The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013
Starter Pack
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Starter Pack--- Cuba Aff/Neg
***1AC*** ............................................................................................................................................... 3
1AC Inherency ....................................................................................................................................... 4
1AC Plan ................................................................................................................................................ 5
1AC Latin America Advantage .............................................................................................................. 6
1AC Soft Power Advantage ................................................................................................................. 10
1AC Solvency....................................................................................................................................... 15
***Inherency/Solvency*** .................................................................................................................... 17
Inherency Ext--- A2 Relations Now ..................................................................................................... 18
***Latin America Advantage*** ......................................................................................................... 19
Relations Uniqueness ........................................................................................................................... 20
Relations Uniqueness--- Now Key ....................................................................................................... 22
Relations Uniqueness--- A2 Obama Appeal ........................................................................................ 23
Removing Embargo Solves Relations .................................................................................................. 24
Removing Embargo Solves Relations--- A2 Regional Influences ....................................................... 26
Latin America Relations--- China Competition ................................................................................... 27
A2 Appeasement Turn--- General ........................................................................................................ 28
A2 Appeasement Turn--- Economics ................................................................................................... 29
Latin America Impact--- Global Instability .......................................................................................... 30
Econ Collapse Causes War ................................................................................................................... 31
Proliferation Causes War...................................................................................................................... 32
***Soft Power Advantage*** ............................................................................................................... 34
Soft Power Uniqueness--- General ....................................................................................................... 35
Soft Power Uniqueness--- Cuba Key ................................................................................................... 36
Aff Solves Soft Power .......................................................................................................................... 38
Soft Power Key to Hegemony .............................................................................................................. 39
A2 Soft Power Fails ............................................................................................................................. 41
A2 Hard Power Solves ......................................................................................................................... 42
A2 Gov Policies Not Key ..................................................................................................................... 44
Heg Solves War .................................................................................................................................... 45
Heg Sustainable--- Catch-All ............................................................................................................... 46
Heg Sustainable--- Soft Power ............................................................................................................. 49
Heg Sustainable--- Economic Power.................................................................................................... 50
A2 Smooth Transition .......................................................................................................................... 51
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The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
***Solvency*** ...................................................................................................................................... 53
Solvency--- Reform .............................................................................................................................. 54
Solvency--- Obama Leadership Key .................................................................................................... 55
***2AC/Miscellaneous*** .................................................................................................................... 56
2AC Terrorism Add-On ....................................................................................................................... 57
A2 No Capability/Motive ..................................................................................................................... 60
A2 Politics Link.................................................................................................................................... 62
A2 Politics Link--- A2 Cuban Americans ............................................................................................ 64
A2 Critique--- Lifting Embargo = D Rule ............................................................................................ 65
***Negative*** ...................................................................................................................................... 66
1NC Latin America Relations Defense ................................................................................................ 67
2NC Latin America Relations Defense ................................................................................................ 68
Cuba Relations Defense ....................................................................................................................... 70
1NC Latin America Impact Defense .................................................................................................... 71
2NC Latin America Impact Defense .................................................................................................... 72
1NC Soft Power Defense...................................................................................................................... 73
2NC Soft Power Defense...................................................................................................................... 74
1NC Heg Impact Defense..................................................................................................................... 75
2NC Heg Impact Defense..................................................................................................................... 76
1NC/2NC Prolif Defense...................................................................................................................... 77
1NC/2NC Econ Defense....................................................................................................................... 78
1NC Politics Link ................................................................................................................................. 81
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The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013
Starter Pack
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
***1AC***
3
The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013
Starter Pack
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
1AC Inherency
Contention 1: Inherency
Obama has moved to ease restrictions on engagement with Cuba but full lift of the
embargo is key
Bechtel 2011 (Marilyn Bechtel, activist and author, January 31, 2011, “Time to normalize relations with Cuba,” People’s
World, http://www.peoplesworld.org/time-to-normalize-relations-with-cuba/)
It's safe to say that no issue in U.S. foreign policy has lingered so long, fundamentally unchanged, as our
country's economic blockade and draconian restrictions on other relations with a very near neighbor,
Cuba. President Obama's recent moves to ease those restrictions, including those announced in mid-January,
are a promising start to a long-overdue normalization of U.S. relations with our island neighbor.¶ Begun in
October 1960 - just months after the Cuban people overthrew U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista - the blockade and other
bans have been strengthened several times over the decades.¶ Besides severely restricting trade with Cuba and imposing
penalties on other countries' trade with the island, successive U.S. administrations have imposed onerous conditions on travel
there by U.S. citizens.¶ Soon after becoming president, Barack Obama signaled a new opening toward Cuba
by greatly easing restrictions on travel to Cuba by Cuban Americans, and on their sending remittances
to family members in Cuba.¶ In mid-January the president again moved to ease travel restrictions, this
time reopening the way for educational and cultural exchanges and enabling all Americans to send financial support to people
in Cuba, as well as expanding the number of U.S. airports that can receive flights from Cuba.¶ Longtime supporters of
normalizing relations are calling the measures a promising step, and urging that full diplomatic and
economic relations be reestablished.¶ "I am extremely gratified to see the series of positive changes to come from
this administration, first in 2009 with its new policies for reuniting families and increasing telecommunications and
humanitarian aid to Cuba, and today with the announcement of these encouraging policy changes," said U.S. Rep. Barbara Lee,
D-Calif., in a Jan. 14 statement. Lee headed a 2009 Congressional delegation to Cuba, which on its return called for positive
changes in relations between the two countries.¶ Noting that Cuba is the only country in the world where Americans are
forbidden to travel, Lee called the blockade "one of the nation's longest-held foreign policy failures," and expressed the hope
that the administration's latest announcement was "just one more step" toward normalized relations.
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The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013
Starter Pack
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
1AC Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic
engagement toward the Republic of Cuba by lifting its economic embargo on the
Republic of Cuba.
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The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013
Starter Pack
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
1AC Latin America Advantage
Advantage ____ : Latin America Relations
The Cuba embargo costs the US international credibility and dooms Latin American
relations--- Plan solves
Birns 2013 (Larry Birns, COHA Director, and, Frederick B. Mills, COHA Senior Research Fellow, January 30, 2013, “Best Time
for US-Cuba Rapprochement is Now,” http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-isnow/#sthash.ZisN1pQb.dpuf
In addition to being counter-productive and immoral, U.S. policy towards Havana is also anachronistic. During the
excesses of the cold war, the U.S. sought to use harsh and unforgiving measures to isolate Cuba from its neighbors in order to
limit the influence of the Cuban revolution on a variety of insurgencies being waged in the region. That narrative did not
sufficiently recognize the homegrown causes of insurgency in the hemisphere. Some argue that it inadvertently drove Cuba
further into the Soviet camp. Ironically, at the present juncture of world history, the embargo is in some ways
isolating the U.S. rather than Cuba. Washington is often viewed as implementing a regional policy
that is defenseless and without a compass. At the last Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, member
states, with the exception of Washington, made it clear that they unanimously want Cuba to participate in the next plenary
meeting or the gathering will be shut down. There are new regional organizations, such as the Community of
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), that now include Cuba and exclude the U.S. Not even
America’s closest allies support the embargo. Instead, over the years, leaders in NATO and the OECD
member nations have visited Cuba and, in some cases, allocated lines of credit to the regime. So it
was no surprise that in November of 2012, the United Nations General Assembly voted
overwhelmingly (188 – 3), for the 21st year in a row, against the US embargo. Finally, while a slim majority of Cuban
Americans still favor the measure, changing demographics are eroding and outdating this support. As famed Cuban Researcher,
Wayne Smith, the director of the Latin America Rights & Security: Cuba Project, at the Center for International Policy, points
out, “There are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba” (Washington
Post, Nov. 9, 2012).
Aff boosts relations and solves regional stability--- Now is the key time
White 2013 (Robert E. White, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, United States ambassador to Paraguay
from 1977 to 1979 and to El Salvador from 1980 to 1981, March 7, 2013, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With
Cuba,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latinamerica.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)
FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a
partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact,
the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America. ¶ Yet for a
half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and
neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chávez of
Venezuela — who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the
political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades — offers an opportunity to restore bonds with
potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity.¶ Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chávez
used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters.
His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Raúl, Cuba’s current president. The embargo no longer
serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming
powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress.¶ An end to the Cuba embargo would send a
powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with
democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas.
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Latin American instability escalates draws in great powers
Rochlin 1994 (James Francis Rochlin, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University, 1994, “Discovering the Americas: The
Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America,” pages 130-131)
While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada
possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining
U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states
in Latin
America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by
linked to the prospect of explosive events
occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite
a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability
created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America,
might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform
adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of
research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate
increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to
decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were
become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
Latin American relations solve the economy and proliferation--- Cuba policy is the key
roadblock
Perez 2010 (David A. Perex, J.D. Yale Law Schoo, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department,” Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, Lexis)
Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's importance to
the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is
obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy,
climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve
correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high return by making regional
cooperation more likely. 20 In order to confront any of the major world issues facing the United States,
Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward
Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region. These three
reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin
America relationship, the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty
years.
Proliferation makes nuclear war inevitable- 4 reasons it’s destabilizing
Heisbourg 2012 (François Heisbourg, Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and of the Geneva
Centre for Security Policy, April 4, 2012, “How Bad Would the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be?,” Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1171&tid=4)
Human societies tend to lack the imagination to think through, and to act upon, what have become known as ‘black
swan’ events (26): that which has never occurred (or which has happened very rarely and in a wholly different context) is
deemed not be in the field of reality, and to which must be added eventualities which are denied because their consequences are to awful to
contemplate. The extremes of human misconduct (the incredulity in the face of evidence of the Holocaust, the failure to imagine 9/11) bear
testimony to this hard-wired trait of our species. This would not normally warrant mention as a factor of growing salience if not for the
recession into time of the original and only use of nuclear weapons in August 1945. Non-use
of nuclear weapons may be taken
for granted rather than being an absolute taboo. Recent writing on the reputedly limited effects of the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bombs (27) may contribute to such a trend, in the name of reducing the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Recent (and often compelling)
historical accounts of the surrender of the Japanese Empire which downplay the role of the atomic bombings in comparison to early research
can produce a similar effect, even if that may not have been the intention (28). However desirable it has been, the end of atmospheric nuclear
testing (29) has removed for more than three decades the periodic reminders which such monstrous detonations made as to the uniquely
destructive nature of nuclear weapons. There
is a real and growing risk that we forget what was obvious to those
who first described in 1941 the unique nature of yet-to-be produced nuclear weapons (30). The risk is no
doubt higher in those states for which the history of World War II has little relevance and which have not had the will or the opportunity to
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wrestle at the time or ex post facto with the moral and strategic implications of the nuclear bombing of Japan in 1945. ¶ Unsustainable
strains are possibly the single most compelling feature of contemporary proliferation. Tight geographical
constraints –with, for instance, New Delhi and Islamabad located within 300 miles of each other-; nuclear multi-polarity
against the backdrop of multiple, criss-crossing, sources of tension in the Middle East (as opposed to the relative
simplicity of the US-Soviet confrontation); the existence of doctrines (such as India’s ‘cold start’) and force postures (such as
Pakistan’s broadening array of battlefield nukes)which rest on the expectation of early use; the role of non-state
actors as aggravating or triggering factors when they are perceived as operating with the connivance
of an antagonist state ( in the past, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914; in the future, Hezbollah operatives
launching rockets with effect against Israel or Lashkar-e-Taiba commandos doing a ‘Bombay’ redux in India?) : individually or in combination,
these factors test crisis management capabilities more severely than anything seen during the Cold War
with the partial exception of the Cuban missile crisis. Even the overabundant battlefield nuclear arsenals in Cold War Central Europe, with their
iffy weapons’ safety and security arrangements, were less of a challenge: the US and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons so deployed were not
putting US and Soviet territory and capitals at risk.¶ It
may be argued that these risk factors are known to potential
protagonists and that they therefore will be led to avoid the sort of nuclear brinksmanship which
characterized US and Soviet behavior during the Cold War in crises such as the Korean war, Berlin, Cuba or the Yom
Kippur war. Unfortunately, the multiple nuclear crises between India and Pakistan demonstrate no such
prudence, rather to the contrary. And were such restraint to feed into nuclear policy and crisis planning –along the lines of
apparently greater US and Soviet nuclear caution from the mid-Seventies onwards-, the fact would remain that initial intent
rarely resists the strains of a complex, multi-actor confrontation between inherently distrustful
antagonists. It is also worth reflecting on the fact that during the 1980s, there was real and acute fear in Soviet ruling circles that the West
was preparing an out-of-the-blue nuclear strike, a fear which in turn fed into Soviet policies and dispositions (31
Economic collapse causes nuclear conflicts
Burrows and Harris 2009 Mathew J. Burrows counselor in the National Intelligence Council and Jennifer Harris a
member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” The
Washington Quarterly 32:2 https://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrowsharris.pdf
Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the¶
future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking¶ forces. With so many possible permutations of
outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity.¶ Even so, history
may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to¶ believe that the Great Depression is not likely to
be repeated, the lessons to be¶ drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling
democracies and¶ multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on¶ the sustainability of
multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the¶ same period). There is no reason to think that this
would not be true in the¶ twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways
in¶ which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more¶ apt in a
constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change¶ would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks,
the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and¶ nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up
on the¶ international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth¶ continues in the Middle East
and youth unemployment is reduced. For those¶ terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of¶
technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most¶ dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist
groups in 2025 will likely be a¶ combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting¶ organizational structures,
command and control processes, and training¶ procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent¶
collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,¶ particularly in the absence of economic outlets that
would become narrower¶ in an economic downturn.¶ The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced
drawdown of U.S.¶ military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s¶
acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed¶ Iran could lead states in the
region to develop new security arrangements with¶ external powers, acquire additional weapons,
and consider pursuing their own¶ nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship¶
that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge¶ naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear
Iran. Episodes of low intensity¶ conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead
to an¶ unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states¶ involved are not well
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established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals¶ combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and
mobile¶ dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in¶ achieving reliable indications and
warning of an impending nuclear attack. The¶ lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short
warning and missile¶ flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on¶
preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.Types of conflict that the world
continues¶ to experience, such as over resources, could¶ reemerge, particularly if protectionism
grows and¶ there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices.¶ Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive¶
countries to take actions to assure their future¶ access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this¶ could result in
interstate conflicts if government¶ leaders deem assured access to energy resources,¶ for example, to be essential for
maintaining domestic stability and the survival of¶ their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important
geopolitical¶ implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval¶ buildups and modernization efforts,
such as China’s and India’s development of¶ blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries
indeed¶ turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of¶ regional naval
capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and¶ counterbalancing moves, but it also will create
opportunities for multinational¶ cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in¶ Asia and the
Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is¶ likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between
states in a more¶ dog-eat-dog world.¶
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The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
1AC Soft Power Advantage
Advantage ____ : Soft Power
American soft power is collapsing due to baseless and hypocritical policies like the
Cuba embargo--- The aff solves the key internal link
Perez 2010 (David A. Perex, J.D. Yale Law Schoo, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department,” Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, Lexis)
Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking long-term as well as
short-term gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez
masks his otherwise autocratic tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from Washington, both
rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the latter has refused to renew
Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic neglect for eight years during
the Bush Administration meant that political capital was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because
of this, President Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade agreement
with Colombia encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S. unilateralism, disregard for
international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been seized by a new generation of populist Latin American
leaders who stoke anti-American sentiment.¶ The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest
and security. Over thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports
from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American,
meaning that a significant portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. 1 These immigrants, as well as their
sons and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite.¶ Just south
of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout the entire region. In the last
few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have written and approved new
constitutions that have consolidated the power of the executive, while extending - or in Venezuela's
case eliminating - presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic lines,
whereby Chavez's base of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial
lines: the preamble to the new Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial
times," a moment in history that Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people
of European or mixed descent have consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional
changes proposed by President Morales. Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of
Bolivia's nine provinces. 2 Like Bolivia, Latin America is still searching for its identity.¶ [*191] Traditionally the U.S. has
projected its influence by using varying combinations of hard and soft power. It has been a long time
since the United States last sponsored or supported military action in Latin America, and although
highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would
view any overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. 3 One can only imagine the fodder
an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of
Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over people and governments without resorting to
coercion, but is limited by other factors.¶ The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps,
but rather an enduring sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to advance
particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible actor on the global and
regional stage. A good reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which
ultimately will help the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. 4¶ In order
to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a
diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American people, of
the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin
America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working with
other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image.
Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to
not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions,
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not lectures." 5¶ When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species."
These are organisms that, despite their small size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the
entire system's stability. Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone nation in Latin America,
having disproportionately dominated Washington's policy toward the region for decades. 6 As a result of
its continuing tensions with Havana, America's reputation [*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other
countries. 7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves to the U.S.
had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair
America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own. 8 In short, America must once again be admired if
we are going to expect other countries to follow our example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have
a reverberating effect throughout Latin America, and would go a long way toward creating goodwill.
Soft power solves laundry list of global problems and is necessary to sustain American
primacy
Lagon 2011 (Mark P. Lagon, International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University's Master of Science in
Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2011, “The Value of
Values: Soft Power Under Obama,” World Affairs Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-soft-powerunder-obama)
Despite large economic challenges, two protracted military expeditions, and the rise of China, India,
Brazil, and other new players on the international scene, the United States still has an unrivaled ability
to confront terrorism, nuclear proliferation, financial instability, pandemic disease, mass atrocity, or
tyranny. Although far from omnipotent, the United States is still, as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
called it, “the indispensible nation.” Soft power is crucial to sustaining and best leveraging this role as
catalyst.
That President Obama should have excluded it from his vision of America’s foreign policy assets—
particularly in the key cases of Iran, Russia, and Egypt—suggests that he feels the country has so declined, not
only in real power but in the power of example, that it lacks the moral authority to project soft
power. In the 1970s, many also considered the US in decline as it grappled with counterinsurgency in
faraway lands, a crisis due to economic stagnation, and reliance on foreign oil. Like Obama, Henry Kissinger
tried to manage decline in what he saw as a multipolar world, dressing up prescriptions for policy as descriptions of immutable
reality. In the 1980s, however, soft power played a crucial part in a turnaround for US foreign policy.
Applying it, President Reagan sought to transcend a nuclear balance of terror with defensive technologies,
pushed allies in the Cold War (e.g., El Salvador, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines) to liberalize for
their own good, backed labor movements opposed to Communists in Poland and Central America, and
called for the Berlin Wall to be torn down—over Foggy Bottom objections. This symbolism not only boosted
the perception and the reality of US influence, but also hastened the demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.
For Barack Obama, this was the path not taken. Even the Arab Spring has not cured his acute allergy to soft power. His May 20,
2011, speech on the Middle East and Northern Africa came four months after the Jasmine Revolution emerged. His emphasis
on 1967 borders as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace managed to eclipse even his broad words (vice deeds) on democracy
in the Middle East. Further, those words failed to explain his deeds in continuing to support some Arab autocracies (e.g.,
Bahrain’s, backed by Saudi forces) even as he gives tardy rhetorical support for popular forces casting aside other ones.
To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power without soft power is to be
China. Even France, with its long commitment to realpolitik, has overtaken the United States as
proponent and implementer of humanitarian intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast. When the American
president has no problem with France combining hard and soft power better than the United States,
something is seriously amiss.
Soft power is key to leadership--- legitimizes hard power and increases influence
Nye 2002 (Joseph S. Nve, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School
of Government, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, p. 9-10, Google Books)
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Of course, hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other. Both are aspects of the ability
to achieve our purposes by affecting the behavior of others. Sometimes the same power resources can
affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction. 31 A country that suffers economic and
military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda as well as its attractiveness. And some countries
may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of invincibility or inevitability. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop
such myths. Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for
smaller states-witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe. But soft power is not simply the reflection of hard
power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the
Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military
resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And some
countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military
and economic weight, because of the incorporation of attractive causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping into their
definitions of national interest. These are lessons that the unilateralists forget at their and our peril. Britain in the
nineteenth century and America in the second half of the twentieth century enhanced their power by
creating liberal international economic rules and institutions that were consistent with the liberal and
democratic structures of British and American capitalism -free trade and the gold standard in the case of Britain, the
International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and other institutions in the case of the United States. If a country
can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its
culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If it can establish international rules
that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to change. If it can help support
institutions that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it may
not need as many costly carrots and sticks.
Hard power is insufficient
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of Government John
Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, “Smart Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its
effective use,” Wesleyan University, google)
First, the costs of using or even threatening force among nuclear powers have skyrocketed. Indeed,
current leading scholarship in the field of security has proclaimed that the nuclear revolution has been instrumental
in creating a new age of a “security community,” in which war between major powers is almost
unthinkable because the costs of war have become too great (Jervis 1988, 1993, 2002). Mueller (1988) reinforces and
modifies the nuclear deterrent argument by introducing the independent deterrent of conventional war in an age of advanced
technology. In short, the utility of respect, admiration and cooperation (i.e., soft power) has increased relative to
the utility of coercion with respect to the usefulness of the instruments of statecraft. Moreover, the
exorbitant dangers that the hard resources of military technology have produced require far greater
use of the instruments of soft power in order for nations to achieve sustainable security in the long
run.
US hegemony solves escalation of global hotspots- decline causes hotspots to escalate
worldwide
Brzezinski 2012 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (CSIS counselor and trustee and cochairs the CSIS Advisory Board. He is also the
Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University, in Washington, D.C. He is cochair of the American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus and a member of the
International Advisory Board of the Atlantic Council. He is a former chairman of the American-Ukrainian Advisory Committee.
He was a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State from 1966 to 1968; chairman of the Humphrey
Foreign Policy Task Force in the 1968 presidential campaign; director of the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976; and
principal foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter in the 1976 presidential campaign. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was
national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. In 1981, he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his role in
the normalization of U.S.-China relations and for his contributions to the human rights and national security policies of the
United States. He was also a member of the President’s Chemical Warfare Commission (1985), the National Security Council–
Defense Department Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (1987–1988), and the President’s Foreign Intelligence
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Advisory Board (1987–1989). In 1988, he was cochairman of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force, and in 2004, he
was cochairman of a Council on Foreign Relations task force that issued the report Iran: Time for a New Approach. Dr.
Brzezinski received a B.A. and M.A. from McGill University (1949, 1950) and Ph.D. from Harvard University (1953). He was a
member of the faculties of Columbia University (1960–1989) and Harvard University (1953–1960). Dr. Brzezinski holds honorary
degrees from Georgetown University, Williams College, Fordham University, College of the Holy Cross, Alliance College, the
Catholic University of Lublin, Warsaw University, and Vilnius University. He is the recipient of numerous honors and awards)
February 2012 “After America” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?page=0,0
For if
America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International
uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a
sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to
global political and economic disorder,
a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare
with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by
then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new,
globally cooperative world order. More
probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive
realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a
setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a
world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism,
nationalism, and religion could ensue. RELATED 8 Geopolitically Endangered Species The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among
them India,
Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of
U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be
thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case
America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain
prospects, will
almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union.
Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of
commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a
balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others
may move more rapidly to
carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so
forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial,
technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably
mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both
of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing
international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's
dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China
is not yet
ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every
important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several
decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the
major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been
restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive
Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing
would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India,
Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek
support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble
could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors.
A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to
resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number
of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo
reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's
decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most
endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind
by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist.
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A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's
economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as
economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A
decline in American power, however, would likely
undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United
States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid
about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others'
development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a
particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by
history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another
consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the
generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space,
cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the
global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential
absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality
of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where
there would normally be conflict. None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would
generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S.
global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming
today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the
world after America would be increasingly
complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start
bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.
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1AC Solvency
Contention 2: Solvency
Lift the embargo--- it’s not working anyway
Bandow 2012 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president
Ronald Reagan, December 11, 2012, “Time to End the Cuba Embargo,” CATO Institute,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo)
It is far past time to end the embargo.¶ During the Cold War, Cuba offered a potential advanced
military outpost for the Soviet Union. Indeed, that role led to the Cuban missile crisis. With the failure of
the U.S.-supported Bay of Pigs invasion, economic pressure appeared to be Washington’s best strategy for ousting the Castro
dictatorship.¶ However, the end of the Cold War left Cuba
strategically irrelevant . It is a poor country
with little ability to harm the United States. The Castro regime might still encourage unrest, but its
survival has no measurable impact on any important U.S. interest.¶ The regime remains a humanitarian
travesty, of course. Nor are Cubans the only victims: three years ago the regime jailed a State Department contractor for
distributing satellite telephone equipment in Cuba. But Havana is not the only regime to violate human rights. Moreover,
experience has long demonstrated that it is virtually impossible for outsiders to force democracy. Washington often has used
sanctions and the Office of Foreign Assets Control currently is enforcing around 20 such programs, mostly to little effect. ¶ The
policy in Cuba obviously has failed. The regime remains in power. Indeed, it has consistently used the
embargo to justify its own mismanagement, blaming poverty on America. Observed Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton: “It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want
to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what
hasn’t happened in Cuba in the last 50 years.” Similarly, Cuban exile Carlos Saladrigas of the Cuba Study Group
argued that keeping the “embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hardliners.”
Plan solves immediately
Holmes 2010 (G. Holmes, MA from Georgetown, “SEIZING THE MOMENT,”
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?sequence=1)
From an image stand point repealing the sanctions and removing the embargo is symbolic. It shows Cuba and
the world that although the United States is pro democracy, it does not wish to impose its values on
other nations. The Cuba Democracy Act was an attempt to force democratic changes in Cuba.10 By repealing the act the United
States, illustrates that it respects the sovereignty of nations. Considering that this Act did allow for the application of U.S.
law in a foreign country11, repealing it not only sends the message about U.S. views on sovereignty but also
shows that the administration is taking steps to ensure that sovereignty is actually respected .
