Hartsough 1
Harrison Hartsough
Constitutional Law I
Dr. Deutsch
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company, et al. v. Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce
NATURE OF CASE
While the constitutional implications of this case are quite clear as there was little doubt that it dealt with
the powers of the executive under Article II of the Constitution, and the form of action was in regards to a
breach of these powers, the actual remedy sought from the Court is harder to pin down. This is because
the steel industry companies applied for a writ of certiorari despite having won at the district court level.
Part of the reason for this had to do with the fact that the Washington D.C. Circuit Court, sitting en banc,
decided that a stay of the injunction should be issued until the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari
and could hear subsequent motions. Unhappy with the decision to stay the injunction of seizing the
mills, especially given the fact that the government could still raise employee wages, respondents took the
unorthodox route of applying for a writ of certiorari when they already had an injunction against the
seizure issued by the District Court of Washington D.C. The remedy sought by petitioner was that the
Court should accept a motion to disallow respondent, the US government, from adjusting prices while the
Supreme Court heard the case. In addition to this, petitioners sought the affirmation of the District
Court’s decision. That decision established that President Truman had overstepped his Article II powers
in seizing the steel mills and nationalizing them because they were necessary to the Korean conflict.
Originally planning to apply for a writ of certiorari as well, respondent sought to have the District Court’s
decision precluding the seizure overturned. This case came to the Supreme Court through its power to
review lower court decisions under appellate jurisdiction.
FACTS
The Korean War necessitated many of the same kinds of mobilization that World War II had. The
problem for President Truman, engaged in another armed conflict about five years after the end of World
War II, was that the American people did not see a direct enemy in North Korea. The real enemy lay in
Moscow. While these facts do not immediately pertain to the case, they are indispensable because of the
context they provide. Inflationary pressures caused by the “police action” prompted the creation of a
successor to the Office of Price Administration (“OPA”) found in the Office of Price Stabilization (OPS).
The World War II idea of expanding bureaucracy to meet with domestic issues was applied again.
Truman also established the Wage Stabilization Board (“WSB”). Initially it dealt more with wage policy
questions rather than disputes between unions and employers. The Economic Stabilization Agency
(“ESA”), oversaw the OPA and WSB. All of them were created through executive orders Truman issued
from the beginning of the Korean engagement. These organizations were authorized under Title IV of the
Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”). The power of the President to assist in settling labor disputes
was defined in Section 502 of Title V in the DPA. According to Congress, the President had the power to
initiate “voluntary conferences” of labor unions and companies and then was tasked with carrying out the
agreement set between them. The problem with this was that in the next section, Section 503, the
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President could not take any action that was in conflict with the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Many
Congressmen saw this as inherently contradictory. Could the President create new labor laws, as 502
seemed to indicate, or did he have to follow the protocol set forth in Taft-Hartley? Not only were the
relationships between the bureaucracies Truman set up convoluted, but so was the legislation that
permitted them. Title V, taken as a whole, was not a firm foundation for the establishment of methods to
deal with labor disputes.
The Taft-Hartley Act, as we shall see, was an enormous sticking point for the administration. In part
because the Act allowed the President to seek injunctions against labor strikes that served to delay a strike
while negotiations were carried out, and for the more political motivation of siding with the unions,
Truman vetoed the Act. Congress, however, overrode his veto. And Congress would continue to defy
Truman’s wishes. Reflecting the decline in the initial rally round the flag mentality at the outset of the
Korean conflict, Congress not only refused to add more anti-inflationary measures, but added the
Capehart Amendment allowing the companies to be compensated for wage increases from June 1950 to
July 26th, 1951. Truman was now even more on the side of labor, although this may not have necessarily
been his intention. Certainly, it helped in the general election, but if he were to be an arbiter in
negotiations the steel companies would not regard him well. Truman was attempting to walk the fine line
between partial mobilization and full scale war. Korea was a proxy war, not a World War III. This
would prove an extremely important fact in the way in which the case was framed, and the degree to
which precedent of seizure of private property from President Roosevelt’s era was comparable.
