency's recent denial of Sativex as a prescription drug in the United Kingdom.
(Sativex's parent company, GW Pharmaceuticals, is based in London.) In recent years, British politicians have taken an atypically
hard-line against the recreational use of marijuana -- culminating in Prime Minister Gordon Brown's declaration that today's pot is
now of " lethal quality." (Shortly thereafter, Parliament elected to stiffen criminal penalties on the possession of the drug from a
verbal warning to up to five years in jail.) In such an environment is it any wonder that British regulators have steadfastly refused to
legalize a pot-based medicine, even one with an impeccable safety record like Sativex? Conversely, Canadian health regulators -who take a much more liberal view toward the use of natural cannabis and oversee its distribution to authorized patients -- recently
approved Sativex as a prescription drug.
Impact Turn
Pharma growth collapses india relations
Choudhury 14 (Gaurav, Writer for the Hindustan Times, Powerful US pharma lobby pins hope
on Modi to mend relations, http://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/powerful-uspharma-lobby-pins-hope-on-modi-to-mend-relations/article1-1229853.aspx, Accessed 1/13/15,
RRR)
The US pharmaceutical industry is pinning its hopes on the new NDA government and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s expected visit
to Washington in September to iron out thorny intellectual property rights (IPR)
issues that have threatened to sour trade
relations between the two countries.¶ “A new government in India, which acknowledges the significance of encouraging
innovation, signals renewed hope in the global community for improving patient lives through advancements in pharmaceutical
science,” said John J Castellani, president and CEO of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), an
organisation that represents America’s leading biopharmaceutical research companies.¶ “The recent discussion about trade and IPR
issues between senior commerce officials from both countries, and (Prime Minister) Modi’s impending visit to the US in September,
are steps in the right direction,” Castellani told HT in an e-mail interview.¶ In April, the
US Trade Office did not
designate India a Priority Foreign Country (PFC)—a negative designation —but there is still a lurking
fear among Indian industry, particularly generic drug producers, about punitive measures given
persistent lobbying. Under the US Trade Act, a PFC is the worst classification given to “foreign
countries that deny adequate and effective” IPR protection. The US Chamber of Commerce and the
pharma lobby had in recent months mounted an intense campaign against India’s patent
regime, demanding it be designated a PFC.
India relations key to prevent warming and extinction
Revkin 6/27 (Andrew C., New York Times Opinion Section, Kerry Proposes U.S.-India
Push on Carbon and Climate, 6/27/13,
http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/kerry-proposes-u-s-india-push-oncarbon-and-climate/?_r=0)//LA
Shortly after prodding
India in a New Delhi speech to find ways to cut greenhouse gas
emissions, Secretary of State John Kerry sent a “Your Dot” piece emphasizing that he sees this as a
partnership between two dynamic, innovative democracies. Here’s Kerry’s fresh pitch, followed by my initial reaction: I
was in India this week for the fourth U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue, joined by my friend from Massachusetts and one of the
smartest, most creative leaders in government, Energy Secretary Ernie Moniz. Every time I visit India, it’s as if I set foot in a
different country, a country racing forward to meet the economic and development demands of modernity, a boisterous
democracy where debate is a prized commodity. But the country I visited this week was also grappling with the impact of
extraordinary flooding responsible for the heartbreaking loss of lives and livelihoods. Here, too, extreme
weather
events are causing unbelievable disruption and dislocation — and India is not alone:
extreme weather events are increasing all over the world and 12 of the hottest 14
years on record have occurred since 2000. Just last week, the World Bank reported that within the next
generation that same warming atmosphere could lead to widespread water and food shortages,
historic heat waves, prolonged droughts, and more intense flooding. And tragically,
India is a primary candidate for all four. India helps feed the world, but extreme heat
could actually cut in half yields of the most productive areas, wreaking havoc on
global food prices. The Himalayan glaciers are receding, threatening the supply of
water to almost a billion people. What does that tell us? It underscores the imperative that
we act forcefully and cooperatively on climate change, not because of ideology, but because of
science. The global climate challenge is about opportunity, security, even our very
survival in the long term. These challenges are interconnected and we have the opportunity — right now — to
address them in ways that move our economies forward and deliver tangible benefits to the global community. The good news
is that if
we address climate change the right way, it’s not going to hurt our economies;
it’ll actually grow them. Staring us in the face today is one of the greatest economic
opportunities of all time – the clean energy market. The new energy market is a $6
trillion market and its fastest growing segment by far is clean energy. [His office said this
figure comes from an estimate for the global energy market made by the venture capitalist John Doerr.] This is not just
about air and water and weather, it’s about job creation, capturing investment, and
improving our economies. My time in India, fortuitously, came on the eve of President Obama announcing a series
of domestic measures to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Our decisive action at home empowers us to
make more progress internationally on the shared global challenge of climate
change. We in the United States recognize our responsibility to lead on climate action and we are committed
to doing our part by taking significant actions to reduce our own emissions. Under President Obama,
the United States has done more to combat climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions than ever before, both at
home and abroad. And the announcement just this week of actions that include cutting domestic carbon pollution from new
and existing power plants and increasing the use of renewable and clean energy sources puts tangible action behind our
words. India
and the
United States are particularly well-positioned to roll up our sleeves and cooperate to
address climate change. We have strong foundations to build on together, and I believe that by joining forces,
India and the United States can make this leap for the benefit of both our countries and the world. We can, I
believe, do so in a way that erases the anxiety (quite understandable) in a country like India that wants to grow and develop
just as we did in the 1800s and 1900s. But the beauty of today’s technology is that India can grow clean – an option the United
States didn’t have during our time of economic transformation from an agrarian to an industrialized nation. We can work on
this together. That is why we announced this week the formation of a U.S.-India Working Group on Climate Change to seek new
ways to find solutions and push the curve of discovery. This new Working Group will allow us build on our common values and
seize the common possibilities that lie ahead of us. My bottom-line take away from my climate and energy discussions in
must do more
together to confront the climate challenge – and if we get it right, our partnership can be
an example for the world. Kerry will likely face resistance in seeking lockstep commitments, of course, given that
India? The world’s largest democracy and the world’s oldest democracy, both scientific leaders, can and
India’s prime challenge is bringing reliable electricity and affordable fuels by any means to its billion-plus citizens — some 400
million of whom were unaffected by last year’s blackouts because they have no access to electricity at all. As I’ve written, some
of that new energy can and should come through a push on renewable sources, particularly in villages that are unlikely to be
on a conventional power grid for years, if ever. But many parts of India could use energy provided by any means. In
his
New Delhi speech, Kerry spoke of India joining “China and the United States and
other major economies in order to rapidly develop joint technology and pilot
programs for low- or no-carbon strategies.” This is a sound idea, but could rub Indian
officials the wrong way. More than a few times, Indian diplomats and officials have told me they
bristle every time they see India lumped with China in discussions of obligations to eschew fossil fuels, given that
India’s per-capita energy use is less than a third that of China. Still, Kerry is right that the prosperous, urban side of
India, with a straining, highly inefficient electrical grid, traffic-choked streets and other sources of energy waste, can do plenty
to cut emissions even as it boosts energy access. One
opportunity was unmentioned in Kerry’s speech and this post:
the chance for the United States to help India develop its shale gas, an energy source that India
is keen on tapping and that is cleaner than other fossil fuel choices. As with China, nurturing partnerships that spread best
drilling practices for gas can
be a win for climate and clean air — if gas is developed in place
of coal (or dirty diesel). [Grist has some reactions from an environmental campaigner in India.] Over all, there’s a lot
of promise in nurturing a partnership between the United States and India on
expanding energy choices that work for the long haul. I hope Kerry keeps at it.