Repealing the Helms-Burton Law will certainly stimulate foreign investment in Cuba as well. Many foreign countries
were leery of investing in Cuba out of fear of being sued or losing property under the provisions established by the Helms-Burton Act.12 This
return of foreign investment will further secure Cuba's place in the global marketplace. It also will help to
silence skeptics who will question U.S. intentions. Since the sanctions against Cuba were unilateral U.S. actions, an
unsolicited change in course will undoubtedly spark speculation. Allowing all countries to invest in Cuba again
underscores the United States' position of desiring for all countries to participate in the global market
place. It is difficult to imagine that the benefits of lifting the embargo will not be immediate and
substantial in regards to the United States reputation in the world. Looking at the long-term benefits of removing
the sanctions, the two benefits that stand out the most are trade and fuel.
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Aff is restores Latin America relations and international credibility
Pascual 2009 (Carlos Pascual, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings institution, and Vicki
Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive
Engagement,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)
U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and
strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemi- sphere. Our nearly 50-year old policy toward Cuba
has failed on both counts: it has resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the is- land and
has left the United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become a
bellwether, indicating the extent to which the United States will act in partnership with the region or
unilaterally—and ineffectually. inevita- bly, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary
if the United States seeks to engage the Cuban people.¶ This paper proposes a new goal for U.S. policy to- ward Cuba: to
support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the polit- ical and economic future of their country
through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within;
the type of government at the helm of the island’s future will depend on Cubans. Our policy should therefore encompass
the political, eco- nomic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of
their country. This policy will advance the interests of the United States in seeking stable relationships based on common
hemispheric values that pro- mote the well-being of each individual and the growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban government and Cuban people effectively, the United States will need to engage with other govern- ments, the private sector, and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). in so doing, U.S. policy¶ toward Cuba would reflect the hemisphere’s and our own
desire to encourage the Cuban govern- ment to adopt international standards of democ- racy, human rights, and
transparency.¶ Engagement does not mean approval of the Cu- ban government’s policies, nor should it indicate a wish to
control internal developments in Cuba; legitimate changes in Cuba will only come from the actions of Cubans. If the United
States is to play a positive role in Cuba’s future, it must not indulge in hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a
dialogue on issues that would advance democracy, justice, and human rights as well as our broader
national interests. perversely, the policy of seeking to iso- late Cuba, rather than achieving its objective, has
contributed to undermining the well-being of the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba
and Latin America. It has reinforced the Cuban government’s power over its citizens by increasing their dependence on it
for every aspect of their livelihood. By slowing the flow of ideas and information, we have unwittingly helped Cuban state
security delay Cuba’s political and economic evolution toward a more open and representa- tive government. And, by too
tightly embracing Cuba’s brave dissidents, we have provided the Cu- ban authorities with an excuse to denounce their
legitimate efforts to build a more open society.
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***Inherency/Solvency***
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Inherency Ext--- A2 Relations Now
Despite gestures to the contrary the Cuba embargo still precludes relations and
intercultural contact
Bandow 2012 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president
Ronald Reagan, December 11, 2012, “Time to End the Cuba Embargo,” CATO Institute,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo)
The U.S. government has waged economic war against the Castro regime for half a century. The policy
may have been worth a try during the Cold War, but the embargo has failed to liberate the Cuban
people. It is time to end sanctions against Havana.¶ Decades ago the Castro brothers lead a revolt against a nasty
authoritarian, Fulgencio Batista. After coming to power in 1959, they created a police state, targeted U.S. commerce,
nationalized American assets, and allied with the Soviet Union. Although Cuba was but a small island nation, the Cold War
magnified its perceived importance.¶ Washington reduced Cuban sugar import quotas in July 1960. Subsequently U.S. exports
were limited, diplomatic ties were severed, travel was restricted, Cuban imports were banned, Havana’s American assets were
frozen, and almost all travel to Cuba was banned. Washington also pressed its allies to impose sanctions.¶ These various
measures had no evident effect, other than to intensify Cuba’s reliance on the Soviet Union. Yet the collapse of the latter nation
had no impact on U.S. policy. In 1992, Congress banned American subsidiaries from doing business in Cuba and in 1996, it
penalized foreign firms that trafficked in expropriated U.S. property. Executives from such companies even were banned from
traveling to America.¶ On occasion Washington relaxed one aspect or another of the embargo, but in
general continued to tighten restrictions, even over Cuban Americans. Enforcement is not easy, but Uncle Sam
tries his best. For instance, according to the Government Accountability Office, Customs and Border Protection increased its
secondary inspection of passengers arriving from Cuba to reflect an increased risk of embargo violations after the 2004 rule
changes, which, among other things, eliminated the allowance for travelers to import a small amount of Cuban products for
personal consumption.¶ “Lifting sanctions would be a victory not for Fidel Castro, but for the power of free
people to spread liberty.Ӧ Three years ago, President Barack Obama loosened regulations on Cuban
Americans, as well as telecommunications between the United States and Cuba. However, the law
sharply constrains the president’s discretion. Moreover, UN Ambassador Susan Rice said that the embargo will
continue until Cuba is free.
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***Latin America Advantage***
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Relations Uniqueness
Our relations are bad now but Obama can fix them
LAP 2011 (Latin American Perspectives Editorial Board, peer-reviewed academic journal about Latin America, May 11, 2011,
“Dangerous Complacencies : Obama, Latin America, and the Misconceptions of Power,” Sagepub)
Obama’s campaign rhetoric blended an intention to reassert U.S. power in areas where it had lost
influence with a more positive commitment to respect- ful multilateralism in which the nonmilitary
dimensions of foreign policy would underlie U.S. leadership. However, under the directives of Clinton-era advisers,
Obama has chosen, as many have noted in puzzlement and regret, to sustain—and in fact strengthen—the security
strategies and policies of the Bush administration. In practice, the recourse to militarism in Latin
American policy echoes the Obama administration’s belief in the efficacy of military power in
Afghanistan and reveals the limitations of its foreign policy vision.6 According to Secretary of State Clinton’s
(2010) description of the Obama administration’s national security strategy, Washington, although willing to accept a limited
role for emerging powers, continues to “see a world in which great power is exercised by primarily one nation,” the United
States.¶ Though the United States may be able to hold sway over smaller countries and achieve shortterm objectives, in the long run it will earn the enmity of most Latin Americans. More important, it will
have squandered an opportunity for constructive and mutually beneficial engagement with the new
political forces emerging in the region. This bellicose attitude will reinforce the view that the United
States still aspires to be an imperial power and will undoubtedly acceler- ate growing efforts at
regional integration, the formation of alternative organiza- tions that do not include the United
States, and expanding relations with China.¶ Disappointment with the Obama administration was a major factor in
the Latin American decision to create a new regional organization that excludes the United States and Canada. On February 22,
2010, hosted by Mexico in Cancún, 33 nations met to launch the Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (Latin
American and Caribbean Community of States—CLACS). Only Honduras was not invited, a clear rejection of U.S. support for the
Lobo government. The new community is an echo of Simón Bolívar’s attempt to forge a Latin American confederation of
nations. Obama still has the opportu- nity to heed this and other manifestations of Latin American
dissatisfaction with his policies and chart a new course. However, just as in domestic policy, he is faced
with competing demands from his base and from dominant interests. So far he has been unable or
unwilling to seriously challenge elite priorities despite their negative consequences for the overwhelming
majorities in the United States and Latin America.
Now is the key time for Latin American relations
Shifter 2012 (Michael Shifter, President of Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, “Remaking the Relationship: The United
States and Latin America,” IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Relations between the United States and Latin America are at a curious juncture . In the past decade,
most Latin American countries have made enormous progress in managing their economies and reducing
inequality¶ and, especially, poverty, within a democratic framework . These critical changes have brought greater autonomy,
expanded global links, and grow- ing self-confidence . It is now the United States that is in a sour mood,
struggling with a still weak economic recovery, diminished international stature and influence, and
fractured politics at home .¶ These recent changes have profoundly affected Inter-American relations . While
relations are today cordial and largely free of the antagonisms of the past, they also seem without
vigor and purpose . Effective cooperation in the Americas, whether to deal with urgent problems or to take advantage of
new opportunities, has been disappointing .¶ The Inter-American Dialogue’s report is a call to all nations of the hemi- sphere to
take stock, to rebuild cooperation, and to reshape relations in a new direction . All governments in the hemisphere should be
more attentive to emerging opportunities for fruitful collaboration on global and regional issues ranging across economic
integration, energy security, protection of democracy, and climate change . The United States must regain its cred- ibility in the
region by dealing seriously with an unfinished agenda of problems—including immigration, drugs, and Cuba—that stands in the
way of a real partnership . To do so, it needs the help of Latin America and the Caribbean .¶ If the current state of affairs
continues, the strain between the United States and Latin America could worsen, adversely affecting
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the interests and well- being of all in the hemisphere . There is a great deal at stake . This report offers a
realistic assessment of the relationship within a changing regional and global context and sets out an agenda of old and new
business that need urgent attention . A collaborative effort should begin immediately at the sixth Summit of the Americas in
Cartagena, Colombia .
Now is the key to normalize relations
Ashby 2013 (Dr. Timothy Ashby, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, March 29, 2013,
“Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States – The Importance of Trading with State-Owned
Enterprises,” COHA, http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/#sthash.U0nrDoiq.dpuf
Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation.
Reforms instituted within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector
entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate,
automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been
leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and
freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was time for the “gradual transfer” of “key roles to new
generations,” President Raúl Castro announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was
not even born at the time of the Cuban Revolution. [1]¶ The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and
opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet
external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process. The death of Venezuelan President
Hugo Chávez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil
imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos, especially among the island’s disaffected
youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and regional
security. To maintain Cuba’s social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States
must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and
state-owned.
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Relations Uniqueness--- Now Key
Aff solves, now key
Barnes 2013 (Michael D. Barnes, represented Maryland in the House of Representatives as a Democrat from 1979 to
1987, serving as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, senior fellow at the Center for
International Policy in Washington, March 4, 2013, “Time is ripe for a new approach to Cuba,” Baltimore Sun,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-03-04/news/bs-ed-cuba-20130304_1_cuba-question-current-cuba-policy-foreign-policy)
There is one international issue, however, on which genuine progress is not only possible but is likely
— if the secretary of state and President Barack Obama are prepared to make this issue a foreign
policy priority.¶ Only 90 miles from America's shores is the small nation of Cuba, which today poses no military or economic
threat to the United States but is a continuing reminder of more than 50 years of failure by Democratic and Republican
administrations to achieve our stated objective of fostering democratic change.¶ Our current Cuba policy is an irritant
in our relations with many friends in this hemisphere who believe the policy of attempted isolation of
Cuba has been counterproductive. Our State Department has essentially been informed that there will never be
another summit of hemispheric leaders if Cuba is not included.¶ Secretary Kerry will remember the central role he
played in the normalization of relations with Vietnam by President Bill Clinton in the 1990s, and how normalizing
relations with a communist erstwhile foe can be a win-win. Most will agree that the politics of Vietnam were
even more complex, particularly with the emotionally lingering POW and MIA issue, than U.S.-Cuba politics.¶ I am advocating a
series of engagements with Cuba on issues of mutual concern. Both countries are concerned about drug trafficking,
environmental issues (including hurricane tracking), migration, and development of potentially lucrative oil and gas reserves in
the Florida Straits.¶ Recently, I heard Cuba's senior representative in Washington, Ambassador Jose Cabanas, speak with
considerable logic about how his country could cooperate with the United States on energy production, which is now being
joint-ventured by Cuba with companies from many other countries, while our energy companies are prohibited from
participating. He noted that an oil spill, for example, off the coast of Cuba would affect not only Cuba but almost immediately
South Florida as well.¶ The United States has had informal contacts with Cubans on these and other mutual concerns. I am
proposing that the Obama administration, with the secretary of state taking the lead, move quickly to formalize arrangements
that will serve the unquestioned interests of both countries. Cuban officials have indicated they are willing to do so, and we
should test this assertion without preconditions. Although I do not propose seeking immediate normalization of relations with
Cuba, that could well be the ultimate result of the phased steps I am advocating.¶ The political landscape on the Cuba
question is shifting. About half of the Cuban-American vote in Florida in 2012 went for President
Obama. An encouraging report emerged in recent days that the State Department is considering removing Cuba from its list
of state sponsors of terrorism.¶ Many of the issues our nation must confront seem almost beyond solution.
In our own front yard is one issue — opening the door to better relations with Cuba — that could
achieve the same kind of success that President Clinton and then-Senator Kerry achieved in Vietnam
less than two decades ago.
