AFF
Mapping 1AC
Plan 1 - Mapping
Text: The United States federal government should fund a mapping expedition
to investigate its territorial claims in the Arctic.
Inherency - Mapping
The NOAA’s maps of the Arctic are inadequate – more data needs to be
obtained.
Papp 11 (Admiral Robert J, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral, Testimony before
Congress, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg72568/html/CHRG-112shrg72568.htm,
AS)
Answer. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's ¶ (NOAA) Office of Coast Survey has
responsibility for
charting waters ¶ under U.S. jurisdiction to the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone. ¶ NOAA considers the
nautical charting data in much of the U.S. Arctic to ¶ be inadequate or nonexistent. According to NOAA's
U.S. Coast Pilot, ¶ much of the Bering Sea area is ``only partially surveyed, and the ¶ charts must not be
relied upon too closely, especially near shore.''¶ A nautical chart shows water depths (soundings obtained from ¶
hydrographic surveys), shoreline, prominent topographic features, aids ¶ to navigation, and other information pertinent to marine ¶
transportation. Nautical charts serve multiple purposes. Not only do ¶ they aid navigation and promote vessel safety, but they also
have ¶ scientific value. Models describing storm influence on coastal erosion, ¶ for instance, require information on nearshore
bathymetry. Acquiring ¶ adequate bathymetric data for the nearshore zone of the Beaufort and ¶ Chukchi seas would improve our
ability to forecast the condition of the ¶ rapidly changing arctic coastal zone. Forecasts of coastal zone change ¶ are important to
infrastructure planning, natural resource management, ¶ and for local communities.¶ The
water depth information in
U.S. Arctic waters is a major ¶ concern. The soundings along the northern Alaska coast and south to the ¶ Bering Strait
were obtained between 1940 and 1969 from hydrographic ¶ surveys capable of only partial bottom coverage, some using lead lines.
¶ The discrete point soundings obtained using lead lines can be more than ¶ 500 meters apart. Widely spaced soundings do not
contain enough data to ¶ detect pinnacles, rocks, shoals, and other obstructions that protrude ¶ above the sea bottom and may not
reflect actual water depths in the ¶ surrounding area.¶ Along the northern Alaska coast, the 10-fathom (60 feet) curve lies ¶ 2 to 20
miles offshore. Soundings inside the 10-fathom curve are ¶ charted anywhere from one-half to three-quarters of a nautical mile ¶
apart. However, in some areas, the charted soundings are spaced as much ¶ as four nautical miles apart. Historical
sounding
positions were ¶ obtained using less accurate positioning technology than what is ¶ available to
modern vessels using the Global Positioning System (GPS), ¶ Differential GPS, Electronic Chart Display, and Information
Systems).¶ Modern hydrographic surveying technology includes the use of single ¶ beam and multibeam echosounders, along with
side scan sonar. Multibeam ¶ technology obtains millions more soundings than single beam systems and ¶ covers a wide swath of
the ocean floor, depending on the depth (deeper ¶ water equates to wider swath, shallower water equates to narrower ¶ swath).
Side scan sonar is towed behind the survey vessel and the data ¶ obtained assists in detecting objects (wrecks, rocks, or other ¶
obstructions) that project from the sea floor. Until full coverage ¶ bottom surveys obtained using multibeam echosounders and/or
side scan ¶ sonar are completed, the extent of potential hazards will not be known. ¶ Side scan sonar and multibeam systems
provide nearly 100 percent bottom ¶ coverage of the sea floor, greatly enhancing the ability to detect ¶ hazards undiscovered by
earlier, less modern surveys.¶ During the 2010 field season, the Office of Coast Survey's ¶ Hydrographic Surveys Division undertook
hydrographic survey projects in ¶ the Bering Strait, Port Clarence, and Kuskokwim River--collecting over ¶ 300 square nautical miles
of hydrographic data. However, this is only a ¶ small portion of the estimated 40,000 square nautical mile U.S. Arctic ¶ hydrographic
survey requirement. Much
of the data needed for improving ¶ charts in the U.S. Arctic still needs to
be obtained through modern ¶ hydrographic surveys, water level information, geodetic control, and ¶ shoreline/channel
delineation.
Arctic War - Mapping
Climate change has opened the Arctic to competition and there’s no applicable
legal regime to solve.
Rogate and Ferrara, 12 (Chiara and Marco, Chiara Rogate is an M.A. candidate at The Johns Hopkins University’s SAIS
Bologna Center. She graduated from the University of Bologna in 2008. After interning at the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) in Cairo and at NATO in Brussels she worked as a researcher at Isttituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale
(ISPI), and at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) in Milan, where she focused on climate change negotiations.¶ Marco Ferrara
is an M.A.I.A. candidate at The Johns Hopkins University’s SAIS Bologna Center. He graduated from the University of Bologna in
2011. For his undergraduate thesis he studied the evolution of international legal regimes within the Arctic, with a particular focus
on the effect of such regimes on the recent warming trends taking place in the region, 2012, Bologna Center of International Affairs,
John Hopkins, http://bcjournal.org/volume-15/climate-change-and-power-shifts-in-the-arctic-region.html, AS)
The effects of climate change can be paradoxical. While contributing stress to world habitats as
well as providing an impetus to rework the economic structures of states in order to mitigate
negative consequences of inefficient economic growth, climate change is unfreezing economic
opportunities, as seen in the case of the Arctic. The North increasingly has gained geopolitical
importance, with attention being centered on the Arctic Circle. Recently, ice shelves in the
region have receded at an alarming rate while temperatures have risen at twice the average of
rest of the world.19 The magnitude of these effects is apparent when considering that 40
percent of the perennial ice that characterizes this region has melted away in the last quarter
century alone.20 As a fulcrum of global climate change, the consequences of such warming
trends in the Arctic are apparent not only in the local environment, but throughout the world
due to a series of cascading effects that could engender further large-scale climatic change.21
The ‘great thaw’ has shifted the importance of the Arctic within the international arena both
politically and economically.¶ Even before the onset of global warming, the Arctic was already a
politically contentious area, principally because it is a weak point within the convoluted web
of treaty-based and customary international law. This is mostly due to the fact that unlike the
case of Antarctica, there is no overarching treaty governing the ‘High North’. The only
applicable international regime to this day remains the “Convention on Law of the Sea”, which
was signed in 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, and took force beginning in 1994. The treaty
establishes general rules for governing maritime navigation and resource exploitation, but does
not address issues that are particular to the Polar region, such as the need for a common
governance framework,22 nor does it take into account the region’s unique and delicate
environmental conditions. Additionally, the treaty has yet to be ratified by all of the Arctic
powers, undermining its legitimacy. Consequently, the unfreezing of the glaciers is creating a
legal “no-man’s land” without precedent.23 The lack of a systematic governance structure has
led to the occurrence of many conflicts as well as significant tension among the Arctic powers
– namely Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.A. – and has, therefore, made
involvement in the region sensitive to variations in the international balance.¶ Traditional and
longstanding conflicts in this region are numerous but tend to pivot around certain common
themes, such as disputes over contested strips of land, maritime boundary demarcation, and
fishing privileges. Such conflicts generally remained ‘frozen’ during the Cold War due to the
balance that existed between NATO and the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) as well as an
appreciation for the sensitive nature of the area occasionally dubbed the “New Mediterranean”
due to its strategic location between North America and present day Russia.24 Both sides found
it prudent to bury ongoing conflicts in the area lest they risk worsening existing tensions.25
After the end of the Cold War, conflicts in the area remained crystallized and unresolved for
much the opposite reason, namely the region’s relative irrelevance within the new international
order. However, conflict has remained and the temporary deflation of the Russian threat
created the possibility for broader disagreements over the Arctic among NATO partners.26¶
With the onset of the 21st century, the ‘grace period’ of relative tranquility in the region
ended due to several factors. Primarily, the precarious situation was exacerbated by the onset
of global climate change, which added a layer of fresh conflicts to the existing strata of frozen
ones. There is no consensus regarding the significance of environmental change on the evolving
political situation in the region,27 but climate change has contributed to making exploration and
exploitation of the region commercially appealing. Examples can be found in the opening of new
sea-lanes, such as the Northwestern and Northeastern Passages,28 in addition to making the
extraction of resources – specifically hydrocarbons such as oil and natural gas – from the Arctic
seabed economically feasible.29¶ The 2008 U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic holds
up to 22% of untapped global reserves of energy resources.30 The potential wealth of such
untapped natural resources is drawing the Arctic from the periphery back into mainstream
international politics as nations scramble to strengthen and consolidate their influence over the
region. It is therefore fair to state that global climate change, along with significant technological
innovations in extraction processes and infrastructure,31 is contributing to the transformation
of the Arctic from a backwater to a key geographical entity, resulting in premonitions of the
Arctic as the background for the “Great Game” of the 21st Century.32 The Arctic thaw has not
simply unfrozen the former perennial ice shelves, but has also sparked new conflicts on top of
established ones, thus compounding an environmental problem with acrimonious political
disputes over resources. The lack of an applicable framework of international law has
therefore made the Arctic a region in which it is possible to observe international anarchy in
one of its purest and most striking forms, as states with divergent interests rush to establish
their claims and plant a foothold in this contested area.
US dis-involvement creates conflicts – Arctic states are making territorial claims
with their militaries.
Borgerson, 9 (Scott G, International Affairs Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations,
3/25/09, Foreign Affairs, “The Great Game Moves North
As the Arctic Melts, Countries Vie for Control,”
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64905/scott-g-borgerson/the-great-game-moves-north,
AS)
The Arctic is the fastest-warming region on earth and continues to melt at a breathtaking rate.
Last summer, for the first time in history, the polar icecap retreated far enough to open sea
routes north of Eurasia as well as North America, and it is expected to be completely ice-free
during the summer months in 2013. Boreal forests are appearing where there was once just
frozen tundra, and last summer, the first wild fire was recorded north of Alaska's Brooks range,
in a region where the local Inuit dialects lack a word for forest fire.¶ In an article in Foreign
Affairs last year, I described how not only is the climate changing fast, but the region's
geopolitics are also rapidly transforming. As the Arctic coastal states begin to make claims
over both these transit passages and newly accessible deep-water resources, a Great Game is
developing in the world's far north.¶ The next few years will be critical in determining whether
the region's long-term future will be one of international harmony and the rule of law, or a
Hobbesian free-for-all. Although the Bush administration took a huge step by publishing a new
Arctic policy during its final week in office, the Obama administration must do far more to keep
Washington from being further marginalized in this geostrategically important region.¶ The
polar icecap in the central Arctic Ocean thinned by half between 2001 and 2007. Other signs -such as warmer deep-water ocean currents, greater albedo feedback loops, and massive ice
shelves breaking free -- point to further melting. Scientists are increasingly concerned that the
thawing permafrost will disgorge millions of tons of methane, unleashing what some refer to
as a "climate bomb," a runaway warming cycle that could dramatically raise the planet's
temperature.¶ The Arctic may be open to year-round shipping within a few decades, if not
sooner. Eventually, the Arctic, like the Baltic Sea or Great Lakes, will freeze in the winter and
melt in the summer. Shipping companies are taking notice. The German-based Beluga Shipping
company, for example, is planning to move cargo from the Atlantic to the Pacific via the
Northeast Passage this summer unassisted by icebreaker escort.¶ Last July, the U.S. Geological
Survey released the first-ever comprehensive assessment of the region's oil and gas potential,
and the numbers are staggering. Based on a resource appraisal of technically recoverable
hydrocarbons, the Arctic contains about 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and about
30 percent of the world's undiscovered natural gas. Together this represents 22 percent of all
untapped but technically recoverable hydrocarbons. More than 80 percent of these resources
lie offshore.¶ Due to the ongoing global economic crisis, development of these oil and gas
fields has proceeded in fits and starts. The price of energy needs to be high enough to make
production in such an extreme environment economically viable. To complicate matters even
more, some Arctic coastal states have not settled on the regulatory standards for
development. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court, for example, ruled last November that before the
Royal Dutch Shell company can move forward with exploratory drilling in the Beaufort Sea north
of Alaska -- for which it had already paid the U.S. government billions of dollars in leases -- the
U.S. Interior Department needs to further study the environmental impacts of drilling on the
sea's bowhead whale population and nearby indigenous communities.¶ Similarly, Norway has
barred production of oil and gas in some of its northern waters, despite the Norwegian company
StatoilHydro partnering with Gazprom, the state-owned Russian energy giant, in the Russian
Arctic. While Norway is struggling with this contradiction, Russia seems to have no such qualms
and has dived headlong into massive Arctic nonrenewable energy projects. Gazprom hopes to
bring the enormous Shtokman field, in the Barents Sea, on stream by 2013. The field holds
enough gas to provide all of the United States' electricity needs for six years, and Gazprom is
eagerly eyeing the U.S. energy market, envisioning regular shipments of liquefied natural gas to
import facilities in Maryland and Georgia.¶ Given the high stakes and pace of Arctic climate
change, countries that border the ocean are working to extend their sovereignty in the region.
After its controversial flag-planting on the North Pole seafloor in 2007, Russia moved to further
bolster its Arctic presence in 2008. In addition to strategic bomber flights to the edge of U.S.,
Canadian, Norwegian, and Danish airspace, the Russian navy began patrolling Arctic waters last
summer for the first time since the Cold War. On the eve of President Barack Obama's first visit
to Canada in late February, the Canadian air force scrambled fighter jets to intercept Russian
long-range bombers.¶ The Russian federal government plans to invest more than a billion dollars
in the northern port of Murmansk, doubling the port's capacity by 2015. Moscow also pledged
last summer to build at least three new nuclear icebreaker ships to join what is already the
world's largest icebreaker fleet. And much to the chagrin of environmentalists, Moscow
completed a reactor vessel for the first floating nuclear power plant in October 2008.¶ Russia has
developed a muscular new national security program that views the Arctic as a strategically
vital territory. Last September, Nikolai Patrushev, the former head of the FSB (the successor
agency to the KGB) and current secretary of the Russian Security Council, declared that "the
Arctic must become Russia's main strategic resource base," and a forthcoming Russian plan for
developing the Arctic over the next decade reportedly threatens that it "cannot be ruled out
that the battle for raw materials will be waged with military means."¶ Russia is not alone.
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper held a cabinet meeting last August in the Arctic town
of Inuvik, more than 2,500 miles north of Ottawa, to pledge his commitment to defend Canadian
Arctic sovereignty. In 2008, Canada conducted its largest military exercise ever in the region
and blocked the sale of Canadian radar technology to a U.S. buyer on national security
grounds. In addition, Ottawa committed $40 million to scientific research projects to support its
Arctic seabed claims. Meanwhile, Greenland passed a home-rule referendum in November that
will eventually lead to independence from Denmark "in the not too distant future," in the words
of Hans Enoksen, the current Siumut prime minister; the European Union has a new Arctic
policy and plans for building its own icebreaker; and at the end of January, NATO held a
conference in Iceland about its future mission in the Arctic.¶ Even Asian countries with no Arctic
coastlines are getting into the game. The Chinese sent its icebreaker, the Snow Dragon, on its
third Arctic expedition last summer. Beijing successfully earned observer status to the Arctic
Council and also plans to install its first long-term deep-sea monitoring system in the Arctic to
keep an eye on long-term marine changes and the impacts of global warming on China's climate.
South Korean and Singaporean shipyards are building massive new icebreakers and icestrengthened tankers to navigate new Arctic routes. Japan is closely watching the shorter
shipping routes opening up in the region, which will benefit Japanese businesses due to the
country's northern latitude.¶ Last May, top officials from the United States, Canada, Denmark,
Norway, and Russia gathered in Greenland to declare their mutual commitment to the rule of
law and to behaving peacefully in the new Arctic. At the same time, Arctic countries are closely
collaborating on mapping the area's seafloor, with scientists from one country frequently sailing
on icebreakers of another. On the face of it, everyone seems to be getting along swimmingly.¶
But all of this camaraderie is at odds with the growing remilitarization of the Arctic. The region
is in the midst of transforming from a frozen, sleepy backwater into a potential epicenter of
world affairs. How this all plays out in the geopolitical development of the region is a story that
is very much still being written. The plot is full of characters espousing the rhetoric of
cooperation yet pursuing their self-interests, and the conclusion could lead in multiple
directions.¶ The United States, however, remains largely asleep at the wheel. In the future,
contests over fresh water, political instability from forced migrations, and increasingly severe
pandemics due to global warming will become only more common
These conflicts go nuclear.
Wallace and Stephens, 10 (Michael and Steven, Michael Wallace is Professor Emeritus at
the University of British Columbia; Steven Staples is President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa,
March 2010, Canadian Pugwash, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue”
AS)
The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President
Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last
year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training
for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.”55
Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time
in 15 years.56¶ In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a
National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the
preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic,
including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the
Arctic.57¶ The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to
withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in
Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the
Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this
renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence.¶ The
Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian
sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military
training base and a deep-water port.¶ Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence
position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent
that draws on army, navy and air force assets with ship- based helicopters able to drop troops
anywhere.58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace.¶ Last year
Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for
Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000
soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil
rigs.59¶ The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after
Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About
12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved.¶ Jayantha Dhanapala, President of
Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation
bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being
expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the Russian
Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge
on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied
NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict
escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”61 Many will no doubt argue that this is
excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military
confrontation can be taken lightly.
Specifically, Russia is insistent on establishing military capabilities to back up its
unreasonable territorial claims.
Cohen et al, 8 (Ariel Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D., and Jim Dolbow, Senior Research Fellows and
PhD’s in ¶ Russian and Eurasian Studies Aand International Energy ¶ Security, Oct 30 2008, The
Heritage Foundation “The New Cold War: ¶ Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic”)
After its invasion of Georgia, Russia has clearly hardened its international posture and is
increas- ingly relying on power, not international law, to set- tle its claims. Moscow has also
intensified its anti- American policies and rhetoric and is likely to chal- lenge U.S. interests
whenever and wherever it can, including in the High North.¶ Russia takes its role as an Arctic
power seriously. In 2001, Russia submitted to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea a
formal claim for an area of 1.2 million square kilometers (460,000 square miles) that runs from
the undersea Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev Ridge to the North Pole. This is roughly the
combined area of Germany, France, and Italy.32 The U.N. commission did not accept the claim
and requested “additional data and informa- tion.”33 Russia responded by sending a scientific
mission of a nuclear-powered icebreaker and two ously organized media event, the mission
planted the Russian flag on the ocean’s floor at the Lomonosov Ridge after collecting soil
samples that supposedly prove that the ridge is part of the Eur- asian landmass. During the
mission, Deputy Chair- man of the Russian Duma Artur Chilingarov, the veteran Soviet explorer
heading the scientific expe- dition, declared, “The Arctic is ours and we should demonstrate
our presence.”34 Such statements run counter to the spirit and potential of international
cooperation and seem inappropriate for a scientific mission.The U.S. has objected to these
claims and stated that they have “major flaws.” Professor Timo Koi- vurova of the University of
Lapland in Finland stated that “oceanic ridges cannot be claimed as part of the state’s
continental shelf.”35 Russia intends to resubmit its claim by 2009.36¶ Russia is also moving
rapidly to establish a phys- ical sea, ground, and air presence in the Arctic. In August 2008,
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a law that allows “the government to allocate
strategic oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf without auctions.” The law restricts
participa- tion to companies with five years’ experience in a region’s continental shelf and in
which the govern- ment holds at least a 50 percent share, effectively¶ allowing only statecontrolled Gazprom and Ros- neft to participate.37 President Medvedev also fea- tured the
Arctic prominently in the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept, which states: “In accor- dance
with the international law, Russia intends to establish the boundaries of its continental shelf,
thus expanding opportunities for exploration and exploitation of its mineral resources.”38¶
During 2008, Russian icebreakers have con- stantly patrolled in the Arctic. Russia has 18 operational icebreakers, the largest flotilla of icebreakers in the world.39 Seven are nuclear, including
the 50 Years of Victory, the largest icebreaker in the world.40 Russia is planning to build new
nuclear-powered icebreakers starting in 2015. Experts estimate that Russia will need to build six
to 10 nuclear icebreak- ers over the next 20 years to maintain and expand its current level of
operations.41 Russia’s presence in the Arctic will allow the Kremlin to take de facto possession
of the underwater territories currently in dispute.¶ In addition to icebreakers, Russia is
constructing an Arctic oil rig in the northern shipbuilding center of Severodvinsk, which will be
completed by 2010. The rig will be the first of its kind, capable of oper- ating in temperatures as
low as minus 50 degrees Celsius (minus 58 degrees Fahrenheit) and with- stand the impact of ice
packs. The new rig was com- missioned by the state-controlled Gazprom and demonstrates that
Russia is serious about oil explo- ration in the Arctic.42 Russia’s Polar Saber Rattling¶ In August
2007, shortly after sending the scien- tific expedition to the Arctic ridge, then Russian President
Vladimir Putin ordered the resumption of regular air patrols over the Arctic Ocean. Strate- gic
bombers including the turboprop Tu-95 (Bear), supersonic Tu-160 (Blackjack), and Tu-22M3
(Backfire) and the long-range anti-submarine war- fare patrol aircraft Tu-142 have flown patrols
since then.43 According to the Russian Air Force, the Tu- 95 bombers refueled in-flight to extend
their oper- ational patrol area.44 Patrolling Russian bombers penetrated the 12-mile air defense
identification zone surrounding Alaska 18 times during 2007.45 Since August 2007, the Russian
Air Force has flown more than 90 missions over the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans.46¶ The
Russian Navy is also expanding its presence in the Arctic for the first time since the end of the¶
Cold War.47 Lieutenant General Vladimir Sha- manov, head of the Defense Ministry’s combat
train- ing department, said that the Russian Navy is increasing the operational radius of the
Northern Fleet’s submarines and that Russia’s military strategy might be reoriented to meet
threats to the country’s interests in the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf.
