Western democracy promotion:
a counter-narrative
Joel Lazarus
St Anthony’s College,
University of Oxford
Paper to be presented at the ‘Challenging Orthodoxies’ conference, Critical
Governance Studies Centre, University of Warwick, December 13-14th 2010
Introduction
The promotion of democracy worldwide is a declared foreign policy objective of
Western governments. ‘Democracy promotion’ also takes the form of aid
interventions funded by Western governments and multilateral organisations and
implemented by American and European non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
designed to build democratic political institutions within non-democratic political
systems and societies. In this paper, I consider the nature and effects and the future of
Western democracy promotion both as foreign policy and aid strategy.
In the first section of this paper, I critique both the stated objectives of and
justifications for Western democracy promotion as foreign policy and also challenge
the often implicit assumptions about democracy and democracy promotion that serve
to legitimate the concept and practice of democracy promotion. In the second section,
I consider what we know about the actual rather than the desired or idealised effects
of Western democracy promotion as aid strategy. I find strong evidence for both
potential and actual damaging consequences of democracy promotion aid. In the third
section, I argue that, because of a failure to deliver on what is promised and because
of a changing geo-political world order, the model of Western neo-liberal democracy
promotion and the states and organisations that endeavour to export it are suffering a
growing crisis of legitimacy. In the fourth and final section, I suggest that
prescriptions for reforming the way democracy is promoted are flawed and will not
redeem democracy promotion from its current crisis.
What is democracy promotion and why promote democracy?
With several detailed anatomies of the democracy promotion industry – the ‘who’ of
democracy promotion - already on offer (e.g. Carothers 1999, Burnell 2000), I focus
here on the objectives and justifications – the ‘what’ and ‘why’ - of democracy
promotion. I contrast democracy promoters’ own objectives and justifications with
my own understanding of reality.
Objectives: What are democracy promoters seeking to promote?
Unprincipled democracy promotion
European and American governments alike declare their commitment to the
promotion of ‘democracy’ throughout the world. The US State Department declares
that ‘[p]romoting freedom and democracy and protecting human rights around the
world are central to U.S. foreign policy’.1 Similarly, the European Union ‘believes
that democracy and human rights are universal values that should be vigorously
promoted around the world’.2 In reality, however, the promotion of democratic
principles and institutions is routinely sidelined and undermined by the prioritisation
of the commercial, geostrategic, and energy interests of both the United States, the
member states of the European Union, and the domestic and transnational capitalist
forces that greatly influence their foreign policies. Evidence of this ‘unprincipled
democracy promotion’ can be found on all continents.3
Little difference among democracy promoting nations
1
US State Department website (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/index.htm). Accessed July 15th 2010.
European Commission website (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm).
Accessed July 15th 2010.
3
For evidence of unprincipled democracy promotion in the post-communist world see Brown 2001;
Wedel 2001; Mendelson & Glenn 2002; Youngs 2006; Gahramanova 2009. For evidence from the
Arab world see Carothers 2004; Schmid & Braizat 2006; Olsen 1998; Ottaway 2008; Kausch 2008;
Choucair Vizoso 2008; Echagüe 2008. For evidence from Asia see Carothers 2004; Youngs 2008;
Nordhold 2004. For evidence from Latin America see Robinson 1996; Carothers 2004; Clement 2005.
For evidence from Africa see Olsen 1998; Chafer 2002; Crawford 2005; Khakee 2007; Carother 2004;
Youngs 2008. I intentionally exclude coverage of the democracy promotion policies of the US in Iraq
and Afghanistan under President George W Bush primarily because I wish to emphasise that what I
call unprincipled democracy promotion goes well beyond the extreme examples of the Bush
administration to characterise the actions of virtually all American and European governments.
2
Many commentators argue that a real and significant distinction must be made
between the American and European approaches to democracy promotion. Much has
been made of the European Union’s ability to use soft, normative power rather than
hard, military force to secure the changes it desires in neighbouring countries and
beyond (Manners 2002, Diez & Pace 2007, Kleinfeld & Nikolaidis 2009). In the wake
of American failure to bring democracy by invasion to Iraq and Afghanistan or by
electoral revolution to Georgia, Ukraine, and other post-communist states, the idea
and ideal of ‘normative power Europe’ is understandably attractive. A depletion of
American credibility as democracy promoter makes proponents of democracy
promotion look to the EU to lead on this issue. In response, the European Union
claims to have ‘developed an approach to democracy promotion based on patience, a
long-term perspective and sensitivity to the primary role of local actors’ (Youngs
2008: 1). Yet, in reality, in a recent volume of six country case studies, Youngs (2008:
1) concludes that ‘[m]ost European governments do not now have a strategy for
democracy promotion that is consistent, effective and based on a clear vision of the
relationship between democratisation and other political objectives’.
What is clear is that unprincipled promotion of democracy characterises the foreign
policies of the European Union and its member states as much as those of American
governments. Beyond this, what is equally clear is that the conflicting interests of
different member states in different global regions and their widely contrasting
commitments to the promotion of democracy makes the notion of a unified and
consistent EU foreign policy, as of now, an unattainable myth:
‘Far from the monolithic Brussels superstate of Eurosceptic nightmare, what we have
here is more like herding cats’ (Garton Ash 2008).
The idea of a uniform American democracy promotion strategy is equally misguided.
The inconsistent application of American democracy promotion policies is in no small
way the product of a permanent battle between individuals and groups within
Congress, the Senate, the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense.
In this battle, those representing the interests of American commerce and geo-strategy
invariably come out on top:
‘[E]very important institutional advance in the U.S. Government that strengthens the
democracy policy – the human rights reports and creation of DRL [Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor], the offices for religious freedom and
trafficking in persons, the funding for various country and functional programs – not
only emerged from Congress rather than the State Department, but was consistently
resisted by the Department’ (anonymous communication in Melia 2005:15).
In conclusion, the unprincipled promotion of democracy is consistent both among
geographic regions and among American and European governments. Indeed, even
the United Nations itself has faced major criticisms of its role in the unfree, unfair,
and violent presidential elections in Afghanistan in 2009 (Daily Telegraph 2009).
Promoting polyarchy, even authoritarianism, but not democracy
Depending on the disposition of incumbent and opposition elites towards Western
interests and the balance of power between them, Western actions are often directed
at sustaining authoritarian regimes or even bringing autocratic rulers to power. At
best, they are directed to installing a model of liberal democracy that equates to
orthodox political scientists’ top-down and institutionalist definitions of polyarchy
rather than to any bottom-up, structuralist understanding of democracy (Dahl 1971,
1989; Robinson 1996). Thus, a ‘democracy’ is defined by the presence of certain
(formal) institutions which ensure democratic politics.
Consensual hegemony?
By applying Gramscian theory to case studies of Western democracy promotion in
Latin America, Robinson (1996) has argued that democracy promotion constitutes an
attempt by transnational capitalist elites to avoid excessive coercion and instead
establish global consent to secure the hegemony of neo-liberal forms of economic and
political globalisation. This is what he and other critical thinkers identify as the real
objective of Western democracy promotion. We will consider this perspective later in
this paper. Suffice to conclude at this juncture that the foreign policies and diplomatic
actions are serving often to support authoritarian elites and even to undermine rather
than support genuinely pro-democratic forces in non-democratic societies around the
world.
Justifications: Why promote democracy?
The three founding myths of democracy promotion: principle, security, development
Democracy promotion as both foreign policy objective and aid strategy is justified by
its proponents on three main grounds: principle, security, and development. These are
encapsulated most succinctly in USAID’s (2005) ‘Democracy and Governance
Strategic Framework’. According to this Framework, the US government promotes
democracy first ‘as a matter of principle: people have the fundamental right to
participate in the decisions that affect their lives’ (USAID 2005: 5). Second, USAID
sees the promotion of democracy as ‘central to our national security’ because
‘countries that lack political freedom, accountability, and avenues for redress can also
breed internal instability and threaten regional and international security’ (ibid: 5).
Finally, the US promotes democracy because ‘democracy, good governance, and
development reinforce each other to create a virtuous circle’ (ibid: 5). Let us consider
these three justifications one by one.
