Neg
Note on file organization: uniqueness for each type of terror attack is in the impact section
1NC
Terror threats are mounting
Bolton 2015 (John R [served as the US Permanent Representative to the UN and as Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security]; NSA activities key to terrorism fight; Apr 28;
www.aei.org/publication/nsa-activities-key-to-terrorism-fight/; kdf)
After six years of President Obama, however, trust in government is in short supply. It is more than a little ironic that Obama finds himself
defending the NSA (albeit with obvious hesitancy and discomfort), since his approach to foreign and defense issues has consistently reflected
near-total indifference, except when he has no alternative to confronting challenges to our security. Yet if harsh international realities can
penetrate even Obama’s White House, that alone is evidence of the seriousness of the threats America faces. In fact, just in
the year
since Congress last considered the NSA programs, the global terrorist threat has dramatically increased.
ISIS is carving out an entirely new state from what used to be Syria and Iraq, which no longer exist within the borders created
from the former Ottoman Empire after World War I. In already-chaotic Libya, ISIS has grown rapidly, eclipsing al-Qaeda there
and across the region as the largest terrorist threat. Boko Haram is expanding beyond Nigeria, declaring its own
caliphate, even while pledging allegiance to ISIS. Yemen has descended into chaos, following Libya’s pattern, and Iran has
expanded support for the terrorist Houthi coalition. Afghanistan is likely to fall back under Taliban
control if, as Obama continually reaffirms, he withdraws all American troops before the end of 2016. This is not the time to cripple
our intelligence-gathering capabilities against the rising terrorist threat. Congress should unquestionably reauthorize
the NSA programs, but only for three years. That would take us into a new presidency, hopefully one that inspires more confidence, where a
calmer, more sensible debate can take place.
Government surveillance critical to prevent terror attacks
Sulmasy, 13 --- Professor of Law and Governmental Affairs Officer at Coast Guard Academy
(6/10/2013, Glenn, “Why we need government surveillance,”
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/10/opinion/sulmasy-nsa-snowden/, JMP)
The current threat by al Qaeda and jihadists is one that requires aggressive
intelligence collection and efforts. One has to look no further than the disruption of the New
York City subway bombers (the one being touted by DNI Clapper) or the Boston Marathon bombers to
know that the war on al Qaeda is coming home to us, to our citizens, to our students, to our streets and
our subways.
This 21st century war is different and requires new ways and methods of gathering information. As
technology has increased, so has our ability to gather valuable, often actionable, intelligence. However,
the move toward "home-grown" terror will necessarily require, by accident or purposefully, collections
of U.S. citizens' conversations with potential overseas persons of interest.
An open society, such as the United States, ironically needs to use this technology to protect itself. This
truth is naturally uncomfortable for a country with a Constitution that prevents the federal government
from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures." American historical resistance towards such
activities is a bedrock of our laws, policies and police procedures.
But what might have been reasonable 10 years ago is not the same any longer. The constant armed
struggle against the jihadists has adjusted our beliefs on what we think our government can, and must,
do in order to protect its citizens.
Terrorist attacks escalate – killing billions
Myhrvold 2014 (Nathan P [chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief
technology officer at Microsoft]; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action;
cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf; kdf)
Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when
bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of
our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater
lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are
as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held by any nation-state. A handful of
people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is
possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the
situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging.
Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the
needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing
nation-states—like
North Korea—which possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear
club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to
manage. The newer and less understood danger
arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent
on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now
perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear
attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are
much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming
retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has
become reversed. Terrorists often
hope to provoke reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in
their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his
henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts
anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The
damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim
some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually,
the world will recognize
that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield weapons and
mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited themselves to dramatic tactical
terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major
cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.
**Links
2NC must read
Threats are real and our scholarship is sound – surveillance is the key tool in
preventing attacks
-AT: Terror Talk- the risk of a terrorist attack is enough that we need to have discussions about particular
groups
-AT: No Threats- Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS disagree, as they splinter they become more
difficult to stop
-Surveillance Key- “The chief difference between now and the situation before 9/11 is that all of these
countries have put in place much more robust surveillance systems”
Lewis 2014 (James Andrew [senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS];
Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate; Dec;
http://csis.org/files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf; kdf)
The phrase “terrorism” is overused, and the threat of terrorist attack is easily exaggerated, but that
does not mean this threat it is nonexistent. Groups and individuals still plan to attack American citizens and
the citizens of allied countries. The dilemma in assessing risk is that it is discontinuous. There can be long periods where no
activity is apparent, only to have the apparent calm explode in an attack. The constant, low-level activity in
planning and preparation in Western countries is not apparent to the public, nor is it easy to identify the moment
that discontent turns into action. There is general agreement that as terrorists splinter into regional groups, the risk of attack increases.
Certainly, the threat to Europe from militants returning from Syria points to increased risk for U.S. allies. The messy U.S. withdrawal from Iraq
and (soon) Afghanistan contributes to an increase in risk.24 European authorities have increased surveillance and arrests of suspected militants
as the Syrian conflict lures hundreds of Europeans. Spanish counterterrorism police say they have broken up more terrorist cells than in any
other European country in the last three years.25 The chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, who is better placed than most
members of Congress to assess risk, said in June 2014 that the level of terrorist activity was higher than he had ever seen it.26 If the United
States overreacted in response to September 11, it now risks overreacting to the leaks with potentially fatal consequences. A
simple
assessment of the risk of attack by jihadis would take into account a resurgent Taliban, the power of
lslamist groups in North Africa, the continued existence of Shabaab in Somalia, and the appearance of a
powerful new force, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Al Qaeda, previously the leading threat, has splintered into
independent groups that make it a less coordinated force but more difficult target. On the positive side, the
United States, working with allies and friends, appears to have contained or eliminated jihadi groups in Southeast
Asia. Many of these groups seek to use adherents in Europe and the United States for manpower and funding. A Florida teenager was a
suicide bomber in Syria and Al Shabaab has in the past drawn upon the Somali population in the United States. Hamas and Hezbollah
have achieved quasi-statehood status, and Hamas has supporters in the United States. Iran, which supports the
two groups, has advanced capabilities to launch attacks and routinely attacked U.S. forces in Iraq. The United Kingdom faces problems from
several hundred potential terrorists within its large Pakistani population, and there are potential attackers in other Western European nations,
including Germany, Spain, and the Scandinavian countries. France, with its large Muslim population faces the most serious challenge and is
experiencing a wave of troubling anti-Semitic attacks that suggest both popular support for extremism and a decline in control by security
forces. The
chief difference between now and the situation before 9/11 is that all of these countries
have put in place much more robust surveillance systems, nationally and in cooperation with others, including the
United States, to detect and prevent potential attacks. Another difference is that the failure of U.S. efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the opportunities created by the Arab Spring have opened a new “front” for jihadi groups that makes their primary focus
regional. Western targets still remain of interest, but are more likely to face attacks from domestic sympathizers. This could change if the wellresourced ISIS is frustrated in its efforts to establish a new Caliphate and turns its focus to the West. In addition, the al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen
(al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) continues to regularly plan attacks against U.S. targets. 27 The
incidence of attacks in the
United States or Europe is very low, but we do not have good data on the number of planned attacks
that did not come to fruition. This includes not just attacks that were detected and stopped, but also
attacks where the jihadis were discouraged and did not initiate an operation or press an attack to its
conclusion because of operational difficulties. These attacks are the threat that mass surveillance was
created to prevent. The needed reduction in public anti-terror measures without increasing the chances of successful attack is
contingent upon maintaining the capability provided by communications surveillance to detect, predict, and prevent attacks. Our
opponents have not given up; neither should we.
2NC Perception Trick
Independently, the perception of widespread surveillance is crucial to deter effective
terrorist communication --- the plan emboldens effective regrouping
Rascoff 14 [Samuel J. Rascoff, Associate Professor of Law, Faculty Director, Center on Law and Security,
New York University School of Law, “COUNTERTERRORISM AND NEW DETERRENCE,” 2014]
An open question - an answer to which requires more empirical data - is whether the government's prosecution of
relatively amateur would-be terrorists based on stings is likely to be effective in deterring better-trained
terrorists. n109 But it bears remembering that the viability [*855] of the deterrence-based account of stings does not
depend on who is prosecuted. The mere fact of prosecution can alter terrorists' perceptions of future
success by implying a pervasive surveillance network n110 facilitated by technology. n111 As Alex Wilner
observed of Canadian counterterrorism, the fact that the country's "intelligence community clearly has the means and the tools
to uncover plots expeditiously" creates an "overwhelming perception ... that terrorists are unlikely to evade Canada's
watchful eye." n112 In sum, the meaning of a sting operation and subsequent trial must include the strategic benefits of revealing the fact of
undercover surveillance as well as the normative costs implied by widespread
surveillance. n113 This in turn illustrates the [*856]
New deterrence
also enriches understanding of the role of fear and emotion in counterterrorism. Terrorism aims at
complicated relationship between transparency and secrecy entailed by new deterrence. C. Psychology and Strikes
communicating vulnerability and sowing distrust; violent attacks are, in a sense, means to bring about these more intangible objectives. n114
(Thus, building sufficient social resiliency to withstand terrorist attacks, as new deterrence counsels, deprives terrorists of an important goal,
even when an attack succeeds. n115) But fear n116 and distrust are also part of the counterterrorism repertoire. n117 Inevitably this fact raises
serious [*857] normative issues. First is the foundational question of what it means for the state to manage terrorist risk through the potentially
widespread, deliberate employment of fear. n118 Rich sociological and historical literature attest to the emotional costs of aggressive national
security tactics. n119 Second is a concern about the distribution of fear and whether the government considers race and religion when
employing it. n120 My central point here, however, is not normative so much as conceptual: Whereas policymakers, lawyers, and the general
public often define counterterrorism as the sum of so many violent interventions, new
deterrence reminds us that
counterterrorism also operates in a psychological register. Unlike traditional deterrence, which conveys its
message through fear of being caught and punished, new deterrence relies on a wider and subtler range of official
modalities that go to the likelihood of terrorist success. For example, the government may aim to
demoralize an adversary by telegraphing the state's overwhelming might. The state might do so by "spreading
false or exaggerated rumors of the [*858] existence of sting operations," n121 sowing a sense of distrust
within a cell by implying that one among them is on an official payroll, or even conveying an image of officials as
irrational and prone to unmeasured violence. n122
Link: Generic
Surveillance is the only method to stop terrorist attacks
Sanger and Shanker 2013 (David E and Thom; NSA Director firmly defends surveillance efforts; Oct
12; www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/us/nsa-director-gives-firm-and-broad-defense-of-surveillanceefforts.html; kdf)
FORT MEADE, Md. — The director
of the National Security Agency, Gen. Keith B. Alexander, said in an interview that to
prevent terrorist attacks he saw no effective alternative to the N.S.A.’s bulk collection of telephone and
other electronic metadata from Americans. But he acknowledged that his agency now faced an entirely new reality, and the
possibility of Congressional restrictions, after revelations about its operations at home and abroad. While offering a detailed defense of his
agency’s work, General Alexander said the broader lesson of the controversy over disclosures of secret N.S.A. surveillance missions was that he
and other top officials have to be more open in explaining the agency’s role, especially as it expands its mission into cyberoffense and
cyberdefense. Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the National Security Agency, testified on Thursday before the Senate Intelligence
Committee.N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social Connections of U.S. CitizensSEPT. 28, 2013 “Given where we are and all the issues that are on the
table, I do feel it’s important to have a public, transparent discussion on cyber so that the American people know what’s going on,” General
Alexander said. “And in order to have that, they need to understand the truth about what’s going on.” General Alexander, a career Army
intelligence officer who also serves as head of the military’s Cyber Command, has become the public face of the secret — and, to many,
unwarranted — government collection of records about personal communications in the name of national security. He has given a number of
speeches in recent weeks to counter a highly negative portrayal of the N.S.A.’s work, but the 90-minute interview was his most extensive
personal statement on the issue to date. Speaking at the agency’s heavily guarded headquarters, General Alexander acknowledged that his
agency had stumbled in responding to the revelations by Edward J. Snowden, the contractor who stole thousands of documents about the
N.S.A.’s most secret programs. But General Alexander insisted that the chief problem was a public misunderstanding about what information
the agency collects — and what it does not — not the programs themselves. “The
way we’ve explained it to the American
people,” he said, “has gotten them so riled up that nobody told them the facts of the program and the
controls that go around it.” But he was firm in saying that the disclosures had allowed adversaries, whether foreign governments or
terrorist organizations, to learn how to avoid detection by American intelligence and had caused “significant and irreversible damage” to
national security. General Alexander said that he was extremely sensitive to the power of the software tools and electronic weapons being
developed by the United States for surveillance and computer-network warfare, and that he set a very high bar for when the nation should use
them for offensive purposes. “I see no reason to use offensive tools unless you’re defending the country or in a state of war, or you want to
achieve some really important thing for the good of the nation and others,” he said. Those comments were prompted by a document in the
Snowden trove that said the United States conducted more than 200 offensive cyberattacks in 2011 alone. But American officials say that in
reality only a handful of attacks have been carried out. They say the erroneous estimate reflected an inaccurate grouping of other electronic
missions. But General Alexander would not discuss any specific cases in which the United States had used those weapons, including the bestknown example: its years-long attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz. To critics of President Obama’s administration, that
decision made it easier for China, Iran and other nations to justify their own use of cyberweapons. General Alexander, who became the N.S.A.
director in 2005, will retire early next year. The timing of his departure was set in March when his tour was extended for a third time, according
to officials, who said it had nothing to do with the surveillance controversy spawned by the leaks. The appointment of his successor is likely to
be a focal point of Congressional debate over whether the huge infrastructure that was built during his tenure will remain or begin to be
restricted. Senator Patrick J. Leahy, a Vermont Democrat who leads the Senate Judiciary Committee, has already drafted legislation to eliminate
the N.S.A.’s ability to systematically obtain Americans’ calling records. And Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, a Wisconsin Republican and coauthor of the Patriot Act, is drafting a bill that would cut back on domestic surveillance programs. General Alexander was by turns folksy and
firm in the interview. But he was unapologetic about the agency’s strict culture of secrecy and unabashed in describing its importance to
defending the nation. He insisted that it would have been impossible to have made public, in advance of the revelations by Mr. Snowden, the
fact that the agency collected what it calls the “business records” of all telephone calls, and many other electronic communications, made in
the United States.
The agency is under rules preventing it from investigating that so-called haystack of data
unless it has a “reasonable, articulable” justification, involving communications with terrorists abroad, he
added. But he said the agency had not told its story well. As an example, he said, the agency itself killed a program in 2011 that collected the
metadata of about 1 percent of all of the e-mails sent in the United States. “We terminated it,” he said. “It was not operationally relevant to
what we needed.” However, until it was killed, the N.S.A. had repeatedly defended that program as vital in reports to Congress. Senior officials
also said that one document in the Snowden revelations, an agreement with Israel, had been misinterpreted by those who believed that it
meant the N.S.A. was sharing raw intelligence data on Americans, including the metadata on phone calls. Officials said the probability of
American content in the shared data was extremely small. General Alexander said that confronting what he called the
two biggest
threats facing the United States — terrorism and cyberattacks — would require the application of
expanded computer monitoring. In both cases, he said, he was open to much of that work being done by private industry, which he
said could be more efficient than government. In fact, he said, a
direct government role in filtering Internet traffic into
the United States, in an effort to stop destructive attacks on Wall Street, American banks and the theft of intellectual
property, would be inefficient and ineffective. “I think it leads people to the wrong conclusion, that we’re reading their e-mails and trying to
listen to their phone calls,” he said. Although he acknowledged that the N.S.A. must change its dialogue with the public, General Alexander was
adamant that the agency adhered to the law. “We
followed the law, we follow our policies, we self-report, we
identify problems, we fix them,” he said. “And I think we do a great job, and we do, I think, more to protect people’s civil
liberties and privacy than they’ll ever know.”
Link: Congressional Oversight
Oversight has zero chance of working but still substantially undermines executive
secrecy
Posner and Vermeule 10 [Eric, professor of law at the University of Chicago AND Adrian, professor of
law at Harvard, The Executive Unbound, p. 25-29]
Many institutional factors hamper effective legislative monitoring of executive discretion for legal
compliance. Consider the following problems. Information Asymmetries Monitoring the executive requires expertise in the
area being monitored. In many cases, Congress lacks the information necessary to monitor discretionary policy
choices by the executive. Although the committee system has the effect, among others, of generating
legislative information and expertise,18 and although Congress has a large internal staff, there are domains
in which no amount of legislative expertise suffices for effective oversight. Prime among these are areas
of foreign policy and national security. Here the relative lack of legislative expertise is only part of the problem; what makes it
worse is that the legislature lacks the raw information that experts need to make assessments. The problem
would disappear if legislators could cheaply acquire information from the president, but they cannot. One obstacle is a suite of legal
doctrines protecting executive secrecy and creating deliberative privileges— doctrines that may or may not be
justified from some higher-order systemic point of view as means for producing optimal deliberation within the executive branch. Although
such privileges are waivable, the executive often fears to set a bad institutional precedent. Another
obstacle is the standard executive
Congress leaks like a sieve, so that sharing secret information with legislators will result in
public disclosure. The problem becomes most acute when, as in the recent controversy over surveillance by the
National Security Agency, the executive claims that the very scope or rationale of a program cannot be discussed
with Congress, because to do so would violate the very secrecy that makes the program possible and
claim that
beneficial. In any particular case the claim might be right or wrong; legislators have no real way to judge, and they know that the claim might be
made either by a wellmotivated executive or by an ill-motivated executive, albeit for very different reasons. Collective Action Problems Part of
what drives executive reluctance to share information is that, even on select intelligence committees,
some legislator or staffer is bound to leak and it will be difficult to pinpoint the source. Aware of the relative safety that the
numbers give them, legislative leakers are all the more bold. This is an example of a larger problem, arising from the fact that there are many
more legislators than top-level executive officials. Compared to the executive branch, Congress
finds it more costly to
coordinate and to undertake collective action (such as the detection and punishment of leakers). To be
sure, the executive too is a “they,” not an “it.” Much of what presidents do is arbitrate internal conflicts among executive departments and try
to aggregate competing views into coherent policy over time. As a strictly comparative matter, however, the contrast is striking: the executive
can act with much greater unity, force, and dispatch than can Congress, which is chronically hampered by the need for debate and consensus
among large numbers. This comparative advantage is a principal reason why Congress enacts broad delegating statutes in the first place,
especially in domains touching on foreign policy and national security. In these domains, and elsewhere, the very conditions that make
delegation attractive also hamper congressional monitoring of executive discretion under the delegation. There may or may not be offsetting
advantages to Congress’s large numbers. Perhaps the very size and heterogeneity of Congress make it a superior deliberator, whereas the
executive branch is prone to suffer from various forms of groupthink. But there are clear disadvantages to large numbers, insofar as monitoring
executive discretion is at issue. From the standpoint of individual legislators, monitoring
is a collective good. If rational and selfinterested, each legislator will attempt to free ride on the production of this good, and monitoring will be
inefficiently underproduced. More broadly, the institutional prerogatives of Congress are also a collective good. Individual
legislators may or may not be interested in protecting the institution of Congress or the separation of
legislative from executive power; much depends on legislators’ time horizons or discount rate, the expected
longevity of a legislative career, and so forth. But it is clear that protection of legislative prerogatives will be much less emphasized in an
institution composed of hundreds of legislators coming and going than if Congress were a single person. “Separation of Parties, not Powers”
Congress is, among other things, a partisan institution.19 Political scientists debate whether it is principally a partisan institution, or even
exclusively so. But Madison arguably did not envision partisanship in anything like its modern sense.
Partisanship undermines the
separation of powers during periods of unified government. When the same party controls both the
executive branch and Congress, real monitoring of executive discretion rarely occurs, at any rate far less than in
an ideal Madisonian system. This
appears to have a marked effect in the domain of war powers and foreign
affairs, where a recent study by political scientists William Howell and Jon Pevehouse shows that congressional oversight of presidential war
powers differs markedly depending upon the partisan composition of Congress.20 When Congress is a co-partisan of the president, oversight is
minimal; when parties differ across branches, oversight is more vigorous. Partisanship can enhance monitoring during periods of divided
government,21 but this is cold comfort for liberal legalists. From the standpoint of liberal legalism, monitoring is most necessary during periods
of unified government, because Congress is most likely to enact broad delegations when the president holds similar views; and in such periods
monitoring is least likely to occur. The Congress of one period may partially compensate by creating institutions to ensure bipartisan oversight
in future periods— consider the statute that gives a minority of certain congressional committees power to subpoena documents from the
executive22—but these are palliatives. Under unified government, congressional
leaders of the same party as the
president have tremendous power to frustrate effective oversight by the minority party. The Limits of
Congressional Organization Congress as a collective body has attempted, in part, to overcome these problems through internal institutional
arrangements. Committees and subcommittees specialize in a portion of the policy space, such as the armed forces or homeland security,
thereby relieving members of the costs of acquiring and processing information (at least if the committee itself maintains a reputation for
credibility). Intelligence committees hold closed sessions and police their members to deter leaks (although the sanctions that members of
Congress can apply to one another are not as strong as the sanctions a president can apply to a leaker in the executive branch). Large staffs,
both for committees and members, add expertise and monitoring capacity. And interest groups can sometimes be counted upon to sound an
alarm when the executive harms their interests. Overall, however, these arrangements are not fully adequate, especially in domains of foreign
policy and national security, where the scale of executive operations is orders of magnitude larger than the scale of congressional operations.
Congress’s whole staff, which must (with the help of interest groups) monitor all issues, runs to some 30,000
persons.23 The executive branch has some 2 million civilian employees, in addition to almost 1.4 million in the active
armed forces.24 The sheer mismatch between the scale of executive operations and the congressional
capacity for oversight, even aided by interest groups or by leakers within the bureaucracy, is daunting.
Probably Congress is already at or near the limits of its monitoring capacity at its current size and budget.
Link: Constitution Free Zones/Borders
Surveillance by TSA, Border and Customs agents key to security --- internal safe guards
will protect civil rights
Horwitz, 14 --- covers the Justice Department and criminal justice issues nationwide for The
Washington Post (12/8/2014, Sari, “Justice Dept. announces new rules to curb racial profiling by federal
law enforcement,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-to-announcenew-rules-to-curb-racial-profiling-by-federal-law-enforcement/2014/12/07/e00eca18-7e79-11e4-9f3895a187e4c1f7_story.html, JMP)
A fact sheet on the policy said that some
DHS activity is not covered by the policy because of the “unique nature
of DHS’s mission.” “This does not mean that officers and agents are free to profile,” according to the
DHS fact sheet. “To the contrary, DHS’s existing policies make it categorically clear that profiling is
prohibited, while articulating limited circumstances where it is permissible to rely in part on these
characteristics, because of the unique nature of border and transportation security as compared to
traditional law enforcement.” President George W. Bush banned racial profiling in 2003, but the prohibition did not apply to
national security investigations and covered only race — not religion, national origin, gender or sexual orientation and gender identity. Civil
rights groups and Democratic lawmakers have pushed for expanded anti-profiling protections since
President Obama was elected in 2008. Holder began the process to revamp the rules in 2009 and considers the
new policy one of the signature accomplishments of his tenure. About six months ago, the Justice Department
delivered the rules to the White House. But they applied only to the department, and White House officials wanted the polices to cover
additional agencies. The rules have been delayed in part because DHS
officials pushed the White House and the Justice
Department to allow major exclusions for agencies such as the Transportation Security Administration,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection. In several high-level meetings, DHS
Secretary Jeh Johnson argued that immigration and customs agents and airport screeners needed to
consider a variety of factors to keep the nation safe, according to officials familiar with his personal efforts. TSA officials
argued that the rules should not apply to them because the TSA is not a law enforcement agency. In its fact
sheet, DHS officials said that they will review activities not directly covered by the guidance to ensure that
“we are including every appropriate safeguard and civil rights protection in the execution of those
important security activities, and to enhance our policies where necessary.”
Link: Domestic Spying
Surveillance is critical to thwart domestic right-wing terror attacks
Perez and Bruner 2015 (Evan and Wes; DHS intelligence report warns of domestic right-wing terror
threat; Feb 20; www.cnn.com/2015/02/19/politics/terror-threat-homeland-security/; kdf)
Washington (CNN)They're
carrying out sporadic terror attacks on police, have threatened attacks on
government buildings and reject government authority. A new intelligence assessment, circulated by the
Department of Homeland Security this month and reviewed by CNN, focuses on the domestic terror threat from
right-wing sovereign citizen extremists and comes as the Obama administration holds a White House conference to focus efforts
to fight violent extremism. Some federal and local law enforcement groups view the domestic terror threat
from sovereign citizen groups as equal to -- and in some cases greater than -- the threat from foreign
Islamic terror groups, such as ISIS, that garner more public attention. The Homeland Security report, produced in coordination with the FBI,
counts 24 violent sovereign citizen-related attacks across the U.S. since 2010. The government says these are extremists who
believe that they can ignore laws and that their individual rights are under attack in routine daily
instances such as a traffic stop or being required to obey a court order. They've lashed out against authority in
incidents such as one in 2012, in which a father and son were accused of engaging in a shootout with police in Louisiana, in a confrontation that
began with an officer pulling them over for a traffic violation. Two officers were killed and several others wounded in the confrontation. The
men were sovereign citizen extremists who claimed police had no authority over them. Among the findings from the Homeland Security
intelligence assessment: "(Sovereign citizen) violence during 2015 will occur most frequently during routine law enforcement encounters at a
suspect's home, during enforcement stops and at government offices." The report adds that "law enforcement officers will remain the primary
target of (sovereign citizen) violence over the next year due to their role in physically enforcing laws and regulations." The White House has
fended off criticism in recent days for its reluctance to say the words "Islamist extremism," even as the conference this week almost entirely
focused on helping imams and community groups to counteract the lure of groups like ISIS. Absent from the White House conference is any
focus on the domestic terror threat posed by sovereign citizens, militias and other anti-government terrorists that have carried out multiple
attacks in recent years. An administration official says the White House is focused on the threat from all terrorists, including from sovereign
citizen and other domestic groups. "I don't think it's fair to say the (White House) conference didn't address this at all," the official said, adding
that President Barack Obama addressed the need to combat "violent ideologies" of all types. An official at the Justice Department, which is
leading the administration's counter-radicalization effort, says many of the tactics aimed at thwarting radical Islamic recruitment of young
people can also be used to fight anti-government extremist groups. While groups like ISIS and al Qaeda garner the most attention, for many
local cops, the danger is closer to home. A survey last year of state and local law enforcement officers listed sovereign citizen terrorists, ahead
of foreign Islamists, and domestic militia groups as the top domestic terror threat. The survey was part of a study produced by the University of
Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. In 2013, a man who held anti-government views
carried out a shooting attack on three Transportation Security Administration employees at Los Angeles International Airport, killing one TSA
officer. Last year, a couple killed two police officers and a bystander at a Las Vegas Walmart store. Mark Potok, senior fellow at the Southern
Poverty Law Center, said that by some estimates, there are as many as 300,000 people involved in some way with sovereign citizen extremism.
Perhaps 100,000 people form a core of the movement, he said. The federal government's focus on the domestic groups waxes and wanes,
Potok said, in part because the threat from foreign groups like al Qaeda and its affiliates. Potok says sovereign citizen groups have attracted
support because of poor economic conditions. Some groups travel the country pitching their ideology as a way to help homeowners escape
foreclosure or get out of debt, by simply ignoring the courts and bankruptcy law. The Homeland Security report's focus on right-wing terrorists
is a subject that garnered political controversy for the Obama administration in the past. In 2009, a
Homeland Security report on
possible recruitment of military veterans by right-wing militia groups prompted an outcry from veterans
groups. The report was produced by staff members during the Bush administration but wasn't published until then Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano had taken office. Napolitano criticized her own agency for the report.
Link: Drone warrants
The plan grounds drones – blocking preventive measures
McNeal 2014 (Gregory [prof at Pepperdine University]; Drones and Aerial surveillance: Considerations
for Legislators; Nov; www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/11/drones-and-aerial-surveillance;
kdf)
To counter the threat of surveillance, privacy
advocates have focused solely on requiring warrants before the use
of drones by law enforcement. Such a mandate oftentimes will result in the grounding of drone
technology in circumstances where law enforcement use of drones would be beneficial and largely noncontroversial. For example, in light of the Boston Marathon bombing, police may want to fly a drone above a
marathon to ensure the safety of the public. Under many bills, police would not be allowed to use a
drone unless they had a warrant, premised upon probable cause to believe a crime had been or was about to be committed. This
requirement exceeds current Fourth Amendment protections with regard to the reasonableness of observing activities in public places. What
this means is that the police would need to put together a warrant application with sufficient facts to prove to a judge that they had probable
cause. That
application would need to define with particularity the place to be searched or the persons to
be surveilled. All of this would be required to observe people gathered in a public place, merely because the observation was taking place
from a drone, rather than from an officer on a rooftop or in a helicopter. In a circumstance like a marathon, this probable
cause showing will be difficult for the police to satisfy. After all, if the police knew who in the crowd was a potential
bomber, they would arrest those individuals. Rather, a marathon is the type of event where the police would want to
use a drone to monitor for unknown attackers, and in the unfortunate event of an attack, use the
footage to identify the perpetrators. This is precisely the type of circumstance where the use of drone
could be helpful, but unfortunately it has been outlawed in many states. To make matters worse, this
type of drone surveillance would pose little to no harms to privacy. A marathon is a highly public event, the event is
televised, it takes place on streets where there are surveillance cameras and spectators are photographing the event. Moreover, in the states
where drones have been banned (unless accompanied by a warrant), the police have not been prohibited from using any other type of
surveillance equipment --- just drones. This
technology centric approach has done little to protect privacy, but will
certainly harm public safety, depriving law enforcement of a tool that they could use to protect people.