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Relations Uniqueness--- A2 Obama Appeal
Despite rhetoric hemispheric relations are bad
LAP 2011 (Latin American Perspectives Editorial Board, peer-reviewed academic journal about Latin America, May 11, 2011,
“Dangerous Complacencies : Obama, Latin America, and the Misconceptions of Power,” Sagepub)
Meeting with the presidents of Latin America at the Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad in April 2009,
Barack Obama pledged to recast relations with the region. After years of hostile dealings with George W. Bush,
Latin Americans eagerly looked forward to a new era of relations with the United States and
welcomed Obama’s declaration that “every one of our nations has a right to follow its own path” and
his pledge to engage the rest of the hemi- sphere on the basis of “mutual respect and equality.” At the
halfway point in his first term, however, there is little to distinguish Obama from his predeces- sor George W.
Bush (recognized even in mainstream analysis such as Tim Padgett’s cogent appraisal in Time [2009]).1 The promise of
Obama’s rhetoric in Trinidad failed to materialize in concrete policies and, in retrospect, may have been a way to
deflect attention from the fact that his administration had no plans for fundamentally altering U.S. policy toward Latin America.
Even as he was announcing “a new era” in Trinidad, U.S. trade representatives were busy meeting with the president of
Colombia to revive prospects for the Bush- initiated free-trade agreement with that nation. Candidate Obama had criti- cized
Bush efforts to sign a free-trade agreement with a country where trade unionists are persecuted, human rights are trampled,
and the army kills peas- ants (called falsos positivos) and passes them off as guerrillas to claim a reward.
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Removing Embargo Solves Relations
Aff has transformative effect on relations
Bandow 2012 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president
Ronald Reagan, December 11, 2012, “Time to End the Cuba Embargo,” CATO Institute,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo)
Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the Obama administration because it offers a unique
opportunity for the president to transform our relations with the hemisphere. Even a slight shift away
from hostility to engagement will permit the United States to work more closely with the region to
effectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba. By announcing a policy of critical and constructive engagement
at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the president can prove that he has been listening to the region.
He can under- line this commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans, and engaging
in dialogue with the regime, as prom- ised during his campaign. By reciprocally improving our diplomatic relations
with Cuba, we will enhance our understanding of the island, its people, and its leaders. However, while
these measures will promote understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relationship between our countries, they are insufficient to ensure the changes needed to result in normal dip- lomatic relations over
time.¶ if the president is to advance U.S. interests and principles, he will need a new policy and a long- term strategic vision for
U.S. relations with Cuba. If he is prepared to discard the failed policy of regime change and adopt one of
critical and con- structive engagement, he and his administration will lay the foundations for a new
approach to- ward Cuba and the Latin America. like his pre- decessors, president Obama has the authority to
substantially modify embargo regulations in¶ order to advance a policy of engagement that would broaden and deepen
contacts with the Cuban people and their government. He has the popular support—domestic and international—to engage
Cuba, and, by so doing, to staunch our diminishing influence on the island and recapture the high road in
our relations with the hemisphere.
Lifting the embargo solves relations
Curtain 2008 (Joseph W. Curtain, MA Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008, “ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REASONS WHY
THE U.S. SHOULD NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH CUBA,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA483591)
How can the U.S. minimize the triangular threat posed by Iran, Venezuela and Cuba? How can this cycle of
dependency, control and power be broken? Probably one of the easiest solutions is normalizing relations with
Cuba. The U.S. could be processing nickel or drilling for oil in Cuba. The U.S. could easily surpass the E.U. and China
and lead all other countries in aggregate trade with Cuba. With U.S. capital flowing through the Cuban
economy, it could in time replace Cuba’s dependency on Venezuela and thereby effectively negate
Chavez’s influence. Given normalized relations with Cuba, if Chavez were able to create a Venezuelan-Cuban
confederation, it would be in name only because the U.S. could replace Venezuela as its benefactor. And by normalizing
relations with Cuba, the triangular threat would be minimized to isolated and separate threats from
Iran and Venezuela.
Aff key to Latin America relations
Shifter 2012 (Michael Shifter, President of Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, “Remaking the Relationship: The United
States and Latin America,” IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America . The
50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and
punitive instrument . It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations . Although the United States
has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do
far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba . Cuba is one
of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement .¶ At the same
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time, Cuba’s authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas . At present, it is the only
country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press . Latin American and Caribbean nations
could be instrumental in supporting Cuba’s eventual transition to democratic rule . An end to the US policy of isolating
Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights viola- tions, would be an important first step .
Aff key to integrating the western hemisphere
LAP 2011 (Latin American Perspectives Editorial Board, peer-reviewed academic journal about Latin America, May 11, 2011,
“Dangerous Complacencies : Obama, Latin America, and the Misconceptions of Power,” Sagepub)
The United States needs to conceptualize a new, win-win relationship with Latin America. In the early
history of Latin America the winners were European colonialists and then later North American
corporations and their local dominant- class allies. The North sought to protect unequal exchange with a powerful
military and a secret CIA intervention apparatus. The masses of Latin America paid the price in poverty and human rights
abuses. Today, however, Latin Americans are claiming a more equal situation. A civilized U.S. Latin American policy cannot be
achieved with minor changes in regional policy patterned on the bigotry and conceit of the past or be forged in isolation in
offices in Washington. The military interventions, coups, and destabilization programs, whether implemented by the CIA or the
National Endowment for Democracy, to overthrow nationalist regimes must be abandoned. The extensive CIA appa- ratus
inside Latin American countries must be dismantled. along with repres- sive indoctrination programs that function within the
United States.¶ Mutuality in decision making and experience sharing are needed. Inter- national policy
should become a hemispheric endeavor. It should not continue to be mostly a U.S. thrust in the face
of a weak Latin America. Collective policy making may require new institutions and a new will to succeed. For exam- ple,
a mechanism could be established to produce a Social Charter of the Americas that formalizes a commitment to human rights
and core labor standards. Such collective policy making also requires a more formalized system for deliberating on public policy,
one that includes substantial mech- anisms, such as those promoted by the World Social Forum, for bringing together
grassroots movements and sharing local government initiatives in a regularized way. The Western Hemisphere could
strive for the European Union model of the movement of labor across national borders along with
goods, services, and capital.
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Removing Embargo Solves Relations--- A2 Regional Influences
Lifting embargo key to offset Venezuelan influence
Curtain 2008 (Joseph W. Curtain, MA Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008, “ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REASONS WHY
THE U.S. SHOULD NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH CUBA,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA483591)
What does the embargo have to do with it? The short answer—everything. Cuban dependence on Venezuela and
Venezuela’s subsequent leverage over Cuba are aided and abetted by the U.S.–Cuban embargo. Due to
the embargo’s trade restrictions, Venezuela has in effect replaced the role the U.S. would have played in a
post Soviet Union globalized Cuban economy. Certainly Chavez is best known for his incessant and irreverent antiimperialist rhetoric which makes him, at times, hard to take seriously. However a close look at his actions reveals what seems to
be a deliberate plan to pose a significant threat to the U.S. A quick run down of the facts are as follows: Chavez has recently
spent $5 billion to create the strongest military in Latin America, Venezuela is one of Cuba’s top creditors, Cuba’s
debt to Venezuela is $2.5 billion and rising, and the Cuban military is helping complete Chavez’s
transformation of the Venezuelan military. Add the facts to the Cuba-and-Venezuela-are-one-nation
rhetoric, the Venezuela needs a robust military to defend itself from the U.S. rhetoric, the Venezuela
should be able to pursue “peaceful” nuclear weapons rhetoric and the narrow defeat of the
constitutional reforms that would have made Chavez possibly an indefinite president of a Cuba and
Venezuela confederation and the implications to U.S. security should be quite obvious.
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Latin America Relations--- China Competition
We’re in competition with China for power in Latin America
Perez 2010 (David A. Perex, J.D. Yale Law Schoo, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department,” Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, Lexis)
The absence of a strong American presence over the last eight years has also given China the
opportunity to step in as a major player, both economically and politically, in regions all around the
world, but particularly in Latin America. The Chinese government has invested a tremendous amount
of soft power in Latin America, where it is now the continent's third largest trading partner, with an annual trade growth
of 30% since 2001. 115 American disinterest in Latin America has convinced many countries to adopt a
"Pacific view," whereby China steps in to fill the gap left by America's absence. 116¶ After signing a free trade agreement
with Chile, China quickly displaced the United States as that country's largest export market. China also [*224] recently
displaced the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading partner. 117 In 2000, trade between China and Latin America hovered around $ 13
billion, but in 2007, that number had increased to $ 102 billion, and by 2008 total trade was valued at $ 140 billion. 118 Even
despite the current financial crisis, trade between China and Latin America is likely to grow during the next five years. ¶ China's
interest in Latin America is also based on its increasingly assertive global political agenda. In 2007, Costa
Rica dropped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, a move heavily courted by Chinese officials. In 2008, President Hu rewarded
Costa Rica's new policy by visiting San Jose and signing a free trade agreement in 2010. 119¶ China also timed the release of a
new policy paper on Sino-Latin American relations to coincide with President Hu's most recent trip to the region. It charts
China's growing relationship with Latin America and promises increased cooperation in scientific and technological research,
cross-cultural educational exchanges, as well as political and economic exchanges. 120 As China's role in Latin America
increases, American clout correspondingly decreases in terms of relative power. To be sure, the U.S. will
remain the major powerbroker in the Americas for decades to come, but will increasingly have to make room for a
new player. Given this diminishing economic position, Washington will have to rely more heavily on
diplomatic initiatives that shore up credibility rather than simply economic incentives and
disincentives, such as bilateral trade agreements.
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A2 Appeasement Turn--- General
Aff doesn’t make Cuba a geopolitical threat
Johnson 2010 (Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, National Security Program
Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, September 16, 2010, Third Way Institute,
http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf)
Peter Brookes, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense under George W. Bush, said that lifting the embargo
could lead to Cuba becoming a regional power, arguing that the US “[doesn’t] need a pumped-up
Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean—or beyond.”14
While Venezuela, for example, has challenged the US on some interests, its anti-American leadership
has not been able to present a serious counterweight to the US or have a significant impact on US security.
Given that Venezuela is a much bigger economic player than Cuba due to its oil revenues, it is highly
unlikely that Cuba would pose a significant geopolitical challenge to the US, even if significant sums of
money enter Cuba’s economy.
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A2 Appeasement Turn--- Economics
A2 it rewards Castro
Johnson 2010 (Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, National Security Program
Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, September 16, 2010, Third Way Institute,
http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf)
Former Senator Mel Martinez has argued against lifting the embargo, claiming that the US needs “to
support pro-democracy activists in Cuba, not provide the Castro regime with a resource windfall.”15
Florida Rep. Tom Rooney has argued that lifting the embargo would serve to reward Cuba’s leadership for its decades-long
record of human rights abuses and allow the abuse to continue due to the absence of pressure from the US.16 The US has
used the embargo as an effort to pressure the communist leadership for nearly fifty years, yet the
status quo remains unchanged. If a possible downside of lifting the embargo is that the situation will not change, then
the US has nothing to lose by making an effort to normalize relations with Cuba. By refusing to engage Cuba and
make efforts to move Cuba forward, the US is in a weak position to criticize the Cuban leadership.
Lifting the embargo and normalizing relations would put the US in a stronger position to bring about
change through economic advancements that could in turn result in domestic demands within Cuba
for greater social and political freedoms.
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Latin America Impact--- Global Instability
Latin American instability goes global
Manwaring 2003 (Max G. Manwaring, Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, retired U.S. Army
colonel and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College, March 2003, “STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT
WITH IRAQ: LATIN AMERICA,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub289.pdf)
When what mattered most in U.S. national security policy toward the hemisphere were military
bases, preserving access to sea lines of communication, choke points, and raw materials and hydrocarbons—and militarily
denying those assets to the Soviet Union and its surrogates—the United States could ignore internal conditions in
Latin America. But, since the United States is now interested in the need for nonhostile dispositions toward the
country, the capacity of neighbors to buy American-made products, a commitment to international economic cooperation, the
continued development of democratic and free market institutions and human rights—the United States must concern
itself with the internal conditions that spawn subnational, national, regional, and global insecurity and
instability.16¶ This dilemma is critical. Continued neglect and indifference to Latin America’s stability
problems will profoundly affect the health of the U.S. economy—and the concomitant power to act in
the international security arena. At the same time, increasing instability in the hemisphere will likely
increase direct security threats from terrorists to U.S. interests in the region and to the United States.
Much is at risk.17
Major threat to the US--- failed states
Hammons 2008 (Stewart A. Hammons, masters from Joint Advanced Warfighting School, April 4, 2008, “Latin American
Instability: A Major Threat To The US,”
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA487122)
Political, economic, and social instability is seen throughout Latin America. The case examples provided were chosen to
highlight how delicate and intertwined the problems of instability can be. Every country in Latin America has significant levels of
instability, not just the three chosen as case examples. Instability is indicative of weak states and can turn into
failed states with minimal additional external influences from non-sates and sub-state actors. The
worst-case scenario for the US is the development of numerous failed states within Latin America. The
threat from narco-terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists may be the most critical from a safety and
security perspective but is just the tip of the iceberg. The linked nature between the various countries
within Latin America as well as the effects on the US are critical to economic prosperity, security,
social equality, and rule of law.
