PHILIP KELLY
Wither Democracy? My Search For Likely Causes
Part One: Introduction
I briefly define “democracy” thusly: majority rule, with minority protections.
Other fuller definitions to this important concept would suffice, too. But, I chose
not to define the democracy concept more exactly, because I do not want to get
myself entangled within the many definitions, often contradictory ones, that are
available. That is not my mission in this paper. Nonetheless, not having a set
definition to direct me may hinder my attempts at locating specific conditions or
causes for democracy, the goal of this query. Alas, I admit that problem, but I will
ignore it.
To me, democracy figures as the best form of government yet devised, for a
variety of reasons - better transparency, efficiency, human rights, power
transitions of elites, among other reasons. Unfortunately, for a process and an
institution as vital to us as a democracy, we have few clear indicators of what may
actually create democratic governments. For example, in my own quantitative
(statistical) investigations, I have been limited to finding only several weak
statistical associations that might point to likely causes. These disappointingly few
I will describe below. But, also below, I want to expand beyond the statistical to a
discussion both of the political-theory realm and of my own experiences as an
election observer, all of where I will attempt to winnow out several general
“indicators” of democracy.
Part Two: Possible Statistical Indicators of Democracy
I administered for several decades the Fitzgibbon-Johnson-Kelly survey of
Latin American democracy, a project that encompassed over a half-century of
data collection from a survey administered every five years amongst upwards to
one-hundred prominent North American scholars (Kelly 1998: 3-11). In a
1
stepwise-regression statistical model, I assembled over one-hundred variables in
an attempt toward locating some correlations between some of those variables
and the republics ranking highest on the democracy tabulations. I was
disappointed when just two variables appeared to be significant, “daily
newspaper circulation per capita,” and “tractors per hectare,” both, to me,
yielding little explanatory value. Indeed, the primary variables I thought might
prove relevant, such as “urbanization,” “physical quality-of-life index,” “public
education expenditures per capita,” and “gross national product per capital,” all
failed me as indicators of democracy. In sum, my quantitative search for those allencompassing variables that would provide me a full explanation of democracy
causes clearly eluded me.
A later study of mine pertained to a possibility of predicting certain spatial
features that might relate to Latin American democracy (Kelly and Perez 2002),
but, nonetheless, just one weak connector appeared, that being, the coastal
South American states held higher democracy ratings than did the interior
republics, although, in this study, I could not control effectively for spuriousness.
I am certain that numerous similar investigations can be listed in the extant
literature that could record isolated variables that might associate with
democracy. But, I have yet to find a general, all-encompassing list of variables
systematically linked to democracy causes. In one a recent article (2001), Michael
Ross, for example, found a tie between oil and minerals dependency of nations
and their lacking of democracy. Enlisting a least-squares regression model, he
scored exceedingly high statistical significance in four areas (2008: 356): 1) “oil
does hurt democracy;” 2) regions beyond the Middle East are affected also by this
tendency; 3) “nonfuel wealth likewise impedes democratization;” and 4)
“tentative support” is offered for three causal explanations that may connect oil
and authoritarianism:
[A] rentier effect, through which governments use low tax rates and high
spending to dampen pressures for democracy; a repression effect, by which
governments build up their international security forces to ward off
democratic pressures; and a modernization effect, in which the failure of
2
the population to move into industrial and service sector jobs renders them
less likely to push for democracy.
In a more recent article (2008:107), Ross also noted that “Oil production reduces
the number of women in the labor force, which in turn reduces their political
influence. As a result, oil-producing states are left with atypically strong
patriarchal norms, laws, and political institutions.” His point here: rigid patriarchal
cultures retard freedom.
Again, I could describe other statistical ties, but all weak ones, between
certain variables and democracy. Nonetheless, my search for a rather
comprehensive statistical explanation for the underlying causes for democracy
has not been successful. And, piecemeal findings, those of limited extent, while
useful, will not fully answer my inquiry, either. For instance, I would want these
discoveries: do the wealthier societies, or those with fair distributions of wealth,
correlate with democracy? Or, do high levels of education or low levels of
geographical isolation so correlate? Is democracy better associated with certain
cultures, histories, religions, or ethnicities? But, alas, I have become convinced
that broader explanatory variables of a statistical bent, such as these, that would
lead us to democracy simply do not exist. In sum, this approach will not lend us
much help in determining the conditions or causes that might lead to a
democratic government.