Link: Drones
Drones are critical to combat bio- and chemical-terror
Koerner 2015 (Matthew R [Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2015]; DRONES AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: REDEFINING EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY; 64 Duke L.J. 1129; kdf)
Senator Dianne Feinstein, a staunch advocate of governmental surveillance n1 and Chairman of the 113th Congress's Senate Intelligence
Committee, n2 recently found herself, rather ironically, as the target of surveillance. n3 One day at her home, Senator Feinstein walked to the
window to check on a protest that was taking place outside. n4 Much to her surprise, a small drone n5 hovered on the other side of the
window, only inches away, spying on her. n6 The drone immediately flew away. n7 Senator Feinstein's experience is just one example of drones
being used for surveillance within the United States. But her story and others like it n8 have sparked significant controversy over the use of
drones for domestic surveillance, which falls within a broader debate [*1131] on privacy and governmental surveillance programs. n9
Advocates of robust federal surveillance policies champion governmental surveillance as the only way to
prevent terrorist and cyber attacks against the United States. n10 President Barack Obama defended these
surveillance programs as ""modest encroachments on privacy'" that "strike the "right balance' between national
security and civil liberties." n11 In comparison, privacy advocates envision these surveillance programs leading to a dystopian, totalitarian
government watching over its citizenry - undetected but omnipresent. n12 References to George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four n13 abound.
n14 [*1132] Apart from the surrounding privacy-concerns debate, drones
currently provide many practical benefits and
their projected applications seem limitless. n15 Based on their obvious advantage of being unmanned, drones have the
capability to conduct missions previously considered too risky, dangerous, or impracticable. These
applications are also provided at continuously decreasing costs and with the latest technological sophistication, such as the
capability to see through physical obstructions, to detect various chemical and biological agents in the air, to
recognize human faces and license plates, and to fly in strategic, coordinated formations. n16
Link: Drone Sales
Drone sales key to crush ISIS
Tucker and Weisgerber 2015 (Patrick and Marcus; Obama to Sell Armed Drones to More Countries;
Feb 17; www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/02/obama-sell-armed-drones-morecountries/105495/; kdf)
The State Department on Tuesday announced that the
United States would be expanding the sale of armed unmanned aerial
to carefully selected allied countries. The announcement suggests that strategic partners – especially
in the Middle East — could acquire American-made armed drones before the year is out. Some of those could go toward the
international campaign against the Islamic State, or ISIS. Battlefield commanders and the intelligence community are hungry for large,
vehicles, or UAVs,
armed drones as they could loiter over targets for hours. The footage captured by high-powered cameras attached to these unmanned aircraft
has been critical in determining the locations for airstrikes against Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria, U.S. officials say. State Department
officials maintained that every export request would meet “a strong presumption of denial,” according to Tuesday’s release, but U.S. officials
will allow exports on “’rare occasions’ that are justified in terms of the nonproliferation and export control factors specified in the [Missile
Technology Control Regime Guidelines.]” The Missile Technology Control Regime, or MTCR, is a voluntary partnership that the United States
and 33 other countries established in 1987 to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Officials who spoke to the Washington
Post said that new export applications would be approved or denied within months of receipt, clearing the way for armed drones and armed
drone technology to potentially arrive in other countries by year’s end. The new policy affects drones that are capable of flying a distance of
300 kilometers and carrying a payload of 500 kilograms. Those specifications come from the MTCR but apply to drones like the Reaper, which
are capable of carrying laser-guided bombs and Hellfire missiles. Exporting
more drones—either armed or outfitted with laser targeting
systems for smart bombs—to key allies and partners in the Middle East like Jordan would help them strike Islamic State,
according to experts. “Transferring drones, particularly those that had laser designators so they could designate targets for strikes from
manned fighter aircraft, to coalition partners such as Jordan participating in strikes against ISIL could be a significant advantage to them,” Paul
Scharre, fellow and director of the 20YY Warfare Initiative at the Center for a New American Security, told Defense One. Earlier this year, a
member of the House Armed Services Committee disclosed to the Washington Times that the Obama administration had denied a request from
Jordan for unarmed Predator spy drones. But that was before Jordan stepped up its F-16-led air assault to retaliate against Islamic State for the
brutal burning alive of First Lt. Moaz al-Kasasbeh, the Jordanian pilot captured by the terrorist group. “Given our mutual interests, and our
strong relationship, it’s absolutely critical that we provide Jordan the support needed to defeat the Islamic State,” Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif.,
wrote to President Obama in a Feb. 5 letter. The
loosened export rules do not mean that every ally in a pinch will be
fast-tracked for the most lethal drones that America produces. Ukraine is reportedly seeking unarmed drones to bolster
its campaign against Russian-supported separatists. “I find it hard to imagine that this would lead to transferring large-scale armed drones to
Ukraine, not to mention the fact that they would likely have difficulty operating them effectively. This might help pave the way for transferring
small, tactical drones to Ukrainian forces, which wouldn’t be a game-changer, but would help them with tactical reconnaissance and would be a
sensible move,” said Scharre. “The
new drone export policy is unlikely to lead to the transfer of armed drones to
Ukraine,” Michael Horowitz, associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, told Defense One. Horowitz and other
experts argue that the policy change could allow the U.S. to regain some control if not over armed proliferation at least over how proliferation
occurs. Last May, the Chinese Times reported that China would be selling their Wing Loong armed UAV, sometime called a Predator knockoff,
to U.S. ally Saudi Arabia.
Link: Telephone Metadata
Telephone metadata doesn’t infringe on privacy, but does prevent terrorism
Praast 2014 (Linda Renee [J.D., Magna Cum Laude, California Western School of Law, 2013; LL.M.,
National Security and U.S. Foreign Relations Law, George Washington University, 2014]; This Isn't Your
Founding Fathers' Fourth Amendment: Analyzing the Constitutionality of Warrantless Metadata
Collection under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; 51 Cal. W. L. Rev. 7; kdf)
Conclusion The events of September
11, 2001 demonstrated America's vulnerability to terrorist attacks at home.
The government responded with legislation creating new agencies, new protections, and new methods of
gathering intelligence designed to predict and prevent future similar catastrophes. The cost of this
enhanced protection is unavoidable pressures on privacy. The NSA's telephony metadata collection
program is one such program designed to predict and prevent terrorist attacks. Congress impliedly approved the
program as it currently functions through its reauthorization of section 215 of the Patriot Act. Therefore, the program is statutorily allowed.
Addressing the larger issue, the program
does not represent an impermissible search under the Fourth
Amendment. The only data collected is information voluntarily provided by telephone users to their
third-party telephone providers. While the scope of the data collection is vast, the data itself is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. So long as the data analysis is limited to queries concerning suspected foreign agents or
terrorists, and so long as the data collected does not expand to include substantive content of the
telephone calls, the program is a permissible, legal national security tool.
Link: Foreign intelligence requirement
Valid terrorism concerns justify the collection of data
Praast 2014 (Linda Renee [J.D., Magna Cum Laude, California Western School of Law, 2013; LL.M.,
National Security and U.S. Foreign Relations Law, George Washington University, 2014]; This Isn't Your
Founding Fathers' Fourth Amendment: Analyzing the Constitutionality of Warrantless Metadata
Collection under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; 51 Cal. W. L. Rev. 7; kdf)
The statutory authority cited by the government for the metadata collection is the FISA business records provision, added by section 215 of the
Patriot Act and codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861. n43 Titled "Access to Certain Business Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism
Investigations," section 215 allows the FBI to apply to a FISA court for an order "requesting production of any tangible things," including
telephony metadata. n44 The provision allows such requests for information relevant to "an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence
information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities." n45 The
statute expressly limits the investigations to those concerning foreign governments and their agents and individuals in contact with, or known
to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation. n46 The
NSA surveillance program
disclosed by the Guardian clearly encompasses telephony metadata for individuals who are not involved with
foreign governments or terrorist activities. However, while the metadata is collected without regard to the
foreign intelligence requirement, the FISA Court orders allowing metadata collection "strictly limit access
to, analysis of, and dissemination of information derived from the metadata to valid counter-terrorism
purposes." n47 To accomplish this, the stored metadata is only accessible through search queries by a very
limited number of NSA officials, resulting in a very small percentage of the metadata actually being
analyzed. n48 These searches are only approved based on "facts giving rise to a reasonable, [*16] articulable
suspicion that the selection term to be queried is associated with one or more of the specified foreign
terrorist organizations." n49 The Government argues that Congress permits the collection scheme used by the NSA under section 215.
n50 As evidence, the Government points to congressional reauthorization of section 215 in 2010. n51 This reauthorization occurred after all
members of Congress had received a report on the telephony metadata program. n52 This reauthorization, made with full knowledge of how
the statute was being implemented, shows congressional approval and provides statutory authority for the metadata program under section
215.
Link: FISC
FISC imposes slow and cumbersome procedures --- that disrupts effective counterterror
Yoo 14 [John, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley Law School; Visiting
Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. “The Legality of the National Security Agency's Bulk Data
Surveillance Programs,” Summer, 2014, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 10
ISJLP 301, lexis]
FISA, and the law enforcement mentality it embodies, creates several problems. FISA requires "probable cause" to
believe that someone is an agent of a foreign power before one can get a warrant to collect phone calls and emails. n35 An al Qaeda leader could have a cell [*309] phone with 100 numbers in its memory, ten of which are in
the United States and thus require a warrant. Would a FISA judge have found probable cause to think the users of those ten
numbers are al Qaeda too? Probably not. Would our intelligence agencies even immediately know who was using those numbers at the time of
captured al Qaeda leader's calls? The same is true of his e-mail, as to which it will not be immediately obvious what addresses are held by U.S.
residents. In
our world of rapidly shifting e-mail addresses, multiple cell phone numbers, and Internet
communications, FISA imposes slow and cumbersome procedures on our intelligence and law enforcement
officers. n36 These laborious checks are based on the assumption that we remain within the criminal justice
system, and look backwards at crimes in order to conduct prosecutions, rather than within the national
security system, which looks forward in order to prevent attacks on the American people. n37 FISA requires a lengthy review
process, in which special FBI and DOJ lawyers prepare an extensive package of facts and law to present to the FISC.
n38 The Attorney General must personally sign the application, and another highranking national security officer, such as the President's
National Security Advisor or the Director of the FBI, must certify that the information sought is for foreign intelligence. n39 Creating
an
existing database of numbers that can be quickly searched can allow the government to take advantage of
captured al Qaeda numbers abroad, before the cells within the United States break their contacts. A critic,
however, might argue that billions of innocent calling records are not "relevant" to a terrorism investigation. Even if terrorist communications
take place over the phone, that cannot justify the collection of all phone call records in the United States, the vast [*310] majority of which
have nothing to do with the grounds for the search. The FISC rejected this argument because, to be useful, a
database has to be
broad enough to find terrorist calls. "Because known and unknown international terrorist operatives are using telephone
communications, and because it is necessary to obtain the bulk collection of a telephone company's metadata
to determine those connections between known and unknown international terrorist operatives as part of authorized
investigations," the court observed, "the production of the information sought meets the standard for relevance
under Section 215." n40 Aggregating calling records into a database, the court found, was necessary to find the
terrorist communications and the links between terrorists. n41 It may not even be possible to detect the links before such
a database is created. If a database is not comprehensive, in other words, then the government will only be able to
glimpse incomplete patterns of terrorist activity, if it can glimpse any at all. Relevance is a slippery
concept, but it cannot require that every piece of information obtained by subpoena must contain information
related to guilt. Even when grand juries subpoena the business records or communications of a criminal suspect, it is likely that the large
majority of the items will not have any relationship to the crime. Nonetheless, a grand jury may subpoena all of a suspect's financial records to
find those that pertain to a criminal conspiracy. A
different way to view the NSA's telephone calling record program is
that the "relevant" tangible "thing" is the database itself, rather than any individual calling record.
Link: FISC -- Disclosing decisions
Disclosing FISC decisions destroys strategic ambiguity – precludes effective deterrence
Rascoff 14 [Samuel J. Rascoff, Associate Professor of Law, Faculty Director, Center on Law and Security,
New York University School of Law, “COUNTERTERRORISM AND NEW DETERRENCE,” 2014]
Finally, it bears mentioning that the
complicated relationship between secrecy and revelation demanded by new
deterrence plays out in the legal arena as well. n96 On one level, public laws are exercises in revelation. For example, while
reports of the details of the NSA Prism program created a sensation, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
(hardly a secret document) seems to have authorized the collection in question. n97 On the other hand, legal
interpretations that are [*852] crucial to the oversight of national security programs - such as opinions of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) n98 or the Justice Department's memorandum authorizing a lethal strike against American
citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi n99 - have been withheld. Part of the reasoning is that these legal analyses themselves contain
secrets or that in a world in which government is expected to operate at the outer limits of legal
authority, n100 to disclose those limits publicly is, in effect, to reveal national security secrets. On this view, to
maintain strategic ambiguity, it is necessary to be vague about legal interpretation. n101 In sum, new
deterrence subtly refocuses the debate [*853] away from a zero-sum contest between secrecy and transparency and toward a
more nuanced account.
Link: Logfren Amendment
Lofgren amendment fails – destroys effective response to terrorism
Margulies 14 [Peter, Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law, B.A. 1978, Colgate
University; J.D. 1981, Columbia Law School, “Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata
and Foreign Content Collection After Snowden,” December, 2014, Hastings Law Journal, 66 Hastings L.J.
1, lexis]
The Lofgren Amendment paints with an unduly broad brush. It does not allow queries based on U.S.
persons who are involved with hostage situations. Even though this query does not readily fit with the NSA's current criteria,
barring it altogether would be counterproductive. In exigent cases, the NSA should have the ability to frame
queries that may save lives. The Constitution presents no bar since courts have [*72] regularly approved searches under exigent
circumstances. n422 Nor does the use of U.S. person queries in hostage situations clash with section 702's bar
on targeting U.S. persons, since the queries concern evidence already acquired through the targeting of persons reasonably believed
to be outside the United States. n423 Moreover, the government may well have the need to seek other information
regarding U.S. persons that could be included in lawful collection under section 702 and might be difficult
to acquire through other means. For example, the government might intercept communications sent or
received by an ISIS operative in Syria or Iraq, and might wish to know if the ISIS operative mentioned any U.S. persons who are
currently abroad fighting on ISIS's behalf or might wish to go abroad for this purpose. It is true that the government might be
able to secure a traditional FISA warrant once it determined that someone had taken concrete steps to join ISIS's fighting force,
since that would make that individual an "agent of a foreign power" who could be targeted under the statute. n424 However, in a
particular case, such as one in which a U.S. person who had fought with ISIS was about to board a plane to return to the United States,
time might be of the essence. In such a case, the government may not have received sufficient notice of that
individual's ISIS involvement to allow for the completion of a traditional FISA application. Under these
circumstances, it would be appropriate to authorize a query of a section 702 database. The Lofgren
Amendment also fails to address this situation.
Link: PCLOB
Destroys effective intel sharing
Margulies 14 [Peter, Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law, B.A. 1978, Colgate
University; J.D. 1981, Columbia Law School, “Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata
and Foreign Content Collection After Snowden,” December, 2014, Hastings Law Journal, 66 Hastings L.J.
1, lexis]
Another flawed fix is the proposal by Chairman Medine and Judge Wald of the
PCLOB. That proposal requires ex ante judicial
review of NSA queries to ensure that they are "reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information." n425 This proposal is
superior to the Lofgren Amendment because it has an appropriately deferential substantive standard. Moreover, a larger FISC role is useful.
n426 In addition, Medine and Wald outlined an intriguing alternative, entailing FISC appointment of a special master who could review a
"representative sample of query results" and make recommendations to the court. n427 The
major flaw in the Medine and Wald proposal
is its differential standard for the NSA and the FBI. Under the proposal, the test for the FBI, as assessed
ex ante by [*73] the FISC in all but exigent circumstances, would be whether the U.S. person query is
"reasonably likely to return information relevant to an assessment or investigation of a crime." n428 The
NSA's test is whether the query is "reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information." n429 The
differing criteria for FBI and NSA queries could hamper intelligence sharing between the two agencies,
replicating the failures of the "wall" that existed between agencies prior to September 11. n430
Link: PRISM
PRISM decimates Al Qaeda’s ability to conduct mass attacks
Etzioni 15 [Amitai Etzioni, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George
Washington University, former President of the American Sociological Association, former Professor at
Harvard Business School, former Senior Adviser to the White House, “
NSA: National Security vs. Individual Rights,” Intelligence and National Security, Volume 30, Issue 1,
2015, pages 100-136]
One telling piece of evidence regarding the effectiveness of the
electronic surveillance programs is the way they hobbled bin
Laden. He found out that he was unable to use any modern communication device to run his terror
organizations that had branches in three continents.54 He was reduced to using the same means of
communication employed 5000 years ago – a messenger, a very slow, low-volume, cumbersome, and unreliable way of
communication and command; in effect, preventing bin Laden from serving as an effective commander-in-chief
of Al Qaeda. Moreover, once the CIA deduced that using a messenger was the only way left for him to communicate – tracking the
messenger led to bin Laden's downfall.55 Additional evidence publically available that the NSA programs
forced terrorists to limit their communications is gleaned from reports that following the revelation that
the United States intercepted the communications of Ayman al-Zawahiri, there was a sharp decline in Al
Qaeda's electronic communications.56 In short, we have seen that there continues to be a serious threat of
terrorism to national security; that terrorists cannot be handled like other criminals and to counter them distinct
measures are best employed; and that surveillance programs like PRISM and the phone surveillance programs make a
significant contribution to curbing terrorism. In short these programs do enhance one core element of the liberal
communitarian balance. The next question the article addresses is the extent they undermine the other core element.
PRISM roadblocks terrorists – guts them of the tools necessary to pull off an attack
Arquilla 2013 (John [Professor and Chair Department of Defense Analysis @ Naval postgrad school];
In Defense of PRISM; Jun 7; foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/07/in-defense-of-prism/; kdf)
Prior to TIA, and well before 9/11, there were other ancestors of our current big data efforts. At the National Security Agency, and in other
parts of the extensive American intelligence community, search systems known by such evocative names as "Echelon" and "Semantic Forests,"
among others, were in use, striving relentlessly to detect patterns of communication that might open up golden seams of information from the
most secret caches of the world’s various malefactors. Often enough, these and other tracking tools did distinguish the pattern from the noise,
and national security was well served. And in
the early days of the war against al Qaeda, the enemy was still using
means of communication that American intelligence had the ability to monitor — including satellite phones and
such — leading to several counterterror coups and high-level captures. But the network learned quickly and adjusted,
becoming far more elusive, more dispersed, its cells increasingly attuned to operating independently, its nodes and links ever less visible. It
was against this shift that something like PRISM had to be mobilized to improve our ability to find the
foe whose best, and only real defense against us is his capacity for concealment. Thus, the tantalizing
prospect of PRISM, and of the whole "finding effort," is to deny the terrorists the virtual haven that they
enjoy throughout the world’s telecommunications spaces — indeed, throughout the whole of the "infosphere," which
includes cyberspace. The piercing of this veil would mark a true turning point in the war on terror, for al Qaeda
and other networks simply cannot function with any kind of cohesion, or at any sort of reasonable
operational tempo if their communications become insecure. Cells and nodes would be ripped up, operatives killed or
captured, and each loss would no doubt yield information that imperiled the network further. Even if al Qaeda resorted to the drastic measure
of moving messages, training, and financial information by courier, operations would be so slowed as to cripple the organization. And even
couriers can be flagged on "no fly" lists or caught boarding tramp steamers and such. So for all the furor caused by the PRISM revelations, my
simple recommendation is to take a deep breath before crying out in protest. Think
first about how the hider/finder dynamic
in the war on terror has driven those responsible for our security to bring to bear the big guns of big
data on the problem at hand. Think also about whether a willingness to allow some incursions into our
privacy might lead to an improved ability to provide for our security, and where that equilibrium point
between privacy and security might be. And last, think about the world as it might be without such a
sustained effort to find the hidden — to detect, track, and disrupt the terrorists. That would be a world in which
they stay on their feet and fighting, and in which they remain secure enough, for long enough, to acquire true weapons of mass destruction.
Those of us in the national security business, who know that networks so armed will be far harder to
deter than nations ever were, believe that big data approaches like PRISM and its forebears, have been
and remain essential elements in the unrelenting and increasingly urgent effort to find the hidden.
Link: Profiling – FBI
New profiling rules preserves FBI flexibility to fight terrorism --- broader restrictions
will wreck mission effectiveness
Apuzzo, 14 (4/9/2014, Matt, “Profiling Rules Said to Give F.B.I. Tactical Leeway,”
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/us/profiling-rules-said-to-give-fbi-tactical-leeway.html?_r=0,
JMP)
WASHINGTON — Attorney General Eric H. Holder
Jr.’s long-awaited revisions to the Justice Department’s racial
profiling rules would allow the F.B.I. to continue many, if not all, of the tactics opposed by civil rights
groups, such as mapping ethnic populations and using that data to recruit informants and open
investigations. The new rules, which are in draft form, expand the definition of prohibited profiling to include not just race, but
religion, national origin, gender and sexual orientation. And they increase the standards that agents must meet before considering those
factors. But they do
not change the way the F.B.I. uses nationality to map neighborhoods, recruit
informants, or look for foreign spies, according to several current and former United States officials either involved in the policy
revisions or briefed on them. While the draft rules allow F.B.I. mapping to continue, they would eliminate the broad national security
exemption that former Attorney General John Ashcroft put in place. For Mr. Holder,
who has made civil rights a central issue
of his five years in office, the draft rules represent a compromise between his desire to protect the rights of
minorities and the concern of career national security officials that they would be hindered in their
efforts to combat terrorism. The Justice Department has been reworking the policy for nearly five years, and civil rights groups hope
it will curtail some of the authority granted to the F.B.I. in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Muslims, in particular, say federal agents
have unfairly singled them out for investigation. The officials who described the draft rules did so on the condition of anonymity because they
were not authorized to discuss them. Mr. Holder, who officials say has been the driving force behind the rule change, gave a personal account
of racial profiling on Wednesday before the National Action Network, the civil rights group founded by the Rev. Al Sharpton. “Decades ago, the
reality of racial profiling drove my father to sit down and talk with me about how, as a young black man, I should interact with the police if I was
ever stopped or confronted in a way I felt was unwarranted,” he said. Throughout
the review process, however, the attorney
general and his civil rights lawyers ran up against a reality: Making the F.B.I. entirely blind to nationality
would fundamentally change the government’s approach to national security. The Bush administration banned
racial profiling in 2003, but that did not apply to national security investigations. Since then, the F.B.I. adopted internal rules that
prohibited agents from making race or religion and nationality the “sole factor” for its investigative
decisions. Civil rights groups see that as a loophole that allows the government to collect information
about Muslims without evidence of wrongdoing. Intelligence officials see it as an essential tool. They say,
for example, that an F.B.I. agent investigating the Shabab, a Somali militant group, must be able to find out whether a state has a large Somali
population and, if so, where it is. As written, the new rules are unlikely to satisfy civil rights groups and some of the administration’s liberal
allies in Congress. Senator Richard J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois, has said the existing rules “are a license to profile.” The Justice Department
rules would also apply to the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, but it is the F.B.I.
that takes the lead on most national security investigations. Farhana Khera, the president of Muslim Advocates, said expanding the rules to
cover nationality and religion would be a significant step forward. But she opposed any rule that allowed the F.B.I. to continue what it calls
“domain mapping” — using census data, public records and law enforcement data to build maps of
ethnic communities. Agents use this data to help assess threats and locate informants. “It would certainly
mean we have work to do,” said Ms. Khera, who was one of several rights advocates who met with Mr. Holder about the profiling rules last
week. “We want an effective ban on all forms of profiling.” Before federal agents could consider religion or other factors in their investigations
under the new rules, they would need to justify it based on the urgency and totality of the threat and “the nature of the harm to be averted,”
according to an official who has seen the draft. That would not prevent agents from considering religion or nationality, but officials said the goal
was to establish clear rules that made doing so rare. Department officials were prepared to announce the new rules soon and had told
Congress to expect them imminently. But recently, the White House intervened and told Mr. Holder to coordinate a larger review of racial
profiling that includes the Department of Homeland Security, officials said. That is significant because the Bush-era racial profiling rules also
contained an exception for border investigations, which are overseen by the department. Hispanic advocacy groups are as opposed to that
caveat as Muslims are to the exception for national security investigations. Mr. Holder cannot tell Homeland Security what rules to follow. But
he has told colleagues that he believes border agents can conduct their investigations without profiling and by following the same rules as the
Justice Department, one law enforcement official said. It is not clear how long this broader review will take, but for now it has delayed release
of the Justice Department rules. Relations between the F.B.I. and Muslims have at times been strained since the weeks after 9/11, when agents
arrested dozens of Muslim men who had no ties to terrorism. Since then, the F.B.I. has adopted new policies and invested heavily to explain
them to Muslim populations. Senior
agents speak at mosques and meet regularly with imams and leaders of
Muslim nonprofit groups, but suspicions remain. Internal F.B.I. documents revealed that agents used their
relationship-building visits at mosques as a way to gather intelligence. Leaked training materials, which the F.B.I.
quickly disavowed, described the Prophet Muhammad as a cult leader and warned that mainstream Muslims shared the same “strategic
themes” as terrorists. The draft rules would establish a program to track profiling complaints. The current process is less organized, making it
difficult to track patterns in complaints or how they are resolved.
xt – FBI Link UQ
Recent DOJ guidelines won’t result in any changes to FBI practices and still permits
surveillance in critical areas
Phelps, 14 (12/9/2014, Timothy M., “Comey says new profiling guidelines will have no effect on the
FBI,” http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-fbi-comey-profiling-20141209-story.html, JMP)
The new Justice Department guidelines governing profiling by federal law enforcement officers will have
no effect on FBI practices, its director, James B. Comey, said Tuesday.
On Monday, Comey’s boss, Atty. Gen. Eric H. Holder Jr., said the new guidelines were “a major and
important step forward to ensure effective policing by federal law enforcement officials.”
But at a press briefing Tuesday, Comey said that the FBI, the lead federal law enforcement agency, is
already in compliance with the new guidelines and strongly asserted that no changes were required.
The guidelines “don’t have any effect on the FBI,” he said
Asked whether the new guidance would change anything to FBI does now, Comey said, “No, nothing. It
doesn’t require any change to our policies or procedures.”
He said the FBI field manual for agents would not be changed because it was already in compliance with
the guidelines, which expand restrictions on racial and ethnic profiling to cover religion, national origin,
sexual orientation and gender identity.
He defended the FBI practice of “mapping” communities to identify neighborhoods by race, religion or
national origin. Civil rights leaders were critical Monday of the failure of the Justice Department to
curtail the practice.
“We need to be able to understand the communities we serve and protect,” Comey said. “When there is
a threat from outside the country, it makes sense to know who inside the country might be able to help
law enforcement.”
“It is about knowing the neighborhoods: what’s it like, where’s the industry, where are the businesses,
are there particular groups of folks who live in a particular area?”
Despite shortcomings, recent review demonstrates FBI’s effectiveness because of
unfettered surveillance
Ackerman, American national security reporter and blogger, national security editor for the Guardian,
and Yuhas, 15 (3/25/2015, Spencer & Alan, The Guardian, “FBI told its cyber surveillance programs
have actually not gone far enough; In-house 9/11 Review Commission calls for further expansion of
informant and cyber surveillance networks but largely ignores domestic intelligence gathering,” Lexis,
JMP)
An in-house review of the FBI has found the agency failing to go far enough in its expansion of physical
and cyber surveillance programs, urging the bureau to recruit deeper networks of informants and bring
its technological abilities up to pace with other intelligence agencies.
While billed as a damning critique of the FBI, the in-house assessment known as the 9/11 Review
Commission primarily attacks the bureau for not moving fast enough to become a domestic intelligence
agency, precisely the direction in which the FBI has pivoted since the 2001 terror attacks.
The majority of the panel's findings recommend bureaucratic changes - such as expanded training for
FBI intelligence analysts or expanding cooperation with local and state law enforcement through the
agency's Joint Terrorism Task Force - or otherwise urge Director James Comey onward in the long-set
course he and predecessor Robert Mueller have set, such as bolstering the FBI's "human intelligence"
(Humint) network of informants.
In particular, the report found that the agency fails to support analysts and linguists who interpret
intelligence behind the scenes. The "imbalance" between support for field agents and analysts "needs
urgently to be addressed to meet growing and increasingly complex national security threats, from
adaptive and increasingly tech-savvy terrorists, more brazen computer hackers, and more technically
capable, global cyber syndicates", the report's authors wrote.
Yet the "Review Commission cannot say that with better JTTF collaboration, Humint or even intelligence
analysis that the FBI would have detected those plots beforehand", the panel concedes, offering only
that FBI counterterrorism "might have benefited" with an acceleration of what the agency has already
been doing.
Much of the report remarked approvingly on the FBI's activities of the past decade, praising the way it
shares information with government agencies and the new rules that allow it to surveil a target
without a warrant.
