Vietnam: Pacification and the
Big War
Lsn 33
ID & SIG:
• air mobility, attrition, Ia Drang, Kennedy,
limited war, NVA, Operation Rolling
Thunder, pacification, Special Forces
(Green Berets), strategic hamlet program,
Westmoreland
Pacification
• Between 1961 and 1963,
President Kennedy
launched a full-scale
counterinsurgency
program in Vietnam, part
of which would become
the “pacification” program
• Major goals
– Strengthen the South
Vietnamese
government’s hold on
the peasantry
– Cut into the heart of
the Viet Cong politicomilitary organization
• Designed to “win the
hearts and minds” of the
South Vietnamese
In 1967, Robert Komer, shown here with
President Johnson, was selected to head
CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural
Development Support)
and coordinate all pacification programs
Pacification
• Strategic Hamlet Program…
South Vietnamese peasants
from scattered villages were
brought together in defended
and organized hamlets in order
to protect them, isolate the Viet
Cong, and show the superiority
of what the SVN government
could offer
– Patterned after British experience
in Malaya
– Did not work in Vietnam because
of traditional Vietnamese ties to
the land
Pacification
• Combined Action Program… Placed
selected Marine squads within the
village militia to eliminate local
guerrillas
– Very successful at the local level but
required a degree of AmericanVietnamese cooperation unable to be
replicated on a wider scale
– Drew American troops away from the “big
war”
• Instead, American troops
concentrated on the “big war”and left
pacification to the South Vietnamese
who did not show an abundance of
commitment to the task
Pacification
• Revolutionary
Development
Program… Put armed
social workers into
Vietnamese villages to
begin grass roots civic
improvement and
eliminate the VC
shadow government
– Didn’t reach full
potential because
South Vietnamese
government feared the
consequences of real
rural politicalization
25th Infantry Division soldiers support
the Revolutionary Development
Program by clearing the village of
Rach Kien during Operation Lanakai
Pacification
• Chieu hoi (opens arms)
amnesty program…
designed to persuade VC
to change sides
– When VC saw the program
might bear fruit they
unleashed a terrorist
campaign that reduced
defections from 5,000 to 500
a month
– CORDS responded with
Operation Phoenix, a direct
action plan to kill, capture, or
co-opt the “provincial
reconnaissance units”
These former VC who took
advantage of the chieu hoi
amnesty receive training in
automotive repair to help them
in their new lives
Pacification: Overall Assessment
• Commonly considered a
missed strategic
opportunity
• Suffered from being “too
little, too late”
– CORDS not activated
until 1967
• Perceived as competition
with the “big war” and
many military officers
favored a “military
solution”
Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis
LeMay reportedly said, “Grab
‘em by the balls and their hearts
and minds will follow.”
Limited War
• When the Soviet Union and
the US nuclear programs
reached the point of Mutually
Assured Destruction, the US
faced the dilemma of
responding to communist
challenges in peripheral areas
by either risking starting a
nuclear war or doing nothing
• The alternative strategy of
limited war was developed to
harness the nation’s military
power and employ only that
force necessary to achieve
the political aim
The US considered, but did
not use, atomic bombs in
support of the French at
Dien Bien Phu in 1954
Limited War
• The objective of limited war
was not to destroy an
opponent but to persuade
him to break off the conflict
short of achieving his goals
and without resorting to
nuclear war
• The limited war theory was
more an academic than a
military concept and its
application resulted in
tensions, frustrations, and
misunderstanding between
the military and civilian
leadership
Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara is sharply criticized
for his technocratic and
statistical approach to the
Vietnam War
Johnson’s Approach
• The Johnson
Administration was
deeply influenced by
limited war theory
– Desirous not to let the
conflict expand into a
third world war
– Imposed precise
geographical
limitations
• Cambodia, etc
– Kept military
commanders in close
check
“General, I have a lot
riding on you. I hope you
don’t pull a MacArthur on
me.” (Johnson to
Westmoreland, Feb 1966)
Strategy of Attrition
• Traditionally, the “American way
of war” had been a strategy of
annihilation
– Seeks the immediate
destruction of the combat
power of the enemy’s armed
forces
• In Vietnam, the US would instead
follow a strategy of attrition
– The reduction of the
effectiveness of a force
caused by loss of personnel
and materiel
• This proved to be a poor strategy
against the North Vietnamese
who used a strategy of
exhaustion
– The gradual erosion of a
nation’s will or means to resist
Anti-war protests such as
this one at the 1968
Democratic National
Convention showed
domestic support for the
war was waning
Problems with the Strategy of
Attrition
• Led the US to fight according to the
theory of gradual escalation
– A steady increase in the level of
military pressure (rather than
employing overwhelming force
all at once) would coerce the
enemy into compliance
– US never had enough forces to
control the countryside
– US soldiers served one year
tours in Vietnam
– North Vietnamese soldiers were
there till the end and recognized
“Victory will come to us, not
suddenly, but in a complicated
and tortuous way.”
