Strengthening Tanzania’s Anti Corruption Action
Business Case - Intervention Summary
What support will the UK provide?
The UK will provide £11m over four years (2011/12 – 2014/15).
Why is UK support required?
Tanzania has taken important steps in the past decade to tackle corruption, out performing most
of its neighbours in East Africa in international rankings (with the exception in recent years of
Rwanda). Nonetheless, corruption is still prevalent. Tanzania has a relatively comprehensive anticorruption legislative and institutional framework, but implementation is weak, and there is a low
likelihood of being held to account for corrupt behaviour. Absolute levels of corruption are hard to
assess with a high degree of accuracy, as are overall trends. After an extended period of
progress on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Tanzania’s score
declined between 2007 and 2010 (3.2 to 2.7). Public perceptions, although not a reliable measure
of absolute levels of corruption, reflect a growing awareness of, and concern about corruption
across key sectors of government1.
Corruption in Tanzania threatens to undermine development gains by diverting scarce revenue
from productive use, weakening essential services such as healthcare and law enforcement, and
deterring private investment2. It also poses a risk to the UK’s substantial aid investment in
Tanzania: DFID plans to channel over half of its support to Tanzania through the government
system in the next four years.
DFID’s wider engagement in Tanzania already tackles various aspects of corruption through a
variety of different interventions; for example through improved management of public finances
including procurement, parliamentary scrutiny of spending, improved human resource
management in the civil service, and empowering civil society to hold government to account. This
programme will focus on improving the performance of the institutions most directly involved in
tackling corruption (Preventing and Combating Corruption Bureau – PCCB, Directorate of Public
Prosecutions – DPP, Financial Intelligence Unit – FIU, and the National Audit Office – NAO). It will
help them to work more effectively together on the identification and handling of corruption risk
and cases. It will also address corruption in the police and judiciary, which the Tanzanian public
perceive as the most corrupt government institutions. The programme will also provide demanddriven advisory inputs to other sectors that are at high risk of corruption and/or where significant
investments are planned by DFID (likely to include Tanzania Revenue Authority and Ports
Authority, education, health, water and roads). Finally, this programme will help increase national
and international incentives for Tanzania to take action against corruption, though an Integrity
Fund. This programme will be delivered through a managing agent to be competitively procured.
The programme will be overseen by the Tanzanian government through the National Criminal
Justice Forum.
What are the expected results?
The programme’s intended impact is reduced impact of corruption on the poor in Tanzania (directly
in terms of bribery and improved access to services and indirectly through reduced diversion of
public resources). The programme’s intended outcome is more active implementation of anticorruption measures, particularly in high risk/high impact sectors. Success will be measured
through improvements in relevant Global Integrity Index scores and National Corruption Surveys,
and through a reduction in the proportion of the public who pay a bribe when they encounter the
police or the judiciary .
1
2
East African Bribery Index 2010, Afrobarometer 2008
Public Goods, Rents and Business in Tanzania’ ODI 2011, ‘Informal Pay and the Quality of Healthcare’ CMI 2007
The outputs will be:
a. Oversight agencies improve identification and handling of corruption risks and cases
Success will be measured through increases in numbers / percentages of corruption cases
reported and accepted for investigation and prosecution, faster average handling speeds,
improvements in follow up on corruption findings in NAO reports, and Tanzania being taken off
the Financial Action Task Force watch list for deficiencies in anti money laundering compliance.
b. Accountability mechanisms strengthened in the police and judiciary, and anti-corruption
measures incorporated into major DFID sector programmes
Success will be measured through improved corruption perceptions of traffic police and
compliance with police front desk, police criminal investigation and primary court procedures,
increases in corruption complaints received / addressed by the police and judiciary, and active
management of corruption risk in DFID sector programmes including through special audits
c. Government has increased domestic and international incentives to tackle corruption
Success will measured through increases in public willingness to report corruption / numbers of
corruption complaints, results achieved through NGO and private sector advocacy efforts, and
results achieved through enhanced joint donor dialogue with government on corruption.
The above results will be measured using a mixture of: international and country-specific corruption
surveys, government reports and data sets, external reviews and evaluations.
1. Strategic Case
A - Context and need for DFID intervention
Corruption challenges
1.1 Corruption is a brake on economic development, a burden for the poor and a waste of
valuable and limited resources. It poses a serious development challenge in Tanzania. The
Preventing and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) conducted an extensive governance and
corruption survey in 2009, which found that 87% of people regarded corruption as one of the main
problems facing Tanzania, with the police, judiciary and health services cited as the worst
offenders. The survey also identified corruption as being a significant impediment to the growth
and operation of businesses. Based on recent surveys and reports, DFID’s 2011 Fiduciary Risk
Assessment (FRA) also assessed the risk of corruption (mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar) as
substantial.
1.2 Corruption impedes DFID’s objectives in Tanzania in a number of ways including: (i) distorting
the allocation of scarce public resources away from productive to non-productive activities3; (ii) by
undermining the impact of services4; iii) discouraging private sector investment and development5
and (iv) through its disproportionate impact on the poorest.6 It also risks reducing the value for
money of UK aid in Tanzania.
1.3 During most of the past decade, Tanzania has shown progress in tackling corruption, and outperformed most of its neighbours in Africa. This has been reflected in an overall rise on the main
international anti-corruption indices (up from -1.09 (2000) to -0.42 (2009) on the World Bank
Control of Corruption Index, and from 2.2 (2001) to 2.7 (2010) on Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)). However, in recent years some of these gains have been
lost, with Tanzania’s score declining in the Transparency International CPI between 2007 and
2010 (see Chart 1 below).
Chart 1 – Tanzania’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index (compared to other DFID Africa Partner Countries)
4.5
Tanzania
DRC
Ethiopia
Ghana
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
2005
3
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Kenya
Malawi
Mozambique
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
e.g. by prioritising spending in areas where money can most easily be diverted, inflating the cost of contracts, or extorting bribes from
businesses. See Systematic Review on Growth and Corruption, Ugur 2011
4 Public Goods, Rents and Business in Tanzania’ ODI 2011, ‘Informal Pay and the Quality of Healthcare’ CMI 2007
5
The World Bank Institute produced research in 2004 stating that countries that tackle corruption and improve their rule of law may
‘increase their incomes by as much as four times in the long term, with child mortality falling by as much as 75 percent’.
6
See Transparency International Global Corruption Barometers 2003-2009, the last of which shows that the percentage of people in the
lowest income quintile paying bribes for services exceeds those in the highest income quintile in all but one of the services surveyed
1.4 Other surveys capturing Tanzanian perceptions and experiences of corruption reflect a
growing awareness of corruption. 17.4% of businesses identified corruption as the most
problematic factor for doing business in Tanzania in the 2010/2011 Global Competitiveness
Report, compared with 12.4% in 2008/09. According to the Afrobarometer, the proportion of
Tanzanians rating government as corrupt rose between 2005 and 2008 (see Table 1 below), while
the proportion rating government as doing badly fighting corruption rose from 26% to 39% over
the same period. Over 50% of Tanzanians surveyed said they would fear punishment if they
complained about misuse of public funds (compared to 34% in Kenya, 33% in Uganda, and 27%
in Mozambique).
Table 1: Tanzanian perceptions of corruption in government
Taken from Afrobarometer Surveys for Tanzania (2005 and 2008)
Government entity
President and officials in his office
Members of Parliament
Elected local government councillors
Government officials
% saying some, most or
all are corrupt (2005)
29
38
44
45 (national/local)
% saying some, most or
all are corrupt (2008)
54
70
71
73
% increase between
2005 and 2008
86%
84%
61%
62%
1.5 The sectors most affected by corruption, according to public perception, are the police and
judiciary. Between 2009 and 2010, the proportion of Tanzanians who had to pay bribes when
dealing with the Tanzanian Police Force (TPF) or judiciary rose significantly, from 40.9 to 53.8%
for the police, and 28.5 to 46.6% for the judiciary7. Analysis of corruption in the police and judiciary
highlights problems ranging from petty bribery in the traffic police, through to extortion from
businesses, wrongful arrest, and interference with due process in remand and trial of suspects
particularly at primary court level (eg manipulating bail conditions, ‘mislaying case files’, and
influencing case hearings).
1.6 As a low income country, and in a context of severe budget constraints8, the Tanzanian
government cannot afford the misuse or diversion of public funds. The pervasiveness of corruption
(or at least perception of pervasiveness) risks undermining reforms already achieved. Ultimately, it
is the poor and vulnerable who are most affected because they are the most dependent on
government services, and can least afford to pay petty bribes or challenge corrupt behaviour.
