“D
eclining levels of legitimacy, good governance, and socioeconomic performance all point in the direction of a disturbing
trend: the quality of democracy in Paraguay is extremely low.
The absence of collective actors has given rise to parties that are clientelistic, rather than issue-based, in nature. For almost twenty years, these
neopopulist parties have dominated Paraguayan politics, implementing
particularistic, pork-barrel, and volatile policies that have, in turn, engendered economic
stagnation, high levels of poverty, and profound disenchantment. Between the “rock” of
low-quality democracy and the “hard place” of
neopopulism stands Bishop Fernando Lugo, a
likely frontrunner in Paraguay’s 2008 presidential election. Fears that he may be the next
Hugo Chávez are misguided. A Lugo presidency could spur much-needed reform in Paraguay.
”
—Diego Abente-Brun, June 7, 2007
Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Dilemmas of Democracy in
Paraguay
by
Diego Abente-Brun
Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow
June 7, 2007
National Endowment for Democracy
Please note that the views expressed in this presentation represent the
opinions and analysis of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect
those of the National Endowment of Democracy.
The Third Wave of Democracy (1978- )
and its Challenges
 Electoral
democracies, illiberal regimes.
 Low quality democracies
The Emerging Literature on Quality of
Democracy
 O’Donnell,
Vargas Cullel, Iazetta, The
Quality of Democracy, 2004
 Diamond & Morlino, Assessing the Quality
of Democracy, 2005
 Emphasis on:
Conceptual craftsmanship
 Studies of comparative dyads
 Missing:
 A systematic inquiry into the causes

Defining Quality of Democracy
The question to be addressed…
Distinguishes between nature and quality of democracy
 …NOT how democratic a democracy is, or a polyarchy is … (Rule of
law, participation, competition, Accountability, Freedom, Political
Equality, Responsiveness)
 …but what is the quality of regimes that qualify as democratic (or
polyarchic) in terms of their ability to address key issues.


Three variables taken into account:
1.
2.
3.
Legitimacy (Ability to generate support)
Effectiveness (Ability to govern well/governance)
Efficacy (Ability to deliver)
Quality of Democracy in South America:
1) LEGITIMACY
OVERALL INDEX
DEMOCRACY
2000–2004
1995–2005
SUPPORT
FOR
SATISFACTION
WITH
Paraguay
38
34
32
17
Ecuador
38
34
43
14
Bolivia
40
39
40
13
Peru
41
39
49
24
Colombia
41
41
46
29
Brazil
47
43
37
22
Venezuela
53
56
76
56
Chile
53
56
59
43
Argentina
59
57
65
34
Uruguay
66
68
77
63
Sources: Frances Hagopian, 2005 (Support & Satisfaction with Democracy, Importance of voting,
Valid votes/VAP, Trust in Gov’t, Democracy is the Best System), Latinobarómetro 2005.
Quality of Democracy in South America:
2) GOVERNANCE
COUNTRY
AVERAGE
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Control of
Corruption
Venezuela
-0.88
-1.00
-0.92
-0.68
-0.91
Paraguay
-0.83
-0.76
-1.06
-0.44
-1.08
Ecuador
-0.77
-0.89
-0.92
-0.39
-0.87
Colombia
-0.58
-1.87
-0.13
0.11
-0.45
Bolivia
-0.38
-0.50
-0.45
0.20
-0.76
Perú
-0.28
-0.85
-0.32
0.34
-0.28
Argentina
-0.17
-0.14
0.01
-0.13
-0.43
Brazil
-0.03
-0.16
-0.07
0.18
-0.07
Uruguay
0.61
0.64
0.56
0.59
0.64
Chile
1.17
0.71
1.27
1.36
1.36
Source: World Bank, Kauffman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters.” Data
averaged for the period 1996–2005.
Quality of Democracy in South America:
3) SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
COUNTRY
POVERTY GAP
POVERTY
GDP GROWTH PC
Bolivia
34.40
62.40
0.90
Paraguay
30.30
61.00
-1.10
Colombia
24.10
50.60
0.30
Venezuela
22.10
48.60
0.90
Ecuador
20.80
49.00
1.10
Perú
20.60
54.70
1.60
Brazil
17.80
38.70
0.70
Argentina
12.20
29.40
1.40
Chile
6.30
18.70
3.00
Uruguay
4.50
15.40
1.00
Source: CEPAL. Data from most recent year available (ranges from
2001 to 2004).
The Quest for an Explanation
Three hypotheses:
1. STRUCTURAL


Socioeconomic matrix
Stakeholders and nature of the political game
2. INSTITUTIONAL


Nature of the party system
Rules of the political game, constitutional and legal
3. SOCIO-CULTURAL