Biggest threat to the US
Hammons 2008 (Stewart A. Hammons, masters from Joint Advanced Warfighting School, April 4, 2008, “Latin American
Instability: A Major Threat To The US,”
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA487122)
The US has always approached Latin America on an “as needed” basis. Unfortunately the conditions and stakes have changed
especially since 9/11. Latin America, because of its proximity to the US along with its instability, is the
largest current threat to the US. It all comes down to a simple concept: Pay for the security now at a relatively small
cost to the US or pay for it later at a much higher cost in terms of American lives and security.
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Econ Collapse Causes War
Global economic crisis causes war and great power transitions--- best studies
Royal 2010 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010,
“Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic,
Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict . Political
science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and
defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels.
Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work
on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of
pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such,
exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also
Gilpin, 10981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon,
1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive
environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999).
Seperately, Polllins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the
likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between
global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996,2000) theory
of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions
and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from
trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectation of
future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict
increases , as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could
potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist
moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict
at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and
external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal
and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict,
which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89). Economic decline
has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the
capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting
government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic
decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to create a ‘rally round the flag’ effect. Wang
(1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and
use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997) Miller (1999) and Kisanganie and Pickering (2009) suggest that the
tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic
leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has
provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak
presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.
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Proliferation Causes War
Prolif won’t be peaceful
Elhefnawy 2008 (Nader Elhefnawy, PhD, Army War College, August 2008, “The Next Wave of Nuclear Proliferation,”
Parameters, online)
It is inconceivable that anything like this distribution will continue in a world turning heavily to nuclear energy, a fact that has
already laid the foun- dation for a broadening of production and use in East and South Asia.8 We should also expect a
large-scale, rapid establishment of nuclear energy produc- tion in areas where it has been virtually
absent, for example, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. To approximate France’s
current level of nuclear energy reliance, for instance, Iran alone would require roughly 18 operational reactors; Saudi Arabia,
20. More extensive substitution of nuclear energy for other sources of power, or future economic expansion (such as described above), will require a commensurate growth in the number of reactors.9¶ All of this may sound abstract, but moves in
this direction are al- ready well under way. Some 40 developing nations have expressed interest in starting nuclear energy
programs, and many have moved beyond vague state- ments of intentions.10 The United Arab Emirates, for instance, has
already struck a deal for two reactors, the only one of 11 nations in this region (thus far) to have announced such plans.11¶
Assessing the Danger¶ As outlined above, a future in which the world as a whole turned to nuclear energy will
mean not just an expansion of nuclear energy production, but substantial changes in production impacting
mainland Asia, Africa, and Latin America. An assessment of the associated proliferation risk involved devolves
basically into an examination of two dimensions, capabilities and intentions—what widened nuclear energy use will mean for
the access of these states to nuclear weapons technology; and the impact that this new envi ronment will have on a
government’s motivation to actually use that access to produce nuclear weaponry.¶ Technological Access¶ The increase in
nuclear energy production described above will mean greater production, trading, and consumption of the fissile materials and
other technologies that are part of the nuclear fuel cycle. The specifics differ according to reactor type, but every reactor uses
uranium in the produc- tion of its fuel and produces plutonium in its waste, extractable in the fuel re- processing procedure,
and in such a manner that every type of reactor poses a measure of proliferation risk.12 Gas-cooled and heavy-water
reactors use natural uranium as fuel, but are ideal for producing weapons-grade plutonium. “Fastneutron” reactors use fissile material (such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium) at the very start of their fuel cycle, and
Fast Breeder Reactors in particular produce more fissile material than they consume.¶ Even Light Water Reactors (LWRs), which
have been described as “proliferation-resistant” (two of which were provided to North Korea under the Agreed Framework),
are no exception.13 They use low-enriched uranium, which is not useful for making weapons, but which is produced in the
same en- richment process used to manufacture weapons. Additionally, low-enriched uranium can be seen as halfway to
weapons grade, since it can be more rapidly enriched to the needed level than stock natural uranium. At the same time, while
these reactors produce relatively smaller quantities of lower quality plu- tonium than other types, it has been estimated that a
1,000-megawatt LWR can still generate enough “weapons-usable” plutonium for up to 50 bombs a year.14¶ The response on
the part of those seeking to limit proliferation has, accordingly, been to encourage as many nuclear energy users as possible not
to develop the entire fuel cycle; that is, to forgo building up their own fuel en- richment and reprocessing capabilities. Instead,
it is proposed that they buy fuel and reprocessing services on the world market, as proposed in the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership of February 2006. There are, however, widespread doubts about the initiative’s likely cost and effectiveness,
concerns articulated in a letter signed by a number of control organizations, including the Federation of American Scientists, the
Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Arms Control Association.15 Their objections, however, fail to include one important
point—that states have been partly dissuaded from developing the full nuclear fuel cycle for eco- nomic reasons, a fact that
may not remain operative in any massive expansion of nuclear energy use.¶ Simply put, it is cheaper for a small nuclear program
to buy nuclear fuel on the world market than to build and operate the facilities required to en- rich uranium domestically. This
has resulted in only eight of some 30 nuclear energy producers actually engaging in enrichment on an industrial scale.16 The
same is true for fuel reprocessing facilities, especially given the relatively low cost of newly mined uranium. Accordingly, only a
handful of states (Britain, France, Russia, Japan, and India) actually practice civil reprocessing.17¶ Any significant growth in
nuclear energy production would change those economics. Many of today’s “small” programs would become
equal in size to those now considered large-scale, and for that reason their investments in enrichment
and reprocessing less impractical. Additionally, with more programs large and small operational, there would be a
larger, more lucrative market for fuel production and fuel recycling services; the latter would in all
likelihood grow more attractive as enlarged uranium consumption tightens supplies and drives up
prices. (Indeed, as the situation currently stands, many uranium exporters not regarded as likely proliferators—including
Australia and Canada—are interested in enrichment technology because enriching their uranium before export would increase
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profitability.)18 Certainly if ura- nium prices were to rise, there would be more interest in Fast Breeder Reac- tors, which one
analyst suggests can extract more than 60 times as much energy per ton of mined ore as a “conventional” nuclear plant when
operated in a closed circuit with thermal reactors and reprocessing facilities.19¶ In short, the economic incentives for
states to refrain from developing the full nuclear fuel cycle will almost certainly weaken, while the
particularly worrisome fast-neutron reactors will become more attractive. At the same time, the heightened
dependence on nuclear energy, and the experience of en- ergy scarcity, will continue to reinforce the search for “energy
independence” and “energy security,” contributing to the pressure that the nonproliferation re- gime is already experiencing,
as the result of being a “ratifier” of unequal ac- cess to nuclear technology.20 In any event, such changes enormously increase
the already substantial burden of monitoring and securing the storage and movement of the supplies associated with nuclear
power generation, not to mention the political costs of maintaining the regime.21 Motivation ¶ As outlined previously, any
plausible combination of political ar- rangements and technological innovations is likely to have uneven results. Determined
states are likely to find it easier to acquire the means for produc- ing fissile material, which raises the
other key dimension of the issue—the motivation for acquiring these weapons in the first place.¶
Long-established research strongly indicates that the motivation to build nuclear weapons is more of
a factor than simply achieving the technological capacity.22 Indeed, it is due to this excessive focus on capacity
that ear- lier predictions about the speed and the extent of nuclear proliferation (which projected 25 to 50 nuclear-weapon
states by the year 2000) proved wrong.23 The relative ease with which the weapons might be built is proof of this; a pro- gram
to develop a minimal capability from scratch could cost as little as $500 million, less than the price of a modern warship.24¶ In
short, were capacity the only issue, there would be far more nu- clear powers in the world, though of course access to the
means cannot be ruled out as a factor in decisionmaking. When much of the infrastructure for developing a nuclear arsenal is
already in place, as may be the case in several advanced countries, the decision to do so entails lower costs; and given the
speed with which these programs can be initiated, the nations in question are also less susceptible to preventative action than
countries starting from scratch.25 A particular danger is that having such facilities in place provides them with the option of
diverting material from the fuel cycle for covert weapon programs.26¶ The rationale driving the shift to nuclear
energy in the first place (en- ergy and climate stress) will increasingly translate into greater motivation on
the part of some actors to pursue a nuclear capability. Broad economic disrup- tion is nearly certain as
the result of the tightening of oil supplies and the cli- mate changes this scenario anticipates. Politically,
this may translate into changes in the distribution of international power depending on individual
states’ ability to cope (as with wealthier nations, or ones with energy-efficient economies), or even profit from
these conditions (for instance, oil exporters); while the most vulnerable states may collapse, creating even
greater prob- lems for the international community (havens for crime, terrorism, or refugee flows).27
Intensified conflict over territory and waters rich in energy and other resources will become
increasingly likely.¶ Alliances, trading relationships, and other arrangements will be in flux, and when
combined with the associated anxiety and vulnerability may exacer- bate a desire on the part of certain states to
minimize their vulnerability. A goal which nuclear weapons have long been viewed as a cheap way of achieving. The
“nuclearization” of a single state can induce a chain reaction across a region. The nuclearization of China
spurred India and in turn Pakistan to follow suit, and the Argentinean and Brazilian nuclear programs fed off one another.
Today the pos- sibility that a nuclear North Korea may lead South Korea or Japan to acquire nu- clear weapons is often
discussed.28 In the Middle East there are signs that Saudi Arabia is reviewing its nuclear options, and a nuclear-armed Iran may
encourage the Saudis and others in the region to continue down this path.29¶ With nuclear technology more widely
available these actions can be taken much more rapidly and at less cost. Those pursuing this course of
action will find it a simple matter to amass large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It is also worth noting that
even were the development of actual nuclear weapons to remain a rarity, “virtual arsenals” could be more common,
leaving the nu- clear weapons status of a longer list of countries uncertain, in many cases deliberately
so, with a detrimental impact on the security environment.30
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***Soft Power Advantage***
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Soft Power Uniqueness--- General
Soft power is low and ineffective now
Glassman 2013 (James K. Glassman, May 6, 2013, “President Obama surprisingly ineffective at using soft power,” The
Hill, http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/298077-president-obama-surprisingly-ineffective-at-using-soft-power-)
So how’s it working for you? In my view, not particularly well. Look at the last 100 days. The revolt against the
Syrian regime has become one of the most brutal repressions in decades. The situation has grown worse,
with the almost certain use of chemical weapons crossing what the president drew as a “red line.” North Korea, developing
nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them over long distances, has denigrated America and threatened to
attack us. And, speaking of nukes — and the goal of nuclear nonproliferation — Iran remains undeterred as well, with
its own “red line” in doubt. Meanwhile, the United States suffered its first terrorist bombing since 9/11 , with
three killed and more than 200 wounded — an event that occurred eight months after the attack on our consulate in Benghazi,
Libya, where a U.S. ambassador was killed for the first time in 33 years.¶ The problem of America being “reviled in
many parts of the world” is vastly overblown, but it has surely not been remedied. Europeans and the
Japanese like us more, but they were pretty fond of us to start with. Muslims, according to the Pew Research
Center, like us less. In Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, the average favorability rating for the United States in 2012
was 21 percent; in 2008, it was 26 percent.¶ Foreign policy is not easy. The challenges are unpredictable, which
is why the best policy rests on a solid foundation of principle and a clear strategy. The George W. Bush
administration’s national security strategy was simple: keep America safe and promote freedom. These
goals are linked; free nations rarely threaten the United States or their own neighbors. Achieving both these goals
requires leadership — a consistency that reassures our allies and deters our enemies.
US soft power is waning--- new initiatives are necessary
Lagon 2010 (Mark P. Lagon, Sep/Oct 2010, “The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama,” World Affairs Journal,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-soft-power-under-obama)
One irony of the Obama presidency is how much it relies on hard power. The president came into
office proposing a dramatic shift from George W. Bush’s perceived unilateralism, and most of his
predecessor’s hard-edged counterterrorism tactics and massive deployments in wars abroad. Yet after three years, Obama has
escalated forces in Afghanistan, embraced the widespread use of unmanned drones to kill terrorists at the risk of civilian
casualties, kept Guantánamo open, and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in a thoroughly unilateral fashion. ¶ What he
hasn’t accomplished to any great degree is what most observers assumed would be the hallmark of
his approach to foreign affairs—a full assertion of the soft power that makes hard power more
effective. His 2008 campaign centered on a critique of President Bush’s overreliance on hard power. Obama suggested he
would rehabilitate the damaged image of America created by these excesses and show that the United States was not a cowboy
nation. Upon taking office, he made fresh-start statements, such as his June 2009 remarks in Cairo, and embraced political
means like dialogue, respectful multilateralism, and the use of new media, suggesting that he felt the soft power to change
minds, build legitimacy, and advance interests was the key element missing from the recent US approach to the world—and
that he would quickly remedy that defect.¶ Yet President Obama’s conception of soft power has curiously
lacked the very quality that has made it most efficacious in the past—the values dimension . This may
seem odd for a leader who is seen worldwide as an icon of morality, known for the motto “the audacity of hope” and his
deployment of soaring rhetoric. Yet his governance has virtually ignored the values dimension of soft power,
which goes beyond the tradecraft of diplomacy and multilateral consultation to aggressively assert
the ideals of freedom in practical initiatives. The excision of this values dimension renders soft power
a hollow concept.