Shamanov said that “we have a number of highly-professional military units in the Leningrad,
Siberian and Far Eastern military dis- tricts, which are specifically trained for combat in Arctic
regions.”48¶ On July 14, 2008, the Russian Navy announced that its fleet has “resumed a
warship presence in the Arctic.” These Arctic naval patrols include the area of the Spitsbergen
archipelago that belongs to Norway, a NATO member. Russia refuses to recognize Norway’s
right to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone around Spitsbergen. Russia deployed an
anti-subma- rine warfare destroyer followed by a guided-missile cruiser armed with 16 longrange anti-ship cruise missiles designed to destroy aircraft carriers.49¶ The resumption of Cold
War–style patrols and increased naval presence in the Arctic is in keeping with Moscow’s
more forward posture and is intended to increase its leverage vis-à-vis territorial claims.
Moscow is taking a dual approach of pro- jecting military power while invoking international
law. Regarding the naval deployments near Spits- bergen, the Russian Navy stated:¶ Sorties of
warships of the Northern Fleet will be made periodically with a necessary regu- larity. All actions
of the Russian warships are fulfilled strictly in accordance with the inter- national maritime law,
including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.50¶ At a meeting of the Russian
government’s Mari- time Board in April 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov backed a
policy of settling territorial disputes in the region with the countries bordering the Arctic
through cooperation. First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, who is now deputy prime
minister, stressed at the meeting that Russia observes the international law on the matter
through adherence to “two international conven- tions”: the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf, signed by Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S., and the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea.51¶ While paying lip service to international law, Russia’s
ambitious actions hearken back to 19th- century statecraft rather than the 21st-century lawbased policy and appear to indicate that the Kremlin believes that credible displays of power
will settle the conflicting territorial claims. By comparison, the West’s posture toward the
Arctic has been irresolute and inadequate.
US- Russia war causes extinction – a mere political crisis can trigger a nuclear
exchange.
Caldicott 2002 (Helen- Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility, The new nuclear
danger, p. 7-12)
The United States owns 103 nuclear power plants, plus many other dangerous radioactive
facilities related to past activities of the cold war. A 1000- kiloton bomb (1 megaton) landing on a
standard iooo megawatt reactor and its cooling pools, which contain intensely radioactive spent nuclear fuel, would
permanently contaminate an .' area the size of western Germany3 The International Atomic Energy
Agency now considers these facilities to be attractive terrorist targets, ' post-September 11,2001. Millions of decaying bodies-human
and animal alike-will rot, infected with viruses and bacteria that will mutate in the radioactive-environment to become more lethal.
Trillions of insects, naturally ' resistant to radiation-flies, fleas, cockroaches, and lice--will transmit disease from the dead to the
living, to people whose immune mechanisms have been severely compromised by the high levels of background radiation. Rodents
will multiply by the millions among the corpses and shattered sewerage systems. Epidemics of diseases now controlled by
immunization and good hygiene will reappear: such as measles, polio, typhoid, cholera, whooping cough, diphtheria, smallpox,
plague, tuberculosis, meningitis, malaria, and hepatitis. Anyone who makes it to a fallout shelter and is not asphyxiated in it, will
need to stay there for at least six months until the radiation decays sufficiently so outside survival is possible. It has been postulated
that perhaps older people should be sent outside to scavenge for food because they will not live long enough to develop
malignancies from the fallout (cancer and leukemia have long incubation periods ranging from five to sixty But any food that
manages to grow will be toxic because plants concentrate radioactive elements.*/ Finally, we must ¶ examine the systemic global
effects of a nuclear . , war. Firestorms will consume oil wells, chemical facilities, cities, and forests, covering the earth with a blanket
of thick, black, radioactive , I I ' smoke, reducing sunlight to 17 percent of normal. One year or more ' ) , will be required for light and
temperature to return to normalper-"r haps supranormal values, as sunlight would return to more than its , , usual intensity,
enhanced in the ultraviolet spectrum by depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer.
Subfreezing temperatures could
destroy ¶ the biological support system for civilization, resulting in massive starvation, thirst, and
hypothermia.5 To quote a 1985 SCOPE document published by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, "the
total loss of human agricultural and societal support systems would result in the loss of almost
all humans on Earth, essentially equally among combatant and noncombatant countries alike . . . this vulnerability is an
aspect not currently a part of the understanding of nuclear war; not only are the major combatant countries in danger, but virtually
the entire human population is being held hostage to the large-scale use of nuclear weapons. . . .",! i The proposed START I11 treaty
between Russia and America, even if it were implemented, would still allow 3000 to 5000 hydrogen bombs to be maintained on
alert." The threshold for nuclear winter? One thousand loo-kiloton bombs blowing up loo cities7-a I c distinct possibility given
current capabilities and targeting plans. On January 25,1995, military technicians at radar stations in northern Russia detected
signals from an American missile that had just been launched off the coast of Norway carrying a US. scientific probe. Although the
Russians had been previously notified of this launch, the alert had been forgotten or ignored. Aware that US. submarines could
launch a missile containing eight deadly hydrogen bombs fifteen minutes from Moscow, Russian officials assumed that America had
initiated a nuclear war. For the first time in history, the Russian computer containing nuclear launch codes was opened. President
Boris Yeltsin, sitting at that computer being advised on how to launch a nuclear war by his military officers, had only a three minute
interval to make a decision. At the last moment, the US. missile veered off course. He realized that Russia was not under attack.' If
Russia had launched its missiles, the US. early-warning satellites would immediately have detected them, and radioed back to
Cheyenne Mountain. This would have led to the notification of the president, who also would have had three minutes to make his
launch decision, and America's missiles would then have been fired from their silos. We were thus within minutes of global
annihilation that day. ,' Today, Russia's
early-warning and nuclear command systems are deteriorating.
Russia's early-warning system fails to operate up to seven hours a day because only one-third
of its radars are functional, and two of the nine global geographical areas covered by its
missile warning satellites are not under surveillance for missile detection.9 TO make matters worse,
the equipment controlling nuclear weapons malfunctions frequently, and critical electronic
devices and computers sometimes switch to combat mode for no apparent reason. According to
the CIA, seven times during the fall of 1996 operations at some Russian nuclear weapons facilities were severely disrupted when
robbers tried to "mine" critical communications cables for their copper!'" This vulnerable
Russian system could
easily be stressed by an internal or international political crisis, when the danger of accidental
or indeed intentional nuclear war would become very real. And the U.S. itself is not
invulnerable to error. In August 1999, for example, when the National Imagery and Mapping Agency was installing a new
computer system to deal with potential Y2K problems, this operation triggered a computer malfunction which rendered the agency
"blind" for days; it took more than eight months for the defect to be fully repaired. As the New York Times reported, part
of
America's nuclear early-warning system was rendered incompetent for almost a year." (At that
time I was sitting at a meeting in the west wing of the White House discussing potentially dangerous Y2K nuclear weapons glitches.
Several Pentagon officials blithely reassured me that everything would function normally during the roll-over. But in fact, their
intelligence system had already been disabled.) Such
a situation has the potential for catastrophe. If
America cannot observe what the Russians are doing with their nuclear weapons-or vice ¶
versa-especially during a serious international crisis they are likely to err on the side of "caution," which could mean that
something as benign as the launch of a weather satellite could actually trigger annihilation of the planet.
Mapping is key to resolve territorial conflicts.
Blank 11 (Blank, Stephen, senior fellow at Strategic Studies Institute. Russia in the Arctic. Pg.
11-13.Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011. Web.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1073.pdf>. XM)
The United States and Canada have joined efforts in mapping missions to determine the
boundary of each country’s Arctic continental shelves.35 The activities are part of the
multiyear, multiagency effort undertaken by the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, led by
the Department of State, with vice co-chairs from the Department of the Interior and the
National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The joint 2009 continental Shelf Survey
mission, which lasted from August 7 to September 16, 2009, marks the second year of such
cooperative endeavors.36 More such activities are planned for 2010.37 Mapping is important
for resolving any conflicting claims by other Arctic nations. For example, the United States and
Canada have likely claimed some of the same parts of the continental shelf.38 Canada and
Russia occupy 75 percent of the Arctic Ocean’s coastline. They each claim that the channels
between their Arctic islands and coasts are their “internal waters,” and that if a foreign vessel
needs to pass, it requires authorization. The position of the United States is that the Northern
Sea Route and Northwest Passage are “international straits.”39 Mapping data will help to
determine whether Russian claims conflict with U.S. and Canadian claims.
Negotiations are inevitable – establishing US presence via mapping gives us leverage.
Borgerson, 8 (Scott G, International Affairs Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations,
March/April 2008, Foreign Affairs, “Arctic Meltdown
The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,”
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63222/scott-g-borgerson/arctic-meltdown, AS)
The Arctic Ocean is melting, and it is melting fast. This past summer, the area covered by sea
ice shrank by more than one million square miles, reducing the Arctic icecap to only half the
size it was 50 years ago. For the first time, the Northwest Passage -- a fabled sea route to Asia
that European explorers sought in vain for centuries -- opened for shipping. Even if the
international community manages to slow the pace of climate change immediately and
dramatically, a certain amount of warming is irreversible. It is no longer a matter of if, but
when, the Arctic Ocean will open to regular marine transportation and exploration of its
lucrative natural-resource deposits.¶ Global warming has given birth to a new scramble for
territory and resources among the five Arctic powers. Russia was the first to stake its claim in
this great Arctic gold rush, in 2001. Moscow submitted a claim to the United Nations for
460,000 square miles of resource-rich Arctic waters, an area roughly the size of the states of
California, Indiana, and Texas combined. The UN rejected this ambitious annexation, but last
August the Kremlin nevertheless dispatched a nuclear-powered icebreaker and two
submarines to plant its flag on the North Pole's sea floor. Days later, the Russians
provocatively ordered strategic bomber flights over the Arctic Ocean for the first time since
the Cold War. Not to be outdone, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced funding
for new Arctic naval patrol vessels, a new deep-water port, and a cold-weather training center
along the Northwest Passage. Denmark and Norway, which control Greenland and the
Svalbard Islands, respectively, are also anxious to establish their claims.¶ While the other Arctic
powers are racing to carve up the region, the United States has remained largely on the
sidelines. The U.S. Senate has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
the leading international treaty on maritime rights, even though President George W. Bush,
environmental nongovernmental organizations, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard service
chiefs, and leading voices in the private sector support the convention. As a result, the United
States cannot formally assert any rights to the untold resources off Alaska's northern coast
beyond its exclusive economic zone -- such zones extend for only 200 nautical miles from each
Arctic state's shore -- nor can it join the UN commission that adjudicates such claims. Worse,
Washington has forfeited its ability to assert sovereignty in the Arctic by allowing its
icebreaker fleet to atrophy. The United States today funds a navy as large as the next 17 in the
world combined, yet it has just one seaworthy oceangoing icebreaker -- a vessel that was built
more than a decade ago and that is not optimally configured for Arctic missions. Russia, by
comparison, has a fleet of 18 icebreakers. And even China operates one icebreaker, despite its
lack of Arctic waters. Through its own neglect, the world's sole superpower -- a country that
borders the Bering Strait and possesses over 1,000 miles of Arctic coastline -- has been left out
in the cold.¶ Washington cannot afford to stand idly by. The Arctic region is not currently
governed by any comprehensive multilateral norms and regulations because it was never
expected to become a navigable waterway or a site for large-scale commercial development.
Decisions made by Arctic powers in the coming years will therefore profoundly shape the future
of the region for decades. Without U.S. leadership to help develop diplomatic solutions to
competing claims and potential conflicts, the region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its
resources.
Solvency - Mapping
Mapping is the only way to determine the extent of US territorial claims – that’s
a pre-requisite to anything.
Cohen et al 8 (Ariel, Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies @ Heritage, PhD
@ Tufts U, “The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic”,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/bg2202.pdf, AS)
The United States needs to develop a comprehen- sive policy for the Arctic, including diplomatic,
naval, military, and economic policy components. This should include swiftly mapping U.S. territorial claims
to determine their extent and to defend against claims by other countries. With oil and gas prices
recently at historic highs in a tight supply and demand environment, the rich hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic may bring some
relief to consumers. These resources, especially the hydrocarbons, also have the potential to significantly enhance the economy and
the energy security of North America and the world. Russian Ambitions. Russia recognizes the mul- tifaceted potential of the Arctic
and is moving rapidly to assert its national interests. Moscow has submitted a claim to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to
an area of 460,000 square miles— the size of Germany, France, and Italy combined. The Kremlin is pursuing its interests by
projecting military power into the region and by using diplo- matic instruments such as the Law of the Sea Treaty. Russia made a
show of planting its flag on the Arctic seabed in August 2007 and has resumed strategic bomber flights over the Arctic for the first
time since the end of the Cold War. While paying lip service to international law, Russia’s ambitious actions hearken back to 19thcentury statecraft rather than the 21st-century law- based policy and appear to indicate that the Kremlin believes that credible
displays of power will settle conflicting territorial claims. By comparison, the West’s posture toward the Arctic has been irresolute
and inadequate. This needs to change. Reestablishing the U.S. Arctic Presence. The
United States should not rely on
the findings of other nations that are mapping the Arctic floor. Timely mapping results are
necessary to defending and asserting U.S. rights in bilateral and multilateral fora. The U.S.
needs to increase its efforts to map the floor of the Arctic Ocean to determine the extent of
the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and ascertain the extent of legitimate U.S. claims to
territory beyond its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. To accomplish this, the U.S.
needs to upgrade its icebreaker fleet. The U.S. should also continue to cooperate and advance its interests with other
Arctic nations through venues such as the recent Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland. Specifically, the United States
should: • Create an interagency task force on the Arctic bringing together the Departments of Defense, State, Interior, and Energy
to develop the overall U.S. policy toward the region. The U.S. should use diplomatic, military, and economic means to maintain its
sovereignty in the Arctic, including establishing a Joint Task Force–Arctic Region Command, headed by a Coast Guard flag officer. The
U.S. should also establish an Arctic Coast Guard Forum modeled after the successful Northern Pacific Coast Guard Forum. •
Accelerate the acquisition of icebreakers to support the timely mapping of the Arctic OCS and the Arctic in general to advance U.S.
national interests. The
U.S. needs to swiftly map U.S. claims on the OCS and areas adjacent to
Alaska to preserve its sovereign territorial rights. Timely mapping will be important as the
other Arctic nations submit their claims within the 10-year window. The U.S. should not rely
on mapping from other countries to advance its claims or to defend against the claims of
other countries.
The US can defend its territorial claims independently – it’s only a question of
mapping out what those claims are.
Blank 11 (Blank, Stephen, senior fellow at Strategic Studies Institute. Russia in the Arctic. Pg.
11. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011. Web.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1073.pdf>. XM)
The policy statement urges the U.S. Senate to approve the U.S. accession to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) promptly. The United States
currently is not a party to the UNCLOS and therefore is not bound by any procedures and
determinations concluded through UNCLOS instruments. Instead, the United States is
pursuing its claims “as an independent, sovereign nation,” relying in part on Harry S. Truman’s
Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, which declares that any hydrocarbon or other resources
discovered beneath the U.S. continental shelf are the property of the United States.26 The
United States can defend its rights and claims through bilateral negotiations and in
multilateral venues such as the Arctic Ocean Conference in May 2008, which met in Ilulissat,
Greenland. Despite the new U.S. Arctic strategy, some have argued that the United States will
not have leverage or a “seat at the table” to pursue or defend its Arctic claims if the United
States is not a party to UNCLOS. However, U.S. attendance at the conference in Ilulissat as
well U.S. participation in the Arctic Council27 significantly weakened this argument. Even
though the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, other Arctic nations “are unable to assert
credible claims on U.S. territory in the Arctic or anywhere else in the world” because President
Truman already underlined U.S. rights to Arctic resources with his proclamation.28 Yet to
protect its rights, the United States needs to know how far its claims stretch into the Arctic
Ocean.
Treaty 1AC
Plan 2 – Treaty
Text: The United states federal government should negotiate an Arctic treaty to
resolve territorial disputes.
Inherency – Treaty
Warming has made the Arctic accessible. No adequate treaty to govern the
Arctic has been signed yet.
Struzik 10 (Struzik, Ed-2007 recipient of the Atkinson Fellowship in Public Policy and finalist for
the Grantham Prize for Excellence in Reporting on the Environment in 2008. "As the Far North
Melts, Calls Grow for Arctic Treaty." Environment 360. Yale, 14 June 2010. Web. 18 July 2014.
<http://e360.yale.edu/feature/as_the_far_north_melts_calls_grow_for_arctic_treaty/2281/>.
XM)
Until recently, the Arctic Ocean — locked in ice year-round, which prevents maritime passage
through the region and inhibits most resource exploitation — has not needed a strict regime
of protection. Regional issues have been resolved by the intergovernmental Arctic Council,
which has had non-binding authority to handle disputes among the eight Arctic states. But
WWF and a sizeable number of politicians, scientists, and academics are calling for a new form
of governance in the Arctic Ocean, which could be ice-free in summer within two decades,
opening up the region to an unprecedented surge of shipping, fishing, and hydrocarbon
development. “Few — if any — seriously question any longer that the Arctic Ocean meltdown
has now become irreversible,” said one of the WWF reports. “The governance and regulatory
regime that currently exists in the Arctic may have been adequate for a hostile environment
that allows very little human activity for most of the year. But when the Arctic Ocean becomes
increasingly similar to regional seas in other parts of the world for longer and longer parts of
the year, adequacy cannot be assumed and reform of the regime is indispensable.” Yet as
sorely needed as an international agreement on managing the Arctic may be, there is no
consensus on what an Arctic treaty would look like or whether a treaty or charter is the best
way to manage and protect economic, environmental, cultural, and security interests in the
region. The debate has broken down into two camps, those — such as WWF — that prefer a
“hard-law” approach of new treaties and protocols, and those who advocate a “soft-law”
approach of regional cooperation and management under existing regulations, such as the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Most everyone agrees, however, that failure
to cooperate in a more meaningful way will result in a series of chaotic scenarios that could
result in environmental disaster and heightened tensions among Arctic states. The idea of
drafting a treaty to deal with Arctic issues is nothing new. University of Toronto political
scientist Franklyn Griffiths came up with a proposal in 1979 that would have set up a
demilitarized zone in the Arctic in which polar nations would cooperate in areas of pollution
control and scientific study. Lincoln Bloomfield, the former director of Global Issues for the
National Security Council in the United States, expanded on that idea with a much broader
proposal two years later. The Soviet Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev gave the concept international
credibility in 1987 when he called for a treaty on cooperation in the Arctic. While the concept
has evolved, it has never been able to cut through the complexity of the issues in the Arctic.
The Antarctic Treaty, which went into effect in 1961, covered an uninhabited continent (save for
scientific bases) that was almost entirely covered in ice. The Antarctic Treaty and ensuing
protocols, signed by nations representing 80 percent of the world’s population, set aside the
southernmost continent as a scientific preserve. The treaty also bans military activities and
prohibits resource exploitation. Few international agreements have worked as well.
Arctic War – Treaty
Climate change has opened the Arctic to competition and there’s no applicable
legal regime to solve.
