Anton Chekhov

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Clickers quizzes
 Research Assignment
 Final Exam
 Diligent (100%) reading, preparation, attendance, participation

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Concert of Europe
Traditional enemies: north/south
Key to military: “technology”
Construction of EMPIRE
War with Japan
World War I

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Mil. leadership embarrassed
Marxist ideology: defined enemy
Ideology rejected states/nations
“Workers of the World Unite”
Civil War -- Whites/interventions
Amorphous union: Internationale
USSR (CCCP)

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Stalin / Trotsky
World Depression / Isolation
Inward turning Central Planning
Purges/all challengers (military) '
“Socialism in One Country”
Pact with Germany (secret)
Baltics, Poland

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Katyn Forest
1941 Nazis Attack north / south real agenda near collapse, heroism, desperation
Alliance with West – promises '
Stalingrad

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Working toward different objectives
(Brits, US, Soviets)
“Spheres of Influence” bargain
Linchpin: “Democracy”
Truman & THE BOMB
“Uncle Joe: the schemer”
Iron Curtain

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UNO Advantage: USSR ...
Pol/Econ buffer -- client states
Play ‘hard ball’ in Berlin ‘48
Test A-Bomb ‘49
China becomes Communist ‘49
Ideological antipathy = Cold War
Korean conflict -- gets hot ‘51

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Abandons ideology self-serving state
Paranoid behavior (elites)
Tightens control EE / other CPs
Disparages Chinese
Leaves no direction at death ‘53

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Peaceful co-existence
“THAW” denounces Stalin -- “reformer” visits US / Nixon to Moscow
Sputnik ‘57
Castro to power in Cuba ‘59
Summit with Pres. Kennedy

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Missiles in Turkey
U-2 Shoot-down
Rookies in the White House?
Bay of Pigs
Vienna Summit & “truth”
Khrushchev warns: will make you feel as vulnerable as we feel

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High drama
Communication problem
Psychology – zero-sum thinking
Domestic & Foreign “politics”
What qualities to those that prevail ?

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Venue change
Domestic politics gets ugly …
Prague Spring; reform pressures ‘68
Soviet leadership: '
Brezhnev Kosygin (LBJ)
Real complications: Ho, geog,
RVN, Chinese & French before

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Nixon & Kissinger
China rapprochement
Carter: “human rights”
Mutual nuclear buildup
Afghanistan ’78, ‘79
Managing East Europe !!
Brezhnev Doctrine & rules

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No CLEAR rules bilateral relationships; hub no export of reform; no patterns no domestic & foreign divergence no double exposure

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Kosygin dead; Brezhnev dying
Andropov / Chernenko leadership
Buildup on cruise-control
Third world adventures (timid)
“professional thief” '
Where have all the believers gone?
State proud!
More challenge to manage EE

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Concept: USSR / “Internationale”
Socialism in One Country
Builders of Socialism &
Peaceful Co-existence Among
Countries with Differing Social
Systems
Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty

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Glasnost
Perestroika -- New Union Treaty
NEW THINKING
Perceived problems: treated like pariah non-competitive force = glue holding alliance

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Soften tone
Create co-operation arms agreements seek aid make state more “typical” become world “citizen”
NO USE OF FORCE

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How ideologically driven was SFP?
Did the structure of the Soviet system influence SFP?
How “aggressive” was SFP?
How central was the military to SFP?
When was force challenged as a basis for
SFP?
What was the LEGACY of SFP?
?

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CC Dept. of International Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
KGB
Ministry of Defense
“Friendship” Organizations
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Ministry of Foreign Trade
POLITBURO Council of Ministers

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Duma Committees
SVR
Security Council
Foreign Ministry
Defense Ministry
Interdepartmental Committee on
Foreign Policy
+

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PRESIDENT edicts in lieu failed/slow process large scale int’l negotiations control of Security Council memb authoritarian personality
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Regionalization / challenge