What has already been done to tackle corruption
1.7 Tanzania has put in place many of the fundamentals required to tackle corruption successfully.
Much of the momentum generated during President Kikwete’s first term (2005-2010) was built
upon Tanzania’s credible anti-corruption legal framework. The Prevention and Combating of
Corruption Act 2007 has helped Tanzania to meet most of the legal standards required by the UN
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and has also strengthened the PCCB, although it is still
not independent. More recently Tanzania also adopted the Election Expenses Act (2010) to
achieve more transparency in campaign finance. Tanzania will be reviewed on UNCAC
compliance in 2012, which may drive further improvements in its institutional and legislative
frameworks, eg the adoption of Access to Information legislation.
1.8 Considerable donor support has been given to the PCCB, which has increased its capacity
significantly in recent years (as of April 2010, 471 corruption cases had commenced prosecution,
more than in the whole of 2009). The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has also reported
strengthened capacity in terms of number of cases handled and files closed per year. In May 2010
and 2011, Tanzania secured its first grand corruption convictions and the recent informal release
of the PCCB Governance and Corruption Survey has led to greater levels of media focus on anticorruption. In 2008, the Ministry of Finance established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to
investigate or report cases of suspicious financial transactions. The FIU is now scaling up to
7
East Africa Bribery Index 2010
Tanzania’s fiscal deficit has significantly increased in the past few years from 1.6% in 2007/8 to an estimate of 6.5% of
GDP in 2010/11; i.e. from TSh. 366.0bn to 2241.0bn – Economist Intelligence Unit
8
improve compliance with international standards on Anti Money Laundering (AML). As of Oct
2011, Tanzania was at Tier 1 of the FATF watch-list of countries that are non-cooperative and/or
have serious AML deficiencies. If it does not make sufficient progress by Feb 2012, it will drop
down to Tier 2. It then has 12 months at Tier 2 before it could be subjected to counter-measures
such as loss of international banking relationships.
1.9 Extensive donor support has also been provided to the NAO, which is now close to full
AFROSAI (African Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions) Level III accreditation. Progress
includes the production of more comprehensive and detailed audit reports, and broadening the
NAO’s mandate to forensic audits and reviews of operational systems to identify and mitigate
potential risk areas for fraud. Donor support has also helped to strengthen the Public Procurement
Regulatory Authority (PPRA) resulting in improved compliance with procurement legislation.
Parliament has also intensified its debates on the misuse of public funds (as identified in audit
reports and public expenditure tracking surveys). An Internal Auditor General (IAG) office has also
been recently established within the Ministry of Finance to strengthen internal audit functions
throughout Government. Prompted by pressure from budget support donors, the Government has
initiated a high-level dialogue on corruption.
What more is needed to tackle corruption
1.10 Despite the above progress, perceptions of corruption are worsening. This may be partly
due to increased awareness of corruption, and improve ability of government systems to detect it.
However, surveys clearly show experiences of corruption are also on the rise in certain
institutions, such as the police and judiciary. Several factors may be responsible. The Global
Integrity Index Tanzania Report for 2010 finds that Tanzania’s problem is not so much the quality
of its institutional framework, but the weak implementation of that framework. This manifests for
example in limited ability of the PCCB to tackle powerful interests, a reactive rather than proactive
approach to investigations, low willingness of citizens to complain on corruption, and poor
responsiveness to corruption complaints. A further challenge is translating institutional
improvements at the central level into sharper anti-corruption controls in government services.
The judiciary and law enforcement officials are notable for their lack of accountability. Other high
spend/high risk sectors such as health, ports, tax administration and local government also rate
poorly in the East Africa Bribery Index9.
DFID’s Objectives and Comparative Advantage
1.11 Tackling corruption is integral to DFID’s overall Business Plan, which commits that up to 5%
of all budget support should go to accountability institutions. Corruption remains a ministerial
priority. It is also a major factor affecting public support for the aid agenda10. Addressing
corruption is a core element of HMG’s objectives in Tanzania, which aim to support stronger, more
transparent and democratic oversight institutions and hold institutions to account by empowering
civil society. Reduced corruption in the public sector will help DFID to achieve its broader goals,
since over 50% of DFID resources for Tanzania will be channelled through the government over
the next four years. It will also improve conditions for private sector led growth.
1.12 DFID already engages in key areas that are important to the prevention of corruption. These
include public financial management reform11, public sector reform12, deepening democracy13, and
9
Approximately one quarter of those surveyed that sought services from the Tanzania Revenue and Ports Authorities paid a bribe; and
one fifth of those seeking services from a hospital. East Africa Bribery Index 2010
10
57% of the UK public believe that corrupt leaders, bureaucratic wastage and poor use of funds make it pointless donating money to
help reduce poverty.
11
The government’s PFM reform programme addresses areas such as more realistic revenue forecasting and improved financial
reporting; simplification of financial management information systems; strengthening of payroll controls; procurement compliance audits;
strengthened action by parliamentary accounts committees; and harmonisation of tax laws.
12 The Public Sector Reforms Programme II (PSRP II) aims to enhance capacity, performance and accountability of Ministries,
independent government Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in the use of public resources and service delivery to levels consistent
with timely and effective implementation of the strategic and priority programmes under the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction
of Poverty (MKUKUTA II). Specifically the programme addresses accountability and responsiveness mechanisms which provide
opportunity to citizens to be aware and proactively demand quality services; and systems for managing public servants and leaders to
instil integrity and work ethics.
empowering citizens to hold government to account. DFID is also engaged in high level dialogue
on corruption through General Budget Support fora,. This programme will complement and these
efforts, by supporting more targeted action on anti-corruption enforcement and more active
implementation of anti-corruption measures at sector level. For more details on DFID’s overall
anti-corruption engagement in Tanzania, see the diagram at Annex 5.
1.13 DFID will remain one of the largest bilateral supporters of Tanzania for the next five years,
contributing over 10% of total foreign aid. The UK has influence beyond its spending, eg through
the UK’s broader bilateral relationship, DFID’s key positions in the Government–donor dialogue
structure, and through the multilateral organisations that the UK finances such as the World Bank,
UNDP, AfDB and EC. These place it in a good position to make linkages and lever collective efforts.
B – Impact and Outcome
1.14 The programme’s intended impact is reduced impact of corruption on the poor in Tanzania
(directly in terms of bribery and improved access to services, indirectly through reduced diversion of
public resources). The programme’s intended outcome is more active implementation of anticorruption measures, particularly in high risk/high impact sectors. Success will be measured
through improvements in relevant Global Integrity Index scores, and through a reduction in the
proportion of the public who pay a bribe when they encounter the police, judiciary or magistrates.
1.15 The outputs will be:
a. Oversight agencies improve identification and handling of corruption risks and cases
Success will be measured through increases in numbers / percentages of corruption cases reported
and accepted for investigation and prosecution, faster average handling speeds, improvements in
follow up on corruption findings in NAO reports, and Tanzania being taken off the Financial Action Task
Force watch list for deficiencies in anti money laundering compliance.
b. Accountability mechanisms strengthened in the police and judiciary, and anti-corruption
measures incorporated into major DFID sector programmes
Success will be measured through improved corruption perceptions of traffic police and compliance
with police front desk, police criminal investigation and primary court procedures, increases in
corruption complaints received / addressed by the police and judiciary, and active management of
corruption risk in DFID sector programmes including through special audits.
c.
Government has increased domestic and international incentives to tackle corruption
Success will measured through increases in public willingness to report corruption / numbers of
corruption complaints, results achieved through NGO and private sector advocacy efforts, and results
achieved through enhanced joint donor dialogue with government on corruption.
13 The overarching objective of Deepening Democracy Programme is to strengthen the democratization processes by introducing
interventions that will support efforts to advocate legal reforms (and, possibly, constitutional amendments) for a more liberalized political
environment; strengthen and entrench the human and material elements of existing democratic practices and institutions, making them
more robust, responsive effective and efficient in their operation; and enhance democratic beliefs and culture and intensify
understanding of and respect for democratic principles, values and culture.
2. Appraisal Case
A - Feasible options
2.1 This section presents a theory of change for how to achieve more active implementation of
anti-corruption measures in Tanzania. It then considers the feasible options for DFID’s anticorruption programme (taking into account what is already being supported by DFID and others,
and evidence of what is most likely to have impact), outlines in more detail what the programme
will deliver, and identifies the optimum delivery channels.
Theory of Change
2.2 There is no one widely accepted international theory of change on tackling corruption that
can be applied in all contexts. There are multiple views about what drives corrupt behaviour at the
individual level and why anti-corruption efforts are often so weak. Evidence of what works on anticorruption is limited and often highly country specific. However to the extent possible, the theory of
change for this programme draws on relevant international evidence and academic literature.
2.3
The corruption problem identified in the Strategic Case is as follows:
Although Tanzania has put in place most of the institutional structures necessary to tackle
corruption, these are not fully deployed, and corruption levels remain significant, weakening
government services and prospects for long term growth and development.
