China’s Maritime Disputes
A CFR InfoGuide Presentation
The East and South China Seas are the scene of escalating territorial disputes between China and its neighbors,
including Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The tensions, shaped by China's growing assertiveness, have
fueled concerns over armed conflict and raised questions about Washington's security commitments in its
strategic rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing_usechina_sea_InfoGuide Has video clips to watch on website
Mapping the Claims
Six countries lay overlapping claims to the East and South China Seas, an area that is rich in hydrocarbons and
natural gas and through which trillions of dollars of global trade flow. As it seeks to expand its maritime
presence, China has been met by growing assertiveness from regional claimants like Japan, Vietnam, and the
Philippines. The increasingly frequent standoffs span from the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, on China’s eastern
flank, to the long stretch of archipelagos in the South China Sea that comprise hundreds of islets. The U.S. pivot
to Asia, involving renewed diplomatic activity and military redeployment, could signal Washington’s
heightened role in the disputes, which, if not managed wisely, could turn part of Asia’s maritime regions from
thriving trade channels into arenas of conflict.
Historical Context
China’s maritime disputes span centuries. The tug-of-war over sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkakus in the East
China Sea can be traced to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, while Japan’s defeat in World War II and Cold War
geopolitics added complexity to claims over the islands. The fight over overlapping exclusive economic zones
in the South China Sea has an equally complex chronology of events steeped in the turmoil of Southeast Asian
history. Globalization—including extensive free trade pacts between claimants—and recent developments like
the U.S. “pivot” to Asia have further connected the two disputes. As China’s economic ascent facilitates
growing military capabilities and assertiveness in both seas, other regional players are also experiencing their
own rise in nationalism and military capability, and have exhibited greater willingness to stake territorial
claims.
By the Numbers
Policy Options
Thousands of vessels ply the East and South China Sea waters, from fishing boats to coastal patrols and naval
ships. Increasingly frequent clashes between China and its neighbors heighten the risk that miscalculations by
sea captains or political leaders could trigger an armed conflict, which the United States could be drawn into
through military commitments to allies Japan and the Philippines. Policy experts believe that a crisis
management system for the region is crucial.
Resource Sharing
Claimants in both the South China Sea and East China Sea could cooperate on the development of
resources (PDF), including fisheries, petroleum, and gas. A resource-sharing agreement could include bilateral
patrolling mechanisms, which would deter potential sources of conflict like illegal fishing and skirmishes
arising from oil and gas exploration. More collaborations in the mold of joint fishery deals like those between
China and Vietnam and Japan and Taiwan could mitigate risk by sharing economic benefits.
Military-to-Military Communication
Increased dialogue between military forces has the potential to reduce the risk of conflict escalation.
Communication mechanisms like military hotlines to manage maritime emergencies, similar to the one set up
by China and Japan and the one that China and Vietnam agreed to institute in June 2013, could be established
among all claimants. These hotline systems would connect leaders in the event of a crisis that could arise from
such mishaps as naval maneuvers misinterpreted by captains of merchant vessels or fishermen. Lastly, joint
naval exercises could support greater military transparency and help develop shared rules of the road.
Building a Multilateral Framework
The development of a multilateral, binding code of conduct between China and ASEAN countries is often cited
as a way of easing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The parties have already agreed upon multilateral
risk reduction and confidence-building measures in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea, but none have adhered to its provisions or implemented its trust-building proposals. While China has
historically preferred to handle all disputes bilaterally, the resumption of negotiations between Beijing and
ASEAN still holds promise for reinvigorating a multilateral framework toward greater cooperation and conflict
resolution.
International Arbitration
Bringing territorial disputes to an international legal body presents another means of conflict mitigation. The
International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea are two forums where
claimants can file submissions for settlement. In July 2013, a UN tribunal was convened in The Hague to
discuss an arbitration case filed by the Philippine government contesting the legality of China’s territorial
claims in the South China Sea. An outside organization or mediator could also to be called upon to resolve the
disagreement, although the prospect for success in these cases is slim given China’s likely opposition to such
options.
