Dismantling an International Fraud Ring in Brazil
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Dismantling an International Fraud Ring in Brazil cliff jordan oct 2003 Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA) Conference San Diego, California Purpose of Discussion 1. Share our lessons learned from experience with International Fraud Ring in Brazil 2. Discuss impact of Sep 11th on Telephone Fraud in Brazil Our Industry Environment Anatel Regulations for Fixed Line Local and LD Operators 1. Not allowed to discriminate against customers based on credit history or ability to pay for basic service. 2. Not allowed to block service for Bad Debt until after 2 warnings and 30 days have passed from due date of invoice. 3. Basic Customers are NOT Subscribed to an LD Operator. They choose the LD Operator at the time of dialing the LD call. For example: call via Embratel 0021-1-914-827-9086 0023-1-240-337-5907 call via Intelig Our History Jun 1999 – Sep 2000 Jun 1999 – PIC Code dialing started. Jan 2000 – Billing customers started. Jul 2000 – First Fraud Reports Aug 2000 – Blocking of International calls begins Sep 2000 – Fraud Control Department organized 1 Manager + 1 Analyst + 1 Developer = NEED MORE HELP FAST!! Sep 20, 2000 – First Police Action for Fraud Typical Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 1 – Brazil Fraudster calls Saudi Fraudster and sets up Long Duration call Step 2 – Saudi Fraudster with client tells Brazil Fraudster where his client wants to call (eg. friend in India) Typical Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 3 – Brazil Fraudster makes second call (eg. India) Step 4 – Brazil Fraudster conferences the two calls together Step 5 – Saudi client talks to friend in India Typical Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 6 – Brazil Fraudster and Saudi Fraudster settle the money between them Oct 2000 – Dec 2000 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Investigated Fraud Systems and purchased Sheriff a) CDR Based b) Near Realtime c) Greater Influence on Customized Development d) Neural Network Engine e) Thresholds f) Case Manager To be installed in Feb 2001. Until then..... Jan 02 Oct 2000 – Dec 2000 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 We were blocking MANIACS! a) Long Duration calls to Hot Countries over 2 hours b) Accumulated duration to Hot Countries of 5 hours + per day Hot Countries = Mideast and some LatAm Countries c) No pre-checking of Customer Info, Payment Info d) Used above criteria and GUT Feelings! e) 98% Accuracy Oct 2000 – Dec 2000 1200 one week without blocking! 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 We made a COUPLE of little mistakes... a) Blocked a TV Network for calls related to international news gathering b) Blocked an Isreali Hospital Result?..... We got executive direction to validate customer first! Jan 02 Oct 2000 – Dec 2000 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 We Then Recognized... 1. Sheriff would not be agressive enough for this fraud. 2. We needed a system that could do the following: • • • Automatically Blacklist B number after Long Duration call Automatically Blacklist A number after Long Duration call Stop the Long Duration call in progress 3. We heard of a system that could meet these needs... For us it was ECTEL’s FraudView system – discussions began Jan 02 Jan 2001 – Mar 2001 1200 Allowed fraud in prep for police action 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Progress... 1. Hired 5 more analysts and 3 supervisors and trained them! 2. Installed Sheriff in February 2001 Result? ..... Fraud amount dropped! 3. Began sharing of information with our competitor Intelig 4. Decided to attempt a second police action in March in Rio Jan 02 Jan 2001 – Mar 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Second Police Action, Rio – March 9th, 2001 Please meet: Ismael – from Palestine Syed – from Bangladesh New Fraud Technology... DTMF boxes Dec 01 Jan 02 DTMF Box Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 1 – Saudi Fraudster calls DTMF box in Brazil which triggers first Long Duration call from Brazil to Saudi. DTMF Box Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 2 – Saudi Fraudster sends via DTMF a code and destination phone number (eg. India) across Long Duration call DTMF Box Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 3 – Box automatically opens second line, dials destination (eg. India), and conferences the two calls Step 4 – When call to India completes, India disconnects call DTMF Box Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 5 – Box is now ready to accept another DTMF command DTMF Box Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 5 – Box is now ready to accept another DTMF command Jan 2001 – Mar 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Second Police Action, Rio – March 9th, 2001 Please meet: Ismael – from Palestine Syed – from Bangladesh New Fraud Technology... DTMF boxes Dec 01 Jan 02 Jan 2001 – Mar 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Installed Pilot Version of FraudView – March 12th, 2001 Discovered: 1. We could now see the DTMF signals sent by Fraudsters 2. We could automatically block when DTMF patterns