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Soft Power Uniqueness--- Cuba Key
Our Cuba policy costs us soft power
Iglesias 2012 (Commander Carlos Iglesias, October 3, 2012, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel
Cuba,” US Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408)
Finally, U.S. international legitimacy and influence have a great deal to gain from a more inclusive and
less unilateral approach. U.S. retort to U.N. anti-embargo resolutions that bilateral relations are
exempt from General Assembly scrutiny have had longstanding blowback. This rhetoric has historically
undercut American’s legitimacy and wasted political capital on this central world stage. Outside of New York City and across
the globe, decades-long sanctions against the island have netted few if any national objectives, all the
while depleting substantial national soft power. The cost- benefit analysis to U.S. national foreign policy will remain
exceedingly unfavorable, if not outright counter-productive.
Embargo is universally unpopular
Koenig 2010 (Colonel Lance Koenig, November 3, 2010, “TIME FOR A NEW CUBA POLICY,”
US Army War College,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518130.pdf)
Internationally, the world is nearly unanimous in its opposition to the United States policy towards Cuba.
In fact, on 28 October 2009, the United Nations General Assembly voted on a non-binding resolution to lift
the embargo with 187 votes in favor of the resolution, three votes against (the United States, Israel, and Palau)
and two abstentions (Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands). 29 The nearly universal unpopularity
of this policy takes away from the soft power of the United States and is an obstacle to the bilateral
relations between the United States and numerous other nations.¶ The United States requires a policy
that will lead to better relations between the United States and Cuba, increase the soft power of the United States
in the Latin American world, and pull the Cuban government towards a more representative form of
governance. These conditions will contribute to the national security of the United States as well as to the western
hemisphere. So with this in mind, what are our likely options?
Embargo is unsustainable--- Maintaining the status quo dooms our soft power
Koenig 2010 (Colonel Lance Koenig, November 3, 2010, “TIME FOR A NEW CUBA POLICY,” US Army War College,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518130.pdf)
Strengthen the current policy. Eliminate the billions of dollars per year in remittances from Cuban-Americans to relatives within
Cuba. Work multi- laterally with other countries to increase the effectiveness of the current embargoes on trade and travel.
Fully implement the “Powell Commission Report” recommendations to end the trading with Cuba and¶ 10¶ restrict the ability of
EU citizens to travel to Cuba. The EU nations provide a great opportunity to make up for lost trade with the United States and
have a large population of potential tourists for Cuban beaches. The United States must deter actions by the Organization of
American States to work closer with Cuba. The Organization of American States should also warn its members to limit the scope
of bilateral relations with Cuba in order to support the efforts of the United States. The United States must use Radio and TV
Marti to inform the Cuban people of the true cause of their economic difficulty, the dysfunctional communist centrally
controlled economy vice economic sanctions. And finally, tighten the noose around the economy and government of Cuba to
attempt to bring down the government in a shorter period of time. This option assumes that our current policy is
the correct policy, but needs to be strengthened. It eliminates half Castro dictatorship and undermine the succession
strategy.31 The Powell Commission Report seeks to reverse the recent economic gains to put added pressure on the
government of Cuba. 32 Additionally, pressure the European Union to stop ¶ measures and contradicting policies to produce a
more powerful embargo with devastating effect on the Cuban dictatorship. The risk is that the United States will
become further isolated from the world in regards to its Cuba policy and will create additional
sympathy for Cuba. This could result in open disregard for the embargo by the European Union and
other countries interested in trade with Cuba, with a collapse of the effectiveness of the embargo. The
soft power of the United States would suffer with possibly no gain. The United States could lose all
possible influence over the future direction of the Cuban government as the Castro regime is replaced.
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Aff boosts soft power
Koenig 2010 (Colonel Lance Koenig, November 3, 2010, “TIME FOR A NEW CUBA POLICY,”
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
US Army War College,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518130.pdf)
The United States will gain leverage with the Cuban government as relations improve, and that will be
the time to address human rights in Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and
convicted in Florida, should be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the “Cinco Heroes” and
their plight is well known.37¶ So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the Cuban government most of
what they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo Naval Base after the government of Cuba shifts towards
a representative form of government. The foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act. “The future of
the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically
elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base
to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.”38 The United States Congress
should soften the language referring to a democratically elected government and instead substitute
that a representative form of government is required before entering into negotiations for the
Guantanamo base.¶ Once Cuba makes changes towards a representative form of government the United States can start
working on democratic reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic form of government,
support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba makes changes towards democracy, the
United States should block the request of several member states to let Cuba into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton said it well in a recent interview. “Many member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba
to return immediately, without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the suspension —
which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century — with a process of dialogue and a future decision that will turn on
Cuba’s commitment to the organization’s values.” 39 These values include promoting democracy and defending human rights.
The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The Obama administration has taken
some steps in this direction with the lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba,
and the ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the new majority of CubanAmericans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in the United Nations and the European Union it is
clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive of this action. The combination of the above mentioned events now
points to an opportunity to make real progress that will benefit both nations. The United States would gain in soft
power, gain an additional economic trading partner, and have a chance to influence the type of
changes in the Cuban government as the Castro influence wanes. Clearly, support to the Cuban people will
indirectly provide support to the Cuban government, but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that
improvements in their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with the capitalist world.
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Aff Solves Soft Power
Aff increases credibility, soft power, etc.
Hinderdael 2011 (Klaas Hinderdael, M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy
and Energy, Resources, and Environment, June 11, 2011, “Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for
Improved Leadership,” by http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true)
Conclusion The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of
1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel
Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs,
and foreign policies.¶ In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the
opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of
engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact
domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or
North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States
will return in kind.¶ The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further
engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own,
often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs
stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s
political structure and human rights policies.¶ At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic
costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the
Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50 While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America
have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also
favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring
island.52¶ At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise
for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united
States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo,
combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years.¶ American policymakers
should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its
own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the
island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries
unclench their fists.
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Soft Power Key to Hegemony
Soft Power is key to sustaining U.S. hegemony – and it’s more important than all other
factors.
Fraser 2003 Matthew Fraser, 2003, PhD in political science from Institut d' Etudes Politiques de Paris, former Editor-inChief of National Post, Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire,” p.9-13, Google Books
The central thesis in the pages that follow may seem outlandish, controversial, and provocative. It will be argued here that, while
U.S.
military and economic power is indispensable to America's superpower status, soft power historically
has been a key strategic resource in U.S. foreign policy. During the First World War, one of America's most powerful
ambassadors was Charlie Chaplin. When the Second World War broke out two decades later, Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck conducted
Disneyland diplomacy to spread American values throughout the world. Today,
in the Information Age of the Internet, soft
power has become increasingly instrumental in the emerging world order dominated by an American
Empire. The notion of "empire" is admittedly contentious, even among American leaders. President George W. Bush declared: "America has
no empire to extend or utopia to establish." And yet, when President Bush demonstrated the awesome force of
American hard power against despicable regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, it suddenly became
fashionable to discuss, even if disapprovingly, America’s imperialist ambitions. When U.S. bombs
obliterated targeted sections of Baghdad, the United States was referred to as a "smart bomb
imperium." Despite claims that America is a reluctant hegemon, the new global reality of a Pax Americana is a fact that cannot easily be
contradicted. Today, no nation disputes America's status as the planet's sole superpower. Recognition of America as a
"hyperpower" is usually based on material facts—specifically, the superiority of American hard
power. Yet America's global domination has been achieved largely through non-military means—in
short, through the extension, assertion, and influence of its soft power. If hard power, by definition, is
based on facts, soft power is based on values. American hard power is necessary to maintain global
stability. American soft power—movies, pop music, television, fast food, fashions, theme parks—spreads, validates, and
reinforces common norms, values, beliefs, and lifestyles. Hard power threatens; soft power seduces.
Hard power dissuades; soft power persuades. Ironically, many Americans are only vaguely aware of the global impact of U.S.
soft power. Yet America's adversaries have never underestimated its effects . Mao Zedong once warned that American
pop cultural products were "candy-coated bullets." He was wrong on only one point: their impact is much more powerful. One can only imagine
how Mao would react today upon learning that one of his successors, Jiang Zemin, succumbed to the allures of American soft power. In1998,
the Chinese leader confessed he'd seen, and enjoyed, the Hollywood movie Titanic. Jiang Zemin even recommended the movie to members of
his communist Politburo. Reactions to American soft power are diverse and ambiguous. Soft power incites awe and envy, but also provokes
resentment and hostility. Anti-globalization protestors condemn the United States as a cultural juggernaut driven by the commercial values of
"Brand America." Hostile passions are easily inflamed against American cultural symbols, which are associated with a cosmopolitanism that
incites deep-seated anxieties. In France, Hollywood and McDonald’s are bitterly resented among elites—who denounce "Coca-colonization"—
despite profound historical affinities with America as an enlightened republic founded on the same universal values. Even in Canada, the most
American nation outside the United States itself, local patriotism is tinged with deep-seated anti-American sentiments. In the non-Western
world, American cultural icons and U.S. corporate brands—from MTV to McDonald's—are resented precisely because they are so seductive. If
American-style cultural globalization is considered subversive, it's because its powerful messages are so efficiently transmitted and readily
received. When Islamic ayatollahs invoked the Koran to ban MTV from their local television screens, their interdictions were symbolic
declarations of war against America. Some countries, like Saudi Arabia, benefit from the protection of American hard power, yet banish the
symbols of American soft power—despite a predilection among their elites for Cadillac’s and Gulfstream’s. In North Korea, communist dictator
Kim Jong-Il idolizes Michael Jordan and is a fan of Hollywood movies, and yet his regime provokes America with the threat of nuclear arms.
These intense
and contradictory reactions to American soft power pose a serious challenge to America's
overwhelming presence in the world. Traditionally, U.S. foreign policy has been torn between the cold calculations of
self-interested realism and the high-minded mission of moral idealism. As Franklin Roosevelt once declared: "Our chief purpose
to humanity rests on our combining power with high purpose." Today, in the early years of the 21st century, U.S. foreign policy
appears to be inspired by a more assertive unilateralism—or what has been called the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine was
born on September 11, 2001, when the entire planet watched in horrified disbelief as New York's gleaming World Trade Center
collapsed into a colossal heap of twisted metal onto lower Manhattan. Osama bin Laden's space-age barbarians perpetrated
their terrorist violence not against the United States, but against an entire system of values and beliefs. The Islamic terrorists
had no specific demands. Their cause professed greater ambitions: the destruction of Western civilization. And the West's
leader was the Great Satan: America. When the United States retaliated against the Taliban regime, which was harboring bin
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Laden's Al Qaeda operation, U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan immediately provoked violent counter reprisals throughout the
Islamic world. America's fanatical enemies, powerless to counter American hard power, targeted the usual symbols of American
soft power: McDonald's, Coca-Cola, Pizza Hut, KFC, and Burger King. No American pop cultural icon was safe from hysterical
acts of fundamentalist vandalism. The impact of these spontaneous outbursts was immediately felt around the world.
international tourism ground to a panic-stricken halt. Major airlines were driven close to bankruptcy. Stock markets
plummeted, wiping out billions in wealth. The Walt Disney Company, fearing more terrorist attacks, closed its Disneyland
theme parks. Mickey Mouse, it seemed, was hastily retreating to a Disney hunker to escape the wrath of Allah. It did not take
long, however, for the U.S. military to retaliate and reassert American power. When President Bush declared that America
would embark on a full-scale "crusade" to rid the world of evil, his word choice—denounced by critics—evoked medieval
Christian expeditions to recapture the Holy Land from the heathens. Ominous predictions about a looming "clash of
civilizations" seemed prescient. America's decimation of bin Laden's terrorist regime in Afghanistan was the first demonstration
of the Bush Doctrine’s broad reach. The overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein sent an even more powerful message to
the world that America was prepared, even unilaterally, to impose its will on the world. Yet once again, the assertion of U.S.
hard power met with fierce reactions against symbols of American soft power. The Golden Arches, in particular, became the
target of anti-American violence from Buenos Aires and Quito to Seoul and Manila. For America's adversaries, McDonald’s has
become a preferred substitute for U.S. embassies. Make no mistake, America's global domination is based mainly on the
superiority of U.S. hard power. But the influence, prestige, and legitimacy of the emerging American Empire
will depend on the effectiveness of its soft power. No empire-- Greek, Roman, French, Ottoman,
British—has been indifferent to the effects of its soft-power resources. The endurance of the
American Empire, too, will depend on the effectiveness of its soft power. This book provides a detailed analysis—
historical and contemporary" of the complex role played by soft power in the emergence of an American Empire. Divided into four main
sections: movies, television, pop music, and fast food—the pages that follow will trace the origins, history, and current role of soft-power
resources in U.S. foreign policy. By the end of this book, it will have been demonstrated that America's
soft-power arsenal
contains awesome weapons of mass distraction.