2.4 Analysis suggests three factors lie behind this. The first, which concerns individual behaviour,
is simply that the rewards of corruption presently outweigh the risks. Despite Tanzania’s progress
on anti-corruption, there remain plentiful opportunities to commit corruption, and a low likelihood of
being caught or sanctioned. The realities of a cumbersome bureaucracy with limited capacity to
meet service demand, coupled with comparatively low pay on the part of junior government
officials14, help drive this equation. Monopoly and discretion strengthen the hands of government
officials to extort payments. Despite doing relatively well overall in tackling corruption relative to its
East African neighbours, the 2006 World Bank Enterprise Survey for Tanzania found that 49.47% of
firms expected to pay informal payments to public officials to get things done, compared to 36% for
the region. This leads to a collective action problem: the more pervasive corruption is, the more it
defines the ‘rules of the game’ and the greater the cost to the individual to challenge it15.
2.5 The second factor is the weak capacity of the Tanzanian government system to actively
implement anti-corruption and wider accountability measures16. Although several oversight
institutions have improved their performance, major weaknesses remain, especially in terms of the
disconnect between oversight institutions (as evidenced by low follow up on audit reports, and
slow passage of corruption cases between institutions), inadequate skills and lack of proactivity in
the detection and handling of complex corruption cases, and weak implementation of anticorruption measures at the sector level (eg the absence of police supervision). Historically,
analysis shows that those developing countries that achieved significant improvements in
international corruption rankings have had the bureaucratic ability to properly impose and enforce
anti-corruption measures17.
2.6 The third factor, and possibly the most important in explaining recent trends, is inconsistent
and uneven levels of political commitment to tackle corruption. This is the case in high politics but
also at an institutional level. A recent study in Tanzania finds that transparency and accountability
Graduate entry scale into the general civil service commences at Tsh 156,000 per month. The Tanzania Trade Union’s Congress
recommends that the minimum national monthly salary should be Tsh 350,000 (though this figure is not supported by the GoT); the
general view on low pay is that it can be a driver of petty corruption, but improving pay does not by itself reduce corruption ie it’s a
necessary but not sufficient condition
15
See ‘The Failure of Anti Corruption Policies’, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2010, and A Vicious Circle of Corruption and Mistrust in
Institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, Cho and Kirwin 2007
16
See Global Integrity Report 2010
17
See ‘Governance and Anti Corruption Reforms in Developing Countries: Policies, Evidence and Ways Forward’, Mushtaq Khan 2006,
and ‘Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda’, Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011.
14
initiatives supported by international donors, are ‘systematically undermined by...informal
processes of patronage and rent seeking’ (Cooksey 2011). A major driver for these processes is
the government’s desire to maintain political support and to manage powerful constituencies.
Various factors may intensify patronage and rent seeking, for example disunity in the political
system (as happened in the CCM in the run up to the 2010 general elections) and new access to
‘easy’ rents (such as the anticipated gas reserves in Tanzania). The challenge is how to support a
transition from a political system driven by narrow powerful constituencies, to one in which
resources are used in the wider public interest.
2.7 This leads to the following hypothesis: Corruption levels in Tanzania will reduce if there is
more active implementation of anti-corruption measures, and this in turn will occur if there is:
(a) improved technical capacity and joint working among oversight agencies – leading to more
proactive detection and efficient handling of corruption risks and cases, and stronger collective
action / less scope for political interference
(b) fewer opportunities and incentives to be corrupt - through government reforms that reduce
opportunities for corruption (eg simplified financial management and bureaucratic systems,
clearer performance standards); also through increased likelihood of detection and sanction if
committing corruption (eg more functional complaints mechanisms, improved performance
monitoring, more in-depth auditing). These also need to be applied at sector level if they are to
have a tangible impact on public experiences of corruption (such as paying bribes to police).
(c) increased domestic and international incentives for government to tackle corruption –
strengthening the voice and influence of domestic actors that have an interest in how public
resources are used in Tanzania, to broaden the government’s constituency base beyond
political elites, and increase public confidence that it is worthwhile acting against corruption.
Using international levers to motivate government action, eg donor dialogue on budget
support, international corruption investigations, and compliance with international standards.
2.8 These three areas are mutually reinforcing, as the diagram below shows:
Diagram 1: Theory of Change for Strengthening Anti Corruption Enforcement in Tanzania
2.9 There are some key assumptions undermining this theory of change. On A – Stronger
oversight system – these are that: there is sufficient funding for the oversight institutions to deliver
their roles; there is a coherent institutional framework allowing institutions to work effectively
together rather than in competition with each other; and that the institutions have sufficient
independence to be able to operate without too much political interference. On B, the assumptions
are that: there will be sufficient increases in the proportion of corruption cases identified and
sanctioned, and in the degree of oversight and monitoring within individual government
institutions, to alter behaviour. On C, the assumptions are that: the Tanzanian government would
be responsive to increased incentives to act; that civil society and the private sector would make
reasonable demands; that there are international levers that touch sufficiently on national
government interests to motivate action; and that development partners have sufficient common
interests to be able to engage jointly on anti-corruption.
2.10 Clearly, tackling high levels of corruption is a long term proposition.
Sustained
improvements in absolute levels of corruption may therefore not be seen during the timeframe of a
four year anti-corruption programme. Nonetheless intermediate outcomes are attainable, and
should, over time, reduce corruption.
Broad options for DFID programme
2.11 Perhaps the main challenge with a system-wide approach of the kind outlined in the diagram
above is where to draw the line. Much of the wider system-strengthening on resource
management and accountability in Tanzania is already being tackled through other programmes
(civil society strengthening, public financial management, public sector and legal sector reform). In
particular, much of the government’s public financial management reform work – which DFID
supports - is directly relevant to anti-corruption. For example, the government intends its fourth
PFM reform programme to be “instrumental in the fight against waste and unnecessary spending
and corruption, as it improves access to financial data, increases audits relating to risks and
results and promotes more open and competitive procurement processes and commitment
controls”. Specific actions will include:









More realistic revenue forecasting
Strengthened centralised internal audit
Simplification of financial management information systems
Strengthened payroll controls
Improved quality of financial recording and reporting
Improved procurement compliance
Greater use of risk-based auditing
Strengthening of Parliamentary Accounts Committees
Harmonisation of tax laws
2.12 These wider cross-government reforms do not need to be duplicated in this programme.
Instead, it should focus on those elements of the theory of change that are not presently
addressed elsewhere. This suggests three main options for DFID:
i)
Focus only on oversight institutions, since strengthening them would impact on all three
factors above (stronger oversight, incentives not to be corrupt, and internal pressure on
government) - A) in above theory of change)
ii)
Take a broader approach, which also addresses high risk sectors and external pressures
on government – A), B), and C) in theory of change.
iii)
‘Do nothing’, resulting in only indirect DFID support for anti-corruption through the existing
reform programmes mentioned above, combined with any assistance that other
development partners such as UNDP might provide on anti-corruption.
B. Evidence of likely impact of options
2.13 The latest evidence on the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures – and thus, which of
the above options would be most desirable - is medium. There are two relevant studies that have
been carried out recently. The first, a DFID commissioned systematic review of the effectiveness
of anti-corruption approaches, tentatively concludes that prospects for success are greatest when
oversight is combined with strengthened incentives not to be corrupt (such as performance related
pay), and that oversight is most powerful when it is capable of both detecting and sanctioning
corruption18. The second is a 2011 Joint Evaluation of Anti Corruption Effectiveness (JEACE)
sponsored by DFID and other partners. This draws on five country case studies and is more of a
qualitative evaluation, examining a variety of programmes,. The JEACE suggests that a
comprehensive, system-wide approach to tackling corruption has the greatest prospect of
success, and identifies the following as important for impact: stronger working across oversight
institutions; the incorporation of anti-corruption in sectors and wider reform programmes such as
public financial management; greater engagement of civil society; and more use by donors of
international analysis and dialogue with government. Both studies make clear the paucity of
evidence on impact of anti-corruption measures. Most success stories are case specific and
based on qualitative evidence of impact. They also note the challenge of translating successful
project outcomes into impact on overall corruption trends.
2.14 Within Tanzania, efforts so far have focused on oversight institutions, together with wider
system strengthening. As the Strategic Case makes clear, this has resulted in some gradual
improvements in the performance of oversight institutions and wider public financial management
(particularly auditing and procurement) but does not appear to have had much tangible impact on
sectors, where the public are most directly affected, such as the police and judiciary. Nor has this
been sufficient to sustain Tanzania’s ratings on international corruption indices (although this may
be outside the scope of any donor programme).
Environment and climate change effects
2.15 The environmental and climate change effects of the first two programme options above
would be largely positive, since they would result in improved implementation of anti-corruption
measures, which would indirectly benefit the management of natural resources and environmental
services. The third option – ‘do nothing’ – would be the worst because without targeted action
there may be less likelihood of offenders being held to account for corruption, eg in areas like
award of contracts to logging companies. This is summarised below.
