Anti-Corruption Reforms: Lessons Learned
from Africa
by
Sahr Kpundeh
Flagship Course on Governance and AntiCorruption
December 1-3, 2003
Overview of Presentation
 Introduction
 Main Arguments
 Framework—Process vs. Structural Interventions
 Arrangements for Combating Corruption
 Dedicated Institutions
 Four Scenarios of Anti-Corruption Interventions
 Conclusions
Introduction
 Africa’s development discourse reshaped from narrow
focus on technical dimensions of economic policy to
notions of good governance
 Shift traced to wave of democratization in early 1990’s
 World Bank President speech on the “cancer of
corruption” in October 1996 an important moment in the
process
 Six years later, data show no systematic evidence of
decline in corruption between 1996 and 2002.
Cont’d.
 Some suggest the single most evident consequence of the
attention to corruption has been a resurgence of cynicism
among African citizens
 Key question then is “was the emphasis on fighting
corruption misplaced?”, or was the potentially fatal
character of the disease correctly diagnosed, only to
subsequently discover that it has turned out to be
incurable?
Central Arguments
 Shining the spotlight on corruption was not mistaken,
nor is the challenge hopeless.
 The error was in presuming that the cure lay in narrowly
targeted anti-corruption data-collection and awareness
raising campaigns.
 The crucial lesson over the past six years has been that
the roots of corruption lie in dysfunctional state
institutions.
Cont’d.
 Anti-corruption campaigns are not a substitute for the difficult
task of public sector reform and capacity building.
 An emphasis on fighting corruption can play a valuable role as
part of a virtuous spiral of mutually-reinforcing process and
structural interventions.
 In practice though, little has been done across the continent to
encourage linkages between process and institutional
interventions.
 The failure to recognize the benefits of a two-pronged reform
approach has impeded the ability to build a legitimate, credible
and institutionalized effort to address corruption and ultimately
sustain change.
Process Interventions and
Structural Change: A Framework
 Process Interventions inform and educate the citizenry
about the impact of corruption and are often the first steps
in changing a culture of corruption and weak service
delivery.
 Some examples may include moralization campaigns,
local or citizen efforts to pressure public officials to use
public resources for civic not private purposes—process
of changing the way government’s act in decision
making—some of such decisions may have to address
structural issues.
Limitations of Process
Interventions
 As is increasingly being recognized, the disabling weakness of
an exclusive reliance on process interventions to combat
corruption is that it presupposes that exhortation and moral
suasion will be sufficient to transform the behavior of both
public officials and citizens.
 Some are quick fix measures or moralizing campaigns that fail
to focus on institutionalizing structural reforms or establish
durable and lasting legitimate political processes.
 The effectiveness of efforts to combat corruption depends at
least as much on the quality of the core public institutions and
processes.
Arrangements for combating
corruption
Prevention
Detection
Core State
Institutions
Checks and balances--separation of
legislature, executive and judiciary
(horizontal accountability)
Budget management (treasury,
procurement, audit)
Declaration of public officials’ assets
Political competition and accountability
Freedom of information; Meritocratic
civil service/adequate pay
Decentralization -(vertical
accountability)
Police
Parliamentary
oversight
Community oversight
Ombudsman
Auditor General
Free media
Dedicated
AntiCorruption
Programs
Ombudsman;
Anticorruption Agencies outreach
programs- seminars for business leaders;
helps public and non-state actors identify
strategies for reducing corruption; funds
studies of corruption; community
relations highlighting awareness,
prevention and sanctions
Anti-corruption
agencies – conduct
searches, examine bank
accounts, audit private
assets
Enforcement
Justice System
Anti-corruption agencies
– seize property,
incarcerate individuals,
Arrangements for Combating
Corruption
 The table distinguishes between the three central elements of
the fight against corruption – prevention, detection, and
enforcement. As the first row of the table highlights, core
public institutions play a central role in all three.
 Corruption prevention is advanced through institutionally
structured check and balance arrangements, supported by
transparency.
 Corruption detection is advanced through governance
structures which oversee how public resources are used,
combined with policing and prosecutorial services which
investigate criminal activity.
 Anti-corruption enforcement is the responsibility of the justice
system.
Cont’d.
 The second row of the table summarizes how dedicated
anti-corruption agencies engage each of these efforts. I
will argue later that if the core public institutions are in
place, these dedicated agencies can add value on the
margin: buttressing prevention by intensifying public
awareness, and strengthening detection by adding to the
supply of specialist anti-corruption investigatory
capabilities.
 The more difficult question posed by table 2 is: what is
the value of these dedicated agencies if the core public
institutions are underdeveloped?