Econ
Decline doesn’t cause war
Morris Miller, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, ‘2K
(Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect)
The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden
economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes?
Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of
such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable
denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of
the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to
seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process
leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this
hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in
Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much
of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ...
The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore
no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of
violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to
crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).
Disease
No extinction
Posner 5—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7
th
Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe,
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html)
Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the
200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously
destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the
entire human race. There is a biological reason . Natural selection favors
germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because
their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts
too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its
spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural
pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in
Yet the fact that
prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it
more difficult to localize an infectious disease.
Intervening actors check
Zakaria 9—Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral
Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June
2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)
Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize
After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic,
we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health
It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf.
Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide
Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But
as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having
died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the
predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated
damage.
media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think
there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a problem, we can describe it
in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But we can rarely anticipate the human response
to that crisis. Take swine flu. The virus had crucial characteristics that led
researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast. They described—and the media reported—
what would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met
by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican
government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to
those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and
scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as
Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches,
They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby
really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is
detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 in which
sporting events.
millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish
But the world we live in today looks nothing like
1918. Public health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during
the First World War. Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate publichealth system—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century.
flu to help him understand how to respond.
1nr Econ
No impact- History proves
Ferguson 6— Laurence A. Tisch prof of History at Harvard. William Ziegler of Business Administration at Harvard. MA and D.Phil from Glasgow
and Oxford (Niall, “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/the_next_war_of_the_world.html)
What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great
Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much
out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the
countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact,
no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a
whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe,
and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed.
Robust studies prove
Miller 2k – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?,
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm)
Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic
ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some
dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part
of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war.
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would
After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22
countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional
wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic
crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more
According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of
not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis.
direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military...
In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of
dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one
form of violence to abort another.
(
1nr Disease
No terminal impact – diseases are either too fast or too slow
The Independent 03 [UK
“Future Tense: Is Mankind Doomed?”, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0725-
04.htm 7/25/03]
Maybe - though plenty of experienced graduate students could already have a stab. But nature knows that infectious
diseases
are very hard to get right. Only HIV/Aids has 100 per cent mortality, and takes a long time to achieve it. By definition,
lethal diseases kill their host. If they kill too quickly, they aren't passed on; if too slowly, we can
detect them and isolate the infected. Any mutant smallpox or other handmade germ would
certainly be too deadly or too mild. And even Sars killed fewer people worldwide than die on
Britain's roads in a week. As scares go, this one is ideal - overblown and unrealistic.
Extinction unlikely from pandemics- burnout & medical science
Posner ‘5 (Richard A, American jurist, legal theorist, economist a judge on the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Chicago, “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them”, January 1, 2005,
http://business.highbeam.com/6258/article-1G1-130930466/catastrophe-dozen-most-significant-catastrophic-risks) LA
Yet the
fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years
or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been
enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to
destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited
lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be
spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly
natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy
the entire human race.
The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the
human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small,
scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to
localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one.
Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a
lust time.
cartels
1nc
Legalization doesn’t kill the cartels – they are diversifying now
Zaiac 5/21 (Nick Zaiac-Young Voices Advocate working as a public policy researcher in Washington, DC. He holds a degree in
economics and international relations from American University—“Marijuana Legalization Won’t Crowd Out Cartels", 5/21/2014,
http://dailycaller.com/2014/05/21/marijuana-legalization-wont-crowd-out-cartels/, mjb)
¶ Everyone agrees that drug
cartels are terrible, violent organizations, which is probably why a recent Washington Post article
describing a collapse in Mexican wholesale marijuana prices after 2012 has garnered so much attention. Advocates
of
cannabis legalization in the U.S. were quick to jump on the story as a victory over the cartels
since Mexico decriminalized the drug in 2009. These advocates have long claimed that legalization would
lead to a weakening of Mexico’s cartels and, with it, their stranglehold on the country. Unfortunately, this may
be wishful thinking, as there are doubts about how much cannabis legalization can really hurt
the cartels.¶ ¶ “Farmers in the storied ‘Golden Triangle’ region of Mexico’s Sinaloa state … say they are no longer
planting the crop,” the heavily quoted Washington Post article reports about marijuana farming. “Its wholesale price
has collapsed in the past five years, from $100 per kilogram to less than $25.” While a reader can easily misconstrue
this quote as saying that less pot is being produced, thereby weakening the cartels, the article then goes on to describe how the
farmers are instead planting opium poppies, which will supply the US heroin trade instead.¶ ¶
Indeed, recent months have seen a surge in reports of cartels moving into new forms of illegal activities. A few weeks ago, Mexican
authorities in seized 68,000 tons of cartel-mined iron ore while en route to China. Last year, the Zetas cartel was revealed to have
been involved in massive illegal coal mining operations. Around the same time,the Knights Templar cartel’s vast involvement in the
avocado trade was exposed. And then came the revelation that the “lime crisis” every margarita-lover in the nation is freaking out
about is, at least in part, being fueled by cartel involvement in the fruit’s trade.¶ ¶ Cartels’ movement into normally legal markets
seems shocking to many, but the ideas are far from new. As far back as 1995, noted social scientists Diego Gambetta and Peter
Reuter wrote about how cartels will seek out opportunity for profit any way they can, citing Cosa Nostra’s involvement in price fixing
the concrete industry. Cartels act as catalysts of illicit entrepreneurship, giving individuals the ability to enter the darker side of legal
markets. The lime trade is an excellent example. Exporting limes to the U.S. is a good, common, and legal trade. The Knights Templar
thereby expropriated some lime farms while using their clout to regulate competition out of existence.¶ ¶ Cartels
have
proven extremely adaptable to outside pressure. When some government action can prove
successful in the short-term, like the Coast Guard shutting down the Caribbean cocaine trade, the cartels will
adapt. In the Caribbean case, it meant shifting supply routes overland via Mexico. When crackdowns occur in
particular industries, the cartel will shift away from it. A notable example of this was the U.S.-based mafia’s
avoidance of the heroin trade in the 1950s, ceding the trade to the Sicilian mob. The penalties for trafficking heroin were so stiff that
they posed systemic risk to the mafia, and thus they avoided an otherwise lucrative market.¶ ¶ As such, cartels
are becoming
diversified networks of businesses, not simply reliant on the traditional drug trade for
revenue. Back in 2011, Sylvia Longmire noted that this diversification would insulate cartels from
economic and political shocks of legalization, just like having a diverse portfolio of stocks
insulates investors from some risk.