"With the new and almost entirely unclassified AG Guidelines, special agents working on national
security issues could now at the assessment stage 'recruit and task sources, engage in interviews of
members of the public without a requirement to identify themselves as FBI agents and disclose the
precise purpose of the interview, and engage in physical surveillance not requiring a court order' just as
special agents working on organized crime investigations could do," the authors wrote.
Link: Profiling – Mosques
Surveillance of particular communities key to prevent terrorism
Lengell, 15 (1/7/2015, Sean, “Peter King: Surveillance of Muslim community vital for national
security,” http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/peter-king-surveillance-of-muslim-community-vitalfor-national-security/article/2558311, JMP)
Rep. Peter King said Wednesday’s attack on a Paris newspaper that killed a dozen people highlights the need
for enhanced police surveillance in Muslim communities to help combat terrorism. “It shows us that we should
put political correctness aside and realize that it is important to have police in the communities to be using sources, to be using informers,” the
conservative New York Republican told Fox News on Wednesday. “Let's face it. The
threat is coming from — for the most part, it's
coming out of the Muslim community. It's a small percentage, but that's where it's coming from.” King said
law enforcement spying of certain ethnic communities is nothing new, saying that police for decades have used such tactics to combat the
Italian-American Mafia and the Westies, a gang that sprang from New York City's Irish-American community in the 1960s. “We
have to be
able to go in there and find out what's happening so we can be tipped off and not stand back and treat
all communities as if they're the same,” he said. "If it's Islamist terrorism, we have to have more
surveillance in those communities.” The Associated Press reported that three masked gunmen shouting "Allahu akbar!" stormed
the Paris offices of the satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo, killing 12 people, including its editor, before escaping in a car. The
publication's caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad have frequently drawn condemnation from Muslims. King
said that while it’s uncertain
Paris shooting, “it shows the absolute necessity” of “on-the-ground
intelligence. “You can't provide security for every soft target in a major city. But if you have surveillance,
if you're in the community, if you have informers, that shows how essential this [is], like the NYPD's
been doing over the years,” he said.
if enhanced surveillance could have stopped the
AT: Link Turn-“Too Much Hay”
The turn makes no sense – programs are effective now
Lewis 2014 (James Andrew [senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS];
Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate; Dec;
http://csis.org/files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf; kdf)
If the risk of attack is increasing, it is not the right time to change the measures the United States has
put in place to deter another 9/11. If risk is decreasing, surveillance programs can be safely reduced or
eliminated. A more complicated analysis would ask if the United States went too far after 9/11 and the measures it put in place can be
reduced to a reasonable level without increasing risk. Unfortunately, precise metrics on risk and effectiveness do not exist,
12 and we are left with the conflicting opinions of intelligence officials and civil libertarians as to what
makes effective intelligence or counterterrorism programs. There are biases on both sides, with intelligence officials
usually preferring more information to less and civil libertarians can be prone to wishful thinking about terrorism and opponent intentions.13
Interviews with current and former intelligence officials give us some guidance in deciding this. The
consensus among these individuals is that 215 is useful in preventing attacks, but the least useful of the
programs available to the intelligence community. If there was one surveillance program they had to
give up, it would be 215 before any others, but ending 215 would not come without some increase in risk.
Technology and algorithms check
Marritz 2013 (Ilya; Verizon Call Logs Controversy: No Such Thing As Too Much Information; June 6;
www.wnyc.org/story/297513-verizon-call-logs-controversy-no-such-thing-too-much-information/; kdf)
The news that Verizon is providing the government with data about its customers on a daily basis has reignited the debate between balancing
individual privacy and national security. Barry Steinhardt of the
group Friends of Privacy USA said the surveillance itself is
not so surprising, but the volume of material gathered is. “The government seems to think the way to
find the needle in the haystack is to pour more hay on the stack,” Steinhardt said. That idea might seem counterintuitive. But too much information is increasingly a thing of the past, as powerful computer programs
tease patterns out of bigger and bigger pools of data.
**Impact Debate - Generic
Impact: Turns the Aff -> Increase Surveillance
Empirically - a terror attack leads to greater surveillance, turns the aff
Tuccille 2015 (J.D. [Managing Editor, Reason.com]; What's a terrorist attack if not an excuse for
domestic spying?; Jan 14; reason.com/blog/2015/01/14/whats-a-terrorist-attack-if-not-an-excus; kdf)
Following on last week's terrorist attacks in France, the British government has dusted off a long-sought
"snooper's charter"—better known as the Data Communications Bill—to ease the power of officials to track people's
private communications. "It is too soon to say for certain, but it is highly probable that communications data was used in the Paris
attacks to locate the suspects and establish the links between the two attacks," Home Secretary Theresa May told Parliament. "Quite simply, if
we want the police and the security services to protect the public and save lives, they need this
capability. You get that? There's no evidence that the bill would have prevented the Charlie Hebdo attack, but that incident is why you
should pass the bill. Prime Minister David Cameron even says that messaging services that can't be intercepted should be banned. Using the
latest outrage to inject new life into old security-state legislation isn't a British specialty. When the Patriot Act was introduced in 2001, thenSenator Joseph Biden boasted, "I drafted a terrorism bill after the Oklahoma City bombing. And the bill John Ashcroft sent up was my bill." This
is a game in which politicians everywhere can participate. Never mind that, as Reason's Ron Bailey pointed out in November, "there is very little
evidence that the Internet is making terrorism easier to do." But pretending otherwise, and passing legislation that empowers security services,
lets government officials accumulate power and give the appearance of doing something when the public is frightened. Added Bailey: As [David
Benson, a political scientist at the University of Chicago] argues, exaggerating the Internet's usefulness to terrorism has "egregious costs."
Some officials, for example, have been calling for a "kill switch" that would allow the government to shut
down the Internet in an emergency. Noting how much Americans depend upon the Net for commerce, communication, medical
care, and so forth, Benson points out that "It is difficult to imagine a terrorist attack being as costly as turning off the Internet would be."
Terrorism also gives officials an excuse to tighten censorship—especially in jurisdictions, including many democratic
countries in Europe, where the whole free speech thing has relatively shallow roots. So get ready for the ride. Driven by a need to appear
proactive, and a preexisting taste for accumulating power, government
officials once again exploit a murderous incident
to increase their authority over us. Which escalates the ongoing cold war between people who want to
be left alone, and the governments that seek to control them.
Impact: Turns the Aff -> Racism
Terror attacks incite racism domestically, regardless of who attacks
Akrahm and Johnson 2002 (Susan M [Associate Clinical Prof @ Boston U School of Law] and Kevin R
[Associate Dean for Academic Affairs@ UC Davis, Prof of Law and Chicana/o Studies]; RACE, CIVIL
RIGHTS, AND IMMIGRATION LAW AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: THE TARGETING OF ARABS AND
MUSLIMS; Nov 2; www.privacysos.org/sites/all/files/akram.pdf; kdf)
Times of crisis are often accompanied by hostility toward minorities in the United States. For Arabs and Muslims, this
may be even more problematic, as perpetrators of hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims frequently fail to
differentiate among persons based on religion or ethnic origin, from Pakistanis, Indians, Iranians, and Japanese to
Muslims, Sikhs and Christian Arabs.89 The widespread perception in the United States is that Arabs and Muslims are
identical and eager to wage a holy war against the United States.90 In fact, according to a 1993 report, only 12% of the
Muslims in the United States at that time were Arab,91 and Arab Muslims are even a minority in the Arab-American community.92 Although
there are Muslim “extremists,” the majority of Muslims are “decent, law-abiding, productive citizens.”93 Because
of the lack of
differentiation between different types of Arabs and Muslims, terrorist acts by small groups of Arabs and Muslims
often have been followed by generalized hostility toward entire communities of Arabs and Muslims in the
United States. For example, after Lebanese Shi’a gunmen in 1985 highjacked TWA Flight 847 to Beirut, beat an American on the plane to death,
and held the remaining passengers hostage for over two weeks,94 violent attacks against persons of Arab and Muslim origin occurred across
the United States.95 Islamic centers and Arab-American organizations were vandalized and threatened. A Houston mosque was firebombed. A
bomb exploded in the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee office in Boston, severely injuring two policemen.96 Later that same year,
after terrorists hijacked the Achille Lauro cruise liner and murdered a passenger, a wave of anti-Arab violence swept the country, including the
bombing of an AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee office that killed its regional executive director.97 In 1986, in apparent response
to the Reagan Administration’s “war on terrorism” directed at Libya,98 another episode of anti-Arab harassment and violence broke out. The
same night of a U.S. bombing raid on Libya, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee national office in Washington received threats.
Shortly thereafter, the Detroit American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee office, the Dearborn Arab community center, and the Detroit
Arab-American newspaper received bomb threats.99 Threats,
beatings and other violent attacks on Arabs were
reported across the United States.100 At this time, someone broke into a Palestinian family’s home, set off a smoke bomb inside
the house, and painted slogans such as “Go Back to Libya” on the walls.101 The Gulf War intensified anti-Arab hostility in the United States.
The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee reported four anti-Arab hate crimes for 1990 before
the invasion of Kuwait in August.102 Between the invasion and February 1991, the Committee reported
175 incidents.103 When U.S. intervention commenced in January 1991, Arab and Muslim businesses and community
organizations were bombed, vandalized, and subjected to harassment.104
Impact: Terror Bad
Even a small attack pulled off by 1 person could kill billions
Myhrvold 2014 (Nathan P [chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief
technology officer at Microsoft]; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action;
cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf; kdf)
Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when
bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of
our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater
lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are
as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held by any nation-state. A handful of
people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is
possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the
situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging.
Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the
needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore.
Impact: Escalation
9/11 proves, attacks invite counter-attacks
Myhrvold 2014 (Nathan P [chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief
technology officer at Microsoft]; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action;
cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf; kdf)
Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a nuclear
threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing
diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger arises from the increasing likelihood
that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this
happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate
response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will
retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can
strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the
fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often
hope to provoke reprisal attacks on their own
people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in point. While it seems likely that
Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is
unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its
host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and
adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow.
Eventually,
the world will recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because
terrorists can wield weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they
have limited themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast
over the internet, and bombings in major cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.
Threats real - Lone Wolf
Lone wolf threats are mounting
Wall Street Journal 2015 (The Anti-Surveillance Rush; 20 May 2015: A.12; ProQuest; kdf)
Among the GOP presidential field, Marco Rubio has come out in favor of metadata, while Chris Christie gave a thoughtful speech Monday on
intelligence and foreign affairs in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The New Jersey Governor speaks
with some authority as a
former antiterror prosecutor who worked in the greater New York region that is a principal target of
global jihad. "If we want to manage events -- and not have events manage us -- then we need superior knowledge
of the world around us," Mr. Christie said. "Instead, Washington is debating the wrong question entirely -which intelligence capabilities should we get rid of?" He is flattering the legislative rush by calling it a debate. Mr.
Christie was especially sharp on the distinction between the practical realities of protecting the country
and "the intellectual purists worried about theoretical abuses that haven't occurred -- instead of the real
threats that we've already seen from Garland, Texas, to Fort Dix, New Jersey." The growing world disorder may
mean metadata is more critical than ever. A rush to the exits is no way to conduct U.S. intelligence, or the affairs of
Congress. If a majority of Senators really do want to disarm in the terror war, then they should defend their positions, listen to the other side,
and be accountable for the results. Cramming such a major policy into law before a holiday weekend is a failure to treat national security with
the seriousness it deserves.
AT: Mueller
Mueller is a hack
Graham Allison 9, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, “A Response to
Nuclear Terrorism Skeptics” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Hein Online
What drives Mueller and other skeptics to arrive at such different conclusions?¶ They make four major
claims that merit serious examination and reflection.¶ CLAIM 1: No ONE IS SERIOUSLY MOTIVATED TO CONDUCT A NUCLEAR
TERRORIST ATTACK.¶ More than a decade ago, no one could have imagined that a Japanese doomsday
cult would be sufficiently motivated to disseminate sarin gas on the Tokyo subway. Indeed, at the time of that attack,
the consensus among terrorism experts was that terrorists wanted an audience and sympathy-not
casualties. The leading American student of terrorism, Brian Jenkins, summarized the consensus judgment in 1975: "terrorists seem 34 to be more interested in having a lot of people watching, not a lot of people
dead.""¶ As intelligence officials later testified, an inability to recognize the shifting modus operandi of some terrorist groups was
part of the reason why members of Aum Shinrikyo "were simply not on anybody's radar screen."" This, despite the
fact that the group owned a 12-acre chemical weapons factory in Tokyo, had $1 billion in its bank account, and had a history of serious nuclear ambitions.'9 ¶ Similarly, before the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon that extinguished 3,000 lives, few imagined that terrorists could mount an attack upon the American
homeland that would kill more Americans than the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. As Secretary Rice testified to the 9/11 Commission, "No
one could have imagined them taking a plane, slamming it into the Pentagon and into the World Trade Center, using planes as a missile." 20 For most Americans, the idea of international terrorists mounting an attack on our
homeland and killing thousands of citizens was not just unlikely, but inconceivable. But assertions about what is "imaginable" or "conceivable" are propositions about individuals' mental capacities, not about what is objectively
possible.¶ In fact, Al Qaeda's actions in the decade prior to the 9/11 attacks provided clear evidence both of intent and capability. While its 1993 attack on the World Trade Center succeeded in killing only six people, Ramzi Yousef,
the key operative in this case, had planned to collapse one tower onto the second, killing 40,000. In the summer of 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war upon the United States. Two years later, Al Qaeda attacked
the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people. In October 2000, Al Qaeda attacked the warship USS Cole. Throughout this period, Al Qaeda's leadership was running thousands of
people through training camps, preparing them for mega-terrorist attacks.¶ Notwithstanding Aum Shinrikyo's brazen attack, Al Qaedas audacious 9/11 attack, and the recent attacks in Mumbai that killed 179 people,
Mueller maintains that "terrorists groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire... they have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful." He asserts that the
evidence about Al Qaedas nuclear intentions ranges from the "ludicrous to the merely dubious," and that those who take Al Qaeda's nuclear aspiration seriously border
on "full-on fantasyland."1¶ Even scholars who would have been inclined to agree with this point of view have revised their
judgment as new facts have accumulated. In 2006, for example, Jenkins reversed the basic proposition that he had set forth three decades earlier. In his summary: "In the 1970s the
bloodiest incidents caused fatalities in the tens. In the 1980s, fatalities from the worst incidents were in the hundreds; by the 1990s, attacks on this scale had become more frequent. On 9/11 there were thousands of fatalities, and
Jihadists seem
ready to murder millions, if necessary. Many of today's terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot
of people dead."22 (Emphasis added.)¶ Al Qaeda has been deadly clear about its ambitions. In 1998, Osama bin Laden declared that he considered obtaining weapons of mass destruction "a religious duty."" In
there could have been far more. We now contemplate plausible scenarios in which tens of 35 thousands might die." Underlining the contrast with his own 1975 assessment, Jenkins now says: "
December 2001, he urged his supporters to trump the 9/11 attacks: "America is in retreat by the grace of God Almighty..but it needs further blows."2 A few months later, Al Qaeda announced its goal to "kill four million
We also now know that Al Qaeda
has been seriously seeking a nuclear bomb. According to the Report of the 9/11 Commission, "Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years... and
continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability." It further reveals " bin Laden had reportedly been heard to speak of wanting a
'Hiroshima." The Commission provides evidence of Al Qaedas effort to recruit nuclear expertise-including evidence
Americans."5 It eVen managed to gain religious sanction from a radical Saudi cleric in 2003 to kill "ten million Americans" with a nuclear or biological weapon.26 ¶
about the meeting between two Pakistani nuclear weapon scientists, bin Laden, and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan to discuss nuclear weapons.2 These scientists were founding members of Ummah Tamer-e-Nau
(UTN), a so-called charitable agency to support projects in Afghanistan. The foundation's board included a fellow nuclear scientist knowledgeable about weapons construction, two Pakistani Air Force generals, one Army general,
and an industrialist who owned Pakistan's largest foundry.28¶ In his memoir, former CIA Director George Tenet offers his own conclusion that "the most senior leaders of Al Qaeda are still singularly focused on acquiring WMD"
and that "the main threat is the nuclear one." In Tenet's view, Al Qaedas strategic goal is to obtain a nuclear capability. He concludes as follows: "I am convinced that this is where Osama bin Laden and his operatives desperately
want to go."2 9¶
CLAIM 2: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR TERRORISTS TO ACQUIRE FISSILE MATERIAL.¶ Assuming that terrorists have the intent-
could they acquire the necessary materials for a Hiroshima-model bomb? Tenet reports that after 9/11, President Bush showed President Putin his briefing on UTN. In Tenet's account of the meeting, Bush "asked Putin point blank
if Russia could account for all of its material." Putin responded that he could guarantee it was secure during his watch, underlying his inability to provide assurance about events under his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin.3o¶ When
testifying to the Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2005, Commit- 36 tee Vice-Chairman John Rockefeller (D-WV) asked CIA Director Porter Goss whether the amount of nuclear material known to be missing from Russian
There is sufficient material unaccounted for that it would be possible
for those with know-how to construct a weapon.. .I can't account for some of the material so I can't make the assurance about its whereabouts."¶ Mueller
sidesteps these inconvenient facts to assert a contrary claim. According to his telling, over the last 10 years, there have been only 10 known thefts of highly
enriched uranium (HEU), totaling less than 16 pounds, far less than required for an atomic explosion. He acknowledges, however, that "There may have been additional thefts that went undiscovered."32¶ Yet, as
Matthew Bunn testified to the Senate in April 2008, "Theft of HEU and plutonium is not a hypothetical worry, it is an
ongoing reality." He notes that "nearly all of the stolen HEU and plutonium that has been seized over the years had never been missed before it was seized." The IAEA Illicit Nuclear
Trafficking Database notes 1,266 incidents reported by 99 countries over the last 12 years, including 18 incidents involving HEU or plutonium
trafficking. 130 research reactors around the world in 40 developing and transitional countries still hold the essential ingredient for nuclear weapons. As Bunn explains, "The world stockpiles of HEU
nuclear facilities was sufficient to construct a nuclear weapon. Goss replied, "
and separated plutonium are enough to make roughly 200,000 nuclear weapons; a tiny fraction of one
percent of these stockpiles going missing could cause a global catastrophe."¶ Consider the story of Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov. Arrested
in February 2006 in Georgia, he was carrying 100 grams of 89-percent enriched HEU as a sample and attempting to find a buyer for what he claimed were many additional kilograms. Mueller asserts that "although there is a
legitimate concern that some material, particularly in Russia, may be somewhat inadequately secured, it is under lock and key, and even sleepy, drunken guards, will react with hostility (and noise) to a raiding party."" ¶
CLAIM 3: IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CONSTRUCT A NUCLEAR DEVICE THAT WORKS.¶ Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former
director of the Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, testified that, "The 21s' century will be defined first by the desire and then by the ability of non-state actors to procure or develop crude nuclear
Mueller argues that
his conclusion follows from an analysis of 20 steps an atomic terrorist would have to accomplish in what he judges
to be the most likely nuclear terrorism scenario. On the basis of this list, he claims that there is "worse than one in a 37 million" chance of
success. 38¶ His approach, however, misunderstands probabilistic risk assessment. For example, some of the steps on the list would have to be
weapons."6 In contrast, Mueller contends that, "Making a bomb is an extraordinarily difficult task... the odds, indeed, are stacked against the terrorists, perhaps massively so." 37¶
completed before an attempt to acquire material could begin (therefore, the success rate for any of those steps during the path would, by definition, be 100 percent). Other steps are unnecessary, such as having a technically
At
U.S. weapons labs and among the U.S. intelligence community, experts who have examined this issue
largely agree. John Foster, a leading American bomb maker and former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, wrote a quarter century ago, "If the essential nuclear materials are at hand, it is
possible to make an atomic bomb using information that is available in the open literature." 4 Similarly, Theodore Taylor, the nuclear physicist who designed America's
smallest and largest atomic bombs, has repeatedly stated that, given fissile material, building a bomb is
"very easy. Double underline. Very Easy." 4¶ Inquiring into such claims, then-Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) asked the major nuclear weapons laboratories whether they could make such a device if they had nuclear
sophisticated team pre-deployed in the target country. Although he assumes that stolen materials will be missed, in none of the 18 documented cases mentioned earlier had the seized material been reported missing."¶
materials. All three laboratories answered affirmatively. The laboratories built a gun-type device using only components that were commercially available and without breaking a single U.S. law. ¶ The Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, known as the Silberman-Robb Commission, reported in 2005 that the intelligence community believed Al Qaeda "probably had access to
nuclear expertise and facilities and that there was a real possibility of the group developing a crude nuclear device." It went on to say that "fabrication of at least a 'crude' nuclear device was within Al Qaedas capabilities, if it could
Skeptics argue that terrorists cannot replicate the effort of a multi-billion dollar nuclear
program of a state. This claim does not distinguish between the difficulty of producing nuclear materials
for a bomb (the most difficult threshold) and the difficulty of making a bomb once the material has been acquired. The latter is
obtain fissile material."43¶
much easier. In the Iraq case, for example, the CIA noted that if Saddam Hussein had stolen or purchased nuclear materials from abroad, this would have cut the time Iraq needed to make a bomb from years to months.1 Moreover,
The grim reality of globalization's dark
underbelly is that non-state actors are 38 increasingly capable of enacting the kind of lethal destruction
heretofore the sole reserve of states.¶ CLAIM 4: IT IS TOO DIFFICULT TO DELIVER A NUCLEAR DEVICE TO
THE UNITED STATES.¶ In the spring of 1946, J. Robert Oppenheimer was asked whether units of the atom bomb could be smuggled into New York and then detonated. He answered, "Of course it could be
terrorists do not require a state-of-the art weapon and delivery system, since for blowing up a single city a crude nuclear device would suffice.¶
done, and people could destroy New York." As for how such a weapon smuggled in a crate or a suitcase might be detected, Oppenheimer opined, "with a screwdriver." He went on to explain that because the HEU in a nuclear
weapon emits so few radioactive signals, a bomb disguised with readily available shielding would not be detected when inspectors opened the crates and examined the cargo.41¶ The nuclear weapon that terrorists would use in
the first attack on the United States is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile. In his appearance before a Senate subcommittee in March 2001, six months before 9/11, National Intelligence Officer
Robert Walpole testified that "non-missile delivery means are less costly, easier to acquire, and more reliable and accurate."' 6 ¶ Citing the 1999-2003 U.S. Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Mueller states that transporting an improvised nuclear device would
require overcoming "Herculean challenges.""¶ He does not explain, however, why bringing a crude nuclear
weapon into an American city would be materially different than the challenge faced by drug smugglers
or human traffickers. According to the Government Accountability Organization, an average of 275 metric tons of cocaine have arrived in Mexico each year for transshipment to the United States since
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Gilmore Commission),
2000. Reported seizures averaged about 36 tons a year, a 13 percent success rate for the intelligence and law enforcement community. Three million illegal immigrants enter the country each year, and only one in three gets
caught."
Impact – Right Wing Nuts
Uniqueness – Threats Real
Right-wing fanatics are the biggest threat to the US
Kruzman and Schanzer June 16, 2015 (Charles and David; The Growing Right-Wing Terror Threat;
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/opinion/the-other-terror-threat.html?_r=0
THIS month, the headlines were about a Muslim man in Boston who was accused of threatening police officers with a knife. Last month, two
Muslims attacked an anti-Islamic conference in Garland, Tex. The month before, a Muslim man was charged with plotting to drive a truck bomb
onto a military installation in Kansas. If
you keep up with the news, you know that a small but steady stream of
American Muslims, radicalized by overseas extremists, are engaging in violence here in the United
States. But headlines can mislead. The main terrorist threat in the United States is not from violent Muslim
extremists, but from right-wing extremists. Just ask the police. In a survey we conducted with the Police Executive Research
Forum last year of 382 law enforcement agencies, 74 percent reported anti-government extremism as one of the top
three terrorist threats in their jurisdiction; 39 percent listed extremism connected with Al Qaeda or like-minded terrorist
organizations. And only 3 percent identified the threat from Muslim extremists as severe, compared with 7 percent for anti-government and
other forms of extremism. The self-proclaimed Islamic State’s efforts to radicalize American Muslims, which began just after the survey ended,
may have increased threat perceptions somewhat, but not by much, as we found in follow-up interviews over the past year with
counterterrorism specialists at 19 law enforcement agencies. These officers, selected from urban and rural areas around the country, said that
radicalization from the Middle East was a concern, but not as dangerous as radicalization among right-wing extremists. An officer from a large
metropolitan area said that “militias,
neo-Nazis and sovereign citizens” are the biggest threat we face in regard
to extremism. One officer explained that he ranked the right-wing threat higher because “it is an emerging threat that we don’t have as
good of a grip on, even with our intelligence unit, as we do with the Al Shabab/Al Qaeda issue, which we have been dealing with for some
time.” An officer on the West Coast explained that the
“sovereign citizen” anti-government threat has “really taken
off,” whereas terrorism by American Muslim is something “we just haven’t experienced yet.” Last year, for example, a man who identified
with the sovereign citizen movement — which claims not to recognize the authority of federal or local government — attacked a courthouse in
Forsyth County, Ga., firing an assault rifle at police officers and trying to cover his approach with tear gas and smoke grenades. The suspect was
killed by the police, who returned fire. In Nevada, anti-government militants reportedly walked up to and shot two police officers at a
restaurant, then placed a “Don’t tread on me” flag on their bodies. An anti-government extremist in Pennsylvania was arrested on suspicion of
shooting two state troopers, killing one of them, before leading authorities on a 48-day manhunt. A
right-wing militant in Texas
declared a “revolution” and was arrested on suspicion of attempting to rob an armored car in order to
buy weapons and explosives and attack law enforcement. These individuals on the fringes of right-wing
politics increasingly worry law enforcement officials. Law enforcement agencies around the country are training their
officers to recognize signs of anti-government extremism and to exercise caution during routine traffic stops, criminal investigations and other
interactions with potential extremists. “The
threat is real,” says the handout from one training program sponsored by the Department of
law enforcement officers have been killed by right-wing extremists, who
share a “fear that government will confiscate firearms” and a “belief in the approaching collapse of
government and the economy.” Despite public anxiety about extremists inspired by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, the number of
Justice. Since 2000, the handout notes, 25
violent plots by such individuals has remained very low. Since 9/11, an average of nine American Muslims per year have been involved in an
average of six terrorism-related plots against targets in the United States. Most were disrupted, but the 20 plots that were carried out
accounted for 50 fatalities over the past 13 and a half years. In contrast, right-wing
extremists averaged 337 attacks per
year in the decade after 9/11, causing a total of 254 fatalities, according to a study by Arie Perliger, a professor at the
United States Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center. The toll has increased since the study was released in
2012. Other data sets, using different definitions of political violence, tell comparable stories. The Global Terrorism Database maintained by
the Start Center at the University of Maryland includes 65 attacks in the United States associated with right-wing ideologies and 24 by Muslim
extremists since 9/11. The International Security Program at the New America Foundation identifies 39 fatalities from “non-jihadist”
homegrown extremists and 26 fatalities from “jihadist” extremists. Meanwhile, terrorism of all forms has accounted for a tiny proportion of
violence in America. There have been more than 215,000 murders in the United States since 9/11.
For every person killed by
Muslim extremists, there have been 4,300 homicides from other threats. Public debates on terrorism focus
intensely on Muslims. But this focus does not square with the low number of plots in the United States by Muslims, and it does a disservice to a
minority group that suffers from increasingly hostile public opinion. As
state and local police agencies remind us, rightwing, anti-government extremism is the leading source of ideological violence in America.
Link – Surveillance
All surveillance measures are useful to prevent fanatics from pulling off attacks & Ohio
is evil
Sewell 2015 (Dan; New FBI official: Terror threat in Ohio is surprising; May 30;
www.bucyrustelegraphforum.com/story/news/state/2015/05/30/new-fbi-official-terror-threat-ohiosurprising/28217115/; kdf)
CINCINNATI – The
new head of the FBI's wide-ranging Cincinnati division says the threat of homegrown
terrorists in her native state is surprising and scary. Angela Byers became special agent in charge of the office that covers 48 of
Ohio's 88 counties in late February, just after back-to-back arrests of young men in Cincinnati and Columbus in separate cases alleging they
were plotting attacks in the United States. Both have pleaded not guilty to all charges. Byers told The Associated Press in an interview she was
surprised at the threat level in Ohio, and she suspects many
people in the Midwest don't realize that "violent
extremists" can pop up anywhere. "It's scary. And it's scary to us. I'm not sure the general public quite gets the gravity of it," she
said. She said counterterrorism efforts are ongoing in her office, although she couldn't comment on any possible other cases.
"It seems like once we get one guy, another guy pops up high on the radar," she said. "We just keep moving
from one to the next." The cases that broke this year in her division were the arrests of Christopher Lee Cornell, of suburban Cincinnati,
on charges he planned to attack the U.S. Capitol, and Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud, 23, of Columbus, accused of planning to attack a military
base or prison after returning from terrorist training in Syria. Mark Ensalaco, the director of human rights research at the University of Dayton,
who has written about Middle East terrorism and the Sept. 11 attacks, said
trying to detect homegrown "lone wolves"
before they act is "a nightmare for national security." But he said use of confidential informants and
federal electronic surveillance can raise concerns about protecting citizens' rights.