Three Possible Responses
 One possible answer could be that these agencies add no value
because they lack any impartial and credible means of
enforcement – and indeed might be of negative value because
they detract from the need for systemic reforms.
 Alternatively, anti-corruption agencies might be argued to add
value as a stopgap, an interim measure enabling a newlyempowered political leadership that genuinely is committed to
stamp out corruption to demonstrate some results in the shortterm, even as it embarks on the long-run process of
institutional reform.
 A third answer derives from considering the interaction
between process and structural interventions from a more
dynamic perspective.
Virtuous Spiral vs. Burn-Out
Populism
Structural Institutions
Goal of process
intervention is
participatory
structural
reforms
Structures
empower
participation
Process Interventions
Linking Process and Structural
Interventions
 Viewed in this way, dedicated anti-corruption programs emerge
as part of a sequence of change in which process interventions
are linked with structural change in a virtuous cycle— a means
to educate and move changes forward, with increased
participation generating pressure for structural interventions
which improve public performance.
 In other words, how do we make sure there is pay-off to
participation? Corruption is not a marginal issue, and if it is
going to be taken seriously, marginal institutions cannot just be
created. I submit that our thinking should be shaped by how
we approach the structure/process interactions.
Cont’d.
 Put differently,
political leaders committed to building
state capacity over the long-term, might nonetheless
choose to embark on complementary process reforms.
 The regime leader may be committed to anticorruption
but may lack the leverage and power to implement
change because of clientelism, patronage politics, and the
active opposition of political elites who want and ‘need’
to maintain the status quo.
Cont’d.

In such settings, process interventions can be useful to push
and shake the dynamics within the public sector by raising
civic awareness about the damaging effects of corruption in
society, as well as highlighting the benefits of good governance
and improved service delivery, and consequently
empowerment of citizenry and local government.
 Such interventions can be seen as foundations or entry points
for structural reforms, because they engender participatory
governance that raises awareness about mis-governance in
societies, and hence helps accelerate momentum for change.
 This is all about expectations citizens have about their
governments, and how they can influence their governments as
well. As democratization takes root in Africa, we are
beginning to see how people change their expectations of
government and look for avenues to get their voices heard.
Impact of Dedicated A-C
Institutions
 Several African countries have developed anticorruption
agencies as the central platform for controlling administrative
corruption. While a few have produced significant and
sustained reductions in corruption, most have mixed records of
success.
 Since many have adopted the specific elements proven
effective in Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia, it is worth
asking why these anticorruption reform efforts in Africa have
been unable to replicate their successes.
Analysis of A-C Agencies
 I would like to consider this issue through the lens of the
framework shown earlier by:
 exploring first, the extent to which the modest record of
Africa’s anti-corruptions programs can be linked to
weaknesses in complementary core state institutions, and
 second, the extent to which these programs have played a
positive catalytic role in the dynamic sequence
highlighted earlier.
 But before turning to these issues it is helpful to set the
stage by looking more closely at the key characteristics
of some successful agencies outside of Africa.
Characteristics
 Five characteristics are highlighted – using illustrations from





agencies outside of Africa, as benchmarks for assessing their
African counterparts.
First, independence is fundamental.
Second, they are well financed operations and have budget
predictability.
Third, key complementary institutions work relatively well—
workable justice systems, courts, police, etc.
Fourth, the media plays a critical role in raising awareness of
the citizenry as well as reporting fairly and objectively.
Fifth, effective anti-corruption agencies are themselves
accountable for performance (with checks and balances to
ensure that independence is not compromised) -- the process of
so-called guarding the guardians.
Some Features of AntiCorruption Agencies in Africa
Country
Independence Budget
Workable
Predictability Core
Institutions
Free
Media
Accountability
Power of
Prosecution
Botswana
---
+
+
+
+
No
Uganda
+
---
xx
---
---
Yes
Zambia
---
xx---
---
xx
---
No
Tanzania
---
---
---
---
---
No
Sierra
Leone
xx
+
xx
xx
---
No
Malawi
---+
---
---
---
---
No
Kenya
xx
---
xx
xx
xx
No
+Strong:
--- Fair:
xx Weak
Four Scenarios of African
cases
 Anti-corruption agency as a compliment to state
institutions.
 Anti-corruption agency as phony populism.
 Anti-corruption agency as a useful short-term substitute
when state institutions are weak.
 Structure-process cumulative change.
Scenario 1
 Compliment to state institutions, e.g. Botswana
Independence—Its statute specify that it is an independent agency that provides
community outreach programs to public and private sectors on the costs of
corruption.