Option
Evidence
Climate and Environment Category – risk and opportunity (A, B, C, D)
1. Support to oversight
institutions
Medium
C risk and B opportunity. The poor and vulnerable rely heavily on
environment for their livelihoods (micro) and contribution to the economy
(macro). Direct impact is limited but indirect impact is substantive both on
environmental services and in tracking revenues of natural resources such
as forestry, land, water and mining
2. Oversight institutions, sectors
and external influencing
Medium
C risk and B opportunity. See above – with possibility of even greater
impact if external influencing leads to greater action on corruption in related
sectors.
3. ‘Do nothing’ - support through
existing system reform
programmes and others’ anti
corruption efforts
Medium
B risk and C opportunity. Without targeted action there may be less
likelihood of offenders being held to account for corruption, and therefore
greater risk of environmental abuse.
Hanna, R., Bishop, S., Durlacher, K., Nadel, S., Scheffler, G. 2010. ‘The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policy: What has worked,
what hasn’t, and what we don’t know – A Systematic Review Protocol,’ DFID Systematic Review.
18
C. Appraisal of each feasible programme option
2.16 The benefits and disadvantages of each programme option will now be appraised.
Option 1 - Taking a narrow focus on oversight institutions (estimated cost £5.15m) would
keep the programme structure simple, and allow for concentrated effort but therefore
limited impact. It would fail to tackle significant corruption vulnerabilities at the sector level –
in particular in the police and judiciary – and would also fail to strengthen external demands
on government, which are a critical part of motivating action.
Option 2 - Taking a broad focus (estimated cost £11m) to include high risk sectors and
external demands on government would be the most complicated to design and manage.
However, it would be addressing more of the factors identified as important in the theory of
change. It would also spread programme risk, so that if one area was making limited
progress (such as working with the PCCB and DPP), more attention could be given to
others that were showing more traction (such as external demands on government, or
incorporation of more robust anti-corruption measures into the Tanzania Police Force).
Option 3 - The ‘do nothing’ approach (financial cost £0) is not credible in the context of
continuing substantial levels of corruption, the growing awareness of the levels of
corruption and its negative impact amongst Tanzanians, and DFID’s continued investment
through GoT systems. Working through existing reform programmes would be time
consuming and the impact limited, because they have much broader goals and do not
include all the institutions most relevant for anti-corruption efforts (such as the FIU). If DFID
did not go ahead with a new anti-corruption programme, some modest assistance would
continue through other donors: principally UNDP (probably focused on the PCCB through
the next National Anti Corruption Strategy and Action Plan), plus some ad-hoc technical
assistance from the US, Canada and others to the Ethics Secretariat, FIU and DPP.
However, this would be on a much smaller scale and without taking a system wide
approach, and it would represent a net loss of action on anti-corruption since DFID’s
existing Tackling Corruption Programme has been brought to an end and would not be
replaced by new anti-corruption specific programming.
2.17 The table below summarises this analysis, rating each option high, medium or low:
Option
Costs
Benefits
Risks
1. Narrow:
Oversight
institutions
£ 5.15
million
Medium
 Oversight institutions improve their identification
and handling of corruption risk and cases
Medium
 Action will be limited, because of lack of external
pressure on government to act on corruption, and
therefore lack of clear mandate for oversight institutions
to do their job
2. Broad:
Oversight
institutions,
sectors and
external
influencing
£ 11.0
million
High
 Oversight institutions improve their identification
and handling of corruption risk and cases
 Reduced corruption in the most vulnerable sectors
(e.g. police, judiciary)
 Reduction in citizens’ direct experience of
corruption
 Greater external demands on government should
build commitment to act
 Having a broad approach will build faster
momentum, and will also allow more flexibility to
scale up or down different components depending
on where there is most traction
Medium
 Broader programme, risks spreading funding and
efforts too thinly.
3. Do
nothing
£0
Low/Medium
 Continued minor improvements in the
performance of oversight agencies – eg agencies
acquire new specialist skills
 Wider reforms eg on public financial management
will indirectly and gradually reduce opportunities to
commit corruption
High
 Drop in support for anti-corruption and lack of system
wide approach will reduce momentum for action among
oversight institutions
 Fiduciary risk for DFID for lack of specific programme
on anti-corruption given scale of bilateral investment in
Tanzania and the present corruption indicators
2.18 From the table above, Option 3 is eliminated. The question is whether the benefits of Option
2 are worth the additional financial investment compared to Option 1. This appraisal concludes
that they are, because of the greater likelihood of overall success on anti-corruption (based on the
research listed in para 2.13 above), as well as the increased momentum that would be achieved
through a major push of this kind.
More detailed appraisal of Option 2
2.19 During the appraisal period, DFID Tanzania explored the components that could be
included in Option 2, through consultations with the oversight agencies and other development
partners, lessons learned on DFID’s previous anti-corruption programme, and specific analytical
work. Below is a brief summary of findings:
 Support to oversight agencies needs to go beyond donating resources and one-off training
courses, to include hands-on capacity strengthening, longer-term provision of high quality
expertise, and more sustainable transfer of technical skills. There are weaknesses in handling
complex corruption cases, and proactive intelligence gathering. Facilitating linkages between
oversight institutions is critical: the NAO is producing findings that are not systematically
followed up; the PCCB is submitting cases to the DPP that are not routinely processed; the FIU
works in relative isolation and needs to be better connected to the other oversight bodies.
 In-depth support to vertical sectors should focus on the police and judiciary, because they are
the worst ranking institutions in all corruption perceptions surveys on Tanzania. The risks of
engaging are high: there are only a few international examples of successful anti-corruption
efforts in the police and judiciary19, and previous reform efforts with the judiciary in Tanzania
have had limited traction. However, there is a window of opportunity with the police, which has
an Inspector General that is keen to tackle corruption, and also a new reform programme that
would help underpin any anti-corruption efforts. Similarly, the judiciary has a new Chief Justice
who wishes to tackle corruption in his institution20. Beginning work at primary court level (where
both police and judiciary are involved) may be less contentious and stand more chance of
success. The Canadian-led Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP) provides a context and
dialogue mechanism that could be used to support this work (for example the LSRP is already
engaged in supporting aspects of case management and records management).
 In addition, the appraisal found openings to provide demand-driven analytical and advisory
support to other high risk/high spend sectors where DFID is engaged. The purpose would be to
influence key design and review points in sector programmes, to ensure effective incorporation
of anti-corruption measures. These would be light-touch inputs, with the responsibility for
implementation lying with the sector programmes. At this stage of the programme, it is difficult to
be specific about the precise support that would be provided through this demand-driven
mechanism. However, the appraisal looked at six high risk sectors where DFID plans major
spend, where there would be potential merit in analytical and advisory support beyond the
normal corruption risk management / due diligence that is built into all DFID programmes:
i)
19
Tanzania Revenue Authority – ranked as the 5th worst institution for bribery in Tanzania
by the East African Bribery Index (EABI) 2011, with 26% of respondents that had contact
with the TRA paying a bribe. DFID’s existing programme is coming to an end, and a new
programme is likely from 2012. There would be an opportunity to influence the design of
this programme, learning lessons from past anti-corruption efforts with the TRA. Benefits
of improved anti-corruption would include increased government revenue, and more
predictability for businesses and private individuals paying tax.
Structural reform and rebranding led to a significant reduction in street level police corruption in Georgia (di Puppo, 2010). In Rajasthan, simple
measures such as duty rotation at station level, and the involvement of community observers, were found to have an impact on corruption (Banerjee,
Chattopadhyay, Duflo and Keniston, 2009. In Guatemala City, the establishment of a Clerk of Courts office virtually eliminated the problem of lost files
and reduced court congestion. In Serbia, a new automated case management system that selected judges at random and allowed citizens to track the
progress of their cases online enabled a 24% reduction in pending cases within two years (‘Reducing Corruption in the Judiciary’, USAID 2009)
20
Following his appointment, on 27 Dec 2010 Newspapers and TVs quoted the Mr Justice
Othman who became Tanzania's seventh Chief Justice since independence outlining his priority areas as to address; one, the delay of
cases and judgments, two, corruption, etc... (New CJ Othman outlines priority areas)
ii)
Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA) – ranked as the 4th worst institution by in Tanzania by
the EABI 2011, with 24% of respondents that had contact with the TPA paying a bribe.