Impact – Racism
Right-wing terrorism accesses the internal-link more than the aff
Iyer 6/19/2015 (Deepa; Charleston Shooting is domestic terrorism;
america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/6/charleston-shooting-is-domestic-terrorism.html; kdf)
A gun rampage. A hate crime. An act of domestic terrorism. The
shooting deaths of nine people in the historic Emanuel African
Methodist Episcopal Church in downtown Charleston, South Carolina, on Wednesday night must be characterized as all three. While we
await further information about the suspect, Dylann Roof, and as we mourn with the families of the victims, it is important that we categorize
this tragedy accurately. Roof, apprehended by police on Thursday, is a 21-year-old white man. Before he opened fire on a group of adults and
children who had gathered for Bible study, Roof apparently told the congregation, “You rape our women and you’re taking over our country.
And you have got to go.” According to his roommate Dalton Tyler, he had planned something like this attack for six months. “He was big into
segregation and other stuff,” Tyler told ABC News. “He said he wanted to
start a civil war. He said he was going to do something like
Charleston shooting is a violent act of racial hatred, intended to terrorize and
intimidate black people. It exists on the alarming spectrum of other acts of hate in places of worship,
that and then kill himself.” The
including the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963; the spate of arsons against African-American
churches in the late 1990s in the South; the anti-Semitic graffiti regularly sprawled on the walls of synagogues and murders at Jewish
community centers; the burning of Korans and throwing of Molotov cocktails at mosques; the vandalism of Hindu temples; and the 2012
shooting of six Sikh worshippers at a gurdwara in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, by a white supremacist. Indeed, acts
of violence are
perpetrated regularly in this country, on the streets and in places of worship, and on the basis of racial
bias, sexual orientation, religious bias, ethnicity, disability, gender bias and gender identity. Annual reports
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) sketch a national landscape filled
with hate crimes against people, including assaults and homicides, and property, including vandalism to
places of worship or cross-burnings. The BJS reports that the percentage of hate crimes involving violence increased from 78
percent in 2004 to 90 percent in 2011 and 2012. Meanwhile, the Southern Poverty Law Center has been tracking the organized activities of
anti-immigrant, anti-gay, anti-Muslim and anti-government “patriot” groups, many of which are forming in response to changing American
racial demographics, immigration patterns and the election of a black president. They are motivated by the belief that the balance of power will
shift away from white Americans — a sentiment apparently voiced by Roof when he said “you are taking over,” before opening fire at the
church. These
domestic right-wing hate groups should not be taken lightly. Their ideologies of white
supremacy and white nationalism are seeping into mainstream political activity and rhetoric, and
influencing “lone wolves” who are committing the majority of hate violence in the country.
AT: Terror K
No link – the disad focus on actual threats: right wing fanatics
Iyer 6/19/2015 (Deepa; Charleston Shooting is domestic terrorism;
america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/6/charleston-shooting-is-domestic-terrorism.html; kdf)
We can start by calling the Mother Emanuel Church shooting a hate crime, as Charleston police chief Greg Mullen has already done. But we
should also call it domestic terrorism. Doing so will help us understand the gravity of such acts and ensure that we characterize acts of hate in
similar ways, regardless of the race or faith of the perpetrator. Typically, the media and lawmakers label an act of mass violence motivated by
hatred or bigotry as terrorism when the perpetrator is Muslim or is of Arab, Middle Eastern, North African or South Asian descent in order to
trigger a sense of national insecurity related to the 9/11 attacks. On the other hand, white perpetrators of similar crimes are given the benefit
of the doubt, treated as innocent until proven guilty or characterized as mentally unfit. These disparate narratives in turn influence policy and
legal decisions as well as public opinion towards people from marginalized backgrounds. Categorizing
mass violence motivated
by bigotry as domestic terrorism will also compel the federal government to study, monitor, track,
prosecute and ultimately prevent the hateful actions of radical right groups motivated by notions of
white supremacy. Currently, the government’s programs to combat violent extremism almost exclusively focus on the threat of Muslim
radicalization. Notwithstanding the negative perceptions of Muslims fueled by these programs, it is vital that the
federal government allocate resources towards countering violent extremism by hate groups that target
communities of color and faith. But a label is only a start. In order to address the roots of hate violence perpetrated by individuals,
we must come to terms with the structural inequities in America. The cycles of economic, education, incarceration and housing policies that
abandon, criminalize and disenfranchise black and brown people foster an environment in which hateful individuals feel empowered to
violently target already marginalized communities. We
must disrupt these cycles through policy and culture shifts that
include dismantling the narratives, propelled by xenophobia, Islamophobia and racism, that are
constructed about black and brown communities — as people who are undeserving of benefits and
rights.
Impact – Al Qaeda
Uniqueness - Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda is expanding and plotting attacks against the West
Hubbard 6/9/2015 (Ben; Al Qaeda Tries a New Tactic to Keep Power: Sharing It;
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/world/middleeast/qaeda-yemen-syria-houthis.html; kdf)
BEIRUT, Lebanon — After they routed the army in southern Yemen, fighters from Al Qaeda stormed into the city of Al Mukalla, seizing
government buildings, releasing jihadists from prison and stealing millions of dollars from the central bank. Then they surprised everyone.
Instead of raising their flags and imposing Islamic law, they passed control to a civilian council and gave it a budget to pay salaries, import fuel
and hire teams to clean up garbage. The fighters receded into the background, maintaining only a single police station to arbitrate disputes. Al
Qaeda’s takeover of Yemen’s fifth-largest city in April was the most direct indication yet that the group’s
most potent regional affiliates are evolving after years of American drone strikes killing their leaders and
changing to meet the challenge posed by the Islamic State’s competing and land-grabbing model of
jihad. While the image of Al Qaeda has long been one of shadowy operatives plotting international attacks from remote hide-outs, its
branches in Yemen and Syria are now increasingly making common cause with local groups on the battlefield. In doing so, they are distancing
themselves from one of Osama bin Laden’s central precepts: That fighters should focus on the “far enemy” in the West and not get bogged
down in local insurgencies. In recent weeks,
the Qaeda affiliate in Yemen has allied with armed tribes to fight
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, putting that alliance on the same side of the country’s civil war as the
United States and Saudi Arabia. In Syria, Qaeda-allied fighters are important members of a rebel coalition against President Bashar
al-Assad that includes groups supported by the West. This strategy has clear benefits for a group that has long been near the top of the United
States’s list of enemies by allowing it to build local support while providing some cover against the threat of foreign military action. But
despite Al Qaeda’s increased involvement in local battles, American officials say the group remains
committed to attacking the West, a goal that could be easier to plot from sanctuaries where it enjoys
local support. Cooperating with others could also give Al Qaeda a long-term advantage in its competition with the extremists of the Islamic
State, analysts said. Since its public break with Al Qaeda last year, the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, has stolen the jihadist limelight by
seizing cities in Syria and Iraq and declaring a caliphate in the territory it controls. This has won it the allegiances of other militant cells from
Libya to Afghanistan. The Islamic State has insisted that other groups join it or be considered enemies, a tactic that has alienated many in areas
it controls. And its public celebration of violence, including the beheading of Western hostages, helped spur the formation of a United Statesled military coalition that is bombing the group. Al Qaeda’s branches in Syria and Yemen have taken a different route, building ties with local
groups and refraining from the strict application of Shariah, the legal code of Islam, when faced with local resistance, according to residents of
areas where Al Qaeda holds sway. When Al Qaeda took over Al Mukalla in April, it seized government buildings and used trucks to cart off more
than $120 million from the central bank, according to the bank’s director, Abdul-Qader Foulihan. That sum could not be independently verified.
But it soon passed control to a civilian council, giving it a budget of more than $4 million to provide services, an arrangement that made sense
to local officials seeking to serve their people during wartime. “We are not Qaeda stooges,” said Abdul-Hakeem bin Mahfood, the council’s
secretary general, in a telephone interview. “We formed the council to avoid the destruction of the city.” While the council pays salaries and
distributes fuel, Al Qaeda maintains a police station to settle disputes, residents said. It has so far made no effort to ban smoking or regulate
how women dress. Nor has it called itself Al Qaeda, instead using the name the Sons of Hadhramaut to emphasize its ties to the surrounding
province. One self-described Qaeda member said that the choice of name was deliberate, recalling that after the group seized territory in
southern Yemen in 2011, the country’s military had mobilized to push it out with support from the United States. “We were in control for a year
and six months, we applied God’s law, we created a small state and the whole world saw it, but they did not leave us alone,” the man said in an
interview with a Yemeni television station. “So we came here with the name the Sons of Hadhramaut, but the people here know who we are.”
American officials have long considered the terrorist group’s Yemeni branch, known as Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, the most dangerous to the West. It has sought to carry out attacks against the United
States, and it retains sophisticated bomb-making expertise. Now, Yemen’s civil war has given the group an opportunity
to expand, analysts said.
--AT: al-Wuhayshi killed
Al-Wuhayshi’s death galvanized AQAP
Johnson 6/16/2015 (Bridget; AQAP Confirms Leader Killed, Vows to Make U.S. ‘Taste the Bitterness of
Defeat’; pjmedia.com/tatler/2015/06/16/aqap-confirms-leader-killed-vows-to-make-u-s-taste-thebitterness-of-defeat/; kdf)
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula confirmed in a statement released through its media arm, Al-Malahem, that leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi was
killed in an American airstrike in Yemen. “We in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula mourn to our Muslim nation … that Abu Baseer Nasser bin
Abdul Karim al-Wuhayshi, God rest his soul, passed away in an American strike which targeted him along with two of his mujahideen brothers,
may God rest their souls,” Khaled Batarfi, a senior member of the group, read in the group’s nearly 10-minute statement. “Let
it be known
to the enemies of God that their battle is not only with one person or figure, no matter how important,”
Batarfi stressed. “To the infidel America: God has kept alive those who will trouble your life and make you
taste the bitterness of defeat.” AQAP’s commander of military operations, Qassim al-Raimi, has moved
into the top spot.
Al Qaeda Gets Nukes
Al-Qaeda’s regrouping across the world – they’re searching for nukes
Etzioni 15 [Amitai Etzioni, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George
Washington University, former President of the American Sociological Association, former Professor at
Harvard Business School, former Senior Adviser to the White House, “
NSA: National Security vs. Individual Rights,” Intelligence and National Security, Volume 30, Issue 1,
Winter 2015, pages 100-136]
Those who hold that terrorism has much subsided can draw on President Obama's statements. The President announced in May 2013 that ‘the
core of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own
safety than plotting against us’,21 and echoing this sentiment in August when he stated that ‘core Al Qaeda is on its heels, has been
decimated’.22 Administration officials have been similarly optimistic regarding the diminished terror threat.23 And he ‘pivoted’ US foreign
policy away from a focus on the Middle East in favor of a focus on East Asia.24 However, since then there has been a steady stream of reports
that suggest that much remains to be done in facing terrorism, indeed that Al Qaeda is rebuilding its strength and that the pivot to the Far East
may well have been premature. Core
Al Qaeda is regrouping under the banner of ‘Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’ (AQAP).
Ayman al-Zawahiri has taken over Osama bin Laden's vacated position. It has expanded from 200–300 members in 2009 to over 1000
today.25 This group was behind the ‘most specific and credible threat’ since the attacks on 9/11, which led to the
closure of dozens of American embassies across the Middle East.26 And it managed to capture and control significant
territory in Yemen.27 Al Qaeda affiliates are growing in strength and spreading into additional
nations.28 Al Qaeda increasingly is relying on a decentralized network of collaborating terrorist affiliates.29
Affiliates include groups in Africa (a network that spans Algeria, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Libya),30 the
Caucasus, Syria, and Somalia.31 Taken together, ‘Al Qaeda franchises and fellow travelers now control more
territory and can call on more fighters, than at any time since Osama bin Laden created the organization 25 years
ago’.32 Al Qaeda in Iraq has recently started a bombing campaign that killed over 1000 people. The group has
transformed Iraq into a staging point for incursions into the Syrian civil war.33 At the same time, Syria is
turning into a haven and breeding ground for terrorists: ‘an even more powerful variant of what
Afghanistan was more than 30 years ago’.34 It is estimated that there are as many as 17,000 foreign fighters in the country, most from
Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.35 Western intelligence officials worry that Syria is ‘developing into one of the biggest terrorist
threats in the world today.’36 Al Qaeda and its subsidiaries have shown that they are agile and able to adapt as
revealed in their use of ink cartridges as a bomb and ‘implanted’ explosives undetectable by airport scanners.
Finally, terrorists have been trying to get nuclear weapons. Both Russia and Pakistan have less-than-fullysecured nuclear arms within their borders,37 and Pakistan has experienced at least six serious terrorist
attempts to penetrate its nuclear facilities.38
Impact - ISIS
Uniqueness: ISIS in the US
ISIS has infiltrated the US -- only strong surveillance can prevent escalation
Perez and Prokupecz May 30 (Evan and Shimon; FBI struggling with surge in homegrown terror
cases; www.cnn.com/2015/05/28/politics/fbi-isis-local-law-enforcement/; kdf)
The New York Police Department and other law
enforcement agencies around the nation are increasing their
surveillance of ISIS supporters in the U.S., in part to aid the FBI which is struggling to keep up with a surge in the number of
possible terror suspects, according to law enforcement officials. The change is part of the fallout from the terrorist attack in Garland,
Texas earlier this month. The FBI says two ISIS supporters attempted a gun attack on a Prophet Mohammad
cartoon contest but were killed by police. One of the attackers, Elton Simpson, was already under investigation by the FBI but
managed to elude surveillance to attempt the foiled attack. FBI Director James Comey told a group of police officials around
the country in a secure conference call this month that the FBI needs help to keep tabs on hundreds of
suspects. As a result, some police agencies are adding surveillance teams to help the FBI monitor suspects.
Teams of NYPD officers trained in surveillance are now helping the FBI's surveillance teams to better keep track of suspects, law enforcement
officials say. Why ISIS is winning, and how to stop it NYPD Commissioner William Bratton has said he wants to add 450 officers to the force's
counterterrorism unit, partly to counter the increasing domestic threat posed by ISIS sympathizers. The same is happening with other police
departments around the country. The Los Angeles Police Department's counterterrorism unit is also beefing up its surveillance squads at the
request of the FBI, law enforcement officials say. Comey said at an unrelated news conference Wednesday that he has less confidence now that
the FBI can keep up with the task. "It's
an extraordinarily difficult challenge task to find -- that's the first challenge -- and
then assess those who may be on a journey from talking to doing and to find and assess in an
environment where increasingly, as the attorney general said, their communications are unavailable to us even with court orders,"
Comey said. "They're on encrypted platforms, so it is an incredibly difficult task that we are enlisting all of our state, local and federal partners
in and we're working on it every single day, but I can't stand here with any high confidence when I confront the world that is increasingly dark
to me and tell you that I've got it all covered," he said. "We are working very, very hard on it but it is an enormous task." On Saturday, an FBI
spokesman said the bureau doesn't have a shortage of resources and the Garland attack wasn't the result of lack of surveillance personnel. If
agents had any indication that Simpson was moving toward an attack, they would have done everything to stop it, the spokesman said. The
appeal for local help isn't intended to seek more surveillance, but more broadly to encourage local law enforcement to increase vigilance given
the heightened threat, the FBI said. The Garland attack prompted a reassessment for FBI officials. Simpson's social media and other
communications with known ISIS recruiters drew the FBI's interest earlier this year. The Americans linked to ISIS FBI agents in Phoenix began
regular surveillance of Simpson, though it was not round-the-clock monitoring, according to a U.S. official. The agents watching Simpson
noticed he disappeared for a few days. Investigators
looked into his communications and found social media
postings making reference to the Garland cartoon contest. That discovery is what prompted the FBI to
send a bulletin to the joint terrorism task force that was monitoring the Garland event. The bulletin arrived
about three hours before the attack. Comey told reporters this month the FBI had no idea Simpson planned to attack the event or even that he
had traveled from his home in Phoenix to Texas.
Uniqueness: ISIS coming
ISIS is growing in power – all tools are necessary to mitigate their strength
Rojas June 19, 2015 (Nicole; US State Department: Isis knocks off al-Qaeda as leading terrorist
oganisation; www.ibtimes.co.uk/us-state-department-isis-knocks-off-al-qaeda-leading-terroristoganisation-1507091; kdf)
The Country Reports on Terrorism by the US State Department, released on 19 June, reveals Isis
has beaten al-Qaeda as the
world's leading terrorist organisation. The new report found that the Islamic State in the Middle East, as well as its partner Boko
Haram in Africa, has led to the decline of al-Qaeda's power. It reported that al-Qaeda leadership "appeared to lose momentum as the selfstyled leader of a global movement in the face of Isil's [Isis] rapid expansion." However, the report noted that al-Qaeda
continued to
have an impact on terrorism. "Though AQ central leadership was weakened, the organisation continued to serve as a
focal point of 'inspiration' for a worldwide network of affiliated groups, including al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula—
a long-standing threat to Yemen, the region, and the United States; al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb; a;-Nusrah Front; and al-Shabaab," the
report said. The report also found that nearly
33,000 people were killed and another 34,700 were injured in about
13,500 terrorist attacks around the world last year. According to NBC News, that equates to a 35% increase in terrorist
attacks and an 81% rise in fatalities since 2013. CNN reported that 24 Americans died last year in terrorist attacks, specifically in Afghanistan,
Jerusalem and Somalia. The attacks, which were dominate in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Nigeria and Syria, happened in 95 countries
total. More aggressive and ruthless attacks Terrorist
groups were conducting more aggressive attacks, which
included "ruthless methods of violence such as beheadings and crucifixions intended to terrify
opponents". Isis and Boko Haram also employed tactics such as "stoning, indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, and kidnapping children for
enslavement".
Threats real – attacks on the homeland
ISIS is unique – intercepting communication early is key to prevent attacks in the US
Temple-Raston 2015 (Dina; For Next President, the fight against extremism will hit closer to home;
May 27; wlrn.org/post/next-president-fight-against-extremism-will-hit-closer-home; kdf)
This week, the FBI arrested a 20-year-old Texas man named Asher Abid Khan on allegations that he intended to join the self-proclaimed Islamic
State. He joins more than
60 young American men and women who have been lured to Syria by the group, also
known as ISIS. What makes Khan's case a little different, though, is the way in which he was arrested by authorities. He had been in Australia
and then traveled to Turkey and was about to cross into Syria when his parents sent him a frantic message. They claimed his mother was in the
hospital and was desperate to see him. The ruse worked. He left Turkey, flew to Texas and was finally arrested Tuesday, nearly a year after his
return. It is unclear whether his parents' participation in convincing him to come home will have some bearing on any eventual sentence — he
has been charged with material support to a terrorist organization and faces up to 15 years in prison. Khan's case is important because it is an
indication of the creativity law enforcement officials are starting to employ to stem the flow of American Muslims to ISIS; and it foreshadows
the scope of the problem facing the next president from his or her first day in office. In the past two years, nearly
200 Americans have
either tried to travel to Syria and were stopped, are actively considering going, or have actually made it
to the ISIS battlefields there. Al-Qaida has never had that kind of attraction and appeal in the U.S. The threat of prison clearly isn't
solving the problem. So law enforcement officials are starting to entertain alternatives, and that means the next president will likely have to do
so as well. The one thing everyone seems to agree with in regard to ISIS is that it is fundamentally different from al-Qaida. Its leader, Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, sees himself as a religious figure, a descendant of the prophet who has been chosen to create a homeland, or caliphate, for the
world's Muslims. Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaida, fancied himself a warrior, locking horns with the West. A caliphate, he said, could
come later. Similarly, ISIS' goals — at least at this point — are different. While bin Laden and his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri are focused on
attacking the U.S.; ISIS is endlessly creative in trying to get young men and women to leave home to create a state in Syria and Iraq. If
you
don't want to fight, its recruitment videos say, not to worry, you can be a plumber or an electrician or a traffic
cop in the new caliphate. ISIS doesn't lure young men and women from around the world with the long
audio diatribes bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have always favored, instead the group has been more
creative. For example, it re-created its own version of the popular video game Grand Theft Auto. Download the game and you can shoot up
Syrian troops, or local police, and get a dose of ISIS propaganda at the same time. "I don't think al-Qaida ever had that kind of
talent," says Tony Sgro, the CEO of a San Francisco company called EdVenture Partners which, among other things, markets to exactly the
kind of people who are attracted by ISIS' sales pitch. "I personally don't remember them being such a world-class employment, branding and
recruiting agency. But ISIL is."
ISIS is a threat – surveillance is uniquely key in preventing an attack
Bidgood and Phillips 6/3 (Jess and Dave; Boston Terror Suspect's Shooting Highlights Concerns over
reach of ISIS; www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/us/usaama-rahim-boston-terrorism-suspect-plannedbeheading-authorities-say.html?partner=rss&emc=rss; kdf)
BOSTON —
Investigators had been watching Usaamah Abdullah Rahim long enough to know about his avid
interest in Islamic State militants, but when they overheard him talking on a cellphone about beheading
Massachusetts police officers, they moved in, leading to a confrontation Tuesday morning outside a pharmacy here that left
Mr. Rahim dead and once again raised alarms about the influence of foreign extremists on homegrown radicals. The shooting occurred in the
fairly quiet neighborhood of Roslindale on a routine weekday morning, when officials said an F.B.I. agent and a Boston police officer fired on
Mr. Rahim after he threatened them with a knife. The
shooting quickly and suddenly revealed what officials described
as a lengthy terrorism investigation, with several law enforcement agencies looking into a suspected murder plot that involved at
least two other people, including a relative of Mr. Rahim’s who was charged Wednesday with conspiracy. The knife confiscated from Usaama
Rahim.Officers Kill Suspect Who Wielded Knife in Boston Here in a city that had just finished with the trial of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who was
sentenced to death a few weeks ago for his role in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, the episode prompted another round of outrage and
scrutiny. Coming just a month after two Muslim men with ties to the Islamic State were shot and killed while trying to attack an anti-Islamic
gathering in Garland, Tex., the case has also renewed concerns in Washington about the long reach of the Islamic State and other radical groups
that have seized on Internet recruitment. “These cases
are a reminder of the dangers posed by individuals
radicalized through social media,” said the chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, Representative Michael McCaul,
Republican of Texas, at a hearing on Wednesday. He added that Mr. Rahim had been under investigation because he was
“communicating with and spreading ISIS propaganda online.”
Impact: ISIS
ISIS will get nuclear and chemical weapons
Cirincione 2014 (Joe [president of Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation]; ISIS will be in
position to get nuclear weapons if allowed to consolidate power, resources, says expert;
www.nydailynews.com/news/world/isis-nukes-allowed-consolidate-expert-article-1.1958855; kdf)
The risk of a terrorist attack using nuclear or chemical weapons has just gone up. ISIS is willing to kill large
numbers of innocents, and it has added three capabilities that catapult the threat beyond anything seen before: control of large, urban
territories, huge amounts of cash, and a global network of recruits. British Home Secretary Theresa May warned that if
ISIS consolidates
its control over the land it occupies, “We will see the world’s first truly terrorist state” with “the space to
plot attacks against us.” Its seizure of banks and oil fields gave it more than $2 billion in assets. If ISIS could make the right
connection to corrupt officials in Russia or Pakistan, the group might be able to buy enough highly enriched
uranium (about 50 pounds) and the technical help to build a crude nuclear device. Militants recruited from
Europe or America could help smuggle it into their home nations. Or ISIS could try to build a “dirty
bomb,” conventional explosives like dynamite laced with highly radioactive materials. The blast would not kill
many directly, but it would force the evacuation of tens of square blocks contaminated with radioactive particles. The terror and
economic consequences of a bomb detonated in the financial districts of London or New York would be
enormous. ISIS could also try to get chemical weapons, such as deadly nerve gases or mustard gas. Fortunately, the most likely source of
these terror weapons was just eliminated. The Obama administration struck a deal with Syrian President Bashar Assad that has now destroyed
the 1,300 tons of chemical bombs Assad built. Without this deal, ISIS would likely already have these weapons. There are two good answers to
these threats. First, drain the swamp: Secure or eliminate the materials ISIS would need to build terror bombs. Second, deter any attack by
making sure ISIS knows our retribution would be swift, certain and devastating.
Impact - Cyber-attacks
Uniqueness: Cyber-attack
A massive Iranian cyber-attack is coming
Kagan and Stiansen 2015 (Frederick [Director of AEI’s Critical Threats Project and a former
professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point] and Tommy [Chief techonology
officer of Norse]; The Growing Cyberthreat from Iran; www.aei.org/publication/growing-cyberthreatfrom-iran/
I ran is emerging as a significant cyberthreat to the US and its allies. The size and sophistication of the nation’s hacking
capabilities have grown markedly over the last few years, and Iran has already penetrated well-defended networks in the US and Saudi Arabia
and seized and destroyed sensitive data. The lifting of economic sanctions as a result of the recently announced framework for a nuclear deal
with Iran will dramatically increase the resources Iran can put toward expanding its cyberattack infrastructure. We
must anticipate
that the Iranian cyberthreat may well begin to grow much more rapidly. Yet we must also avoid overreacting to this
threat, which is not yet unmanageable. The first requirement of developing a sound response is understanding the nature of the problem,
which is the aim of this report. Pistachio Harvest is a collaborative project between Norse Corporation and the Critical Threats Project at the
American Enterprise Institute to describe Iran’s footprint in cyberspace and identify important trends in Iranian cyberattacks. It draws on data
from the Norse Intelligence Network, which consists of several million advanced sensors distributed around the globe. A sensor is basically a
computer emulation designed to look like an actual website, email login portal, or some other kind of Internet-based system for a bank,
university, power plant, electrical switching station, or other public or private computer systems that might interest a hacker. Sensors are
designed to appear poorly secured, including known and zero-day vulnerabilities to lure hackers into trying to break into them. The odds of
accidentally connecting to a Norse sensor are low. They do not belong to real companies or show up on search engines. Data from Norse
systems combined with open-source information collected by the analysts of the Critical Threats Project have allowed us to see and outline for
the first time the real nature and extent of the Iranian cyberthreat. A
particular challenge is that the Islamic Republic has
two sets of information technology infrastructure— the one it is building in Iran and the one it is renting
and buying in the West. Both are attacking the computer systems of America and its allies, and both are
influenced to different degrees by the regime and its security services. We cannot think of the Iranian cyberfootprint as confined to Iranian soil.
That fact creates great dangers for the West, but also offers opportunities. Iranian companies, including some under
international sanctions and some affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and global terrorist organizations like Hezbollah,
are hosting websites, mail servers, and other IT systems in the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Simply by
registering and paying a fee, Iranian security services and ordinary citizens can gain access to advanced computer systems and software that
the West has been trying to prevent them from getting at all. The bad news is that they are getting them anyway, and in one of the most
efficient ways possible—by renting what they need from us without having to go to the trouble of building or stealing it themselves.
xt-Iran funds terror
Iran is massively invested in terror plots – surveillance is critical to monitor the spread
Lee and Klapper June 19, 2015 (Matthew and Bradley; US report finds Iran threat undiminished as
nuke deadline nears; global terror killings soar;
www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2015/06/19/us-35-percent-spike-in-global-terror-attacks-in2014; kdf)
WASHINGTON (AP) — Iran's support
for international terrorist groups remained undiminished last year and even
expanded in some respects, the Obama administration said Friday, less than two weeks before the deadline for completing a nuclear deal
that could provide Tehran with billions of dollars in relief from economic sanctions. The assessment offered a worrying sign of
even worse terror-related violence to come after a year in which extremists in the Middle East, Africa
and Asia committed 35 percent more terrorist acts, killed nearly twice as many people and almost
tripled the number of kidnappings worldwide. Statistics released by the State Department on Friday also pointed to a tenfold
surge in the most lethal kinds of attacks. Yet even as the Islamic State and the Taliban were blamed for most of the death and destruction in
2014, the
department's annual terrorism report underscored the ongoing threat posed by Iran and its
proxies across the Islamic world and beyond. Tehran increased its assistance to Shiite militias fighting in Iraq and continued its
long-standing military, intelligence and financial aid to Lebanon's Hezbollah, Syrian President Bashar Assad's embattled government and
Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad. While the 388-page study said Iran has lived up to interim nuclear deals with world powers thus
far, it gave no prediction about how an Iran flush with cash from a final agreement would behave. World powers and Iran are trying to conclude
an accord by the end of the month, setting 15 years of restrictions on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for significant relief from the
international sanctions that have crippled the Iranian economy. The negotiations don't involve Iran's support for militant groups beyond its
border. But Israel and the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf, Iran's regional rivals, fear a fresh wave of terrorism as a result of any pact.
President Barack Obama, hoping to ease their fears, has said most of the money would go to Iran's economic development. America's
"grave concern about Iran's support for terrorism remains unabated," White House spokesman Eric Shultz said.
"That is all the more reason that we need to make sure they don't obtain a nuclear weapon." In total last
year, nearly 33,000 people were killed in almost 13,500 terrorist attacks around the world, according to the figures that were compiled for the
State Department by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. That's up
from just over 18,000 deaths in nearly 10,000 attacks in 2013. Twenty-four Americans were killed by extremists in 2014, the report said. And
abductions soared to 9,428 in the calendar year from 3,137 in 2013. The report attributes the rise in attacks to increased terror activity in Iraq,
Afghanistan and Nigeria and the sharp spike in deaths to a growth in exceptionally lethal attacks in those countries and elsewhere. There were
20 attacks that killed more than 100 people each in 2014, compared to just two a year earlier, the report said. Among those were December's
attack by the Pakistani Taliban on a school in Peshawar that killed at least 150 people and the June attack by Islamic State militants on a prison
in Mosul, Iraq, in which 670 Shiite prisoners died. At the end of 2014, the prison attack was the deadliest terrorist operation in the world since
Sept. 11, 2001, according to the report. Despite all indications pointing toward increased violence, the
State Department's
counterterrorism coordinator said the numbers didn't reflect improvements by the U.S. and its partners
in stamping out terrorism financing, improving information sharing, impeding foreign fighters and
forming a coalition to fight the Islamic State. "We have made progress," Ambassador Tina Kaidanow said.