Rogate and Ferrara, 12 (Chiara and Marco, Chiara Rogate is an M.A. candidate at The Johns Hopkins University’s SAIS
Bologna Center. She graduated from the University of Bologna in 2008. After interning at the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) in Cairo and at NATO in Brussels she worked as a researcher at Isttituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale
(ISPI), and at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) in Milan, where she focused on climate change negotiations.¶ Marco Ferrara
is an M.A.I.A. candidate at The Johns Hopkins University’s SAIS Bologna Center. He graduated from the University of Bologna in
2011. For his undergraduate thesis he studied the evolution of international legal regimes within the Arctic, with a particular focus
on the effect of such regimes on the recent warming trends taking place in the region, 2012, Bologna Center of International Affairs,
John Hopkins, http://bcjournal.org/volume-15/climate-change-and-power-shifts-in-the-arctic-region.html, AS)
The effects of climate change can be paradoxical. While contributing stress to world habitats as
well as providing an impetus to rework the economic structures of states in order to mitigate
negative consequences of inefficient economic growth, climate change is unfreezing economic
opportunities, as seen in the case of the Arctic. The North increasingly has gained geopolitical
importance, with attention being centered on the Arctic Circle. Recently, ice shelves in the
region have receded at an alarming rate while temperatures have risen at twice the average of
rest of the world.19 The magnitude of these effects is apparent when considering that 40
percent of the perennial ice that characterizes this region has melted away in the last quarter
century alone.20 As a fulcrum of global climate change, the consequences of such warming
trends in the Arctic are apparent not only in the local environment, but throughout the world
due to a series of cascading effects that could engender further large-scale climatic change.21
The ‘great thaw’ has shifted the importance of the Arctic within the international arena both
politically and economically.¶ Even before the onset of global warming, the Arctic was already a
politically contentious area, principally because it is a weak point within the convoluted web
of treaty-based and customary international law. This is mostly due to the fact that unlike the
case of Antarctica, there is no overarching treaty governing the ‘High North’. The only
applicable international regime to this day remains the “Convention on Law of the Sea”, which
was signed in 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, and took force beginning in 1994. The treaty
establishes general rules for governing maritime navigation and resource exploitation, but does
not address issues that are particular to the Polar region, such as the need for a common
governance framework,22 nor does it take into account the region’s unique and delicate
environmental conditions. Additionally, the treaty has yet to be ratified by all of the Arctic
powers, undermining its legitimacy. Consequently, the unfreezing of the glaciers is creating a
legal “no-man’s land” without precedent.23 The lack of a systematic governance structure has
led to the occurrence of many conflicts as well as significant tension among the Arctic powers
– namely Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.A. – and has, therefore, made
involvement in the region sensitive to variations in the international balance.¶ Traditional and
longstanding conflicts in this region are numerous but tend to pivot around certain common
themes, such as disputes over contested strips of land, maritime boundary demarcation, and
fishing privileges. Such conflicts generally remained ‘frozen’ during the Cold War due to the
balance that existed between NATO and the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) as well as an
appreciation for the sensitive nature of the area occasionally dubbed the “New Mediterranean”
due to its strategic location between North America and present day Russia.24 Both sides found
it prudent to bury ongoing conflicts in the area lest they risk worsening existing tensions.25
After the end of the Cold War, conflicts in the area remained crystallized and unresolved for
much the opposite reason, namely the region’s relative irrelevance within the new international
order. However, conflict has remained and the temporary deflation of the Russian threat
created the possibility for broader disagreements over the Arctic among NATO partners.26¶
With the onset of the 21st century, the ‘grace period’ of relative tranquility in the region
ended due to several factors. Primarily, the precarious situation was exacerbated by the onset
of global climate change, which added a layer of fresh conflicts to the existing strata of frozen
ones. There is no consensus regarding the significance of environmental change on the evolving
political situation in the region,27 but climate change has contributed to making exploration and
exploitation of the region commercially appealing. Examples can be found in the opening of new
sea-lanes, such as the Northwestern and Northeastern Passages,28 in addition to making the
extraction of resources – specifically hydrocarbons such as oil and natural gas – from the Arctic
seabed economically feasible.29¶ The 2008 U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic holds
up to 22% of untapped global reserves of energy resources.30 The potential wealth of such
untapped natural resources is drawing the Arctic from the periphery back into mainstream
international politics as nations scramble to strengthen and consolidate their influence over the
region. It is therefore fair to state that global climate change, along with significant technological
innovations in extraction processes and infrastructure,31 is contributing to the transformation
of the Arctic from a backwater to a key geographical entity, resulting in premonitions of the
Arctic as the background for the “Great Game” of the 21st Century.32 The Arctic thaw has not
simply unfrozen the former perennial ice shelves, but has also sparked new conflicts on top of
established ones, thus compounding an environmental problem with acrimonious political
disputes over resources. The lack of an applicable framework of international law has
therefore made the Arctic a region in which it is possible to observe international anarchy in
one of its purest and most striking forms, as states with divergent interests rush to establish
their claims and plant a foothold in this contested area.
US dis-involvement creates conflicts – Arctic states are making territorial claims
with their militaries.
Borgerson, 9 (Scott G, International Affairs Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations,
3/25/09, Foreign Affairs, “The Great Game Moves North
As the Arctic Melts, Countries Vie for Control,”
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64905/scott-g-borgerson/the-great-game-moves-north,
AS)
The Arctic is the fastest-warming region on earth and continues to melt at a breathtaking rate.
Last summer, for the first time in history, the polar icecap retreated far enough to open sea
routes north of Eurasia as well as North America, and it is expected to be completely ice-free
during the summer months in 2013. Boreal forests are appearing where there was once just
frozen tundra, and last summer, the first wild fire was recorded north of Alaska's Brooks range,
in a region where the local Inuit dialects lack a word for forest fire.¶ In an article in Foreign
Affairs last year, I described how not only is the climate changing fast, but the region's
geopolitics are also rapidly transforming. As the Arctic coastal states begin to make claims
over both these transit passages and newly accessible deep-water resources, a Great Game is
developing in the world's far north.¶ The next few years will be critical in determining whether
the region's long-term future will be one of international harmony and the rule of law, or a
Hobbesian free-for-all. Although the Bush administration took a huge step by publishing a new
Arctic policy during its final week in office, the Obama administration must do far more to keep
Washington from being further marginalized in this geostrategically important region.¶ The
polar icecap in the central Arctic Ocean thinned by half between 2001 and 2007. Other signs -such as warmer deep-water ocean currents, greater albedo feedback loops, and massive ice
shelves breaking free -- point to further melting. Scientists are increasingly concerned that the
thawing permafrost will disgorge millions of tons of methane, unleashing what some refer to
as a "climate bomb," a runaway warming cycle that could dramatically raise the planet's
temperature.¶ The Arctic may be open to year-round shipping within a few decades, if not
sooner. Eventually, the Arctic, like the Baltic Sea or Great Lakes, will freeze in the winter and
melt in the summer. Shipping companies are taking notice. The German-based Beluga Shipping
company, for example, is planning to move cargo from the Atlantic to the Pacific via the
Northeast Passage this summer unassisted by icebreaker escort.¶ Last July, the U.S. Geological
Survey released the first-ever comprehensive assessment of the region's oil and gas potential,
and the numbers are staggering. Based on a resource appraisal of technically recoverable
hydrocarbons, the Arctic contains about 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and about
30 percent of the world's undiscovered natural gas. Together this represents 22 percent of all
untapped but technically recoverable hydrocarbons. More than 80 percent of these resources
lie offshore.¶ Due to the ongoing global economic crisis, development of these oil and gas
fields has proceeded in fits and starts. The price of energy needs to be high enough to make
production in such an extreme environment economically viable. To complicate matters even
more, some Arctic coastal states have not settled on the regulatory standards for
development. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court, for example, ruled last November that before the
Royal Dutch Shell company can move forward with exploratory drilling in the Beaufort Sea north
of Alaska -- for which it had already paid the U.S. government billions of dollars in leases -- the
U.S. Interior Department needs to further study the environmental impacts of drilling on the
sea's bowhead whale population and nearby indigenous communities.¶ Similarly, Norway has
barred production of oil and gas in some of its northern waters, despite the Norwegian company
StatoilHydro partnering with Gazprom, the state-owned Russian energy giant, in the Russian
Arctic. While Norway is struggling with this contradiction, Russia seems to have no such qualms
and has dived headlong into massive Arctic nonrenewable energy projects. Gazprom hopes to
bring the enormous Shtokman field, in the Barents Sea, on stream by 2013. The field holds
enough gas to provide all of the United States' electricity needs for six years, and Gazprom is
eagerly eyeing the U.S. energy market, envisioning regular shipments of liquefied natural gas to
import facilities in Maryland and Georgia.¶ Given the high stakes and pace of Arctic climate
change, countries that border the ocean are working to extend their sovereignty in the region.
After its controversial flag-planting on the North Pole seafloor in 2007, Russia moved to further
bolster its Arctic presence in 2008. In addition to strategic bomber flights to the edge of U.S.,
Canadian, Norwegian, and Danish airspace, the Russian navy began patrolling Arctic waters last
summer for the first time since the Cold War. On the eve of President Barack Obama's first visit
to Canada in late February, the Canadian air force scrambled fighter jets to intercept Russian
long-range bombers.¶ The Russian federal government plans to invest more than a billion dollars
in the northern port of Murmansk, doubling the port's capacity by 2015. Moscow also pledged
last summer to build at least three new nuclear icebreaker ships to join what is already the
world's largest icebreaker fleet. And much to the chagrin of environmentalists, Moscow
completed a reactor vessel for the first floating nuclear power plant in October 2008.¶ Russia has
developed a muscular new national security program that views the Arctic as a strategically
vital territory. Last September, Nikolai Patrushev, the former head of the FSB (the successor
agency to the KGB) and current secretary of the Russian Security Council, declared that "the
Arctic must become Russia's main strategic resource base," and a forthcoming Russian plan for
developing the Arctic over the next decade reportedly threatens that it "cannot be ruled out
that the battle for raw materials will be waged with military means."¶ Russia is not alone.
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper held a cabinet meeting last August in the Arctic town
of Inuvik, more than 2,500 miles north of Ottawa, to pledge his commitment to defend Canadian
Arctic sovereignty. In 2008, Canada conducted its largest military exercise ever in the region
and blocked the sale of Canadian radar technology to a U.S. buyer on national security
grounds. In addition, Ottawa committed $40 million to scientific research projects to support its
Arctic seabed claims. Meanwhile, Greenland passed a home-rule referendum in November that
will eventually lead to independence from Denmark "in the not too distant future," in the words
of Hans Enoksen, the current Siumut prime minister; the European Union has a new Arctic
policy and plans for building its own icebreaker; and at the end of January, NATO held a
conference in Iceland about its future mission in the Arctic.¶ Even Asian countries with no Arctic
coastlines are getting into the game. The Chinese sent its icebreaker, the Snow Dragon, on its
third Arctic expedition last summer. Beijing successfully earned observer status to the Arctic
Council and also plans to install its first long-term deep-sea monitoring system in the Arctic to
keep an eye on long-term marine changes and the impacts of global warming on China's climate.
South Korean and Singaporean shipyards are building massive new icebreakers and icestrengthened tankers to navigate new Arctic routes. Japan is closely watching the shorter
shipping routes opening up in the region, which will benefit Japanese businesses due to the
country's northern latitude.¶ Last May, top officials from the United States, Canada, Denmark,
Norway, and Russia gathered in Greenland to declare their mutual commitment to the rule of
law and to behaving peacefully in the new Arctic. At the same time, Arctic countries are closely
collaborating on mapping the area's seafloor, with scientists from one country frequently sailing
on icebreakers of another. On the face of it, everyone seems to be getting along swimmingly.¶
But all of this camaraderie is at odds with the growing remilitarization of the Arctic. The region
is in the midst of transforming from a frozen, sleepy backwater into a potential epicenter of
world affairs. How this all plays out in the geopolitical development of the region is a story that
is very much still being written. The plot is full of characters espousing the rhetoric of
cooperation yet pursuing their self-interests, and the conclusion could lead in multiple
directions.¶ The United States, however, remains largely asleep at the wheel. In the future,
contests over fresh water, political instability from forced migrations, and increasingly severe
pandemics due to global warming will become only more common
These conflicts go nuclear.
Wallace and Stephens, 10 (Michael and Steven, Michael Wallace is Professor Emeritus at
the University of British Columbia; Steven Staples is President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa,
March 2010, Canadian Pugwash, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue”
AS)
The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President
Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last
year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training
for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.”55
Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time
in 15 years.56¶ In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a
National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the
preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic,
including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the
Arctic.57¶ The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to
withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in
Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the
Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this
renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence.¶ The
Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian
sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military
training base and a deep-water port.¶ Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence
position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent
that draws on army, navy and air force assets with ship- based helicopters able to drop troops
anywhere.58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace.¶ Last year
Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for
Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000
soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil
rigs.59¶ The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after
Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About
12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved.¶ Jayantha Dhanapala, President of
Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation
bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being
expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the Russian
Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge
on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied
NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict
escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”61 Many will no doubt argue that this is
excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military
confrontation can be taken lightly.
Specifically, Russia is insistent on establishing military capabilities to back up its
unreasonable territorial claims.
Cohen et al, 8 (Ariel Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D., and Jim Dolbow, Senior Research Fellows and
PhD’s in ¶ Russian and Eurasian Studies Aand International Energy ¶ Security, Oct 30 2008, The
Heritage Foundation “The New Cold War: ¶ Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic”)
After its invasion of Georgia, Russia has clearly hardened its international posture and is
increas- ingly relying on power, not international law, to set- tle its claims. Moscow has also
intensified its anti- American policies and rhetoric and is likely to chal- lenge U.S. interests
whenever and wherever it can, including in the High North.¶ Russia takes its role as an Arctic
power seriously. In 2001, Russia submitted to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea a
formal claim for an area of 1.2 million square kilometers (460,000 square miles) that runs from
the undersea Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev Ridge to the North Pole. This is roughly the
combined area of Germany, France, and Italy.32 The U.N. commission did not accept the claim
and requested “additional data and informa- tion.”33 Russia responded by sending a scientific
mission of a nuclear-powered icebreaker and two ously organized media event, the mission
planted the Russian flag on the ocean’s floor at the Lomonosov Ridge after collecting soil
samples that supposedly prove that the ridge is part of the Eur- asian landmass. During the
mission, Deputy Chair- man of the Russian Duma Artur Chilingarov, the veteran Soviet explorer
heading the scientific expe- dition, declared, “The Arctic is ours and we should demonstrate
our presence.”34 Such statements run counter to the spirit and potential of international
cooperation and seem inappropriate for a scientific mission.The U.S. has objected to these
claims and stated that they have “major flaws.” Professor Timo Koi- vurova of the University of
Lapland in Finland stated that “oceanic ridges cannot be claimed as part of the state’s
continental shelf.”35 Russia intends to resubmit its claim by 2009.36¶ Russia is also moving
rapidly to establish a phys- ical sea, ground, and air presence in the Arctic. In August 2008,
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a law that allows “the government to allocate
strategic oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf without auctions.” The law restricts
participa- tion to companies with five years’ experience in a region’s continental shelf and in
which the govern- ment holds at least a 50 percent share, effectively¶ allowing only statecontrolled Gazprom and Ros- neft to participate.37 President Medvedev also fea- tured the
Arctic prominently in the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept, which states: “In accor- dance
with the international law, Russia intends to establish the boundaries of its continental shelf,
thus expanding opportunities for exploration and exploitation of its mineral resources.”38¶
During 2008, Russian icebreakers have con- stantly patrolled in the Arctic. Russia has 18 operational icebreakers, the largest flotilla of icebreakers in the world.39 Seven are nuclear, including
the 50 Years of Victory, the largest icebreaker in the world.40 Russia is planning to build new
nuclear-powered icebreakers starting in 2015. Experts estimate that Russia will need to build six
to 10 nuclear icebreak- ers over the next 20 years to maintain and expand its current level of
operations.41 Russia’s presence in the Arctic will allow the Kremlin to take de facto possession
of the underwater territories currently in dispute.¶ In addition to icebreakers, Russia is
constructing an Arctic oil rig in the northern shipbuilding center of Severodvinsk, which will be
completed by 2010. The rig will be the first of its kind, capable of oper- ating in temperatures as
low as minus 50 degrees Celsius (minus 58 degrees Fahrenheit) and with- stand the impact of ice
packs. The new rig was com- missioned by the state-controlled Gazprom and demonstrates that
Russia is serious about oil explo- ration in the Arctic.42 Russia’s Polar Saber Rattling¶ In August
2007, shortly after sending the scien- tific expedition to the Arctic ridge, then Russian President
Vladimir Putin ordered the resumption of regular air patrols over the Arctic Ocean. Strate- gic
bombers including the turboprop Tu-95 (Bear), supersonic Tu-160 (Blackjack), and Tu-22M3
(Backfire) and the long-range anti-submarine war- fare patrol aircraft Tu-142 have flown patrols
since then.43 According to the Russian Air Force, the Tu- 95 bombers refueled in-flight to extend
their oper- ational patrol area.44 Patrolling Russian bombers penetrated the 12-mile air defense
identification zone surrounding Alaska 18 times during 2007.45 Since August 2007, the Russian
Air Force has flown more than 90 missions over the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans.46¶ The
Russian Navy is also expanding its presence in the Arctic for the first time since the end of the¶
Cold War.47 Lieutenant General Vladimir Sha- manov, head of the Defense Ministry’s combat
train- ing department, said that the Russian Navy is increasing the operational radius of the
Northern Fleet’s submarines and that Russia’s military strategy might be reoriented to meet
threats to the country’s interests in the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf.
Shamanov said that “we have a number of highly-professional military units in the Leningrad,
Siberian and Far Eastern military dis- tricts, which are specifically trained for combat in Arctic
regions.”48¶ On July 14, 2008, the Russian Navy announced that its fleet has “resumed a
warship presence in the Arctic.” These Arctic naval patrols include the area of the Spitsbergen
archipelago that belongs to Norway, a NATO member. Russia refuses to recognize Norway’s
right to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone around Spitsbergen. Russia deployed an
anti-subma- rine warfare destroyer followed by a guided-missile cruiser armed with 16 longrange anti-ship cruise missiles designed to destroy aircraft carriers.49¶ The resumption of Cold
War–style patrols and increased naval presence in the Arctic is in keeping with Moscow’s
more forward posture and is intended to increase its leverage vis-à-vis territorial claims.
Moscow is taking a dual approach of pro- jecting military power while invoking international
law. Regarding the naval deployments near Spits- bergen, the Russian Navy stated:¶ Sorties of
warships of the Northern Fleet will be made periodically with a necessary regu- larity. All actions
of the Russian warships are fulfilled strictly in accordance with the inter- national maritime law,
including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.50¶ At a meeting of the Russian
government’s Mari- time Board in April 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov backed a
policy of settling territorial disputes in the region with the countries bordering the Arctic
through cooperation. First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, who is now deputy prime
minister, stressed at the meeting that Russia observes the international law on the matter
through adherence to “two international conven- tions”: the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf, signed by Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S., and the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea.51¶ While paying lip service to international law, Russia’s
ambitious actions hearken back to 19th- century statecraft rather than the 21st-century lawbased policy and appear to indicate that the Kremlin believes that credible displays of power
will settle the conflicting territorial claims. By comparison, the West’s posture toward the
Arctic has been irresolute and inadequate.
US- Russia war causes extinction – a mere political crisis can trigger a nuclear
exchange.
Caldicott 2002 (Helen- Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility, The new nuclear
danger, p. 7-12)
The United States owns 103 nuclear power plants, plus many other dangerous radioactive
facilities related to past activities of the cold war. A 1000- kiloton bomb (1 megaton) landing on a
standard iooo megawatt reactor and its cooling pools, which contain intensely radioactive spent nuclear fuel, would
permanently contaminate an .' area the size of western Germany3 The International Atomic Energy
Agency now considers these facilities to be attractive terrorist targets, ' post-September 11,2001. Millions of decaying bodies-human
and animal alike-will rot, infected with viruses and bacteria that will mutate in the radioactive-environment to become more lethal.
Trillions of insects, naturally ' resistant to radiation-flies, fleas, cockroaches, and lice--will transmit disease from the dead to the
living, to people whose immune mechanisms have been severely compromised by the high levels of background radiation. Rodents
will multiply by the millions among the corpses and shattered sewerage systems. Epidemics of diseases now controlled by
immunization and good hygiene will reappear: such as measles, polio, typhoid, cholera, whooping cough, diphtheria, smallpox,
plague, tuberculosis, meningitis, malaria, and hepatitis. Anyone who makes it to a fallout shelter and is not asphyxiated in it, will
need to stay there for at least six months until the radiation decays sufficiently so outside survival is possible. It has been postulated
that perhaps older people should be sent outside to scavenge for food because they will not live long enough to develop
malignancies from the fallout (cancer and leukemia have long incubation periods ranging from five to sixty But any food that
manages to grow will be toxic because plants concentrate radioactive elements.*/ Finally, we must ¶ examine the systemic global
effects of a nuclear . , war. Firestorms will consume oil wells, chemical facilities, cities, and forests, covering the earth with a blanket
of thick, black, radioactive , I I ' smoke, reducing sunlight to 17 percent of normal. One year or more ' ) , will be required for light and
temperature to return to normalper-"r haps supranormal values, as sunlight would return to more than its , , usual intensity,
enhanced in the ultraviolet spectrum by depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer.
Subfreezing temperatures could
destroy ¶ the biological support system for civilization, resulting in massive starvation, thirst, and
hypothermia.5 To quote a 1985 SCOPE document published by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, "the
total loss of human agricultural and societal support systems would result in the loss of almost
all humans on Earth, essentially equally among combatant and noncombatant countries alike . . . this vulnerability is an
aspect not currently a part of the understanding of nuclear war; not only are the major combatant countries in danger, but virtually
the entire human population is being held hostage to the large-scale use of nuclear weapons. . . .",! i The proposed START I11 treaty
between Russia and America, even if it were implemented, would still allow 3000 to 5000 hydrogen bombs to be maintained on
alert." The threshold for nuclear winter? One thousand loo-kiloton bombs blowing up loo cities7-a I c distinct possibility given
current capabilities and targeting plans. On January 25,1995, military technicians at radar stations in northern Russia detected
signals from an American missile that had just been launched off the coast of Norway carrying a US. scientific probe. Although the
Russians had been previously notified of this launch, the alert had been forgotten or ignored. Aware that US. submarines could
launch a missile containing eight deadly hydrogen bombs fifteen minutes from Moscow, Russian officials assumed that America had
initiated a nuclear war. For the first time in history, the Russian computer containing nuclear launch codes was opened. President
Boris Yeltsin, sitting at that computer being advised on how to launch a nuclear war by his military officers, had only a three minute
interval to make a decision. At the last moment, the US. missile veered off course. He realized that Russia was not under attack.' If
Russia had launched its missiles, the US. early-warning satellites would immediately have detected them, and radioed back to
Cheyenne Mountain. This would have led to the notification of the president, who also would have had three minutes to make his
launch decision, and America's missiles would then have been fired from their silos. We were thus within minutes of global
annihilation that day. ,' Today, Russia's
early-warning and nuclear command systems are deteriorating.
Russia's early-warning system fails to operate up to seven hours a day because only one-third
of its radars are functional, and two of the nine global geographical areas covered by its
missile warning satellites are not under surveillance for missile detection.9 TO make matters worse,
the equipment controlling nuclear weapons malfunctions frequently, and critical electronic
devices and computers sometimes switch to combat mode for no apparent reason. According to
the CIA, seven times during the fall of 1996 operations at some Russian nuclear weapons facilities were severely disrupted when
robbers tried to "mine" critical communications cables for their copper!'" This vulnerable
Russian system could
easily be stressed by an internal or international political crisis, when the danger of accidental
or indeed intentional nuclear war would become very real. And the U.S. itself is not
invulnerable to error. In August 1999, for example, when the National Imagery and Mapping Agency was installing a new
computer system to deal with potential Y2K problems, this operation triggered a computer malfunction which rendered the agency
"blind" for days; it took more than eight months for the defect to be fully repaired. As the New York Times reported, part
of
America's nuclear early-warning system was rendered incompetent for almost a year." (At that
time I was sitting at a meeting in the west wing of the White House discussing potentially dangerous Y2K nuclear weapons glitches.