DFID supports the TPA through the Trademark East Africa programme, which is
planning a US$21m investment on port connectivity, increasing the number of port
concessionaries and looking at revenue streams. This programme could provide
analytical inputs to help strengthen anti-corruption measures. Benefits would include
improved predictability for importers and exporters, reduced tax evasion and reduced
scope for smuggling.
iii)
Health – 84.9% of respondents in the PCCB 2009 Anti Corruption Survey regarded
health institutions as very or fairly corrupt. DFID is planning a major new health sector
programme (investment level to be determined) that will focus on quality of basic
services, accountability and demand. Corruption challenges in the health sector are
multiple, affecting areas such as drugs procurement and supply, petty bribery, and
absenteeism. This programme could provide analytical inputs into the design of the
health programme, and provide a challenge function during programme implementation.
iv)
Education – DFID plans major spend on education, comprising £30m through sector
budget support, £30m on girls’ education, £30m on improving education quality, and an
imputed share of £15m of General Budget Support (since the government spends 18%
of its budget on education). Although education ranks better than other services in
perceptions surveys on corruption (eg ‘just’ 61% of respondents in the PCCB 2009 Anti
Corruption Survey regard education institutions as fairly or very corrupt), the sector is,
nonetheless, affected. At the service delivery point, the main complaints relate to
demand for unofficial payments. At the higher level, risks and vulnerabilities include: the
transfer of capitation grants to local government level, the lack of separate audits for the
education sector (because it cuts across several government ministries), and
procurement. This programme could provide analytical and advisory resources to ensure
the robust assessment and mitigation of corruption risk in the new programmes.
v)
Water – This sector is identified not so much because corruption risk is particularly high
in the water sector in Tanzania, but because of the nature of investment that DFID is
planning (£30m on a rural water programme, probably through a basket fund, entailing
large scale construction and procurement). DFID has already been improving financial
management in the water sector, for example introducing cost norms that brought down
per capita expenditure from US$90 to US$58. This programme could assist in the design
of the new programme, by analysing the technical audits that have been carried out in
the water sector, and mapping out corruption risks and mitigation measures in areas
such as management of water at the user level, procurement of civil works and
associated design, supply and consultancy services.
vi)
Rural roads – to date, investments in Tanzania have focused on trunk roads connecting
major cities with neighbouring countries. There has been very limited investment in rural
roads. DFID is considering a major scale up on support to rural roads, with spend
somewhere between £50m and £150m depending on how resources are allocated
across the DFID programme. Again, this will involve multiple large scale construction and
procurement activities at high risk for corruption, potentially to be spent through local
government and managed at district level, where scrutiny of expenditure is relatively
weak. Common corruption risks in the road sector include: exaggeration of needs,
manipulation of allocation formula, phantom projects, loose specifications, over-design of
projects, collusion and bribery in procurement, and diverting funds under the cover of
expenditure such as staffing, equipment, purchase of supplies and quality control. This
programme could provide analytical inputs to assist in robust assessment and mitigation
of risk in the road sector, helping to maximise the value for money for DFID’s investment.
 The appraisal also considered whether natural resource management and the Extractives
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) merited targeted support through this programme. It
concluded against this. The EITI process is already well supported by the World Bank, Norway
and (to a lesser extent) Canada. Tanzania is progressing through its EITI candidacy, and is due
to submit a second report to the EITI Secretariat, which – if accepted – will pave the way for EITI
membership. The African Development Bank will then assist with the establishment of EITI as
an institution in country. Norway is also engaged in wider natural resource management issues
– firstly in the mining sector, where it has been advising on mining tax models, terms and
conditions of contracts, and auditing of mining companies; and secondly timber, forestry and
fisheries, where it is considering a new programme on effective approaches to manage finances
and enhance non-tax revenue collection, and also supporting NGOs to research and monitor
forestry cover under the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(REDD) climate change initiative. Given the importance of natural resources, and particularly
new oil and gas revenue, to Tanzania’s overall governance and financial management, DFIDT
will be engaged generally in the sector but in terms of specific anti-corruption interventions, there
are no immediate entry points. Opportunities may emerge when the second EITI report is
submitted, and DFID will assess the scope for engagement at that point.
 In terms of increasing incentives on government to act, the appraisal found that the media and
parliament already play an active role in pressing for action on corruption21. Demand from civil
society, academia and the private sector has been less prominent, and should be strengthened,
although it will be important not to duplicate existing efforts22. There is room for more
coordinated and concerted dialogue by international partners on anti-corruption, along the lines
already in place in Uganda (which entails improved analysis and agreement on corruption
priorities (systemic and case-based), use of a core script, and agreed graduated responses in
the event of deteriorating circumstances). More use could be made of international instruments
such as UNCAC and international AML standards to lever action (eg Tanzania’s place on the
Financial Action Task Force watchlist).
What the DFID programme will deliver
2.20 Based on the above analysis, DFID will deliver the following outputs in this programme:
Output 1. Oversight agencies work together to tackle corruption more effectively
 Detection: Assist the FIU to scale up and strengthen monitoring of suspicious financial transactions, and
meet international AML standards. Support the NAO to strengthen its statutory financial audits in high
risk areas, to increase the probability that fraud will be detected, and enhance the NAO’s capacity to
conduct forensic audits to ensure that preventative measures are in place. Both audit types will also
support the gathering of evidence to be used in investigations/sanctions
 Investigation and prosecution: Support the PCCB and its Zanzibar equivalent (once established) and
the DPP and its Zanzibar equivalent in sustainable upgrade of skills for handling complex corruption
cases; Assist the PCCB in ensuring Tanzania meets international standards relating to UNCAC,
particularly during the 2012 review process
 Other sectors: Provide anti-corruption ‘back-stopping’ interventions on a demand-driven basis to specific
sectors. This might include identifying corruption vulnerabilities and designing mitigating measures for
incorporation into ongoing/new DFID programmes supporting the Tanzania Revenue Authority, roads,
water and health. Monitor impact.
 Cross-linkages: Support joint working between the above institutions to improve management of
corruption cases, and increase the proportion that result in prosecution or other sanction or satisfactory
resolution; Facilitate a more productive working relationship between the NAO and PCCB to better
identify and mitigate common corruption risks identified as a result of corruption cases uncovered
21
This helped to precipitate the resignation in 2008 of the Prime Minister and three Cabinet Ministers, as well as the dismissal of the Governor of the
Bank of Tanzania
22
DFID’s Accountability in Tanzania Programme already supports the role of civil society organisations in accountability, eg: increasing access to
information and engagement in budget oversight; better monitoring and advocacy on corruption in the health and natural resource sectors; and
investigative journalism.
Output 2. Accountability mechanisms strengthened in the police and judiciary, and in
four DFID sector programmes: customs and revenue, roads, water and health
 Police: Strengthen oversight of the police through the Ministry of Home Affairs and within the TPF. To
include central referral of complaints against the police, training for investigators dealing with police
misconduct, and improved supervision and management structures for high risk police units; Increase
role of communities in working with police on anti-corruption
 Judiciary: Improve judicial accountability systems through introduction of a performance management
system, and improving the Judicial Service Commission’s capacity to respond to and investigate
complaints; Strengthen public awareness of court procedures, introduce a service charter and court
users’ manual and improve collection and analysis of court statistics
 Other sectors: Provide demand-driven anti-corruption analytical/advisory inputs to specific sectors. This
might include identifying corruption vulnerabilities and designing mitigating measures for incorporation
into ongoing/new DFID programmes supporting the Tanzania Revenue Authority, Tanzanian Ports
Authority, rural roads, rural water, health and education. Monitor impact.
Output 3. Increased domestic and international incentives for Governent to tackle
corruption
 Domestic stakeholders: Improve understanding of public barriers to complaint about corruption, and
address issues identified (likely to include improving complaints channels); Support better evidence
collection and dissemination on corruption levels and trends. Use this to facilitate more productive
dialogue between government and civil society groups/private stakeholders
 Other sectors: Facilitate enhanced coordination and dialogue by the international community on anticorruption; Analyse international levers impacting on corruption, and maximise engagement on these –
to include compliance with UNCAC and Financial Action Task Force AML
2.21 DFID is also considering support for the NAO through the Government’s new five year
Public Financial Management Reform Programme (2012 – 2016). Care will be taken to ensure
that the two support lines are coherent and maximise synergies as best as possible. For all three
outputs, frequent monitoring of impact will be critical. As mentioned above, one of the benefits of a
comprehensive programme of this kind is the flexibility to scale up or scale back individual
interventions depending on where greatest progress is being made and upon regular
assessments of political will.
D. Appraisal of feasible programme delivery options
2.22 Initially, in the interests of getting the programme initiated quickly, it will be managed by
DFID advisors and programme staff. DFID will oversee the disbursement of funds to
implementing organizations throughout the life of the programme. However, due to limited
resource within DFID general management of the programme is not sustainable long-term. Three
decisions are needed about the long term delivery of the programme. These are: (i) how to handle
programme management; (ii) what channel to use for support to government; and (iii) what
channel to use for external dialogue, analysis and advice. Each is considered in turn below.
(i) Options for overall programme management
2.23 The programme could be overseen either by DFID itself, or by a managing agent. If the
managing agent route is chosen, there is the option of either channelling support through UNDP
(which is developing a new anti-corruption programme and already works closely with the PCCB),
or through a private agent to be competitively procured. Cost-benefit criteria compared are:
overhead costs; speed with which the arrangement can be established, and acceptability to
stakeholders (including track record so far). Each is scored 1 – 5 with 5 being the best score.