Impact: Cybercrime
Cybercrime poses the most probable existential threat
Paikowsky and Baram 2015 (Deganit [post-doctoral fellow at the Davis Institute for International Relations at
Hebrew University in Jerusalem and a senior researcher at the Yuval Nee’man Workshop for Science, Technology, and Security
at Tel-Aviv University, also a research associate at the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University and a consultant
to the space committee of Israel’s National Council for Research and Development] and Gil [Ph.D. candidate in the department
of political science at Tel-Aviv University, and a researcher at the Yuval Nee’man workshop for Science, Technology, and
Security at Tel-Aviv University]; Space Wars; Jan 7; www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142690/deganit-paikowsky-and-gilbaram/space-wars?cid=rss-rss_xml-space_wars-000000; kdf)
In September 2014, hackers from China broke into the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) network in an attempt to
disrupt data related to disaster planning, aviation, and much more coming from U.S. satellites. This breach was the
latest in a series of cyberattacks on space systems, exposing the Achilles’ heel of such technology: the vulnerability of its computers and
the information it creates and transmits. Cyberattacks, which are on the rise in every industry, pose particularly significant threats to
space systems as they are used so ubiquitously in corporate and military operations, making them increasingly attractive targets for hackers. Although only
about a dozen countries have the capability to launch a satellite into space , billions of people around the world rely on space
systems for nearly every aspect of modern life. Satellites are used to support phones, the Internet, and banking
systems. They are also used to monitor land, air, and maritime traffic; facilitate global communications; transmit mass media in real time;
monitor the earth for climate change or severe weather threats and natural disasters; gather intelligence; and send early
warnings of incoming ballistic missiles. It is no wonder, then, that the global economy depends on communication
satellites, navigation systems, and earth-observation satellites. The backbone of all these services consists of 1,200 operational satellites currently orbiting the
earth, which have the potential to cause significant tangible damage by attacking national or global space systems across countries and continents. Even a small
glitch can wreak havoc. For example, in April 2014, the Glonass System, the Russian equivalent of the American-designed GPS, malfunctioned due to two small
mathematical mistakes in the software. Significantly, fixing the system took more than 13 hours, and the half-day breakdown led to severe disruption of Glonass
receivers, which affected iPhone5 users. While the disruption was not caused by ambitious hackers, it is easy to see why space
systems are the brass
ring of cybercrimes: They are low effort and high return. Therefore, a relatively simple hack can inflict
considerable damage. It is easy to see why space systems are the brass ring of cybercrimes: They are low effort and high return. Therefore, a relatively
simple hack can inflict considerable damage. EASY PREY Although a space system is composed of three connected segments—satellites and spacecraft that orbit the
earth, ground stations, and the communication systems that link the two—cybercriminals only need to find the vulnerabilities in one of these segments. For
example, for a few hundred dollars, a hacker can buy a small jamming device on the Internet to interfere with satellite signals. “We have to make it (satellite
navigation systems) more robust,” warned Colonel Bradford Parkinson, who led the creation of the GPS. “Our cellphone towers are timed with GPS. If they lose that
time, they lose sync and pretty soon they don’t operate. Our power grid is synchronized with GPS [and] so is our banking system.” Space
systems have
become the target of hacking. In July of last year, the United States identified a 28-year-old British citizen who hacked a number of government
networks, including NASA. He attempted to grab highly sensitive data and claimed he would “do some hilarious stuff with it.” Four months later, in November 2013,
viruses infected the computers used by the International Space Station. Japan’s space agency also discovered a computer virus inside a few of its computers in
January 2012 and Germany’s space center recently suffered an espionage attack, with several of its computers getting hit with spyware. Since 2009, the BBC has
complained of disruptions to its Persian-language radio and television programs and has accused Tehran of interfering with international satellite broadcasts
beamed into Iran. Only after the EU made a diplomatic complaint to pressure Iran to cease and desist did the attacks stop. When North Korea jammed South
Korea’s GPS signals in May 2012, it affected the navigation of over 250 flights. The list goes on. One of the reasons space systems, especially commercial ones, are
such easy prey is that they often operate with outdated software. Developing a space system is generally a long process that, depending on the complexity of the
system, takes several years to complete. And once the system is operational, it is expected to last for at least several years—sometimes even more than a decade.
This process makes it difficult to update the system’s security software. Moreover, in many cases, the information systems that are being used to manage space
systems are mostly based on commercial “off-the-shelf” products, with known vulnerabilities and low levels of protection, especially compared to supposedly
better-protected military systems. In 2014, a number of think-tanks, from the Council on Foreign Relations to London-based Chatham House, as well as the
information-security firm IOActive, sounded the alarm on how vulnerable space systems are to cyberattacks. These reports warned of the ease with which
backdoors in software—an undetected remote access to a computer—can be exploited, and of the prevalence of unsecured software, non-protected protocols, and
unencrypted channels. One of the studies’ recommendations was to immediately remove software updates from the public websites of various companies that
provide satellite services and equipment, in order to prevent hackers from reverse-engineering the source code. However, despite these warnings, the
space
industry is barely aware of these risks and its responses are slow. Herein lies a challenge: to produce and put into practice
standards and regulations regarding multinational and commercial activities in space technology and exploration. MOVING FORWARD In the past year, several
space-faring nations have begun to tackle the issue. Three months ago, the U.S. Air Force announced that it hopes to develop technologies that would prevent
hackers from jamming its satellites. Russia intends to significantly update the robustness and security of its military and government satellite communication system
by 2025. Despite these positive steps, national governments and international bodies have more ground to cover. First, governments need to increase their efforts
to raise awareness regarding the growing threat of cyberattacks against both government and commercial space systems. Second, in order to provide better
protection, governments and corporations should take a holistic rather than piecemeal approach regarding the protection of all segments of their systems, and
work toward solutions that will ensure the performance of the systems and their services, rather than protecting a specific asset. For example, satellites are and will
continue to be damaged by cyberattacks; but the ability of an entire system to operate smoothly and recover rapidly is more crucial than the security and safety of a
single satellite. Third, military, civil, and commercial actors should engage in more dialogue in order to strengthen overall protection. They can do so by sharing
information and working jointly toward better standards and regulations. Fourth, governments and international bodies should try to standardize protocols for
protecting space systems. For example, when NOAA was breached in September, the Inspector General for the Commerce Department, which oversees the
network, had just criticized it for an array of “high-risk vulnerabilities” in the security of its satellite information and weather service systems. It took nearly a month
for NOAA to admit it had been hacked. Hiding such information hampers meaningful and timely discussion about the issue and delays the development of
preventive measures. Enforcing a standard protocol could help alleviate this problem. And finally, protecting space systems must be an international effort. Spacefaring nations should work together to achieve international cooperation on all of the areas mentioned above: raising awareness, sharing information, and
developing much-needed standards. The
potential for colossal damage and the relative ease of launching a
cyberattack on space systems make them tantalizing targets for cybercriminals. The threat is already at
our doorstep, and it will only get bigger. It is time for the international space community to muster the political will to rise to this growing
challenge.
xt-- Cyber attacks escalate
Cyber war escalates
Tilford 12 (27 July 2012, Robert, Writer for The Examiner, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-theelectric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa)
“Cyber
attackers could all too easily shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast, the west coast,
and the middle part of our country”, said Senator Grassley on July 26, 2012. “Any one attack could leave
dozens of major cities and tens of millions of Americans without power. We know, because we were shown in a
room here in the Capitol, how an attack could take place and what damage it would do, so we know this is not just make believe”, he said. So
what would a cyber attack look like anyway? The Senator explained: “Without
ATMs or debit card readers, commerce
would immediately grind to a halt. My daughter, who lives here in the DC area, lost power when the storm hit. They waited for a
number of hours, and then they took all the food out of their freezer, they gave away what they could, and they threw the rest away. And that
was the way it was all over. Their power was out for about a week, and it made it very difficult. They are fortunate enough to have a basement,
and the heat wasn’t oppressive down there. Without
refrigeration, food would rot on the shelves, the freezers
would have to be emptied, and people could actually go hungry. Without gas pumps, transportation
arteries would clog with abandoned vehicles. Without cell phones or computers, whole regions of the
country would be cut off from communication and families would be unable to reach each other.
Without air conditioning and without lifesaving technology and the service of hospitals and nursing
homes, the elderly and sick would become much sicker and die. Most major hospitals have backup
power, but it is only for a limited amount of time. It depends on how much fuel they can store, and that is very limited”, Senator
Grassley said. The devastation that the Senator describes is truly unimaginable. To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take
out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple harm the U.S. military. The senator notes that is that the
same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors
also power “every military base in our country.” “Although bases would be prepared to weather a short
power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out”, he said. Which
means military command and control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our
country would shut Down completely. “Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many
weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power”, said Senator Grassley. “So in a few short hours or days, the
mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions”, he said. We contacted
the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real. Top national
security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security
Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and
improving the nation’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source: Congressional Record). So
how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure (see video:
Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_kVQrp_D0kY&feature=relmfu ). A cyber attack today against
the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “full scale” US military response.
That could include the use of “nuclear weapons”, if authorized by the President.
--AT: No Cyber Terror
Leading security firms prove – cyber terror threats are areal and ramping up
Sanger and Perlroth 2015 (David E Sanger and Nicole; Iran is raising sophistication and frequency of
cyberattacks, study says; Apr 15; www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/world/middleeast/iran-is-raisingsophistication-and-frequency-of-cyberattacks-study-says.html?ref=topics; kdf)
WASHINGTON — In February, a year after the Las Vegas Sands was hit by a devastating cyberattack that ruined many of the computers running
its casino and hotel operations, the director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., publicly told
Congress what seemed obvious:
Iranian hackers were behind the attack. Sheldon G. Adelson, the billionaire chief executive of Sands, who is a major supporter of
Israel and an ardent opponent of negotiating with Tehran, had suggested an approach to the Iran problem a few months before the attack that
no public figure had ever uttered in front of cameras. “What I would say is: ‘Listen. You see that desert out there? I want to show you
something,’ ” Mr. Adelson said at Yeshiva University in Manhattan in October 2013. He then argued for detonating an American nuclear
weapon where it would not “hurt a soul,” except “rattlesnakes and scorpions or whatever,” before adding, “Then you say, ‘See, the next one is
in the middle of Tehran.’ ” Instead, Tehran
directed an attack at the desert of Nevada. Now a new study of Iran’s
cyberactivities, to be released by Norse, a cybersecurity firm, and the American Enterprise Institute, concludes that beyond the
Sands attack, Iran has greatly increased the frequency and skill of its cyberattacks, even while negotiating with
world powers over limits on its nuclear capabilities. “Cyber gives them a usable weapon, in ways nuclear technology does not,”
said Frederick W. Kagan, who directs the institute’s Critical Threats Project and is beginning a larger effort to track Iranian cyberactivity. “And it
has a degree of plausible deniability that is attractive to many countries.” Mr. Kagan argues that if sanctions against Iran are suspended under
the proposed nuclear accord, Iran will be able to devote the revenue from improved oil exports to cyberweapons. But it is far from clear that
that is what Iran would do. When Mr. Clapper named Iran in the Sands attack, it was one of the few instances in which American intelligence
agencies had identified a specific country that it believed was using such attacks for political purposes. The first came in December, when
President Obama accused North Korea of launching a cyberattack on Sony Pictures. Other United States officials have said that Iran
attacked American banks in retaliation for sanctions and that it destroyed computers at the oil giant
Saudi Aramco in retaliation for the close Saudi ties with the United States. The evidence from the Norse report, along with analyses by
American intelligence agencies, strongly suggests that Iran has made much greater use of cyberweapons over the past year, despite
international sanctions. The attacks have mostly involved espionage, but a few, like the Sands attack, have been for destructive purposes. In the
report, to be released Friday, Norse — which, like other cybersecurity firms, has an interest in portraying a world of cyberthreats but
presumably little incentive in linking them to any particular country — traced thousands of attacks against American targets to hackers inside
Iran. The report, and a similar one from Cylance, another cybersecurity firm, make clear that Iranian hackers are moving from ostentatious
cyberattacks in which they deface websites or simply knock them offline to much quieter reconnaissance. In some cases, they appear to be
probing for critical infrastructure systems that could provide opportunities for more dangerous and destructive attacks. But Norse and Cylance
differ on the question of whether the Iranian attacks have accelerated in recent months, or whether Tehran may be pulling back during a
critical point in the nuclear negotiations. Norse, which says it maintains thousands of sensors across the Internet to collect intelligence on
attackers’ methods, insists that Iranian hackers have shown no signs of letting up. Between January 2014 and last month, the Norse report said,
its sensors picked up a 115 percent increase in attacks launched from Iranian Internet protocol, or I.P., addresses. Norse said that its sensors
had detected more than 900 attacks, on average, every day in the first half of March. Cylance came to a different conclusion, at least for Iran’s
activities in the past few months, as negotiations have come to a head. Stuart McClure, the chief executive and founder of Cylance, which has
been tracking Iranian hacking groups, said that there had been a notable drop in activity over the past few months, and that the groups were
now largely quiet. American intelligence agencies also monitor the groups, but they do not publicly publish assessments of the activity.
Classified National Intelligence Estimates over the past five years have identified Russia and China as the United States’ most sophisticated, and
prolific, adversaries in cyberspace. However, American officials
have said that Iran and North Korea concern them
the most, not for their sophistication, but because their attacks are aimed more at destruction, as was the case with
the attack on Sony Pictures. In addition to the Sands attack last year — about which Mr. Clapper gave no detail in public — Iran has been
identified as the source of the 2012 attack on Saudi Aramco, in which hackers wiped out data on 30,000 computers, replacing it with an image
of a burning American flag.
Impact - Nuclear Terror
Impact: Nuclear Terror
A nuclear terror attack would kill billions, collapse the global economy, and cause
escalation
Schwartz 2015 (Benjamin [Worked at the Departments of State, Defense and Energy]; Right of Boom:
The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism; The Overlook Press; p. 1-2; kdf)
IN AN OTHERWISE CALM AND UNEVENTFUL MORNING, A
small nuclear weapon explodes in downtown Washington, DC. The
count
rises to over a hundred thousand, and the destruction is measured in hundreds of billions of dollars. The
blast's electromagnetic pulse burns out electrical components across the metropolitan area. Radiation leaves
the center of the city uninhabitable for the first time since it was declared America's capital in 1790, and the scientific community
predicts that it will remain so for a decade. The stock market plunges as investors anticipate draconian customs
regimes that will choke global trade. Fear of further attacks paralyzes America and much of the Western world. Hours after the
device generates a yield of fifteen kilotons, roughly the same force unleashed by the bomb Little Boy over Hiroshima. T he casualty
explosion, a little unkown terrorist group claims responsibility. It is the first time the president, who was not in Washington at the time of the
blast, and his surviving cabinet members, including the director of national intelligence, have heard of the group. After searching intelligence
databases, analysts report that the group is linked to three hostile governments, all of which have issued statements condemning the attack
and denying involvement. It will take weeks for the remnants of the US intelligence community to assess that one of these three governments
is probably lying, but even then the US government won't have irrefutable evidence of complicity. Unlike
a ballistic missile or bomb
the origin of what analysts will call a "container-based improvised
nuclear device" is difficult to determine and impossible to prove. Nuclear forensics will ultimately provide strong
delivered by enemy land-, air-, or seacraft,
evidence that the fissile material used in the device originated from the country under suspicion. Signals intelligence will record celebrations
and praise of the attack by midlevel officials in that country's military and intelligence establishment. However, the
intelligence
reporting taken as a whole will suggest that negligence within that country's weapons industry and at its
nuclear complexes is at least as plausible a scenario as a deliberate transfer by government officials to
the terrorist group. Yet there is no conclusive reporting that points to either willful negligence or human
error. Either way, there is no way to know if the transfer occurred through official policy, the machinations of a venal or ideologically
motivated individual, or simple incompetence. There is almost nothing about the origins of the attack that the president of the United States
knows for certain.
Yes Nuclear Terror- Pakistan
Pakistani nukes pose an existential risk – myriad of reasons
Schwartz 2015 (Benjamin [Worked at the Departments of State, Defense and Energy]; Right of Boom:
The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism; The Overlook Press; p. 66-78; kdf)
The breakup of the Soviet Union presented an entirely unprecedented challenge: the redeployment of thousands of nuclear weapons and the
dismantlement of hundreds of nuclear installations. It was this challenge that focused a great deal of attention on the danger of "loose nukes,"
another of Allison's "Three No's." In 1991, it also spurred Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to launch the Cooperative Threat Reduction program,
which has since provided a half billion dollars each year to improve the safety and security of Russia's unconventional arms. These funds
allowed the United States to remove nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and financed the demolition of thousands of
Soviet weapons, including missiles, submarines, bombers, and warheads. The Nunn-Lugar CTR program also paid the salaries of tens of
thousands of Soviet weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians who were impoverished by the economic crises of the early 1990s and
helped discourage them from working for American adversaries and governments of proliferation concern. 20 The growth of CTR efforts
corresponded with a significant decline in seizures of illicit highly enriched uranium, partially enriched uranium, and plutonium sales on the
black market. Between 1992 and 2002 there were at least eleven cases ofHEU seizures and two plutonium seizures reported to the IAEA. In
contrast, only four seizures occurred during nearly a decade between 2002 and 2012, and they were all associated with a single countryGeorgia. While correlation certainly doesn't prove causation, these statistics are a strong indication of CTR' s effectiveness and suggest that the
threat of loose Soviet nukes and fissile materials has been largely contained. 21 Unfortunately,
the threat of "loose nukes" has
shifted rather than declined. Few have had greater access to information on this threat, and experience combating it, than Rolf
Mowatt-Larssen. A twenty-three year veteran of the CIA's Clandestine Service, Mowatt-Larssen served multiple tours as a chief of station and
rose to the agency's most powerful positions: chief of the European Division, chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, and chief
of the Counterterrorism Center. After the September 11, 2001 attacks George Tenet, the director of the CIA, tapped Mowatt-Larssen to be at
the point of the spear in America's response to the threat of nuclear terrorism. Mowatt-Larssen fulfilled this role first within the CIA and then
from the basement of the Energy Department's headquarters as the director of its Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.22 The
centrality of Mowatt-Larssen's efforts is documented, among other places, in Tenet's memoir. After leaving government, Mowatt-Larssen
articulated the problem in no uncertain terms: "The
greatest threat of a loose nuke scenario stems from insiders in
the nuclear establishment working with outsiders, people seeking a bomb or material to make a bomb.
Nowhere in the world is this threat greater than in Pakistan."23 Pakistan is distinguished by an extraordinary
combination of malevolent ingredients. It is the only country ever to have both the founding father of the nation's nuclear weapons program
and a lead nuclear weapons scientist independently develop clandestine networks to proliferate atomic weapons for profit. The latter, and
better known of the two, Abduel Qadeer Khan, stole uranium enrichment technology while working at a centrifuge manufacturing company in
the Nether lands during the 1970s, went on to develop Pakistan's uranium enrichment pathway to the bomb, and then proceeded to go into
business for himself His clients included Iran, Libya, and North Korea. This became apparent to the world in dramatic fashion in January 2003
when US agents intercepted a German ship named the BBC China that was transporting a large stash of nuclear weapons components to Libya.
Libyan officials later admitted to having reached an agreement with Khan Research Laboratories to provide $100 million in exchange for a
"complete store-bought nuclear weapons program."24 Khan also built upon Pakistan's long-standing relationship with North Korea in the field
of missile technology to provide that country with dozens of centrifuges.25 As early as 1987, Khan also sold to the Iranians and eventually
provided them P-1 centrifuges, schematics of advanced P-2 designs, and hundreds of sensitive nuclear components.26 Despite his public
confession in 2004, Khan
remains a hero to the vast majority of Pakistanis, a political reality that compelled
president Pervez Musharraf to pardon Khan for his crimes. Pakistan's other premier proliferator, Bashiruddin Mahmood, is less
well known but was also a stalwart of the nuclear program during the 1970s; he occupies the singular position of being the most senior scientist
to liaison directly with al-Qaeda. The chief designer and director of Pakistan's Khushab Plutonium Production Reactor, Mahmood retired from
government service in 1999 and founded a nongovernmental organization called Umma Tameer-e-Nau (UTN; Reconstruction for the Islamic
Community). The leadership of UTN was made up of retired Pakistani nuclear scientists, military officers, engineers, and technicians, including
Chaudhry Abdul Majid, who had been a nuclear fuel expert at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology. In the summer of 2001,
Mahmood and Majid traveled to Afghanistan under the cover of the UTN in order to discuss nuclear weapons with mullah Mohammed Omar
and Osama bin Laden. According to former director of the Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet, Mahmood was thought of as something of
a madman by many of his former colleagues in the Pakistan nuclear establishment. In 1987 he published a book called "Doomsday and Life
After Death: the Ultimate Faith of the Universe as Seen by the Holy Quran." It was a disturbing tribute to his skewed view of the role of science
in jihad. The book's basic message from the
leader of a group that has offered WMD capabilities to AQ [al-Qaeda] was that the world would end one day soon in the fire of nuclear holocaust that would usher in
judgment day and thus fulfill the prophecies of the Quran ... Mahmood and Majid were detained after a tip from a
foreign intelligence service prompted the CIA to inform the Pakistani government of their actions. The two scientists admitted to the meetings,
noted that bin Laden was interested in nuclear weapons and that Majid had drawn a rough sketch of an improvised nuclear device for him, but
denied that they assisted al-Qaeda. Despite failing several polygraph tests and a statement from Libya's head of intelligence claiming that the
UTN had tried to sell Libya a nuclear bomb, the two scientists were soon released.27 According to Tenet, the United States "knew that UTN
enjoyed some measure of support from Pakistani military officers ... notably the former director of Pakistani intelligence service, Gen. Hamid
Gul."28 A
second factor that makes the nuclear terrorism threat from Pakistan especially acute is its track
record as a sanctuary and a patron of terrorist organizations. Even before Pakistan became a state after the partition of
British India, its advocates decided that securing an Islamic polity required an investment in asymmetric proxies. India was destined to have
conventional military superiority, so the Muslims of the subcontinent from the start invested in unconventional warfare. From the bloody
battles of partition through the present day, the Pakistani military cultivated radicals, which for the first few decades were overwhelmingly
Pathans/Pashtuns, but in recent time have come to include Punjabis as well. This isn't a temporary fad; it is an embedded component of
Pakistan's national security system. The
ability of Osama bin Laden to enjoy approximately a decade of hospitality
just miles from Pakistan's premier military university likely had more to do with the sympathies of a
handful of people then official policy, but his presence was entirely consistent with Pakistani support for radical jihadist groups
such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Taibai, the Haqqani Network, and the Afghan Taliban, among others.29 Third, and likely related,
Pakistani public opinion polls consistently show widespread antipathy toward the United States and
sympathy for jihadist organizations. As of June 2012, 75 percent considered the United States "an enemy."30
Significant segments of the public not only hold anti-American views but also subscribe to radical militant ideology that is manifest in violence
against Christians, Shi'ites (of which 375 were killed in 2012 alone), symbols of secularism, and even the Pakistani government. The
assassination in 2011 of Pakistan's only Christian minister, Shahbaz Bhatti, was indicative of this trend, but even more alarming than the murder
was the subsequent outburst of public support for the assassin. Thousands of demonstrators celebrated the "execution," which they claimed
was justified by Bhatti's efforts to reform Pakistan's blasphemy laws, which impose the death penalty for insulting Islam. Before former prime
minister Benazir Bhutto was murdered in 2007, she expressed a belief that al-Qaeda would march on Islamabad in a matter of years.31 These
attitudes are worth bearing in mind in the context of another statistic: the approximately nine thousand civilian scientists, including two
thousand who reportedly possess "criticallmowledge" of weapons manufacturing and maintenance who work in Pakistan's nuclear
complexes.32 There is arguably no published figure more qualified to comment on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program than Feroz Khan, who
served for thirty years in the Pakistani military and occupied senior positions at Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, the country's nuclear
decision-making and command-and-control apparatus. Regarding the insider threat Khan has said, "Pakistan faces
two fundamental
challenges in establishing its personnel reliability requirements. First, religious extremism is increasing in
Pakistani society as a whole .... Second, because Pakistan does not have sophisticated technological controls
over personnel, it has to rely on the rationality and loyalty of individuals . .. . "33 These words don't inspire a great
deal of confidence. A fourth development of serious concern is that radical ideology and radical organizations inevitably have spawned radical
violence in Pakistan. According to Bruce Reidel, a CIA veteran and former lead Pakistan analyst for the Obama administration, government
insiders have facilitated multiple terrorist attacks against the Pakistani state, including suicide bombings at air force bases that house nuclear
weapons storage sites.34 In 2011, Jeffrey Goldberg reported in the Atlantic that at least six
facilities widely believed to be
associated with Pakistan's nuclear program had already been targeted by militants. The Pakistani military's
inability to protect its own assets was demonstrably apparent in early 2011 when it took forces over fifteen hours to regain control of a major
Pakistani naval base near Karachi after militants overran it, destroyed two P-3C Orion surveillance planes and killed ten people.35 These events,
alongside a variety of other negative economic indicators, led Stephen Cohen, a leading expert on the country, to conclude, "The fundamentals
of the state are either failing or questionable, and this applies to both the idea of Pakistan, the ideology of the state, the purpose of the state,
and also to the coherence of the state itself. I wouldn't predict a comprehensive failure soon, but clearly that's the direction in which Pakistan is
moving."36 Fifth and most alarming, Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal and its nuclear doctrine are undergoing changes
that exponentially expand the risk of terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon. With respect to sheer size,
Pakistan was on track to displace France as the world's fourth largest nuclear weapons power.37 This is a
dangerous development in itself, but is accompanied by even more troubling indications of how those weapons will be managed. Feroz Khan
has confirmed these facts, and his access to senior Pakistani officials, including former president Musharraf, lend great credibility to his account
of the nuclear security situation in Pakistan. While a Pakistani patriot and strong supporter of the country's nuclear weapons program, Khan's
account reveals a number of issues of grave concern from a proliferation perspective. Khan cites two specific events as catalysts that pushed
Pakistan to undertake unprecedented risks with respect to its nuclear arsenal. The first was instigated by India on January 25, 2000, when
India's defense minister, George Fernandes, formally announced a new doctrine of"limited war under the nuclear umbrella"-a doctrine that
would become known as Cold Start. The central idea of the Cold Start doctrine is that India could take conventional military action against
Pakistan in a limited manner that would prevent escalation to nuclear war. This would allow India a viable response to Pakistani-sponsored
terrorist attacks. Following Lashkar-e-Taibai's attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, India demonstrated that this doctrine was
more than words by mobilizing 500,000 troops for the first time since the 1971 war. The subsequent ten-month standoff between the two
countries convinced the Pakistan military that it needed to up its nuclear ante. In Khan's words, the standoff demonstrated that "Pakistan
would lack the resources to begin major mobilizations whenever terrorists attacked India and instead would be forced to rely even more on
nuclear deterrence."38 A second catalytic event was the US-led invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, which placed US military assets in striking
distance of Pakistan. As early as the 1960s, Americans had expressed alarm about nuclear security in Pakistan. None other than the famous
Henry De Wolf Smyth of the Smyth Report once stated, "What I am concerned about internationally is power reactors in countries that have
unstable governments. The Pakistani reactor, for example, builds up a stockpile of plutonium. Suppose there's a revolution. A totally new and
crazy government comes in, and here's the plutonium just sitting there asking to be made into a bomb."39 Islamabad has long been aware of
these concerns, and when it conceded to Washington's demand for access to Pakistani airspace to support US military operations in
Afghanistan its "decades-long fear of preventive strikes sent it to high alert." India's Cold Start doctrine and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan
spurred Pakistan to make changes in its nuclear posture that are entirely rational within a framework that assumes the Indian military to be an
existential threat; but these changes are also extremely destabilizing when placed in the context of Pakistan's domestic instability. The first
change is a massive expansion of Pakistan's plutonium production capacity. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission is constructing three
additional heavy water reactors at the same site as its fiftymegawatt Khushab reactor. To reprocess the higher quantities of plutonium,
Islamabad is also doubling the capacity of the reprocessing plant at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology as well as
completing a much larger commercial- scale reprocessing facility at Chashma that was abandoned by the French in 1978.411 This is consistent
with Pakistan's position with respect to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which Pakistani diplomats have worked for years to block; these
diplomats declare that in order to maintain their country's minimal critical deterrent, Pakistan cannot be expected to accept any cap in fissile
material production. Expansion of plutonium production is also reportedly being accompanied by greater HEU enrichment. According to Feroz
Khan, the Khan Research Laboratories continue to produce at least one hundred kilograms of HEU annually and are expanding their capability
by introducing and installing a new generation of P-3 and P-4 gas centrifuges that have a significantly higher separative work unit. A second
development, which is closely related to the first, is Pakistan's decision to build small tactical nuclear warheads.