seen 3. Block = Insert SILENCE on the line We configured FraudView to automatically: 1. Block when detection of reverse direction DTMF signals sent by Fraudsters 2. Blacklist and Block on Long Duration calls to Hot Countries Jan 02 Apr 2001 – Jun 2001 1200 Allowed fraud in prep for police action 800 Fraud rose with Sheriff alone 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Began using both Sheriff and Pilot Version of FraudView Did another police action in May, again in Rio Signed contract for ECTEL FraudView De-installed Pilot Version of FraudView as part of installation of Production FraudView Jan 02 Apr 2001 – Jun 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 May 30th, 2001 Rio de Janeiro Names Unknown – 4 Brazilians Meet: Fraudsters were trained and brought in from Foz de Iguaçu. Were paid a little over minimum Claimed their wage boss was Arab from Foz de Iguaçu. Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 Jul 2001 – Sep 2001 1200 800 Fraud dropped! 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Hired 12 new fraud analysts and 7 support staff FML trained new analysts and support staff Installation of Production FraudView complete It now became very difficult for the Arab International Fraud Ring to complete the Long Duration leg! Jan 02 A DESPERATE Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 1 – Try to setup Long Duration call a. Hacked into PABX in Greece and reoriginated to Saudi – caught via DTMF! A DESPERATE Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 1 – Try to setup Long Duration call a. Hacked into PABX in Japan and reoriginated to Saudi – caught via DTMF! A DESPERATE Fraud Scenario with Arab International Fraud Ring Step 1 – Try to setup Long Duration call a. Hacked into PABX in Texas, US and reoriginated to Saudi – caught via DTMF! Jul 2001 – Sep 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Sep 11! Aug Sep Oct 01 01 01 Nov 01 September 11, 2001 – Hot Country traffic at average levels Dec 01 Jan 02 Jul 2001 – Sep 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Sep 11! Aug Sep Oct 01 01 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 September 11, 2001 An event that begs a whole set of questions... 1. Did any of the communications of the Sep 11th terrorist attack pass through the Embratel network as part of the fraud that we had been fighting? 2. Could it be that terrorists are frauding our network like the call-sellers, Drug dealers, and the Arms dealers? Jan 02 Jul 2001 – Sep 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Sep 11! Aug Sep Oct 01 01 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 September 11, 2001 3. Is al Qaeda or any other terrorist group funded by this Arab International Fraud Ring? 4. Does the Arab International Fraud Ring have any connections or is affiliated with al Qaeda or any other terrorist group? 5. What will be the impacts on our industry as a result of the new realities of terrorism? Jan 02 Jul 2001 – Sep 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Sep 11! Aug Sep Oct 01 01 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 September 11, 2001 Stay tuned.... Some answers to these and other like questions are coming in the next the few slides... Jan 02 Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 October 2001 We increased the complexity of the filters and were able to quickly find the fraudsters as soon as they made their first call. The fraud amounts dropped even further in October. The month the dominos began to fall for the Arab International Fraud Ring in Brazil.... Jan 02 Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 October 5th, 2001 Meet: Salvador, Bahia (northeast Brazil) Roberto Barreto de Matos, 23 anos Telephone Technician Contracted by unknown Arab from Foz de Iguaçu, Brazil to setup and maintain a Falsified Identification Documents to clandestine switch. lines. Used computer adquire 16 telephone and Wasmodems. paid R$3000 monthly to maintain the system Suspicious neighbors notified the police which led to the search warrent and subsequent arrest. Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 October 5th, 2001 Meet: Oct 01 Foz de Iguaçu, Cascavel and surrounding area José de Fatima Carnietto – innocent victim of stolen ID Fraudsters stole his ID. Rented an apt in Cascavel (near Foz de Iguaçu) in Jun 01. There lived 4 men between 20 and 26 years old. several telephone lines. Adquired Completed calls Saudi to: Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Italy, USA, Canada, Sudan, and Egypt Calls made between June 26 and Aug 23. Abandoned apt. apartment on Oct and phone bills, Owner entered and called police. We found over 50 accounts with name Fatima Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 October 10th, 2001 Meet: Maringá, near Foz de Iguaçu Valdir Vitalino Alex Honorato da Silva Ederaldo Felix dos Santos Daniel Trabanca Idiane Aparecida Wolff José Antonio de Sá Clipped onto at least 10 seperate accounts in Maringá between July and August. Believed to have run at least 6 clandestine switches in the area of Maringá. Police found passport of Ederaldo with US Visa Bank transactions with fraudsters in Saudi application. done through Bank West Union in Paraguay in name