National legalization causes immediate revenue decline—DTOs will undergo
internal restructuring.
Beau Kilmer et al 10 (Codirector, RAND Drug Policy Research Center; Senior Policy
Researcher, RAND; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School, et al, 2010, “Reducing Drug
Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California
Help?,”http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pd
f)
Presumably, the DTO demand for labor will decline, at least at the aggregate level. Given the lack
of specialization, one would think almost all the individual DTOs will suffer some decline. One
question is whether those “reductions in force” can be achieved through “natural attrition” or
whether they will require “layoffs,” to use familiar industrial jargon. Large-scale dismissals might
carry a peculiar risk, both for the organization and for society in general. Those who are fired may
try to create their own organizations, so DTO managers may have to think strategically about
whom to dismiss. Also, those leaving have probably become accustomed to earning levels they
cannot attain in legal trade. Since the whole industry would be affected by the downturn, other
DTOs will not be hiring. Thus, the fired agents might attempt to compete with their former
employers. Hence, in the short run, there could be additional violence resulting from at least
three sources: • conflict between the current leaders and the dismissed labor • within DTOs.
Even after the firing of excess labor, the earnings of the leadership most likely will decline. One
way the individual manager might compensate for this is to eliminate his or her superior,
generating systemic internal violence from senior managers who become more suspicious in the
face of the overall decline in earnings. • between DTOs. The leadership of an individual DTO
may try to maintain their earnings by eliminating close competitors.
Causes power jockeying between DTOs—spikes violence.
Pavlik 14 (Jim, "Legal Pot Means More Violence in Mexico–Not Less," High Technocracy, February
5, hightechnocracy.com/2014/02/05/legal-pot-means-more-violence-in-mexico-not-less/, ICO =
International Criminal Organization)
So I think legalizing marijuana can actually have a greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts effect on
Mexican state capacity. Why I eventually come to the same conclusion as Hope is because of the
nature of the violence in Mexico. Most of the violence in Mexico is not between state actors and
the ICOs; it’s between ICOs. If it’s hard to determine how much money is made in the marijuana
biz, it’s even harder to determine which ICOs are profiting the most from this sector (relative
to the other sectors they are in). And that’s an important point. Whichever cartels are most
affected by the loss of the additional revenues are going to become weaker relative to those
cartels which aren’t as affected. These relative power shifts are the primary driver of interICO violence. In other words, legalized marijuana—at least for a while—should increase
violence in Mexico. The plazas that abut the US border will be important geographical areas to
control so long as there remain any black or grey market goods to smuggle across them. Disrupting
the ICOs relative positions as they battle for equilibrium is exactly the kind of thing that will
make violence worse.
Aff doesn’t solve violence
Jean Daudelin 14, Professor at Carleton University's Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs, 9/10/14, “A less-violent, illicit drug market? It is possible,”
http://opencanada.org/features/comments/a-less-violent-illicit-drug-market-it-is-possible/
the main challenge lies elsewhere . The ‘War on Drugs’ has
been an unmitigated disaster, mainly because it has created the conditions for mass murder in
Latin America. In five years, between 2007 and 2012 and according to the latest available data (UNODC, 2014), 773,052 people have been
Eliminating that part of the problem is a good thing. But
murdered in the region: 274,585 in Brazil, 121,683 in Mexico, 92,274 in Colombia, 84,980, in Venezuela, 36,237 in Guatemala, and so on. By no means
all of those homicides were drug-related, but most analysts agree that a
very large proportion of them is tied to drugs or
more precisely to conflict
over shares of domestic markets and export routes.¶ But to this carnage,
cannabis and its traffic have contributed very little . Cocaine is the culprit and its legalization ,
which would destroy the black market and eliminate the violence currently tied to it, is not in the cards. Not here, nor in Latin
America. Something else must be sought.¶ By any humane standard, harm reduction in this case has to mean the
reduction of homicidal violence and the limited liberalization that is politically feasible would
simply not help . Decriminalization of cocaine possession and personal use, moreover, could very well lead to increased consumption and
create larger, more valuable and more competitive drug markets. What is needed are policies that make those markets less violent.
Drug violence is decreasing and there’s no impact
Sandra Dibble 14, master’s degree in journalism from Columbia University, worked at The
Miami Herald for nearly a decade, specializing in coverage of the Cuban, Nicaraguan and Haitian
communities, got the Pulitzer Prize as part of the team that uncovered Iran-Contra, 4/15/2014,
“Mexico homicides down, but other drug-related crimes persist”,
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/Apr/15/mexico-crime-violence-report-university-sandiego/2/?#article-copy
Mexico’s crackdown on powerful drug cartels has succeeded in driving homicides down for the
second year in a row, but it has opened the door for an increase in crimes, such as kidnapping and extortion, that affect greater
numbers of ordinary citizens, according to report released Tuesday. The crimes
are being carried out by smaller
and weaker groups “that focus on making money where they can,” said David Shirk, one of the authors of
the University of San Diego study. “Unfortunately, improvements in the homicide rate did not entail universal improvements in
citizen security.” The study comes as President Enrique Peña Nieto is well into the second year of his six-year term. Unlike his
predecessor, Felipe Calderón, Peña Nieto has played down public rhetoric against drug trafficking organizations, focusing instead on
the need for political and economic reforms. But analysts say that Peña Nieto’s administration has continued to deploy federal
forces to combat organized crime, and continued to arrest major drug traffickers. “I think the
government repression of
the bigger groups pulverizes them,” said John Bailey, a professor emeritus at Georgetown University in Washington,
D.C., and author of the book, “The Politics of Crime in Mexico.” “The criminals look at other ways to make money.” The USD study,
entitled “Drug Violence in Mexico,” was funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the fifth annual report
prepared under the auspices of the university’s Justice in Mexico Project. In documenting drug violence, the researchers looked at
different tallies, including those of Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information and data from the National
Security System, as well as independent counts by Mexican media organizations. The report comes amid public discussion in Mexico
about the federal government’s crime statistics under Peña Nieto. The Tijuana newsweekly, Zeta, has challenged statements by
high-ranking officials that homicides fell by 16.1 percent in Mexico in 2013, reporting last month that 23,640 murders related to
organized crime have taken place since Peña Nieto took office in December 2012. The USD study reported 15 percent drop in
homicides in 2013, but says “these findings should be viewed with caution, due to questions raised by analysts over “possible