Plutonium-based nuclear weapons designs, which can require only four to six kilograms of plutonium, allow for substantial miniaturization.41
This trend is consistent with the April20ll test of the HatfXIINASR missile system, which is a rocket launcher capable of being tipped with a
nuclear warhead. According to Khan, "The implication of this system is that Pakistan has acquired the capability to build a miniaturized nuclear
warhead .. . plutonium-based system that requires an implosion device with a diameter of less than twelve inches-quite a technological
achievement."42 From a proliferation prospective this is also quite a problem. A third development of grave concern is
the implication of the fielding of such a system. To be most effective, it would have to be "pre-deployed and combat ready."43 Kahn suggests
that given the current trajectory of the program, "at some
point nuclear weapons would be mated with delivery
systems in peacetime." 44 This is the same allegation that Goldberg made in his 2011 article in the Atlantic asserting that Pakistan is
using civilian-style vehicles without noticeable defense to transport not merely the "demated" components of nuclear parts but "mated"
nuclear weapons.45 The Congressional Research Service has also cited lieutenant general Khalid Kidwai, the head of Pakistan's Strategic Plans
Division in 2008, who made the same allegation. 46 This contention is conjecture rather than a sure fact, but the military dynamics of the
conflict between Pakistan and India do encourage the predeployment of combat ready nuclear weapons and therefore make these assertions
plausible. Fourth, Khan confirms that Pakistan has prioritized preventing Indian or American disablement of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal above
the danger of theft. As the United States prepared to launch an attack on the Afghan Taliban after September 11, 2001 , President
Musharraf reportedly ordered the dispersal of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal to "at least six secret new
locations."47 The dispersal of the arsenal apparently is also consistent with Khan's allegation that Pakistan is expanding its nuclear weapons
delivery systems. Initially, Pakistan only had the capability to deliver atomic weapons by aircraft, but with
assistance from North Korea and China, solid and liquid fueled ballistic missiles became an option.
However, Pakistan interpreted India's bid for an Arrow antiballistic missile system and Patriot PAC-3 system to back up its S-300 system as a
threat that could blunt Pakistan's offensive systems. Pakistan responded by developing the Babur cruise missile and, according to Khan, is also
actively pursuing a sea-based deterrent that would "complete the third leg of the [nuclear] triad."48 When considering the potential for a
maritime nuclear capability, it is worth keeping in mind a statement that a retired Pakistani general made to Goldberg: "Different aspects of the
military and security services have different levels of sympathy for the extremists. The navy is high in syrnpathy. "49
Yes Nuclear Terror - Loose Nukes
Pakistani nukes will get loose
Schwartz 2015 (Benjamin [Worked at the Departments of State, Defense and Energy]; Right of Boom:
The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism; The Overlook Press; p. 15-16; kdf)
With respect to "loose nukes," the threat faced today is unprecedented. The good news is that the danger that Allison
focused on-fissile material leaking out of the former Soviet republics-has been substantially curtailed, though not eliminated. When Allison
served in government he was confronted by a slew of nuclear smuggling cases. Between 1992
and 2002, eleven cases of
attempted sales of highly enriched uranium and two cases of attempted plutonium sales occurred. In
contrast, between 2002 and 2012 there have been only four cases-all but one of which was linked to a single country,
Georgia. This is a good news story, which is probably due in no small measure to the efforts of the United States to provide rapid security
upgrades as part of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program.6 Unfortunately, this
good news has been
accompanied by extremely dangerous developments in Pakistan. The country is in the midst of a massive
expansion of its nuclear weapons complex at a time when radicalization is on the rise and its military is
under frequent attack from insurgents. Moreover, the size of the nuclear complex is not only expanding but, according to Feroz
Khan, a thirty-year veteran of the Pakistani program, the military is also planning to produce miniaturized tactical
nuclear weapons, deploy them in a ready-to-launch state, and mate them with new delivery vehicles. From a proliferation
perspective this is a frightening prospect, particularly considering that Pakistan has an unparalleled history of proliferation. This is all
occurring in a country that hosted Osama bin Laden and the senior leadership of al-Qaeda for over a
decade and where the military intelligence service continues to court, coopt, and coordinate with a wide
array of terrorists groups.7
Yes Nuclear Terror – AT: Safeguards
The safeguards highlighted by their ev will fail – only intelligence can solve
Myhrvold 2014 (Nathan P [chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief
technology officer at Microsoft]; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action;
cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf; kdf)
Preventing nuclear war and fighting common crime are similar in some ways. Both efforts typically exploit the principle of deterrence by
inflicting punishment after the fact. This approach works well when the deterrence is real—when it is clear that the probability of punishment
or retaliation is high. With strategic terrorism, we already know we cannot retaliate effectively. Besides deterrence, the
other main
approach to security is guarding: preventing crime by having forces on the scene that stop criminals or attackers in their tracks.
Guarding is used quite a bit in counterterrorism—air marshals on flights, security screeners in airports, and
bomb-sniffing dogs at large events. Unfortunately, guarding does not prevent strategic terrorism. If the goal
of a terrorist is to spread an infectious disease in the United States, it is simple to put a few infected
volunteers on a plane headed into our country. It would be difficult for security to notice anything amiss. The terrorists
wouldn’t be obviously sick or carrying suspicious items. Even if a way existed to detect such attackers, by the time someone found them in the
United States, it would already be too late. Even
with nuclear, chemical, or noncontagious bio warfare, guarding the
country is of limited use. Intercepting a nuclear bomb in a shipping container works only if you stop it in
a place you don’t mind losing if the weapon detonates. Having a nuclear bomb explode in a Port
Authority facility in New Jersey may be marginally better than having it explode in midtown Manhattan, but it would be a
Pyrrhic victory. The only way to beat strategic terrorists is to go after them, either in their home territory or, if
they are already here, before they have built a sufficiently dangerous weapon. We need to strike preemptively. The Iraq War, however, has
given preemption a bad name. Destroying Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction was the goal, yet investigators ultimately found that
he didn’t have any. This not only discredits the intelligence process that led us into Iraq, it discredits preemption itself. Both the country and the
world will be highly skeptical of any rush to a preemptive attack. Most preemptive action will not be at the level of a full-scale war and thus will
require lower thresholds of certainty. Nevertheless, any sort of preemptive attack places tremendous demands on intelligence gathering—
demands that our intelligence community, in its current form, cannot meet. The need to battle strategic terrorists preemptively sets the bar for
21st-century intelligence services: they must provide information of sufficient quality and timeliness to enable policy makers to decide whether
or not to act. The intelligence community needs a complete bottom-up review to determine whether its structure and methodologies match
present and future needs. The new approach will require large and unpopular budget increases. Existing program budgets will need to be
redistributed. Congress will vigorously defend current projects affecting their constituents and contractors will howl. Action
nevertheless imperative.
is
AT: Nuclear Terror doesn’t escalate
It’s impossible to know if nuclear terror would escalate, best to side with caution
Schwartz 2015 (Benjamin [Worked at the Departments of State, Defense and Energy]; Right of Boom:
The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism; The Overlook Press; p. 3-5; kdf)
Yet there are very few authors, academics, or entertainers who have really thought through the scenario described above or examined in detail
the question of what happens in the days, weeks, and months after such an attack. Presumably, part of the reason for this is that the
US
government's response to nuclear terrorism is unknowable. Ask anyone who has spent time at the White House on the
National Security Council staff and they will tell you that decisions of war and peace are in no small part the product of
fickle factors like the personality of the president and the people who surround him. Thoughtful national
security practitioners also know that happenstance and dumb luck have a prominent role in shaping discussions in the White House Situation
Room. These conditions make realistic speculation difficult to formulate. The wide range of possible scenarios and the
salience of unknowable factors make it difficult to anticipate hypothetical policy prescriptions. Another reason that this question hasn't
demanded an answer is that most people understandably consider it to be far less relevant than "How can nuclear terrorism be prevented?"
Speculating on responses to a nuclear attack is a bit like contemplating the day after any number of
disasters that involve an unprecedented scale of devastation. Does the national security community focus on the US
government's potential response to an asteroid striking the planet or the aftermath of a war between China and the United States? It does not,
because these types of scenarios fall into the realm of the surreal or at a minimum envision a situation in which there is such massive social
disruption and such a severe diminution of US government capacity that it is difficult to even know where to begin. Admitting the limits of
American power, particularly the "hard power" of the US military and intelligence community, is also not a popular pastime. A politician would
need to be unusually brave to publicly focus on the day after an act of nuclear terrorism instead of the days before. Accepting nuclear terrorism
is an unacceptable position, his opponents would surely retort. There are also no precedents, history, or cases of nuclear terrorism to provide
context or demand consideration.
People -particularly pundits and politicians-who have not studied much history often use
the term unprecedented to describe the unfamiliar, but the scenario laid out above is truly something
new under the sun. Since a successful nuclear terrorism event has not happened before, and it is not happening now, there is less
appetite for thinking deeply about it than there is for considering more traditional security issues. From the sinking of the Lusitania by a
German U-boat, to the Japanese empire's attack on Pearl Harbor, to al-Qaeda's attacks that culminated in the events of 9/11, Americans
are conditioned to contemplate surprise attacks and expect that the US government can respond swiftly
and severely, to manifest the prediction made by Japanese admiral Isoroky Yamamoto that a surprise attack against America
would "awaken a sleeping giant."
AT: Low Probability
The probability of a nuclear terror attack is at unprecedented levels – amplifies the
magnitude
Schwartz 2015 (Benjamin [Worked at the Departments of State, Defense and Energy]; Right of Boom:
The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism; The Overlook Press; p. 23-25; kdf)
Is the scenario above simply the product of an overactive imagination and a penchant for alarmism? This is a reasonable question to
ask. And it is worth answering before embarking on an exploration of potential responses to nuclear terrorism. Those who assert that there is a
genuine threat of nuclear terrorism should acknowledge at the outset that there are legitimate reasons for skepticism. In fact, those who have
paid closest attention to the issue over the years may be most conditioned to be incredulous. They
have heard public officials
repeatedly issue dire warnings of impending terrorist attacks, watched and seen that no attack
materializes, and then have been presented with little or no evidence to support the initial alert. It is also perfectly understandable that
reasonable people question the competence and/or trustworthiness of US national security officials, particularly those responsible for nuclear
issues. This
is especially so in light of the second American-led invasion of Iraq-a war justified to the public
largely on the basis of nonexistent nuclear weapons. Moreover, warnings of impending doom didn't originate with then vice
president Dick Cheney. "I think we have to live with the expectation," remarked a Los Alamos atomic engineer in 1973, "that once every four or
five years a nuclear explosion will take place and kill a lot of people." This statement is cited in John McPhee's The Curve of Binding Energy,
which detailed concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nonstate actors over forty years ago.3 In the context of this history,
accusations of Chicken Little-like behavior aren't flippant reactions. While
exaggeration may mislead the credulous and
offend the perceptive, neither the absence of a precedent for nuclear terrorism nor the intelligence failure regarding Saddam Hussein's
WMD program change the growing threat. Many of these conditions aren't new; they have existed since the dawn
of the nuclear age, and the world has been very fortunate that the danger has been effectively managed
for so long. Other conditions are truly unprecedented. The world crossed from Graham Allison's "Three No's" into
three Yeses with a whimper rather than a bang, but we have nevertheless entered an environment of extraordinary risk.
Allison's contention that "[t]he detonation of a terrorist nuclear device in an American city is inevitable if the U.S. continues on its present
course" is certainly debatable.4 Yet
an objective assessment of the current nuclear security situation and its
future trajectory leads to an unavoidable conclusion: We are more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than
at any time since the dawn of the nuclear age.
AT: Schwartz Indicts
Criticism of Schwartz is that his magnitude is too small – experts agree that he is
awesome
Boot 2015 (Max [senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations]; 'Right of Boom,' by Benjamin E
Schwartz; Feb 6; www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/books/review/right-of-boom-by-benjamin-eschwartz.html; kdf)
Nuclear terrorism has long been a staple of movies and television shows. But typically, Hollywood productions end with the bomb being
defused. What would happen if heroes didn’t save the day and the United States experienced the worst 24 hours in its history? That is the
important question Benjamin E. Schwartz,
a career government official who has worked at the Departments of
State, Defense and Energy, sets out to answer in his clunkily titled first book, “Right of Boom.” (“Right of boom” is ­government-speak
for “after an explosion.”) His analysis begins with a fictional narrative that unfolds in a flat, matter-of-fact tone: “On an otherwise calm and
uneventful morning, a small nuclear weapon explodes in downtown Washington, D.C. . . . The casualty count rises to over a hundred thousand,
and the destruction is measured in hundreds of billions of dollars.” Schwartz rather arbitrarily assumes that the president is out of town at the
time of the explosion, along with other key officials. They must then figure out what to do when a “little-known terrorist group” (no ideology
specified) claims responsibility. Experts suggest the group is “linked to three hostile governments, all of which have issued statements
condemning the attack and denying involvement.” Eventually, in Schwartz’s story line, intelligence concludes that the nuclear material most
likely came from one nation (unnamed) but that “negligence within that country’s weapons industry and at its nuclear complexes is at least as
plausible a scenario as a deliberate transfer by government officials to the terrorist group.” What, then, should the president do? Schwartz
notes that “people may assume that the answer to nuclear terrorism is tragic but quite straightforward: retaliation with nuclear weapons.” But
it may not be so simple. It is far from certain that the president would be willing to incinerate the people of, say, North Korea, Iran or Pakistan.
And, as Schwartz notes, “American maneuver room would be severely curtailed if the nuclear threat network emanated from Russian or
Chinese territory.” Only Dr. Strangelove would suggest starting World War III with a state that possesses hundreds if not thousands of nuclear
weapons. What’s more, taking out the nuclear weapons even of a smaller state like Pakistan or North Korea would not be easy. It would be
necessary to wipe out the entire arsenal, but of course all states camouflage and disperse their nuclear stockpiles. If American strikes left some
nukes intact, the danger of a further nuclear attack on the American homeland would be very real. What about using boots on the ground?
“U.S. military forces could invade a country and forcefully take control over ­nuclear-related sites and facilities,” Schwartz says. He may go too
far in suggesting that such an action would have “limited prospects of eliminating the threat,” but he is right that it would be a “high-risk
venture” whose downside could include many of the problems the United States encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq. While
Schwartz
believes (rightly) that airstrikes against suspected nuclear proliferators would be the most likely initial
response, he argues that dealing with an act of nuclear terrorism in the long term would require a much
more complex series of actions designed to blunt “global nuclear threat networks.” Washington would need
“capabilities to conduct missions ranging from halting the sale of dual-use components through legal and diplomatic processes, to freezing
funds of weapons proliferators, to isolating and immobilizing terrorist groups, to improving security practices at nuclear materials storage sites,
to coercive interdictions on the high seas, to seizing and securing -nuclear weapons sites and even to -destroying nuclear weapons arsenals.”
Schwartz’s most intriguing suggestion is that an act of nuclear terrorism could revive an idea briefly entertained by the Truman administration
to establish “an international structure to control nuclear energy” — an International Atomic Energy Agency on steroids. Countries that failed
to comply with its edicts could face more than sanctions or strong rhetoric — they could be “presumed guilty” and ­declared “a legitimate
target for retaliation following nuclear terrorism even in the absence of proof of complicity.” Whatever happens, there is little doubt that we
would be entering a brave new world whose contours can be glimpsed only dimly. Schwartz is to be commended for thinking about the
unthinkable. It’s a shame he has not produced a better book. Schwartz is, to put it mildly, no thriller writer. His nuclear-attack plot is presented
with a minimum of drama, and it’s hard not to roll your eyes when he sketches an imaginary conversation on an unnamed television show
between experts from nonexistent think tanks chatting in language no human being would actually use. “As the late Irving Kristol noted many
years ago,” one of his pundits declaims, “international law is a fiction abused callously, or ignored ruthlessly, by those nations that, unlike the
Western democracies, never took it seriously in the first place.” Back to you, Bret. Schwartz also takes long detours into historical case studies
of limited relevance. For example, he compares possible responses to terrorism with America’s campaigns against the Comanches and Britain’s
against the Pashtuns in the 19th century. He even suggests that “war against Al Qaeda waged through unmanned aerial vehicles and informants
on the ground” is similar to the “punitive” expeditions undertaken by the British Raj in what is now Pakistan. The analogy doesn’t hold up.
British forces routinely burned villages in retaliation for Pashtun raids. Winston Churchill, who as a young army officer participated in one such
campaign, left a memorable description of how the Tirah Valley “was filled with the smoke,” which “hung like a cloud over the scene of
destruction.” If Washington were engaged in such a policy today, our armed forces would be bombing villages in Pakistan. But they’re not.
Current policy is actually “leadership targeting” — trying with great discrimination to eliminate the key players in Al Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations. This approach also has a long history, dating back to the Roman assassination, in 139 B.C., of a rebel leader in Hispania (Spain)
named Viriathus, but it goes entirely unmentioned here. And more disturbing than Schwartz’s failure to cite the relevant historical examples is
his conceptual error in failing to differentiate between decapitation strikes and punitive expeditions. “Right
of Boom” is marred by
other problems as well, like Schwartz’s unwillingness to consider the possible impact of the nation’s
entire political leadership being wiped out. Another curious omission is neglecting to think about what
would happen if more than one nuclear bomb went off, or if more nuclear attacks were threatened. That possibility was
raised in Andrew Krepinevich’s “7 Deadly Scenarios,” a more compelling look at this same issue that also goes unmentioned here. Finally
Schwartz does not explain what steps policy makers should take to stop nuclear terrorism before it occurs. What, for example, should we be
doing to prevent Iran from getting the bomb? Schwartz never says. Nonetheless, even if “Right
of Boom” is not the book we need on
nuclear terrorism, it can still do some good if it spurs greater study of and conversation about what is arguably
our most important and least-understood national security threat.
**AT: Aff args
AT: FREEDOM Act Thumps
Either A) Freedom act solves and takes out inherency means vote neg on presumption
OR B) it’s just a drop in the bucket
Straeley 2015 (Steve; Congress’ NSA Bulk Surveillance Reform Bill: Much Ado about Little; May 4;
www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/congress-nsa-bulk-surveillance-reform-bill-much-ado-about-little150504?news=856395; kdf)
The USA Freedom Act, a bill passed out of committee last week which would limit the government’s ability to spy on Americans’
communications, would hardly put a crimp in the National Security Agency’s (NSA) surveillance practices. The Freedom
Act would stop most government collection of domestic calling metadata. The government would be limited to requesting from
telecommunications companies information when there is a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that a “specific selection term” is connected to
international terrorism, according to an analysis by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. But the
bill doesn’t address data
collection under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, which allows the collection of the actual
content of some communications, including that of Americans, and the collection of information from overseas calls. “If this bill
passes, the NSA will continue unaddressed surveillance programs and will secretly torture the English
language to devise novel justifications for spying on Americans,” David Segal, exec utive director of Demand
Progress, a group that has fought for more civil liberties, told The New York Times. “We won’t even know the details until a new whistleblower
comes forward a decade or two from now.” An
amendment which would strengthen protections against backdoor
surveillance such as that allowed under Section 702 has drawn significant support (pdf), but has been
rejected, along with others. House Judiciary Committee Chair Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Virginia) and ranking member Rep. John Conyers
(D-Michigan) have said the Freedom Act has been carefully crafted as a compromise and if it’s amended, it has no chance of getting
a vote on the House floor. Its chance for success hinges on the expiration next month of authority for bulk data collection and those in
the intelligence community want to ensure they still have some ability to spy on Americans.
And—It wasn’t key
Lewis 2014 (James Andrew [senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS];
Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate; Dec;
http://csis.org/files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf; kdf)
If the risk of attack is increasing, it is not the right time to change the measures the United States has
put in place to deter another 9/11. If risk is decreasing, surveillance programs can be safely reduced or
eliminated. A more complicated analysis would ask if the United States went too far after 9/11 and the measures it put in place can be
reduced to a reasonable level without increasing risk. Unfortunately, precise metrics on risk and effectiveness do not exist,
12 and we are left with the conflicting opinions of intelligence officials and civil libertarians as to what
makes effective intelligence or counterterrorism programs. There are biases on both sides, with intelligence officials
usually preferring more information to less and civil libertarians can be prone to wishful thinking about terrorism and opponent intentions.13
Interviews with current and former intelligence officials give us some guidance in deciding this. The
consensus among these individuals is that 215 is useful in preventing attacks, but the least useful of the
programs available to the intelligence community. If there was one surveillance program they had to
give up, it would be 215 before any others, but ending 215 would not come without some increase in risk.
AT: Privacy outweighs
Their impacts are about the perception the public has about intrusion of privacy –
overwhelmingly the public enjoys it
Sherfinski June 4 (David; NSA surveillance prevented terrorist attacks, most voters say: poll;
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/4/nsa-surveillance-prevented-terrorist-attacks-poll/; kdf)
Nearly two-thirds
of U.S. voters say the National Security Agency’s bulk data collection program has thwarted
terrorist attacks in the United States, but a majority also think it’s likely that the program has violated Americans’ civil liberties. Sixtyfive percent say they believe the NSA program has helped prevent terrorist attacks in the United States,
compared to 28 percent who don’t believe it has, according to a Fox News poll. Meanwhile, 57 percent say they believe the surveillance
program has led to civil liberties of law-abiding Americans being violated, compared to 36 percent who don’t believe that it has. But a
plurality of voters, 49 percent to 42 percent, said the government’s surveillance of U.S. citizens is more likely to
help catch terrorists and protect Americans from additional attacks, as opposed to hurting law-abiding
Americans by using private information improperly. Backers of the program have said there aren’t any
documented abuses, while opponents have pointed to a recent report from the Justice Department’s inspector general saying the
program hasn’t been responsible for a big break in a terrorism case, either.
AT: Fear mongering
Their authors are just as guilty of fear mongering
Bolton 2015 (John R [served as the US Permanent Representative to the UN and as Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security]; NSA activities key to terrorism fight; Apr 28;
www.aei.org/publication/nsa-activities-key-to-terrorism-fight/; kdf)
Congress is poised to decide whether to re-authorize programs run by the National Security Agency that assess patterns of domestic and
international telephone calls and emails to uncover linkages with known terrorists.
These NSA activities, initiated after al-Qaeda’s
deadly 9/11 attacks, have played a vital role in protecting America and our citizens around the world from the stillmetastasizing terrorist threat. The NSA programs do not involve listening to or reading conversations, but rather seek to
detect communications networks. If patterns are found, and more detailed investigation seems warranted, then NSA or other
federal authorities, consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, must obtain judicial
approval for
more specific investigations. Indeed, even
the collection of the so-called metadata is surrounded by
procedural protections to prevent spying on U.S. citizens. Nonetheless, critics from the right and left have attacked
the NSA for infringing on the legitimate expectations of privacy Americans enjoy under our Constitution. Unfortunately, many
of these critics have absolutely no idea what they are talking about; they are engaging in classic
McCarthyite tactics, hoping to score political points with a public justifiably worried about the abuses of power characteristic
of the Obama administration. Other critics, following Vietnam-era antipathies to America’s intelligence community, have never reconciled
themselves to the need for robust clandestine capabilities. Still others yearn for simpler times, embodying Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s
famous comment that “gentlemen don’t read each others’ mail.” The
ill-informed nature of the debate has facilitated
scare-mongering, with one wild accusation about NSA’s activities after another being launched before
the mundane reality catches up. And there is an important asymmetry at work here as well. The critics can say whatever
their imaginations conjure up, but NSA and its defenders are significantly limited in how they can respond. By definition, the
programs’ success rests on the secrecy fundamental to all intelligence activities. Frequently, therefore, explaining
what is not happening could well reveal information about NSA’s methods and capabilities that terrorists and others, in turn, could use to
stymie future detection efforts.
AT: No recent terror
They say no recent terror, but that’s because the programs are working
Lewis 2014 (James Andrew [senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS];
Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate; Dec;
http://csis.org/files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf; kdf)
If the risk of attack is increasing, it is not the right time to change the measures the United States has
put in place to deter another 9/11. If risk is decreasing, surveillance programs can be safely reduced or
eliminated. A more complicated analysis would ask if the United States went too far after 9/11 and the measures it put in place can be
reduced to a reasonable level without increasing risk. Unfortunately, precise metrics on risk and effectiveness do not exist,
12 and we are left with the conflicting opinions of intelligence officials and civil libertarians as to what
makes effective intelligence or counterterrorism programs. There are biases on both sides, with intelligence officials
usually preferring more information to less and civil libertarians can be prone to wishful thinking about terrorism and opponent intentions.13
Interviews with current and former intelligence officials give us some guidance in deciding this. The
consensus among these individuals is that 215 is useful in preventing attacks, but the least useful of the
programs available to the intelligence community. If there was one surveillance program they had to
give up, it would be 215 before any others, but ending 215 would not come without some increase in risk.
AT: Doesn’t solve terrorism
These programs have stopped over 50 terror attacks
Dozier 2013 (Kimberly; NSA: Surveillance Programs Foiled Some 50 Terrorist Plots Worldwide; Jun 18;
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/18/nsa-surveillance_n_3460106.html; kdf)
The director of the
National Security Agency insisted on Tuesday that the government's sweeping surveillance programs
have foiled some 50 terrorist plots worldwide in a forceful defense echoed by the leaders of the House Intelligence
Committee. Army Gen. Keith Alexander said the two recently disclosed programs – one that gathers U.S. phone records and
another that is designed to track the use of U.S.-based Internet servers by foreigners with possible links to terrorism – are critical in the
terrorism fight. Intelligence officials have disclosed some details on two thwarted attacks, and Alexander promised additional information
to the panel on thwarted attacks that the programs helped stop. He provided few additional details. The programs "assist the intelligence
community to connect the dots," Alexander told the committee in a rare, open Capitol Hill hearing. Alexander got no disagreement from the
leaders of the panel, who have been outspoken in backing the programs since Edward Snowden, a 29-year-old former contractor with Booz
Allen Hamilton, disclosed information to The Washington Post and the Guardian newspapers. Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., chairman of the
committee, and Rep. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland, the panel's top Democrat, said the programs were vital to the intelligence
community and assailed Snowden's actions as criminal. "It is at times like these where our enemies within become almost as damaging as our
enemies on the outside," Rogers said. Ruppersberger said the "brazen disclosures" put the United States and its allies at risk. The general
counsel for the intelligence community said the NSA cannot target phone conversations between callers inside the U.S. – even if one of those
callers was someone they were targeting for surveillance when outside the country. The director of national intelligence's legal chief, Robert S.
Litt, said that if the NSA finds it has accidentally gathered a phone call by a target who had traveled into the U.S. without their knowledge, they
have to "purge" that from their system. The same goes for an accidental collection of any conversation because of an error. Litt said those
incidents are then reported to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which "pushes back" and asks how it happened, and what the NSA is
doing to fix the problem so it doesn't happen again. Rogers previewed the latest public airing of the NSA controversy the morning after
President Barack Obama, who is attending the G-8 summit in Ireland, vigorously defended the surveillance programs in a lengthy interview
Monday, calling them transparent – even though they are authorized in secret. "It is transparent," Obama told PBS' Charlie Rose in an
interview. "That's why we set up the FISA court," the president added, referring to the secret court set up by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act that authorizes two recently disclosed programs: one that gathers U.S. phone records and another that is designed to track the
use of U.S.-based Internet servers by foreigners with possible links to terrorism. Obama said he has named representatives to a privacy and civil
liberties oversight board to help in the debate over just how far government data gathering should be allowed to go – a discussion that is
complicated by the secrecy surrounding the FISA court, with hearings held at undisclosed locations and with only government lawyers present.
The orders that result are all highly classified. "We're going to have to find ways where the public has an assurance that there are checks and
balances in place ... that their phone calls aren't being listened into; their text messages aren't being monitored, their emails are not being read
by some big brother somewhere," the president said. A senior administration official said Obama had asked Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper to determine what more information about the two programs could be made public, to help better explain them. The official
spoke on condition of anonymity because the official was not authorized to speak publicly. Snowden accused members of Congress and
administration officials Monday of exaggerating their claims about the success of the data gathering programs, including pointing to the arrest
of the would-be New York subway bomber, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. In an online interview with The Guardian in which he posted answers to
questions Monday, Snowden said that Zazi could have been caught with narrower, targeted surveillance programs – a point Obama conceded
in his interview without mentioning Snowden. "We
might have caught him some other way," Obama said. "We might have
disrupted it because a New York cop saw he was suspicious. Maybe he turned out to be incompetent and the bomb
didn't go off. But, at the margins, we are increasing our chances of preventing a catastrophe like that
through these programs," he said. Obama repeated earlier assertions that the NSA programs were a legitimate counterterror tool and
that they were completely noninvasive to people with no terror ties – something he hoped to discuss with the privacy and civil liberties board
he'd formed. The senior administration official said the president would be meeting with the new privacy board in the coming days.