Several Pentagon officials blithely reassured me that everything would function normally during the roll-over. But in fact, their
intelligence system had already been disabled.) Such
a situation has the potential for catastrophe. If
America cannot observe what the Russians are doing with their nuclear weapons-or vice ¶
versa-especially during a serious international crisis they are likely to err on the side of "caution," which could mean that
something as benign as the launch of a weather satellite could actually trigger annihilation of the planet.
An Arctic treaty is key to creating an effective governance structure that can
resolve territorial disputes.
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): pag. 332-333.
2009. Web.
<https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>. XM)
In addition to addressing conflicting territorial sovereignty claims and preservation of the
Arctic environment, an Arctic treaty should also address security concerns. Like the Antarctic
Treaty, a treaty in the Arctic should express that the Arctic shall be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes. Additionally, it is critical that an Arctic treaty include: provisions for
enforcement, penalties for signatories who breach its terms, and a provision for dispute
resolution. Thus, an Arctic treaty is the most optimal framework for Arctic governance, as it is
has the potential to address the wide range of issues that face this distinctive region, and
assure future cooperation among the States. The rapidity with which the Arctic is melting and
the approaching State deadlines imposed by UNCLOS for CLCS submissions demand that the
States work on developing a treaty now. Representatives of the five Arctic States met most
recently in Ilulissat, Greenland, in May 2008, at which time they issued a joint declaration
acknowledging the changing conditions of the Arctic due to climate change. The declaration also
indicated an intention and commitment to continued Arctic governance under UNCLOS. In
apparent response to the growing criticism of that approach, the declaration stressed the five
States’ commitment to cooperating with each other, and concluded, “We therefore see no
need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.”
The Arctic States’ adherence to the UNCLOS framework, however, is fraught with the
potential for future conflict as issues arise for which the treaty has not provided. The time to
develop an Arctic treaty is now, while the States are expressing a commitment to cooperation,
and before any one State gains an advantage over the others by successfully securing
sovereignty over a portion of the Arctic. Because of the uncertainty as to the strength of each
State’s claim, and the risk to each that sovereignty may be denied it in favor of another State,
it would be in each State’s best interest to enter into an Arctic treaty now to assure its
continuing role in governance of the region.
Solvency – Treaty
Only a new treaty would solve the laundry list of issues in the arctic.
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): pag. 333-334.
2009. Web.
<https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>. XM)
While the opening of shorter navigational routes and the increasing accessibility of natural
resources, including oil, coal, and gas, may be advantageous to the economies of the Arctic
States, the melting of the polar ice caps will also result in global and regional climate changes,
increased sea levels worldwide, and detrimental consequences for the Arctic environment and
its native marine populations, which are of vital significance to the rest of the world.186 Much
of the dispute over territory in the Arctic stems from uncertainty due to the lack of knowledge
and scientific data regarding this long-overlooked region of the world. Each of the five Arctic
States asserting claims to the region are doing so on a variety of bases, from historical claims
to scientific claims, unsure of which will prove effective under international law. While
UNCLOS has been the international legal framework utilized in the Arctic to date, it will be
insufficient in addressing all the concerns that plague the Arctic, regardless of whether the
United States ratifies the treaty. The Arctic requires its own system of governance that can
address its unique features, as “[n]o one wins if the region remains a lawless frontier.”187 The
Arctic is too valuable and too significant to processes throughout the world to allow it to
remain unregulated. If the sovereignty dispute is somehow resolved through UNCLOS or some
other process without an Arctic treaty in place, the entire world will be at the mercy of a few
States. Whichever States gain sovereignty rights will be free to fully exploit the region with the
rest of the world helpless to stop them. An Arctic treaty, however, can strike a balance
between preserving the Arctic of yesterday and developing the Arctic of tomorrow.
2AC
XT Russian Buildup
Russia is concentrating its military resources in the Arctic to access its
resources.
Mitchell, 14 (Jon, Foreign Policy Journal, 4/23/14, “Russia’s Territorial Ambition and Increased
Military Presence in the Arctic,” http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/04/23/russiasterritorial-ambition-and-increased-military-presence-in-the-arctic/, AS)
As the U.S. and E.U. keep a very close eye on the situation with Russia and Ukraine, Russia is also increasing
its presence
and influence elsewhere: the Arctic – a melting region that is opening up prime shipping lanes and real estate with an
estimated $1 trillion in hydrocarbons.[1] With the opening of two major shipping routes, the North Sea route and the Northwest
Passage, the
potential for economic competition is fierce, especially among the eight members of the Arctic
council: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Russia, and the United States.[2]¶ President Putin made
statements this week concerning Russia’s national interests in the Arctic region: chiefly,
militarization and the preparation of support elements for commercial shipping routes.[3] The Russian President called for full
government funding for “socio-economic development” from 2017-2020, including a system of Russian naval bases
that would be home to ships and submarines allocated specifically for the defense of national interests that
involve the protection of Russian oil and gas facilities in the Arctic.[4] Russia is also attempting to accelerate
the construction of more icebreakers to take part in its Arctic strategy.[5]¶ The Russian Federation recently
staked a territorial claim in the Sea of Okhotsk for 52,000 square kilometers,[6] and is currently preparing an Arctic
water claim for 1.2 million square kilometers.[7] The energy giant owns 43 of the approximate
60 hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic Circle.[8] With Russian energy companies already developing hydrocarbon deposits
and expanding border patrols on its Arctic sea shelf (in place by July 1, 2014),[9] Putin is actively pursuing a strong
approach to the Arctic region. Russian oil fields, which significantly contribute to the country’s revenue, are in
decline – forcing Russian oil companies to actively explore the Arctic region.[10] While the U.S. Defense
Secretary called for a peaceful and stable Arctic region with international cooperation, the Arctic has created increased
militarization efforts, particularly by Russia.¶ Already the Arctic has seen powerful warships of Russia’s Northern Fleet,
strategic bomber patrols, and airborne troop exercises.[11] In fact, Russian military forces have been permanently stationed in the
Arctic since summer 2013.[12] According to a source in the Russian General Staff, a new military command titled Northern Fleet –
Joint Strategic Command, will be created and tasked to protect Russian interests in its Arctic territories; a strategy that was
approved in 2009.[13] Furthermore, weapons
developers are being tasked with creating products that
can face the harsh Arctic environment. According to an RT report, “Putin ordered the head of the Russian arms
industry, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, to concentrate the efforts on creation of Arctic infrastructure for the soonest
deployment of troops. Rogozin reported that all Russian weapons systems can be produced with special features needed in the
extreme North and the weapons companies were ready to supply such arms to the Defense Ministry.”[14]¶ The “Arctic
infrastructure” that Rogozin refers to will include Navy and Border Guard Service bases.[15] These bases are part of Putin’s aim to
strengthen Russian energy companies and military positions in the Arctic region. In 2013, a formerly closed down base was reopened
in the Novosibirsk Islands and is now home to 10 military ships and four icebreakers – a move that Reuters called “a demonstration
of force.”[16] The Defense Ministry is also planning on bringing seven airstrips in the Arctic back to life.[17]¶ Russia’s militarization in
the Arctic region is only a part of its increasing activity throughout the globe. Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said, “It’s crucially
important for us to set goals for our national interests in this region. If we don’t do that, we will lose the battle for resources which
means we’ll also lose in a big battle for the right to have sovereignty and independence.”[18] On the contrary, Aleksandr Gorban, a
representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry is quoted saying that a “war for resources”[19] in the Arctic will never happen.¶ But
what was once a more hands-off region of the world that provided international cooperation and stability is now
turning into a race for sovereignty and resources claims – as evidenced not only by Russia’s increasing military
presence, but also Canada and the United States. Canada is now allocating part of its defense budget
towards armed ships that will patrol its part of the Arctic Circle,[20] while the United States has planned a
strategy of its own. In addition to conducting military exercises with other Arctic nation members, the U.S. Navy has proposed a
strategy titled The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030 that was released in February 2014. The 2013 National
Strategy for the Arctic Region, cited in the Arctic Roadmap, provides the Navy’s two specific objectives for the Arctic: 1) advance
United States’ security interests; and 2) strengthen international cooperation.[21] According to the strategy, the Navy’s role will
primarily be in support of search and rescue, law enforcement, and civil support operations.[22] However, this may grow to a more
militarized strategy depending on the U.S. government’s view of Russia’s increased military activity in the Arctic region over the next
few years. In either case, the
U.S. is falling behind in Arctic preparation. It has very few operational
icebreakers for the Arctic region where its only primary presence is seen through nuclear submarines and unmanned aerial
vehicles, according to an RT article.[23] Until 2020, the Navy will primarily use its submarines and limited air assets in the Arctic,
while its mid-term and far-term strategy emphasizes personnel, surface ships, submarines, and air assets that will be prepared for
Arctic conditions and operations.[24] Despite its mid and long-term
strategy, the U.S. will already be lagging
in establishing a military presence to compete with Russia’s, who already has strategies in motion until 2020
and later.¶ Last month, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a united Canadian-U.S. counterbalance to Russia’s Arctic
presence, pointing out “they have been aggressively reopening military bases.”[25] While the U.S. cannot legitimately criticize Putin
for opening military bases and simultaneously avoid blatant hypocrisy, it is worth noting that Russia
is developing a
strong military presence in a potentially competitive region. Russia’s plans to reopen bases and create an
Arctic military command fosters the conclusion that Russia wants to be the first established dominant force
in a new region that will host economic competition and primary shipping lanes, albeit in a harsh environment that makes it
difficult to extract resources. Nicholas Cunningham aptly stated “both Russia and the West fear losing out to the other in the far
north, despite what appears to be a small prize.”[26]
The status quo guarantees war – aggressive Russian posturing incites
widespread militarization over resources and trade.
Trent, 11 (C. Packard, Naval Postgraduate School, 3-2011, “An evaluation of the Arctic--will it
become an area of cooperation or conflict?,” http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10783, AS)
“Russia is the most determined and assertive player in the Arctic.”238 Russia’s
¶
behavior with regards to the
Arctic can be viewed as aggressive and unpredictable. ¶ “Russia’s approach to Arctic affairs has been of two
minds and thus sometimes confusing ¶ and difficult to interpret. Self-assertive and occasionally aggressive
rhetoric has ¶ alternated with more conciliatory signals and practical compliance with
international ¶ law.”239 For example, in August 2007, a Russian submersible on a research expedition deposited a Russian
flag on the seabed of the North Pole as a symbolic act.240 However, ¶ the leader of the expedition, Artur Chilingarov, thought that it
was more than a symbolic ¶ act by stating, "I don't give a damn what all these foreign politicians there are saying ¶ about this. If
someone doesn't like this, let them go down themselves…and then try to ¶ put something there. Russia
must win. Russia has
Arctic has ¶ always been Russian."241 At the same time, Russia is abiding by international
law, ¶ settling decade’s long disputes, and participating in the Ilulissat Declaration with the ¶ other Arctic nations. ¶ Russia’s
Security Strategy for the Arctic, National Security Strategy of the ¶ Russian Federation until 2020, emphasizes
cooperation but the policy also stresses the ¶ importance of a continued military presence, the
need to “maintain a ‘necessary combat ¶ potential’ in the North and reveals plans to establish special Arctic military formations to ¶
protect the country’s national interests ‘in various military and political situations.’”242 ¶ The policy
considers the use of military force to resolve competition for energy near ¶ Russia’s borders or those of its
what it takes to win. The
allies: “in case of a competitive struggle for resources it is ¶ not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use
military might. ¶ The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can ¶ be changed.”243 The
struggle for resources is not the only area of the policy that identifies a threat: ¶ The National Security
Strategy also
asserts that the Northeast Passage is a ¶ national transportation route under Russian
jurisdiction and that any ¶ nation’s efforts to change that legal status will be seen as a threat
to ¶ Russia’s national security. Russia perceives this shipping channel as ¶ potentially developing into the central link in a
maritime network ¶ connecting Europe and Asia giving it significant authority and control ¶ over a major transport artery.24
Russia has many plans to build their combat capability in the Arctic and among ¶ them is to modernize its
Northern Fleet with a major naval build up. Russia has the ¶ largest and most powerful icebreaker fleet in
the world, with 24 icebreakers,245 and plans ¶ to build three to four third generation icebreakers246 with the first being built by
2015.247 ¶ Of the 24 icebreakers, seven are nuclear powered, including the world’s largest ¶ icebreaker, the 50 Years of
Victory. In recent years, the Russian icebreakers have begun ¶ to regularly patrol the Arctic, and the icebreaker fleet is a key to the
region’s economic ¶ development. 248 Moscow
¶
has plans to build eight Borei class nuclear powered ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs), one of which, the Yury Dolgoruky, has been completed, but ¶ is not yet in service. It took
approximately 12 years to complete the Yury Dolgoruky and ¶ the ambitious plan is to have all eight completed by 2015.249 These
submarines will be ¶ armed with 16 to 20 launch tubes for submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) ¶ Bulava and six torpedo
tubes.250 An
even more ambitious plan for the Russian ¶ government is to build five to six aircraft
carrier battle groups to be based in the Northern ¶ and Pacific fleets by 2030;251 build 20 Steregushchy class multipurpose
corvettes, two of ¶ which are currently in service, armed with anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles along ¶ with torpedoes; and
build 20 Admiral S. Gorshkov class frigates, the first is expected to ¶ be in service by the end of 2011 armed with anti-air and antiship missiles along with ¶ torpedoes.252 ¶ They
will also build new strategic bombers, and increase overall
military activity ¶ in the Arctic. “A new TU strategic bomber to replace the Tu-95MC Bear, Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-22M3
Backfire should be designed by 2017 with production beginning ¶ in 2020.”253 Furthermore, the Russians plan to establish
special Arctic military ¶ formations to protect Russian national interests. They will form an Arctic Spetsnaz ¶ (special
purpose force) to support the northern policy and secure the region.254 ¶ In addition to the plans to build a more combat capable
force, Russia has ¶ expanded its military activities in the Arctic since 2007.255 This activity has not gone ¶ unnoticed by the other
Arctic nations. For example, in 2007, Russia resumed long range ¶ strategic bomber flights over the Arctic for the first time since the
Cold War. “During ¶ 2007 alone, Russia penetrated Alaska’s 12 mile air defense zone 18 times.”256 Russia ¶
does not give any advanced notice to these flights257 and, since they began, the U.S. and ¶ Canadian aircraft have shadowed
Russian bombers as they approach Canadian and U.S. ¶ soil until they turn around and head back toward Russia.258 In addition,
soon after ¶ planting the Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole in 2007, Russia conducted
an ¶ air force
exercise in which it launched cruise missiles over the Arctic.259 Russia’s policy ¶ emphasizes the importance
of cooperation yet Russia maintains an aggressive posture in ¶ the Arctic. Conley and Kraut argue that Russia is implementing a twotrack approach in ¶ respect of the Arctic. On the one hand, Russia’s increased military activity in the polar regions ¶ coupled with its
stated objectives of a major naval buildup to operate in ¶ the Arctic suggest that it will be a potentially unpredictable and ¶
provocative player. On the other hand, Russia has demonstrated that it ¶ will play by the rules of international law (UNCLOS) as it
submits its claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, ¶ participates actively in the Arctic Council, and has
signed the 2008 ¶ Ilulissat Declaration to maximize its economic benefits from a stable ¶ region.260 ¶ As mentioned, Russia is
implementing the measures necessary in order to reap the ¶ benefits the Arctic has to offer by being aggressive and unpredictable,
and will
do ¶ whatever it takes to be the powerhouse of the Arctic. In order to be competitive
with ¶ Russia, the other Arctic nations are increasing their military capabilities and assets. This
chapter has examined counterarguments to the proposition that Arctic will ¶ become a zone of cooperation. It has revealed the
means by which the Arctic might be ¶ pushed towards conflict through the unresolved disputes in the
Arctic, Russia dependency ¶ on the Arctic, and an increase of military and security presence in the Arctic. There are a ¶ significant
number of potential flashpoints that could ignite the Arctic into conflict. The
discussion of territorial disputes
highlighted issues arising from access to shipping ¶ channels and navigable waterways, specific
territorial claims, and international maritime ¶ boundaries between and beyond territorial waters. Also
¶
examined was Russia’s ¶ dependency on the amount of oil and gas available in the Arctic. Russia’s main focus is ¶ regaining the
status of a superpower by being aggressive and unpredictable in order to ¶ control the resources in the Arctic. Russia’s influence and
behavior are provocative to ¶ other Arctic nations and if
Russia is not willing to change its approach, the Arctic
may be ¶ headed towards conflict. ¶ Russia is a potentially hostile superpower in the Arctic, and in order defend their ¶
claims, the other Arctic nations have increased or plan to increase their military ¶ capabilities and assets. This will allow the Arctic
nations to be more strategically ¶ aligned, especially with Russia. The Arctic nations are building or have plans to build a ¶ more
combat capable Arctic force to protect its sovereignty and national interests in the ¶ be more strategically ¶ aligned, especially with
Russia. The Arctic nations are building or have plans to build a ¶ more combat capable Arctic force to protect its sovereignty and
national interests in the All of these factors—to include territorial claims, Russia’s dependency, and the
¶ militarization of
the Arctic—can potentially lead to conflict in the Arctic. It all depends ¶ on which one has the potential to flash and
cause the conflict. Until all of these issues are ¶ resolved peacefully with all sides in agreement, the
potential for conflict will remain.
XT Solvency – Maritime Domain Awareness
Mapping is critical to boosting the US’ Arctic Maritime Domain Awareness –
resolves any alt causes.
Perry and Andersen, 12 (Charles and Bobby, vice president and director of studies at the
IFPA, research analyst at IFPA, 2012, The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “NEW STRATEGIC
DYNAMICS in the ARCTIC REGION, Implications for National Security and International
Collaboration,” http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf/, AS)
One key capability gap that will likely continue to hamper Arctic operations in the coming decades is
in maritime domain awareness in the polar region. MDA – the effective ability of U.S. forces to
locate, identify, and track vessels or any other activity in the maritime domain that could affect
national secu- rity interests – remains extremely limited, largely¶ because of the remoteness of the
region, inadequate Arctic Ocean and weather data, lack of communication and nav- igation infrastructure,
insufficient intelligence informa- tion, and the lack of a consistent U.S. government presence in the High North.327 Given the very
limited sensor cover- age of the area, great distances from main bases, and harsh, rapidly changing atmospheric conditions, even
collecting and maintaining a basic awareness of other ships, subma- rines, and aircraft in the Arctic becomes a nearly impos- sible
task.328 Not long after the start of the Coast Guard’s 2008 summer deployment in the polar region, for instance, District 17 officials
based in Alaska complained of a wor- rying lack of Arctic domain awareness that severely con- strained the service’s ability to fully
understand the risks of operating in or monitoring the icy waters around Alaska and beyond. As a senior U.S. Coast Guard official
pointed out after the agency’s 2008 operations, “We had almost no idea, no maritime domain awareness, of what was actual- ly
happening on the waters of the Arctic.”329¶ A
major impediment to achieving better domain aware- ness in the High North
is the current lack of accurate data or Arctic navigation, including nautical charts for areas previously
covered by ice, shoreline mapping, tides, water levels, currents, sea-ice conditions, and meteorological information. Experts
agree that there is still very little knowledge about the Arctic’s unique and ever-changing ocean
patterns, especially since only less than 5 percent of the polar area has been mapped to current standards.330 Nautical
charts of the Alaska region, for example, are of low resolution and mostly based on soundings from the
1940s or 1950s, showing vast areas that have not been surveyed using modern instrumentation
or have never been surveyed at all.331 The problem of producing reli- able nautical charts for the
Arctic is further compounded by America’s insufficient number of hydrographic sur- vey
vessels and their limited capability when it comes to operating in and around the ice.332 The lack of real-time information on
weather, ocean conditions, and ice char- acterization (for example, depth or thickness) has had a particularly negative effect on the
Coast Guard’s ability to conduct routine and emergency missions in the polar region, as smaller pieces of sea ice are frequently
missed by current technology, posing a significant threat to most ships observed in the area, including the Coast Guard’s fleet of
non-icebreaking boats. For their part, icebreakers attempting to operate in the deeper reaches of the Arctic Ocean are themselves
extremely vulnerable to so-called sea-ice pressure ridges, formed when massive sheets of ice collide with one another, and in
the
absence of reliable data, even experienced mariners may be unable to suf- ficiently assess the
“deceptive appearance of sea ice,” as illustrated by Coast Guard cutter Healy’s experience dur- ing its summer 2008 operations off
Barrow, Alaska, when it struck what to the crew appeared to be thin, first-year ice only to discover that it was a fifteen-foot thick iceberg of multi-year ice, well beyond the ship’s icebreaking capabilities.333
XT Treaty Solves
Treaty addresses security concerns
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): pag. 332-333.