withholding or manipulation of data.” It also reported significant increases in extortion and kidnapping cases. The states that
registered the highest number of homicides in 2013 were Guerrero, Mexico, Chihuahua, Sinaloa and Jalisco, according to
government figures cited in the study. The largest decreases from the previous year were registered in Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua,
Tamaulipas, Veracruz and Morelos. Of those states showing the largest increases in 2013, Baja California presented the highest rate,
31 percent, the study reported.¶ Among other findings:¶ • Mexico's homicide rate is about average for the Americas, well below
Honduras and Venezuela but higher than the United States, Cuba and Canada.¶ • Many homicides in Mexico continue to be
attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime groups.¶ • Community self-defense groups have expanded in Guerrero,
Michoacan and other states.¶ • Compared with previous years, recent
organized crime arrests have not
appeared to produce large spikes in violence .¶ Tijuana has been held up as an example of how civic participation
and improved law enforcement can lead to reduced crime rates. But the report listed 492 homicides in Tijuana in
2013, up from 320 the previous year and second only to Acapulco, with 883. It called the spike “the most significant
surge in intentional homicides among major municipalities in 2013.” The numbers are still far below the city’s
homicide peak in 2008, and Tijuana’s homicide rate in 2013 remained lower than those of the cities of Acapulco, Culiacán,
Juarez, Chihuahua and Torreon, according to the report. “Tijuana stands out in part because things had gotten so much better,”
Shirk said. The study does not delve into the causes of Tijuana’s rise in homicides. But the rise has drawn calls for greater crimefighting efforts by state and municipal law enforcement officials. “Local authorities are not recognizing these figures, they are saying,
‘no everything is fine,’” said Roberto Quijano, a Tijuana attorney who studies the city’s crime trends for the umbrella group, Tijuana
Coordinating Council. “We have mixed results. We have to recognize that.” Baja California government figures show that overall
crime in Tijuana, Baja California’s largest city, has gone down since 2008, most notably car thefts, commercial
robberies and armed robberies. But house break-ins have remained high. Kidnappings have been relatively low, though there has
been an increase in abductions in which there are no ransom demands — frequently a form a retribution among members of
criminal organizations. With most of the illicit drugs in Mexico destined for users in the United States, U.S. users “are a major driving
force behind this (drug) violence,” Shirk said. And criminal groups in Mexico who perpetrate the violence typically used weapons
smuggled across the border from the United States, Shirk said. But save
for certain high-crime areas, U.S. citizens
should not fear traveling to Mexico, Shirk said: “When you consider the volume of travelers and the volume of crimes
against U.S. citizens, there is very little cause for concern.”
And there’s no impact to any spikes that have occurred
Randy Dotinga 14, freelance contributor to the Voice of San Diego, interviewing David Shirk,
director of the Justice in Mexico Project, 4/18/14, “Tijuana Violence Ticks Up, But Don’t Blame
Cartels”, http://voiceofsandiego.org/2014/04/18/tijuana-violence-ticks-up-but-dont-blamecartels/
But now, for
most of Mexico at least, the days of extreme drug violence are on the wane. A new report
by a team at the University of San Diego finds that violence in the country peaked in 2011, and intentional
killings declined by an estimated 15 percent last year. ¶ Tijuana bucked the trend, with 492
homicides reported in 2013. That’s up from 320 in 2012, but still far from the worst 1,000-plus numbers just a
few years ago. ¶ For perspective, I turned to David Shirk, a political science professor at USD and director of the Justice in
Mexico Project. He is a co-author of the new report, which analyzes drug violence in Mexico. ¶ We talked about the effects of
violence on ordinary residents of Tijuana, the evolving nature of killings in the city and why the mayhem hasn’t crossed over to the
American side of the border.¶ How does use of illegal drugs in the U.S. affect violence in Mexico? ¶ We’re the largest market for
drugs in the world, and we consume at a higher rate than many other countries. ¶ If Americans stopped illegal drug use, you’d have a
very different organization of crime in Mexico. You wouldn’t have highly profitable, extremely well-financed and well-armed drug
cartels and organized crime groups in the way that you do now. That’s undeniable. ¶ And if you took that market away, you could
see an annual homicide rate as low as 7 or 8 per 100,000 people in Mexico, which is not dissimilar from our own. ¶ The drug wars in
Mexico heated up about 25 years ago as cartels began competing for market share. What happened? ¶ The Mexican government
was basically forced by the United States to stop protecting the Guadalajara Cartel and allowing it to operate with impunity. The
dismantling of the Guadalajara Cartel led to a fragmentation into three regionally based organized crime groups that began to fight
against each other. ¶ Why
did violence suddenly explode in 2008, a year after Mexico saw a record-low homicide
rate? ¶ The Sinaloa Cartel and its former partners suddenly began to fight against each other .
We’re not sure why the feud broke out between those organizations, but it led to a no-holds-barred attempt to take over major
zones of control in different parts of Mexico, especially along the border. ¶ As a result, we saw an explosion of violence in Tijuana,
Ciudad Juarez and (the Mexican state of) Nuevo Leon from 2008-2010. ¶ But in 2011, things had begun to shift. There
were 418 homicides in Tijuana that year, and people were already talking about how good things were. ¶ Of course, 10-15 years ago,
no one would have found close to 500 homicides to be an acceptable level. ¶ How
has violence in Tijuana evolved
a different kind of violence now . ¶ You don’t see bodies hanging
from bridges, decapitated heads, running gun battles in the streets of Tijuana. ¶ Instead, there’s more localized, streetcorner violence among local criminals fighting over turf, nothing like what we saw in 2008 and 2009. ¶ What
from the worst days of the drug-war period?¶ It’s
does the current level of violence mean for residents of Tijuana who aren’t criminals? ¶ I don’t think the change in the level of
violence — 160 additional homicides — has the same direct effect on daily lives as the 2008 violence, which was really terrifying for
people in Tijuana. ¶ For
ordinary citizens, for schoolkids, for housewives, for businesspeople, this does not mean a
major change in their day-to-day lifestyle. If you’re driving your kids to school every day, this year is no different
than last year. ¶ In 2008, you were much more likely to be directly confronted with a sign of this violence. ¶ You were driving under
those bridges and seeing those guys hanging from them. I had Mexican students who’d go shopping at Costco and see someone run
out with an automatic weapon in front of their car. ¶ I
don’t think what we saw last year entered the radar
screen of ordinary people.¶ What calmed the drug wars? ¶ Part of the reason we’re seeing things calm down
is that competition has largely eroded . The Sinaloa Cartel largely won. You have one big organization
that calls the shots, and nobody really challenges them. ¶ The cartel is still very strong even
after the arrest of leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman. It’s still the largest and most powerful organization, and his
business partners who are at large still have effective control of the organization’s drug operations.