Part Three: the Political-Theory Path to Democracy Causes
Another avenue toward locating causes of democracy has been the work by a
number of political theorists (Mazo 2005). I would define their efforts as
comprised of four rather distinct approaches: the “structuralist;” the “sequencebased” or “historical-development;” the “institutionalist;” and the “agency”
theories. Below, I will offer a brief description of each “school” so that we might
be able to glean distinguishing variables that might help us predict the rise of a
democracy:
1) Structuralists: an exploration of preconditions or prerequisites before
democracy may emerge: the work ethic of Protestantism; a minimal level of
3
economic development leading to a middle class; a culture of compromise
and accommodation; higher literacy and education levels.
2) Sequence-based or historical-development: a pattern of historical
relationships among a sequence of actors appearing in society before
democracy arises: an aristocracy weakening and splitting that would lead to
a bourgeois class; arrival of broader national unity and political
participation before the appearances of political parties and competition.
3) Institutionalist: a state must be modern before it becomes democratic; rule
of law and civil society would precede elections; again, a national unity is
essential; democracy emerges from institutional qualities within the state
itself, such as representative bodies (legislatures, bureaucracies, courts).
4) Agency theory: emphasis upon the role of elites as agents of change; a
serious polarization among elites would eventually evolve into a period of
bargaining that would then lead to democracy; elites sometime committing
themselves to fair and equally-applied rules of a democratic majority;
defeated elites accepting the rule of victorious elites.
Taken together, these four approaches, more than the statistical, have given
me some room to expand my thoughts relative to the causes of democracy. And
they appear to mesh well with my experiences in Paraguay relative to its attempts
to advance democracy despite the nation’s rather repressed history of
dictatorship. I want to contribute a brief mention of these experiences below as
my third path to selecting possible “indicators” of democracy.
Part Four: My Experience as an Election Observer in Paraguay
I served as an election observer to the 1989 presidential and parliamentary
elections of Paraguay. The long-term dictator, General Alfredo Stroessner, had
just been overthrown, and the election campaigns that soon followed his demise
were the first true partisan contests in decades, so this event took on some
historical significance for the Republic. My team of largely North American faculty
was invited to interview, and later, observe, the several groups that were
pertinent to the elections, these being political, business, labor, religious, social,
and other factions of interest. During van rides from place to place in and around
4
Asuncion, during breakfast and dinner discussions, and during other meetings of
assessment and reporting, we grew to focus upon this concept of “democracy,”
and thus, on which might factors might prompt its success, and more
immediately, its past failure in Paraguay. I remember our conversations being
more in the critical and normative fields than in the objective and statistical areas,
at least, to me at the time, those being the more meaningful insights. Thus, my
early notice of these other approaches had taken hold.
I came away from this experience aware of the necessity of elite
contributions toward democracy. General Andres Rodriguez, the army officer
most responsible for Stroessner’s ouster (and a reformed drug smuggler, still very
wealthy from his earnings), insisted upon free elections for president and
parliament. According, these were held, and he subsequently was freely elected
president with an 80% supportive mandate. After his four-year tenure as chief
executive, he willingly stepped down from office, and again, demanded free
elections for his replacement. Rodriguez, to me, contributed mightily to
Paraguay’s growth toward its contemporary democracy, for elections since then
have been largely free, and, at present, an opposition party leader holds the
presidency.
Part Five: Six Factors That Might Underlay the Success of Democracy
In this paper I want to pursue six “indicators” I thought worthy of our
panel’s discussions, these factors being what I believe to be essential variables to
the success of establishing and/or of maintaining a democratic system. I offer
these six democracy indicators for consideration; they are not meant to be
exhaustive, as other variables might be pondered as well. Following my brief
examination of these traits, I will apply each of them to a case study pertinent to
Central American politics, that of contrasting the republic of Costa Rica, the top
democracy among the twenty Latin American countries according to my
Fitzgibbon scale of democracy, with its close neighbor, Nicaragua, normally
ranking at the bottom-most ranks in the democracy scale.