Option
Overhead costs
How fast to establish
Acceptability to stakeholders
Score
A.
DFID
1. Would represent big transaction
cost for DFID given complexity of
programme, and degree of influencing
required. Would require one full time
adviser plus local consultancy (6 –
7% of programme cost).
5. Fast. A2 advisers on
board that could initiate
work
while
additional
advisory expertise was
recruited in
5. Good. Should be acceptable.
11
B.
UNDP
3. Standard charge is 7 – 9% for
NEX+, ie where UNDP channels
finances to government on behalf of
DFID, manages all procurement etc.
Would entail some transaction costs
to ensure UNDP able to deliver the
programme to the standard required
3. Medium. UNDP would
have
to
design
a
proposal. It could then
bring in a team within 3
months of approval
2. Medium to low Government would
approve. Donors have concerns about
UNDP performance, based on past
delivery of weak programmes with
mixed calibre staff
8
C.
Private
agent
3. Standard management agent fees
are around 10% based on what
KPMG charges for AcT, and Ernst &
Young standard quotes for similar
programmes.
Would entail some
transaction costs to handle tendering
and get consultancy team operating
4. Medium to Fast if use
DFID advisory expertise
to get programme off the
ground while going to full
competitive tender (which
would take 9 months)
4. Medium to good. Depends on agent
selected and calibre of staff. Some
more acceptable to government than
others.
Acceptable
to
external
stakeholders because of perceived
higher efficiency and neutrality.
11
2.24 Options A and C score the same. On balance, Option C is preferred because the
transaction costs for DFID to fully manage this programme would be so high, and because it
would be more difficult for DFID to play a steering/strategic oversight role if it were involved in day
to day management. The private agent would do more than programme administration: it would
also have a critical role in networking between actors involved in anti-corruption,
influencing/dialogue, and bringing in world class international analysis and advice.
(ii) Options for channelling support to government
2.25 Most technical support and training for government will be directly procured through the
managing agent. Therefore this delivery channel will be used to: oversee progress against
workplans; and promote more effective horizontal linkages23. Aid effectiveness principles argue
against the creation of a new project implementation unit. Therefore, the options are: the National
Anti Corruption Strategy and Action Plan coordinated by the PCCB; the Legal Sector Reform
Programme; and the National Criminal Justice Forum, hosted by the DPP. Given that the financial
cost of each channel would be similar, cost-benefit criteria are: capacity to manage resources and
workplans, and ability to convene and forge closer working links between relevant agencies. As
above, these are scored 1 – 5.
Analysis of delivery options for support to government
Option
Management of workplans
Management
resources
NACSAP III
2. Low-Medium. NACSAP II is a
very broad strategy. NACSAP III
has yet to be drafted but it is likely
that DFID interventions would be a
small part of a much broader
process, and therefore receive
limited attention
Legal Sector
Reform
Programme
National
Criminal
Justice
Forum
23
of
Convening power
#
4. Medium-High. UNDP would
provide the interface for this.
Therefore, there would be
reasonable resource and
programme
management
capacity.
4. Medium-High. PCCB hosts
regular
NACSAP
meetings
attended
by
all
relevant
agencies.
However
as
discussions are very broad, may
not
get
specific
agency
representatives that need
10
2. Low-Medium. LSRP is broad
and DFID interventions would be
secondary to long-established
objectives. Not clear what replaces
LSRP post 2012.
2. Low-Medium. World Bank
audit found concerns about
LSRP financial management.
EC audit more positive.
1. Low. LSRP coordinated
through Ministry of Justice and
Constitutional Affairs. Has limited
leverage over PCCB and DPP.
5
5. Good. A Committee would be
created under the NCJF dedicated
to this work.
3. Medium. Funding would be
disbursed
via
Treasury
ensuring fiduciary assurance
such as audit oversight. NCJF
would provide oversight and
approval
mechanism
for
funding flows.
4. Medium-High. NCJF is a
statutory body therefore can
convene oversight bodies for this
work. However, PCCB would
need a leading role, e.g. co-chair
or there may be institutional
rivalries
12
Actual disbursement of funds to Government institutions via the Treasury with be undertaken by DFID (see diagram 2 below)
2.26 At this stage, co-ordination through the National Criminal Justice Forum is preferred
as the most credible option. Participation of PCCB will be handled by representation at Director of
Investigations level, and options for co-chairing and hosting meetings at the PCCB as well as DPP
will be explored. During the inception phase of the programme, this coordination mechanism will
be monitored closely (a) to ensure that the PCCB plays an active role, and (b) to verify how
NACSAP III is developing and how far programme objectives can be aligned with and/or jointly
delivered. If NCJF remains the main delivery channel, MOUs will be needed with LSRP (before it
closes in December 2012) and NACSAP III (once operational) to ensure no duplication of efforts.
(iii) Options for supporting external dialogue, analysis and advice
2.27 There are no suitable existing mechanisms to support the non-government components of
the programme, and therefore an Integrity Fund will be set up. This will be used to support the
advisory and analytical inputs into sectors, broader corruption analysis and trend monitoring, joint
donor dialogue with government on anti-corruption, and more concerted engagement by civil
society and private sector – to include issue-based advocacy with government. The Integrity Fund
will be supervised by the managing agent (see Management Framework at Annex 8). Links will be
established with DFID’s Accountability in Tanzania Programme, and to Tanzanian think-tank
organizations such as Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) and Economic and Social
Research Foundation (ESRF)
2.28
Diagram 2 below summarises the programme delivery structure that will be used.
Diagram 2: Summary of programme delivery structure
E. Value for Money
2.29 The following measures will be used to assess the value-for-money of the programme,
noting that in many cases, baseline data has yet to be determined:
Effectiveness (how well our outputs will achieve our desired outcome):
 % of low income households paying bribes and/or the % of the public that encounter
police, judiciary or magistrates and pay a bribe;
 % of targeted citizens who believe that Government is committed to tackling corruption in
the public sector and/or % that are willing to complain about corruption;
 Number of corruption cases reported and/or % of reported cases investigated by PCCB
and/or & % of investigated cases that are accepted for prosecution
 Number of complaints concerning the police and judiciary that are received and acted on;
Efficiency (how our inputs are converted into outputs)
 increase in the number of fraud cases detected by NAO as a result of staff trained on fraud
detection, new fraud detection system being installed and forensic/special audits conducted;
 increase in number of complex corruption cases detected and prosecuted as a result of
PCCB, FIU and DPP staff being trained
 decrease in perceptions of corruption in traffic police in pilot areas as a result of measures
introduced by programme
 numbers of sector programmes with robust anti-corruption measures as a result of
advisory and analytical inputs provided
Economy (inputs being purchased at the appropriate quality and right price)
 Overhead costs of the managing agent will be monitored. These should not exceed 10%
of the cost of the programme, as benchmarked against programmes with similar
management structures;
 Unit costs for the provision of technical assistance and training will be monitored to ensure
high quality assistance at a reasonable price. The managing agent will be asked to
benchmark this against the equivalent provided in Tanzania and internationally.
2.30 Finally, we will also monitor qualitatively the extent to which the interventions funded
leverage outcomes (i.e. catalyse wider reform efforts) beyond DFID’s own contribution.
3. Commercial Case
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
3.1 This programme has several components, and will involve both direct and indirect
procurement. The diagram below summarises the procurement structure that will be used.
Diagram 3: Procurement Structure for Programme
`
3.2
The direct procurement will be in the form of a contract competitively tendered to a
managing agent. The agent will procure analysis, technical assistance and advocacy work on
behalf of DFID. The technical assistance will be provided both to government and external bodies.
The agent will also be responsible for managing overall programme reporting.
3.3
The money channelled through the government via the Treasury and National Criminal
Justice Forum (NCJF) will be used to support coordination of oversight institutions, and to fund
selected key results in the beneficiary institutions’ workplans. The proposed design means that the
indirect procurement arrangements for the intervention will follow the Government of Tanzania
procurement systems. A standard Memorandum of Understanding will be signed by the Treasury
(Ministry of Finance) and the recipient Institutions. The Treasury will disburse funds according to
requests upon approval of request by the NCJF and DFID, and will subject those funds to the
same scrutiny as other Government of Tanzania expenditure, including auditing.
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial
advantage for DFID?
3.4
For the direct procurement element, DFID will conduct a competitive tender under full
European Union competition procedures (see Section E). In order to get the best value for money,
the Terms of Reference (TOR) will set out clear expectations of the supplier, with outcome-focused
specifications. The contract will also adhere to DFID standard terms and conditions (eg relating to
travel and subsistence), thus keeping costs down. Milestone payments will be used to pay the
contractor upon satisfactory completion of the outcomes set out in the TOR.