Principle
With regard to the first of these justifications, principle, it is beyond the scope of this
concluding chapter to explore fully the ethics of Western interventions in the name of
democracy promotion. Suffice to say here that by labelling the current
implementation of democracy promotion as ‘unprincipled’, I am contrasting the
pristine and presently unattainable ideal of democracy promotion with its sullied
reality. Thus, I am concerned here not with justifications based on ideals but based
instead on a contemporary reality in which Western democracy promotion is an
unprincipled rather than a principled pursuit. Unprincipled democracy promotion may
be justified on other grounds, but surely not on ethical ones. This undermines the first
of the founding myths justifying and legitimating democracy promotion. The
protection of universal democratic principles would require a principled application of
this protection itself. This is currently unattainable.
Security
The security justification for democracy promotion is founded firmly on the longestablished ‘democratic peace’ theory which, in its simplest formulation, states that
democracies do not go to war with other democracies.4 Building democracies abroad
4
See, for example, Doyle 1986, Gleditsch 1992, Owen 1994, Halperin et al 2005
thus becomes a matter of self-interest: ‘the US must make democracy promotion a
priority because “liberty at home now depends on liberty abroad”’ (Traub 2008: 219).
The security argument is at the heart of official American and European justifications
for democracy promotion. President Bill Clinton asserted that ‘[u]ltimately, the best
strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance
of democracy elsewhere’.5 For President George W Bush, ‘expanding freedom’ was
‘more than a moral imperative. It is the only realistic way to protect our people’.6 In
Europe, both the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighbourhood
Policy have been designed as mechanisms to build liberal democratic institutions
beyond EU borders with security concerns in mind (Schmid & Braizat 2006; FerreroWaldner 2007).
There are many flaws in this simplistic version of the democratic peace thesis. First,
the power of the thesis depends very much on what definition of democracy one
adopts. Here, again, the problem is one of a conflation of ideal and reality. Whilst the
democratic peace thesis may prove somewhat robust with regard to mature
democracies with genuine elements of institutionalised representation, it falls apart
when applied to those ‘democracies with adjectives’ – fragile polyarchies,
competitive authoritarian regimes, and the like - for whom the term ‘democracy’ is far
too liberally applied (Collier & Levitsky 1997). Mansfield and Snyder (2005) have
shown how and why what they call ‘emerging democracies’ are more likely to go to
war across and within their own borders. Collier and Rohner (2007: 2-4) find that
polyarchy actually increases prospects of internal conflict in countries below a
threshold of $2,750 GDP per capita. Thus, while the establishment of a nominally
5
State of the Union Address 1994 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/states/docs/sou94.htm). Accessed August 4th 2010.
6
George W Bush’s speech to mark Human Rights Day 2008 (http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2008/December/20081210155356eaifas0.9769709.html). Accessed August 4th 2010.
pluralist party system and elections may seem to many to be putting a country on the
road to democracy, it could well be putting it on the road to internal conflict and even
violence.
This brings us to the issue of the nature of the conflicts we include. The democratic
peace thesis is more concerned with cross-border wars, but internal civil wars can be
equally devastating to a nation and the wider region. Hobsbawn (2007: 98) offers the
example of Colombia, a country with ‘an almost unique record of virtually continuous
constitutional representative democratic government’, yet one in which ‘the number
of people killed, maimed and driven from their homes…over the past half-century
runs into millions…’. The Colombian and other examples lead Hobsbawn (2007: 99)
to the conclusion that ‘the well being of countries does not depend on the presence or
absence of any single brand of institutional arrangement, however morally
commendable’.
Then there is the issue of the nature of the military threat that Western democracy
promoting nations now face. Rather than military invasion from other nations, the
threat is far more one of acts of terrorism committed by non-state actors. Citing
examples of long-lived terrorist groups in mature democracies such as the IRA in the
United Kingdom and ETA in Spain, Bermeo (2009a: 24) concludes that ‘there is little
evidence that democracy provides immunity from terrorism’. Furthermore, one must
not forget that the present threat of terrorism from Islamist groups comes from within
American and European societies as much as it does from Muslim nations (ibid: 25).
Carothers (2008a: 74) argues that ‘the notion that democratization around the world
will dry up the sources of radical Islamist terrorism rests on substantial doses of
wishful thinking’ and, offering the examples of China and Saudi Arabia, reminds us
that ‘[m]any autocracies have been more effective in preventing terrorism than many
democracies’.
Finally, while mature democracies may not attack other mature democracies, their
democratic political systems have not stopped them attacking other, non-democratic
nations. In reality, a ‘culture of democracy’ is not always ‘fundamentally a culture of
peace’ (Boutros Ghali in Diamond 1999: 5). Very often, of course, the deliverance of
peace and freedom is used to justify such invasions. ‘[American] presidents rarely fail
to trot out “democracy” as a justification for their actions abroad’ (Bueno de Mesquita
& Downs 2004). Yet, the actual track record is far less impressive than the rhetoric.
Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2004), for example, find that of the 35 post-War
military interventions undertaken by the United States in ‘developing countries’, in
only one case did a ‘full-fledged, stable democracy’ subsequently emerge within ten
years. The case in question was Colombia whose own political stability has been
questioned earlier in this section. Whatever the real justifications for invasion may be,
democratic nations are no less belligerent. Bermeo (2009a: 25) seems right to find
‘the functionalist message that democracy will bring peace’ both ‘unrealistic’,
‘blatantly self-serving’, and an unintended way to ‘legitimat[e] skepticism’ towards
American and European democracy promotion efforts.
Development
The relationship between particular forms of political and economic systems remains
a puzzle at the heart of social scientific research. In spite of this uncertainty, however,
the message propounded by Western aid donors is clear and unambiguous: that ‘all
good things go together’, that is political and economic freedoms complement and
sustain each other in a virtuous cycle of development and democratisation.
One does not even need to explore the literature on this theme to challenge this claim
of universal mutual complementarity. Empirically, in fact, the link between
authoritarian rule and rapid and sustained economic development seems far more
evident. Consider, for example, the phenomenon of the so-called ‘developmental
states’ of Latin America and particularly of East Asia.7 Within the literature on
developmental states lies an emphasis on the importance of the autonomy, albeit
‘embedded’ within key industrial sectors (Evans 1995), of state leaders, allowing
them to make big decisions quickly. This is not to say that democracy is always
necessarily incompatible with rapid, sustained development, but that it seems less
compatible than with more authoritarian or at least more centralised forms of
governance.
One final point on the issue of development is to highlight that the model promoted
by aid donors of the restrained, ‘nightwatchman’ state regulating a free-market,
private sector-driven process of economic development also conflicts with the
historical evidence of the state’s role in the successful development of today’s
Western First World nations and the more protectionist industrial and economic
strategies they employed (Chang 2002, 2008).
Once more, then, the final fundamental justification for Western democracy
promotion weakens when the logic behind it is interrogated.
Assumptions about democracy and democracy promotion
Behind the moral, strategic, or economic justifications for democracy promotion lie
often implicit assumptions about democracy and democracy promotion that also serve
to justify democracy promotion as foreign policy objective and aid strategy. The
7
See, for example, Johnson 1982, Amsden 1989, Leftwich 1995, Evans 1995, Aoki et al 1997, WooCumings ed 1999.
primary assumptions in question here are: that democracy is a universally applicable
political system, that citizens of the ‘developing world’ want democracy and want the
West to intervene in their societies to promote it, and that citizens in Western societies
want their governments to promote democracy abroad.
Assumptions of democracy as universally applicable political system
A detailed discussion of the nature of democratisation is beyond the scope of this
paper. Suffice to say here that the whole logic of Western democracy promotion is
necessarily founded on an assumption that all non-democratic political systems can
become democratic which necessarily rejects structuralist or culturalist arguments
about the socio-economic or political cultural pre-requisites for democratic politics
posited by many political scientists and sociologists.