The seizure of the mills arose from the union contracts slated to terminate on December 31st, 1951. Union
members led by Philip Murray, head of the United Steelworkers of America (“USWA”) demanded wage
increases corresponding to increases in the cost of living and prices. Steel companies, subjected to price
controls set by the administration, demanded in turn that the government allow them to raise their prices
to ensure a consistent profit margin.
Truman insisted that the dispute be forwarded to the WSB. Once the WSB had heard the case it could
recommend wage or price increases (or both). Made up of equal numbers of public, industry, and union
representatives, the WSB’s decision came down very much on the side of the unions, to the point where
Truman and his advisors thought that they had gone too far. There would be no price increase to correlate
to the increase in wages in the WSB recommendation. The WSB felt that the companies could absorb
such losses without significant injury. Although this may have been true, the driving principle behind the
talks themselves was that an equitable agreement ought to be reached, not one that favored only the
unions. Although Truman had created the agency, he was losing control of it.
The WSB acceded to the request of the unions, granting them a 12.5 cent raise that would retroactively be
applied to all pay from January 1, 1952 onward, along with successive increases of 2.5 cents on June 30th ,
1952 and January 1st, 1953. The minority in the decision, the industry representatives, made the point
very clear that such a one-sided decision was not an amenable. And in truth, the WSB recommendation
was far better than the USWA could have gotten had there been collective bargaining taking place rather
than an intermediary making what was regarded as an untenable proposition. The recommendation
threatened the whole system of stabilization Truman deemed necessary for supporting the Korean
conflict. Faced with the prospect of a strike should the government not take action because of the steel
companies’ unwillingness to be subject to such a decision and the USWA’s belief that it deserved such
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increases in compensation, the Truman administration determined that the only recourse was to seize the
steel mills and put them under government control.
In making this decision, however, Truman had backed himself into a corner. He believed it was
necessary for the steel mills to remain open but had few options in trying to do so. Congressional action
was unlikely as Congress believed that the President should use the Taft-Hartley Act, which he had
originally vetoed and would take time. Using the Selective Service Act of 1948 obliged the government
to follow a set of delineated steps that would also take time, time that the administration did not have.
The only viable option seemed to be to seize the mills using Truman’s Article II powers.
Upon the seizure, the steel industries immediately filed a motion for a preliminary injunction until the
case could be heard on its merits. The case was brought before Judge David Pine. Owing to a poor
performance by Assistant Attorney General Holmes Baldridge, especially in asserting the idea that the
judiciary had no business in intervening with this execution of executive power, Judge Pine issued a
preliminary injunction against the implementation of the seizure. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals in
Washington DC stayed the injunction until the Supreme Court decided whether it would hear the case.
As mentioned, it decided that the government would not be limited in terms of wage adjustments;
however, the Supreme Court would later preclude this in its consideration of pre-trial matters. The
contentions of both sides were essentially the same; with the exception that respondent (D) tried to shore
up their arguments before the Court in light of Baldridge’s lackluster performance.
For its part, respondent (D), represented by the justice department and solicitor general, prepared a 175page brief for the Court. It elaborated on many of the points Baldridge had failed to make regarding the
precedent that existed for the seizure of private property. Acting as respondent (D), the government
maintained first that the district court had gone against equitable principle in issuing an injunction. Judge
Pine had answered a constitutional question when he should not have. Furthermore, his decision was
erroneous because it failed to consider the fact that alternate remedies for injury the steel industry might
experience were available. Finally, Truman’s decision not to use existing legislation to seize the
companies did not preclude him from doing so. Encouraging the Court to use a balancing of interests, the
government, speaking for Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer (D), added that even if the claims of
“irreparable injury” made by the steel companies had merit, such damages did not outweigh the harm to
the “public interest.” Most of the rest of the brief was designated as historical recitation of instances in
which government seizures of private property were legal. This included the notion of stewardship put
forth by President Theodore Roosevelt, as well as the general Hamiltonian idea that the powers of the
executive go beyond those enumerated by the Constitution. Respondent (D) felt that there were implicit
powers necessary and proper to the President being able to carry out his duties.