Core state institutions---they work relatively well; checks and balances in the
system; official cooperation mandated; the DCEC has been relatively successful
in dealing with cases of corruption, most of which have been brought before the
courts and resulted in prosecutions and sentences.
Budget Predictability ---The total budgetary provision for the financial year
2000/2001 was approx. U.S.$2.4m, as against U.S.$ 2.2m for the previous year –
an increase in their budget; civil servants are well paid including DCEC officials,
in comparative terms to public sector employees.
Media– Free media that contributes to awareness raising and reports objectively
Accountability-- strong emphasis on horizontal and vertical accountability.
Scenario 2
 Phony populism----Sierra Leone and Malawi
--Sierra Leone
Independence—Some operational independence; Act states it cannot be subject
to the control of any person or authority
Core Institutions—very weak judiciary, enforcement agencies compromised,
general disregard for accountability mechanisms (numerous examples of
corrupt police, judges; officials in key government positions); Parliament
insignificant as an oversight body
Budget predictability—key support from DFID, and some from SLG; 2002
budget was US.$6.5m, a decrease from US$8.5 in 2001
Accountability– submits annual reports to the President; requires consent from
AG to prosecute; Advisory Committee appointed by the President assists the
Commission in performance of their duties—advise on appointments,
discipline, etc.
Media—relatively weak, sensationalism and lack of professional techniques to
do good investigative journalism; law discourages free flow of information to
the public.
Contrast
 When the Sierra Leone and Malawi cases are contrasted with
the Botswana case, one can argue the following:
 the lack of supportive institutional state structures in both
Sierra Leone and Malawi such as the judiciary, parliaments,
and other democratic accountability mechanisms, coupled with
the general lack of effective leadership and commitment to
leverage change in the anti-corruption fight resulted in the anticorruption agencies been used as populist measures to appease
donors.
 Operational constraints demonstrate they are meant to be token
efforts or their establishment are populist moves by the
politicians to give the impression they are taking steps to
improve governance and address corruption.
Scenario 3
 Effective short-term substitutes----Uganda, Zambia,
Tanzania
Uganda—
Independence-- 1995 constitution established the IGG’s independence
Accountability– reports to Parliament and required to submit regular reports.
Complimentary Institutions—relatively weak judiciary; police and other
accountability institutions are plagued with “allegations” of going after small
fry; other institutions play a role—Auditor General, DPP, etc. Ethics and
Integrity Directorate established to coordinate A-C efforts
Media—relatively free and plays a role in sensitization against corruption.
Access to key information is limited, e.g. reports from Commissions of
inquiry
Budget predictability—poor funding for IGG; concern that some A-C efforts are
duplicated by other bodies leading to resource dissipation.
Uganda Cont’d.
 The Uganda case demonstrates the need to have
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an institutional
framework in place that complements each other in the fight against
corruption.
However, despite the plethora of institutions, there has not been
much success because the core institutions are relatively weak
Anti-corruption interventions led by the IGG are used as a stop-gap
measure to raise awareness about the ills of corruption while much
still needs to be done in the areas of detection and enforcement.
There are perennial problems with the proc. systems, weak FM,
cases of diversion of budgetary funds, poor audit coverage, etc.
There is some evidence of selective impunity ranging from cases
involving the former VP, cabinet ministers censured by Parliament
for wrongdoing, but later given positions in either the Movement or
retained as ministers with no attempts made to recover allegedly
stolen funds.
Uganda Cont’d.
 On the bright side, within the Govt.’s Strategy and Plan of Action to
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fight corruption, several positive steps have been taken to strengthen
the core institutions, for e.g.
the legal framework and the capacity of law enforcement have been
strengthened with the enactment and application of the Leadership
Code 2000
Enactment and application of the IGG Bill 2000
Enactment and application of the revised Local Government Act
Auditor General’s Act has been revised and strengthened
Case management by DPP has been computerized.
A new set of Public Finance Procurement Regulations (PFPR) has
been approved and in use;
A reformed Central Tender Board has commenced operation, and
Procurement Units have being established in all procuring organs of
government
A pay reform proposal is been considered by cabinet.
Zambia (1)
 The Anti-Corruption Commission in Zambia shares similar features with the
Uganda and Tanzania cases.
 Unlike Uganda and Tanzania where there was alleged political support, the
Commission under former President Chiluba was considered to be his tool,
with regular interference from politicians and relegating its focus only on
petty corruption.
 The level of investigations and prosecutions were comparatively low;
resources were insufficient and there was serious staff shortage.
 The institutional framework was weak--Commission has to get the consent of
the DPP before prosecuting a case; he can refuse to give consent for
prosecution without citing reasons.
