Innovation, Security & Growth
Perspectives from the U.S. Innovation System
Myths, Realities & Opportunities

Six Countries Programme Workshop
Defense & Security R&D
Brussels, Belgium
November 19, 2004
Charles W. Wessner, Ph.D.
Director, Technology and Innovation
National Research Council
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Role of the National Research Council
• The NRC Mission is the Advise the
Government on Science, Engineering, and
Medicine
– Studies for federal agencies, Congress, and
some self-initiated; 270 Reports Issued Each
Year
– Nearly 1,300 staff and 10,000 volunteers
annually involved in NRC/IOM studies
– Budget of some $160 million: 85% from
government agencies and 15% private
• Great Prestige. High Quality Analysis with
Direct Impact on U.S. Policymaking
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Presentation
• Question: Is military R&D a source of
Commercial Advantage in the U.S.
Innovation System?
• Myths and Realities about the U.S.
Innovation System
• The Limits of Spinoff
• The Need for a Broader Technology and
Security Policy
• A Better Model: The Potential for
Innovation Awards in Europe
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Related Questions for Today
(From our Swedish Friends)
• How can public investments in security
research generate maximum impact on
innovation and growth?
• How to find forms (or mechanisms) to
strengthen the innovation systems?
• How to increase the efficiency in public and
private procurement of military products?
• How to increase innovation by encouraging the
participation of small companies?
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
An Overview of the US R&D
Portfolio
Dramatic Increases in the US Budget
for Defense & Homeland Security R&D
R&D in FY 2005 Budget
• Federal R&D expected to rise to $132 billion in
FY’05, up from $126 in FY’04
• Most funding increases over past few years
have gone to Defense Weapons development
and Homeland Security R&D (including biodefense)
• FY’05 R&D budget continues this trend
• All other R&D agencies have seen flat or
declining R&D budgets (with modest
increases in some programs offset by cuts in
others)
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
U.S. Defense R&D is High
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
…But Focus is on Development
Is U.S. R&D Leadership Therefore a Myth?
The focus on
weapons
development and
testing overstates
the R&D element of
the budget.
It is often not
basic or even
applied research
but rather testing
and certification.
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Security Related R&D in Other Agencies
• NIH (NIAID) is the lead agency for BioDefense
– Bio-defense research at NIH to be
$1.8Billion in FY2005
– Most of money to go for NIH Research
Grants
• NSF to fund basic research in areas related
to Homeland Security
• USDA involved in food security & animal
health
• Each Agency wants its Share of “Security”
Source: AAAS, 2004
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Post 9-11 Increase in Bio-defense R&D
NIH is the Lead Agency in Bio-defense Research
DHS Portfolio Heavily Development and Labs Oriented
Opportunities for Security Cooperation with Europe
NIH Budget is $1.8 Billion
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Current Trends are Troubling:
President’s Proposed Cuts in the R&D
Budget for FY2005
• $660M cut from Basic and Applied Research at
DoD
• $68M cut from DoE Office of Science
• $63M cut from Energy Conservation R&D at
DoE
• $183M cut from Agriculture Research
• $24M cut from Transportation Research
• Advanced Technology Program to be Ended
• Manufacturing Extension Program: Proposed
budget down 63% from 2003 level
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
What are the Implications for Europe?
• Concern in Europe on impact of increased
US Defense and Security R&D budgets on
– European Defense and Commercial Industries
– European Science Base in Trans-Atlantic
Cooperation & Competition
– European Policy Aspirations
• To help address these concerns, EURAB
commissioned PREST to undertake an
analysis of the impacts of US Defense R&D
spending
– Andrew D. James, US Defence R&D Spending:
An Analysis of the Impacts, January 2004
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
PREST Report Findings
• Defense & Homeland Security missions are driving
increases in US Defense R&D budgets
• Impact of New Expenditures:
– Spin-off products & technologies from Defense R&D is
a Reality
– Defense R&D Spending Impacts University Science
Base and Training of Graduate Scientists & Engineers
– Defense R&D Spending Creates New Markets and is a
Source of Early-Stage Seed Funding
– Leveraging Civilian Technologies (like IT) for Defense &
Security Missions Improves International
Competitiveness of US Firms
• Begins & Ends with the Claim that “synergies
between defence and civil research are far
ahead of the situation in Europe.”