Petitioners (P) presented a shorter and perhaps more cogent argument. They stuck to a lone contention,
one that respondent would find difficult in circumnavigating: since there were already in existence
legislative means of ending the strike in the Taft-Hartley Act, the President was not authorized to seize
the mills. The President did not have the means to seize the steel mills in a different manner than
Congress had proscribed. The Court seemed very receptive to this argument, and did little to probe John
W. Davis as he made oral arguments as counsel for petitioners (P). The contention by respondent (D) that
steel production could not be interrupted was unfounded. In their view, the union had given advance
notice of its strike and had respondent (D) wished, the Taft-Hartley Act could have been invoked. In
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seizing the mills, the President had violated his role defined within the Constitution and had taken on the
role of Congress, enacting all laws that are necessary and proper. Petitioner’s (P) brief also touched on
the idea the President’s role as commander in chief did not allow such a seizure because the country was
not involved in congressionally recognized war. Outside of war, eminent domain was the only means of
seizing private property, and this was something that only Congress could act upon. One aspect of the
oral arguments worth noting was the contention by Solicitor General (and acting Attorney General) Philip
Perlman that Congress’ inaction regarding directly contrary legislation to the seizure illustrated that
Congress was at least indifferent, if not content. Justice Frankfurter did not appreciate this idea. To him,
the inaction of Congress was not a means to prove an act was not disapproved of by Congress.
ISSUES
This case encompasses two paramount issues that depend upon one another. Since the decision
petitioners appealed was in their favor and granted a preliminary injunction, the question of whether it
was appropriate to address constitutional issues, as well as ultimate merits, on arguments for that motion.
If such questions could be addressed on a preliminary motion, did President Truman have a basis for the
execution of his seizure of the companies within the Constitution or Congressional statute? In addressing
these questions, the case also implicitly touched upon the debate between the ideas of the President’s
powers being taken as an aggregate of the enumerated powers. And this resuscitated the debate of
whether there were implicit executive powers not specifically delineated within the Constitution.
DECISION
Justice Black decided that such questions could be answered on a preliminary motion. In regards to a
basis for the seizure, he found that there was no basis in either the Constitution or any Congressional
legislation. In acting in the manner he did, Truman violated the separation of powers and threatened the
very integrity of a democratic system.
RATIO DECIDENDI
MAJORITY OPINION – JUSTICE BLACK
In the first of seven opinions that came from the Court, Justice Black disseminates the issues concerning
separation of powers and the idea of implicit powers of the executive. First, using precedent found in
cases such as Hooe v. United States, Black established that constitutional questions can be answered on
preliminary motions. In passing, he mentioned also that the fact that the time-sensitive damage
petitioners would suffer was part of what factored into his conclusion that such a motion could address
constitutional questions. Thus, the district court had ruled correctly when it addressed the merits.
True to his literalist nature, Black determined quite easily from the merits that Truman lacked the power
to seize the steel mills. For Black, executive authority must stem directly from the Constitution or a
statute and cannot be implied. He refused to consider such powers in aggregate. A relevant fact to
Black’s decision was that Congress had set out a protocol to be followed to enjoin unions from striking
until a settlement could be reached. The administration had not made use of any statutes available to
seize private property. Rather, they had opted to create new legislation allowing them to seize the mills.
To Black, this was a penetration into the powers of the legislative branch and was repugnant to the
Constitution. The separation of powers did not allow for any kind of penetration into the powers of
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another branch as far as Black was concerned. Extremely salient to his decision was the fact that the
President had attempted to legislate in the place of Congress, clothing himself not only in the powers of
the executive, but in the powers of the legislative as well.
Thus, Black’s principle of law was that because there was no statute permitting the President to seize the
mills and because he had effectively given himself powers reserved for Congress, the act of seizing the
steel mills was declared unconstitutional and the decision of the district court was affirmed. Another
important aspect in coming to this decision was the fact that this was a labor dispute rather than a crisis
that related directly to the war efforts of the United States (such as in Schenck v. United States). Black
distinguished the two, holding that the President’s powers as commander-in-chief do not allow him to act
as a legislator. He then went on to conclude that Truman had vested in himself inappropriate legislative
powers.