I offer the following descriptors of democracy, in order of importance, for
your consideration:
5
1) A great leader or statesperson, one who would dedicate himself/herself
unselfishly and effectively to fostering the institutions of democracy
within his/her country. For the United States, a George Washington or
Abraham Lincoln, for Mexico, a Lazaro Cardenas, for Costa Rica, a Jose
Figueres, for Brazil, a Luiz Lula da Silva. This list, of course, could be
much expanded, relative to one’s own perspective.
Such individuals would be a rare national treasure, completely
honest and wholly committed to constructing and maintaining
democratic institutions and practices. Emitting a charisma might assist,
perhaps, but if not, that individual certainly must be a widely respected
leader able convincingly to demonstrate the value of democracy to his
followers and to his countrymen as a whole. His purpose clearly and
consistently would be for the construction of free institutions and
supportive cultures, with a primary goal of presenting to future
generations this ambition as based upon clearly appropriate present
policies and personal examples.
Would Plato assist us here in our search for causes of democracy?
His intent, as I understand it in his masterpiece, The Republic, generally
was to correct the deficiencies he saw in the governments and
leadership of his era, particularly in warning against the harms of the
oligarchic, democratic, and, particularly, tyrannical varieties (Republic,
Book VIII). His preference lay in an aristocracy, or “timocracy,” that
assembled “lovers of wisdom” or philosophers into a leadership cadre
that would bring the “pleasantest life” to all the citizens (Books VIII, IX).
He was primarily interested in clarifying the concepts of wisdom,
courage, temperance, and justice, his “four virtues” (Book IV), and in
suggesting that these qualities be stipulated for the guardians, his
favored leadership elite. Accordingly, much of his content focused on
better educating the guardians by imbuing them with new philosophical
approaches (Books II, VI, IX) and with a more structured, and a less
“poetic,” direction in their instruction (Books III, IV, V, VII, X).
Unfortunately, despite Plato’s intellect and impact upon Western
philosophy, I cannot recommend him to developing a democratic milieu,
6
for reason of his reliance upon a superior elite to rule and of his neglect
of encouraging the active involvement of a wider citizenry. My
description of a democratic leader, being, perhaps, more liberal, gives
more weight to trusting the wisdom of the average voter and to
distrusting the power Plato has given to a guardian class.
2) A cadre of supporters, all loyal to the statesman and to his ambitions for
constructing and maintaining a democracy. Our leader must attract
these supporters to his banner; he cannot effectively proceed toward
goals of democracy without such assistance. Here, I would emphasize a
political party, although, it would not be unheard of for a reformist
military faction also to serve this purpose.
Indeed, a dedicated, well-organized, and, itself, a democraticallyestablished party would be essential to this mission. I cannot imagine a
democracy without this structure. For, a political party brings the people
into some participating in policies and leadership. It attracts followers,
encourages popular views that will translate into policies and actions,
and demands a transparency within the ruling echelons, all necessary
features of a democracy.
3) A political culture showing necessary traits of compromise, moderation,
and a respect for minority groups and opinions. Competitive and
democratically-led political parties would reflect and enhance such a
culture. To me, the average democratic system could become quite
instable and fragile during times of turmoil; these cannot withstand
great amounts of stalemate, rigidity, intolerance, and extremism for
long. Building free societies from these disturbances would be difficult.
Yet, a political culture based upon compromise, moderation, and a
respect for minorities, I would judge, would bring about a stable and
lasting democratic state, one that could withstand the disturbances most
countries sometimes face. But, such a culture of moderation must
originate from the past, from families, traditions, and other sources that
would underlie a pluralist community; it cannot be imposed by outsiders.
4) Sufficient national wealth and prosperity for a vibrant middle class. I
equate democracy squarely with the middle sectors of society, for the
7
diverse groups between wealth and poverty tend to recognize their
well-being as gained in free institutions. Indeed, the origins of
democracy come from the beginnings of the industrial age when the
higher profits could filter down to the bourgeoisie.
Significant concentrations of riches in the elite classes, as seen
above in the Michael Ross articles, does not augur well for democracy.
Better, a fairly progressive spread of resources will tone down class
tensions, provide more transparency in businesses and governments,
strengthen middle class participation in policy making and in elections,
maintain a stable economy, and encourage an atmosphere of fairness
within a participatory democratic format. So, to me, democracy does
not have to reside exclusively in the wealthier Western nations; rather,
it is the fair distribution of wealth that must underlie the emergence of a
successful democracy.