2009. Web.
<https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>. XM)
In addition to addressing conflicting territorial sovereignty claims and preservation of the
Arctic environment, an Arctic treaty should also address security concerns. Like the Antarctic
Treaty, a treaty in the Arctic should express that the Arctic shall be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes. Additionally, it is critical that an Arctic treaty include: provisions for
enforcement, penalties for signatories who breach its terms, and a provision for dispute
resolution. Thus, an Arctic treaty is the most optimal framework for Arctic governance, as it is
has the potential to address the wide range of issues that face this distinctive region, and
assure future cooperation among the States. The rapidity with which the Arctic is melting and
the approaching State deadlines imposed by UNCLOS for CLCS submissions demand that the
States work on developing a treaty now. Representatives of the five Arctic States met most
recently in Ilulissat, Greenland, in May 2008, at which time they issued a joint declaration
acknowledging the changing conditions of the Arctic due to climate change. The declaration also
indicated an intention and commitment to continued Arctic governance under UNCLOS. In
apparent response to the growing criticism of that approach, the declaration stressed the five
States’ commitment to cooperating with each other, and concluded, “We therefore see no
need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.”
The Arctic States’ adherence to the UNCLOS framework, however, is fraught with the
potential for future conflict as issues arise for which the treaty has not provided. The time to
develop an Arctic treaty is now, while the States are expressing a commitment to cooperation,
and before any one State gains an advantage over the others by successfully securing
sovereignty over a portion of the Arctic. Because of the uncertainty as to the strength of each
State’s claim, and the risk to each that sovereignty may be denied it in favor of another State,
it would be in each State’s best interest to enter into an Arctic treaty now to assure its
continuing role in governance of the region.
Treaty solves water-way disputes
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): pag. 332. 2009.
Web. <https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>.
XM)
In addition to requiring the Arctic States to freeze, at least temporarily, their claims to Arctic
territory, an Arctic treaty will also need to address use of Arctic waterways while claims are
frozen. The Northwest Passage provides an obvious example. If the Canadian claim that the
Passage is internal waters—and thus closed to foreign vessels—and the American claim that the
Passage constitutes international waters— whereby foreign vessels are entitled to exercise
normal freedoms of navigation—are both “frozen,” it is not readily apparent whether foreign
vessels are to be permitted to use the strait.1 One way an Arctic treaty could manage use of
1
. Rothwell, supra note 69, at 368.
the Northwest Passage is to allow Canada to exercise sovereignty over the Passage while also
permitting international navigation through the Passage. Thus, the treaty could allow
Canada’s sovereignty claim to remain intact, while also allowing for navigation based on
UNCLOS provisions regarding transit passage through international straits.2Accordingly, both
States would be able to achieve their objectives in the short term while maintaining their
contrary positions.
Treaty solves mapping resolving territorial claims
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): pag. 330. 2009.
Web. <https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>.
XM)
Thus, the most favorable approach is to freeze all claims to Arctic territory, at least until there
has been more scientific study of the region. Under the terms of an Arctic treaty, the States
could prescribe extensive mapping of the sea floor, which would likely resolve many of the
conflicting territorial claims, as they exist largely due to a lack of scientific information on the
region. A major benefit of this approach is that, as was the case with Antarctica, States would
agree that scientific exploration, peace, and preservation of the fragile ecosystems of the
Arctic region are more important than their claims to sovereignty.
Treaty solves resources
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): pag. 330-331.
2009. Web.
<https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>. XM)
An Arctic treaty should also address permissible activity within the region. It is essential that
the treaty resolve the acceptable level of resource extraction, if allowed at all, in consideration
of the consequences to the environment and native populations. While UNCLOS may be an
effective alternative in determining the jurisdictional limits of the Arctic States, once those
boundaries are delineated, it lacks the mechanisms to control what the States do within the
realm of their respective territories. While “[e]xcluding others from exploitation of the shelf’s
resources is an essential element of a State’s jurisdiction over conduct on the shelf,” it does not
necessarily follow that a State should be able to develop the area within its bounds. Though
UNCLOS broadly calls on coastal States to protect the marine environment, it lacks any
enforcement mechanism. An Arctic treaty could establish limits to exploitation of the Arctic
natural resources, and institute other environmental standards to preserve the natural
landscape and indigenous populations that currently inhabit the region. Such provisions are
critical, as the ecosystem of the Arctic has been described as “more finely tuned and acutely
sensitive to environmental impact than . . . any other part of the globe.” Because Arctic
ecosystems are so fragile and have lengthy recovery periods, any pollution or contamination
of the environment could have ruinous effects, especially given “the increased difficulty in
cleaning-up the Arctic environment due to the frigid, icy weather conditions.”170 Not only is
accidental pollution, such as oil spills, a serious concern, but so is pollution caused by the
constant routine passage of ships through the region’s waters. It is critical to the marine
environment that the international community “regulate the [Arctic] environment by preventing
oil spillage and other despoliation of the Arctic Ocean.” Without such an agreement, a lack of
2
. Id. at 369.
oversight of a State’s activities within its jurisdiction could lead to drastic consequences in the
Arctic and worldwide. Furthermore, if the treaty is to allow some resource extraction, it also
should address who profits from those resources. Not only do the Arctic States have an
interest in profiting from the region’s rich energy resources, but the indigenous Arctic
populations have also indicated their desire to share in the proceeds if extraction is to be
allowed. While the prospect of attaining access to the Arctic’s valuable natural resources may
pose a challenge to an international agreement, past cooperation amongst the Arctic States
provides hope that an Arctic treaty is attainable. The United States and Canada have already
forged the Arctic Cooperation Agreement in acknowledgement of the need to “cooperate in
advancing their shared interests in Arctic navigation, development and security,” while
remaining sensitive to the Arctic’s unique environment and its native populations.3 Likewise, in
2005, Canada and Denmark reached an agreement for managing Hans Island, while the two
States continue to pursue their claims of the small land mass.4 They have also undertaken a
joint surveying project of the Arctic area near their coasts.5 In 1996, the eight Arctic States
established the Arctic Council, which was designed to promote cooperation among the Arctic
States. While the Arctic Council is demonstrative of the States’ ability to cooperate, it cannot
serve the same function as an Arctic treaty since it has been delegated negligible power and
its laws have no binding effect on the Arctic States.6 To date, “the most the Arctic Council has
been able to do . . . has been to adopt guidelines and recommendations on how the Arctic
[S]tates should apply their [individual State] regulations in [Arctic] areas.”178 Thus, while States
have undertaken collaborative approaches to the Arctic, there continues to be a need for
binding international law in the Arctic.
3 . Canada-United States: Agreement on Arctic Cooperation and Exchange of Notes Concerning Transit of Northwest
Passage, U.S.-Can., Jan. 11, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 141.
4 . Loukacheva, supra note 68, at 3.
5 . Krauss, supra note 10, at A1.
6 . See Timo Koivurova, Environmental Protection in the Arctic and Antarctic: Can the Polar Regimes Learn from
Each Other?, 33 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 204, 214 (2005). 178. Id.
XT Mapping = Pre-req
Mapping is key to navigation of the Arctic.
GAO, 14 (Government Accountability Office, March 2014, “MARITIME ¶ INFRASTRUCTURE ¶
Key Issues Related to ¶ Commercial Activity in ¶ the U.S. Arctic over ¶ the Next Decade,”
http://gao.gov/assets/670/661761.pdf, AS)
The USCG is conducting a Waterway Analysis and Management System ¶ assessment along the
western and northern coasts of Alaska in order to ¶ understand the extent and type of aids to
navigation needed; however, ¶ officials we spoke with indicated that there were no current plans
to ¶ expand deployment of aids to navigation in the Arctic region. According to ¶ federal
government sources, there are a number of challenges to such ¶ deployment in the Arctic. First,
hydrographic surveying and mapping must ¶ be completed before the USCG can install aids to
navigation in an area, ¶ and as noted in table 3, a large amount of the U.S. Arctic remains
uncharted or mapped.40¶ The USCG is currently in the preliminary phase of a new polaricebreaker ¶ acquisition project including development of a formal mission need ¶ statement, a
concept of operations, and an operational requirements ¶ document.¶ Second, aids to navigation
are particularly ¶ challenging to operate north of the Bering Strait due to the freeze-thaw ¶ cycle
and likelihood of sustaining damage from floating sea ice.
XT Mapping Solves Territorial Disputes
Mapping would resolve territorial conflicts
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): 330. 2009. Web.
<https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>. XM)
Thus, the most favorable approach is to freeze all claims to Arctic territory, at least until there
has been more scientific study of the region. Under the terms of an Arctic treaty, the States
could prescribe extensive mapping of the sea floor, which would likely resolve many of the
conflicting territorial claims, as they exist largely due to a lack of scientific information on the
region. A major benefit of this approach is that, as was the case with Antarctica, States would
agree that scientific exploration, peace, and preservation of the fragile ecosystems of the
Arctic region are more important than their claims to sovereignty.
AT Can’t Compete
Mapping enables us to have Arctic operations – allows safe maneuvering of
ships.
Kendrick 14 (Kendrick, Lyle-Reporter at Barents Observer. "Map Shortcomings Could Hinder
Northern Sea Route Growth."Barentsobserver. N.p., 28 June 2014. Web. 16 July 2014.
<http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2014/06/map-shortcomings-could-hinder-northern-searoute-growth-28-06>. XM)
Melting ice allowed the region to open up shipping routes in Arctic waters that are mostly under
Russian control and cut significant transit time between Europe and Asia. Use of the route has
steadily grown since ships began using it in 2010. According to data from the Northern Sea
Route Administration, four vessels used the route in 2010, 34 used it in 2011, 46 used it in 2012
and 71 used it last year. China will be releasing a guide to Arctic shipping in July for ships sailing
through the Northern Sea Route to Europe. But the current weak satellites in the area and poor
sea maps are like bottlenecks preventing the kind of massive Arctic transit speculated by
some, said Jan-Gunnar-Winther, director of the Norwegian Polar Institute, to the
BarentsObserver. Satellite communication with ships in the High North is weak which means
ship operators cannot adequately take real-time high-resolution images for other vessels to use,
Winther said. These kinds of images give information about sea conditions which allow
efficient and safe maneuvering in water that is partly covered in ice, he said. The area is
particularly dangerous to navigate without sufficient mapping data because there is limited
infrastructure for search and rescue operations. Vessels are safest on the route when
following icebreakers which can help navigate frozen Arctic patches and be a first line of
support in a search and rescue operation, said Gunnar Sander, an Arctic sea ice researcher
with the Norwegian Polar Institute, to the BarentsObserver.
AT Russian N/W Does not Cause Extinction
US- Russian war will cause extinction – nuclear winter, nuclear famine, collapse
of economic infrastructure, and sheer death.
Helfand, 14 (Ira, M.D., who practices medicine in Springfield, Mass., is a past president of Physicians
for Social Responsibility and is now the co-president of the International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War, 5/3/2014, “Another View: Ukraine crisis puts focus on danger of nuclear war,”
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/05/04/another-view-ukraine-crisisdanger-nuclear-war/8665185/, AS)
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has made
it clear that the danger of nuclear war is still with us and may
be greater than at any time since the height of the Cold War. What does that mean for United States nuclear
policy?¶ There are today more than 15,000 nuclear warheads in the world. The vast majority, more than 95 percent, are in the
arsenals of the United States and Russia. Some 3,000 of these warheads are on "hair-trigger" alert. They are
mounted on missiles that can be fired in 15 minutes and destroy their targets around the world less than 30 minutes later.¶ During
the Cold War, there was a widespread understanding of what nuclear weapons could do.¶ That is not true today.¶ Those who lived
through the Cold War have put this painful information out of mind, and a generation has come of age that never learned about the
terrible effects of nuclear war. This must change if we are to make rational decisions about nuclear policy.¶ Over the last few years,
new information has emerged that underlines the danger posed by even the limited use of nuclear weapons. Studies published in
2006 by Rutgers University's Alan Robock and his colleagues examined the effects of a "limited" nuclear war involving just 100 small
nuclear weapons, the size of the Hiroshima bomb, less than 0.5 percent of the world's nuclear arsenals.¶ The specific scenario they
examined involved a war between India and Pakistan. The two nations have fought three wars in the last 70 years, have come close
to war on two other occasions, engage in daily skirmishes across their contested border in Kashmir, and have more than 200 nuclear
weapons in their arsenals, many much larger than the weapons used in the study.¶ The effects in India and Pakistan are horrific. In
the first week more than 20 million people are killed by blast, fire and radiation as the great cities of South Asia are destroyed.¶ But
the global impact is far worse. As the cities burn, the fires loft 5 million tons of soot into the upper atmosphere, blocking out
sunlight. Across the globe, temperatures fall an average of 1.3 degrees Celsius, and precipitation declines as less water evaporates
into the cooler atmosphere to fall back as rain.¶ This climate
disruption has a catastrophic impact on food
production around the world. In Iowa, as across the entire U.S. Corn Belt, soy production declines an average of 7 percent for a
full decade, and corn production declines an average of 12 percent. In China, rice production declines an average of 17 percent and
the equally important wheat crop declines a staggering 31 percent.¶ "Nuclear Famine," a report issued last year by Physicians for
Social Responsibility, explored the impact this decline in food production would have on human health. The
world is not
prepared to withstand a fall in food production of this magnitude. World grain reserves amount to only
some 70 days of consumption and would quickly be exhausted.¶ There are already 870 million people in the developing world who
are malnourished today. They get just enough food to maintain their body mass and do a little work to gather or grow food. There
are also 300 million people who get adequate nutrition today but live in countries that depend on imported food.¶ All of these
people, more than 1 billion, many far removed from the actual conflict, would be at risk of starvation in the event of even this very
"limited" use of nuclear weapons. Another 1.3 billion people in China might also starve given the enormous shortfalls in Chinese
grain production.¶ And no one has yet studied the effects of climate disruption on other food crops in other countries. Will U.S.,
Canadian and European wheat production fall as dramatically as in China?¶ A famine of this magnitude is unprecedented in human
history. Never have we faced the possible death of 15 percent to 30 percent of the human race in the course of a single decade.
Such a catastrophe would not mean the extinction of our species, but it would almost certainly bring about the end of modern
civilization as we know it.¶ These data make clear that even
the smaller nuclear weapons states, countries that
a threat to all mankind.¶ But
the danger posed by the U.S. and Russian arsenals is even greater. A single U.S. Trident submarine carries
96 warheads, each 10 to 30 times larger than the bombs used in the South Asia scenario. That means that each Trident can
cause the nuclear famine scenario many times over. We have 14 of them, and that is only one-third of our
nuclear arsenal, which also includes land-based missiles and long-range bombers.¶ The Russians have the same
incomprehensible level of overkill capacity.¶ What would happen if there were a large nuclear war? A
might well go to war, and over whose nuclear arsenals the U.S. has no direct control, pose
2002 report by Physicians for Social Responsibility showed that if only 300 of the 1,500 warheads in the Russian arsenal got through
to targets in the United States, up to 100
million people would die in the first 30 minutes. The entire
economic infrastructure on which we depend — the public health system, banking system, communications
network, food distribution system — would
be destroyed. In the months following this attack, most of the rest of the
population would also die, from starvation, exposure to cold, epidemic disease and radiation poisoning.¶ The global
climate disruption would be even more catastrophic.¶ Limited war in South Asia would drop global
temperatures 1.3 degrees Celsius. A war between the United States and Russia, using only those weapons
they will still possess when the New START treaty is fully implemented in 2017, drops temperatures an average of 8
degrees Celsius. In the interior of Eurasia, North America and in Iowa, temperatures drop 20 to 30 degrees Celsius to a level
not seen in 18,000 years — since the coldest time of the last Ice Age.¶ Agriculture stops, ecosystems collapse, the
vast majority of the human race starves and many species, perhaps including our own, become
extinct.¶ As events in Ukraine have made clear, there is still a very real possibility that the United States and Russia may find
themselves on opposite sides of an armed conflict, and that means that these vast nuclear arsenals might be used. Even if there
is not a deliberate use of nuclear weapons, there is the danger of an accidental nuclear war .¶
We know of at least five episodes since 1979 when either Moscow or Washington prepared to launch nuclear war in the mistaken
belief that they were themselves under nuclear attack. The most recent event that we know about was in 1995, five years after the
end of the Cold War. The same kind of computer accident could happen today.¶ Recognizing these dangers, 126 nations came
together in Norway in March 2013 for a two-day conference to explore the full extent of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear
war. A follow-up meeting in Mexico last February attracted 146 nations — three quarters of the countries in the world. The United
States and the other major nuclear powers, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, or P5, chose to boycott
these meetings fearing that they would lead to negotiations for a treaty to ban the possession of nuclear weapons.¶ Why should the
U.S. fear such a treaty?¶ Russian nuclear
weapons, and the nuclear weapons held by other nuclear weapons nations,
remain the greatest threat to American national security. It should be the highest priority of our government
to get rid of these weapons. The possibility of conflict with Russia only underlines the urgent need to make sure nuclear weapons
are not available to be used by either side. We can only do this by entering into negotiations with Russia and the other nuclear
weapons states to achieve the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, including our own.¶ The P5 are already committed
under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do just this. We have loudly demanded that other countries respect the NonProliferation Treaty and forego nuclear weapons, but we have flouted our responsibilities under the treaty to eliminate our nuclear
arsenals.¶ Negotiating such a treaty will not be easy, but it can be done. The U.S. and Russia have already successfully eliminated
more than 50,000 nuclear weapons. We know how to dismantle them and how to verify compliance with the treaties under which
they have been dismantled. What is lacking is the political will.¶ There will be a follow-up meeting in Vienna this fall to discuss how
to deal with the danger of nuclear war. The U.S. should attend and provide leadership to this growing international movement.¶
Some say that it is unrealistic to talk about the elimination of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it is a fantasy to think we can safely
maintain these arsenals indefinitely.¶ In
a world armed with thousands of nuclear weapons, it is only a
matter of time until they are used.
AT LOS Alt Cause
UNCLOS doesn’t do jack – it’s non-binding and not specific to the Arctic.
Farrens, 10 (Thomas C, J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law, May 2010,
“Shrinking Ice, Growing Problems: Why We Must Act Now ¶ to Solve Emerging Problems Posed
by an Ice-Free Arctic,” http://www.uiowa.edu/~tlcp/TLCP%20Articles/192/farrens.finalfinal.mlb.042410.pdf, AS)
At first glance, the UNCLOS appears to be exactly what the international ¶ community needs to
resolve the problems facing the Arctic. Nevertheless, ¶ three major defects have hampered the
ability of the UNCLOS to adequately ¶ solve the region’s problems. First, the United States has
not ratified the ¶ treaty.126 Second, nations may opt out of the dispute resolution
procedures. ¶ Third, the environmental protections required by the UNCLOS do not ¶
adequately account for the unique needs of the Arctic environment. Without the United
States’ participation, the treaty cannot reach its full ¶ potential. The United States is still an
incredibly powerful player on the ¶ international stage, and its absence as a signatory nation
seriously weakens ¶ the treaty’s ability to effectuate any kind of real change. It is somewhat ¶
surprising that the Senate has not ratified the treaty. Both former Presidents ¶ Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush supported ratification during their ¶ presidencies.129 Vice President Joe Biden is
also on the record as supporting ¶ ratification.130 President Obama has likewise publicly stated
that ratification ¶ of the UNCLOS will protect our ―economic and security interests while ¶
providing an important international collaboration to protect the oceans and ¶ its resources.‖131
The only holdouts are the Senate Republicans. Considering ¶ the diminished role of the Senate
Republicans since the 2008 elections,¶ it ¶ appears that the Obama Administration and Congress
may push to ratify the ¶ However, even if the United States decides to ratify the treaty, there is
¶ still an inherent structural problem that may prevent the UNCLOS from ¶ solving disputes of
any magnitude. This structural problems is that nations ¶ may opt-out of the UNCLOS dispute
resolution procedures.134 In fact, every ¶ Arctic nation except Norway has chosen this method
to avoid the binding ¶ language of the UNCLOS.135 The treaty’s substance hardly matters if
there is ¶ no way to enforce its provisions. ¶ There is also a significant problem with the
generality of environmental ¶ protections in the UNCLOS. As mentioned previously, the treaty
purports to ¶ regulate activity in all of the world’s oceans.136 It does not, therefore, deal ¶
explicitly with the very unique problems facing the Arctic environment.137 ¶ Unless the
international community recognizes the region’s special needs, its natural environment will
continue to worsen and become even more difficult ¶ to restore.
AT Indigenous Rights
The plan is beneficial for Arctic indigenous peoples and includes them in the
process.
Zellen 9 (Barry, Research Editor of the Arctic Security Project at the Center for Contemporary
Conflict, 10/13/9, “Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom: The Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Arctic,”
p.115-6)
Many of Bellinger's views would be reflected in America's long-awaited announcement of an
updated Arctic Policy in January 2009. Indeed, an historic shift—toward greater inclusion of the
numerous tribal, national, and international actors on the circumpolar stage—was evident in
the first comprehensive re-articulation of U.S. national policy on the Arctic region since 1994.
In National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25
(NSPD-66/HSPD-25), issued by President Bush on January 9, 2009, among the six policy
objectives identified in Section III, Subsection A, were to “4. Strengthen institutions for
cooperation among the eight Arctic nations” and to “5. Involve the Arctic's indigenous
communities in decisions that affect them.”38 This is historically significant, and demonstrates
an increased awareness of the growing political and economic participation of the Arctic
peoples in governing their own affairs as well as a continued commitment to a collaborative,
multinational approach to solving the region's challenges. Also of significance is that although
the very first policy objective listed in Section III, Subsection A, is to “Meet national security and
homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region,” the second is to “Protect the Arctic
environment and conserve its biological resources,” and the third to “Ensure that natural
resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally
sustainable.” Both Objectives 2 and 3 will directly benefit the foundational pillars upon which
the indigenous Arctic cultures depend for their cultural, nutritional, and economic survival.
That the sixth policy objective listed is to “Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local,
regional, and global environmental issues” reinforces America's renewed commitment to
multilateralism at the top of the world, and increasing environmental knowledge at all levels,
from the local to the global, during this time of Arctic transformation.39
AT Security K
Discourse has no effect on policy – our evidence is specific to the Arctic.