CONCURRENCE – JUSTICE DOUGLAS
Agreeing with Black’s conclusion that the separation of powers ought to be immutable, Justice Douglas
took note of some issues that Black had not. First, he espoused the idea that the executive is able to move
more quickly to respond to crises than the other two branches. What this meant for Douglas was that
decisions otherwise repugnant to the Constitution might be allowed to remain. Douglas therefore called
for the same standard to be applied to actions by the executive and legislative branches.
That standard was to arise from the same place where Black’s principle was found – the allocation of
powers within the Constitution. A salient fact for Douglas was that Congress was vested with the power
to compensate those whose property was seized under the Fifth Amendment, therefore only Congress
could authorize seizures of private property. Due process under the Fifth Amendment indicated that
branches had to be responsible for both aspects – compensation and the power to seize. Although the
government had evinced the notion that compensation would be made available, Douglas felt that this
compensation could only come from Congress. He agreed with Black that Truman’s actions constituted a
legislative act and was able to concur in the ultimate conclusion Black made, albeit in a different way.
CONCURRENCE – JUSTICE FRANKFURTER
Ever a judicial restraintist, Justice Frankfurter was very hesitant to address questions of constitutional
interpretation in regards to the powers given to the President under Article II. He easily rejected the
absolutist position Black and Douglas had set forth, and added that the branches are “partly interacting
not wholly disjointed.” He did agree with Black that damages would be hard to calculate and could not
simply be monetary.
However, he diverged completely from Black’s sweeping constitutional gestures when he considered the
Taft Hartley Act by itself, and not with constitutional questions. For Frankfurter, the salient fact of the
case was that Congress had created in the Taft-Hartley Act a means of stopping a strike. By not including
a provision allowing the President to seize private property, Congress had said no to Truman’s seizure
before it happened. With regards to the Defense Production Act, specifically Title V, Frankfurter felt the
sections on labor disputes did not allow the President to seize the steel mills, especially considering
Section 503 precluded any action inconsistent with the Taft-Hartley Act. Frankfurter also rejected much
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precedential argument presented by respondent, and concluded that although it was difficult for him to do,
he believed in this instance that the founders’ idea of slow government had to be respected.
CONCURRENCE – JUSTICE JACKSON
Agreeing with Frankfurter on some key points, Justice Jackson seemed more able to address
constitutional issues. Jackson defined three sets of circumstances in which the President may opt to use
executive power in seizing private property. A President may rely on his powers and congressional
powers, only on his own power, or may operate in contradiction to Congress’ powers. Jackson asserted
that Truman’s actions fell into the third category based on what he had done in seizing the steel mills. He
agreed with the majority and Frankfurter in that the Taft-Hartley Act had not given Truman the power to
unilaterally seize the steel mills without any kind of adherence to procedure.
While acknowledging Truman had some power as commander in chief, it was Jackson’s conclusion that
this role is external in nature – not internal. He agreed with the majority on this point. When external,
Jackson mentioned as dictum, the President could operate that power to its fullest extent. Jackson
considered historical context in this, but also in concluding that the President is often given extraordinary
powers by Congress in times of crisis. Were the President to be able to seize these on his own, Jackson
insisted, the United States would be no better than Nazi Germany. He disagreed with the majority’s
absolutist claims, though.
CONCURRENCE – JUSTICE BURTON
As with the majority, Justice Burton felt that Truman had given himself inappropriate legislative powers.
However, Burton also felt that the immediate case had not been an occasion for such a display of
executive power. In asserting this, he added that the government had not completed the requirements that
the Taft-Hartley Act had for obtaining and injunction, as respondent had contended. Like Frankfurter, he
avoided passing judgment on the inherent power issue.
CONCURRENCE – JUSTICE CLARK
Justice Clark did not concur in the opinion of the Court. His opinion only contributed as a vote to the
majority. Clark felt that Black, in writing for the majority, had eliminated any possibility of there being
inherent powers of the executive. Clark’s basis for his vote was grounded in the existence of statutes that
gave Truman alternatives to seizure.
DISSENT – CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON JOINED BY JUSTICES MINTON AND REED
The dissent disagreed with both positions of the majority – whether they were the absolutist argument of
Black and Douglas, or the argument that inherent powers existed but were not appropriate in this case.