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Is Military R&D a Source of
Commercial Advantage in the U.S.
Innovation System?
Myths about the
U.S. Innovation System
Central Myth about the
U.S. Innovation System
• It is a Well-oiled, Centrally
Controlled, Innovation Machine
• There is a Broad Consensus on
How the System Works and what
Opportunities and Problems need
to be Addressed
• “Military R&D is the U.S. Secret
Weapon in Competitiveness Wars”
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Myth of the Rational Policy Framework
• Euro Myth: U.S. Innovation Policy is based on a
coherent National Innovation Agenda
• Reality: There is no U.S. Ministry of Science
 Multiple sources of policy making
• Congressional Committees,
• Federal Agencies—NSF, NIH, others
• State Governments
+ Positive: Multiple sources of experimentation means
that the system can be more adaptive; responsive to
new challenges
– Negative: Lack of coherence can lead to de facto
outcomes that can hurt innovation
• Example: Post Cold War Falloff in U.S. investments
in Science & Engineering Education was not a
product of rational U.S. policymaking.
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Myth of the Rational Policy Framework
Euro Myth: U.S. Innovation Policy is based
on a coherent National Innovation Agenda
Reality: Architect of U.S. Innovation Policy
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Myth of Perfect Markets
• Strong U.S. Myth: “If it is a good
idea, the market will fund it.”
• Reality: Potential Investors have less
than perfect knowledge, especially
about innovative new ideas
– “Asymmetric Information” leads to
suboptimal investments
– This means that it is hard for small firms
to obtain funding for new ideas
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Reality: The Valley of Death
Early-Stage Funding Gap
Federally
Funded
Research
Creates
New Ideas
Capital to Develop
Ideas to Innovation
Product
Development
&
No Capital
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Innovation
© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Cash Flow Valley of Death
Adapted from: L.M. Murphy & P. L. Edwards, Bridging the Valley of Death—Transitioning from
Public to Private Sector Financing, Golden CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, May 2003
Technology
Creation
Technology
Development
Early Commercialization
Successful
Cash
Flow
Cash Flow
Valley of
Death
Moderately
Successful
Time
Unsuccessful
SBIR & ATP
Unsuccessful
Typical
Primary
Investors
Federal Agencies,
Universities, States,
Companies
Entrepreneur &
Seed/Angel Investors
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Venture
Capitalists
IPO
© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Myth of U.S.Venture Capital Markets
• Myth: “U.S. VC Markets are broad &
deep, thus there is no role for
government awards”
• Reality: Venture Capitalists have
– Limited information on new firms
– Prone to herding tendencies
– Focus on later stages of technology
development
– Most VC investors seek early exit
• Large U.S. Venture Capital Market is
Not Focused on Early-Stage Firms
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Military R&D Myth
The Myth of Military Spin-Offs
• Euro Myth: “U.S. Defense
Research/Procurement Directly Funds
Civilian Technologies”
• Reality: “Very few technologies proceeded
effortlessly from defense conception to commercial
application.”
– Secrecy, military specs, and long lead times slow
diffusion of new defense technologies
– Even efforts to use low-cost civilian technologies
for defense use, i.e., “spin-ins,” are often
blocked by complicated military procurement
system
Beyond Spin-off, John Alic, Lewis Branscomb, et al.