Watson 11 (Scott, dept of poli sci @ Univ of Victoria, International Studies Association Annual Convention 2011,
"What We’ve Got Here, Is Failure to Securitise: Arctic Sovereignty and National Security in Canada", 3/16/11,
http://convention2.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=www_search&offset=0&limit=5&multi_search
_search_mode=publication&multi_search_publication_fulltext_mod=fulltext&textfield_submit=true&search_module
=multi_search&search=Search&search_field=title_idx&fulltext_search=What+We%E2%80%99ve+Got+Here%2C+Is+F
ailure+to+Securitise%3A+Arctic+Sovereignty+and+National+Security+in+Canada)
Given the profound changes occurring in the Arctic region, the potential for military conflict between states competing for resources
is now a common refrain of the media, political elites and academics. Academic
experts on the Arctic warn of the
possibility of “armed brinkmanship” (Borgerson, 2008), “resource wars” (Howard, 2009), “a potential
battleground” (Emmerson, 2010), “ cauldron of political conflict” (Fairhall, 2010), though most of these authors
use the potential for conflict to support de-securitizing moves, such as strengthening international
cooperation, promoting the Arctic Council or making the Arctic a zone of peace. While this strategy presents an
interesting study in the role of academics in the de-securitization process, what is most interesting for the purposes of this study is
that the
military threat narrative has sufficient resonance to make these dire warnings
plausible. Representations of the Arctic in the Canadian media and by Canadian political elites support this
contention. In 2006, the Toronto Star declared that the protection of the Arctic was a key national interest (Granatstein, 2006),
while more recently, a Globe and Mail headline read, “In the Arctic, Canada is willing to fight to keep the true north free” (Mahoney,
2010). In his 2005 election platform, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced plans to develop an Arctic national sensor
system, a military-civilian deep-water port and the purchase of three heavily armed icebreakers as part of his Canada First Defence
Policy (Christensen, 2007). In 2010, Prime Minister Harper tied the purchase of new state of the art F-35 fighter jets to protecting
Canadian sovereignty in its far north. What is puzzling, given the rather commonplace evocation of security threats in discussion of
Canada’s Arctic region currently and through much of its post-WWII history, is that Canadian Arctic policy does not appear to reflect
these security concerns. The investments proposed by Stephen Harper in 2005, and similar proposals by numerous previous
Canadian prime ministers, have yet to come to fruition, as investment in the Canadian Arctic remains modest. Additionally,
interaction between Arctic states is more cooperative than not. Canada, Russia and Denmark are proceeding with their territorial
claims in the Arctic within internationally recognized procedures associated with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). Furthermore, Canada regularly engages in cooperative endeavours with other Arctic nations, including those with whom
it has boundary disagreements: Denmark, Russia and the United `States (Byers, 2009). The
disjuncture between the
securitized rhetoric and actual practices in the Arctic indicates either a failure of the
securitization process or a failure of securitization theory to account for what evoking
‘security’ accomplishes. And it is not only the militarized security narrative that has failed to
have much impact on Canadian Arctic policy. The environmental security frame is a recurrent element in the
discussion over Canadian Arctic policy since the early 1960’s and numerous governments have made policy proposals based on
potential threats to the fragile Arctic ecology. Similarly, Canadian policy pronouncements often draw on potential threats to the
socio-cultural, economic and political survival of indigenous populations in the Arctic region as well. Yet, as with the more recent
military security threats, these
security claims have not translated into concerted policy change on the
One possible explanation for the apparent failure of these
securitizing narratives is that they all compete with one another, and ultimately act as
counter-securitizing narratives that undermine policy proposals consistent with the other frames. However, the
existence of counter-securitizing narratives on its own does not resolve the problem of failed
securitization. Rather than providing an answer to why military securitization has failed, the
existence of counter-securitizing narratives prompts the question of why none of these
narratives have been successful in terms of producing drastic policy change in the Canadian Arctic.
part of the Canadian government.
Our specific realist contextualization of the Arctic’s geopolitical instability is
true and good.
Dittmer et al 11 (Jason, All Profs of Geograpy @: University College London, University of
Oulu, and Royal Holloway, U of London “Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice?
Recasting Arctic geopolitics,” Political Geography, Science Direct, p.3-4)
The idea of the Arctic as an open – or opening – and uncertain space also calls forth futureoriented imaginative techniques, notably scenario analysis and the booming trade in “Arctic
futures” (Anderson, 2010). The rhetorical orientation of such exercises inevitably reproduces
and gives free rein to divergent conceptualizations of the future. Thus, on the one hand are
dystopian imaginations of the Arctic as a locus of social, political, economic, cultural and
ecological disaster. While during the 1990s Arctic space was infused with political idealism and
hope as the end of the Cold War seemed to open the possibility of a less explicitly territorialized
governance regime (the Arctic Council), current interventions in Arctic space raise the spectres
of conflict, environmental degradation and the “resource curse” (Emmerson, 2010). The notion
of the Arctic as an open, ‘melting space’ is thus represented as posing a multi-faceted security
risk. Scott Borgerson (2008) published a notably neo-realist intervention in Foreign Affairs which
considered this kind of scenario in more detail; he argued that the decrease in sea ice cover is
directly correlated to evidence of a new ‘scramble for resources’ in the region, involving the five
Arctic Ocean coastal states and their national security interests. According to Borgerson (2008:
65), the Arctic “region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources”. More generally,
melting ice is correlated with enhanced accessibility and hence opportunities for new actors
ranging from commercial shipping to illegal migrants and terrorist groups to migrate within and
beyond the Arctic. At the most extreme, neorealists have contended that Arctic installations
such as pipelines or terminals might be potential targets for terrorist organizations hell-bent on
undermining North American energy security (Byers, 2009). At the same time, the Arctic is also
framed as a space of promise: the locus of a potential oil bonanza, new strategic trade routes
and huge fishing grounds (Powell, 2008a). No wonder then that the Arctic possibilities have
resulted in a number of scenarios on the relationship between Arctic resources and Arctic
geopolitical order. Lawson Brigham, a well known Arctic expert, has imagined an “Arctic race”, a
scenario in which “high demand and unstable governance set the stage for a ‘no holds barred’
rush for Arctic wealth and resources” (described in Bennett, 2010, n.p.). This vision, which is
opposite to “Arctic saga”, can be regarded as a liberal warning message. Accordingly, without
new governance structures based on new international agreements, high demand in the Arctic
region could lead to political chaos which could also jeopardize Arctic ecosystems and
cultures.
Our realist calculations are a pre-requisite to the critique and are a net benefit
to the permutation.
Dittmer et al, 11 (Jason, Sam Moisio, Alan Ingram, Klaus Dodds, Department of Geography,
University College London, Pearson Building, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom
b Department of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland
c Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom, Science
Direct 2/4/11, “Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic
geopolitics,” AS)
Third, the relationship between orderings of Arctic space and state and international affairs is
another potential area for further research. Paradoxically, it seems that the unique nature of
Arctic space is giving rise in Arctic geopolitics to a reassertion of the very territorial political
order that this uniqueness is held to call into question. There is much more to explore in terms
of the relationship between Arctic space and Arctic political order. The kind of critical
geopolitical examination we have in mind would see these spheres as being intrinsically related.
One may for instance inquire into how the liberal and neo-realist rationalities are articulated
in different places and institutional contexts and how these rationalities are indeed entangled
and co-constituted. The operation and manifestation of these rationalities should thus be
examined through the lens of the “very local” as they actualize and transform in different Arctic
“events” ranging from the formal meetings of the Arctic Council to the many informal meetings
which bring together different “Arctic actors”. This type of perspective would potentially
provide insights into how different Arctic identities and subjectivities are negotiated and how
these identities are related to the wider political rationalities of Arctic geopolitics.¶ Fourth,
these kinds of questions and issues call for a diversity of methodological approaches, ranging
from the kinds of textual and institutional analysis familiar to critical geopolitics, to more
ethnographic explorations of practice, to archival research, to interviewing and networking in
policy communities, to examinations of the kinds of epistemologies at work in military
exercises, scenario planning and “Arctic futures” (see Anderson, 2010). One could easily imagine
a wide range of approaches to studying the Canadian Rangers which would build on the archival
and interview-based techniques deployed by Lackenbauer, 2005 and Lackenbauer, 2007. Such
research might distinguish itself by focusing on everyday life (rather than say looking for
examples of so-called hot and banal nationalisms) within the Arctic (Dittmer & Gray, 2010), and
the ways in which Arctic populations, especially indigenous peoples, negotiate their identities as
Arctic peoples vis-à-vis the state-based identities which the discourse of ‘Arctic geopolitics’ and
the Canadian Rangers seek to impose. Unpacking Arctic geopolitics further will require the
effort of many scholars working in different ways, but also collaboratively, across a variety of
sites.
AT T – Development: Treaties=Development
Treaty is development
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): 329. 2009. Web.
<https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>. XM)
[An Arctic treaty] could arrange for sustainable development of Arctic resources, do the
seafloor mapping that’s needed to sort out the conflicting territorial claims, develop shipping
shortcuts through the northern passages, set technological standards for ships that navigate
the icy waters and guard the welfare of the more than one million indigenous people living
within the Arctic Circle.164 A new international governance under an Arctic treaty could
therefore be a first step in developing the newly accessible Arctic, while also preserving the
environment and the welfare of its native populations.
Treaty is a means of development
OAS 80 (Organization of American States. "VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
SIGNED AT VIENNA 23 May 1969." Oas.org. N.p., 27 Jan. 1980. Web.
<http%3A%2F%2Fwww.oas.org%2Flegal%2Fenglish%2Fdocs%2FVienna%2520Convention%2520
Treaties.htm>. XM)
Recognizing the ever-increasing importance of treaties as a source of international law and as
a means of developing peaceful co-operation among nations, whatever their constitutional and
social systems,
AT T Development: Negotiations=Development
Negotiate means development
Breen 2k (Breen, Michael P.- Cambridge University Press, and Andrew Littlejohn-Cambridge
University Press. Classroom Decision-making: Negotiation and Process Syllabuses in Practice.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. Web.
<http://www.andrewlittlejohn.com/website/docs/Extract%20Chapter%201%20Breen%20and%
20Littlejohn%20.pdf>. XM)
First, when language learning is undertaken in a classroom group, negotiation is a means for
developing a harmonious relationship between three teaching-learning agendas: any external
requirements upon the learning in terms of pre-specified knowledge and capabilities, individual
learning agendas and the evolving collective curriculum of the group.
Negotiate means development
Fiske and Clark 96 (Fiske, Christine-Department of Human Development and Family Studies,
and Janet A. Clark-Department of Human Development and Family Studies. "Negotiation Skills."
University of Missouri, Nov. 1996. Web. 18 July 2014.
<http://extension.missouri.edu/p/gh6830>. XM)
To find solutions to these disagreements, negotiation skills are needed every day at home, at
work and in the community. Negotiation means developing an ability to resolve disputes and
conflicts. Effective negotiation requires a willingness to work with other people to reach
solutions that everyone can live with.
Negotiate means to prepare for a treaty
dictionary.com n.d. (negotiate. dictionary.com, n.d., Web.
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negotiate>. XM)
1. to deal or bargain with another or others, as in the preparation of a treaty or contract or in
preliminaries to a business deal.
AT Russia Says No
Russia will say Yes. US-Russia relations high concerning the Arctic
R.I.A. 14 ("Arctic Cooperation May Ease Russia-US Tensions." RIA Novosti. 22 May 2014. Web.
15 July 2014. <http://en.ria.ru/world/20140522/190037278/Arctic-Cooperation-May-EaseRussia-US-Tensions--Analyst.html>. XM)
WASHINGTON, May 22 (RIA Novosti), Leandra Bernstein – Tense relations between Russia and
the US and NATO could potentially be cooled through Arctic cooperation, according to the
program director at the George Washington Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian
Studies. “I think the Arctic is, today at least, one of the last places for cooperation with Russia
following the Ukrainian crisis,” Marlene Laruelle said. “US-Russia [Arctic] cooperation will
probably be less directed to cooperation on security issues because of the Ukrainian crisis,” she
specified, “but there are several other elements that are still open for discussion.” Since 2011
the US has increased its stake in Arctic security and development and currently holds the
chairmanship for the Arctic Council. The US is planning to invest $1.5 billion focusing on the
Arctic, according to former State Department official Heather Conley. However, US assets in the
region are limited and they rely on dated technology and borrowed equipment from other
Arctic nations. Russia is currently the only country employing nuclear-powered icebreakers.
“The securitization trend we see in the Arctic from the Russian side is mostly not an issue of
military aggressiveness, but it is a business issue,” Laruelle said. Concerning Russia’s
delimitation of its continental shelf and control over the North Sea Pass, Laruelle said “Russia
is playing by the rules.” The demarcation of national and international waterways is contested
within the Arctic Council, but the first voyage of a Chinese merchant ship, Hong Xing, through
the North Sea Pass last year set a precedent when the ship adhered to all Russian
requirements for passage. There are hopes that increased trade will take place through Arctic
routes. The route is expected to see between ten and twelve commercial trips this year.
Laruelle’s remarks were part of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center on the interests of the
Arctic nations, and the increasing participation in the region by non-Arctic players, particularly
China, Japan, Korea, and Singapore.
Russia says yes- willing to cooperate in the arctic
Milazzo 14 (Milazzo, Eleonora-ACCEL Fellow. "Prospects of Cooperation in U.S.-Russia
Relations in the Arctic." Http://russiancouncil.ru/. RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL,
19 Mar. 2014. Web. 18 July 2014. <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/arcticcooperation/?id_4=1053>. XM)
In the current situation, bilateral relations between the U.S. and Russia run the risk of becoming
increasingly problematic. Do you think this will affect Arctic cooperation? In the last years, we
have witnessed a deep evolution in the understanding of the Arctic issues among both
American and Russian experts. We have understood that we are allies rather than enemies
and that we have shared interests in the Arctic. At the time being, all countries are willing to
cooperate in the Arctic. This willingness remains in spite of the crisis in Ukraine or in any other
sphere. The Arctic has been and will be a very fruitful field of cooperation between Russia and
the U.S., Norway, and Canada. I don’t think there will be any problems. I believe that what we
need is to more openly discuss all the issues. In 2013, the U.S. signed the new Arctic Strategy. It
refers to the American national interest all the time, but the American experts did not tell us
what this national interest is. We need clarity and openness in discussing our goals. The U.S. is
going to chair the Arctic Council in 2015. Both American and Russian authorities consider Arctic
cooperation as one of the most fruitful. What will the U.S. agenda be? What do you expect from
the American chairmanship of the Council? What we expect is enhanced cooperation on a
number of issues. First of all, we expect to strengthen coast guard and naval cooperation. In
the Arctic, there is no such possibility for military conflict. Still, we need to regulate all maritime
activities, especially those conducted by non-Arctic states like China or South Korea. All
activities, from fisheries to scientific research, must be conducted in accordance with the law. To
ensure this, we need to enhance cooperation between the coast guards. When the Canadian
Minister Stephen Harper states that they are strengthening their navy or their coast guards, this
does not mean that we are witnessing an arm race in the Arctic. It just shows the tendency to
regulate unregulated activities[1]. Also, enhanced coast guard cooperation with the U.S. and
with the other Arctic states will help in tackling the new threats of the globalized world. Security
concerns such as terrorism, piracy, and drug and human trafficking are shared by both Russia
and the U.S. Tackling these challenges effectively is in everyone’s interest. Another pivotal issue
for Russian-U.S. cooperation is the conclusion of a new framework for fishery regulation in the
Central Arctic Ocean. These waters are not regulated because they are covered with ice for the
most part of the year. With the prospect of a reduction in ice cover, it is important to create a
regime to prevent illegal fisheries. Even more, this should be done as soon as possible, before
problems arise and cooperation becomes more difficult. The U.S. is pushing for this fishery
regulation and I think this is a good initiative, especially for the Arctic Five. Fish are a
transboundary resource and such a regulation would prevent unregulated fishing in the high
seas, with all of its economic and environmental consequences. We do not intend to create a
legal regime that deliberately excludes non-Arctic states. Nonetheless, these countries should
play according to the rules established by the Arctic Five or by the Arctic Council. In this regard,
the fact that the Artic Council is transforming from a forum into an international organization is
a very good tendency. Last but not least, we are willing to discuss our position concerning the
Baker-Shevardnadze agreement. With the negotiation of this agreement, Russia lost a large
portion of the Bering Sea, and with it, its fishing stocks. Russia is now willing to change its
negative attitude towards this agreement. We can start U.S.-Russia negotiations and make
concessions, provided that the U.S. will offer something in exchange, for example, fishing
quotas
Treaty Aff: Trade Add-On
New arctic trade routes will become economically viable – it’s only a question
of US access.
Borgerson, 8 (Scott G, International Affairs Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations,
March/April 2008, Foreign Affairs, “Arctic Meltdown
The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,”
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63222/scott-g-borgerson/arctic-meltdown, AS)
An even greater prize will be the new sea-lanes created by the great melt. In the nineteenth
century, an Arctic seaway represented the Holy Grail of Victorian exploration, and the seafaring
British Empire spared no expense in pursuing a shortcut to rich Asian markets. Once it became
clear that the Northwest Passage was ice clogged and impassable, the Arctic faded from power
brokers' consciousness. Strategic interest in the Arctic was revived during World War II and the
Cold War, when nuclear submarines and intercontinental missiles turned the Arctic into the
world's most militarized maritime space, but it is only now that the Arctic sea routes so coveted
by nineteenth-century explorers are becoming a reality.¶ The shipping shortcuts of the Northern
Sea Route (over Eurasia) and the Northwest Passage (over North America) would cut existing
oceanic transit times by days, saving shipping companies -- not to mention navies and
smugglers -- thousands of miles in travel. The Northern Sea Route would reduce the sailing
distance between Rotterdam and Yokohama from 11,200 nautical miles -- via the current route,
through the Suez Canal -- to only 6,500 nautical miles, a savings of more than 40 percent.
Likewise, the Northwest Passage would trim a voyage from Seattle to Rotterdam by 2,000
nautical miles, making it nearly 25 percent shorter than the current route, via the Panama Canal.
Taking into account canal fees, fuel costs, and other variables that determine freight rates, these
shortcuts could cut the cost of a single voyage by a large container ship by as much as 20
percent -- from approximately $17.5 million to $14 million -- saving the shipping industry
billions of dollars a year. The savings would be even greater for the megaships that are unable
to fit through the Panama and Suez Canals and so currently sail around the Cape of Good Hope
and Cape Horn. Moreover, these Arctic routes would also allow commercial and military
vessels to avoid sailing through politically unstable Middle Eastern waters and the pirateinfested South China Sea. An Iranian provocation in the Strait of Hormuz, such as the one that
occurred in January, would be considered far less of a threat in an age of trans-Arctic
shipping.¶ Arctic shipping could also dramatically affect global trade patterns. In 1969, oil
companies sent the S.S. Manhattan through the Northwest Passage to test whether it was a
viable route for moving Arctic oil to the Eastern Seaboard. The Manhattan completed the
voyage with the help of accompanying icebreakers, but oil companies soon deemed the route
impractical and prohibitively expensive and opted instead for an Alaskan pipeline. But today
such voyages are fast becoming economically feasible. As soon as marine insurers recalculate
the risks involved in these voyages, trans-Arctic shipping will become commercially viable and
begin on a large scale. In an age of just-in-time delivery, and with increasing fuel costs eating
into the profits of shipping companies, reducing long-haul sailing distances by as much as 40
percent could usher in a new phase of globalization. Arctic routes would force further
competition between the Panama and Suez Canals, thereby reducing current canal tolls;
shipping chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca would no longer dictate global shipping
patterns; and Arctic seaways would allow for greater international economic integration.
When the ice recedes enough, likely within this decade, a marine highway directly over the
North Pole will materialize. Such a route, which would most likely run between Iceland and
Alaska's Dutch Harbor, would connect shipping megaports in the North Atlantic with those in
the North Pacific and radiate outward to other ports in a hub-and-spoke system. A fast lane is
now under development between the Arctic port of Murmansk, in Russia, and the Hudson Bay
port of Churchill, in Canada, which is connected to the North American rail network.¶ In order to
navigate these opening sea-lanes and transport the Arctic's oil and natural gas, the world's
shipyards are already building ice-capable ships. The private sector is investing billions of
dollars in a fleet of Arctic tankers. In 2005, there were 262 ice-class ships in service worldwide
and 234 more on order. The oil and gas markets are driving the development of cutting-edge
technology and the construction of new types of ships, such as double-acting tankers, which
can steam bow first through open water and then turn around and proceed stern first to smash
through ice. These new ships can sail unhindered to the Arctic's burgeoning oil and gas fields
without the aid of icebreakers. Such breakthroughs are revolutionizing Arctic shipping and
turning what were once commercially unviable projects into booming businesses.
Trade prevents war, contains war, and checks escalation—solves all other impacts
GRISWOLD 2011 (Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato
Institute and author of Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace
Globalization. “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” Hayek Society Journal Vol. 9
http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf)
Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our
daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya,
but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of
civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths.
The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and
globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In
the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring
more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors.
He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to
cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries.
In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed
lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions.
Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull
believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair
economic competition, with war.” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part
because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace
in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy,
and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way
that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become
more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized
world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and
investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration
has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening
economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer
together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to
understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that
region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the
spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather
than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly
measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets
cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are
becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources
outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them
peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting
the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two
devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United
States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the
WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a
condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European
powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was
to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur
economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans
together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular
success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western
European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world
peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed
conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the
conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off
to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three
actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 19982003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war
with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola,
Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is
the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it
documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers
in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950
to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the
only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many
causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and
peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization
appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005
Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the
propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the
conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the
probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through
econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries
more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the
most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the
same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie
found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces
the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most
important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A
democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because
democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions
– the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and
economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological
fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology
to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic
opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West.