Zero risk of Mexican state collapse---consensus of credible experts
Jean Daudelin 12, Professor @ Carleton, teaches on development and conflict. He is a
specialist of Latin America, particularly Brazil, Central America and Colombia, where he has
researched religious movements, indigenous politics, urban violence, economic integration, and
regional politics. His current research focuses on property rights and conflict, on Brazilian
foreign policy and international relations in the Americas, and on crime and violence in Latin
America, “The State And Security in Mexico” http://books.google.com/books?id=oTu81Bq6s4C&pg=PA127&lpg=PA127&dq=mexico+state+collapse&source=bl&ots=Yhx_8YtFb4&s
ig=pa7WFUmTZL9ABazqwXvl8euUKw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=46UHVNGWOIfxgwSRlYDACg&ved=0CB8
Q6AEwATgU#v=onepage&q=mexico%20state%20collapse&f=false
A careful look at the evidence and the fact that the U.S. seems to be disengaging from what has ultimately been a
limited involvement in the region's drug and organized-crime scene suggests that, from whichever angle one
looks at the problem, the latter does not represent a very significant threat to U.S. security. In that
context, a sizable increase in Canada's involvement can hardly be justified by the dangers the problem represents to its main ally.
The prospects of narco-traffickers provoking a state collapse in Mexico are essentially
nonexistent, notwithstanding alarmist declarations by some U.S. public officials.14 No
reputable expert on the country has supported that view .54 Such prospects for Guatemala, Honduras, or
even El Salvador are much less far-fetched, however, which is why an effort is currently being made by the World Bank, the
European Union, the U.S., and Canada to bolster the region's governments* individual and collective capacity to confront the
organized-crime challenge." It is difficult to argue, however, that the emergence of a narco-state or some kind of state
collapse in Central America and the Caribbean would represent a significant threat for Canada itself. These regions—Central
America and Haiti in particular—have
long been plagued by corruption, violence, and instability and have
previously-seen long episodes of civil war without any ripple effect on Canada. Were such developments
to occur, they would create, relative to North America, the situation that currently exists in the urban peripheries of large Latin
American countries, such as Colombia or Brazil, whose stability and economic prospects are not significantly impacted by the
anarchy and violence that prevail in small "uncontrolled territories."
Even if the drug war gets worse, it’s not an existential threat
Neil Couch 12, Brigadier in the British Army, July 2012, “’Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’:
Reality or Exaggeration?” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-housepapers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf/view
The evidence indicates that the
Pentagon’s apocalyptic horizon-gazing was exaggeration. The conjecture
may have arisen from a failure to understand the nature of the ‘war’, to paraphrase Clausewitz. The US’s
inclination to classify it as an insurgency, George Bush’s judgement on the threat from failed states and assessments of Mexico’s poor progress all add
up to make the Pentagon’s prognosis understandable, but nonetheless flawed. ¶ However, if Mexico is not failing, it certainly is not winning in its drug
war. The flow of arms, drugs and money in and out of the country continues undiminished and the number of deaths each year continues to rise. What
is surprising, therefore, is the extent to which the
country confounds the predictions of theories that indicate
looming weakness. The inability to provide security throughout the country and to control her
borders should be expected to undermine the rule of law and thus state legitimacy, as should the
corruption that causes lack of confidence in key institutions such as the police and judiciary. ¶ The scholarly work that this paper has referenced
indicates that organised
crime and corruption pose challenges to Mexico’s legitimacy, rule of law
and institutions similar to those described in the theory of state failure. Crime and corruption threaten her
economy. The media are not unfettered. The police forces may not be ‘paralysed’, but are distrusted and ineffective. The military is one of few, if not
the only, institutions that retains its integrity, despite being unable to ‘secure the population from violence and fear’ across the ‘whole of its domain’.
Her borders are not fully controlled. Drug barons, though not warlords, act as alternative suppliers of services, such as protection and community
projects. The legal system and judicial framework are not structured to deliver justice equitably. The economy is underperforming, as is the delivery of
public goods and services.¶ However, Clausewitz, Garzón and Rotberg explain why
these are not existential threats . The
aim of the gangs is to make money and they use violence and corruption only to shape the
environment in order to do so. They have no political agenda. Their violence is not ‘politics by other means’ nor is it
directed at the regime in order to gain greater autonomy, political power or concessions. The majority of the violence is
internecine, between gang members; security forces are engaged only when they interfere with the narco-traffickers’ business. In
fact, it is possible the gangs would not want the state to fail . They rely on protection from
compromised elements of the state and on the infrastructure and services that enable them
to continue their business and which allow them to enjoy their profits. The error, therefore, lies in confusing the motives
of drug gangs with those of terrorists and insurgents.
Regional military alliances solves the reasons primacy is good- your offense is empirically
denied
Mearsheimer, 2011, January, John J., Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the Advisory Council of The National
Interest, “Imperial by Design,”http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design4576?page=1, KHaze
Offshore balancing, which was America’s traditional grand strategy for most of its history, is but
another option. Predicated on the belief that there are three regions of the world that are
strategically important to the United States—Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf—it
sees the United States’ principle goal as making sure no country dominates any of these areas as
it dominates the Western Hemisphere. This is to ensure that dangerous rivals in other regions
are forced to concentrate their attention on great powers in their own backyards rather than be
free to interfere in America’s. The best way to achieve that end is to rely on local powers to
counter aspiring regional hegemons and otherwise keep U.S. military forces over the horizon.
But if that proves impossible, American troops come from offshore to help do the job, and then
leave once the potential hegemon is checked.
Aggression fails to deter or coerce- multiple crises prove
Mearsheimer, 2011, January, John J., Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the Advisory Council of The National
Interest, “Imperial by Design,”http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576,
KHaze
The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling
two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a
rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably
build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult
to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless
policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this
problem, as is clear from James Madison’s observation that “no nation can preserve its freedom
in the midst of continual warfare.” Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition
and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home,
shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged
in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and
resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on
Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand
Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more
have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one
of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq and how
a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both
quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been
unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime—
with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead
to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea
from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling
Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post–Cold War administration has tried and failed to
settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further
as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that
the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of
affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the
blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago
Council on Global Affairs survey found that “looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of
Americans think the United States will continue to be the world’s leading power.” Clearly, the
heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.
No impact
John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart 12, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for
International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both
at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute AND Australian Research
Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure
Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, "The Terrorism Delusion," Summer,
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such
an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland.
Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes
only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and
disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists
have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience
and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed
strengths.”8¶ This description may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the
September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on
terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact
even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its
single-minded preoccupation with the extreme.¶ In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with
remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant,
inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of
the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the
most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.”¶ In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be
terrorists need to be
“radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without
raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous
enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; selfsufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give
them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—
psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face
of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound
with people with such characteristics. ¶ In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no
terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the
four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method
by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September
11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited
capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs.
Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins
reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on
U.S. soil every year.12¶ The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales.
Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has
found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia,
Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on knowhow, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their
capacity to learn .13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that
continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act
collectively.14¶ In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored
visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12,
were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’
capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI
operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile
and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply
for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case
19, 23, 30, 42), all
21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment,
some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the
wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15
Cartels don’t have ties with terrorist groups
Sullivan and Beittel 13 (Mark and June. Mark Sullivan is a Specialist in Latin American
Affairs. June Beittel is an Analyst in Latin American Affairs. “Latin America: Terrorism Issues”
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf) 6/27/14 RK
Over the years, the
United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and
Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence
or overthrow elected governments. Although Latin America has not been the focal point in the war on terrorism, countries in the
region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist groups have at times used the region
as a battleground to advance their causes. The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism highlights U.S. concerns about terrorist threats
around the world, including in Latin America. The 2011 report (issued in July 2012) maintained that terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere rose by
The majority of terrorist attacks in the region
were reported to be perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia (the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army) and by other radical leftist Andean groups, such as
the Shining Path in Peru . Overall, the report maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist
40% from 2010 to 2011, with 343 attacks in 2010 and 480 attacks in 2011.1
attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere. U.S. policymakers have expressed concerns over the
past several years about Iran’s deepening relations with several Latin American countries , especially
Venezuela, and its activities in the region. These concerns were reflected once again in the 2011 terrorism report, which cited a foiled plot in 2011 to
assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States in Washington, D.C. by an Iranian operative who thought he was working with a member of a
Mexican drug trafficking organization (but was actually a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration informant). The terrorism report also cited U.S.
sanctions against several Venezuelan companies for violating U.S. sanctions against Iran. One
of the main concerns about Iran’s
increasing relations with the region is its ties to Hezbollah, the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group that the
Department of State designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997. While the State Department asserted in its 2011
terrorism report that there were no known operational cells of either Hezbollah or Al Qaeda
or in the hemisphere, it noted that “ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and moral
support to these and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.” The report also stated that there were credible reports that Hezbollah
sympathizers and supporters engaged in fundraising and support activity in Venezuela. There
has been significant U.S. concern
in recent years about the increasing and brutal violence of Mexico’s drug trafficking
organizations, with as many as 65,000 drug trafficking-related deaths in Mexico from 2007 through 2012. In response to some concerns that
these criminal organizations may be adopting terrorist tactics, the State Department asserted in its 2010 and 2011 terrorism reports that there is
no evidence of ties between the Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and terrorist
groups . The State Department maintains that there is no evidence that these criminal organizations have
“aims of political or territorial control, aside from seeking to protect and expand the impunity with which they conduct their
criminal activity.” In terms of Latin American countries’ abilities to combat terrorism, the State
Department maintained in the terrorism report that regional governments “took modest steps to improve
their counterterrorism capabilities and tighten border security” but that progress was limited by “corruption, weak
government institutions, insufficient interagency cooperation, weak or nonexistent legislation, and a lack of resources.” The State
Department lauded Mexico in its report, maintaining that regular exchange of intelligence and information with Mexico
was crucial in thwarting an Iranian plot in 2011 targeting the Saudi Ambassador to the United States
that involved attempting to enlist criminal elements from a Mexican drug trafficking organization. The State Department also cited the Inter-American
Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) at the Organization of American States as important for U.S. cooperation on terrorism with the region.
2nc AT: Sinaloa
Sinaloa has shifted – that was zaiac
More evidence – farmers in Sinaloa have already shifted
Miroff 4/6 (Nick Miroff April 6 “Tracing the U.S. heroin surge back south of the border as Mexican cannabis output falls”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tracing-the-us-heroin-surge-back-south-of-the-border-as-mexican-cannabis-outputfalls/2014/04/06/58dfc590-2123-4cc6-b664-1e5948960576_story.html mjb)
Farmers in the storied “Golden Triangle” region of Mexico’s Sinaloa state, which has produced
the country’s most notorious gangsters and biggest marijuana harvests, say they are no longer
planting the crop. Its wholesale price has collapsed in the past five years, from $100 per kilogram to less than $25.¶ “It’s
not worth it anymore,” said Rodrigo Silla, 50, a lifelong cannabis farmer who said he couldn’t remember the
last time his family and others in their tiny hamlet gave up growing mota. “I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization.”¶
Growers from this area and as far afield as Central America are sowing their plots with opium
poppies, and large-scale operations are turning up in places where authorities have never seen them.
2NC Link—Turns Case
Outweighs and turns case—national legalization incentivizes cartel black
market activities—props up more dangerous violence that escalates.
Charles D. “Cully” Stimson, 10 is a Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies
at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and
law professor. “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No” Legal Memorandum #56 on
Legal Issues September 13, 2010. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/legalizingmarijuana-why-citizens-should-just-say-no ac 6-18
Violent, brutal, and ruthless, Mexican DTOs will work to maintain their black-market profits at
the expense of American citizens’ safety. Every week, there are news articles cataloguing the
murders, kidnappings, robberies, and other thuggish brutality employed by Mexican drug gangs
along the border. It is nonsensical to argue that these gangs will simply give up producing
marijuana when it is legalized; indeed, their profits might soar, depending on the actual tax in
California and the economics of the interstate trade. While such profits might not be possible if
marijuana was legalized at the national level and these gangs were undercut by mass
production, that is unlikely ever to happen. Nor does anyone really believe that the gangs will
subject themselves to state and local regulation, including taxation. And since the California ballot
does nothing to eliminate the black market for marijuana—quite the opposite, in fact—legalizing
marijuana will only incentivize Mexican DTOs to grow more marijuana to feed the demand
and exploit the black market. Furthermore, should California legalize marijuana, other
entrepreneurs will inevitably attempt to enter the marketplace and game the system. In doing
so, they will compete with Mexican DTOs and other criminal organizations. Inevitably , violence
will follow, and unlike now, that violence will not be confined to the border as large-scale
growers seek to protect their turf—turf that will necessarily include anywhere they grow, harvest,
process, or sell marijuana. While this may sound far-fetched, Californians in Alameda County are
already experiencing the reality of cartel-run marijuana farms on sometimes stolen land,[54]
protected by “guys [who] are pretty heavily armed and willing to protect their merchandise.”[55] It
is not uncommon for drugs with large illegal markets to be controlled by cartels despite
attempts to roll them into the normal medical control scheme. For instance, cocaine has a
medical purpose and can be prescribed by doctors as Erythroxylum coca, yet its true production
and distribution are controlled by drug cartels and organized crime.[56] As competition from
growers and dispensaries authorized by the RCTCA cuts further into the Mexican DTOs’ business,
Californians will face a real possibility of bloodshed on their own soil as the cartels’ profitprotection measures turn from defensive to offensive. Thus, marijuana legalization will increase
crime, drug use, and social dislocation across the state of California—the exact opposite of what
pro-legalization advocates promise.