Branches of Power

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Dimitry Medvedev , President
Vladimir Putin , Prime Minister
Sergei Lavrov , Minister of Foreign Affairs
Nikolai Patrushev , Security Council
Anatoly Serdyukov , Minister of Defense
Director of SVR
Foreign Intelligence Agency
Director, GRU
Military Intelligence Agency
Director of FSB
Federal Security Services
Minister Econ. Dev. & Trade

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Military
Economic
Commercial
Diplomatic
Cultural & Scientific
“Mass”

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Asians, labor, parochialism
Productivity, resources, currency
Support, democ, mil, homeostasis, leaders
Non-zero sum, aversion to war, perceived US non-commitment

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‘92-’93 politics by default … the challenge … duma vs. pres.
the new “constitution” foreign dilemma: support Yeltsin?
Chechnya
Russia in Bosnia & Kosovo
Election ‘95-’96: support Yeltsin?
Massive deterioration ... +

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August ‘98 Collapse!
Policy drift …
Dec. ‘99
Jan. ‘00 factors ill indictment maneuver
March ‘00 PUTIN

(Cold War remnants
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Détente vs. Linkage
Zero / Non-zero sum thinking
Strategic Indigestibility
Permanent Pre-hostilities
Strategic Ambiguous Equivalence
Parity
? For 21 st Century ?

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Prosperity, Stability, Independence
Enhance predictability by following international rules
Dismantle confrontational structures
External relations designed to support domestic development
“Reactive foreign policy”

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“Russia sees no state as hostile to it and will not use force for any purpose other than defense.”
Russian security (operationalized) a function of economics, ecology, demography, energy and health.
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Specifics: eliminate tactical nucs support global defense system (GPALS/not SDI) create stable arms control mechanisms

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Multilateralism
Treaty with Japan (peace)
Cooperation with moderate regimes in Middle East
Link with most prosperous LA &
African
(Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Angola,
Nigeria & S. Africa)
Gravitate toward democratic states
Seeing them as friends

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Atlanticists – tie future & fortunes to WEST
Eurasianists – variant A tie future to “soviet” sphere
East Europe & former republics
-- variant B tie future to China & Islamic world

Yeltsin & Kozyrev
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Russia rejects superpower status because it represents an
“effort to decide the world’s destiny”
Russia is a great power based on history, its place in the world and its material and spiritual potential
Russia can become strong by means other than military
“Living without an enemy in foreign policy is difficult for Russians”

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 increase aid underline independence undermine NATO attract investment dominate region create economic dependencies in
Central Europe
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 achieve full G-8 status establish “convertible” ruble achieve acceptance of “sphere of influence” embrace requests for re-integration boost exports curb outflow of capital

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Air Force, Air Defense, Army, Navy,
Strategic Missile Forces
Generic Problems: financial, leadership, manpower force restructuring, materiel
Acute: Chechnya, Black Sea Fleet,
Nuclear weapons

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First Chechen war ’94 = failure
Yeltsin “reform” of military shoes, pay, one meal a day reduce # generals to 1500
(1/108) raise spending level to Britain
Multi-ethnic confusion
Pilots 10hrs training per year

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No major warships at sea
20,000 nuclear weapons
(? functional)
Draft: 11% reporting
(many seeking med treatment)
Weapons development thwarted
(occasional spasms of image-building) new strategic missile, torpedo, slbm

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Absence of specialized training
Limitations: terrain, night, urban
Casualty prone tactics; tech sparse
Low morale
Pay problems; manpower (draft)
Soviet breakup reverberations
Spetsnaz; kontraktniks

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No jet long range bombers
Excellent air combat planes
Problems with training and budgets
Rugged, unrefined approach – pilot focused not tech focused
Career long enlistments 25 yrs
Defense focused
Taran & Night Witches as examples

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Surface to Air (SAM) missiles
Long, Medium & Short range
Airborne Warning & Control Systems
(AWACS)
“Early” Warning Radar Systems
Key problems: financial & tech support new boundaries!