Assumptions of universal demand
Beyond assumptions about the universal applicability of democracy lie assumptions
about a universal demand for it. The first problem with this assumption is a
methodological one. Surveys such as the Afrobarometer, Eurobarometer, and
Latinobarometer may reveal consistently high levels of popular demand for
democracy, but individual definitions of what democracy actually means vary greatly
and are highly subjective. In fact, there is strong evidence to show that people in all
societies (where their material needs are not secure) prioritise economic security and
prosperity over increased personal liberty (Inglehart 1997). Achard and Gonzalez
(2005: 16) find that, whilst ‘[d]emocracy is now the ideal and the goal of most Central
Americans’, ‘they are increasingly dissatisfied with the way it actually functions’ and
‘whilst defending democracy as an ideal, the majority says that it would support an
undemocratic regime that could solve their economic problems’. In eight post-Soviet
societies, Haerpfer (2008: 415) finds that it is the ‘structure and performance of the
macro-economy’ that constitutes ‘the most important single influence upon support
for the current political regime’. In Eastern Europe too, ‘popular trust in democratic
institutions strongly correlates with the quality of life, as indicated by the Consumer
Price Index, inflation, index of income inequality, and the social security index’
(Krupavicius 2007: 134). In Russia, Whitefield (2005: 140) finds that ‘democratic
norms play no role in shaping Russian state identification while economic norms
dominate’. In her global level study, echoing Haggard and Kaufman’s (1995: 7) thesis
that good economic times generate support for regimes of all stripes, Doorenspleet
(2004: 313) finds a highly statistically significant correlation between regime
legitimacy and economic performance.
Diamond (1999: 192-3) argues that ‘[t]he growing evidence from many countries and
regions suggests that, in forming beliefs about regime legitimacy, citizens weigh
independently – and much more heavily – the political performance of the system, in
particular, the degree to which it delivers on its promise of freedom and democracy’. I
disagree with this submission. I side instead with Sardamov (2007: 407):
‘[t]he underlying notion that human beings all over the world can be chiefly
motivated by a desire for personal liberty seems a truly noble ideal. Like many other
noble ideals, though, it is hardly realistic’.
Thus, the assumption underpinning justifications for Western democracy promotion
of the universal demand for democracy, though ‘noble’, is flawed and instead reflects
‘a sort of wishful thinking entailing dangerous and counterproductive policies’ (ibid:
407).
The assumption of society’s demand for democracy serves to validate actor-oriented
institutionalist theories of democratisation and policies of democracy promotion in the
same way that assumptions of economic demand encapsulated in Say’s law validate
neo-classical economic theory. Thus, Dahl (1971: 26) contends that ‘the greater the
opportunities for expressing, organizing, and representing political preferences, the
greater the number and variety of preferences and interests that are likely to be
represented in policy making’. The assumption here is that, once liberated, civil
society will do all the jobs prescribed for it by liberal theorists. This assumption is
both apolitical and acultural in the sense that it ignores both the structural power
relations and the cultural factors that inhibit and limit the mobilisation and
organisation of oppressed social groups and keeps them politically impotent and
marginalised.
Finally, it is essential to disaggregate demand for democracy per se from any specific
demand for democracy promotion. Whilst donors may be keen to assume that demand
for democracy means demand for their services, this does not necessarily follow.
Indeed, though the welcome for American democracy promotion organisations may
be slightly warmer since Barack Obama replaced George W Bush in the White
House, in many parts of the world, American efforts to promote democracy are
widely met with a deep sense of cynicism and mistrust.
In short, there are good reasons to challenge the assumptions that democracy
promotion’s proponents make about universal demand both for democracy and
democracy promotion.
Assumptions of Western citizens’ demand for democracy promotion
One might be forgiven for assuming from the way in which Western leaders use the
emotive power of democracy in their discursive legitimation of their own foreign
policies that demand for democracy promotion among their own citizens is high. Yet,
Tures (2007: 560) finds that ‘Americans rarely express passionate views on the
subject’ and ‘only a minority express strong preferences for democracy promotion, or
list it as a top priority’. Instead, like their counterparts in non-democratic societies,
Americans ‘give greater preference to elements such as peace, national security, job
security, and a reliable source of energy’. Indeed, whilst 85 percent see protecting
American jobs as a foreign policy priority, Tures (2007: 565) found that only 22
percent saw democracy promotion in a similar light.
Tures’ findings lead him to identify what he calls the ‘democracy promotion gap’ – a
tension between the democratic rhetoric that American citizens seem to like and a
general unwillingness to prioritise and pay for the global promotion of democracy
(Tures 2007: 561). In addition, in the wake of the experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Tures finds that ‘Americans are becoming more skeptical of pushing
freedom upon other countries’ (ibid: 564). Tures’ research strongly suggests that,
though citizens in Western societies may like the idea of spreading peace and liberty
across the globe, in reality, for most charity begins at home . Domestic demand for
democracy promotion interventions cannot be assumed.
Polyarchic objectives and flawed justifications
What are the foreign policy objectives of democracy promotion? Clearly, the
objectives declared by Western policymakers are unrealistic and even deceptive.
Instead, at best, Western governments and organisations are aiming to promote the
growth of institutional polyarchy rather than any popular form of democracy and, at
worst, their unprincipled application of democracy promotion even serves to sustain
and strengthen authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, when scrutinised, the logic behind
the three main justifications for Western democracy promotion of principle, security,
and development and also the assumptions about both international and domestic
demand for such interventions proves highly flawed.
In the next section, I explore the reality of democracy promotion further by assessing
what we know about the actual nature and effects of Western democracy promotion as
aid strategy.
Democracy promotion: known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns
Following in the venerated footsteps of former US Defence Secretary and
existentialist poet Donald Rumsfeld, I consider in this section the ‘known knowns’,
‘the known unknowns’, and the ‘unknown unknowns’ of Western democracy
promotion in an attempt to offer some evaluation of democracy promotion’s merits
and perils as a form of aid intervention (Seely 2003).
The ‘known knowns’ of democracy promotion
What do we know that we know about the nature and effects of democracy promotion
aid interventions aimed at building the organisations and institutions of polyarchy in
targeted societies? In other words, what can we say with certainty, or at least
confidence, about democracy promotion as aid strategy?
‘Political’ democracy promotion
We know that American democracy promotion is largely underpinned by the strategy
of what Carothers (2009) calls ‘political democracy promotion’ which espouses a
Mannichaean understanding of democratisation as a domestic elite struggle, pitting
‘democrats’ against ‘autocrats’. This conceptualisation makes the mission of
democracy promoters clear and simple: assist the democrats and resist the autocrats or
at least try to convince them of the errors of their ways and the benefits of
‘democratic’ institutional reforms.
We also know the flaws in this strategy: that self-declared ‘democrats’ in opposition
may not turn out to rule so democratically once in power; that external interventions
can frustrate and anger those excluded from support and can thereby exacerbate
domestic political conflict; and that those supported can and do use foreign financial,
material, technical, and discursive support for their own particular political ends
(Carothers 2009; Burnell 2000; Spence 2008). We also know that this political
democracy promotion leads governments and other agencies to label new regimes as
‘democratic’ far too quickly and to switch the focus of their assistance from nongovernment sectors to direct governmental support (USAID 2005: 12; Melia 2005;
Carothers 2009).
The methods and techniques of democracy promotion
Democracy promotion aid projects have three main targets for reform within nondemocratic societies: state institutions, political parties and legislatures, and ‘civil
society’. We know that the methods and techniques of democracy promotion in all
three areas are dominated by the provision of technical training and ‘expert’ advice
(Carothers 1999; Burnell 2000; de Zeeuw 2004). For example, with regard to ‘party
aid’ – aid projects aimed at building democratic political parties - Carothers (2006a:
120) identifies a ‘standard method’ characterised by programmes delivered according
to ‘preset, standardized designs not well-adapted to their particular context and
mechanistic methods of implementation’. Such programmes are largely universallyapplied ‘cookie-cutter’ approaches to what Carothers calls ‘institutional modeling’,
consisting predominantly of ‘ritualized methods of training’ such as workshops and
seminars.
We also know that the evidence that exists clearly shows that Western democracy
promotion projects have not succeeded in achieving any significant pro-democratic
outcomes in a single targeted society (e.g. Carothers 1999, 2004, 2006a; Burnell
2000, 2006; Kumar 2004; de Zeeuw 2004). The greatest achievements they point to
are successes in the increased technical efficiency and professionalisation of ‘civil
society’ (read the NGO sector), of state institutions, and of political parties (Burnell
2006; Carothers 2006; Kumar & de Zeeuw 2008).
Aid to state institutions
Democracy promotion aid focused on the reform of state institutions is supposedly
aimed at democratising processes of decision-making within government structures.
Carothers (2009: 14) lauds a ‘developmental’ approach to promoting democratic state
institutions that:
‘favors democracy aid that pursues incremental, long-term change in a wide range of
political and socioeconomic sectors, frequently emphasizing governance and the
building of a well-functioning state.’