of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Africa, and Maria Lúcia Ferreira Josefi. Completed calls to: Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 Visit to Foz de Iguaçu Border town between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay Location of largest waterfalls in Western Hemisphere Strong Arab community (over 20,000 residents) Headquarters for Arab International Fraud Ring in Brazil Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Visit to Foz de Iguaçu Bin Laden visted Foz along with other South American towns in this region between 1995 and 1999. Jan 02 Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 October 17th, 2001 Curitiba, Brazil Roberto Alli Chinais – Lebanon, Leader of Group Deivis Helen Calamucci - Lebanon Mohamed Mahmoud El Husseini - Kuweit Hachem Mahmoud Husseini - Kuweit Meet: Ran clandestine switches in Curitiba in June 2000 and Feb 2001 Federal Police claim Roberto Alli Chinais is another member of the Arab Mafia in Brazil. Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 October 18th, 2001 Foz de Iguaçu, Brazil Muhamed Hassan Atwi - Lebanon Paulo César Caramorí - Brasilian Names Unknown – 3 Brazilians Meet: Were arrested for running clandestine switches in Foz de Iguaçu, within 1st day of fraud. Embratel and Intelig acted together and sent Federal Federal secured search warrents within 2 Police twoPolice addresses. hours and sent agents to both addresses. At one address, they found the 1 Arab and 1 Brazilian and them. they found nothing but telephone At arrested other address wires. Neighbors said that 3 occupants had just fled from the apartment with telephone equipment in Dec 01 Jan 02 Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 October 19th, 2001 Meet: Brasilia, Brazil unknown Federal Police found a PABX setup as a clandestine switch in an apartment in Brasilia. Found also with equipment a package of cocaine. Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 October 24th, 2001 Meet: Mato Grosso, Brazil Ghassan Jamil Al Kayal - Lebanon Jamil Alkayal – Lebanon Rubens Nunes de Barros - Brasilian Were arrested Oct 10th for suspicion of communications with terrorist groups. Police found 2 clandestine switches in Mato Grosso believed to be run by these men. Police found 8 clandestine switches in Cuiabá believed to be run by these men. Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 November 22nd, 2001 Foz de Iguaçu, Brazil Meet: Ivan Balic - Croatia Darko Kuvic – Croatia Thomas Slov - Croatia Relationship with Arab Mafia ? Were arrested within one day of the start of the fraud. Were routing calls through a calling card service in the US to Kuweit and Saudi Arabia. No information on who hired them. Claimed they were tourists. Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 Interesting Relationships Found by Police Assad Ahmad Barakat Accused of imposing monthly tax to Arab owned stores in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay to fund Hezbollah Accused of transfering $50 Million USD to Hezbollah Pro-Terrorist Propaganda and training material found in raid of his residence in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay in December 2001. Barakat fled to Brazil. Owns electronics store in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay Afif Abib Eid Ran clandestine switches in Maringá, Brazil Ederaldo Felix dos Santos Owns videogame store in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay Muhamed Hassan Atwi Ran clandestine switches in Foz de Iguaçu, Brazil Paulo César Caramouri Interesting Relationships Found by Police Assad Ahmad Barakat Accused of imposing monthly tax to Arab owned stores in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay to fund Hezbollah Accused of transfering $50 Million USD to Hezbollah Pro-Terrorist Propaganda and training material found in raid of his residence in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay in December 2001. Barakat fled to Brazil. Arrested in Foz de Iguaçu, Brazil on charges of terrorism in June of 2002. Captured while exiting his electronics store. Sent to maximum security prison in Brasilia. Nov 2002, Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, a worker for Barakat was arrested in Ciudad del Este on suspicion of raising funds for Hezbollah. Detained after police saw him writing down license-plate numbers outside a U.S.-sponsored disaster-management meeting. May 2003, Hassan Abdallah Dayoub, married to Barakat´s first cousin was arrested in the airport at Asuncion, Paraguay while trying to smuggle 5 pounds of cocaine on a trip to Syria. Owns electronics store in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay Afif Abib Eid Owns videogame store in Ciudade del Este, Paraguay Muhamed Hassan Atwi Oct 2001 – Dec 2001 1200 800 400 0 Oct 00 Nov 00 Dec 00 Jan 01 Feb Mar 01 01 Apr May 01 01 Jun 01 Jul 01 Aug 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Nov 01 Dec 01 Jan 02 December, 2001 The month of December appeared very quiet from the Arab International Fraud Ring! Did we win the fraud war? Did they decide to no longer commit telephone fraud? Why do we have an upward trend then in December? The fraud moved to ..... CELLULAR! All Brasil’s Intl Cellular traffic goes through Embratel and Intelig (competitor). This created a business opportunity for Embratel to market fraud service... 