US soldiers regularly
conducted clearing
operations but the Viet Cong
would reoccuppy the area
after the US units moved on
US Troop Levels in Vietnam
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
760
900
3,205
11,300
16,300
23,300
184,300
385,300
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
485,600
536,100
475,200
334,600
156,800
24,200
50
Problems with the Strategy of
Attrition
• Led to a “body count” mentality
– Many reports were exaggerated or
falsified
– North Vietnamese were always able
to replace their losses while
Americans became disillusioned with
the mounting death toll
• Nightly news broadcasts reported US
deaths versus North Vietnamese deaths
– If ours were less, we were winning!
• North Vietnamese showed a remarkable
capability to cope, rebuild, and repair
– The enemy will was never broken
Nightly news anchors
such as Walter Cronkite
regularly reported the
Vietnam “body count”
Problems with the Strategy of
Attrition
• Low-tech nature of the enemy
prevented the US from bringing to
bear the full effects of its combat
power
– North Vietnamese infiltration
routes were hard to bomb
– North Vietnamese ground
troops used the tactic of
“clinging to the G.I.’s belts” to
minimize American ability to use
artillery and close air support
– The nature of guerrilla war
allowed the North Vietnamese
to avoid contact when it was not
to their advantage to fight
A long line of communist
porters carry supplies
along the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. (AP photo by Trong
Thanh)
Other Manifestations of Limited
War Theory
• “Gradual escalation”
– President never fully acceded to the troop or bombing
requests of his commanders, but the process resulted
in the failure of one level of force justifying the
increase to the next level
• Restrictive rules of engagement
• Bombing pauses and negotiations
• Failure to significantly mobilize the National
Guard
Total War vs Limited War
• The relationship between the belligerents is asymmetric.
The insurgents can pose no direct threat to the survival of
the external power because . . . they lack an invasion
capability. On the other hand, the metropolitan power
poses not simply the threat of invasion, but the reality of
occupation. This fact is so obvious that its implications
have been ignored. It means, crudely speaking, that for
the insurgents the war is “total,” while for the external
power it is necessarily “limited.” Full mobilization of the
total military resources of the external power is simply not
politically possible. . . . Not only is full mobilization
impossible politically, it is not thought to be in the least
necessary. The asymmetry in conventional military
capability is so great and the confidence that military
might will prevail is so pervasive that expectation of
victory is one of the hallmarks of the initial endeavor.
– Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”
Total War vs Limited War
• Superior strength of commitment thus compensates for
military inferiority. Because the outcome of the war can
never be as important to the outside power as it is to
those who have staked their very existence on victory,
the weaker side fights harder, displaying a willingness
to incur blood losses that would be unacceptable to the
stronger side. The signers of the Declaration of
Independence risked their lives, fortunes, and sacred
honor in what became a contest with an imperial giant
for which North America was (after 1778) a secondary
theater of operations in a much larger war. For the
American rebel leadership, defeat meant the
hangman's noose. For British commanders in North
America, it meant a return to the comforts and
pleasures of London society and perhaps eventual
reassignment.
– Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”
Total War vs Limited War
• The tables were reversed in Vietnam. There, the United
States attempted to suppress a revolution against
foreign domination mounted by an enemy waging a total
war against a stronger power, a power for which the
outcome of that war could never be remotely as
important as it was to the insurgents. The United States
could and did wreak enormous destruction in Vietnam,
but nothing that happened in Vietnam could or did
threaten core overseas US security interests, much less
the survival of the United States. Thus, whereas the
Vietnamese communists invested all their energy and
available resources in waging war, US annual defense
spending during the war averaged only 7.5 percent of
the nation’s gross national product.
– Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”
Total War vs Limited War
• “The ability of the Vietcong continuously to rebuild their
units and make good their losses is one of the mysteries
of this guerrilla war. We still find no plausible explanation
for the continued strength of the Vietcong. . . . [They] have
the recuperative power of the phoenix [and] an amazing
ability to maintain morale.” (Maxwell Taylor)
• “I never thought [the war] would go like this. I didn’t think
these people had the capacity to fight this way. If I had
thought they could take this punishment and fight this
well, could enjoy fighting like this, I would have thought
differently at the start.” (Robert McNamara)
• “Hanoi’s persistence was incredible. I don’t understand it,
even to this day.” (Dean Rusk)
• The US leadership “underestimated the toughness of the
Vietnamese.” (William Westmoreland)
– Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”
Flexible Response
• President Kennedy moved away from the
Eisenhower Administration’s reliance on nuclear
weapons and developed a strategy of “Flexible
Response” which was designed to permit
different types of military options at different
levels
– Very interested in counterinsurgency and initiated the
Special Forces
• Between 1961 and 1963 Kennedy launched a
full-scale counterinsurgency program in Vietnam
Counterinsurgency
• Provided equipment and
advisors to South Vietnamese
• Special Forces conducted
civic action programs
• US helicopter pilots
transported South
Vietnamese soldiers
• Advisors accompanied South
Vietnamese units down to the
battalion level
Special Forces were active
in training montagnards in
the Central Highlands
Counterinsurgency
• Overall the
counterinsurgency program
failed
• The US military refused to
embrace counterinsurgency
and instead stuck to
traditional warfighting
• Insisted on using
technology and tactics that
were inappropriate for the
environment and the nature
of the war
• North Vietnamese became
very adept at countering US
conventional tactics
B-52 bomber over Vietnam
The Big War
• Bombing
– Rolling
Thunder
• Airmobility
– Ia Drang
• Search and
destroy
– Junction City
• Tet
– Phase III
• Defeat
– Domestic
issues
– Vietnamization
– Withdrawal
• Legacy
– Vietnam
Syndrome
Bombing: Rolling Thunder
• Sustained bombing campaign designed to
– Reduce North Vietnamese/Viet Cong activities by
affecting their will
– Improve South Vietnamese morale
– Provide US and South Vietnam with a bargaining tool
– Reduce infiltration of men and material
– Demonstrate US resolve to support allies
• Gradually expanded from 63,000 tons of bombs
in 1965 to 226,000 in 1967
– Bomb tonnage surpassed what had been dropped on
Germany, Italy, and Japan in World War II
Bombing: Rolling Thunder
• Heavy reliance on air
power overestimated the
capabilities of strategic
bombing and
underestimated North
Vietnamese will
• North Vietnamese were
able to rebuild damage,
seemingly strengthen
their will, and actually
increase infiltration in
spite of the bombing
F-4Cs on a
mission over
Vietnam
Bombing: Rolling Thunder
• Problems
– Micromanaged targeting
and target restrictions
frustrated military
planners
– Difficulty in finding targets
reduced effectiveness
– Gradual escalation and
frequent interruptions
allowed North Vietnamese
to recover
Bombing: Rolling Thunder
• Restrictions
– White House picked targets,
strike force size, weapons,
and timing of attacks
– Most strategic targets were
off limits:
• 30-mile radius around
Hanoi
• 10-mile radius around
Haiphong
• Wide buffer zone along
Chinese border
– North Vietnamese airfields
were off limits
– Could not attack SAM sites
unless fired upon
Bombing Rolling Thunder
• Results
– Ineffective
– Showed a large
disconnect between
political considerations
and military objectives
– “Rolling Thunder had
not been built to
succeed, and it didn’t.”
• John Correll
Johnson supposedly said, “I won’t
let those Air Force generals bomb
the smallest outhouse without
checking with me.”
Airmobility: Ia Drang
• In 1962 Secretary McNamara tasked the “Howze
Board” to study the emerging helicopter
technology and develop “a plan for implementing
fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts which
will give us a significant increase in mobility.”
• In Jan 1963 the Army began forming and testing
the 11th Air Assault Division which would
ultimately result in the 1st Cavalry Division
(Airmobile) being activated in July 1965
• In Aug the division began arriving in Vietnam
Airmobility: Ia Drang
• The airmobility
concept was tested
in combat when the
1st Cav was
ordered to the Ia
Drang valley in Oct
1965
• On Nov 14 a US
battalion (about
450 men) engaged
some 2000 North
Vietnamese
regulars at LZ XRay
Lieutenant Colonel Hal
Moore on LZ X-Ray
Airmobility: Ia Drang
• US relied heavily
on airmobility and
firepower
– Helicopters
provided
transportation,
surprise,
firepower,
logistical support,
evacuation
– Artillery, bombers,
close air support
Airmobility: Ia Drang
• Numerically a huge
US victory
– 3,000 North
Vietnamese killed
compared to 300
Americans
– Confirmed
Westmoreland’s
“search and destroy”
strategy
• North Vietnamese
returned to guerrilla
warfare and made
tactical adjustments to
deal with US firepower
Next
• The Big War (continued) and the Vietnam
Syndrome