Looking into the position Truman was in on April 8th when he issued the executive order for seizure,
Chief Justice Vinson agreed that a steel strike could have deleterious effects on national security. Vinson
also accepted respondent’s contention that there was a stream of precedent that elaborated on the issue of
executive seizure of private property. Vinson considered In re Neagle and In re Debs as examples of this.
In an attack on Jackson specifically for having been the former Attorney General, Vinson included his
reasoning for President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s seizure of the North American Aviation plant. Vinson
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pointed out hypocrisy in the views of Douglas and Jackson when they had been attorneys general. While
other justices had argued that Truman’s actions were not those of a leader looking for dictatorial powers,
Vinson considered his pledge to abide by the actions of Congress quite relevant. Seeing the President as
entirely within his bounds, Vinson would have vacated the district court’s decision.
EDITOR’S ANALYSIS
President Truman never forgot the sting of this defeat. Justice Black, afraid he had taken it personally,
invited Truman and his fellow justices to his home for a party. Tense at the beginning of the evening,
Truman loosened up. However, Truman always felt the Court’s decision was the wrong one. The
decision represented an engagement with the US Constitution that only the Supreme Court could bring –
an engagement the country loved. Truman’s greatest mistake may have been allowing a constitutional
debate to flare up without the external factors that had been present with his predecessors. What can be
said of Truman is that he did not resist the Supreme Court’s position, but immediately returned the steel
mills to their owners.
In stark contrast to Truman’s reaction, the immediate reception of Youngstown was on of elation. The
Supreme Court was hailed for defeating the President’s power-hungry prerogative. Yet close examination
reveals a Court unable to unite on a reason why this was the decision. There were seven opinions written
– and the only united faction on the Court was the dissent. The absolutist position put forth by Justices
Black and Douglas could not be supported by the other justices in the majority. Yet even for those whose
position was that the three branches were not mutually exclusive, distinctions arose. Justices Frankfurter
and Burton regarded the situation with judicial restraint. Trying to avoid delving too deeply into the
inherent powers of the presidency, Frankfurter may have actually made his argument weaker and
presented an anomaly in his rationalization for voting with the majority.
Specifically, Frankfurter presented a prohibition to seizure even though the law itself contained no literal
written prohibition. To Frankfurter, the fact that the House had defeated an amendment giving the
President seizure power was enough to write it into law as he related the legislative history of the TaftHartley Act. Not only is this notion inconsistent within itself, it also flew in the face of precedent
established by the Court. In United States v. United Mine Workers, the Senate had defeated an
amendment allowing the courts the ability to issue injunctions against a mining company. This could not
be read as allowing the Court to do so, merely that the amendment had been defeated.
What seems to be the most important facet of this case is simply the fact that the decision was made.
Presidential powers had been expanding up until this point, either in delegations of power from Congress,
as seen in the expansion of the commerce power in Wickard and Jones and Laughlin, or in actions taken
by the executive such as in Korematsu. It could not serve as formal precedent because of the
concurrences; however, it marked a shift in the Court towards judicial activism. So egregiously had the
administration overstepped its bounds that judicial restraintists such as Burton and Frankfurter had to
declare the seizure null and void.
Upon Chief Justice Vinson’s sudden death in 1953, Earl Warren was nominated to take his place. As
Chief Justice, Warren would reverse the trend of judicial restraint and enter the “political thicket” in terms
of the Court’s choice to answer questions formerly regarded as being exclusively political and up to
Congress. The best example of this is how the Court reversed itself on apportionment of congressional
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districts. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green had addressed this issue. In regard to the claim made
by plaintiffs (a group of Illinois voters) that the division of their congressional districts favored rural
districts with less population, Justice Frankfurter held that this was a political question and was improper
for the Supreme Court to answer. Their claims for remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment were
disregarded because the Court felt it would be improper to delve too deeply into the powers of Congress.