Surveillance isn’t foolproof, but has solved attacks - empirics
Williams and Winter 2015 (Pete and Tom; Man Under Surveillance by Joint Terrorism Task Force
Shot Dead in Boston; www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/man-under-surveillance-joint-terrorism-taskforce-shot-dead-boston-n368376; kdf)
A man wielding a large, military-style knife came at police and FBI agents as they attempted to interview him in Boston early Tuesday, and was
fatally shot only after he refused to drop the weapon, officials said. Usaamah Abdullah Rahim
had been under 24-hour
surveillance by the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force, and a senior official told NBC News they were investigating
whether the 26-year-old Boston man had become radicalized by ISIS-inspired social media messages and
feared a terror plot was in the works. A second man from the Boston suburb of Everett was later taken into custody as officials
conducted a related terrorism investigation, Boston police said Tuesday night. His name was not released. Rahim was stopped around 7 a.m. ET
at a CVS parking lot in Boston's Roslindale neighborhood, FBI Special Agent in Charge Vincent Lisi said at an afternoon news conference. The
officers wanted to interview him at the scene, but had no warrant for his arrest. The officers did not have their guns drawn, and Rahim pulled a
knife out first, Boston Police Commissioner William Evans told reporters. "We have video depicting the individual coming at officers while the
officers were retreating," Evans said. Officers and agents ordered Rahim to drop his weapon, and then took out their firearms and shot at him
when he refused, Evans added. He was struck twice — in the abdomen and torso — and was later pronounced dead at the hospital, police said.
Officials are reviewing whether the shooting was justified, but early surveillance video and witness statements indicate the officers' "lives were
in danger," Evans said. After the shooting, authorities began searching a home in Everett and another address in Warwick, Rhode Island, in
connection to the incident, senior law enforcement sources in New England told NBC News. A source earlier said the occupants in the Everett
home might also be of interest in the investigation. Law
enforcement sources say Rahim had been under investigation
and surveillance for several weeks by the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force. In recent months, ISIS messages
worldwide have called for attacks using whatever weapons are at hand, including guns and knives.
AT: Terrorism Kritiks
Even if they win the K – it is just impact mitigation, not a reason to vote Aff
*This is also the 2NC must read
Lewis 2014 (James Andrew [senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS];
Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate; Dec;
http://csis.org/files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdf; kdf)
The phrase “terrorism” is overused, and the threat of terrorist attack is easily exaggerated, but that
does not mean this threat it is nonexistent. Groups and individuals still plan to attack American citizens and
the citizens of allied countries. The dilemma in assessing risk is that it is discontinuous. There can be long periods where no
activity is apparent, only to have the apparent calm explode in an attack. The constant, low-level activity in
planning and preparation in Western countries is not apparent to the public, nor is it easy to identify the moment
that discontent turns into action. There is general agreement that as terrorists splinter into regional groups, the risk of attack increases.
Certainly, the threat to Europe from militants returning from Syria points to increased risk for U.S. allies. The messy U.S. withdrawal from Iraq
and (soon) Afghanistan contributes to an increase in risk.24 European authorities have increased surveillance and arrests of suspected militants
as the Syrian conflict lures hundreds of Europeans. Spanish counterterrorism police say they have broken up more terrorist cells than in any
other European country in the last three years.25 The chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, who is better placed than most
members of Congress to assess risk, said in June 2014 that the level of terrorist activity was higher than he had ever seen it.26 If the United
States overreacted in response to September 11, it now risks overreacting to the leaks with potentially fatal consequences. A
simple
assessment of the risk of attack by jihadis would take into account a resurgent Taliban, the power of
lslamist groups in North Africa, the continued existence of Shabaab in Somalia, and the appearance of a
powerful new force, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Al Qaeda, previously the leading threat, has splintered into
independent groups that make it a less coordinated force but more difficult target. On the positive side, the
United States, working with allies and friends, appears to have contained or eliminated jihadi groups in Southeast
Asia. Many of these groups seek to use adherents in Europe and the United States for manpower and funding. A Florida teenager was a
suicide bomber in Syria and Al Shabaab has in the past drawn upon the Somali population in the United States. Hamas and Hezbollah
have achieved quasi-statehood status, and Hamas has supporters in the United States. Iran, which supports the
two groups, has advanced capabilities to launch attacks and routinely attacked U.S. forces in Iraq. The United Kingdom faces problems from
several hundred potential terrorists within its large Pakistani population, and there are potential attackers in other Western European nations,
including Germany, Spain, and the Scandinavian countries. France, with its large Muslim population faces the most serious challenge and is
experiencing a wave of troubling anti-Semitic attacks that suggest both popular support for extremism and a decline in control by security
forces. The
chief difference between now and the situation before 9/11 is that all of these countries
have put in place much more robust surveillance systems, nationally and in cooperation with others, including the
United States, to detect and prevent potential attacks. Another difference is that the failure of U.S. efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the opportunities created by the Arab Spring have opened a new “front” for jihadi groups that makes their primary focus
regional. Western targets still remain of interest, but are more likely to face attacks from domestic sympathizers. This could change if the wellresourced ISIS is frustrated in its efforts to establish a new Caliphate and turns its focus to the West. In addition, the al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen
(al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) continues to regularly plan attacks against U.S. targets. 27 The
incidence of attacks in the
United States or Europe is very low, but we do not have good data on the number of planned attacks
that did not come to fruition. This includes not just attacks that were detected and stopped, but also
attacks where the jihadis were discouraged and did not initiate an operation or press an attack to its
conclusion because of operational difficulties. These attacks are the threat that mass surveillance was
created to prevent. The needed reduction in public anti-terror measures without increasing the chances of successful attack is
contingent upon maintaining the capability provided by communications surveillance to detect, predict, and prevent attacks. Our
opponents have not given up; neither should we.
Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid---our authors are
self-reflexive
Michael J. Boyle 8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan,
International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State
University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1,
No. 1, p. 51-64
Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he
suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual
links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted
terrorism “knowledge”’. An
implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of
these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional
and methodological problems. In fact, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but
also have provided their own searching critiques of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998,
Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism implied in
‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources,
methods, and data in the study of terrorism. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by Schmid and
Jongman (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction
of the second edition they point out that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the failure to
address persistent conceptual and data problems has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more
comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly,
Silke’s (2004) volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function, highlighting
the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. A non-reflective community of scholars does
not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.
Terror is a real threat driven by forces the aff can’t resolve---we should reform the war
on terror, not surrender---any terror attack turns the entire case
Peter Beinart 8, associate professor of journalism and political science at CUNY, The Good Fight; Why
Liberals – and only Liberals – Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again, vii-viii
APPLYING THAT TRADITION today is not easy. Cold war liberals devel- oped their narrative of national greatness in the shadow of a totalitarian
Today, the United States faces no such unified threat. Rather, it faces a web of dangers—from disease to
by globalization, which leaves America
increasingly vulnerable to pathologies bred in distant corners of the world. And at the center of this nexis
sits jihadist terrorism, a new totalitarian movement that lacks state power but harnesses the power of globalization instead. ¶
¶ superpower.
environmental degradation to weapons of mass destruction—all fueled
Recognizing that the United States again faces a totalitarian foe does not provide simple policy prescriptions, because today’s totalitarianism
takes such radically different form. But it
reminds us of something more basic, that liberalism does not find its enemies
only on the right—a lesson sometimes forgotten in the age of George W. Bush. ¶ Indeed, it is because liberals so despise
this president that they increasingly reject his trademark phrase, the “war on terror.” Were this just a semantic dispute, it would hardly matter;
better alternatives to war on terror abound. But the rejection signifies something deeper: a turn away from the very idea that
anti-totalitarianism should sit at the heart of the liberal project. For too many liberals today, George W. Bush’s war on terror
is the only one they can imagine. This alienation may be understand- able, but that does not make it any less disastrous, for it is
liberalism’s principles—even more than George W. Bush’s—that jihadism threatens. If today’s liberals cannot rouse as much
passion for fighting a movement that flings acid at unveiled women as they do for taking back the Senate in 2006,
they have strayed far from liberalism’s best traditions. And if they believe it is only George W. Bush who
threatens America’s freedoms, they should ponder what will happen if the United States is hit with a
nuclear or contagious biological attack. No matter who is president, Republican or Democrat, the reaction will make
John Ashcroft look like the head of the ACLU.
Ethical rebellion does not require rejecting all resort to lethal force---killing is
conditionally justified in cases where the target is culpable for injustice. This
distinction will win us the debate---ethical rebellion can allow killing, so long as we
recognize that it is simultaneously necessary, but cannot be truly ethically justified.
Recognizing our own conduct as ethically unjustifiable despite its necessity in
preserving innocent life sets up killing as truly exceptional
Matt Hartman 13, MA, Philosophy, University of Chicago, 6/5/13, “The Rebel or the Militant:
Universality and Political Violence,” http://lucian.uchicago.edu/blogs/colloquium/2013/06/05/therebel-or-the-militant-universality-and-political-violence/
I begin with rebellion, Camus’ analogue to Badiou’s event. For him, rebellion means something restricted, something
that
respects its own limits.
The rebels who [...] wanted to construct [...] a savage immortality are
terrified at the prospect of being obliged to kill in
their turn. Nevertheless, if they retreat they must accept death ; if they advance they must accept murder .
Rebellion, cut off from its origins and cynically travestied, oscillates, on all levels, between sacrifice and murder.[24]
In other words, rebellion
is characterized by a recognition that the status quo is structurally unjust and must be
opposed―hence the rebel’s inability to retreat―and a simultaneous recognition that the means of opposition
themselves imply a crime .[25] The ‘savage immortality’ that appears to arise from rebellion―the point where rebellion’s initial
impetus appears to no longer to govern the sequence―cannot be, and yet the rebel must act. This conflict forms the paradoxical,
logical structure of rebellion that creates an inherent limit upon what can be (ethically) done. As we will see,
that limit is marked by murder.
Moreover, that limit is dependent upon the beginnings of the rebellion. “I rebel―therefore we exist,” says Camus (R 22). This formulation is
variously suggestive, but the two most important implications for our purposes are the axiomatic claims to universality and equality. Similar to
Badiou’s claim that all are ‘virtual militants’ of the event, Camus argues that a rebellion reaches for universality (by transforming the ‘I’ into a
‘We’). Its virtues must apply to all. And for this reason, it must aim at equality, as all must be equal in their ability to make the same declaration.
Rebellion is the assertion of an axiom of equality between one and all. “In assigning oppression a limit within which begins the dignity[26]
common to all men, rebellion defined a primary value” (R 281). Camus’ formulation necessitates an understanding―an ethical principle―of
equality that rebels must recognize. Rebellion is the very process of the assertion of this egalitarianism. We can already begin to see, then, how
Camus’ axiom is an ethical principle.
But this point further implies that the claim of rebellion―a claim to act from principle, not simply to take power―must recognize universality
as a claim concerning the situation. The principle now instituted refers to a governing logic, not to an individual. Again, this claim parallels
Badiou’s rethinking of the State’s logic of ordering. The structure of thought, not the identity of the master, is the problem. Thus, one claims a
wrong against the situation: if the slave merely takes his master’s place, there is no rebellion but a coup. The logic must change. The ‘we exist’
half of Camus’ formulation necessitates as much: if the rebellion’s axiom does not apply to all, the rebellion has no coherent ground or claim. It
would be a mere simulacrum. Rebels must act towards all―they have a limit on what they can not do.
But, against Badiou, they also have a limit on what they can do. The result of the ‘universal value’ defined by the axiom/principle in Camus’
formulation is a limit placed upon rebels. This limit is murder:
[M]urder is thus a desperate exception or it is nothing. It is the limit that can be reached but once, after which one must die.
The rebel [...] kills and dies so that it shall be clear that murder is impossible. He demonstrates that, in reality, he prefers the ‘We are’ to the
‘We shall be.’ [...] Beyond the farthest frontier, contradiction and nihilism begin. (R 282)
This passage contains the core of The Rebel . Camus condemns any logic that justifies murder on the
grounds of a history―either because it helps bring about a desired future state or because it is part of a larger, necessary historical
epoch. He denies any logic that determinatively ties ethical action to a historical context, subsuming particular situations under history.
To justify an act by history is to implicitly de-value the present. It is to imply that a present claim to justice―to the axiomatic principles of
rebellion―are not to be met. It is to deny the ‘we are’ to the ‘we shall be,’ as Camus says above. The axiomatic structure of the statement ‘I
rebel, therefore we exist,’ demands the present be equal to the future. If not, the very structure of politics is denied and rebellion’s logic is
made incoherent. The situatedness of the rebellion―the fact that the axiom is declared now―implies that as a universal, logical claim it is
definitively tied to the present. Because it is universal, the present cannot be devalued to the future, otherwise it would be a mere instrument.
By not separating history into pre- and post-event with an ontologically uncontainable state between them, Camus is providing a framework to
make historical change sensible even as it is ongoing.
The axiomatic aspect of rebellion’s principles conditions this thought. Camus
does not claim that rebellion’s ends should
exist, or that they will exist, or that it would be morally right if they existed: “Nothing justifies the assertion that
these principles have existed eternally; it is of no use to declare that they will one day exist” (R 283). Rather, the axiom is a demand for equality
(or justice or freedom) against the State. Because the axiom acts as an ethical principle for the rebels during the course of their rebellion, the
coherence between the rebels’ actions and their axiom is the justification of their logic. Every (legitimate) rebellion has this form.
And as a result, for Camus, universality is not a matter of Badiou’s virtuality, but of actuality. Because “[rebellion’s] reasons―the mutual
recognition of a common destiny and the communication of men between themselves―are always valid” at the same time they are axiomatic,
Camus is demanding concrete coherence between the rebellion’s actions and its axiom (R 283). The axiomatic principles are merely actualized
by their declaration. But this is possible only because Camus
does not posit an axiom that is (materially, historically)
transformed into an ethical principle . As a result, though Camus may have supported all of the Libyan rebels’ actions, he has built
the framework to sensibly ask the ethical question of them, even though it is based in particularity.
This is because the actual universality Camus posits provides a substantial ethics: murder is the limit of
rebellion and cannot be justified. “Logically,” he says, “one should reply that murder and rebellion are
contradictory. If a single master should, in fact, be killed, the rebel, in a certain way, is no longer justified in using the term community of
men from which he derived his justification” (R 281). The claim is drastic: to murder anyone, even the source of
injustice, is unjustifiable. It denies all egalitarian maxims by denying the victim the chance to meet rebellion’s demand―and it does so
because Camus’ concern is actuality: Badiou’s universality in principle holds whether acted upon or not. But Camus shows in the first three
sections of The Rebel that rebellions that have accepted murder became incoherent.[27]
However, Camus did not forswear murder ―he claimed that it was a limit that could be met exactly once. On the one hand, it
is simply utopian to refuse the use of violence in politics : Assad must be overthrown for the sake of
creating a democracy. But Camus has already denied historical justification as nihilistic and incoherent. And yet inaction would
implicitly accept the unjust status quo . So, then, murder is necessary but unjustifiable ; the rebel “kills
and dies so that it shall be clear that murder is impossible .”
Camus navigates this paradox by insisting on murder’s exceptional status. One should rebel, even by
murder , but simultaneously recognize murder as contrary to one’s own principles . An act of
murder, we can say, will be legitimate but not just : legitimate in battling the unjust present, but unjust
itself because legitimacy cannot clear the rebel of guilt. This claim―which is the core of Camus’ argument against
Robespierre and Lenin, as well as his defense of the Russian terrorist Kaliayev―asserts that history cannot enter into politics’ logic. This
time, this point in history may legitimize an act, but it cannot justify that act because ethical principles
are eternal. Their universality must be protected in the material actions throughout the rebellion.
For this reason, even the legitimacy of murder is conditional .[28] First, the victim must be a cause of the
present injustices ―e.g., the master of the slaves or the Ba’athist dictator. The murder of innocents can only be
legitimated by historicist arguments unavailable to the coherent rebel. Second, the rebel’s act must be recognized as a crime
by her own standards. She must recognize her own guilt as a failure to cohere with her axiom: only this
recognition ensures murder remains exceptional , protecting a practical manifestation of the rebellion’s logic. The crime of
Saint-Just and Robespierre was allowing the Terror to become an institution that altered the rebellion’s logic.
**Counter-terror Debate
AT: Counter-terror ineffective/ AT: Losing WOT
It’s not a question of “have we defeated all the terrorists” but instead, “how do we
most effectively combat terrorism?” – the plan robs intelligence agencies of the tools
needed to prevent large scale attacks—that’s all of our link ev
And – counter-terrorism is working now
Zenko 2015 (Micah; CIA Director: We’re Winning the War on Terror, But It Will Never End; Apr 8;
blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2015/04/08/cia-director-were-winning-the-war-on-terror-but-it-will-never-end/;
kdf)
Last night, Director of Central Intelligence John Brennan participated in a question-and-answer session at Harvard Kennedy
School’s Institute of Politics. The first thirty-seven minutes consisted of an unusually probing exchange between Brennan and Harvard professor
Graham Allison (full disclosure: Graham is a former boss of mine). Most notably, between 19:07 and 29:25 in the video, Allison pressed Brennan
repeatedly about whether the United States is winning the war on terrorism and why the number of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups has only
increased since 9/11: “There seem to be more of them than when we started…How are we doing?” Brennan replied: If
I look across the
board in terms of since 9/11 at terrorist organizations, and if the United States in all of its various forms.
In intelligence, military, homeland security, law enforcement, diplomacy. If we were not as engaged
against the terrorists, I think we would be facing a horrendous, horrendous environment. Because they would
have taken full advantage of the opportunities that they have had across the region… We have worked collectively as a
government but also with our international partners very hard to try and root many of them out. Might
some of these actions be stimulants to others joining their ranks? Sure, that’s a possibility. I think, though it has taken off of the battlefield a lot
more terrorists, than it has put on. This statement is impossible to evaluate or measure because the U.S. government has consistently refused
to state publicly which terrorist organizations are deemed combatants, and can therefore be “taken out on the battlefield.” However, relying
upon the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism,the estimated strength of all al-Qaeda-affiliated groups has grown or stayed
the same since President Obama came into office. Of course, non-al-Qaeda-affiliated groups have arisen since 9/11, including the selfproclaimed Islamic State, which the Central Intelligence Agency estimated last September to contain up to 31,500 fighters, and Boko Haram,
which has perhaps 10,000 committed members. However, the most interesting question posed to Brennan came at the very end from a
Harvard freshman who identified himself as Julian: “We’ve
been fighting the war on terror since 2001. Is there an end in
sight, or should we get used to this new state of existence? Brennan replied: It’s a long war, unfortunately. But it’s been a
war that has been in existence for millennia, at the same time—the use of violence for political purposes against
noncombatants by either a state actor or a subnational group. Terrorism has taken many forms over the years. What is
more challenging now is, again, the technology that is available to terrorists, the great devastation that
can be created by even a handful of folks, and also mass communication that just proliferates all of this
activity and incitement and encouragement. So you have an environment now that’s very conducive to that type of
propaganda and recruitment efforts, as well as the ability to get materials that are going to kill people. And so this is going to be something, I
think, that we’re
always going to have to be vigilant about. There is evil in the world and some people just want to kill for the
sake of killing…This is something that, whether it’s from this group right now or another group, I think the ability to cause damage
and violence and kill will be with us for many years to come. We just have to not kill our way out of this because that’s
not going to address it. We need to stop those attacks that are in train but we also have to address some of those underlying factors and
conditions. I’m not saying that poverty causes somebody to become a terrorist, or a lack of governance, but they certainly do allow these
terrorist organizations to grow and they take full advantage of those opportunities. To summarize,
the war on terrorism is working,
compared to inaction or other policies. But, the American people should expect it to continue for
millennia, or as long as lethal technologies and mass communication remain available to evil people.
xt - Counter-terror effective
American counter-terrorism measures are effective
Bonn 6/17/2015 (Steve [producer of the Rachel Maddow Show]; The scope of
Obawww.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/the-scope-obamas-counter-terrorism-successes; kdf)
Whenever the political world’s attention turns to matters of national security and terrorism, Republican criticisms of President Obama feature
familiar talking points. The president isn’t “aggressive” enough, they say. His approach must be “tougher,” like the policies adopted by the
Bush/Cheney administration. Obama’s counter-terrorism policies are so ineffective, the right insists, that the White House won’t even use the
specific words – “radical Islamic terrorism” – that Republicans demand to hear. But the
gap between GOP rhetoric and
national-security reality continues to grow. We learned yesterday, for example, that a U.S. airstrike killed Nasir alWuhaysh, al Qaeda’s No. 2 official – and the top guy in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As Rachel noted on the show last night,
his death is a “huge deal,” especially given the terrorist plots al-Wuhaysh has helped oversee. NBC News had
a helpful report yesterday on the frequency with which U.S. strikes have successfully targeted al Qaeda’s top leaders. Since Navy SEALs killed
[Osama bin Laden] in 2011, American
drone strikes have taken out seven potential candidates to succeed him
as the leader of what was once the most-feared terror gang. The targeted attacks started within weeks of bin Laden’s
death. Three al Qaeda higher-ups were killed in June, August and September of 2011, followed by another three in late 2012 and early 2013….
Now, the death of 38-year-old Wuhayshi – killed in a strike on Friday – is seen by American intelligence officials as a major blow to al Qaeda,
which is struggling with decimated ranks and ideological competition from the Islamic State. I’m reminded of this piece in The Atlantic last fall,
when Jeffrey Goldberg, hardly a liberal, wrote, “Obama has become the greatest terrorist hunter in the history of the presidency.” It’s a detail
Republicans simply don’t know what to do with, so they ignore it and pretend the president is indifferent to matters of national security, all
evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. While GOP officials and candidates continue to insist that what really matters is word-choice,
Obama’s counter-terrorism strategy includes so many successes, they no longer generate much
attention. Notice, for example, just how little chatter al-Wuhaysh’s death garnered yesterday. There is, of course, an entirely different side
of the debate. Yes, Republican rhetoric is divorced from reality. Yes, Obama has successfully targeted a wide variety of prominent terrorist
leaders. But there are all kinds of related questions that often go overlooked: do U.S. strikes deter or prevent future terrorist threats? Is the
U.S. policy entirely consistent with the law? What are the implications of a policy reliant on drones? Should Americans expect the current
national-security policy to remain in place indefinitely? What happens when one terrorist leader is killed, but he’s replaced by someone worse?
xt - Terror attacks down
Even if they don’t solve all attacks, counter-terror measures are reducing the
frequency and severity – the plan throws the baby out with the bathwater
Gutierrez et al 6/20/2015 (ARES P. GUTIERREZ, CATHERINE S. VALENTE AND AFP; US notes 24% drop
in terror attacks in PH; www.manilatimes.net/us-notes-24-drop-in-terror-attacks-in-ph/193594/; kdf)
According to the Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 prepared by the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism, the
drop in the
number of attacks was attributed to the improved cooperation between Manila and Washington.
“Terrorist groups, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), and the Communist People’s Party/New People’s Army
(CPP/NPA), were unable to conduct major attacks compared to previous years due to continuous pressure from
Philippine counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts. Terrorist groups’ acts included criminal activities designed to generate revenue for
self-sustainment, such as kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and bombings for hire,” the report which was posted on the State Department’s
website said. The report however said that despite “sustained pressure on terrorist organizations,” terrorist and rebel groups in Mindanao
managed to retained its capability to make improvised bombs and engage in small-scale attacks. The State Department likewise gave credit to
the progress in the implementation of the country’s Internal Peace and Security Plan which calls for the transition of internal security
operations from the military to the Philippine National Police. It however branded the transition as “slow and ineffective”. “Continued violent
extremist activity, as well as counterterrorism gaps between the AFP and the PNP, slowed this transition and forced the AFP to continue playing
the lead counterterrorism role in the Philippines,” the report said. The State Department also took note of the government’s push to enact the
proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law and efforts to curb the potential threat posed by radical supporters of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) and the risk of ISIL elements traveling to the Philippines to promote violent extremism in the country or seek safe haven as among the
situations to watch out for in the Philippines. Commenting on the State Department’s report, Communications Secretary Herminio Coloma said
the Philippines is “firmly determined to address these challenges”. “Government is firmly determined to address these challenges through
intensified security measures and pursuit of peace-building initiatives,” he said in a text message. The State Department report mentioned the
Aquino administration’s move to prioritize having the 2007 Human Security Act amended to enable it to conform to international standards;
ease the strict monetary penalties and prison terms against law enforcement officials involved in cases where individuals are wrongly accused
and later acquitted; and remove barriers to support investigations. “The (Anti-Terrorism Council) Project Management Center, in coordination
with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) Secretariat and the Presidential Legislative Liaison Office, ensured the final version of the HSA
was fully in line with the Terrorism Financing Prevention Act and other Anti-Money Laundering Act and Philippine government initiatives prior
to submission to the House of Representatives,” the report said. While the report criticizes the limited capabilities and “mixed record of
accountability and respect for human rights of specialized counterterrorism units like the National Bureau of Investigation and the PNP Special
Action Force, it gave credit to the continued improvement in the security of Philippine passports. It also mentioned the country’s commitment
to improve transportation and port security by increasing security capabilities at its airports, seaports, and bus terminals. The State Department
report moreover said an “under-resourced and understaffed law enforcement and judicial system, coupled with widespread official corruption”
led to “limited domestic investigations, unexecuted arrest warrants, few prosecutions, and lengthy trials of cases.” “Philippine investigators and
prosecutors lacked necessary tools to build strong cases, including a lack of clear processes for requesting judicially-authorized interception of
terrorist communications, entering into plea bargains with key witnesses, and seizing assets of those suspected in benefiting from terrorism,” it
said. The full State Department reported said there were 13,463 attacks in 95 countries in 2014 — up by a third from the year before — with
Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan bearing the brunt of extremist violence, the State Department said in a report. The largest number of attacks
were carried out by Islamic State (IS) militants, who unleashed 1,083 assaults last year as part of a deadly march across Iraq and Syria. The
Taliban were the next most lethal group, with 894 attacks. There was also a sharp rise in violence in Nigeria, where Boko Haram’s Islamist
militants have been spreading terror in the north. Some 7,512 people were killed in 662 attacks. The
report also highlighted a rise
in “lone offender violent extremists in the West” such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January in Paris.
“The terrorism challenges that we face continue to evolve at a rapid pace and we cannot predict with
precision what the landscape will look like one decade or even really a year from now,” said top US
counterterrorism envoy Tina Kaidanow, unveiling the 2014 Country Reports on Terrorism. “We must do more to address the
cycle of violent extremism and transform the very environment from which these terrorist movements
emerge.” Acknowledging that most of the recorded attacks were in war zones, Kaidanow denounced the “savagery” seen last year which
had spurred the high death toll. Kidnappings also jumped by a third, with more than 9,400 people taken hostage, three times as many as in
2013. Ransoms have been used by both IS and Al-Qaeda as an effective way to raise money. But Kaidanow said the numbers did not tell the
whole story, saying the
US has been effective over the past year in building up a coalition to help fight militant
groups, choke off funding and stem the flow of foreign fighters.
Aff
AT: Generic Link
Leading experts—surveillance doesn’t solve terror
Baker and Sanger 2015 (Peter and David E; Why the NSA Isn't Howling over restrictions; May 1;
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/us/politics/giving-in-a-little-on-national-security-agency-datacollection.html; kdf)
The foundation’s analysis said the bill “should end” the bulk collection of “everybody’s phone records.”
But it pointed out that the N.S.A. could still search for records beyond telephone data with fewer
restrictions. And it noted that the bill would not address warrantless collection of Americans’
international calls and e-mails under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
amendments of 2008. The future of the bulk collection program may have been sealed in December
2013, when a panel of experts appointed by Mr. Obama found that the program had been of minimal
intelligence value and ran considerable risks of invading privacy. “N.S.A. believes that on at least a few
occasions, information derived” had “contributed to its efforts to prevent possible terrorist attacks,
either in the United States or somewhere else in the world,” the report said. But the panel concluded
that its review showed that the information collected under the program “was not essential to
preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional” court
orders. The panel recommended legislation that “terminates the storage of bulk telephony metadata by
the government” and that it be held instead by telecommunications companies or some other third
party, ensuring that the government gained access only when the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
issued an order. Although the government said nothing at the time, General Alexander, then in his last
months as the head of the N.S.A., told Mr. Obama that it would be preferable if legislation were passed
that moved the program to private hands.
AT: Link – Drones Aff
Drones are inefficient mechanism to solve terrorism
Rothfuss 2014 (Ian F [George Mason School of Law]; Student Comment: An Economic Perspective on
the Privacy Implications of Domestic Drone Surveillance; 10 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 441; kdf)
Conclusion
U.S. citizens want to be safe from terrorist attacks and other threats, but not at the expense of their
privacy rights. Therefore, a delicate balance must be achieved between privacy and security interests.
Drones represent a surveillance technology advancement that threatens to dramatically alter the
balance between these interests. As discussed in this comment, the current legal framework does not
adequately protect privacy from the widespread surveillance that will likely result from the unrestricted
domestic use of drones. Therefore, prompt legislative action is necessary to address the fundamental
privacy challenges presented by the use of drones. Such legislation should allow for constructive use of
drones within a framework that contains restrictions to protect individual privacy rights. While
widespread general surveillance could make the nation safer from crime and terrorism, such extensive
surveillance will ultimately be inefficient. The surveillance that could result from the domestic use of
drones would detract from individual privacy and cause individuals to reduce productive activities and
invest in countermeasures. Such "privacy disutility" will outweigh the societal benefits unless domestic
drone surveillance is restricted. Therefore, [*462] without legislative action we may soon live in a world
where "every time we walk out of our front door we have to look up and wonder whether some invisible
eye in the sky is monitoring us." n175
Link turn
Surveillance makes counter-terror tools ineffective
Corrigan 2015 (Ray [senior lecturer in mathematics, computing, and technology at the Open
University, U.K.]; Mass Surveillance Will Not Stop Terrorism; Jan 25;
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/new_scientist/2015/01/mass_surveillance_against_terrori
sm_gathering_intelligence_on_all_is_statistically.html; kdf)
Police, intelligence, and security systems are imperfect. They process vast amounts of imperfect intelligence data and do
not have the resources to monitor all known suspects 24/7. The French authorities lost track of these extremists long enough for them to carry
out their murderous acts.