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Soviet fleets: Baltic, Pacific, Black Sea
Break-up & crew integrity
Draconian cuts in maintenance & weapons development: Kursk
No rationale for operational global navy
Black Sea fleet; warm water ports
Odessa as key commercial port …

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Created in 1950s
ICBMs (SS19-24) some from ’60s
Launch on Warning: 9-15 min.
Strike any target in 30 min.
Based in silos, trains, trucks
Topol M newest / SS-27 ?20
Roughly 700 missiles

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“raketchiki”
Priority benefits; isolation, patriotism
Danger: early warning systems launch on warning
Security of facilities
Personnel: biorhythms; testing
Implications: key defense; regional capability?

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Search for popularity: patriotism order via state tame Chechnya
Igor Ivanov, Foreign Minister
Confront US Missile Defense
Balk at support Balkans/Iraq policy of US gov

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Longevity …
Aura & commitment in foreign policy
Energize
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Key areas: Near Abroad,
*Strategic Policy,
*Demographics,
NATO
Chechnya

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Asymmetrical nuclear actors
“Human rights”
Chechnya
Politics & business
How connected?
Crisis Management & unilateralism
How independent?
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Bush Approach
Decidedly secondary role for Russia …

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Ivanov’s New Policies
“New Foreign Policy Concept” threats* transparency & predictability restructuring … nucs?
“everything turned out to be much more complicated”

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Idealistic, pro –Western …
National interests …
Superpower mentality …
“Economical” & focused …
Balance … E vs. W
Continuity …

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End of COLD WAR … ? impacted
NATO, UN
Globalization w/ a Human Face
Strategic Stability
Arms agreements …

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Authoritarian texture to policy
Missiles & the militarization of space
Kosovo as model for breakaways
US-Russian chill & culpability
Ukraine / NATO issues

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Four I’s & Seven Tasks
Institutions, Infrastructure,
Innovation, Investments
1. Overcome legal nihilism / reform courts
2. Lower administrative barriers
3. Lower tax burden
4. Make ruble hard currency
5. Modernize transportation & energy
6. Create basis for innovation
7. Develop program for social development

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Per Capita GDP $7700 growth rate 6+% inflation rate 21% unemployment 11% ++
Primary: oil, gas, coal, timber &
Ag: grains, beets, beef, veg
Manufact: mining, machines, textiles, med, transportation

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Exports: to US, Germany, Ukraine primary & some secondary
$105B
Imports: from Germany, Belarus, Ukraine secondary & some tertiary
$45B

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Competitive products?
Investor confidence?
Primary / Secondary / Tertiary
OIL engine for growth engine for revenue vehicle for status
Infrastructure & econ devel ?

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What kinds of AID are needed?
From whom?
IMF & World Bank
EU
G-7
What kind of DEBT is “carried?
What is the debt “service?”

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Russia has hard currency reserves:
$30B
Owes: from USSR days … $78B to US $3.8B
to Europe $65B to Germany alone $42B overall $150B (banks/govs)

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Debt service: $7B 2002
$19B 2003
Current Russian budget: $40B
Roughly 40% of future budgets
Context: higher oil/gas revenues weak ruble – high import prices
– more domestic prod

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2002 US proposed spending
$30B to safeguard R nucs
2003 Congress bill:
Russian debt for nuc safety
Domestic context: GDP 1/15 US
$720B annual GDP … household income up 10%
… most still live in poverty

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Russia-Ukraine
NATO
Black Sea Fleet
Conversion & costs
Manufacturing Dependency
Agricultural products
Belarus
Lukashenko / media / union?

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“Commonwealth of Independent States”
Searching for clarity: “national interests”
Protect Russian people in successor states
Moldova, Central Asia, Ukraine
Need to deploy Russian forces?
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Georgia (army/no navy); Azerbaijan (1 plane air force);
Dneister Rep. (own army); Ossetia (1 tactical nuc)
Borders, borders, borders …

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Ethnic dimension
Ugly history – Stalin
Unstable region / splintered
“domino” effect?
Reveals vulnerability / condition
Government conduct issues
Order vs. peace

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Ossetia … a description
Russian rationale for incursion Aug. ’08
Focus: Policy in Near Abroad
Principle: Regional hegemony
Costs …
Who made the decision?
Russian leadership
Control of the military
Result: Ossetia & Abkazia

Western facing: Near Abroad
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?post-breakup nuclear issues
?conventional military
?commerce & trade
?ethnic relations
?psychological carryover
?regional anxiety / Georgia ‘08

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General economic relations – trade, aid, dependency
Caspian conundrum …
War on Terrorism
Instability & opportunity ?
Ethnic realities …

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Sino-Russian alternative
How “attractive” is the partner?
Russia-China-India
Russian “pathologies”
ABM & Nuclear weapons
Conventional weapon systems
Mutual apprehensions about US
Marriage, courtship or casual friendship?