The U.S. initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as
Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An even more
effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to products made and grown in
Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real job at an export-oriented factory making
overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruiter. Of
course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism,
anymore than they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and
ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human
beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such
complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade and investment
ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and civil liberties will take root, and
less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war.
Treaty creates the best middle ground – allows for Canadian sovereignty and
international access.
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): pag. 332. 2009.
Web. <https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>.
XM)
In addition to requiring the Arctic States to freeze, at least temporarily, their claims to Arctic
territory, an Arctic tr will also need to address use of Arctic waterways while claims are frozen.
The Northwest Passage provides an obvious example. If the Canadian claim that the Passage is
internal waters—and thus closed to foreign vessels—and the American claim that the Passage
constitutes international waters— whereby foreign vessels are entitled to exercise normal
freedoms of navigation—are both “frozen,” it is not readily apparent whether foreign vessels are
to be permitted to use the strait.7 One way an Arctic treaty could manage use of the
Northwest Passage is to allow Canada to exercise sovereignty over the Passage while also
permitting international navigation through the Passage. Thus, the treaty could allow
Canada’s sovereignty claim to remain intact, while also allowing for navigation based on
UNCLOS provisions regarding transit passage through international straits.8Accordingly, both
States would be able to achieve their objectives in the short term while maintaining their
contrary positions.
7
8
. Rothwell, supra note 69, at 368.
. Id. at 369.
Treaty Aff: Energy Add-On
High oil prices are inevitable in the status quo– severe economic shocks will
bring famine and resource wars within 10 years.
Ahmed, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development, 2013
(Nafeez, “Former BP geologist: peak oil is here and it will 'break economies',” The Guardian,
December 23, Online: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earthinsight/2013/dec/23/british-petroleum-geologist-peak-oil-break-economy-recession)
Dr. Miller critiqued the official industry line that global reserves will last 53 years at current rates of consumption, pointing out that
"peaking is the result of declining production rates, not declining reserves." Despite new
discoveries and increasing reliance on unconventional oil and gas, 37 countries are already post-peak, and
global oil production is declining at about 4.1% per year, or 3.5 million barrels a day (b/d) per year:¶ "We
need new production equal to a new Saudi Arabia every 3 to 4 years to maintain and grow
supply... New discoveries have not matched consumption since 1986. We are drawing down on our
reserves, even though reserves are apparently climbing every year. Reserves are growing due to better
technology in old fields, raising the amount we can recover – but production is still falling at 4.1% p.a. [per
annum]."¶ Dr. Miller, who prepared annual in-house projections of future oil supply for BP from 2000 to 2007, refers to this as the
"ATM problem" – "more money, but still limited daily withdrawals." As a consequence: "Production
of conventional
liquid oil has been flat since 2008. Growth in liquid supply since then has been largely of
natural gas liquids [NGL]- ethane, propane, butane, pentane - and oil-sand bitumen."¶ Dr. Miller is co-editor of a special
edition of the prestigious journal, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, published this month on the future of oil supply.
In an introductory paper co-authored with Dr. Steve R. Sorrel, co-director of the Sussex Energy Group at the University of Sussex in
Brighton, they argue that among
oil industry experts "there is a growing consensus that the era of
cheap oil has passed and that we are entering a new and very different phase." They endorse the
conservative conclusions of an extensive earlier study by the government-funded UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC):¶ "... a
sustained decline in global conventional production appears probable before 2030 and there
is significant risk of this beginning before 2020... on current evidence the inclusion of tight oil [shale oil]
resources appears unlikely to significantly affect this conclusion, partly because the resource base appears
relatively modest."¶ In fact, increasing dependence on shale could worsen decline rates in the long
run:¶ "Greater reliance upon tight oil resources produced using hydraulic fracturing will exacerbate any rising trend in global
average decline rates, since these wells have no plateau and decline extremely fast - for example, by 90% or
more in the first 5 years."¶ Tar sands will fare similarly, they conclude, noting that "the Canadian oil sands will deliver only 5 mb per
day by 2030, which represents less than 6% of the IEA projection of all-liquids production by that date."¶ Despite the cautious
projection of global peak oil "before 2020", they also point out that:¶ "Crude oil production grew at approximately 1.5% per year
between 1995 and 2005, but then plateaued with more recent increases in liquids supply largely deriving from NGLs, oil sands and
tight oil. These trends are expected to continue... Crude oil production is heavily concentrated in a small number of countries and a
small number of giant fields, with approximately 100 fields producing one half of global supply, 25 producing one quarter and a
single field (Ghawar in Saudi Arabia) producing approximately 7%. Most of these giant fields are relatively old, many are well past
their peak of production, most of the rest seem likely to enter decline within the next decade or so and few new giant fields are
expected to be found."¶ "The
final peak is going to be decided by the price - how much can we afford
to pay?", Dr. Miller told me in an interview about his work. "If we can afford to pay $150 per barrel, we could
certainly produce more given a few years of lead time for new developments, but it would
break economies again."¶ Miller argues that for all intents and purposes, peak oil has arrived as
conditions are such that despite volatility, prices can never return to pre-2004 levels:¶ "The oil
price has risen almost continuously since 2004 to date, starting at $30. There was a great spike
to $150 and then a collapse in 2008/2009, but it has since climbed to $110 and held there. The price rise brought a lot
of new exploration and development, but these new fields have not actually increased
production by very much, due to the decline of older fields. This is compatible with the idea that we are pretty much at
peak today. This recession is what peak feels like."¶ Although he is dismissive of shale oil and gas' capacity to prevent
a peak and subsequent long decline in global oil production, Miller recognises that there is still some leeway that could bring
significant, if temporary dividends for US economic growth - though only as "a relatively short-lived phenomenon":¶ "We're like a
cage of lab rats that have eaten all the cornflakes and discovered that you can eat the cardboard packets too. Yes, we can, but...
Tight oil may reach 5 or even 6 million b/d in the US, which will hugely help the US economy, along with shale gas. Shale resources,
though, are inappropriate for more densely populated countries like the UK, because the industrialisation of the countryside affects
far more people (with far less access to alternative natural space), and the economic benefits are spread more thinly across more
people. Tight oil production in the US is likely to peak before 2020. There absolutely will not be enough tight oil production to
replace the US' current 9 million b/d of imports."¶ In turn, by prolonging global economic recession, high oil prices may reduce
demand. Peak demand in turn may maintain a longer undulating oil production plateau:¶ "We are probably in peak oil today, or at
least in the foot-hills. Production could rise a little for a few years yet, but not sufficiently to bring the price down; alternatively,
continuous recession in much of the world may keep demand essentially flat for years at the $110/bbl price we have today. But we
can't grow the supply at average past rates of about 1.5% per year at today's prices."¶ The
fundamental dependence of
global economic growth on cheap oil supplies suggests that as we continue into the age of
expensive oil and gas, without appropriate efforts to mitigate the impacts and transition to a
new energy system, the world faces a future of economic and geopolitical turbulence:¶ "In the
US, high oil prices correlate with recessions, although not all recessions correlate with high oil prices. It does not
prove causation, but it is highly likely that when the US pays more than 4% of its GDP for oil, or more
than 10% of GDP for primary energy, the economy declines as money is sucked into buying fuel instead
of other goods and services... A shortage of oil will affect everything in the economy. I expect
more famine, more drought, more resource wars and a steady inflation in the energy cost of
all commodities."
Oil dependence creates multiple scenarios for war – increases the incentive to
go to war while short-circuiting barriers to conflict.
Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at George Washington
University, 2011
(Charles, “Reframing Energy Security: How Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,”
August, Online:
http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser_-_EnergySecurity-AUGUST2011.docx)
Oil dependence could reduce a state’s security if its access to oil is vulnerable to disruption
and if oil is necessary for operating the state’s military forces. Vulnerable energy supplies can
leave a state open to coercion—recognizing that it is more likely to lose a war, the state has a weaker
bargaining position and is more likely to make concessions.[1] Closely related, if war occurs the state is more
likely to lose. Conflict that is influenced by this mechanism is not fundamentally over the oil;[2] rather, when states already have
incentives for conflict, the oil vulnerability influences their assessment of military capabilities and in turn the path to war.
Recognizing this type of danger during the Cold War, U.S. planning to protect its sea lanes of communication with the Persian Gulf
was motivated partly by the importance of insuring the steady flow of oil that was necessary to enable the United States to fight a
long war against the Soviet Union in Europe. During the Second World War, Japan’s vulnerability to a U.S. oil embargo played an
important role in destroying Japan’s ability to fight.[3] This type of threat to the U.S. military capabilities is not a serious danger
today because the United States does not face a major power capable of severely interrupting its access to key supplies of oil. In
contrast, China does face this type of danger because its oil imports are vulnerable to disruption by the U.S. Navy. Protecting
access to oil threatens other states—an access-driven security dilemma The vulnerability of a
state’s access to oil supplies could reduce its security via a second, more complicated
mechanism—if the state’s efforts to protect its access to oil threaten another state’s security,
then this reduced security could in turn reduce the state’s own security. The danger would follow
standard security-dilemma logic, but with the defense of oil supply lines replacing the standard focus on protection of territory. In
the most extreme case, a
state could try to solve its import vulnerability through territorial
expansion. In less extreme cases, the state could deal with its vulnerability by building up
military forces required to protect its access to oil, which has the unintended consequence of
decreasing its adversary’s military capability and signaling that the state’s motives are malign,
which decreases the adversary’s security, which leads the adversary to build up its own
military forces.[4] Just as protecting a distant ally can require a state to adopt an offensive
capability, protecting access to oil can require offensive power-projection capabilities. Thus, a
state’s need to protect its access to oil could create a security dilemma that would not otherwise exist. Conflict fueled by this
security dilemma need not be over oil or access to oil; by
damaging political relations the security dilemma
could prevent the states from resolving political disputes and avoiding the escalation of crises.
Here again, the United States does not currently face this type of danger; this is largely because the military status quo currently
favors the United States, which relieves it from having to take provocative actions. In contrast, China’s efforts
to protect its
access to oil could be more provocative and generate military competition with the United States. Oil
makes territory increasingly valuable In this type of case, a state places greater value on owning territory because the
territory contains energy resources that are increasingly valuable. The greater value of territory can increase
competition between states, because the benefits of success grow relative to the costs of
competition, for example, the costs of arming. For similar reasons, the greater value of territory increases the
probability that crises over territory will lead to war instead of negotiated compromises, as
states are more willing to run the risks of fighting.[5] This type of conflict is the classic resource war, which is the
path by which oil is most commonly envisioned leading to conflict.[6] We can also hypothesize that the probability of conflict is
greater when territorial boundaries are contested and the political status quo is ambiguous. Because the norm of state sovereignty
is now widely held, states are less likely to launch expansionist wars to take other states’ territory. However, when boundaries are
not settled, states are more likely to compete to acquire territory they value and will compete harder when they value it more.[7] In
addition, unsettled
boundaries increase the possibilities for boundedly rational bargaining
failures that could lead to war. There are two basic paths via which a state could become involved in this type of oil
conflict. The more obvious is for the state to be a claimant in the dispute and become directly involved in a territorial conflict. The
second is likely more important for the United States—an
alliance commitment could draw the state into a
resource conflict that initially began between its ally and another state.[8] The state would not
have energy interests of its own at stake, but intervenes to protect its ally. Along this path,
energy plays an important but less direct role in damaging the state’s security, because
although energy interests fuel the initial conflict, they do not motivate the state’s
intervention.[9] A later section explores the possibility of conflict between China and Japan in the East China Sea, with the
United States drawn in to protect Japan and consequently involved in a war with China. When a state’s economy
depends heavily on oil, severe supply disruptions might do sufficiently large economic damage
that the state would use military force to protect its prosperity. A state this suffers this vulnerability risks
not only suffering the damage that could be inflicted by a supply disruption, which might be the by-product of unrelated domestic or
international events, but also risks being coerced by an adversary. Consequently, states
will want to be confident that
their ability to import oil will be uninterrupted and will pursue policies to ensure secure
access.
Those conflicts go nuclear.
Heinberg, Senior Fellow of the Post Carbon Institute & faculty at the New College of California,
2004
(Richard, “Book Excerpt: Powerdown: Options and Actions for a Port-Carbon World,” Online:
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/2291)
If the leadership of the US continues with current policies, the
next decades will be filled with war, economic
crises, and environmental catastrophe. Resource depletion and population pressure are about
to catch up with us, and no one is prepared. The political elites, especially in the US, are incapable of dealing with the
situation. Their preferred “solution” is simply to commandeer other nations’ resources, using
military force.¶ The worst-case scenario would be the general destruction of human
civilization and most of the ecological life-support system of the planet. That is, of course, a
breathtakingly alarming prospect. As such, we might prefer not to contemplate it – except for the fact that considerable evidence
attests to its likelihood. ¶ The
notion that resource scarcity often leads to increased competition is
certainly well founded. This is general true among non-human animals, among which
competition for diminishing resources typically leads to aggressive behaviour. ¶ Iraq is
actually the nexus of several different kinds of conflict – between consuming nations (e.g., France
and the US); between western industrial nations and “terrorist” groups; and – most obviously –
between a powerful consuming nation and a weaker, troublesome, producing nation. ¶
Politicians may find it easier to persuade their constituents to fight a common enemy than to
conserve and share.¶ War is always grim, but as resources become more scarce and valuable, as
societies become more centralized and therefore more vulnerable, and as weaponry becomes
more sophisticated and widely dispersed, warfare could become even more destructive that
the case during the past century. ¶ By far the greatest concern for the future of warfare must be
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The US is conducting research into new types of nuclear
weapons—bunker busters, small earth-penetrators, etc. Recent US administrations have
enunciated a policy of nuclear first-strike. ¶ Chemical and biological weapons are of secondary concern, although
new genetic engineering techniques may enable the creation of highly infectious and antibiotic-resistant “supergerms” cable of
the US has announced its intention to maintain clear
military superiority to any potential rival (“full-spectrum dominance”), and is actively developing
space-based weapons and supersonic drone aircraft capable of destroying targets anywhere
on the planet at a moment’s notice. It is also developing an entirely new class of gamma-ray
weapons that blur the critical distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons.
singling out specific ethnic groups. ¶ Additionally,
The Arctic offers the best solution to long-term energy security – natural gas,
oil, and methane hydrate reserves can meet demand for years.
Cohen et al, 8 (Ariel Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D., and Jim Dolbow, Senior Research Fellows and
PhD’s in ¶ Russian and Eurasian Studies Aand International Energy ¶ Security, Oct 30 2008, The
Heritage Foundation “The New Cold War: ¶ Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic”, AS)
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic might hold as much as 90 billion barrels
(13 percent) of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 47.3 trillion cubic meters (tcm) (30
percent) of the world’s undiscovered natural gas. At current consumption rates and assuming a
50 percent utili- zation rate of reserves, this is enough oil to meet glo-¶ bal demand for 1.4
years and U.S. demand for six years. Arctic natural gas reserves may equal Russia’s proven
reserves, the world’s largest.1 (See Table 1.)¶ The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources estimates that the underwater Arctic region claimed by Russia could hold as much as 586 billion
barrels of unproven oil reserves.2 The ministry estimates that proven oil deposits “in the Russian
area of water proper” in the Barents, Pechora, Kara, East Siberian, Chukchi, and Laptev Seas
could reach 418 million tons (3 billion barrels) and proven gas reserves could reach 7.7 tcm.
Unexplored reserves could total 9.24 billion tons (67.7 billion barrels) of oil and 88.3 tcm of
natural gas.3 Overall, Russia esti- mates that these areas have up to 10 trillion tons of
hydrocarbon deposits, the equivalent of 73 trillion barrels of oil.4¶ In addition to oil and gas, the
Arctic seabed may contain significant deposits of valuable metals and precious stones, such as
gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, manganese, nickel, platinum, tin, zinc, and diamonds. The rise
of China, India, and other developing countries has increased global demand for these
commodities.5¶ Alaska’s North Slope. Alaska’s North Slope con- tributes significantly to U.S. oil
production and could supply more. The North Slope is the region of Alaska from the Canadian
border on the east to the Chukchi Sea Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) on the west. It includes the
Chukchi Sea OCS, the Beaufort Sea OCS, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), the Central
Arctic (the region between the Colville and Canning Rivers), and the National Petroleum
Reserve, Alaska.6 (See Map 2.)¶ Between 1977 and 2004, the Prudhoe Bay oil field on the North
Slope produced more than 15 billion barrels of oil. By 1988, Prudhoe Bay was¶ accounting for
more than 25 percent of U.S. crude oil production. However, Prudhoe Bay oil field is currently in
steep decline.7 A U.S. Department of Energy report found that the North Slope has potentially
36 billion barrels of oil and 3.8 tcm of natural gas, close to Nigeria’s proven reserves. The report
also estimates that the Chukchi Sea OCS and the Beaufort Sea OCS hold combined energy
reserves of 14 billion barrels of oil and about 2 tcm of natural gas.8¶ Furthermore, these
reserves are even more attrac- tive because their development is less limited by fed- eral,
state, and local legislation, as is the case with ANWR, and are thus more accessible to
drilling.9¶ To enhance U.S. energy security, America should expand domestic oil production.
America remains the only oil-producing nation on earth that has placed a significant amount
of its reserves out of reach.10 Until recently, potentially large U.S. natural gas deposits have
been off limits.11 For instance, ANWR holds potential reserves of about 10 billion barrels of
petroleum.12 Such reserves could lead to an additional 1 million barrels per day in domestic
production, which could be transported south through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, which has a
spare capacity of 1 million barrels per day. An addi- tional 1 million barrels per day would save
the U.S. $123 billion in petroleum imports, create $7.7 bil- lion in new economic activity, and
generate 128,000 new jobs.13¶ Map 2 • B 2202 heritage.org¶ Methane Hydrates. Large methane
hydrate deposits are located on the deep seabed of the Arctic Ocean.14 Methane hydrates are
a solid form of nat- ural gas and have 3,000 times the concentration of methane found in the
atmosphere.15 While no tech- nology currently exists to mine methane clusters, the capability
appears to be just over the horizon. The U.S. and Japan have agreed to cooperate in researching
and developing commercial methane hydrate processing with the goal of selling gas from
methane hydrates by 2018.16 The South Korean Ministry of Energy has also announced that it
will work with the U.S. in exploring and developing methane hydrate deposits to develop a
commer- cially viable energy source. Seoul is also hoping to participate in the U.S.-sponsored
Alaska North Slope project in 2009 to test the viability of using methane hydrates as an energy
source.17¶ Global Oil Supply and the Demand “Crunch.”¶ Arctic oil and gas resources have
become increas- ingly important given the tight energy market. Esca- lating demand for
energy in 2001–2008, stagnating supply, political instability, growing resource nation- alism,
terrorism, and ethnic conflict have combined into a perfect storm of a global supply and
demand crunch.18 This crunch has been reflected in high oil prices ($147 per barrel in July).
While oil prices have since retreated to less than $70 per barrel due to the financial crisis, global
energy markets are expected to remain tight for the long-term as the fundamentals remain
largely the same (i.e., rising demand in emerging markets and flattening supply). While these
trends bode ill for energy security, the resources in the Arctic offer a glimmer of hope.¶ U.S.
Energy Supplies. Developing oil deposits in the Arctic is strategically important because the ¶
region is not beset by religious, ethnic, or social strife and resource nationalism that plague
oil- producing countries in the Middle East, West Africa, and Latin America. One way to reduce
U.S. dependency on foreign oil is to develop Arctic oil fields. Such development would lower
prices in the international oil market, even after account- ing for the time lag for bringing new
oil fields online. Moreover, the rich oil and gas deposits in Alaska’s North Slope and in the U.S.
offshore Arctic territories could further increase U.S. energy supply by guaranteeing
availability of additional domestic energy supplies in the time of a national emergency.19¶
Liquefied Natural Gas. U.S. demand for natural gas is growing because generating electric power
using natural gas is cleaner and more efficient than with coal or oil. Natural gas production in
the U.S. and Canada has not kept pace with the rising demand and is “flattening out” or
declining.20¶ In 2004, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan saw increased
imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a solution, or “price-pressure safety valve,” to reduce
prices and fill the gap from diminishing North American gas supply.21 How- ever, LNG imports
have so far proven expensive in meeting growing demand. The price of natural gas abroad is
nearly double the price in the U.S., so LNG flows to other buyers who are willing to pay higher
prices, such as in Japan.¶ As Royal Dutch Shell’s executive director of gas and power Linda Cook
suggested, U.S. domestic production of natural gas could run 15–20 billion cubic feet per day
below domestic demand by 2025.22 However, augmented LNG production from the Arctic
could help to meet future demand and to reduce gas prices in the domestic market, which
would benefit industry and consumers.
An Arctic Treaty allows for a fair regulation of resource extraction – no DA’s.
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): pag. 330-331.