5) Ethnic homogeneity, or, at least, a high level of national unity would
support the rise of democracy. Again, I see democracies as requiring a
good level of unity, stability, and consistency in their practices. Any sort
of disturbances, ethnic, religious, regional, and the like, place them in
jeopardy. Of course, our other traits – a cohesive leadership, a culture of
moderation, a sufficient middle sector wealth – would resolve and
relieve some these pressures. And, I would judge, for instance, that India
and the United States, among other examples, may have successfully
bridged their immediate diversity problems with showings of national
unity. In contrast, the many African states suffer the most from their
disunity in democracy terms.
6) An isolation from foreign threats, particularly, in having less need for an
armed force. It would appear to me that geographical isolation may
enhance free national institutions, for less wealth would be devoted to a
standing military, and thus, more resources would be expended for
education and the like. My observation here is that militaries, for the
most part, do not equate well with democracy, their cultures, training,
and decision-making practices would differ widely, and negatively, in the
case of an army.
8
War involvements normally shake the stabilities of economic and
political systems, especially for the defeated nations. Frequently, failed
states, civil wars, and revolutions follow defeat, and they are not fertile
ground for democracy. Threats of invasion strengthen the demagogues,
who usually lead their people in directions away from freedom. In sum,
and with all of the above categories, we want stability, moderation, and
compromise, among other values, for democracies to thrive.
Certainly, additional factors that might contribute to democracy could well be
added to my list of these six indicators. Yet, interestingly, I arrived at these six
before I decided to compare the two neighboring Central American republics,
Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Once I applied these several factors, I realized how
well, in my opinion, they fit that comparison of the two different national levels of
democratic attainment.
Part Six: A Case-Study Comparison of Costa Rica and Nicaragua
In Central America, Nicaragua and Costa Rica reside as close neighbors,
holding similar historical, cultural, and geographical environments (Stansifer 1998:
117-135). Yet, their Fitzgibbon democracy scores widely diverge, Nicaragua welldown on the accumulated sixty-year index, Costa Rica occupying the top rating
among the twenty Latin American countries since the 1960s. Investigating causes
for the departure of the two states would help to shed light upon the origins of
democracy between the two peoples.
To simplify this comparison, I will utilize the six traits described above,
outlining for each the outstanding contrasts between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
These should reveal the relevancy of the underlying characteristics that might
have advanced or contracted the rise of a free society in either case.
1) A leader dedicated to fostering institutions of democracy. Although both
countries suffered early republican dictatorships and violence, it would be
Costa Rica where a series of democratic leaders first emerged, sponsoring
free elections and other reforms as early as 1889. The outstanding
statesmen would be Tomas Guardia, who sponsored the first genuinely9
free election in Central America in 1889, and Jose Figueres, who led a
middle-class revolt in 1948 that returned the country to a progression of
free elections that have lasted to the current time and in which his political
party has since alternated in power when defeated by an opposition party.
Nicaragua does not enjoy this same heritage of outstanding leadership.
Instead, the past century saw the rule of an autocratic and corrupt Somoza
family dynasty, stifling free choice from 1932 until 1979, when the final
Somoza was ousted. Unfortunately, the Sandinista revolutionary forces
have not succeeded in matching the example of their democratic
neighbors, although certain electoral reforms have been instituted. In sum,
the contrast in democratic leadership is clear and to Costa Rica’s benefit.
2) A cadre of supporters. A fairly stable two-party system has characterized
both countries during the past century and beyond, although their
dedication toward democracy has gone in quite different directions. In
Nicaragua since the colonial times, two “city-states” opposed each other in
bitter family, ideological, and regional rivalry, this reflected in Leon
sponsoring the Liberal Party, and Granada, the Conservative Party. Neither
faction cooperated with the other, elections lacked transparency, and
periods of partisan domination, in part, depended upon the locals aligning
with foreign outsiders intervening within the country. For instance, the
Liberals allied with the filibuster, William Walker, in 1857, but his execution
three years later disgraced Liberals, and Conservatives controlled the
nation until the Liberal dictator, Zelaya appeared in 1893. Subsequently, he
was deposed in sixteen years, after which, this time, the Conservatives
disgraced themselves by supporting the United States occupation until the
Marines left in 1933. This returned the Republic to the Liberals and the
Somoza dynasty that lasted until 1979. Since that upheaval, party
factionalism has continued, continuing the tradition in Nicaragua of bitter
partisan rivalry. Such strife clearly has not encouraged democracy to arise.