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Main Role for Military R&D is Defense
• U.S. Military Expenditures from 1947 to
the end of the Cold War were designed
to protect the U.S., its NATO allies, and
other countries around the world from
Soviet Expansion
• Vast sums were deployed to this end
– Hot wars were fought in Korea, Vietnam
– Proxy wars in Greece, Afghanistan, many
parts of Africa
– Later interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Kuwait were undertaken to secure human
rights and international stability
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Purpose of U.S. Military Expenditure
• U.S. Military Expenditures were first and
foremost designed to provide the equipment,
maintenance and training to provide credible
capacity to deliver armed support to U.S. allies
• Additional vast sums were (and are) spent on
the U.S. nuclear deterrent
• The Goal of U.S. military expenditure is Security
for the U.S. and its allies and the ability to
influence events
– U.S. Power Projection is Unique (though constrained)
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Difference in Scale of Military
Expenditure
• The United States, for better or for worse,
expends over $400B per year (2004) on the
military
• The UK is next at $40B followed by France at
$30B and Germany at $25B (approximate
figures)
• R&D represents a small portion of these
amounts – usually 3% in the U.S.
• Commercial benefits are small, given the level
of expenditure
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Difference in Scale of Military R&D
• Within NATO, only the Defense budgets of the
UK, France, Germany, and Italy exceed the
R&D budgets of the U.S. military
– All other NATO nations combined invest some
$3B in research and technology investment
• Why? France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Poland,
and Spain spend 60% or more of Defense
Budgets on Personnel
• U.S. Defense Budget Expenditures:
– 35% on Personnel
– 30% on Equipment (including R&D)
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Positive Impacts of Military
Expenditure
• Air power: The U.S. has the only significant
capabilities in
–
–
–
–
Strategic Transport
Refueling
Theatre Surveillance, and
Precision Bomber capabilities among NATO nations
• Navy Carrier Groups and Submarine Fleets
• These capabilities are needed to meet out of area
commitments
– Advanced attack aircraft on the way: F/A 22, as are
advanced unmanned vehicles
• But these New dedicated weapons systems have
limited foreseeable spin-offs
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Positive Impacts of Defense
Expenditures
on Civilian Economy
• U.S. military expenditures did result in
substantial growth in important sectors
of the U.S. economy
– World War II saw the growth of the U.S.
automotive, shipping, aircraft, electronics,
aluminum and steel industries
– Cold War expenditures provided support for
computers, semiconductors, jet engines,
and rockets
• Famous case of Boeing 707 derived from bids
on Air Force Tanker contracts
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
But these Broader Impacts are Limited
• Few Spin-offs: Military R&D often has no
civilian application and is inefficient in terms
of the economy as a whole
– Cases do exist, e.g., cost plus contracts for
semiconductors, but the 1950-60s model no
longer applies
– Major Spin-offs, e.g., the Internet and GPS
have occurred, but they are widely diffused
• GPS was for missile targeting (not for tracking kids)
– U.S. Expenditures, e.g., Stealth technologies,
are often high cost efforts with no foreseeable
civilian spin-off
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Demise of the
Defense-Based R&D Model
• The role of the military shifted in the 1970’s
and ’80s as a proportion of civilian high-tech
markets
– Private market for semiconductors grew rapidly,
dwarfing U.S. military needs
• DoD specifications, secrecy, & long
procurement cycles vitiated potential to fund
cutting-edge commercial technologies
– Commercial IT far outstrips Military Development
• Some ground-breaking innovation continues to
occur (e.g., the Internet) but applications are
pervasive and highly beneficial for new
entrants, e.g., Taiwan, India
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Productive role of U.S. Military
R&D Expenditure is Overstated
• Scale: The military sector is now much smaller than
during the Cold War and has fewer linkages to the
economy
– Top 4 Defense firms (Boeing, Lockheed,
Northrop, & General Dynamics) have a combined
market cap of $102 billion
– Intel alone has a market cap of $140 billion
• Caveat: Defense sector is Employment Intensive
– Defense firms: 477,200 employees
– Intel: 80,500 employees
(All data as of 11 August 04)
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Military R&D Allocations Sap
Funds from more Productive Uses
• Are increases in US Defense R&D spending the
most efficient approach to stimulating
commercial activity?