Diplomatic
Escalatory actions would likely trigger ramped up diplomacy. The United States could initially serve in a
mediation role in the event of crisis erupting in either sea. In the South China Sea, mediation could also come
from ASEAN or a trusted, neutral actor within the region like Singapore. Parties could also call for an
emergency session of the UN Security Council to negotiate a cease-fire, although China’s seat on the council
could limit the effectiveness of this option. In the East China Sea, bilateral management of the dispute is the
likely first option, with Beijing and Tokyo sitting down to negotiate a common guideline for handling the
conflict and preventing its escalation.
Economic
Despite extensive trade ties, the parties to the dispute could respond to a rise in tensions by imposing economic
sanctions. In response to a Chinese action, for instance, Washington could sanction financial transactions, the
movement of some goods and services, and even travel between China and the United States. In retaliation,
Beijing could bar U.S. exports and cut back on its extensive purchases of U.S. Treasuries. Claimants could also
manipulate exports and relaunch boycotts of goods. Some signals of such a response have already been seen: in
2012 Chinese protesters launched a wave of boycotts of Japanese-branded products. Japan also accused China
of halting exports of rare earth minerals after a territorial spat in 2010—a charge Beijing denied—causing a
commodities crisis for resource-dependent Japan.
Military
If confrontation were to involve Japan in the East China Sea or the Philippines in the South China Sea, the
United States would be obligated to consider military action under defense treaties. Experts note that
Washington’s defense commitments to Tokyo are stronger than those to Manila. Under its treaty obligations,
the United States would have to defend Japan in the case of an armed attack; the U.S.-Philippine treaty holds
both nations accountable for mutual support in the event of an “armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the
Parties.” Military action would represent a last resort, and would depend on the scale and circumstances of the
escalation. In the event of armed conflict breaking out between China and Japan, the United States could also
use crisis communication mechanisms outlined in the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
(PDF) to encourage a stand-down of forces and facilitate communication between Tokyo and Beijing. Verbal
declarations that communicate the seriousness of the dispute and convey support for an ally, as well as offers of
military assistance, can also serve as essential “coercive de-escalation” measures during a crisis.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
In the event military conflict erupts, policy experts including Elizabeth Economy, Sheila Smith, and Shen
Dingli outline a few immediate options facing the countries involved.
Diplomatic
Escalatory actions would likely trigger ramped up diplomacy. The United States could initially serve in a
mediation role in the event of crisis erupting in either sea. In the South China Sea, mediation could also come
from ASEAN or a trusted, neutral actor within the region like Singapore. Parties could also call for an
emergency session of the UN Security Council to negotiate a cease-fire, although China’s seat on the council
could limit the effectiveness of this option. In the East China Sea, bilateral management of the dispute is the
likely first option, with Beijing and Tokyo sitting down to negotiate a common guideline for handling the
conflict and preventing its escalation.
Economic
Despite extensive trade ties, the parties to the dispute could respond to a rise in tensions by imposing economic
sanctions. In response to a Chinese action, for instance, Washington could sanction financial transactions, the
movement of some goods and services, and even travel between China and the United States. In retaliation,
Beijing could bar U.S. exports and cut back on its extensive purchases of U.S. Treasuries. Claimants could also
manipulate exports and relaunch boycotts of goods. Some signals of such a response have already been seen: in
2012 Chinese protesters launched a wave of boycotts of Japanese-branded products. Japan also accused China
of halting exports of rare earth minerals after a territorial spat in 2010—a charge Beijing denied—causing a
commodities crisis for resource-dependent Japan.
Military
If confrontation were to involve Japan in the East China Sea or the Philippines in the South China Sea, the
United States would be obligated to consider military action under defense treaties. Experts note that
Washington’s defense commitments to Tokyo are stronger than those to Manila. Under its treaty obligations,
the United States would have to defend Japan in the case of an armed attack; the U.S.-Philippine treaty holds
both nations accountable for mutual support in the event of an “armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the
Parties.” Military action would represent a last resort, and would depend on the scale and circumstances of the
escalation. In the event of armed conflict breaking out between China and Japan, the United States could also
use crisis communication mechanisms outlined in the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
(PDF) to encourage a stand-down of forces and facilitate communication between Tokyo and Beijing. Verbal
declarations that communicate the seriousness of the dispute and convey support for an ally, as well as offers of
military assistance, can also serve as essential “coercive de-escalation” measures during a crisis.