10
Costa Rican political parties, in contrast, have alternated in power after
free elections, with the National Liberation Party winning eight of the
fourteen elections since 1953. A strong national political consensus has
cooperated in legislating these reforms: armed forces abolished, full
women rights, tax on the wealthy, nationalization of banks, term limits on
the executive and congress, weakening of executive, decentralization of
power in favor of municipal governments and autonomous agencies, eighty
percent voter turnout, legitimacy of radical parties including a Communist
Party, among other reforms.
3) A political culture showing traits of compromise, moderation, and
respect for minority opinions. The above descriptions of #2 clearly show
these features affixing to Costa Rica rather than to Nicaragua. Costa Rica
emits an evener distribution of wealth, with a much less-pronounced
division of social class, less poverty, and a marginal oligarchy. The Catholic
Church does not impact greatly upon national events, and we do not see
here the bitterness among factions and the regional rivalries of Nicaragua.
4) Sufficient wealth and prosperity for a vibrant middle class. Charles
Stansifer (pp. 126-127) describes the 1948 upheavals in Costa Rica as a
“middle class movement in favor of political democracy.” He continues in
this vein (128-129): “Studies show significant satisfaction by Costa Rica
citizens with the political system. . . [even] in times of economic crises,
[they] tended to stay with the major political parties. . . . polls showed only
minimum dissatisfaction with the political system.” In recent contrast (129),
Nicaragua experienced “the most destructive war in its history,
unprecedented militarization, repolarization of its politics, and incalculable
economic devastation.” In part, these parallels reflect differences in class
structures and in wealth distribution between the two republics.
5) Ethnic homogeneity, or, at least, a high level of national unity. In
various sectors, we see higher levels of national unity in Costa Rica. As
stated by geographers West and Augelli (1989: 439): “Better than any other
Middle American country, Costa Rica displays a single-cluster distribution of
11
population” in its central valley. No regional divisions occur, similar to the
Leon-Granada hostility in its neighboring republic. Nicaragua, alone, has
additionally experienced race antagonisms. And, again in the case of Costa
Rica, Stansifer writes (127): “National consensus on (the 1949) constitution,
an agreement among the majority of political active citizens on basic
democratic values and rules of conduct, is perhaps the best evidence of
Costa Rica’s democratic political maturity.”
6) Isolation from foreign threats. The national variances in this realm
clearly depart, as Nicaragua has experienced repeated foreign threats since
Independence, from William Walker’s filibuster presidency to the United
States occupation (1912-1933) and the US-backed “Contra” incursions of
the late 1980s. Costa Rica enjoys its isolation, having never encountered
such intrusions. Consequently, Costa Rica lacks an army, and thus,
contributes to education a much higher tabulation. Nicaragua, revealing a
more violent history, has been plagued with militarism, civil war, and
foreign invasion.
Stansifer nicely summarizes these national contrasts:
“Why is there such a difference? It is difficult to resist the conclusion that it
is not Costa Rican will nor Costa Rican wisdom, that it is not Nicaraguan lack
of will nor Nicaraguan lack of wisdom that produced the difference political
histories of the two countries. It is, rather, a combination of historical,
geographical, social, demographic, and economic circumstances”
Bibliography
Kelly, Phil (1998). Assessing Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Westview
Press)
Kelly, Phil and Luisa Perez (2002). “El impacto de la Democratizacion de la
Geopolitica en America del Sur,” Geosur (Uruguay), Nos 267-268: 32-42.
12
Mazo, Eugene (2005). “What Causes Democracy?” Center on Democracy,
Development, and the Rule of Law Working Papers, Stanford Institute on
International Studies, Number 38; pp. 1-8.
Plato, The Republic.
Ross, Michael (2008). “Oil, Islam, and Women,” The American Political Science
Review 102:1, 107-123.
Ross, Michael (2001). “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53:3, 325-361.
Stansifer, Charles (1998). “Elections and Democracy in Central America: The Cases
of Costa Rica and Nicaragua,” in Assessing Democracy in Latin America (Phil Kelly,
editor). pp. 117-135.
West, Robert and John Augelli (1989). Middle America: Its Lands and Peoples 3rd.
ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
13