• Is the US investing in the right kinds of R&D
to enhance economic competitiveness?
• Concentration of R&D Funds on Small numbers
of Engineers Working on Military applications
is Inefficient
• Reduces R&D Funding for Other Sectors of the
Economy
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Belief in Military Based R&D
Model Undercut by Practice
• Much discussion of the Military R&D
Model in the 1980s & Resulting U.S.
Commercial Advantage
• The fact that there was virtually no
increase in Defense Expenditures
among NATO allies Undercuts the
Conviction of the Argument
– The ’80s did see an increase in targeted
commercial technologies
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
U.S. Military R&D: An Appropriate Model?
• U.S. Military R&D is
– Inefficient
– Overcommitted
– Later-Stage
• Development Focus on Testing &
Certification
– Occasionally has Major Impact
• GPS
• Internet
– Often Widely Shared with Others
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Myths and Limitations of Spin-off
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Spin-Off as a Non-Targeted
Economic Benefit
• Why do U.S. policymakers like spinoff as a concept?
– Because spin-off appears to cost nothing
(assuming the defense expenditure is useful)
– Spin-offs help justify high defense expenditures
– Spin-off appears to need no government
management or targeting, thus eliminating any
interference in the marketplace
– Is this true in practice?
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Limits of Spin-Off
• The substantial separation of the
defense and commercial sectors of U.S.
industry limits opportunities and raises
costs
• Adaptation of defense innovation to
commercial use is not cost free
• Focus on defense means technologies
with high commercial potential are
ignored
– DARPA focus in on Long-term and Military
Applications, not Civilian Uses
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Limits of Spin-Off
• Compared to what?
• The efficiency of investments
resulting in spin-offs to meet
commercial technology needs must
be compared to alternatives
– Comparable private sector R&D vs..
government defense R&D?
– No research at all – yes, spin-off
compares favorably to not doing R&D
at all
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Limits of Spin-Off
• Compared to alternative institutions
– R&D at other federal agencies
• Federally-funded civilian technology initiatives,
e.g. , the ATP at NIST
– Basic Research Support at NSF or NIH
• These comparisons are hard to make and
therefore rarely made
• Claims for spin-off benefits tend to be
comparison free – policies focused on military
R&D should be grounded in the present, not
just focused on isolated success cases from 40
or 50 years ago
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Spin-Off: A Success Story
• Direct product conversion of a product
developed at government expense is rare but
does occur
• A good case is Raytheon’s microwave oven – a
classic sequential spin-off within a single firm
• The conditions for success included:
– A complete redesign of the magnetron microwave
power source for ease of manufacture
– A five-fold reduction in magnetron cost through
learning and scale
– Development of a patented safety seal to prevent
the escape of microwave radiation
– Corporate acquisition of the distribution channel
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Spin-Off: 2 Failures & 1 Success
• C-5 Military Transport Aircraft
Competition led to Lockheed’s victory
with:
– Contracts for the C-5 military transport
– Concurrent development of the L-1011
commercial transport
• Lockheed never made a profit on the L-1011
& later withdrew from commercial air
transport
• Boeing lost the competition for the C-5
with the federal support that entailed
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Spin-Off: 2 Failures & 1 Success
• Having lost the C-5 competition, Boeing
then “bet the company” on the 747
– C-5 design work aided development of the 747
– Timing helped: The OPEC embargo ran up
aviation fuel prices, thereby helping the more
fuel efficient 747 gain market share
– The focus on the commercial market helped
Boeing
• Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas had
major military business – both failed in
civilian aircraft production
• Conclusion: Military support works???