He contrasts this with ‘political’ democracy promotion which, by espousing a more
agentic and short-termist conceptualisation of democratisation, promotes individuals
over institutions, thereby often exacerbating domestic political conflict. Yet, even
‘developmental’ democracy promoters working to ‘democratise’ governance
processes tend to support centralised and vertical power structures. To achieve their
targets, democracy promotion technocrats must secure as much of their reform agenda
as possible within the brief life of their specific project. Thus, they need to cultivate
close personal relationships with high-ranking individuals with the power to effect the
changes they seek. In Georgia, for example, the success of a USAID-sponsored
project required the identification of ‘potentially positive collaborators/supporters
within the decision-making body of the Government’ (DAI 2006: 13). Ironically,
technocratic reforms supposedly designed to depersonalise bureaucratic institutions
were themselves dependent on getting ‘the right Georgian’ in the right position of
authority (ibid: 14).
To succeed, democracy promoters need to operate within the order and predictability
of highly centralised governmental structures and cannot accommodate the lengthy
deliberation that comes with more horizontal, democratic practices. Thus, such a
technocratic approach to democracy promotion has also served to promote individuals
over institutions, thereby helping to centralise power in state institutions rather than
making decision-making processes more participatory and decentralised.
Political party aid
Carothers (2006a: 164) finds that ‘even some of [party aid’s] largest, most
concentrated undertakings have failed to produce many lasting positive results’ and
that party aid projects around the world have had ‘modest positive outcomes’ at best.
Carothers lists these modest positive outcomes as ‘better campaigning’ - the use of
increasingly sophisticated election campaign techniques by political parties in
targeted countries and in the general trend towards the ‘professionalization of election
campaigning’ (ibid: 185); ‘small steps on organizational development’; and ‘emergent
norms of party organization’. Yet, with regard to organisational development,
Carothers (2006a: 187) himself concedes that ‘it is hard to identify cases of parties
that as a result of externally funded assistance have made fundamental organizational
changes that have solved the core characteristics that drew party aid providers in to
work with them, such as establishing top-down, leader-centric organizational
structures or reducing significant corruption’. Similarly, with regard to the supposed
institutionalisation of democratic norms of party organisation Carothers (2006a: 189)
concludes that such international norms seem limited to the realm of rhetoric and, in
reality, remain ‘quite toothless and easy to ignore’. Thus, party aid’s one and only
significant contribution has been in the professionalisation of party politics. Yet, this
professionalisation has anti-democratic rather than pro-democratic effects since a
greater role for money in politics tends to favour incumbents in authoritarian regimes
with greater access to state and other resources. A professionalisation of and greater
political focus on election campaigning also means greater use of communications
technologies that allow party leaders to get their messages out to potential voters
without the need of nationwide networks of activists that link the party to society
(Burnell 2006). Thus, the professionalisation of politics is often shorthand for the
greater centralisation rather than democratisation of political party structures and
power.
Civil society aid
Almost two decades of Western development and democracy promotion aid designed
at building liberal civil societies able to advocate for their interests and hold their
governments to account have not only failed in these objectives, but have created
NGO sectors that are the antithesis of the liberal vision for civil society.8 Rather than
being autonomous, self-sufficient organisations based on voluntarism, they are
organisations dependent on continued Western funding run invariably by professional
English-speaking, well-educated, urban-based elites. Those elements of associational
life in many countries that have foundations considered ‘uncivil’ by Western donors,
such as ethnically-based or religiously-oriented organisations have been, until
recently at least, systematically excluded from receiving Western assistance.
The artificial nature of the creation and funding of NGOs makes such organisations
detached from and often maligned by rather than representative of and embedded
within their societies. The often intense competition for Western funds between
NGOs inhibits rather than promotes the tolerance and co-operation necessary for
political organisation and for a more democratic political culture. It has also led to the
growth of certain large NGOs favoured by donors to the detriment of more genuinely
grassroots organisations (Stewart 2009; Uhlin 2009).
Other ‘known knowns’ about democracy promotion
Other known knowns about the nature and effects of democracy promotion projects
include the phenomenon of reverse causality, the paradox at the heart of democracy
promotion aid interventions, and the institutionalisation of the democracy promotion
industry.
Reverse causality
By ‘reverse causality’, I refer to the fact that, rather than transforming the political
culture or the power relations in a targeted society, the institutions established by
8
See, for example, Carothers 1999; Baker 2001; Hearn 2001; Mendelson & Glenn 2002; Nordhold
2004; Gould 2005; Uhlin 2009.
Western democracy promoters become reflective of the current political reality. Thus,
for example, in Georgia, efforts by a Western NGO to establish fora to cultivate interparty dialogue only led to these fora becoming reflective of the personal conflict that
characterises inter-party relations in the country. Consequently, we can submit with
some confidence that, however well intentioned, external interventions aimed at
creating alternative institutions for dialogue, negotiation, and participation are
unlikely to succeed unless all sides, all parties are totally committed to the process.
The classic aid paradox
This final point leads me onto another ‘known known’. If all sides of a political
dispute are willing to engage constructively in dialogue, this, by definition, negates
the need for external projects aimed at building institutions for facilitating dialogue.
Hence, the classic paradox of foreign aid – if it can work in a country it is not needed
and if it is needed it cannot work. There may well be an arbitrating role for external
agents in such processes of dialogue, but these should be undertaken subject to
invitation rather than on the grounds of an assumption of the need and appropriateness
of such interventions.
The classic aid paradox extends into all realms of democracy promotion institutionbuilding. Democracy promotion can only facilitate the development of more
democratic forms of civil society, political parties, or state bodies if there is genuine
and broad commitment within society, parties, and state bodies to democratisation.
Yet, where such commitment exists, democratisation will come without external
assistance. Where it is absent, democracy promotion interventions seem unable to
build either democratic political institutions or consensus for reform.
Institutionalisation of the aid system
Another ‘known known’ is that the aid industry – the organisations comprising the
international development and democracy promotion apparatus – has become a
permanent and institutionalised part of the political and economic landscape in many
aid-dependent countries (Gould 2005; Whitfield 2006, 2009). This is a real concern
for many primarily because its presence and its resources orient its beneficiaries – be
they government ministers, civil servants, or NGO workers – upwards and outwards
rather than inwards and downwards. Accountability is to donors rather than to
citizens.
Aid as a source of power and patronage supports the creation, development, and
maintenance of dominant-party systems. When perceived ‘democrats’ are in power, it
helps the ruling party to build its capacity to dominate. When perceived autocrats are
in power, it works to destabilise the regime and bring perceived democrats to power.
In this way, it prompts all parties to first seek succour internationally rather than
domestically.
Aid as a source of financial support and dependence in society draws talented and
politically engaged people away from both the public sector and party politics.
Burnell (2006: 203) has argued that ‘endeavours that prompt parties to look upwards
and outwards should not mean neglect of renewed efforts to encourage parties to look
inwards and downwards, too’. Yet, as long as access to the state means access to
foreign resources vital to satisfying personal and political success or, in short, as long
as Western and other governments give financial aid, politicians will always suffer
from strained necks rather than stooped shoulders.
The known knowns of democracy promotion
With regard to the known knowns of democracy promotion, we know that nowhere
have democracy promotion interventions secured significant democratic successes in
targeted societies and we can state with confidence that its contribution to the
professionalisation of both civil societies and political parties have had more antidemocratic than pro-democratic outcomes. We can also say that, rather than having
their desired transformative effects, the institutions established by democracy
promoters often become reflective of current power relations in a political system.
Finally, we are becoming increasingly aware of the permanent institutionalisation of
the aid apparatus, including the democracy promotion industry, within aid-receiving
societies and the damaging economic and political effects of this development.
The ‘known unknowns’ of democracy promotion
By ‘known unknowns’, I refer to issues and effects generated by democracy
promotion about which, as Rumsfeld himself would put it, we know that we do not
know. As social scientists investigating complex social phenomena populated by
path-dependent organisations and institutions, we are always grappling with the
unknown and unknowable, particularly when we are trying to understand effects on
political systems and societies that may not become manifest for years or longer.
Thus, Burnell (2008: 422) remind us that ‘[j]udgements about democracy assistance’s
impact that try to take in unintended and future consequences are bound to be more
speculative than commenting on a project’s more narrowly defined objectives or
expenditures alone. And yet impact is what matters most in the long run.’