 There has been a general lack of predictability of the Commission’s budget
over the years. From 1998 –2000, the Commission’s budget was reduced
from approximately US$3.5m to US$2.9m. The Executive always
drastically reduced its proposed budget and even the little money allocated in
the budget is not released in full.
 The picture above makes the case for Zambia to belong under the category of
“phony populism”, where it I believe it was under former President
Zambia (2)
 Under the current President, the Commission has received a
much higher profile, because he has used his leadership to
leverage change in the fight against corruption with a policy of
“zero tolerance” for corruption immediately after elections.
 He dismissed or demoted a number of senior govt. officials
associated with corruption under the previous and his own
govt. including his former VP, the AG, Minister of
Information, the Foreign Minister, and the Permanent
Secretary of the Ministry of Finance.
 The budget of the ACC was increased significantly and its
facilities were upgraded.
 Complementary institutions such as the DPP and the judiciary
also responded to these signals by moving aggressively on
corruption cases, putting close allies of former President
Chiluba under investigation.
Analysis of Cases
 The cases show three different roles of A-C agencies—but the
important question then becomes “under what conditions do ACC
contribute to building momentum against corruption or becoming
phony populist moves to generally appease donors or domestic
critics?
 One possible answer may be when there is strong leadership that uses
their power to leverage change--regular political pronouncements
coupled with their support for strengthening the capacity of
institutional mechanisms.
 Alternatively, in situations where the A-C efforts are used to stir up
activism that leads to burn out, the leadership, as in Sierra Leone and
Malawi lacks the political clout to leverage change primarily because
of the nature of the political dynamics as well as the immaturity of
the existing democratic accountability mechanisms--crony politics,
nepotism, patronage politics, and the presence of an elite group who
may want to maintain the status quo.
Scenario 4—Cumulative Change
 Structure-process cumulative change – 3 phases
 First Phase--1991 donor coordinated action paved the way for 1992 multi-party
general elections
 Second phase--was “Dream Team” phase (1997-2000)
-- civil society mobilization, media, TI-Kenya (building pressure)
--Parliamentary Select Committee (List of Shame Report); APNAC making sure
corruption issue stayed on agenda and picked up by donors; 24 committed members
last year, 12 got re-elected t the house and 8 are in cabinet
 Third Phase 2002 election phase
-- electoral change (inquiries on past major corruption, e.g. Goldenberg)
-- legal Framework—Economic Crimes Bill, Ethics and Code of Conduct Bill (declaration
of assets); new Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs; new KACC with
prosecutorial powers
-- public sector reforms—capacity building to strengthen accountability and
complimentary institutions--supporting capacity building in the Ministry of
Finance that will lead to improvements in expenditure management and
accountability: systems auditing is being introduced in the Internal Audit
Department, IFMIS is being implemented that will lead to better budget
execution and accountability.
An example of how cynicism and regime change can highlight the hazards of anti-
Several Conclusions
 The experiences of African anti-corruption agencies
suggest that the state in these countries either lack the
know-how or the political will to control corruption.
 The ineffectiveness that characterizes anticorruption
institutions are artificial political problems created
deliberately as instruments of political management
whose intentions are twofold: one, to ensure structurally
ineffective reform agencies; and two, to openly
demonstrate to donors that the government has taken
action.
Cont’d.
 A ‘glass half-empty’ view on the impact of anti corruption activities
in Africa in the 1990s– a pessimistic perspective--the 1990s seen to
have begun with a wave of popular revulsion against corruption and
mis-governance, culminating in the emergence in many countries of
new political leaders who asserted their readiness for a new, ‘clean’
beginning.
 A ‘glass-half-full’ angle of vision highlights the dynamic, cumulative
nature of the governance change process. The clamor against
corruption was a first necessary step which transformed the
development discourse across the continent: extravagant efforts at
self-enrichment could no longer hide behind soothing, empty
affirmations of selfless commitment to national development.
Cont’d.
 Certainly, the initial expectation was naive that the problem would be
solved merely by exposing corruption and campaigning against it,
even to the point of committing to ‘zero tolerance’. But the emerging
lesson that a reduction against corruption depends upon stronger core
state institutions is an important one.
 The above discussions highlights both the risk and the opportunity of
bringing the fight against corruption to the top of the development
discourse.
 The risk is that an exclusive reliance on process interventions can
lead to “burn out” populism and apathy.
 The opportunity is that, if used skillfully by political leaders, a
commitment to fight corruption can unleash the civic energy needed
for sustained institutional change.
Q&A
and
Discussion