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US foothold in South Korea
Sustainable bluster …
Russian & Chinese qualms (US)
Crucial distance from regime
Inflated bargaining chip --
NK, RU, CH
NK ? About longevity …
WMD conundrum … pol image & reality

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Terrorist threats
Low morale
Inadequate warning
US ABM systems
Too many enemies with conventional arms

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What happened in the ’90’s?
Support, frustration, failure …
NATO expansion
US-Russian military cooperation
Business & investment
Visibility & status of Russia …
?US strategy & objectives

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“players” qualifications
Russian case: size, nucs, region
Econ potential: energy, market
EU wild card …
China? Brazil? Other …
? gain from Club status

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Future inside or outside …
Isolation
Which has greater meaning for the future?
Upside … downside
Russian assets

*BASICS early history images
*Basis of Conflict / Cooperation
“superpower” status
“national interest”

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Cold War ideology
History (other than Cold War)
WW1, WW2, Tsars, Lenin
Personal & Heritage factors
Afghanistan
Iraq
Terrorism

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40% Russians perceived World thinks “Russia good”
Of those thinking Russia is treated well … generally they feel that the situation is improving
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46% Russians perceive World thinks “Russia bad”
Of those thinking Russia is treated poorly…
60% say it is UNFAIR; 22% it is objective
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The above numbers further analyzed reveal that these opinions range across all social demographic groups

October 11, 2004
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Do you think Russia has external enemies that are able to unleash a war against us?
’98 ’99 ’01 ‘04
YES 44% 73% 61% 68%

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25% USA
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7% Arab & Moslem countries
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68% Russia has friends;
16% no friends
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“Friends” (in order)
Germany (16), France (12), Belarus (12),
Ukraine (9), USA (8), China (7), Kazakstan ( 5)

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68% say Russia has foreign enemies who wish to unleash war against it.
18% say NO.
Who are these “enemies?” most mentioned: USA 25%
Arabs & Moslems 14%
Internatl terrorism 15% other Western countries 5%
Putin: war had been declared against Russia
37% agree; 44% disagree

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March 2005
“Only democrats with their split personalities, could believe that we might get help from abroad. Nobody will help us except ourselves. Therefore, we should be powerful and capable of guaranteeing our national security in any situation – without being an ogre or a monster frightening the rest of the world.
I hope that, having borrowed the best from everyone, we will build our own
Russian democracy.”

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Russians obviously agree that a hostile attitude towards Russia exists in the world today. In keeping with the ideologically shaped Soviet era ‘potential enemy’ concept, many regard the USA as the chief threat. At the same time, terrorism recently came to be regarded as the major foe.
22% of those who think the world’s attitude towards Russia is bad believe that Russia deserves it .
European nations are widely seen as friends.

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42% situation in Iraq is worsening
30% situation unchanged;
5% improving
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Iraqi resistance?
51% will get stronger;
18% remain the same;
6% will weaken

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rather negative 71% (late 2004) undecided ……..15% positive ………….14%

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March ’03 11% sympathy toward Bush
January ’04 20%
April ’04 13%
60% “dislike” Bush
… 74% of university graduates

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Bush: “Democracies have certain things in common: they have rule of law and protection of minorities, a free press, and a viable political opposition.”
Bush: “The Russian government must renew its commitment to democracy and the rule of law. We must always remind
Russia that our alliance stands for a free press, a vital opposition, sharing power and the rule of law.”