2009. Web.
<https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>. XM)
An Arctic treaty should also address permissible activity within the region. It is essential that
the treaty resolve the acceptable level of resource extraction, if allowed at all, in consideration
of the consequences to the environment and native populations. While UNCLOS may be an
effective alternative in determining the jurisdictional limits of the Arctic States, once those
boundaries are delineated, it lacks the mechanisms to control what the States do within the
realm of their respective territories. While “[e]xcluding others from exploitation of the shelf’s
resources is an essential element of a State’s jurisdiction over conduct on the shelf,” it does not
necessarily follow that a State should be able to develop the area within its bounds. Though
UNCLOS broadly calls on coastal States to protect the marine environment, it lacks any
enforcement mechanism. An Arctic treaty could establish limits to exploitation of the Arctic
natural resources, and institute other environmental standards to preserve the natural
landscape and indigenous populations that currently inhabit the region. Such provisions are
critical, as the ecosystem of the Arctic has been described as “more finely tuned and acutely
sensitive to environmental impact than . . . any other part of the globe.” Because Arctic
ecosystems are so fragile and have lengthy recovery periods, any pollution or contamination
of the environment could have ruinous effects, especially given “the increased difficulty in
cleaning-up the Arctic environment due to the frigid, icy weather conditions.”170 Not only is
accidental pollution, such as oil spills, a serious concern, but so is pollution caused by the
constant routine passage of ships through the region’s waters. It is critical to the marine
environment that the international community “regulate the [Arctic] environment by preventing
oil spillage and other despoliation of the Arctic Ocean.” Without such an agreement, a lack of
oversight of a State’s activities within its jurisdiction could lead to drastic consequences in the
Arctic and worldwide. Furthermore, if the treaty is to allow some resource extraction, it also
should address who profits from those resources. Not only do the Arctic States have an
interest in profiting from the region’s rich energy resources, but the indigenous Arctic
populations have also indicated their desire to share in the proceeds if extraction is to be
allowed. While the prospect of attaining access to the Arctic’s valuable natural resources may
pose a challenge to an international agreement, past cooperation amongst the Arctic States
provides hope that an Arctic treaty is attainable. The United States and Canada have already
forged the Arctic Cooperation Agreement in acknowledgement of the need to “cooperate in
advancing their shared interests in Arctic navigation, development and security,” while
remaining sensitive to the Arctic’s unique environment and its native populations.9 Likewise, in
2005, Canada and Denmark reached an agreement for managing Hans Island, while the two
States continue to pursue their claims of the small land mass.10 They have also undertaken a
joint surveying project of the Arctic area near their coasts.11 In 1996, the eight Arctic States
established the Arctic Council, which was designed to promote cooperation among the Arctic
States. While the Arctic Council is demonstrative of the States’ ability to cooperate, it cannot
serve the same function as an Arctic treaty since it has been delegated negligible power and
its laws have no binding effect on the Arctic States.12 To date, “the most the Arctic Council has
been able to do . . . has been to adopt guidelines and recommendations on how the Arctic
[S]tates should apply their [individual State] regulations in [Arctic] areas.”178 Thus, while States
have undertaken collaborative approaches to the Arctic, there continues to be a need for
binding international law in the Arctic.
9 . Canada-United States: Agreement on Arctic Cooperation and Exchange of Notes Concerning Transit of Northwest
Passage, U.S.-Can., Jan. 11, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 141.
10 . Loukacheva, supra note 68, at 3.
11 . Krauss, supra note 10, at A1.
12 . See Timo Koivurova, Environmental Protection in the Arctic and Antarctic: Can the Polar Regimes Learn from
Each Other?, 33 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 204, 214 (2005). 178. Id.
Arctic Aff Updates
Structural trends toward multi-polarity in the status quo ensure Arctic conflict –
other nations use hard power to counterbalance US hegemony.
Murray, 12 (Robert W., Department of Political Science , University of Alberta , Canada
Published online: 01 Jun 2012, The Polar Journal, “Arctic politics in the emerging¶ multipolar
system: challenges and¶ consequences,” AS)
For 50 years, the bipolar system was dominated by two superpowers constantly competing and building arms in an effort to balance
one another. The end of the Cold War signalled a major shift in systemic arrangement, as the system went from being bipolar to the
world entering what was often referred to as the “unipolar moment.”1 The
era of unipolarity and American
hegemony in the international system has been marked by stability in an interstate sense, and the
realignment of various spheres of influence in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise.¶ Far from being just a theoretical notion, the
unipolar moment has also provided states with an environment in which to pursue their national self-interest where
the
likelihood of conflict is decreased and great power security competition has been minimized.2
As such, new areas of foreign affairs and defence strategy have become far more important than they could
have been throughout the bipolar con- strained Cold War years. One of the most notable examples in this regard
has been the increased desire for territorial protection and extension in the Arctic region. In an era of state preoccupation
with humanitarianism, terrorism and economic reces- sion, it is being suggested by some observers that the Arctic has become the
pri- mary stage through which states, both great and minor in power, can pursue their self-interest in a way that combines soft
power cooperation through bodies of gov- ernance with hard power and military build-up.¶ As things presently stand, there are a
variety of nations and institutions all seek- ing to claim governing authority over different parts of the circumpolar region. Nations
making claims to parts of the Arctic Ocean or other northern waters include Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway, Iceland and
Denmark/Greenland. On the institutional side, Arctic governance has been debated and defined by bodies such as the United
Nations, the European Union, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council.3 To date, no
clear resolution to competing claims is in sight, and in some cases the situation is on the verge of
becoming far more competitive as nations such as Russia have resorted to asserting possible military
solutions to contested Arctic issues to bolster their declarations.¶ It is important to note the increased levels of interest over
Arctic relations between states, but, on this point, little attention has been given to the influence of the international system over
this situation. If the unipolar moment has been defined as an era of relative stability and diplomatic coexistence, and tensions
in the Arctic are already on the rise, what is to happen when the multipolar system finally
emerges in the near future?¶ Since 2005, the status of the United States as systemic hegemon has been in
decline due to economic, military and political strains placed on American power capabilities throughout the
Bush era and beyond. This decrease in relative power preponderance has been even further exacerbated by the
economic recession starting in 2008 and the nation’s inability to stabilize its markets. As such, the
predictions of those like Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer are on the verge of coming to fruition, in that the unipolar
moment is about to end.4 New great powers are ris- ing, the United States is no longer able to prevent these
nations from balancing their power, and the once obvious prevalence of American power is far murkier than it was a decade ago. As
the multipolar era becomes increasingly likely, one
must ponder the effects this shift might have on state
foreign and defence strategy- making, especially towards the Arctic region.¶ To date, though its relative power position has
declined significantly in recent years, the United States remains the hegemon of the international system, but it is contended here
that such status is soon to evaporate. In this context, this article argues that the
emergence of a multipolar systemic
arrangement is very likely to increase security competition in the system as a whole, and the Arctic will
be at the epicentre of such conflict. To lend support to this hypothesis, an examination of the impending shift from unipolarity to
multipolarity will be made, as will an account of current security dynamics in the circumpolar region. The article concludes with a
stark warning that without
some kind of real action towards settling competing Arctic claims, it will
be left to states to secure their own territorial assertions through hard power and forceful
means.
Arctic conflict is inevitable – unipolarity is collapsing.
Murray, 12 (Robert W., Department of Political Science , University of Alberta , Canada
Published online: 01 Jun 2012, The Polar Journal, “Arctic politics in the emerging¶ multipolar
system: challenges and¶ consequences,” AS)
The impact of a unipolar systemic arrangement on state behaviour is best explained by the hegemonic stability theory.18 According
to this theory, a
unipolar structure is able to pacify the relations of states because there is
recognition of the hegemon’s ability to control or intervene in conflicts that may threaten its
power, or the order of the system. Wohlforth summarizes the basic precept of hegemonic stability theory by contending:¶ The
theory stipulates that especially powerful states (“hegemons”) foster international orders that are stable until differential growth in
power produces a dissatisfied state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and lar- ger the
concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be [...] If the system is
unipolar, the great power hierar- chy should be much more stable than any hierarchy lodged within a system of more than one pole.
Because unipolarity is based on a historically unprecedented concentra- tion of power in the United States, a potentially important
source of great power con- flict – hegemonic rivalry – will be missing.19¶ It
is essential to note two things about the
status of the United States as systemic hegemon throughout the immediate post-Cold War era – first, that its
preponderance of power in every area of capability measurement created a stable and less tense
system in which states were able to interact; and second, that the United States’ time as hegemon has fostered
the growth of multilateral institutions and agreements rather than a bullying type of unipolarity.20¶ From a
systemic standpoint, it would seem that there is little reason to be concerned about military aggression, arms racing and distrustful
competition in the modern system, but one vital concern to note is that
much of the unipolar and hegeomic
stability literature completely ignores the role of the Arctic in state security calculations.
Throughout an era of institutional binding, regional integra- tion, humanitarianism and soft power growth, the competition for the
Arctic was following much of the same pattern, with states preferring to make their claims in institutional or legal settings. Yet, as
the unipolar moment has started to decline, and multipolarity is on the horizon, the
competition in the circumpolar region has taken on a very different tone.¶ Competing claims over Arctic
territories, such as the Northwest Passage, Beaufort Sea and other maritime boundaries, and the use of the region as a space for
military exercises are by no means new and they have not come to the forefront of the strategic security agendas of states since the
post-9/11 era. Rather, throughout the Cold War, the Arctic was a realm of constant supervision, not because either superpower
wanted to develop the region, but more because of the mutual fear each side had of offensive attacks being launched over the pole.
Even throughout the unipolar moment, the Arctic has been a space for sovereignty competition, but the
nature of the competition had been mostly legal, institutional or soft power focused.21 Worth noting as well is the very complex
nature of reasons for state interests in the Arctic. Mark Nuttall effectively summarizes the complexities of the high north as he
claims:¶ In the post-Cold War world [the Arctic] is seen as a natural scientific laboratory, under- stood as a homeland for indigenous
peoples, a place of sovereignty conflicts, an emerg- ing hydrocarbon province with which the world is coming to think of as one of
the last major frontiers for oil and gas, and a region of dramatic environmental change.22¶ Though the intricacies of Arctic
competition are intriguing to note, it is how states are strategically asserting their claims that is of particular importance.¶ The
start of America’s hegemonic decline has allowed states to revisit their approaches to the
Arctic as nations jockey for position by balancing or rivalling American preferences. As a result, the nature of Arctic
competition has incorporated both soft power and hard power elements. Further, the nature of militarism and
hard power tension has increased due to the recent spending and strategic shifts by many Arctic states in recent years, including
Canada, Norway, Sweden and Russia.23 The
reasons for America’s decline are relatively unsurprising –
military overextension in Afghanistan and Iraq; the lack of international support for American foreign policy
objectives throughout the Bush era; the 2008 economic recession; and the utter dis- trust by most states,
including close American allies, of the United States’ political objectives.24 The system remains unipolar, of course,
but as stated above, the pre- ponderance of power capabilities has substantially diminished,
opening the door for others to balance and rival American power in the coming years.
Climate change has changed states’ perceptions of the Arctic – they view it as
key to improving their economic and natural resource capabilities.
Murray, 12 (Robert W., Department of Political Science , University of Alberta , Canada
Published online: 01 Jun 2012, The Polar Journal, “Arctic politics in the emerging¶ multipolar
system: challenges and¶ consequences,” AS)
Coincidentally, it has also been the revelations of science in recent years that have also
promoted a faster pace for those states making Arctic claims. The role of climate change and its
impact over the Arctic has allowed for states to more freely move into the region and pursue
strategies previously unavailable.25 According to Lotta Numminen, climate change has recently
affected states’ perceptions of the possible economic opportunities in the Arctic in four ways:
first, that the subsurface of the Arctic Ocean floor is assumed to contain substantial oil and gas
reserves, to which there will be increased access; second, that melting waters will provide new
waters for international fisheries; third, the increase in research strategies; and fourth, is the
greater access to sea passages.26 One of the main reasons states see the Arctic region as such
a lucrative area is the potential for increasing their respec- tive economic and natural resource
capabilities. Previously, the northern ice caps prevented states from entering most of the Arctic
Ocean and surrounding areas, but as these environmental situations change, states have readily
identified the high north as a priority in both their security and economic strategies.
Multipolarity is on the horizon - the High North offers challenger nations a way
to counterbalance US power while circumventing regional tensions.
Murray, 12 (Robert W., Department of Political Science , University of Alberta , Canada
Published online: 01 Jun 2012, The Polar Journal, “Arctic politics in the emerging¶ multipolar
system: challenges and¶ consequences,” AS)
Among the main reasons the Arctic has not been more readily seen as a poten- tial area for security competition and conflict is the
interpretation that the United States has little or no interest in the circumpolar region at all. According to Stephen Brooks and
William Wohlforth, American hegemony throughout the post-Cold War era was seen as passive, stable and enduring because of the
lack of counterpower being demonstrated in the system:¶ Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the
north and south, the United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The
main potential challengers to its unipolarity, mean- while – China,
Russia, Japan, and Germany – are in the opposite
not augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States
without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even interna- tional
position. They can-
politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own
neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States,
regional balancing efforts would almost certainly help contain them, as would the massive latent power
capabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to head off an emerging threat.27¶ Almost
completely omitted from such interpretations, however, are America’s north- ern borders
over Alaska and into the Arctic. Latitudinal thinking would seem to indicate that Brooks and Wohlforth are correct in
terms of America’s interests in many areas of the globe, but this ignores what has been happening at the top of the world in the high
north.¶ It is not as if the United States has been ignorant of its own decline in power, especially regarding the Arctic. In 2009, the
United States issued National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 that deal exclusively
with American Arctic policy. According to these directives, the altera- tions to national policies of other states regarding the Arctic
compelled the United States to clearly outline the security and development strategies they would use to protect its Arctic interests.
Among the first, and most clear, elements of the direc- tives is the clear intention of the United States to defend their national
security interests. According to Article III, subsection B 1 of the directives:¶ The United States has broad and fundamental national
security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to
safeguard these interests. These interests include suchmatters as missile defense and early warning; deployment ofsea and air
systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of
navigation and overflight.28¶ The contemporary changes to the international system as the
era of American hegemony
has begun to wane, the effects of climate change and greater access, and the increasingly
militaristic strategies of most every Arctic state have led to a situa- tion where tensions are at
an all time high, and that legal or institutional processes are unlikely to resolve anything amicably. As
the system continues its transition away from unipolarity, observers are left to ponder what might come next after an era of relative
interstate stability.
The next major war will be in the Arctic – multipolarity is inevitable and ensures
conflict dyads, miscalculation, and power imbalances.
Murray, 12 (Robert W., Department of Political Science , University of Alberta , Canada
Published online: 01 Jun 2012, The Polar Journal, “Arctic politics in the emerging¶ multipolar
system: challenges and¶ consequences,” AS)
The problem with such analyses of American hegemony is that the Bush administration chose to ignore utterly such warnings and,
rather than acting mag- nanimously, post-9/11
American foreign policy did precisely what it should not
have. Pre-emption, coercion and irrational interventions, combined with a major economic
recession, all serve to explain why American hegemony began to decline by 2005 in terms of both
actual power levels and perceptions of legitimate hege- monic status.30 The clearest sign that American exceptionalism has been
decreasing is the aggressive and regional balancing dynamics taking place between states in the Arctic region.¶ Security strategy in
the circumpolar region has altered dramatically since 2005, with more states showing interest, hard power spending increasing, and
legal pro- cesses being coupled by at times overtly offensive strategy.31 Russia, Canada and a number of European states, especially
Norway and Sweden, exemplify this line of argument about how sovereignty claims have become focused on traditional inter- state
arms racing and militarism while soft power components, like governance structures and legal processes, continually evolve.32 As
mentioned previously, even
the United States has woken up to see that, as their hegemony declines,
other states have begun to balance against them in the Arctic, thus provoking the 2009 Presi- dential
Directives. Even so, Arctic interested nations have not yielded to American claims, nor has there been any
evidence of America’s closest allies backing down in the face of its Arctic assertions, most clearly evidenced by
Canada’s continued claims over the Northwest Passage.33¶ In the international relations canon, most observers point to
either India or China as emerging great powers that are the most likely to counterbalance Ameri- can power. The 2004 American
National Intelligence Council report highlights this theory by stating:¶ The likely emergence of China and India as new major global
players – similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century – will transform the
geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that
commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the
developing world led by China and India came into their own.34¶ Both China and India have recently expressed their interest in
Arctic affairs, but no
power is as close to rivalling or challenging American power in hard power terms than
Russia. This is especially true in the Arctic, as Russia’s Arctic policies have made its intentions towards asserting its
control over territory it deems to be sover- eign very clear.¶ The role of the Arctic in Russian foreign policy
cannot be understated. According to Russia’s 2008 Arctic policy document, the region is seen as the epicentre
of Russia’s military and socio-economic development. The top two priorities for Russian Arctic interests are
defined as follows:¶ (a) In the sphere of socio-economic development – the expansion of the resource base of the Arctic Zone of the
Russian Federation, in order to substantially satisfy Russia’s needs in hydrocarbon resources, hydro-biological resources, and other
types of strate- gic raw materials;¶ (b) In the sphere of military security, defense, and safekeeping of the state borders of the Russian
Federation located in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation – the upkeep of a favorable operational regime in the Arctic Zone of
the Russian Federa- tion, including the maintenance of the required combat potential of military groupings under the Armed Forces
of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and agencies in this region [...]35¶ In order to achieve these goals, the
Russians have created a unique military brigade to be permanently posted in the Arctic, have placed a Russian Federation flag on the
Arctic Ocean seabed, have conducted various missile tests, have sailed their nuclear submarines through contested waters and have
openly challenged the abilities of other states to enforce their own claims.¶ In response to Russian offensive posturing and the
inability of the United States to dissuade security competition in the area, middle
and minor powers have begun to
use hard power as a means of trying to enforce their sovereignty. Perhaps the best example here is
Canada, whose military capabilities are extremely weak, but strong rhetoric and a drastically increased level of high-north military
spending since 2006 seems to indicate that the
Canadian government cannot rely on its American alliances
to protect its interests, and that posturing by states like Russia or even Denmark clearly threaten Canada’s national
interests. As Norway, Sweden and Denmark have begun to put an emphasis on hard power capabilities to extend¶ or defend
northern claims, Canada has done the same. Worth noting as well in the Canadian context is that, while great powers like Russia and
the United States can easily defeat any middle or minor power, Canada’s capabilities are being either rivalled or surpassed by
European states like Norway.36¶ Canada’s realization of the evolving security and environmental climate in the Arctic has compelled
changes to its domestic and foreign security policies, each seeking to assert Canadian sovereignty over areas of the Arctic, especially
the Northwest Passage. One of the main components of now Prime Minister Harper’s 2005–06 campaign was to bolster Arctic
security resources, as many Canadians have identified the region as an essential part of Canada’s national security and identity.37
Rob Huebert argues:¶ The Harper government has increasingly recognized the significance of maintaining a strong presence in the
Arctic and has vigorously begun to improve Canada’s northern abilities [...] The Harper government has also made a series of
promises to consider- ably expand Canada’s northern capability [...] If these promises are implemented, Canada will have
significantly improved its ability to control activity in its Arctic.38¶ In
virtually any other area of the world,
Canadian national security cannot be divorced from the United States, which is a partial explanation for
why Canada has traditionally been considered a middle power since the end of World War II.39 Yet, since the start of American
decline, the
Canadian government has recognized that its fate in the Arctic will be its own, and not
the Americans have their own interests in the region
and have shown a complete disregard for Canadian claims over the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort
Sea.¶ As the world moves towards multipolarity, it has become increasingly obvious that the Arctic region
represents an area of increased security competition and a potentially conflictual region in the
future. Multipolar systems are the most unsta- ble, and history has shown these to produce military conflict
due to the natural effects brought by a larger number of self-interested powers vying for
power and security. Further, as new great powers begin to emerge, American strategic
considerations will be spread so thin that they will be unable to prevent against their eventual
loss of hegemony. The largest mistake being made at this time by international security scholars and
policymakers is their normal obsession with China, India and latitudinal thinking. The next area of
intrinsically tied to the protection of the United States, as
major war is not likely to be the Middle East, the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea, due to traditional security balancing,
deterrence and economic interests in each of these areas.¶ Multipolarity
naturally brings the possibility of war.
Mearsheimer contends that war is far more likely in multipolar systems for three reasons:¶ First, there are more
opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a multipolar system. Second,
imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have
the capability to¶ win a war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely. Third, the potential for
miscalculation is greater in multipolarity: states might think they have the capabil- ity to coerce or conquer another
state when, in fact, they do not.40¶ Presently, there is little reason to believe that tension and strategic posturing will lead to the
outbreak of war in the near future. That said, as America’s influence continues to wane, other states have shown their desire to take
full advantage of the United States’ inability to control northern affairs. If
the United States does lose its
hegemony, which many commentators believe is inevitable, there will be at least four dyads in security
calculations, with Russia, China and India entering the fray, and two of those states have Arctic borders
and a historical legacy of conflict. Power imbalance in the Arctic is already apparent, with only Russia and the
United States as great powers, while the other Arctic states are middle or minor powers with no hope of preventing a great power
from doing as it pleases. Lastly, miscal- culation is
evident in the present context, as Sweden and Norway are
both arming for possible Russian aggression, though Russia has shown little or no overtly aggressive tendencies
towards Nordic nations.¶ Unipolarity was not going to last forever, but as it fades the probability of
north- ern conflict is ever increasing. The shift to hard power strategies, the effects of cli- mate change, and the
decline of the United States all speak to the fact that multipolarity can increase levels of tension and mistrust, thus altering the
currently stable nature of Arctic affairs. Efforts at Arctic governance through institutional binding or legal claims, as seen in the Arctic
Council and UNCLOS, are able at present to mitigate the ongoing and ever increasing security competition in the high north, but as
the system changes from unipolarity to multipolarity, constraining state behaviour becomes increasingly
difficult. As such, observers must be mindful of the systemic variables at play when explaining and forecasting Arctic politics, as
changes to the structure are very likely to translate into changes to state security strategies.