Only soft power allows us to harness inevitable globalization to increase hegemony.
Nye 2002 Joseph S. Nve, 2002, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy
School of Government, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, p. 110, Google
Books
On balance, Americans have benefited from globalization. To the extent that we wish to continue to do so, we will
need to deal with its discontents. This cannot be accomplished by resorting to slogans of sovereignty,
unilateral policies, or drawing inward, as the unilateralists and sovereigntists suggest: "If we can't do it our way, then we just
won't do it. But at least we the people, the American people, will remain masters of our ship." This prescription mistakes the
abstractions of sovereignty for the realities of power. 96 The result would be to undermine our soft power and
America’s ability to influence others' responses to globalization. Instead, the United States should use
its current preeminence to help shape institutions that will benefit both Americans and the rest of the
world as globalization evolves. Americans will have to factor multilateral institutions and governance
into a broader conception of our national interests, as we shall see in chapter 5.
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A2 Soft Power Fails
Changing geopolitical landscape makes soft power more important than hard power
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of Government John
Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, “Smart Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its
effective use,” Wesleyan University, google)
Greater attention to soft and smart power itself reflects the changing landscape of international
relations. It is no coincidence that such sources of power have been embraced by Neoliberalism and Constructivism,
paradigms that have underscored the changing nature of world politics. In this case, theory has been influenced by events.
While history has shown soft power always to have been an important source of national influence
(certainly the case studies n hard and soft power do), changes in modern world politics have raised its utility all
the more (Gallarotti 2010a and 2010b).4 Indeed the world has become and is continuing to evolve into a
“softer and smarter world.” World politics in the modern age has been undergoing changes that have changed the
potential for both soft and hard power in ways challenge leaders in their quest to optimize national influence. In this
transformed international system, smart power will be a crucial element in enhancing influence over international outcomes
because it has become more difficult to compel nations and non-state actors through the principal
levers of hard power (i.e., threats and force). The world stage has become less amenable to instruments of
hard power like force and threats, and more amenable to actors that are sensitized to the limitations
of hard and the opportunities of soft power created by this new global environment.
Soft power solves even if hard power is still necessary
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of Government John
Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, “Smart Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its
effective use,” Wesleyan University, google)
Much of the present emphasis on smart power is a reaction to a long tradition of decisonmaking that
has neglected the benefits of soft power and over-relied on hard power. And consequently the literature on
smart power has been more demonstrative about using more soft power than about how the two kinds of power (hard and
soft) can be optimally combined. So the emphasis has been more on appreciating the utility of soft power than on appreciating
the virtues of all useful power resources. In short the narrative has underscored reallocation but has fallen well short of
sufficiently considering the goal of a more systematic identification of an optimal diversification among differing power
resources. The prescriptions and warnings of over-reliance on one set of power resources cut both ways. They are as applicable
to over-using soft power as they are to depending too much on hard power strategies. In this respect, the greatest
possible influence a nation can achieve would be obtained through some optimal diversification
among soft and hard power resources. While this diversification has always proved a superior
strategy, it is all the more important in the world of the present and future. Indeed the changes in
international politics highlighted above suggest that indeed it is becoming a more complex and sophisticated
world order (i.e., a cosmopolitan world order) in which the brut forces of hard power have diminished in
their importance relative to soft power. This more cosmopolitan world requires very different strategies for
optimizing influence in world politics. It requires a concomitantly sophisticated theory that can effectively accommodate such
changes in articulating a theory of power. Indeed, it requires a cosmopolitan theory of power that is much more
in keeping with the times.
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A2 Hard Power Solves
Hard power fails--Spread of democracy
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of Government John
Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, “Smart Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its
effective use,” Wesleyan University, google)
Second, the growth of democracy in the world system has served to compound the disutility of coercion
and force as the actors bearing the greatest burden of such coercion and force (the people) have political
power over decisionmakers. In this respect, the process of democratic peace has altered power relations among nations
(Doyle 1997, Russett and Oneal 2001, and Ray 1995). As individuals become politically empowered, they can
generate strong impediments to the use of force and coercion. But even beyond the enfranchisement effect,
democratic cultural naturally drives national leaders towards the liberal principles manifest in the
cannons of soft power. Hence, national leaders are much more constrained to work within softer foreign
policy boundaries, boundaries that limit the use of force, threat and bribery. Rather, outcomes are
engineered through policies more consistent with liberal democratic legitimacy.
Interdependence
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of Government John
Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, “Smart Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its
effective use,” Wesleyan University, google)
Third, the diminishing utility of hard power is partly the result of a specific political, social and
economic context created by modernization: that context is interdependence (Herz 1957, Osgood and
Tucker 1967, Keohane and Nye 1989, and Nye 2004a). Using sticks, or whatever kinds of coercive methods, generate
considerable costs in an interdependent world. Indeed in such an interpenetrated world, punishing or
threatening other nations is tantamount to self-punishment. In such an environment strategies for
optimizing national wealth and influence have shifted from force and coercion to cooperation. But even more
elusive than the quest to limit the fallout from coercion and force in such an environment, is the quest to impose some specific
outcomes onto targeted actors. In an interpenetrated world, targeted actors have many more avenues of escape. Transnational
actors and national leaders could avoid being compelled by carrots or sticks because of their free reign and access to the
international political economy. They can merely escape coercion or buy-offs by taking refuge in numerous possible
international havens. In one important respect, this modern day “economic feudalism” created by
interdependence is shifting the nexus of power from the territorial state to transnational networks
(Nye 2002, p. 75).
Social and political shifts
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of Government John
Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, “Smart Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its
effective use,” Wesleyan University, google)
Fourth, social and political changes have made modern populations more sensitive to their economic
fates, and consequently far less enamored of a “warrior ethic” (Jervis 2002 and Nye 2004b, p. 19). This
“prosperous society” has compounded the influence of economics and made economic
interdependence that much more compelling as a constraint to the utility of hard power. With the rise of
this welfare/economic orientation and the spread of democracy, national leaders have been driven more by the economic
imperative and less by foreign adventurism as a source of political survival (Gallarotti 2000 and Ruggie 1983). This prosperous
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society, through the political vehicle of democracy, has shifted not only domestic but also foreign policy orientations. The
economic welfare concern has put a premium on cooperation that can deliver economic growth and
employment, and worked against hard power policies that might undercut such goals.
International institutions
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of Government John
Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, “Smart Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its
effective use,” Wesleyan University, google)
Finally, the growth of international organization and regimes in the post-war period has embedded nations
more firmly in networks of cooperation: in effect nations are increasingly functioning in a world of law and norms. In
such a world, unilateral actions that disregard these institutions become far more costly. Such institutions
have effectively raised the minimum level of civil behavior in international politics, and consequently raised the importance of
soft power significantly. Consequently, the networks of cooperation have made nations far less likely to
extract compliance in what are considered illegitimate ways, i.e., through force, coercion, or bribery
(Krasner 1983 and Keohane and Nye 1989).
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A2 Gov Policies Not Key
Government actions influence soft power and are the lynchpin of other determinants
Wallin 2013 (Matthew Wallin, April 29, 2013, “War of the Soft Powers,” American Security Project,
http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2013/war-of-the-soft-powers/)
In Foreign Policy today, Joseph Nye penned an article discussing China and Russia’s desire to increase their soft power. As
originator of the term, Nye explains that neither China nor Russia understands exactly how to do this.¶ Though Nye is correct in
identifying China and Russia’s difficulty with soft power, he neglects to get down to the core issue on why this is difficult. ¶ As
soft power is the ability to attract rather than coerce or pay-off, the ability to grow and use soft power
is a bit more nebulous. Unlike hard power, soft power is not something that can simply be bought,
constructed or traded like a tangible object. Rather, soft power results from the collective attributes of a nation,
through action, history, culture and rhetoric. It cannot be applied like a fragrance to freshen a rotten product.¶ Despite the
ebb and flow of American Soft power since the turn of the century, it remains overall fairly strong.
Nye contends that “much of America’s soft power is produced by civil society – everything from
universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture Рnot from the government.Ӧ While this is
arguably true, I would not remove government as a major variable in the soft power equation. Much of
what Hollywood, academia, and civil society are able to do is enabled directly by our principles of
government.¶ Certainly, what can only be described as dysfunction in the American government right now—especially in
regards to the fiscal situation—has an eroding effect on U.S. soft power. Though internal bickering may result in an inability to
pass a budget, no amount of cooperation gives Congress the ability pass a measure to requisition more soft power, or contract
a company to design it. But it can pass legislation that frees it to grow on its own.¶ Rather than trying to “use” more
soft power, Russia and China must first act to earn it. Moral leadership, technological leadership, financial
leadership, and foreign policy leadership and setting standards for individual rights are all factors that can help to increase soft
power. In the case of Russia and China, making more deliberate efforts to resolve issues on the international scene could make
a difference. Russia should distance itself from its support of the Assad regime in Syria. China should pursue diplomacy to
resolve disputes in the South China Sea. Both countries should work to increase freedom of the individual within their borders.
That’s how you increase your soft power.¶ For America, technological and scientific leadership have long been a strong factor in
its soft power reserve. Yet we are at risk of losing this. For example, recent cuts in fusion energy research—one of America’s
most challenging, yet promising research fields—may cause this country to lag behind. Explaining the harm this can cause,
ASP’s Nick Cunningham and Theodore MacDonald recently wrote in AOL Energy today:¶ As other countries invest more heavily
in fusion power, America’s leadership in this field will soon come to an end. Ceding a new high-tech industry to competitors will
result in a decline in America’s competitive edge, and its best and brightest scientists will be lured by more advanced facilities
abroad.¶ If America wants to maintain its competitive edge in soft power, it needs to take the action necessary to do it. That
means continuing to make those scientific breakthroughs that so many admire this nation for. That means continuing to uphold
the principles enshrined in our founding documents. ¶ Thus, it is in our interest to attract the best and brightest from overseas.
Historically, those minds have contributed greatly to all aspects of American society. And is it their contribution to building this
country through their intellect and hard work in a framework of economic and cultural freedom that forms the basis of
American soft power.¶ Are we in danger of losing our soft power edge to Russia and China? At this point,
the answer is no. Should we be frightened by their efforts to augment and enhance their soft power?
The answer is also no. Soft power is not a zero-sum game—one country cannot attack and weaken
another’s soft power. The only way America risks losing its soft power edge is by pursuing negative
actions and neglecting the very things that make it so strong.
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Heg Solves War
U.S. hegemony prevents global war, arms races and genocides***
Thayer 2007 Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State
University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, “Reply to Christopher Layne” p 108
The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the power of the United States creates
stability in international politics. That is vitally important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard
professor Joseph Nye often compares the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it were taken away, a person
would think of nothing else. If the security and stability provided by the United States were taken away,
most countries would be much worse off, and arms races, vicious security competition, and wars
would result. It would be a world without NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We can imagine easily conflict between
traditional rivals like Greece and Turkey, Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan and China, Russia
and Georgia, Hungary and Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race between
China and Japan. In that world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would have been a far bloodier affair that
might have escalated to become another European war. In contrast to what might occur absent U.S.
power, we see that the post-Cold War world dominated by the United States is an era of peace and
stability.
American hegemony solves WMD war
Brzezinski 2004 Zbigniew Brzezinski (Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor of
foreign policy @ Johns Hopkins) 2004 “The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership” p xi
This book is thus partially predictive and partially prescriptive. Its point of departure is that the recent revolution in
advanced technologies, especially in communications, promotes the progressive emergence of a
global community of increasingly shared interest with America at its center. But the potential selfisolation of the only super-power could plunge the world into escalating anarchy, made all the more
ominous by the dissemination of weaponry of mass destruction. With America—given the contradictory
roles it plays in the world—fated to be the catalyst either for a global community or for global chaos,
Americans have the unique historical responsibility to determine which of the two will come to pass.
Our choice is between dominating the world and leading it.
American hegemony prevents major power wars.
Thayer 2007 Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State
University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, “Reply to Christopher Layne” p 108
So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact
that America is so powerful actually reduces the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics
have found that the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood
of war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they could
challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant
country, but are unlikely to do so directly. 'This means that there will be no wars between great powers. At least, not
until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense
security competition—both China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities
increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the
other, and their militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its
"normal" condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right now states are competing with
one another. This is because international politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest.
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Heg Sustainable--- Catch-All
Sustainable—econ and military—short term snapshots are insufficient
Kagan 2012 (Not Fade Away The myth of American decline. Robert Kagan senior fellow at Brookings Inst.