3.5
For the indirect procurement through government, DFID will make an initial payment, then
make all future payments dependent on achievement of key results in the oversight agencies’
workplans. This ‘payment on results’ will increase the ownership and commitment of government to
achieving the programme outcomes. The results will be clearly linked to the programme’s intended
inputs and outputs, and will be both measurable and attributable to DFID’s support. DFID will pay
for the DPP to recruit a procurement agent (who could be seconded from the managing agent, or
sourced within government) to ensure that all procurement of goods or services under this project
represents value for money and complies with Government of Tanzania procurement standards.
All procurement under the programme will be subject to spot audit checks to verify compliance.
DFID will also pay for the DPP to recruit a reporting officer (seconded from within government, or
through the managing agent) to help track programme progress and submit reports on results and
impact.
3.6
The default position is that DFID funding will not be used to pay for per diems, workshops
or study tours unless explicitly agreed in advance with the managing agent and DFID, and linked to
clear deliverables.
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
3.7
The appraisal process has already shown that government is ready to collaborate on this
programme. For the direct procurement, several companies are likely to be interested in the
managing agent role. These include the main management consultants – KPMG, Ernst and Young,
Deloitte, PWC and Adam Smith International – as well as the British Council which has run such
multi-component anti-corruption programmes in a number of other countries (eg Sierra Leone and
Nigeria), and has expertise in the police and judiciary sectors as well. The bigger firms may wish to
partner with specialist organisations focusing on police and judiciary matters, eg Blue Light
Consulting, and South Africa’s Institute for Security Studies.
3.8
There are also likely to be several Tanzanian civil society and private sector organisations
interested in carrying out analytical and advocacy work through the Integrity Fund. These include
REPOA, ESRF, the Uongozi Institute, and other Non State Actors such as the Trade Union
Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA), Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) and Tanzania
Association of NGOs.
D. What are the key underlying cost drivers? How is value added and how will we
measure and improve this?
3.9
The key underlying cost drivers relate to: personnel (the overheads for the managing
agent, the costs of technical assistance provision, and the support staff in the DPP), procurement,
and delivery of activities in workplans (government, bodies funded through the Integrity Fund).
3.10 On personnel, the key is to bring in the highest quality people possible at a reasonable
price. Clear criteria will be specified for the quality of personal required, and their costs
benchmarked against similar providers. Pay will be directly linked to performance and outputs. The
managing agent’s other overhead costs (such as transport, communications) will be scrutinised to
ensure they are comparable with costs that DFID itself would incur.
3.11 On procurement, the programme will need to ensure timely procurement of good quality
goods and services that can deliver the tasks required at the best possible cost. This will be done
by requiring the managing agent to use DFID (or equivalent) standards for procurement, and by
ensuring that the government complies with its own standards for procurement. Compliance will be
verified through spot checks. Any large value procurement items (over £100,000) may only be
signed off with the approval of DFID project manager with the delegated authority, unless if it is a
sensitive procurement.
3.12 The programme will need to ensure workplan activities are high quality and likely to
achieve their desired impact, that they are linked to clear and measurable results, and that they are
delivered at a reasonable cost. This will be achieved by DFID and the managing agent working
with government counterparts and external stakeholders to agree workplans with realistic and
measurable results, and by benchmarking the cost of activities against similar activities carried out
in Tanzania and elsewhere. DFID’s funding for government and for the managing agent will be in
the form of ‘payment by results’, ie providing the next tranche of funding when the previous sets of
milestones have been met.
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
3.13 All contracts awarded by this project will be in line with DFID procurement Guidelines.
Exceptions will be applied only when absolutely necessary, in which case appropriate waivers will
be sought.
3.14 DFID will go out to competitive tender to contract the managing agent. DFID will do this
following the European Union Restricted Procedure for tendering, namely:
 The contract requirement (full TOR and evaluation criteria) will be advertised in the Official
Journal of the European Union. All interested suppliers will be invited to submit expressions of
interest to DFID Tanzania. This will take 35 days. Any companies that are known to have
particular competency in this area will be alerted to the upcoming Request to Participate.
 DFID will then select a shortlist of suppliers who will be invited to tender. Finalised TOR and
evaluation criteria will be shared with the suppliers. The submission of full tenders will take
another 35 days.
 DFID will then evaluate the tenders together with a reference group comprising the DPP, PCCB,
police and judiciary, and one representative each from civil society and the private sector. Based
on the result of this evaluation, the preferred supplier will be selected.
3.15 This tendering process is anticipated to take four months, with a further two months for the
chosen supplier to prepare to take up the contract. The chosen supplier will therefore be expected
to commence work at April 2012.
F. How will contract and supplier performance be managed through the life of the
intervention?
3.16 Contract and supplier performance will be managed through existing established
mechanisms from DFID Headquarters Procurement Group and DFID Tanzania procurement unit
for the managing agent. Managing performance is covered by the monitoring and evaluation
section in the Management case.
4. Financial Case
A. How much it will cost
4.1 The estimated cost of the programme is £11 million over 4 years. It is also expected that
Government Oversight Institutions will contribute around £1 million in total through their usual
activity budgets in their respective Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs), plus
significant resourcing in terms of staff time and running costs of the institutions.
4.2 An indicative breakdown of costs for the programme is in the table below. This is likely to be
subject to change once detailed workplans have been developed with the oversight institutions,
police and judiciary, and the contract has been awarded to the selected managing agent.
Programme intervention
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Total
Support through government
 Coordination
 Tanzania Police Force
 Judiciary (Primary Courts)
 DPP
 PCCB
 NAO
 FIU
Sub-Total
40,000
200,000
100,000
300,000
300,000
100,000
75,000
1,115,000
85,000
1,000,000
400,000
400,000
500,000
250,000
150,000
2,785,000
75,000
1,000,000
400,000
400,000
500,000
250,000
150,000
2,775,000
75,000
800,000
300,000
300,000
400,000
200,000
75,000
2,150,000
275,000
3,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
1,700,000
800,000
450,000
8,825,000
100,000
70,000
120,000
50,000
335,000
100,000
65,000
90,000
50,000
305,000
300,000
205,000
400,000
150,000
1,025,000
Integrity Fund
 Corruption trend analysis
 Civil society/private sector dialogue
 Analytical/advisory inputs in sectors
 Donor joint response/dialogue
Sub-Total
0
0
40,000
0
50,000
50,000
100,000
70,000
120,000
50,000
335,000
40,000
40,000
315,000
65,000
380,000
320,000
65,000
385,000
245,000
100,000
345,000
920,000
230,000
1,150,000
1,205,000
3,500,000
3,495,000
2,800,000
11,000,000
Programme management, monitoring and evaluation
Programme Management
Monitoring and evaluation
Sub-Total
Grand Total
4.3 In addition, the Government of Tanzania will contribute an estimated £1m through its core
funding for the government institutions identified above, for related work. Adequate funding is
available within DFID Tanzania’s pipeline for this programme, and it is within the delegated
authority of the Head of Office to approve. Funding is not considered to be contentious, as the
content of this programme has already been discussed with the Government of Tanzania and is
similar to programmes being supported in other countries, such as Zambia and Nigeria.
4.4 As this programme is high risk and has multiple components, six monthly reviews will be built in
to assess how far each component has traction and is achieving milestones, and funding may be
moved between programme interventions as appropriate. A monitoring and evaluation budget line
has been included to allow for frequent independent reviews of progress. More detailed monitoring
and evaluation will be built into the oversight institution programme lines.
B. How it will be funded: capital/programme/admin
4.5 The intervention will be funded from programme resources (RDEL), under the DFID Tanzania
framework and has been budgeted for in the Operational Plan for DFID Tanzania. While funding
may be shifted between different programme intervention lines (see 4.4 above), the overall totals to
be spent each year will remain consistent with the table above. There should not therefore be any
higher level impact on DFID’s forecast of spend in Tanzania.
C. How funds will be paid out
4.6 The diagram at the beginning of this section illustrated the delivery channel for funding: one to
government (indirect procurement), and one to the managing agent for the remainder of activity.
4.7 The first tranche of funds will be paid to the Government of Tanzania for the oversight
institutions, police and judiciary, on receipt of satisfactory work plans with clear and measurable
results and milestones. Subsequent tranches will be paid on results (i.e. achievement of
milestones). Payments will be made annually.
4.8 The first tranche of funds will be paid to the managing agent on receipt of a satisfactory
programme action plan. Subsequent tranches will be paid on achievement of contract milestones,
and will require submission of valid claims, invoices and proof of completion of work.
4.9 In the event that it is deemed necessary to make a payment in advance of need, DFID will
contact the Finance, Corporate and Procurement Department to justify the request and seek
approval.
D - What is the assessment of financial risk?