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Some Civil-Military
Cooperation Leads to Positive “Spin-offs”
• Concurrent Development of Civil & Military
Applications of a Common Technology
– Nuclear reactors for submarine propulsion and then
electric power production set dominant points of the
technology in the United States
– GE and Pratt/Whitney design and build jet engines for
related families of civilian and military aircraft
– KC135 Stratotanker & Boeing 707 had a common origin
but very different design features (375 flight hours per
year vs. 3000 for the 707
• Development of Engineering Techniques & Tools to
Meet Government Needs
– E.g., Software for computer based design and analysis
from NASA sponsored research
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Various Forms of Civil-Military
Cooperation leading to “Spin-offs”
• Dual-Use Technology Developed from
Defense Agency Research Support
– Defense support for University research
(e.g., Artificial Intelligence) that may be
valuable to civilian industry
• Reverse Spin-off or ‘Spin-on’ to Military
is increasingly common
– E.g., CMOS semiconductor chip
technology was perfected in Japan for use
in electronic wristwatches
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
What Could More European Military
R&D Accomplish?
• More European Military R&D Could
– Enhance some European Military
Capabilities
• From a few large firms?
– Encourage Rationalization
• Is this good for all countries, e.g.,
Sweden and France?
– Stimulate Dual-Use, High Technology
• But is this likely?
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Policy Issue: Allowable vs.. Effective
• Is the push for European Defense R&D
like the Push for R&D Tax Credits?
– Tax Credits are Expensive and Blunt, but
they are Allowed by State Aid Rules, so…
– Military R&D may be Ineffective for New
Technology, but it is Exempt from State Aid
Rules, so…
• Is it a case of Efficiency vs.. the Rules
– Would it be better to change the Rules?
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The U.S. Critique: “Spinoff cannot serve
as a realistic basis for technology policy”
--Alic, Branscomb, et al (1992)
• Defense R&D does not cover gaps in
nation’s technology policies
– Defense contributions are growing smaller &
more specialized
– Many industries benefit little from Defense
R&D
• Spin-offs offer only indirect, inadvertent
contributions
– Focus on spin-offs denies more direct role for
government in technology policy
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Is a French-style Model Right for Europe?
• Large State selected & supported projects,
insulated from rapidly changing market forces by
National Procurement -- National Champion Based
– Nuclear Energy
– Aerospace
• Airbus, Ariane and ESA Program
– Large Scale Transportation--TGV Trains
– Water and Electricity Champions
• A Strategy Not well suited for rapidly changing
technologies and markets, e.g., semiconductors &
computers
• Is Spinoff Really the Current U.S. Model?
– Is it Effective? Compared to What?
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
A Better Model:
Public Private Partnerships offer
more Potential for Innovation in
Europe
Important to Consider Alternatives to
Military R&D: Public-Private Partnerships
• Need to focus on other policies that
could more effectively support nation’s
Commercial Sector, such as PublicPrivate Partnerships
– Public-Private Partnerships focus on the
hurdles between basic research & product
development
– Need to adopt policies to bridge traditional
government roles and traditional private
sector roles
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
A Program “Like an SBIR” May Offer
Europe Higher Returns than “More R&D”
• No New Funds Required for SBIR
– Capitalizes on Existing R&D Investments
and Procurement Funds
• Focus on Valley of Death—Key Point of
Vulnerability for Firms and Products
• National Program to Meet National
Needs with National Firms
• Bottom-up Approach to Security
– Contributes to Innovative Solutions as well
as Growth and Job Creation
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) Program
• Created in 1982, Renewed in 1992 & 2001
• Participation by all federal agencies with an
annual extramural R&D budget of greater
than $100 million is mandatory
– Agencies must set aside 2.5% of their
R&D budgets for small business awards
• To be a $2 billion per year program in 2004
– Largest U.S. Partnership Program
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The SBIR Model
R&D Investment
Social
and
Government Needs
Private Sector
Investment
PHASE II
Research
towards
Prototype
PHASE I
Feasibility
Research
$100K
PHASE III
Product
Development
for Gov’t or
Commercial
Market
$750K
Tax Revenue
Federal Investment
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
SBIR is a Bridge in the Innovation System
• Provides a Bridge between Small
Companies and the Agencies,
especially for Procurement
• Provides a Bridge between Universities
and the Marketplace
• Encourages Local and Regional
Growth, increasingly through the
University connection
• Creates jobs and justifies R&D
investments to the general public
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Key Question:
Would SBIR Work in Europe?