Burnell, Carothers, and others have identified several potential and probable
detrimental effects of the various forms of democracy promotion interventions on
targeted political systems and societies. Let us here consider two specific and very
important issues for democracy promotion on which the jury is out.
Democratic socialisation
Common in the literature written by democracy promoters and advocates of
democracy promotion are claims about benefits of their interventions that are less
tangible, but potentially greatly significant. One prime example of this is the claim of
the effect of ‘democratic socialisation’: that, by exposing political elites and ordinary
citizens alike to democracy promotion projects, these projects inculcate liberal
democratic norms and values within the psyche of participants, leading to prodemocratic changes in their behaviour. Ironically, this claim is also made by certain
critics of democracy promotion and development aid: that such interventions are a
‘technology of social control’ designed to co-opt elites and to establish consensus
around liberal forms of political and economic globalisation (Fraser 2005).
This claim is of crucial importance because, as Carothers (1999: 90) points out, the
‘institutional modelling’ approach that defines practical democracy promotion and the
training method that dominates it, are ‘founded on the idea that individuals in key
institutions can and should be taught to shape their actions and their institutions in
line with the appropriate models’.
In contrast to the promises of democracy promotion’s transformational socialising
power, Carothers’ (2006a: 189) offers pessimistic anecdotal observations about the
gulf between the words and actions of targeted political elites. Rather than
experiencing a more profound change in their political cultural disposition, it seems
that politicians participating in democracy promotion projects merely become well
versed in the discourse of ‘democracy’ as promoted by the West.
A recent survey-based study of politician participants in democracy promotion
projects in Morocco reinforces this skepticism about the ability of democracy
promotion to socialise political elites into liberal democratic values. Freyburg and
Richter (2010) find a positive significant correlation between participation in
democracy promotion projects and increased democratic values only in individuals
who have previously lived in other democratic societies.
Instead of the socialisation of political elites as promised by advocates of democracy
promotion, what democracy promotion seems to play a part in is the international
institutionalisation of the democratic rhetoric rather than the practices of political
elites. And it is ultimately actions that speak louder than words.
‘Aid interactions’: macro undermines micro
Bermeo (2009a) has recently highlighted another ‘known unknown’ for us, that which
she calls the effects of ‘aid interactions’. Both in everyday discussion and in academic
writings, we all too often refer to the many forms and mechanisms that comprise
‘foreign aid’ as one amalgamated whole. Yet, as Bermeo emphasises with regard to
the damaging effect that Western military support to a regime has on democracy
promotion efforts, different forms of Western aid can have different effects and,
moreover, the interactions between these different forms may well also have
differing, unintended, and detrimental effects. I would like to highlight one further,
damaging form of aid interaction.
Though it may be conceptually helpful, even logical to analyse the effects of
institution-building project interventions separately from the effects of foreign policy
and diplomacy when studying Western democracy promotion, in reality, this is a false
and misleading separation. What happens on a macro, foreign policy level directly
affects the efforts of democracy promoters on the ground working with governments,
political parties, and NGOs. Thus, the unprincipled and inconsistent application of
democracy promotion has direct and detrimental consequences for the endeavours of
democracy promoters working on the ground with civil society organisations or
political parties. In Georgia, for example, I found that it had the effect of undermining
faith both in the functional and normative power of the Western model of
‘democracy’.
Thus, we know that what happens at the macro level can greatly effect interventions
at the micro level. What exactly these effects may be we can say with far less
certainty. Hence, the issue of aid interactions is one of democracy promotion’s
‘known unknowns’.
The ‘unknown unknowns’ of democracy promotion
Unintended consequences are, by definition, unforeseen and often unforeseeable. We
can, therefore, speak of the existence of ‘unknown unknowns’ with relation to
democracy promotion and, by extension, all Western aid interventions. Such unknown
unknowns may have long-lasting effects on the political development of targeted
societies. Indeed, when we see evidence of the institutionalisation of the aid industry
in aid-dependent societies today and the retarding effects that this process may be
having on the development of these societies, we might identify this as a previously
‘unknown unknown’ in the sense that it seems highly unlikely that the original
architects of the aid system foresaw such consequences or anything approaching
them. Since unknown unknowns are, by definition, not presently known to us, we can
do no more than to speculate on their existence and perhaps try to trace back current
‘known knowns’ and ‘known unknowns’ to a time when they themselves were
unknown unknowns to prove the evolution of our knowledge in this field.
Known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns in democracy
promotion
When we reflect systematically on our knowledge about the effects of democracy
promotion interventions, we are not left feeling confident about the power of
democracy promotion either to do good in targeted societies or, at the very least, to do
no harm. Instead, we find evidence for the impotence and even damaging potential of
Western democracy promotion projects and we find reasons to be concerned about the
potential medium- and long-term political consequences of such interventions and
policies for targeted societies.
The state of democracy promotion today: a crisis of legitimacy
‘Systemic failures of democratic regimes to operate effectively could undermine their
legitimacy…[S]ustained inability to provide welfare, prosperity, equity, justice,
domestic order, or external security could over time undermine the legitimacy even of
democratic governments’ (Huntington 1996: 10).
Just as he linked ‘waves’ of democratisation with authoritarian regimes’ ‘inability to
maintain “performance legitimacy” due to economic…failure’ (Huntington 1996: 4),
Huntington predicts the possible collapse of democratic (read polyarchic) regimes on
the same grounds. By extension, this same existential threat applies to the Western
policy and practice of democracy promotion. To be able to continue, democracy
promotion ultimately requires some continued political legitimacy. In contrast, in the
following sections, I show how democracy promotion is facing a crisis of legitimacy.
I first show that poor performance has damaged the legitimacy of democracy
promotion worldwide. I then argue that this current ‘crisis of legitimacy’ is already
having tangible repercussions.
The damaged legitimacy of democracy promotion
‘Democracy’ as ‘debased currency’
‘…in the days of what used to be called ‘real existing socialism’ even the most
implausible regimes laid claim to it in their official titles, such as North Korea, Pol
Pot’s Cambodia, and Yemen. Today, of course, it is impossible, outside some Islamic
theocracies and Asian hereditary kingdoms and sheikhdoms, to find any regime that
does not pay official tribute, in constitution and editorial, to competitively elected
assemblies or presidents… This is why rational public discussion of democracy is
both necessary and unusually difficult’ (Hobsbawn 2007: 95)
As representatives of the very system they seek to promote, it is arguably Western
governments and international organisations that have inflicted more damage on the
‘D’ word than the likes of North Korea. Whilst all are aware that North Korea is not a
democracy, most expect Western governments to show far greater commitment and
consistency to the democratic cause. One main way in which Western governments
have damaged the international standing of ‘democracy’ is by ascribing the status of
‘democracy’ to far too many countries unworthy of the title. Almost 100 countries
were included by ‘exultant democracy promoters’ as part of democracy’s ‘Third
Wave’ in the 1990s, yet, according to Carothers (2004: 46), only ‘a small number
have succeeded in consolidating democracy’.
‘Regimes in Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Peru, Russia, Ukraine, and
Zambia were routinely labeled democracies during the 1990s (20). Even extreme
cases such as Belarus, Cambodia, Haiti, and Russia under Putin occasionally earned
a democratic label’ (Levitsky & Way 2010: 14).
As a consequence, ‘[f]or some time, the word democracy has been circulating as a
debased currency in the political marketplace’ (Schmitter & Karl 1996: 49). The
description is an apt one. When a central bank prints too much money, its currency
devalues and the bank loses legitimacy and credibility as an organisation. By being
applied too widely and too loosely, the word ‘democracy’ has lost a significant
amount of its symbolic power and those governments and organisations misusing the
word have also lost credibility and legitimacy.
‘Gun-barrel democracy promotion’
The abuse of the word in the context of the US strategies in both Iraq and Afghanistan
has, no doubt, further devalued ‘democracy’ as global currency. So well documented
is the ‘Iraq effect’ on the status of democracy promotion that I will not dwell on the
case for long here.9 Carothers (2008b: 132) laments the fact that the association with a
war that is ‘almost universally reviled, rejected and regretted around the world’ has
been ‘devastating to the legitimacy of the concept of democracy promotion. He also
regrets President Bush’s association of democracy promotion with regime change, his
‘reattachment of security interests with the democracy concept’, and the reality of the
‘War on Terror’ of closer co-operation between Western democratic governments and
9
For more on the effects of the American invasion of Iraq on democracy promotion, see Diamond
2005; Traub 2007; Carothers 2008.
Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes. Carothers, Traub (2007), and Bermeo (2009b)
all rightly recognise also the damage that American international legal and
humanitarian abuses abroad have inflicted on the legitimacy of democracy promotion
and the credibility of the United States as global promoter of democracy.
‘If, as Steven Fish argues, the success of democracy promotion depends on a people’s
“disposition toward the democratizers,” the efforts of U.S. democracy promoters have
been seriously compromised by these well documented deviations from the
democratic ideal’ (Bermeo 2009b: 14).
The vociferous and sustained condemnation of so-called ‘gun-barrel democracy
promotion’ and the swift moves by President Barack Obama to disassociate his new
administration from the greatest excesses of this policy may allow for some limited
rehabilitation, yet the damage done to the legitimacy of both democracy promotion
and the United States is undoubtedly great.
The socioeconomic foundations of legitimacy
‘The official truth, propagated by the dominant elite, usually has a great deal of
influence. But the firsthand life experience of ordinary people also counts – and
ultimately may have even greater credibility than the official truth’ (Inglehart 1997:
27).
Inglehart’s conclusion can be expressed in five short words: ‘Actions speak louder
than words’. Earlier in this concluding chapter, I offered evidence to show that, just as
Huntington posits here, individuals in societies in all countries and regions of the
world prioritise their material security and prosperity over greater individual political
freedoms. The ‘performance’ required for political legitimacy is, above all, economic
in nature. Yet, the consequences of neo-liberal globalisation have been a major
increase in inequalities in income and opportunity in all parts of the world open to its
effects. Since the birth of the development industry after the Second World War, the
only nations to have achieved long-term, sustainable, and socially transformational
economic development grounded in processes of industrialisation have been those
that have eschewed the support and policy prescriptions of Western aid donors. The
‘underdeveloped world’ remains underdeveloped and the majority of its citizens
remain poor. Citizens of even stable polyarchies are growing increasingly frustrated
by the worsening economic situations they face, situations greatly exacerbated by the
global financial crisis. In short, as Huntington predicted, ‘democracy’, or neo-liberal
capitalist polyarchy to be more precise, is facing a growing crisis of ‘performance
legitimacy’. By extension, democracy promotion too is ‘experiencing serious
questions about its very legitimacy’ (Carothers 2007: 114).
The backlash against democracy promotion
The consequence of democracy promotion’s ‘crisis of legitimacy’ has been to arouse
what has been called a ‘backlash’ or, more emotively, an ‘assault’ against the policies
and practices of democracy promotion and the governments and organisations behind
them (Carothers 2006b; Gerschman & Allen 2006). This backlash has been carried
out by authoritarian governments wise to the interventionist strategies of democracy
promoters, but is also evident in the growth of nationalist populism in Central and
Eastern Europe and socialist populism and social(ist) democracy in Latin America in
societies that have grown tired of and cynical towards Western promises of
development and democracy. This ‘social backlash’, I argue, constitutes a rejection of
neo-liberal capitalist polyarchy made manifest in accordance with local political
structural and cultural tendencies. Here, I explore these state-directed and societal
manifestations of the backlash.
The backlash by authoritarian governments
‘Like European monarchs after 1848, post-Soviet strongmen are now concerned
about the transnational spread of revolution to their fiefdoms’ (Beissinger 2006).
As Beissinger here reflects, a backlash against democracy promotion has been
implemented by authoritarian governments in response to the spate of Westernbacked ‘coloured revolutions’ that took place in former communist states from the
late 1990s to mid-2000s. Chief architect of the ‘political technologies’ behind this
‘strategy of pre-emption’ has been the Kremlin (Silitski in Saari 2009: 743; Ambrosio
2009; Kechaqmadze 2007). The strategy has both a domestic and international
dimension.
Domestically, many authoritarian governments have used their control over formal
institutions to repress and punish Western democracy promotion organisations and
their local partners. Some have passed often draconian new laws regulating
international and local NGOs, making it virtually impossible for unwelcome foreign
organisations to function or even to stay by outlawing foreign funding or making
excessive financial or administrative demands on organisations. Some have banned
international election observers or have made it impossible or very difficult for them
to conduct their missions freely. Though Russia is the prime example here, other postSoviet states, particularly Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, have all
adopted such strategies (Kechaqmadze 2007; Ambrosio 2009). Beyond the postSoviet region, other Asian, African and Latin American governments have adopted
similar strategies. Countries including Ethiopia, Egypt, Nepal, Bahrain, and
Venezuela have all told some democracy promotion organisations to leave or
temporarily halt their activities (Carothers 2008: 133; Sharp 2006: 22).
Internationally, Russia has led a ‘counter-democracy promotion strategy’ that
‘simultaneously questions European democratic standards and norms as well as
European institutions and procedures set up for protecting those standards and
monitoring their practical implementation’ (Saari 2009: 745). Central here is the tactic
of highlighting the double standards of Western democracy promoting states.
A major focus for the Kremlin has been on opposing the current election monitoring
mechanisms of the OSCE and Council of Europe. In October 2007, Russia established
the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, opening offices in Paris and New York,
in order to ‘intensify debate of the general public, NGOs and experts about the ways
of organizing the electoral process, electoral monitoring, to discuss the situation with
national minorities and migrants, rights of children and youth, and freedom of speech
[sic] (Lavrov in Saari 2009: 745). Thus, both at a practical level within specific
regimes and on a normative international level, democracy promoting states and nonstate organisations and the model they pedal are being confronted and challenged by
resilient and revitalised authoritarian regimes.
The backlash by societies
‘The liberal era that began in Central Europe in 1989 has come to an end. Populism
and illiberalism are tearing the region apart…The new hard reality in Central Europe
is political polarization, a rejection of consensual politics, and the rise of populism’
(Krastev 2007: 57).
At the heart of the ‘crisis of democracy’ that Krastev (2007: 62) identifies in Central
and Eastern Europe lies ‘the clash between the liberal rationalism embodied by EU
institutions and the populist revolt against the unaccountability of the elites’. This
‘clash’ equates to the ‘tension’ I describe that is generated in the interaction between
the unprincipled promotion of democracy worldwide and the promotion and
implementation of inequality-generating neo-liberal economic and political reform.
The clash is also a consequence of the technocratic good governance agenda
promoted by Western states and development aid and democracy promotion
organisations that seeks to eradicate petty, systemic forms of corruption, but does
little to inhibit and even facilitates, through privatisation and liberalisation reforms,
elite forms of corruption.
In Central and Eastern Europe, ‘large groups of citizens have chosen to refrain from
participation in newly established democratic institutions’ and ‘the remaining active
electorate has become radicalized’ (Greskovits 2007: 45). Seleny (2007: 156) points
to ‘the persistence across the postcommunist space of xenophobic, ethnocratic,
authoritarian, and often violent subcultures and movements’. Greskovitz (2007: 40)
highlights survey data that reveals ‘strong dissatisfaction with democracy’.
The clash that Krastev refers to in fact pits liberalism against democracy. The political
elites that have benefitted from liberalisation defend their privileged economic and
political status. The EU accession process that facilitated polyarchic stability also
sowed the seeds of future instability by demanding ‘macroeconomic convergence’
around economic liberalism (ibid: 41). Closing down the space for economic policy
debate means severely limiting the space for political debate per se. Instead, popular
frustrations at the costs of neo-liberal reforms are made manifest in more dangerous
and destabilising nationalist and xenophobic forms.
In Latin America, the rejection of the US model of neo-liberal capitalist polyarchy by
both social movements and governments throughout the continent has been more
emphatic and has taken more progressive forms. Social democratic or socialist
governments now dominate the continent’s political landscape and moves to create
regional organisations such as Mercosur, UNASUR (Union of South American
Nations), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) that bypass the
United States and the free trade agreements it pushes are developing.
The end of the unipolar world and the rise of rival models
‘One sees a return in some places to the notion that development requires a strong,
i.e. non-democratic hand, which puts off democratisation until some indefinite future,
and focuses on economic development and perhaps a little rule of law development’
(Carothers 2008a: 130).