4.10 The main financial risk associated with the project relates to channelling funds through
government. DFID’s 2011 fiduciary risk assessment for Tanzania identifies the overall level of risk
as substantial. According to the FRA, the main areas of risk include: (i) limited independence and
effectiveness of external audit; (ii) external pressures and weak commitment control systems for
large contracts; (iii) a weak internal control environment; (iv) the lack of transparency and oversight
of the internal transfer system to public authorities and other bodies; and (v) poor value for money
in procurement practices
4.11 These risks will be managed by (a) limiting the level of funding to be directly managed by
government institutions, e.g. providing technical assistance in kind; (b) paying funds to institutions
through the Treasury thus ultimately achieving more GoT audit coverage; (c) requiring separate
audit of DFID funds provided; (d) requiring spot checks of procurement carried out with DFID
funding, as well as DFID/managing agent co-signature of large procurement items; and (e) linking
payment to achievement of milestones.
4.12 There is also a risk that the managing agent itself, or the recipient institutions of the
Integrity Fund, misuse funds. Due diligence will be conducted on the managing agent before funds
are disbursed, to ensure adequate checks and balances are in place, and the managing agent
itself will also conduct due diligence checks before disbursing funds to partners. In addition to
annual audits, high risk areas of expenditure such as procurement and workshops will be
subjected to additional spot-checks to verify their legitimacy.
E - How expenditure will be monitored, reported, and accounted for
4.13 Annual audited accounts, six monthly financial statements and budget forecasts will be
required for each institution receiving DFID funding. Further funding will only be provided once
prescribed milestones have been met and previous funds accounted for. Agreements with partners
will include an exit strategy where fraud is identified or the expected results are not being achieved.
4.14 The management agent will compile annual assets returns for DFID on behalf of
government and others receiving DFID support. Assets purchased by government will be subject to
Government of Tanzania regulations and will be disposed of or transferred to the individual
institutions when the programme comes to an end. Assets purchased by the managing agent and
other institutions will be similarly disposed of at the end of the programme, in agreement with
DFID.
5. Management Case
A - Oversight
5.1 DFID will be responsible for oversight of this programme, through the Public Sector Advisor.
The Deputy Head of Office will quality assure this programme and ensure it delivers the quality
outcomes intended. The managing agent will retain oversight of the workplan and inputs provided.
5.2 Co-ordination of support to oversight institutions, the police and judiciary will be through a subcommittee of the National Criminal Justice Forum, which will steer their overall direction of work,
and review impact. The DPP will co-chair the sub-committee, and all the key oversight institutions
will be represented. DFID and the managing agent will be observers to the group, and their
consent will be required for sign off of workplans and budget requests. Any technical assistance
provided by the managing agent to the oversight institutions will be in line with the workplans and
approved by the NCJF.
5.3 The Integrity Fund, which will be administered by the managing agent, will be the vehicle for
support to external bodies – civil society and academia, the private sector, and coordination of
international partners. It will have a small steering committee comprising representatives from each
of the above, as well as DFID and the managing agent, to help shape the overall direction of the
Fund and review its impact.
B - Management
5.4 DFID will have responsibility for overall programme management, led by the Public Sector
Adviser, with support from the Deputy Programme Manager on issues such as contracts,
payments and reporting.
5.5 For the first six months of the programme, DFID will lead on programme start-up with the help
of locally recruited consultants, while the tendering process proceeds for selection of the managing
agent. This will comprise: developing workplans with the respective oversight institutions and
carrying out initial disbursements to government, as well as initial analytical and advisory work
through the Integrity Fund (eg to input into sector level work). Thereafter, day to day programme
management will be handled by the management agent, whose duties will include: programme
planning, managing short-term consultancies, making sure programme management is carried out
in line with standard DFID procedures; budgeting and forecasting; and submitting reports for the
project. The agent will also carry out dialogue and influencing with partners, and manage
productive working relations with them. Within the NCJF, a reporting officer will be responsible for
overseeing workplan progress by the oversight institutions, and submitting narrative and financial
reports to the NCJF sub-committee and managing agent.
C - Conditionality
5.6 None.
D - Monitoring and Evaluation
5.7 The results framework for this programme is attached at Annex 3. This will be supplemented by
more detailed workplans for the managing agent and for each of the government beneficiary
institutions. These will have clear, measurable results that are time-bound, and will form triggers for
subsequent disbursement. The main anticipated activities to be included in each workplan are
attached at Annex 4. DFID will carry out an annual review of the programme each year, during
which milestones and indicators will be refreshed as needed.
5.8 Earlier this business case stated that the evidence for this intervention is medium. Because of
the limited international evidence on effectiveness of anti-corruption measures, as well as the scale
(£11m) and degree of innovation and risk in this programme (especially the support to police and
judiciary), an independent impact evaluation will be carried out at the end, including a detailed
review of the support to the police and judiciary. This will draw on the indicators set out in the
attached results framework and the theory of change. It will use evidence gathered through
programme monitoring: a monitoring plan will be put in place for each beneficiary institution, with
clear baselines, milestones and targets, to allow for assessment of progress. It will report on the
extent to which programme outcomes have been achieved, lessons learned in the provision of
support, and scope for replication in other countries. A more detailed evaluation plan will be
developed by DFID in the first six months of the programme.
F. Risk Assessment
Risk Description
Impact on
Success
(L,M,H)
Probability
(L,M,H)
Mitigating Actions
Risk
1
Programme relationships negatively impacted
by wider pressures building in GBS/SBS
relationship around underlying principles etc.
H
M
- Strong communication of results
- Strong relationship with the heads of
implementing institutions
Risk
2
The UK seen as not being the right bilateral
donor to lead on an anti-corruption programme
because of its own recent corruption record in
relation to Tanzania
M
M
- Provide world class expertise – if the
product is useful, this will overcome
concerns
- The recent introduction of the UK Bribery
Act may help to counter the negative
impressions of the UK on corruption
Risk
3
The Judiciary is not fully committed to working
with the UK on tackling corruption and may
therefore block work in this area
M
L
- programme of support to the judiciary will
only take place under strict conditions
including clear commitments from the
judiciary themselves (to be initiated through
early high-level engagement with the Chief
Justice)
- the programme’s focus on the primary
courts may offer a less contentious entry
point than seeking to tackle higher level
corruption
Risk
4
Programmes supporting police reforms or
working across the security and justice sectors
are normally categorised as high-risk. The
possibility of high level political/public criticism
is present especially in the event of allegations
of a human rights breach.
M
M
- Capitalise on the Inspector General of
Police’s commitment to act. Ensure that
interventions supported have a clear
benefit to the police and judiciary
- Closely monitor progress and be prepared
to alter the programme or cease support if
there is no traction
- monitor closely (through CGA and other
mechanisms) HR record of police
Risk
5
Consultancies do not deliver the high quality
work needed
M
M
- clear specification of consultancy
requirements and outputs will help mitigate
this risk
- use of results based management,
checking that milestones have been
achieved before disbursing next payment.
Risk
6
Corruption is uncovered in the programme,
undermining its credibility and forcing DFID to
suspend funding
M
H
- due diligence of NCJF and project
partners before disbursing funding
- development of clear workplans with
measurable results, and payment by
results
- annual audits with in-depth checks on
high risk spend such as procurement and
workshops
- DFID will authorise any procurement over
£100,000
- annual reviews to look at corruption
prevalence and risk, and whether
managing risk adequately
- publish information on support given to
each institution, and establish complaints
mechanism to facilitate reporting of any
abuses.
Acronyms
ADB
AML
CAG
CIDA
CJ
CJF
CPI
FC
CSOs
DFID
DPP
DPs
EITI
ES
EU
FATF
FBO
FIU
GAAP
GOT
HQ
I/E
IGP
IEC
KPIs
LSRP
M&E
MDGs
MIS
MKUKUTAII
MoHA
MOU
MTEF
NACSAP
NCJF
NGOS
PCCB
PPRA
PRBS
TA
TRA
UNCAC
UNDP
African Development Bank
Anti money laundering (
Control and Auditor General (), the
Canadian International Development Agency
Chief Justice
Criminal Justice Forum
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (
Feasibility Criteria
Civil Society Organizations
Department for International Development
The Director of Public Prosecutions ()
Development Partners
Extractive Industries Transparencies Initiative
Ethics Secretariat
European Union
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
Faith-based organisation
Financial Intelligence Unit (the
Generally Accepted Accountancy Principles
Government of Tanzania
Headquarters
Income/expenditure
Inspector General of Police
Information, Education, and Communication
Key performance indicators
Legal Sector Reforms Programme
Monitoring and evaluation
Millennium development goals
Management information system
Tanzanian poverty reduction strategy
Ministry of Home Affairs
Memorandum of Understanding
Medium-term expenditure framework
National ANTI Corruption and Strategic Action Plan
National Criminal Justice Forum
Non-governmental organisation
Preventing and Combating of Corruption Bureau
Public Procurement Regulatory Authority
Poverty Reduction Budget Support
Technical Advisor
Tanzania revenue Authority
UN Convention Against Corruption
United Nations Development Programme