However, in Baker v. Carr the Court saw fit to jump into the “political thicket.” It was justiciable as it
involved “the consistency of state action with the Federal Constitution.” As the Court reached a height of
judicial activism under Warren the Court handed down decisions such as Powell v. McCormack and
Watkins v. United States. Here the Court encroached on the activities of the House, and the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (“HUAC”) respectively. In Powell, the Court found the House could not
refuse to seat a member because of allegations of wrongdoing. Petitioner, Adam Powell, met the
requirements set forth in the Constitution and Warren wrote in his favor in a majority opinion stating, a
“determination of petitioner Powell’s right to sit would require no more than an interpretation of the
Constitution.” To Warren, the Courts had a constitutional responsibility to interpret the constitution and
he refused to avoid such questions as Frankfurter and Burton had. This attitude would get the Court in
trouble as it prodded Congress too much. Similar to the “switch in time that saved nine,” there was a
switch from Watkins to Barenblatt. In Watkins, the Court engaged with the question of Congress’ powers
of investigation, determining that HUAC had not given petitioner, John Watkins, sufficient notice of
which questions he was required to answer. The House was infuriated by this activism. Eventually the
Court would overturn the decision of Watkins in 1957 with Barenblatt, handed down in 1959. Barenblatt
was initially ruled in light of Watkins but when the House began discussing removing the congressional
power of investigation from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Court performed judicial acrobatics in
order that it might retain the balance between the branches of government by still having jurisdiction in
areas of congressional investigation. The trend of judicial activism, clearly, went too far.
In the instance of Youngstown, though, it did not go too far. The problem was that Youngstown became a
stepping stone on the path to judicial activism. While not giving their assent to Black’s judicial activist
position, Frankfurter and Burton had nonetheless given Black a seal of approval in the form of a vote
against respondent.
While Black can certainly be attacked for his absolutist position, at least he is consistent in his
application. The dissent and the concurrences of all the justices but Black and Douglas established that
there had to be at least some inherent powers set out in Article II. The degrees of this power, however,
were widely varied. Black did not allow a judicial anomaly to arise in the form of failing to address
whether constitutional questions could be asked on a preliminary injunctive motion, and his position
represented his consistently literalist approach to the Constitution. In the area of free speech, to be sure,
many regarded Black’s views as absurd. But considering Chief Justice Vinson’s gross misuse of the clear
and present danger standard in Dennis v. United States, rigid consistency may be better than running the
risk of being arbitrary and capricious in jurisprudence. This entails the argument of predictable judicial
rule of law. Is it more important for an issue to be decided than for it to be the right decision? While the
decision in Youngstown can be seen as the correct one, it may not have definitively decided the issue.
This brings up the concurrences within the case – would it have been better to establish precedent that the
Court could use? The concurring justices could have joined Black’s opinion. The effect would be a
predictable rule of law regarding the executive, rather than allowing it room to continue growing in
power. On the other hand, Black’s opinion is very difficult to join. It leaves no room for interaction
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between the three branches, and that interplay is certainly a part of the idea of checks and balances, if not
the separation of powers.
In addition, another possible problem with Black’s opinion presents a judicial anomaly. If the Court was
for slow-operating government, would it not make sense for the Court to not hear the merits on a
preliminary injunction? If the government is expected to move slowly in making a decision, then surely,
the judicial branch must move even slower in examining them. If the process of governing is to be a slow
one, without the kinds of bursts of executive power seen here, then it ought to be consistent across the
three branches. The harms to the steel mills were considered salient, though, while the harm to the public
interest was not.
Although this decision was the correct one, its reasoning is far from sound. It was a first step. But it is
possible it should have been a first step towards regulation of Article II powers, rather than judicial
activism. Has Youngstown stopped the executive power from expanding? Certainly not. Perhaps in this
respect Black’s opinion was justifiable. The existence of “crises” did not cease with Truman. The
Korean conflict was followed by conflicts in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
This is but one area in which executive power has expanded. As commander in chief the President has
been authorized to deploy troops, but must seek the approval of Congress once the sixty day mark has
passed. The War Powers Resolution governs this area of law, but has either been ignored or mitigated by
the fact that the people are usually with the President in making war for a period of time. If the Court’s
objective were to limit executive power a true majority opinion would be needed. The Court seems to
have gone down the path of judicial activism, the result of which was for Congress to threaten to take
away the Court’s jurisdiction in regards to cases of congressional investigation.