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Putin: “The implementation of the principles and norms of democracy should not be accompanied through the collapse of the state and the impoverishment of the people. Democracy is not anarchy; it is not the chance to do anything you want. It is not the chance for anyone to rob his own people.”
“Russia chose a democratic path 14 years ago and did so not in order to make itself compatible with anyone, but for its own good. Naturally, the fundamental principles of democracy must be adapted to the reality of today’s life in
Russia, to our traditions and history.”

Putin: “A global battle for natural resources has begun. Many conflicts carry a whiff of gas and oil.
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NATO is drawing ever-closer to
Russia
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“We shut down our bases in Cuba and Vietnam and what did we get in return? New American bases in
Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Czech
Republic.”

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FM Sergei Lavrov:
US Missiles encircling Russia
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“imperial thinking”
“missile shield” veiled encirclement soon hundreds of missiles positioned
“… very naïve to assume that the American missile-defense base in Europe is aimed against anything but Russia.”

“New phase in the militarization of space”
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Political demonstration
No consultation with Russia
Tests capacity to destroy other countries’ satellites
New strategic weapon
Chinese have destroyed one of their satellites with mil objective in mind

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Medvedev: US engineered Kosovo declaration of independence
US: Russian unhelpful
“No sober-minded person doubts Russia’s contribution to a Kosovo settlement.”
Ossetia (Georgia/Russia)
Abkhazia (Georgia/Russia)
Transdneister (Moldova/Ukraine)
Chechnya (Russia)
All use Kosovo as precedent/model!
“atomization of larger states” brute force prevails
“Russia does not have any punitive measures in the arsenal of its foreign policy tools.”

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US is “financial aggressor” and “economic terrorist”
Forced its monetary unit and free enterprise standards on the rest of the world
Unless Russia more assertive, “we’d be treated as a Third World country … something like Upper
Volta with nuclear missiles.”
“Good for Russia to bare its teeth when important issues are at stake.”
“When you allow others to push you and keep pushing, these others inevitably stop taking you seriously.”

Medvedev: “work with any”
“business of the American people”
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“It is certainly easier to work with a person who has modern positions and is not blinded
 by the past.”
Institute of Political research: Markov
“a victory for Senator McCain would be the worst-case scenario”
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McCain: “I looked into Putin’s eyes and saw the letters KGB.” McCain wants Russia out of
G-7.

Clinton: “Putin doesn’t have a soul.”
Putin :
“A head of state should have a head.”
Obama: Since Putin will remain in charge,
“We should work on arms control and mutual interests while not neglecting democracy and accountability.”

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Russia gets weaker …
Russia gets aggressive …
Russia joins Europe (EU) …
Russia creates Eurasian alliances …
Russia permits … capitalist colonialization
• Russia disintegrates …

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On what basis would you make a prediction?
What factors could cause you to change your prediction?
Is more change imposed on Russia from within or from outside?

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Does Russia have assets?
Who needs Russia?
Does Russia’s power go up or down in parallel with ________’s
 power?
Best way to deal with Russia …
“carrot or stick?”

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Russians love the past, hate the present and fear the future
Chekhov
Any Russian who doesn’t honor the past has no soul; any Russian who wants to return to the past has no brain.
Putin
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Autocrat or Democrat?
Symbol: Double Eagle facing both ways …

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 if $1 = 1 second on a clock …
$80 B
80,000,000,000 = 2,560 years
$300 B
300,000,000,000 = 9,600 years
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$1 T
1,000,000,000,000 = 32,000 years

Medvedev: US and European interests qualitatively different
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Putin: warned against NATO membership; hostile to Russia; retaliatory actions including targeting missile systems in Ukraine.
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Ukraine: “If Putin is afraid, then fear will prevent him from taking illconsidered steps against Ukraine.”

Other Objectives / Priorities
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Middle East “player” status
Reconsidered relations with China
Reconstructing SOVIET sphere
Medvedev: Russia will establish a common economic zone --
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Georgia

Foreign Minister Lavrov recently announced that he expects the relationship with ________ to be non-violent and based on international norms
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
EU
North Africa
China
North Korea
Middle East