2nc Mex Coll
Mexico won’t collapse now - stability increasing, economy is growing and
corruption is decreasing
Barone 13 (Michael, political analyst, coauthor of annual Almanac of American Politics and
senior policy analyst for the Washingon Examiner, “Mexico becomes a stable, politically diverse
neighbor,” American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/article/politics-and-publicopinion/mexico-becomes-a-stable-politically-diverse-neighbor/ 4/6/14
We Americans
are lucky, though we seldom reflect on it, that we have good neighbors. In East Asia, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan and the Philippines face challenges from China over islands they have long claimed in the East China Sea. In Europe, Germany and other
prosperous nations face demands for subsidies from debt-ridden nations to avoid the collapse of the euro. When Southern Europeans look across the
Mediterranean, they see Muslim nations facing post-Arab Spring upheaval and disorder. The United States has land borders with just two nations,
Canada (more on that another day) and Mexico, where Barack Obama is headed next month. They're both good neighbors. I realize that most of the
recent news on Mexico has been about violent drug wars. You
get 500,000 hits when you Google "Mexico failed
state." But that's a misleading picture. The war on drug lords waged by President Felipe
Calderon from 2006 to 2012 has had considerable success and has been de-emphasized by his successor, Enrique
Pena Nieto. The
focus on the drug war ignores Mexico's progress over the last 25 years as an
electoral democracy. For 71 years, it had one-party rule of the PRI, or Party of the Institutional Revolution. Under PRI rule, a president
selected by his predecessor selected his successor. But under PRI Presidents Carlos Salinas (1988-94) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), Mexico
established a clean election system under which the opposition conservative PAN and leftist
PRD parties won state and legislative offices. This was capped when PAN candidate Vicente Fox was elected president in July
2000. When Zedillo came on television and said, "I recognize that Vicente Fox is the next president of Mexico," thousands of Fox supporters gathered
around Mexico City's Angel of Independence and stomped so strongly in unison that the Earth shook. Fox and his PAN successor, Calderon, had some
significant policy successes. But they were frustrated in getting changes in the energy sector, in which the state-owned monopoly Pemex has lagged
behind, and in education, where teacher jobs are handed down from parent to child. The reason
is that since 2000, none of
Mexico's three parties has had a majority in Congress. That's one result of genuine political
competition, in which voters have imposed rotation in office in governorships and legislative
seats. But it also meant that the PAN presidents could not get reforms through Congress if they were opposed by the PRI and the PRD. Things have
been different since the 2012 presidential election. PRI candidate Enrique Pena Nieto seemed a depressingly conventional politician, who as governor
of the state of Mexico (which surrounds central Mexico City) won publicity for dating a telenovela star. Pena won the July election handily and on taking
office in December called for major reforms. He issued a 34-page Pact for Mexico, which proposed greater competition for Pemex in the energy sector,
plus education and judicial reforms. Remarkably, it was endorsed by PAN and PRD as well as the PRI. Pemex has been a sacred cow in Mexico since the
1930s when President Lazaro Cardenas seized foreign oil operations and created the state-owned monopoly. The Pemex union was a pillar of the PRI
establishment. Now a PRI president was proposing to reform it, and his move was endorsed by a PRI party convention in March. Pena also acted on
education. In February, Congress passed a law establishing a transparent system for teacher hiring and evaluation. The next day, the government
arrested the head of the teachers union and charged her with spending $156 million of union funds on luxury goods. And Pena has moved to
deregulate telecommunications, which threatens the position of telecom billionaire Carlos Slim. There
is other heartening news
from south of our border. Mexico's economy is moving ahead with 5 percent growth. Since the
NAFTA treaty went into effect in the 1990s, it seemed that Mexico's economy was tethered to ours, leaving it unable to close the gap with the United
States. Now as
our economy slogs along slowly, Mexico is moving toward catching up. It is, as former
a majority middle-class country now. It is also a country from which, according
to the Pew Hispanic Center, there has been no net migration to the United States since 2007. All this vindicates
our previous four presidents, who pressed for closer ties with Mexico. But most of the credit
belongs to the leaders and people of Mexico. Good neighbors.
Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda has proclaimed,
Economic growth creates Mexican stability
Corchado, 14 (Alfredo, "20 years after NAFTA, Mexico has transformed",
www.dallasnews.com/news/local-news/20140101-20-years-after-nafta-mexico-hastransformed.ece)
LA VALLA, Mexico — Leodegarco Ramírez Ramírez smiles as he stands in a spot symbolizing the rise of a new Mexico, an area
of cornfields that are slowly being replaced by manufacturing plants where his sons and nephews make airplanes and
automobiles. Ramirez and his countrymen
are part of a transformation as Mexico moves from a
commodity, crisis-prone, agriculture-dominated economy to a more broad-based one
with manufacturing plants that produce everything from aerospace and auto parts to refrigerators. “I tell my sons
things are looking up for Mexico,” he said. “We’ll go to the United States more out of curiosity than necessity.”
There is debate over how much of the change is due to the North American Free Trade Agreement. This week marks the 20th
anniversary since the accord took effect for the United States, Mexico and Canada. “Mexico has a world-class
manufacturing sector, and NAFTA has certainly helped bring this industry up to the
highest global standards,” said Pia Orrenius, an economist and migration specialist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas. “Would this have happened without NAFTA? Maybe, but it probably would have taken longer. … Overall, I think
Mexicans see a brighter future for their nation than they did 20 years ago.”
2nc heg
Heg doesn’t solve conflict
Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous
times?: the international politics of great power peace” 173-75)
Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong
enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to
bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of
stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana
where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the
interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the
globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would
ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world
would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive
spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then
perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There
are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the
belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the
hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No
country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in
the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs states have decided that their
interest are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that
was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United
States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon
spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United
States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the
United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and
unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of
the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United
States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible
evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic
stability can only take credit for
influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical
or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to
war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to
fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places
where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that
there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability.
During the1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the
United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense
hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend"
endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military
capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too
far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due
not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not
have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two
decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No
stateseemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least
none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power
vacuums; nosecurity
dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred
once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if
the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S.
capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under
President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical
analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting
for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a
connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the
only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain
stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates
of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United
States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S.
commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at
drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose
that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a
rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand
strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United
States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if
the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending,
which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had
unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then
internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled.
If increases in conflict would have
been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency
demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have
regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the
current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can
operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think
otherwise base their view on faith alone.
2nc terrorism
1 in 3.5 million risk—most recent data proves
Mueller ‘11—IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show)
As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new
information
unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing
so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as
a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a
decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook
Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin
assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to
be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is
"the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in
the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the
group's budget for research on
weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) wassome $2,000 to
$4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain
a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed
its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al
Qaeda members have primarily been engaged
in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest
they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it
seems breathtakingly
unlikely that the miserable little grouphas had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to
set up and staffa uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facilityto
fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other
criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed
with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished
product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention
from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task
force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led
to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And
indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth
of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach
your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are
finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood"
and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such
fulminations
have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and
countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few
people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort
at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009.
Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in
Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however
"radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received
was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he
purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video
recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to
purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the
ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the
civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed,
no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a
simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in
2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside
of
war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and
wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year.