You cannot fix any of this by treating the entire population as suspects and then
engaging in suspicionless, blanket collection and processing of personal data. Mass data collectors can dig deeply into
anyone’s digital persona but don’t have the resources to do so with everyone. Surveillance of the entire
population, the vast majority of whom are innocent, leads to the diversion of limited intelligence resources in
pursuit of huge numbers of false leads. Terrorists are comparatively rare, so finding one is a needle-in-a-haystack problem. You
don’t make it easier by throwing more needleless hay on the stack. It is statistically impossible for total population
surveillance to be an effective tool for catching terrorists. Even if your magic terrorist-catching machine
has a false positive rate of 1 in 1,000—and no security technology comes anywhere near this—every time
you asked it for suspects in the U.K. it would flag 60,000 innocent people. Law enforcement and security services need
to be able to move with the times, using modern digital technologies intelligently and through targeted data preservation—not a mass
surveillance regime—to engage in court-supervised technological surveillance of individuals whom they have reasonable cause to suspect. That
is not, however, the same as building an infrastructure of mass surveillance. Mass
surveillance makes the job of the security
services more difficult and the rest of us less secure.
Less data leads to effective data, the aff is key to solve terrorism
Schwartz 2015 (Mattathias [Staff writer @ The New Yorker]; The Whole Haystack; Jan 26;
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack; kdf)
Before the event, every bit of hay is potentially relevant. “The most
dangerous adversaries will be the ones who most
successfully disguise their individual transactions to appear normal, reasonable, and legitimate,” Ted Senator, a data scientist
who worked on an early post-9/11 program called Total Information Awareness, said, in 2002. Since then, intelligence officials have
often referred to “lone-wolf terrorists,” “cells,” and, as Alexander has put it, the “terrorist who walks among us,” as though Al
Qaeda were a fifth column, capable of camouflaging itself within civil society. Patrick Skinner, a former C.I.A. case officer who works with the
Soufan Group, a security company, told me that this image is wrong. “We knew about these networks,” he said, speaking of the Charlie Hebdo
attacks. Mass
surveillance, he continued, “gives a false sense of security. It sounds great when you say you’re monitoring
have no idea what’s going on.” By
flooding the system with false positives, big-data approaches to counterterrorism might actually make it
harder to identify real terrorists before they act. Two years before the Boston Marathon bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev,
the older of the two brothers alleged to have committed the attack, was assessed by the city’s Joint Terrorism Task Force.
They determined that he was not a threat. This was one of about a thousand assessments that the Boston
J.T.T.F. conducted that year, a number that had nearly doubled in the previous two years, according to the Boston F.B.I. As of 2013, the
every phone call in the United States. You can put that in a PowerPoint. But, actually, you
Justice Department has trained nearly three hundred thousand law-enforcement officers in how to file “suspicious-activity reports.” In 2010, a
central database held about three thousand of these reports; by 2012 it had grown to almost twenty-eight thousand. “The bigger haystack
makes it harder to find the needle,” Sensenbrenner told me. Thomas Drake, a former N.S.A. executive and whistle-blower who has become one
of the agency’s most vocal critics, told me, “If you target
everything, there’s no target.” Drake favors what he calls “a
traditional law-enforcement” approach to terrorism, gathering more intelligence on a smaller set of
targets. Decisions about which targets matter, he said, should be driven by human expertise, not by a
database.
xt—Link Turn: DA=Self-fulfilling prophecy
The fear of terrorism justifies the expansion of surveillance, but fails to solve terror
Weiss 2015 (Leonard [visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and
Cooperation]; On fear and nuclear terror; Mar 3; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 75–87;
kdf)
The rise of the national surveillance state. Lowering the
risk of terrorism, particularly the nuclear kind, is the quintessential
reason that the mandarins of the national security state have given for employing the most invasive
national surveillance system in history. “Finding the needle in the haystack” is how some describe the effort to discern terrorist
plots from telephone metadata and intercepted communications. But the haystack keeps expanding, and large elements of
the American population appear willing to allow significant encroachments on the constitutional
protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. The fear of terrorism has produced this change in the
American psyche even though there is no evidence that the collection of such data has resulted in the
discovery of terrorist plots beyond those found by traditional police and intelligence methods. It is
doubtful that we shall soon (if ever) see a return to the status quo ante regarding constitutional protections. This reduction in the
freedom of Americans from the prying eyes of the state is a major consequence of the hyping of
terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism. This is exemplified by the blithe conclusion in the previously referenced paper by
Friedman and Lewis (2014), in which readers are advised to “be more proactive in supporting our government’s actions to ameliorate potential
risks.” The National Security Agency should love this.
Link Turn - Drones
Federal regulation of drones is necessary to build safeguards against cyber war
Bernd 2013 (Candice [assistant editor/reporter with Truthout]; The Coming Domestic Drone Wars; Sep
19; www.truth-out.org/news/item/18951-the-coming-domestic-drone-wars#; kdf)
Domestic Drone Weaknesses Cyber
warfare may prove to be the most enduring challenge for the FAA when it
comes to ensuring guidelines that will protect Americans adequately as drone technology makes its
transition into civilian life. Peter Singer is the director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and a senior fellow in
the Foreign Policy program at Brookings Institute. He is the author of Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century.
According to him, the
primary weakness of drone technology is many systems' dependence on GPS signals
and remote operation. Even military-grade drone technology can be co-opted, he said. In December 2011, the
Iranian Army's electronic warfare unit brought down an American drone, the RQ-170 Sentinel, after it crossed into Iranian airspace. In Iraq in
2009, Iraqi insurgents were able to use $26 software to intercept the video feeds of US Predator drones in a manner "akin to a criminal listening
in on the police radio scanner," Singer told Truthout. Most recently,
a research team at the University of Texas was able to
demonstrate successfully the spoofing of a UAV by creating false civil GPS signals that trick the drone's
GPS receiver. "There aren't easy answers to these other than good encryption requirements," Singer told Truthout in an email. The Texas
research team hoped to demonstrate the dangers of spoofing early on in the FAA's task to write the mandated rules for UAS integration in the
national airspace, and the Department of Homeland Security invited the team to demonstrate the spoofing in New Mexico. "Vulnerability
to jamming and spoofing depends highly on the design of the aircraft and control systems and vary
across differing architectures. Minimum system performance and design standards developed for civil
UAS designs will address these vulnerabilities," an FAA spokesman told Truthout. Whether minimum standards for
system performance will be enough to address the changing dynamic of cyber warfare, and for that matter,
technology, remains a question, but it's something the FAA and Homeland Security are examining as drone
technology becomes more widespread in the US.
AT: Experts
Their “experts” have motive to exaggerate the likelihood of an attack
Weiss 2015 (Leonard [visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and
Cooperation]; On fear and nuclear terror; Mar 3; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 75–87;
kdf)
There is a tendency on the part of security policy advocates to hype security threats to obtain support
for their desired policy outcomes. They are free to do so in a democratic society, and most come by their advocacy through genuine conviction
that a real security threat is receiving insufficient attention. But there is now enough evidence of how such advocacy has been
distorted for the purpose of overcoming political opposition to policies stemming from ideology that
careful public exposure and examination of data on claimed threats should be part of any such debate.
Until this happens, the most appropriate attitude toward claimed threats of nuclear terrorism, especially when accompanied by
advocacy of policies intruding on individual freedom, should be one of skepticism. Interestingly, while all this attention to nuclear terrorism goes
on, the United States and other nuclear nations have no problem promoting the use of nuclear power and national nuclear programs (only for friends, of course)
that end up creating more nuclear materials that can be used for weapons. The use of civilian nuclear programs to disguise national weapon ambitions has been a
hallmark of proliferation history ever since the Atoms for Peace program (Sokolski, 2001), suggesting that the real nuclear threat resides where it always has
resided-in national nuclear programs; but placing the threat where it properly belongs does not carry the public-relations frisson currently attached to the word
“terrorism.”
No Terror Attack
Terrorists lack the motivation to get the bomb – even if they did, they’d never pull off
an attack
Weiss 2015 (Leonard [visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and
Cooperation]; On fear and nuclear terror; Mar 3; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 75–87;
kdf)
A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might seize nuclear
materials in Pakistan for fashioning a weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have worked within the Pakistani nuclear
establishment, there is little to no evidence that terrorist groups in or outside the region are seriously trying
to obtain a nuclear capability. And Pakistan has been operating a uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly 30
years with no credible reports of diversion of HEU from the plant. There is one stark example of a terrorist organization that actually started a
nuclear effort: the Aum Shinrikyo group. At its peak, this religious cult had a membership estimated in the tens of thousands spread over a
variety of countries, including Japan; its members had scientific expertise in many areas; and the group was well funded. Aum Shinrikyo
obtained access to natural uranium supplies, but the nuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned. The group was also interested in
chemical weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 persons. AumShinrikyo is now
a small organization under continuing close surveillance. What about highly
organized groups, designated appropriately as terrorist,
that have acquired enough territory to enable them to operate in a quasigovernmental fashion, like the
Islamic State (IS)? Such organizations are certainly dangerous, but how would nuclear terrorism fit in with a program for
building and sustaining a new caliphate that would restore past glories of Islamic society, especially since, like any
organized government, the Islamic State would itself be vulnerable to nuclear attack? Building a new Islamic state out of
radioactive ashes is an unlikely ambition for such groups. However, now that it has become notorious, apocalyptic
pronouncements in Western media may begin at any time, warning of the possible acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by IS. Even if a
terror group were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the time, money, and infrastructure needed
to build nuclear weapons creates significant risks of discovery that would put the group at risk of attack.
Given the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its
operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects. And, of course, 9/11
has heightened
sensitivity to the need for protection, lowering further the probability of a successful effort.
xt—No nuclear terror
No risk of nuclear terror – leading expert
Weiss 2015 (Leonard [visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and
Cooperation]; On fear and nuclear terror; Mar 3; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 75–87;
kdf)
Fear of nuclear weapons is rational, but its extension to terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering that is
unjustified by available data. The debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise
the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks. And
the historical record shows that the war risk is real. The Cuban Missile Crisis and other confrontations have demonstrated that miscalculation,
misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a ‘close call’ regarding nuclear war. Although there has been much commentary on the
interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons, evidence
of any terrorist
group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by
other means is virtually nonexistent. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists requires significant
time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work. It
requires putting aside at least some aspects of a groups more immediate activities and goals for an
attempted operation that no terrorist group has accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of
absence, it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic
consideration of the threat.
AT: Lone Wolves
No lone wolf terror
Becker, 12/14/14 [The Foreign Policy Essay: Wolves Who Are Lonely By Michael Becker Sunday,
December 14, 2014 at 10:00 AM, Michael Becker is a Ph.D. student in political science at Northeastern
University. His research focuses on international security, conflict, and terrorism. He can be reached at
becker.m@husky.neu.edu.http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/12/the-foreign-policy-essay-wolves-whoare-lonely/]
the fear surrounding lone wolves is unwarranted and based on ignorance of how they operate.
-actor terrorists tend to conform to certain distinct patterns that can be useful in preventing
attacks
lone wolves are not nearly as threatening as either their name or the hype
around them suggest.
But much of
My research
shows that lone
future
. Perhaps more important, my findings indicate that
Becker photoThe concern about lone-wolf terrorism pervades much of the U.S. national security establishment. President Obama, former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, and current DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson, among others, have cited lone wolves as one of the gravest potential threats to U.S. security. They point to the rise of social media and terrorist propaganda, like the sophisticated videos produced by the Islamic State, and express concern that socially isolated individuals can
It is true that lone-wolf terrorism against the United States has become more common in
the past several years
become radicalized with troubling ease.
. And several lone-actor attacks—including the 2011 shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords, which left six dead, and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, which killed 13—have had deadly and tragic consequences. Concurrently,
there has been little success in terms of identifying a lone wolf “profile.” They can be young or old; black or white; radical Islamists, right-wing extremists, anti-Semites, militant environmentalists, or of another ideological persuasion altogether. Given the diversity of their backgrounds,
I recently undertook an analysis of 84 lone-wolf attacks that occurred in the United
States between 1940 and 2012 in an effort to identify patterns
First, similar to our recent experience with the Ebola outbreak, the fear of the thing is usually worse
than the thing itself. Few lone-wolf attacks in the United States actually kill anyone, and many others
only succeed in killing one person the lone wolf himself
Many lone wolves are incompetent
loners with no experience discharging a bomb or firearm; oftentimes they exhibit behavior that, in
retrospect, is more bizarre and sad than frightening Take Dwight Watson, a.k.a. the “Tractor Man.” In
2003, Watson drove his tractor to Washington, D.C., and threatened to blow up explosives
After
two days, he surrendered unceremoniously and it was revealed that he never had any weapons Part of
the reason for the low casualty rate in lone-wolf attacks is that unlike groups such al-Qaeda that have
significant resources at their disposal and, even more important, a sophisticated division of labor lone
wolves have to do all the work of terrorism themselves finding a target, planning an attack, gathering
supplies, doing reconnaissance, actually carrying out the attack, and possibly executing an escape plan
This disadvantage is reflected in the weapons most lone wolves choose: firearms. Globally
most terrorist attacks are bombings
a lone gunman
likely to produce fewer fatalities
Another significant characteristic of lone wolves is their limited ability to select meaningful
targets The expertise needed to conduct a successful attack on a hardened target—not an easy task—is
reflected in the targets most lone wolves choose and how they conduct themselves Lone wolves tend to
choose unhardened, undefended targets
suspect
that this tendency is due to two factors: the more personal motives that—alongside their political
ideologies—inform lone wolves’ violent tendencies; and the desire to carry out a successful attack
The targets lone wolves choose tend to be congruent with the ideologies that they say
motivate them: so anti-abortion lone wolves
What should all
these patterns mean to counterterrorism officials? They indicate most notably that lone wolves are not
as fearsome as they are often made out to be. Lone wolves are only rarely deadly. What is more, when
they do manage to kill people, their incompetence and reliance on firearms usually limit the number of
deaths
concern about lone wolves is probably overblown,
how can such a protean enemy be countered?
in the targets that lone wolves chose. I came away with several findings that have important national security
implications.
:
(they are almost invariably men).
.
near the National Mall.
at all.
,
—
.
, at the organizational level,
, but lone wolves mainly choose guns. In part, this is because guns can more easily be attained than bombs in the United Stat es, but lone wolves’ preference for firearms obtains globally as
well, suggesting it is driven by their lack of facility with explosives. And
—while still potentially able to cause multiple casualties—is
than a well-made and
well-placed bomb.
.
.
like college campuses, churches, and local government buildings. Only rarely do they opt for significant or symbolic targets like the National Mall. I
, a task made
easier by choosing a softer target.
go after clinics or doctors who perform abortions, while right-wing extremists target government buildings and officials. What is even more striking is that these
small-ball targets tend to be found in or near places well known to perpetrators—the square in their hometown, the synagogue they pass on their way to work, etc. Their daily routines, in other words, are us ually the scene of the crime.
. As a result, policymakers’
and the allocation of resources for counterterrorism purposes should take account of this. In some
Even if the threat were more severe, there are too many potential targets
and too many potential lone wolves to expect law enforcement to monitor, detect, and interdict them
all.
sense, this requires us to learn to live with the existence of lone-wolf terrorism.
AT: Cyber attacks
No cyber threats
Healey 13 Jason, Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, "No, Cyberwarfare
Isn't as Dangerous as Nuclear War", 3/20, www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-threat-to-the-us
America does not face an existential cyberthreat today, despite recent warnings. Our cybervulnerabilities are
undoubtedly grave and the threats we face are severe but far from comparable to nuclear war. ¶ The most recent alarms
come in a Defense Science Board report on how to make military cybersystems more resilient against advanced threats (in short, Russia or
China). It warned that the "cyber threat is serious, with potential consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear threat of the Cold War."
Such fears were also expressed by Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011. He called cyber "The single biggest
existential threat that's out there" because "cyber actually more than theoretically, can attack our infrastructure, our financial systems."¶ While
it is true that cyber
attacks might do these things, it is also true they have not only never happened but are far more
difficult to accomplish than mainstream thinking believes. The consequences from cyber threats may be similar in some
ways to nuclear, as the Science Board concluded, but mostly, they are incredibly dissimilar. ¶ Eighty years ago, the generals of the U.S. Army Air
Corps were sure that their bombers would easily topple other countries and cause their populations to panic, claims which did not stand up to
reality. A
study of the 25-year history of cyber conflict, by the Atlantic Council and Cyber Conflict Studies Association,
has shown a similar dynamic where the impact of disruptive cyberattacks has been consistently
overestimated. ¶ Rather than theorizing about future cyberwars or extrapolating from today's concerns, the history of cyberconflict that
have actually been fought, shows that cyber incidents have so far tended to have effects that are either widespread but fleeting or persistent
but narrowly focused. No attacks, so far, have been both widespread and persistent. There
have been no authenticated cases
of anyone dying from a cyber attack. Any widespread disruptions, even the 2007 disruption against
Estonia, have been short-lived causing no significant GDP loss. ¶ Moreover, as with conflict in other domains, cyberattacks can
take down many targets but keeping them down over time in the face of determined defenses has so far been out
of the range of all but the most dangerous adversaries such as Russia and China. Of course, if the United States is in a conflict with those
nations, cyber will be the least important of the existential threats policymakers should be worrying about. Plutonium trumps bytes in a
shooting war.¶ This is not all good news. Policymakers have recognized the problems since at least 1998 with little significant progress. Worse,
the threats and vulnerabilities are getting steadily more worrying. Still, experts
have been warning of a cyber Pearl Harbor
for 20 of the 70 years since the actual Pearl Harbor. ¶ The transfer of U.S. trade secrets through Chinese cyber espionage
could someday accumulate into an existential threat. But it doesn't seem so seem just yet, with only handwaving estimates of annual losses of
0.1 to 0.5 percent to the total U.S. GDP of around $15 trillion. That's bad, but it
"economic cyberwar."
doesn't add up to an existential crisis or
ISIS is structurally incapable of being a threat
Matthews and Preble 2015 (Dylan and Christopher [Cato's vice president for defense and foreign
policy studies]; Ignore the headlines. The world is getting safer all the time.; Jan 15;
www.vox.com/2015/1/14/7546165/world-getting-safer; kdf)
DM: Did ISIS change your thinking on this at all? ISIS fighter An ISIS fighter in Syria. (AFP/Getty Images)
CP: Not really, for a couple reasons. ISIS may be a terrorist organization, and may be an insurgency, and
may be a quasi-nation-state or attempting to become a quasi-nation-state, but it's hard to be all of
those things simultaneously. Austin Long writes about this in his chapter, about the differences between
insurgents and terrorists. Most terrorists operate in the shadows. The hard part is not killing them, it's
finding them. That's why traditional counterterrorism is an intelligence and information-gathering
process. It's a lot like police work. By declaring itself a state and raising a flag over territory it seizes and
holds, ISIS is trading away one of its key advantages, and opening itself up to more traditional military
attacks. It's a virulent, reprehensible state, but it's not clear to me that it's a greater terrorist threat than
other organizations that are continuing to operate in the shadows.
AT: Right Wing Extremism
Surveillance only increases the risks of right-wing terror
Cannon 6/19/2015 (Gabrielle; Should the Charleston Attack Be Called Terrorism;
www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/06/charleston-shooting-terrorism-american-extremism; kdf)
The Southern Poverty Law Center, a nonprofit advocacy organization, still maintains a database called "The Extremist Files" that profiles
prominent hate groups and extremist movements and ideologies, but Johnson hopes more will be done to get lawmakers to take note.
"Hopefully this will get the attention of those in charge of not only enforcement, but also those making our laws," he said. "Try to wrap your
arms around this problem and try to actually develop a strategy to combat it and mitigate it. That is not being done." Still, as former Mother
Jones reporter Adam Serwer pointed out in his 2011 coverage of the Sikh temple shooting, surveillance doesn't
always lead to
prevention and can impede constitutional rights: "Mike German, a former FBI agent who did undercover
work infiltrating extremist groups including neo-Nazis and militia groups and is now senior policy
counsel for the ACLU, told me that more government surveillance isn't the solution, and that it's a
mistake to think there's a technological silver bullet that can flawlessly identify threats before they can
be carried out. Most people with extreme views, German says, hold horrible (but constitutionally
protected) beliefs they never act on." After Johnson left the DHS, the agency contended it was doing all it could to prevent
domestic terror. As WIRED reported, DHS spokesman Matt Chandler responded by saying that the "DHS continues to work with its state, local,
tribal, territorial, and private partners to prevent and protect against potential threats to the United States by focusing on preventing violence
that is motivated by extreme ideological beliefs."
AT: ISIS
ISIS is structurally incapable of being a threat
Matthews and Preble 2015 (Dylan and Christopher [Cato's vice president for defense and foreign
policy studies]; Ignore the headlines. The world is getting safer all the time.; Jan 15;
www.vox.com/2015/1/14/7546165/world-getting-safer; kdf)
DM: Did ISIS change your thinking on this at all? ISIS fighter An ISIS fighter in Syria. (AFP/Getty Images)
CP: Not really, for a couple reasons. ISIS may be a terrorist organization, and may be an insurgency, and
may be a quasi-nation-state or attempting to become a quasi-nation-state, but it's hard to be all of
those things simultaneously. Austin Long writes about this in his chapter, about the differences between
insurgents and terrorists. Most terrorists operate in the shadows. The hard part is not killing them, it's
finding them. That's why traditional counterterrorism is an intelligence and information-gathering
process. It's a lot like police work. By declaring itself a state and raising a flag over territory it seizes and
holds, ISIS is trading away one of its key advantages, and opening itself up to more traditional military
attacks. It's a virulent, reprehensible state, but it's not clear to me that it's a greater terrorist threat than
other organizations that are continuing to operate in the shadows.
xt – No ISIS Terror
No threat of ISIS terrorism – litany of reasons
Byman and Shapiro 2015 (Daniel L [research director @ Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings]
and Jeremy [Fellow @ Brookings]; Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western
Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq; January; www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/01/westernforeign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-byman-shapiro?rssid=LatestFromBrookings; kdf)
Despite these fears and the real danger that motivates them, the Syrian and Iraqi foreign fighter threat
can easily be exaggerated. Previous cases and information emerging from Syria suggest several mitigating effects that may
reduce—but hardly eliminate—the potential terrorist threat from foreign fighters who have gone to Syria. Those mitigating factors
include: • Many die, blowing themselves up in suicide attacks or perishing quickly in firefights with opposing forces.
• Many never return home, but continue fighting in the conflict zone or at the next battle for jihad. • Many of the foreign fighters
quickly become disillusioned, and a number even return to their home country without engaging in further violence. • Others are
arrested or disrupted by intelligence services. Indeed, becoming a foreign fighter—particularly with today’s heavy use of social media—makes a
terrorist far more likely to come to the attention of security services. The danger posed by returning foreign fighters is real, but American and
European security services have tools that they can successfully deploy to mitigate the threat. These tools will
have to be adapted to the new context in Syria and Iraq, but they will remain useful and effective. Key Policy Recommendations The model below shows how the
various mitigating factors and effective policies can (though not necessarily will) lessen the danger presented by foreign fighters. Complex Model of Foreign Fighter
Radicalization Complex Model of Foreign Fighter Radicalization Decide First is the decision stage. It makes sense to reduce the numbers of those going to the
conflict zone in the first place by interfering in the decision to go. After all, those who do not go cannot be radicalized by foreign fighting. Western countries should
push a counter-narrative that stresses the brutality of the conflict and the internecine violence among jihadists. However, in general, governments are poor at
developing counter-narratives and lack community credibility. It is usually better to elevate existing voices of community leaders who already embrace the counternarrative than to try to handle this directly through government channels. Also vital is developing peaceful alternatives for helping the people affected by the
conflicts in the Middle East. Some fighters—certainly not all but a significant portion—were originally motivated by a genuine desire to defend the Syrian people
against the brutality of the Assad regime. Encouraging charitable activities, identifying legitimate channels for assistance, and otherwise highlighting what
concerned individuals can do to help alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people may siphon off some of the supply of foreign fighters. Local programs for providing
assistance can also improve domestic intelligence gathering capabilities in two ways, according to Western security service officials. First, simply being out and
about in the community gives government officials more access to information about potential radicals. Families become comfortable with intelligence services, as
do community leaders. Second, such programs allow intelligence officials to gain access to individuals who can potentially be recruited to inform on other would-be
jihadists. Desired Results: • Talked out of joining the foreign militias by family or community intervention. • Choose peaceful alternative to fighting. Travel The
second stage in the foreign fighter radicalization process is the travel to Syria. Disrupting the transit route via Turkey is one of the most promising ways of reducing
the threat of foreign fighters to Europe and the United States. Doing so will primarily require better cooperation between Western governments and Turkish
authorities, who have not always seen stopping the flow of fighters as their highest priority. But as Turkish authorities are now becoming more worried about the
jihadist threat to Turkey, Western security services should establish channels with Turkish intelligence and police to warn them of the presence of specific
individuals headed to Syria through Turkey and to encourage Turkey to turn them away from the Turkish border or stop them at the Syrian border and deport them.
Though there are other ways into Syria, all are far harder and more costly for Western fighters. Security cooperation among European services and between
European and American services is also essential. Intelligence collected from the communications of foreign fighters, shared open source monitoring, and other
information from one service can prove vital for discovering transnational networks. Cooperation within Europe is indispensable for stopping travel as jihadists from
one European country often try to travel to Turkey and then on to Syria via another European country in an effort to avoid detection. Desired Results: • Arrested en
route. • Stopped at border and deported. Train and Fight In the third stage of the process, the foreign fighters receive training and fight in Syria or Iraq, mostly out
of the reach of European or American influence. But even here, there are subtle ways of influencing the terrorist indoctrination process. Western security agencies
should do everything they can to sow doubt in the minds of extremist leaders in Iraq and Syria about the true loyalties of Western Muslim volunteers. Highlighting
information gained from recruits and even disinformation about the degree of infiltration by security services can heighten fears. If jihadist organizations come to
view foreigners as potential spies or as corrupting influences, they might assign them to non-combat roles, test their allegiances by offering them the one-way ticket
of suicide bombings, or even avoid recruiting them altogether. Desired Results: • Die in the combat zone. • Stay abroad and fight. • Become disillusioned with the
struggle. Return Upon the foreign fighters’ return, the fourth stage, it is critical to turn them away from violence and jihad. Western services report that they usually
know when individuals return and that many return with doubts. As a first step, security services must triage returnees, identifying which ones deserve the most
attention: our interviews indicate triaging is done inconsistently (and in some cases not at all) among the Western security services. Inevitably, some dangerous
individuals will be missed, and some individuals identified as not particularly dangerous might later become a threat, but a first look is vital for prioritization. Efforts
to promote a counter-narrative are valuable, particularly if they involve parents, preachers and community leaders. Community programs deserve considerable
attention. The goal should be to move potential terrorists towards non-violence; since many are in that category already, hounding them with the threat of arrest or
otherwise creating a sense of alienation can backfire. In the past, family and community members have at times been successful in steering returned fighters
toward a different path, even getting them to inform on their former comrades. Indeed, sending returnees to jail for relatively minor crimes such as going abroad to
fight with a foreign terrorist organization against a distant enemy may simply put them in prison for a few years and expose them to the radicalizing elements
present in many European prisons, where many minor players become exposed to hardened jihadists and integrate into broader networks. Desired Results: •
Arrested and jailed. • De-radicalized and reintegrated. • No desire to attack at home. Plot To disrupt foreign fighters in the fifth and final stage of plotting terrorist
attacks, security services must remain focused on the returnee problem and have sufficient resources to monitor the problem as it emerges in their countries. The
good news is that going to Syria and Iraq and returning home usually does bring one to the attention the security services. But maintaining vigilance as the numbers
increase will be difficult purely for reasons of resources. Marc Hecker, a French expert on terrorism, commented that France could handle the “dozens” who
returned from Iraq but would be over-whelmed by the “hundreds” who may come back from Syria. Keeping track of that many suspects, is exceptionally resource
intensive, particularly if it involves full-time surveillance. For intelligence services, often the problem is not in accessing or gathering the data, but in processing,
analyzing, and following up on it in a timely manner. At the same time, their own effectiveness can work against them: by reducing the problem considerably, they
decrease the danger, thereby creating the impression that they need fewer resources. One way to mitigate this effect is for security services to spread the burden of
responsibility around by training and sharing information with local police and other law-enforcement and community organizations. Security cooperation among
European services and between European and American services is absolutely necessary. Intelligence from the communications of foreign fighters, shared opensource monitoring, and other information obtained by one service can prove crucial for discovering transnational networks. As noted earlier, cooperation within
Europe is critical for stopping travel, as jihadists from one European country often try to travel to Turkey and then on to Syria via another European country in order
to avoid detection. Desired Results: • Attack foiled by law enforcement. • Attack fails due to lack of training or wrong skills. Conclusion The
United States
and Europe already have effective measures in place to greatly reduce the threat of terrorism from
jihadist returnees and to limit the scale of any attacks that might occur. Those measures can and should be improved—and,
more importantly, adequately resourced. But the standard of success cannot be perfection. If it is, then Western
governments are doomed to fail, and, worse, doomed to an overreaction which will waste resources and
cause dangerous policy mistakes.