The backlash against democracy promotion is exacerbated by one other hugely
significant factor. The world order has changed decisively and irreversibly since the
end of the Cold War. The period of American hegemony is over. The rise of China in
particular allows it to project an alternative model of economic and political
development outwards to many societies wishing to emulate their success. Beyond
projection, China is particularly busy offering financial and material support and
assistance to peripheral countries in every continent. In contrast to the conditionalitydriven model of Western aid, China makes no domestic political demands in return
for its assistance. Thus, the Chinese model is far more appealing, of course, to
authoritarian ruling elites. Yet, Carothers (2008a: 131) also recognises that, ‘in many
places, citizens frustrated with the democratic experiments they have lived through
are going along with this new trend’. The inability of the neo-liberal model of
development and democracy to deliver tangible economic benefits for the majority of
citizens in targeted societies has begun to trigger a backlash against it just at a time
when the global hegemony of the model is ending and its future relevance is being
challenged by a powerful, rising alternative model.
The backlash against democracy promotion
Authoritarian governments, fearful of being dethroned by opposition protests funded
by Western governments and NGOs, are striking back, attacking the system of
democracy promotion domestically and challenging both the system and the model of
democracy promotion internationally. Societies in different regions of the world are
rejecting the developmental and democracy model pushed by American and European
states in different ways. The crisis of legitimacy is spawning a backlash, one greatly
exacerbated by the end of American hegemony and the attractiveness and growing
credibility of the Chinese authoritarian model of economic development in particular.
Considering prescriptions for reform
Facing such a crisis of legitimacy, what might the architects of democracy promotion
both as foreign policy and aid strategy, and the intellectuals whose thinking influences
these policies and strategies, do to reverse their fortunes and improve outcomes in
targeted societies? In this section, I consider several options open to them and
question the potential of success for such options. Again, I do not find much cause for
optimism.
Rejecting political engineering
The institution-building model dominates the thinking and language both of
democracy promoters and intellectual advocates of democracy promotion. Such
language is replete with metaphors of construction and engineering in relation to the
development of democratic political institutions. Thus, for example, the National
Democratic Institute (NDI) sees its goal as working to ‘build political and civic
organisations’,10 whilst the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (2004) speaks of
‘building better democracies’. In academic writings, democracies are also the object
of active construction. The title of Mainwaring and Scully’s influential edited volume
of 1995, for example, refers to a process of actively ‘building democratic institutions’.
Diamond (1997) talks of ‘consolidating the Third Wave democracies’. Arendt
Lijphart (1996: 164) sees his aim as offering ‘practical recommendations for
democratic constitutional engineers’.
The danger here is in the adoption and promotion of an excessive formal
institutionalism in which it is believed that ‘democratization is ultimately a matter of
political crafting’ and in which ‘democracy can be crafted and promoted in all sorts of
places, even in culturally and structurally unfavourable circumstances’ (Doorenspleet
2004: 310).
Democracy does not come flat-packed and ready for assembly. Constitutions are not
picked ‘off the shelf’ in a political vacuum. Instead, political institutions are reflective
of and embedded in a society’s relations of economic and political power. A society’s
10
http://www.ndi.org/about_the_institute. Accessed November 16th 2010.
ruling elite is constrained by these structural relations. For all his talk of constitutional
engineering, even Lijphart (1996: 164) recognises that proportional representation
(PR) systems in Europe were adopted ‘through a convergence of pressures from
below and from above. The rising working class wanted to lower the thresholds of
representation in order to gain access to the legislatures, and the most threatened of
the old-established parties demanded PR to protect their position against the new
waves of mobilized voters created by universal suffrage’. Politics is indeed the art of
the possible. What Lijphart here calls constitutional engineering is actually the
outcome of the political conflict produced by structural changes in the social order.
The dangers of excessive formal institutionalism expressed by this discourse of
political engineering are real. We are increasingly recognising that external or topdown attempts at cultural change through formal institutional engineering generate
unintended consequences. McGlinchey (2007: 12) recalls how even Stalin’s
totalitarian attempts to change the culture of Soviet peoples were ‘captured and
adapted to meet the local interests of…regional elites’. Yet, this does not prevent him
from prescribing ‘a considerably more sustained presence in the regions…if
democracy assistance is to succeed in building grassroots constituencies for political
parties’. McGlinchey misses the irony that the logical endpoint of prescribing everincreasing and more invasive efforts to build democracy in targeted societies is
precisely the totalitarianism he rejects.
In conclusion, democracy promoters and academics must recognise the real limits of
formal institutionalism and rethink their use of the discourse of construction and
engineering in relation to democratisation. They must recognise both in word and
deed the often very slow pace of institutional change and heed the warning offered by
Przeworski et al (2004: 540):
We need to be skeptical about our belief in the power of institutions and we need to
be prudent in our actions. Projects of institutional reform must take as their point of
departure the actual conditions, not blueprints based on institutions that have been
successful elsewhere. As a former Brazilian minister, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira,
once put it, ‘Institutions can be at most imported, never exported’.
Ending the localist fallacy
At a rhetorical level, democracy promoters one and all do insist that democracy
cannot be exported, that there is no one universal democratic model that fits all
societies, and that democracy promoters exist only to facilitate local societies’ own
pro-democratic efforts. Thus, the ‘fundamental principle’ for the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED 2007) is that ‘democracy grows from within societies and
cannot be exported’ and that ‘democracy assistance is not an exercise in top-down
social engineering but a way to assist people fighting for increased human rights and
democratic participation’. The European Commissioner for External Relations and
European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner insists that the European
Union recognises that ‘[t]here is no one-size-fits-all solution to democracy promotion’
and that ‘democracy can never be imposed from outside’. Similarly, USAID (2005: 3)
insists that ‘democracy must be home-grown. Thus, the centrepiece of our efforts
remains our strong and enduring partnership with local actors’. The Westminster
Foundation for Democracy (2004: 26) states that ‘[e]verywhere, the purpose should
be to provide support to local initiatives, not to export some model of a party or party
systems that may reflect an image that no longer exists – perhaps never did exist –
even in the well-established democracies. The goal is to share democracy’s values and
democratic principles, not to transfer party blueprints or models.’
This universal declaration of a recognition and respect for local cultural and political
context is not honoured in practice. In reality, as I have explored earlier in this paper,
the bureaucratic and technocratic nature of Western aid donor agencies and project
implementation organisations means the universal, top-down export of an idealised
‘mythic model’ of liberal democracy through a ‘standard portfolio’ of technical
project interventions (Carothers 1999: 90, 2006a: 123). Consequently, such a
declaration constitutes what I call the ‘localist fallacy’ of democracy promotion.
Recently, calls for democracy promoters to end this localist fallacy and develop
programmes truly tailored to local conditions have grown (de Zeeuw 2004; Burnell
2006; Carothers 2006a). And some smaller organisations are proving much more
adaptable in their activities. Yet, even if all donors and project implementation
agencies were to tailor more contextualised programmes to local conditions, would
this really achieve more significant outcomes? If the call is for the preparatory
analysis informing programme design to be more political in nature, that is to take far
greater account of political realities, then it follows that the prescriptions for action
generated should also be more political. Yet, setting aside the ethics of direct
intervention into another society’s political system, the prospect of prescribing overtly
political interventionist programmes seems both highly hazardous and unrealistic.
They seem unrealistic since those prescribing reforms invariably assume that the
organisations both funding and implementing projects can themselves change
internally enough to accommodate significantly new ways of operating. Such changes
involve institutional reforms within these organisations. Since the donor and project
implementation agencies operate the way they do both because of the political
pressures and obstacles they face both at home and in recipient countries and because
the expertise they possess lies specifically in areas of technical know-how, it is
unrealistic simply to assume that these organisations can make the kind of internal
changes needed to implement democracy promotion programmes in dramatically
different ways. Consequently, we should be skeptical of both the ability of democracy
promotion donors and agencies to reform and of the potential for new forms of
interventions to secure significantly more positive outcomes.