“Social capital” of the population
Associational predispositions; horizontal relations
1) STRUCTURAL: Socioeconomic Matrix
NONAGRICULTURAL
WORKFORCE
COUNTRY
Urban
Agric.
Workforce
Informal
Formal
PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES
WITH SOCIAL SECURITY
Informal
Formal
Overall
Bolivia
39.0%
32.3%
66.7%
33.8%
6.5%
46.3%
31.3%
Ecuador
48.0%
30.3%
57.6%
42.4%
14.2%
63.4%
47.1%
Paraguay
49.6%
31.3%
62.9%
37.1%
4.4%
45.3%
26.5%
Peru
55.2%
37.5%
58.0%
42.0%
14.9%
63.9%
48.3%
Brazil
58.4%
19.6%
44.6%
55.4%
34.2%
83.8%
69.2%
Colombia
59.2%
20.9%
59.9%
40.1%
27.5%
83.9%
65.2%
Venezuela
71.5%
9.7%
52.2%
47.8%
16.9%
72.2%
57.0%
Chile
72.1%
13.3%
35.8%
61.2%
48.9%
83.3%
76.4%
Uruguay
74.3%
4.6%
37.7%
62.3%
32.9%
87.0%
73.1%
Argentina
74.9%
1.1%
44.3%
55.7%
17.5%
66.8%
51.5%
Sources: CEPAL, Int’l Labor Organization. Data from most recent available (2002–2004).
1) STRUCTURAL (continued):
Effects of Invertebrate Society
Invertebrate society: Lack of collective actors with
collective interests that can structure the political
game along issue-based lines
This
lack of social articulation favors the emergence
of clientelistic politics
Prevents
the development of horizontal ties and
furthers vertical, hierarchical, and in essence,
exploitative relationships.
Incorporates
popular sectors as clients, but excludes
them as citizens.
2) INSTITUTIONAL:
Clientelistic vs. Issue-Based Parties
Social Base of
Support
Policy Bias
Identity
profile
Redistributive
Universalistic
Progressive
pro-labor; or
conservative,
pro-business
Distributive
Particularistic
Populist,
conservative,
personalistic
Correlates
Types
of Parties
Issue-Based Constituencies
Collectives
Parties
Clientelistic
Parties
Constituents
Individuals
Effects of Clientelistic Parties
on Quality of Democracy
1.
2.
3.
4.
Favors particularistic policies that privilege
individual party supporters.
Breeds dependence on small but organized
groups—mainly public employees—that
interact not with each other but with state.
Reinforces rent-seeking behavior of powerful
socioeconomic actors.
Increases both the weakness and centrality of
the state.
Socioeconomic
matrix
Types of parties
Quality
of policies
Effects of Low Quality of Democracy

GDP per-capita



1980: $1,441
1989: $1,442
2004: $1,382

30% of population is rural and has no access to land
 10% of overall population owns 66% of the available land
 Remaining 60% of population share 6% of the surface
1980–1988
1989–1999
2000–2005
Tax burden
7.7%
10.5%
10.9%
Bureaucratic
Burden
42.4%
61.3%
75.9%
Growth in Public-Sector Employees
Total de cargos de la Administración Central (1989 - 1999)
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2004
Growth in Public-Sector Salaries
The Trap of Clientelism
On the one hand….
 80% of voters belong to one of two
traditional parties
On the other hand…
 75% of the population considers
political parties the least-trustworthy
institution
3) SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS:
Associational Predispositions
 Inspired
by work of Tocqueville
 Interpersonal trust and associational behavior
key to quality of democracy
 Interpersonal trust in Paraguay very low
between 1996 and 2004 (Latinobarómetro)
 In 2001, 56.9% of population didn’t belong to
any intermediate organization; in 2005, 70.3%
 Are these causes or consequences of low
quality of democracy?
The Rock and Hard-Place Dilemma
Low quality democracy vs. the neo-populist alternative
 Neo-populism:



No longer tied to specific social constituencies or
economic policies (e.g. Peron, Vargas), but instead…
…tied to a pattern of personalistic and anti-institutionalist
politics rooted in the appeal and mobilization of
marginalized masses by a charismatic, often authoritarian
leader
1996–2003: the neo-populist temptation;
authoritarian formulas, Gen. Lino Oviedo.
The Unexpected
 Social-science
explanations can never rule
out the unexpected
 The unexpected came in March 2006 with
a citizens’ demonstration led by Monsignor
Fernando Lugo
 This confirms the old adage, “There is no
ill that lasts 100 years nor a Paraguayan
willing to put up with it.”
Hope Beyond Hope
The chiliastic upsurge of former Bishop
Fernando Lugo
Lugo, Chavez, Morales





Lugo not a military leader, but a pastor who grew
up in a tradition of horizontality, collective
leadership, and anti-authoritarianism.
Lugo not a Marxist or a neo-populist but an
exponent of Catholic social progressism.
Lugo not a leader of an ethnically divided society.
Lugo is a catalyst who gathers support from a
wide range of parties, from right to left.
Lugo identifies himself as a centrist (“mbytetepe,
poncho juruicha”); sees ‘left’ as a movement for
change rather than as an ideological platform.
Implications
Ecuador
 Similar socioeconomic matrix, similar clientelistic
parties (but not deeply rooted)
 Instability, development of a new politics of identity
(Pachacutik)
 Emergence of populist-authoritarian alternatives
 Lucio Gutiérrez and Rafael Correa
Bolivia
 Similar socioeconomic matrix, similar clientelistic
parties (but not deeply rooted save MNR)
 Development of new politics of identity
 Emergence of radical alternatives
 Evo Morales
Corollaries
Bolivia:
 If established political elites do not make reform
possible, they make revolutions inevitable.
 Evo Morales.
Ecuador:
 If established political elites do not make reform
possible, they make instability inevitable.
 Mahuad, Gutiérrez, Palacios, Correa …
Paraguay
 If opposition political elites do not make reforms
possible, they make one-party rule inevitable.
 Lugo?
Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Dilemmas of Democracy in Paraguay
Diego Abente-Brun
Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow
THE END