That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine,
threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in
3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included.
--retaliation
No strategic targets and can’t trace weapons.
Dowle. 5(Mark, Teaches at the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, California Monthly, September,
http://www.alumni.berkeley.edu/Alumni/Cal_Monthly/September_2005/COVER_STORY-_Berkeleys_Big_Bang_Project_.asp)
Because terrorists tend to be stateless and well hidden, immediate retaliation in kind is almost
impossible. But some nuclear explosions do leave an isotopic signature, a DNA-like fingerprint that allows forensic physicists
such as Naval Postgraduate School weapons systems analyst Bob Harney to possibly determine the origin of the fissile material in
the bomb. Nuclear
forensics is not a precise science, Harney warns. Post-attack sites are almost
certain to be contaminated with unrelated or naturally occurring radioactivity, and there are
numerous, highly enriched uranium stashes in the world with unknown signatures. But there is no question,
according to Peter Huessy, a member of the Committee on the Present Danger and consultant to the National Defense University in
Washington, D.C., that Russian forensic experts could quickly detect Russian isotopes, and that highly enriched uranium (HEU) from,
say, France could readily be differentiated from American HEU. But, Huessy warns, distinguishing
post-blast residues of
Pakistani uranium from North Korean uranium would be more challenging, probably impossible.
Because neither country is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA inspectors have been
unable to collect from their facilities reliable isotope samples that could be compared to post-attack residues. Even
ifthe uranium were traced, the source nation could claim that the material had been stolen.
No impact to retaliation—strikes would be limited and no one would escalate
SCHUYLER 2007 (Dave,
“Restating the U.S. Policy of Nuclear Deterrence,” Last Mod Nov 13,
http://theglitteringeye.com/?p=459)
A recent post on nuclear deterrence on American Future drew several comments on another
blog. The blogger at American Future, Marc Schulman, outlines the responses in this post. In
summary the responses were that a nuclear response to a nuclear terrorist attack was itself
terrorism, a nuclear retaliation would inevitably draw other state actors to escalate the
exchange, a nuclear retaliation would be collective punishment, and attacking Muslim holy sites
would be counterproductive. I agree with this last point but I want to deal with each of the
other points in some detail. * A nuclear response to a nuclear terrorist attack is
terrorism.There’s no generally accepted definition of terrorism so before tackling this point I’ll
propose one. Ignoring the issue of state actors vs. non-state actors I think that a terrorist attack
is an attack on civilians or civilian assets whose purpose is to provoke terror. It has no other
tactical or strategic significance. Any nuclear response by the United States would be against
military or governmental facilities, sites involved in military production, or command and
control. The objective would be to eliminate the possibility of future attacks or the support for
those who would engage in future attacks. That such a response would inevitably result in
massive civilian casualties is sad. But such a response would not, by definition, be terrorism * A
nuclear retaliation Iran in response to a terrorist nuclear attack would inevitably draw France,
Russia, and China to enter the conflict.To believe this you must believe that France, Russia, and
China will act irrationally. There is absolutely no reason to believe that this is the case. All three
nations know that their intervention against the U. S. would result in total annihilation. There
are other issues as well and let’s examine the two distinct cases: Russia on the one hand and
France and China on the other. As a major non-Gulf producer of oil Russia would be in a position
to benefit enormously in case of a disruption of Gulf oil production or shipment. That being the
case they would publicly deplore a retaliation against Iran but privately rejoice. Both France and
China are in an extremely delicate position. A nuclear response by either would result in total
annihilation and, equally importantly, wouldn’t keep the oil flowing. Lack of a blue water navy
means that both nations are completely at the mercy of the United States’s (or more specifically
the U. S. Navy’s) willingness to keep shipments of oil moving out of the Gulf. China is particularly
vulnerable since it has only about two weeks’ worth of strategic oil reserves. Neither France nor
China has any real ability to project military force other than nuclear force beyond their borders.
They’d be upset. But they’re in no position to do anything about it.
everything else
1nc aspec
Must specify their agent, too many possibilities
McFerran 5 - began his career working as a feature writer and contributing editor for the New
American, a journal committed to topics of social, political, and economic interests. He has
published numerous articles on historical events, politics, and current affairs and served as the
national director of Tax Reform Immediately (TRIM). Dedicated to the American dream of
prosperity, McFerran writes to generate increased awareness and appreciation for the
Constitution of the United States
(Warren, “Political Sovereignty: The Supreme Authority in the United States,” p. 147)
the Preamble of the Constitution reads that "We the people of the United States"
ordain and establish the new government. But this phrase proves nothing , he said. The term "United States"
had been used earlier to designate the thirteen States in Congress assembled, even though the Articles of Confederation specifically recognized the
sovereignty of the separate States. Here was a mere problem of semantics, Calhoun thought (though, of course, he did not use that word; it had not yet been invented).
The phrase "the people of the United States" could be ambiguous, for it was sometimes used in a
territorial or geographical sense. "In this sense, the people of the United States may mean all the people living within
these limits, without reference to the States or Territories in which they may reside, or of which they may be citizens," Calhoun admitted. But he
said the phrase, in its political sense, refers to "the States United, which in-version alone, without further explanation, removes the
ambiguity." There was, strictly speaking, no United States . There were only the States United.
True, Calhoun conceded,
Voter- Absent specification the aff becomes conditional killing neg ground
Presumption- the US isn’t an actor means the plan is meaningless
They must also specify nearly all, otherwise we lose CP ground
1nc nearly all
Interpretation- Nearly all is 60%
Sahagun 98 (Louis, Staff Writer at LA Times and winner of a Pulitzer Prize, Responses to Prop.
227 All Over the Map,
In the Riverside Unified School District, where 15% of the 36,000 students speak little or no
English, "nearly all" means 60% English instruction.
Violation- Aff doesn’t remove most prohibitions
Kamin 12 – Sam Kamin, Professor of Law and Director of the Constitutional Rights & Remedies
Program at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, "Marijuana at the Crossroads:
Keynote Address", Denver University Law Review, 89 Denv. U.L. Rev. 977
Finally, it
is important to remember in this context that marijuana is ¶ regulated not just at the state
and federal levels, but by towns and municipalities as well. Again, the example of Colorado is
illustrative. In our ¶ state, medical marijuana distribution can be zoned, including zoned ¶
completely out of business, at the city and county level. Local entities ¶ cannot prohibit people
from using medical marijuana within their borders, but they can certainly choose to prohibit
any stores from selling it ¶ within those borders. In other states, like California, much of the day-today
management of medical marijuana is left by the state government to ¶ the counties. Unlike the
anti-commandeering principle that prohibits the ¶ federal government from putting the states to work, California and otherstates
explicitly require counties, even those that are ambivalent or worse ¶ about medical marijuana, to implement state policy.13
And T’s a Voter- their interpretation allows aff’s that legalize in one city,
exploding limits and escaping the link to core DA’s