2002 - 2003 Other related frauds began in 2002 that are related to this International Arab Fraud Ring: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Clandestine Switches providing exclusive VIP cellular service for prison inmates, specifically to brasilian mafia leaders. The switches were setup by people trained by the Arab Fraud Ring. Recordings done by the Federal Police of these cellular calls reveal how drugs, arms, and prostitution are trafficked, and how the money is laundered and transferred via banks in Paraguay. Fernandinho Beira-Mar, largest supplier of drugs to Rio continues his operations while in prison getting drugs from FARC in Columbia and buying and selling of arms coming in from the tri-border area (Foz de Iguaçu). Thousands of Russian made AK-47s and millions of bullets and attempts at buying Stinger Missiles. Fernandinho is recorded ordering his contact on the outside to contact the “Lebonese Terrorists in Foz de Iguaçu” to learn how to put together a Clandestine Switch. 2003 Some key regulations for Cellular companies changed in 2003 in Brasil: 1. All cellular customers can now pick their long distance carrier with each call (casual calling). a) This shifted the responsibility of long distance fraud to the long distance carriers. 2. All cellular companies can now offer long distance service with their own pic-code a) This means they are responsible for the fraud that happens with their pic-code Net result for Embratel: As the dominant carrier, we lost some traffic to competition in 2003. However, we still have some of the smaller companies with their own long distance pic-code requesting our realtime fraud service in addition to transport of their calls. Recent Examples of Fraud Traffic from a cellco using our network... 1. Intl Destination Dur (min) Date / Time Origen-Brasil 99.87 17-10-03 09:48:57 2799820666 00xx96638354362B DTMF = >001592431881207<01592431881207*>999<999<99999999>99999999 >9999990015999<9999990015999>0015999<0015999<01592431587803 >999<99999 Comment: This is a call from a cell phone (part of a clandestine switch) in Brasil to Saudi Arabia. The destination sent reverse DTMF to open up other lines to call via Telefonica (0015) to Pakistan (92431881207) and (9243158780). 2. Intl Destination Dur (min) Date / Time Origen-Brasil 17-10-03 18:26:41 1199953229 00xx9616490780C0 497.95 DTMF = >003149413142539<014941142599<01129420841>003161296420841 >00152511133568<0152511158<999>999>999<999<0215949425792# <0155949425792 Comment: This is a call from a cell phone (part of a clandestine switch) in Brasil to Lebanon. The destination sent reverse DTMF to open up other lines to call via Telemar (0031) to Germany (49413142539, 4941142599) and Australia (61296420841). Then calls were routed through Embratel to French Guiana (5949425792). Recent Examples of Fraud Traffic from a cellco using our network... 3. Date / Time Origen-Brasil 20-10-03 10:20:49 1196000909 Intl Destination Dur (min) 00xx48693269071 88.83 DTMF = <021842407408#>002184240674038#<**>***>002184350848013# <02184350848013#>002184350848013#<02184350848013#>*** <***>111111<111111<0 Comment: This is a call from a cell phone (part of a clandestine switch) in Brasil to Poland. The destination sent reverse DTMF to open up other lines to call via Embratel (0021) to Vietnam (84350848013). • The losses for this Cellco in August of 2003 for NOT using our realtime fraud service are between 3 and 4 Million Reais (1.0 – 1.4 Million dollars). Summary of Lessons Learned For Embratel 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. One secret to success in stopping fraud is to have good equipment (systems) and well trained analysts. (6 month ROI or less is entirely possible) Realtime Detection (SS7 monitoring), DTMF detection, and Realtime Blocking, proved INVALUABLE in detection and halting of this Call-Sell fraud. We knew that associated with telephone fraud was drug trafficking, arms dealing, but now also we understand that it is also associated with terrorism. KNOW YOUR CUSTOMERS! Working cooperatively with the law enforcement can be beneficial to both parties. You may win a battle and secure a product/service from fraud, but the war still goes on as the fraudster moves to another weakness in your network. Sharing of fraud data and working cooperatively with your competitor truly helps both mutually and helps clean up the industry. Interesting Reading on the Internet linking TERRORISM with telephone fraud: English http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/11/07/inv.terror.south/ http://www.meib.org/articles/0201_l2.htm Portuguese http://epoca.globo.com/edic/20011022/especial1a.htm http://oglobo.globo.com/especiais/terror/1721902.htm http://www.terra.com.br/istoe/1675/internacional/ 1675_triplice_encrenca2.htm Italian http://www.panorama.it/mondo/americhe/articolo/ix1-A020001020446/idpag1-1 Also other articles documenting individual cases are available. Email request to: cliff@embratel.com.br clifford m. jordan manager - fraud control and prevention Embratel cliff@embratel.com.br cliff.jordan@mci.com 55-21-2519-2032