• Some Believe it Would:
– “SBIR
is one of the few American
Technology Programmes that can be
‘Cut and Pasted’ into European
Innovation Systems”
• Participant at Commission Workshop,
Brussels, June 2004
– EURAB has Recommended an “SBIR
type” Program
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Competitive Awards to Support SME
Innovation are Needed
• SBIR is a Powerful Model
– U.S. National Academy of Sciences research
shows model is flexible and effective
• Recent National Initiatives & Proposal by the
Commission to Permit SBIR-Type Proposals
– Investing in research: an action plan for Europe,
[COM(2003) 226 final/2 – See Section 5.3, p. 19]
– TEKES has adopted a Phase I approach
– VINNOVA is initiating an SBIR Program
– France is exploring an SBIR-type program
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
An Innovation Systems
Perspective on Security
• National Security is founded on a
Robust Innovation System
– Need to Address Linkages among many
Facets of the Innovation System
• Universities, Businesses, Government
– A Robust Innovation System will help make
the Nation Militarily and Economically
Secure
– Robust Defense Spending alone will not
make the Nation more Innovative, thus,
ultimately Less Secure
• Lesson of the Cold War
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
The Transatlantic Cooperation Option
• The U.S. is devoting Substantial
Funds to New Technologies to Meet
the Terrorist Security Threat
– U.S. Capacity constraints are real
– Research cooperation is historically
broad and rich
– Procurement is increasingly open,
and the U.S. market is large
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Conclusion
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Spinoff is a Popular Concept but an
Inefficient Policy at Best
• Spinoff has never been a
consistently effective approach to
enriching commercial technology
• At best it is a weak and expensive
substitute for more direct support
of the commercial technology base
– Alic, Branscomb, et al.
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Benefits of the SBIR & ATP Model for
Defense and Security
• Small Business can bring New Ideas and New
Products to address Security Needs
• SBIR provides a Proven Pathway for Small
Businesses to Help the Government Meet
Defense and Security Needs
• SBIR represents a Low-Cost, High-Leverage
Opportunity for National Policymakers to Meet
Multiple Goals at Constant Cost—No New Funds
• SBIR & ATP address the key Issues of Firm
Formation, Entrepreneurship, Employment, and
Growth and is therefore of Central Policy Interest
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Designing More Realistic Policies for
European Innovation
• To Lead in the Knowledge Economy
– Understand innovation ecosystem
• How can innovation in commercial and
defense sectors draw on & support each
other?
– Provide Incentives rather than Targets
selected by Consensus
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
A Modified European Innovation Strategy
• Create New Public Private Partnerships
– Involve Large & Small Firms
– Encourage National Experimentation
– Involve Universities in Innovation
• Focus on 3 Interrelated Elements:
– Platform Technologies:
• Respect Political Commitment
– Competitive Awards to Large & Small Firm
Joint Ventures [The Advanced Technology
Program (or ATP) Model]
– Competitive Awards to SMEs & Start-ups
(SBIR Type Program)
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Keeping Europe Secure
• Keeping Europe Secure requires,
– Economic growth to safeguard the Social
Compact
– New Technologies to provide Cheaper and
Better Social Services, Health Care,
Environmental Protection, and National
Defense
• Partnerships are one way to do this
• SBIR Breaks Through the Oligopoly Supply
Base for government agencies
– Provides new technologies and new solutions
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Common Challenges
• Learning from Each Other is a Key
to Better Innovation Policy
– Learning from failures (and
distortions) can be as valuable as
learning best practice
• Sorting Myths from Reality is a
First Step Towards More Growth
and More Security
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD
Thank You
Charles W. Wessner, Ph.D.
Director, Technology and Innovation
The National Academies
500 Fifth Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
cwessner@nas.edu
Tel: 202 334 3801
http://www.nationalacademies.org/step
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© Charles W. Wessner, PhD