Ending political democracy promotion
What Carothers has called ‘political democracy promotion’ informs and defines much
of the activities of American governmental and quasi-governmental democracy
promotion organisations and the actual foreign policy practices of both American and
European states. Conceptualising democratisation as an elite battle between
democrats and autocrats facilitates expedient and hands-on policy prescriptions on the
part of democracy promoters, but by trivialising complex domestic political processes
it invariably leads to an exacerbation of domestic political conflict and of power
imbalances. The most salient strategic actions that this conceptualisation of
democratisation generates are: an excessive focus on individuals over institutions; an
excessive focus on elections as moments of potential ‘democratic’ openings; and
excessive support for new ‘democratic’ governments on their accession to power. All
three actions have far more deleterious than positive consequences for any potential
democratic political development in targeted societies. For democracy promotion
projects to have any chance of generating improved outcomes on the ground, this
simplistic conceptualisation of democratisation and the ‘political’ democracy
promotion actions it prompts must change. Yet, in many ways, this conceptualisation
and these actions are institutionalised strongly within American democracy promotion
aid donors and agencies. USAID (2005: 12) emphasises that:
‘[w]e support the democratization momentum. Assistance is most effective when it
responds rapidly to new opportunities. In particular, our support often shifts to a large
degree from the private sector and civil society to the new government to help
establish and strengthen institutions of democratic and accountable governance.
Specifically, we assist the new ministries, the key offices of the president and prime
minister, the newly empowered legislature, and the courts’.
Similarly, the first priority of the NED is to ‘continue to place great emphasis on
aiding democrats in authoritarian and closed political systems’ (NED 2007: 3). When
you have money to spend on supporting democrats you tend to find them.
At the level of international diplomacy, seeking to promote institutions over
individuals runs counter to the long-standing practices of the diplomatic arts. Thus,
Carothers (1999: 277) finds that ‘it is hard for many ambassadors and other senior
diplomats to give up old proconsul habits – to resist the view that promoting
democracy in a country means favoring friends and trying to nudge or push the
political process to ensure that those friends come to power and stay there’.
Ultimately, Western leaders still believe that the mission of democracy promotion is
to ‘support and encourage the forces of reform’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2006).
Yet, who are these ‘forces of reform’? How can external diplomats or democracy
promoters on the ground identify them? Spence (2008) rightly states that ‘[t]he
difficult lesson for democracy promoters today is to recognize that not all members of
the opposition to a particular government are necessarily supporters of democracy…
Opposition leaders are often not good democrats, and are highly imperfect
messengers for democracy’. Similarly, Burnell (2000: 8) recognises that ‘[i]t is not
always easy to judge in advance who is on the side of the angels. Yet, working with
political elites, ruling and oppositional, is an absolutely central and pivotal part of
promoting or ‘building’ democracies. Here, then, is the internal contradiction.
Working with elites may be ‘essential to the success of democracy assistance’
(Bermeo 2009a: 16), yet, since their track record is less than impressive, democracy
promotion donors, project workers on the ground, and Western leaders and diplomats
alike can have little faith in their own judgments regarding the sincerity of political
leaders’ commitment to democratic reforms. Furthermore, even when incumbents
show positive signs, rewarding them too much may actually act as a disincentive in
undertaking further reforms.
Principled and effective democracy promotion can only proceed from a basis of the
promotion of institutions over individuals. Currently, this does not seem a feasible
prospect for American democracy promotion agencies in particular and both
American and European foreign policy makers and diplomats. The continued
personalisation of democracy promotion means the continuation of political
democracy promotion and the continuation of political democracy promotion means
the continued excessive focus on elections and aiding competitive authoritarian
regimes dressed up as ‘democratic’ governments.
Greater conditionality as the key to greater effectiveness?
For Larry Diamond, the key to more effective democracy promotion is greater
‘conditionality’ in the strategies of Western aid donors. ‘By holding governments
accountable and making foreign aid contingent on good governance, donors can help
reverse the democratic recession’ (Diamond 2008: 37). Diamond’s optimism
regarding the power of conditionality to push political recipients of aid toward reform
is misplaced. In the world of development aid, conditionality is a largely discredited
strategy. For three decades, conditionality formed the foundation of World Bank and
IMF attempts to get client countries to implement the kind of neo-liberal reforms they
sought. Yet, by the late 1990s, even the World Bank (1998: 18) conceded that
conditionality ‘is unlikely to bring about lasting reform if there is no strong domestic
movement for change’. Where the rewards are tangible and great enough, for example
the promise of membership of the European Union, by generating huge and palpable
domestic incentives, conditionality can help push political systems towards
democratisation, or at least polyarchisation. Yet, such ‘easy cases’ are now long gone
and in the ‘true test’ countries of the wider European ‘neighbourhood’, neither the
rewards on offer nor the sanctions being threatened can alter incentives in anything
like the same way (Burnell 2007: 9).
Finally, even if effective conditionality were possible, it would require a highly
disciplined and coordinated effort on the part of aid donors. Diamond (2008: 36)
himself recognises that ‘[f]orcing change that leads to better governance will require
serious resolve and close coordination among the established bilateral and multilateral
donors’. Yet, according to the findings of a recent volume of country case studies, a
unified and coordinated policy response does not seem achievable even within the
European Union let alone among a wider group of allies (Youngs ed 2008). Indeed, it
would seem that the end of the unipolar world and of the liberal democratic
hegemony makes it all the more difficult, almost impossible, to orchestrate effective
sanctions among a nation’s major trading partners. Diamond (2008: 36) himself
concedes that ‘[n]ow with the momentum going against democracy – resurgent and
oil-rich Russia flexing its muscles, and China emerging as major donor – it will be
more difficult to encourage reforms’. Conditionality, be it through increased rewards
or threats, does not seem a potent tool for pushing authoritarian regimes towards
democratisation, particularly in the world order of the early 21st Century.
A pessimistic prognosis for democracy promotion
In this section, I have considered prescriptions for reforming the ways in which
democracy
is
currently
promoted
by
Western
governments,
international
organisations, and NGOs. I have explored the viability of democracy promoters
rejecting both the conceptualisation of democracy promotion as an exercise in
political and social engineering and the ‘localist fallacy’. I have argued that it is
unrealistic to expect either democracy promotion aid donors or implementation
agencies to dramatically transform the way they operate and that it is equally unlikely
that any new activities tailored more to local political conditions might generate
significantly improved outcomes. I have also argued that, whilst principled and
effective democracy promotion can only proceed from a basis of the promotion of
institutions over individuals, it is again unlikely that American democracy promotion
organisations and both American and European foreign policy makers and diplomats
will forsake the strategy of political democracy promotion in the foreseeable future.
Finally, I have argued that the prospects for increased conditionality as an effective
tool for democracy promotion are not at all bright. This necessarily leads me to
pessimistic conclusions about the future of democracy promotion as a foreign policy
objective and developmental model for export to see off the present existential threat
posed by the crisis of legitimacy and the backlash it currently faces.
Conclusion: no democracy without the demos
Democratisation is a social process of political and economic development. Since
ruling elites make the crucial landmark decisions in changing political systems, our
attention can be distracted too much away from the social pressures that tend to force
these decisions or the lack of social pressure that facilitate them. In turn, processes of
social development have a historical legacy: they are path-dependent.
‘The assumptions and strategies of democracy aid…have little to do with the history
of how American democracy was deepened and broadened over the 19th and 20th
Centuries. Bumps on the road like the Civil War and the Great Depression fit poorly
with the idea of a naturally unfolding sequence. Similarly, the often tortuous paths of
democratization in many Western European countries, involving embattled aristocrats
and landlords, a rising bourgeoisie, and a mobilized working class, seem to US
democracy promoters remote in time and of uncertain relevance’ (Carothers 1999:
91).
Whilst democratisation is an intrinsically domestic social process, polyarchisation –
the formal establishment and institutionalisation of multi-party political systems – can
be facilitated through external pressure. Yet, in its current form, by focusing on the
promotion of neo-liberal and technocratic forms of political and economic reform – or
‘good governance’ for short – democracy promotion is serving to exacerbate both
economic and political inequality globally, thereby acting an anti-democratic force on
targeted societies. It is here that Robinson’s theory of democracy promotion as
servant of transnational capitalist interests carries great weight. Yet, ultimately,
democracy promotion is failing and will fail in its mission to secure a consensual
hegemony for neo-liberal globalisation.
Perhaps the most fundamental and indispensible element of the democratic political
culture is that of tolerance of a plurality of visions of both the individual and the
common good. The culture of global democracy promotion is bereft of this vital
quality. In ideological terms, it does not tolerate alternative political visions and, in
practical terms, it cannot accommodate the expression of such alternative visions.
Ironically, one such vision that it excludes is that of a more social form of democracy.
Thus, Western democracy promotion detaches democracy from social justice. Herein
lies both the source of the tension it generates and the roots of its ultimate demise.
Only a model and system capable of generating greater social equality rather than
inequality is capable of facilitating the democratisation of polities worldwide.
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