January 11, 2012, The New Republic, http://goo.gl/SEyOM)
Powerful as this sense
of decline may be, however, it deserves a more rigorous examination. Measuring changes in a
nation’s relative power is a tricky business, but there are some basic indicators: the size and the influence of its economy relative
to that of other powers; the magnitude of military power compared with that of potential adversaries; the degree of political influence it
wields in the international system—all of which make up what the Chinese call “comprehensive national power.” And there is the matter
of time. Judgments based on only a few years’ evidence are problematic. A great power’s decline is the
product of fundamental changes in the international distribution of various forms of power that usually occur over longer
stretches of time. Great powers rarely decline suddenly. A war may bring them down, but even that is usually a symptom, and a
culmination, of a longer process. The decline of the British Empire, for instance, occurred over several decades. In 1870, the
British share of global manufacturing was over 30 percent. In 1900, it was 20 percent. By 1910, it was under 15 percent—well below the rising
United States, which had climbed over the same period from more than 20 percent to more than 25 percent; and also less than Germany,
which had lagged far behind Britain throughout the nineteenth century but had caught and surpassed it in the first decade of the twentieth
century. Over the course of that period, the British navy went from unchallenged master of the seas to sharing control of the oceans with rising
naval powers. In 1883, Britain possessed more battleships than all the other powers combined. By 1897, its dominance had been eclipsed.
British officials considered their navy “completely outclassed” in the Western hemisphere by the United States, in East Asia by Japan, and even
close to home by the combined navies of Russia and France—and that was before the threatening growth of the German navy. These were
clear-cut, measurable, steady declines in two of the most important measures of power over the course
of a half-century. SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS for America’s relative decline these days would be more potent if they
had not appeared only in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Just as one swallow does not make a spring, one
recession, or even a severe economic crisis, need not mean the beginning of the end of a great power. The United States
suffered deep and prolonged economic crises in the 1890s, the 1930s, and the 1970s. In each case, it rebounded in
the following decade and actually ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than before the crisis. The 1910s, the
1940s, and the 1980s were all high points of American global power and influence. Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of
America’s decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002, the historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 1980s had written a much-discussed book on
“the rise and fall of the great powers,” America included, declared that never in history had there been such a great “disparity of power” as
between the United States and the rest of the world. Ikenberry agreed that “no other great power” had held “such formidable advantages in
military, economic, technological, cultural, or political capabilities.... The preeminence of American power” was “unprecedented.” In 2004, the
pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying a “comprehensive uni-polarity” unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four
years later Zakaria was writing about the “post-American world” and “the rise of the rest,” and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the
inevitability of American decline. Did the fundamentals
of America’s relative power shift so dramatically in just a
few short years? The answer is no . Let’s start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of
recession and slow growth, America’s position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably
steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of
the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the
richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of
the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan,
which have had a declining share of the global economy. Optimists about China’s development predict that it will overtake the United States as
the largest economy in the world sometime in the next two decades. This could mean that the United States will face an increasing challenge to
its economic position in the future. But the sheer
size of an economy is not by itself a good measure of overall power within
the international system. If it were, then early nineteenth-century China, with what was then the world’s largest
economy, would have been the predominant power instead of the prostrate victim of smaller European
nations. Even if China does reach this pinnacle again—and Chinese leaders face significant obstacles to sustaining the country’s
growth indefinitely—it will still remain far behind both the United States and Europe in terms of per capita GDP.
Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently
noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most
powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—
at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers
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combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to
diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a
higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on
defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual
superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are
the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power
remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not
remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when
the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has
not yet arrived.
Decline’s not inevitable, but a choice—the “when” is essential
Kagan 12 (Not Fade Away The myth of American decline. Robert Kagan senior fellow at Brookings Inst. January
11, 2012 | 5:04 pm; The New Republic, http://goo.gl/SEyOM)
BUT THERE IS a danger. It is that in the meantime, while
the nation continues to struggle, Americans may convince
themselves that decline is indeed inevitable, or that the United States can take a time-out from its global responsibilities while it
gets its own house in order. To many Americans, accepting decline may provide a welcome escape from the moral and material burdens that
have weighed on them since World War II. Many may unconsciously yearn to return to the way things were in 1900, when the United States
was rich, powerful, and not responsible for world order. The underlying
assumption of such a course is that the present world
order will more or less persist without American power, or at least with much less of it; or that others can pick up
the slack; or simply that the benefits of the world order are permanent and require no special exertion by anyone.
Unfortunately, the present world order—with its widespread freedoms, its general prosperity, and its absence of great power
conflict—is as fragile as it is unique. Preserving it has been a struggle in every decade, and will remain a struggle in the
decades to come. Preserving the present world order requires constant American leadership and constant American
commitment.
In the end, the decision is in the hands of Americans. Decline, as Charles Krauthammer has observed, is a choice. It is
not an inevitable fate—at least not yet. Empires and great powers rise and fall, and the only question is when. But the when does matter.
Whether the United States begins to decline over the next two decades or not for another two centuries will matter a
great deal, both to Americans and to the nature of the world they live in.
Resiliency and adaptation like the aff solves all your warrants
Kagan 12 (Not Fade Away The myth of American decline. Robert Kagan senior fellow at Brookings Inst. January
11, 2012 | 5:04 pm; The New Republic, http://goo.gl/SEyOM)
PERHAPS THE GREATEST concern underlying the declinist mood at large in the country today is not really whether the United States can afford
to continue playing its role in the world. It is whether the Americans are capable of solving any of their most pressing economic and social
problems. As many statesmen and commentators have asked, can Americans do what needs to be done to compete
effectively in the twenty-first-century world? The only honest answer is, who knows? If American history is any guide, however, there is at least
some reason to be hopeful. Americans have
experienced this unease before, and many previous generations have
also felt this sense of lost vigor and lost virtue: as long ago as 1788, Patrick Henry lamented the nation’s fall from past glory,
“when the American spirit was in its youth.” There have been many times over the past two centuries when the political system
was dysfunctional, hopelessly gridlocked, and seemingly unable to find solutions to crushing national problems—from slavery and then
Reconstruction, to the dislocations of industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of social welfare during the Great
Depression, to the confusions and paranoia of the early Cold War years. Anyone who honestly recalls the 1970s, with Watergate, Vietnam,
stagflation, and the energy crisis, cannot really believe that our present
difficulties are unrivaled. Success in the past does
American system, for all its often
stultifying qualities, has also shown a greater capacity to adapt and recover from difficulties than many other
nations, including its geopolitical competitors. This undoubtedly has something to do with the relative freedom of American
society, which rewards innovators, often outside the existing power structure, for producing new ways of doing things; and with the
not guarantee success in the future. But one thing does seem clear from the historical evidence: the
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relatively open political system of America, which allows movements to gain steam and to influence the behavior of the political
establishment. The American system is slow and clunky in part because the Founders designed it that way, with a federal structure, checks and
balances, and a written Constitution and Bill of Rights—but the system also possesses
a remarkable ability to undertake
changes just when the steam kettle looks about to blow its lid. There are occasional “critical elections” that allow
transformations to occur, providing new political solutions to old and apparently insoluble problems. Of course, there are no guarantees: the
political system could not resolve the problem of slavery without war. But on many big
issues throughout their history, Americans
implementing a national consensus. When Paul Kennedy was marveling at the continuing success of
the American superpower back in 2002, he noted that one of the main reasons had been the ability of Americans to overcome what had
appeared to him in 1987 as an insoluble long-term economic crisis. American businessmen and politicians
“reacted strongly to the debate about ‘decline’ by taking action: cutting costs, making companies leaner and meaner, investing in
newer tech nologies, promoting a communications revolution, trimming government deficits, all of which helped to produce significant
year-on-year advances in productivity.” It is possible to imagine that Americans may rise to this latest economic challenge as
well. It is also reasonable to expect that other nations will, as in the past, run into difficulties of their own. None of the nations
currently enjoying economic miracles is without problems. Brazil, India, Turkey, and Russia all have bumpy histories that
suggest the route ahead will not be one of simple and smooth ascent. There is a real question whether the autocratic model of China,
which can be so effective in making some strategic decisions about the economy in the short term, can over the long run be flexible
enough to permit adaptation to a changing international economic, political, and strategic environment. In sum: it may be more
than good fortune that has allowed the United States in the past to come through crises and emerge stronger
and healthier than other nations while its various competitors have faltered. And it may be more than just wishful thinking to
believe that it may do so again.
have found a way of achieving and
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Heg Sustainable--- Soft Power
US is not in irreversible decline--- Soft power solves
Bev 2012 (Jennie S. Bev, Associate Partner of Fortune PR Indonesia, May 23, 2012, “The Power of American ‘Soft Power’,”
Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/85broads/2012/05/23/the-power-of-american-soft-power/2/)
Almost four years since the beginning of the Great Recession, signified by the implosion of the financial industry
and the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the United States is recovering. In fact, some sectors have grown to
new heights. Thus, a “declining USA” is no more than a myth.¶ This myth is likely to continue for a while
despite the recession officially ending in June 2009 as the high unemployment and on-going
foreclosure crisis have cloaked significant economic improvements. In the last four years, declinism and
declinists have been spreading paralyzing dystopian analyses. Combine this with Nouriel “Dr. Doom” Roubini’s “the perfect
storm” forecast in 2013 and you probably would become even more paralyzed. ¶ Daniel Gross’ best-selling book Better,
Stronger, Faster released in May 2012 is an exception. It is probably one of the first books that presents encouraging facts in
this recovery period rather than discouraging views of America’s future. ¶ The mammoth has gotten back up, but it is always the
memory of one’s fall that lingers in mind. We all remember that one fateful day when we attended the 341(a) bankruptcy
hearing to meet creditors and not the thousands of days of financial stability. Just like we all remember vividly the day our
loved one was buried six-feet under when he died and not the beautiful decades he shared his life with us.¶ Failure and losing
hurt, thus they are recorded for eternity in our long-term memory. It is just how our brain works, thanks to millions of years of
evolution.¶ The world was so shocked with the fall of USA, that its gradual rise hasn’t yet created a
lasting mental image. Good news, American “soft power” is more powerful than any fiscal policy and
political maneuver.¶ Joseph Nye of Harvard University Kennedy School of Government says “soft power” refers to
the ability to get through attraction rather than coercion or payments. By “to get” it means to receive
favorable treatments based upon attractiveness of a country’s culture, ideals, and policies. For instance, inspired by TV
series about medical doctors, some children in Taiwan aspire to study medicine at an American
university. Infatuated by the idea of a fair trial, an Indonesian dissident aspires to become a lawyer. “Soft power” can be
hardcore power. And the American brand is still the best out there.
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Heg Sustainable--- Economic Power
Economic strength
Brzezinski 2012 (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2012, “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power,” google books)
The first crucial asset is America’s overall economic strength. America is still the world’s largest
national economy by a good margin. Only the economically united European region slightly surpasses the United States,
but even so the Western European model exhibits higher structural unemployment and lower rates of growth. More significant
for future trends is the fact that the
United States, despite Asia’s rapid economic growth, has maintained
for several decades its major share of the world’s GDP (see Figure 2.3). Its 2010 GDP of over $14 trillion accounted
for just around 25% of¶ global output, while its closest competitor, China, made up over 9% of global output with a close to $6
trillion GDP. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace estimates that the United States will go from having a $1.48
trillion smaller GDP than the EU in 2010 to a $12.03 trillion larger GDP than the EU in 2050; and in terms of per capita GDP, the
United States will increase its lead over the EU from $12,723 in 2010 to $32,266 in 2050.¶ It is true that according to
current forecasts, China, largely due to its overwhelming population base, will surpass the United States in total
economic size sometime in the twenty-first century; the Carnegie Endowment puts that date around 2030. For similar
reasons, although not at the same speed, India should climb up the global GDP ranks over the next forty years as well. But
neither China nor India will come even close to US levels in per capita GDP (see Figure 2.4). Thus, neither
China, nor India, nor Europe can match the United States in its potent economic mix of overall size and high
per capita GDP. This economic advantage—assuming America also exploits its other assets—can preserve
America’s global economic clout and systemic appeal, as well as its suction effect on global talent.
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A2 Smooth Transition
No smooth transition
Brzezinski 2012 (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2012, “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power,” google books)
If America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor, such as China.
While a sudden and massive crisis of the American system would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic
chaos, a
steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay and/or into endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be
unlikely to produce, even by 2025, the “coronation” of an effective global successor. No single power will be
ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to
play. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive and somewhat chaotic realignments of both global and regional power,
with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being.
What follows analyzes the implications of that historically ominous—though certainly not predetermined—“if.”¶ In
the absence of a
recognized leader, the resulting uncertainty is likely to increase tensions among competitors and inspire
self-serving behavior. Thus, international cooperation is more likely to decline, with some powers seeking to promote
exclusive regional arrangements as alternative frameworks of stability for the enhancement of their own interests. Historical
contenders may vie more overtly, even with the use of force, for regional preeminence. Some weaker states
may find themselves in serious jeopardy, as new power realignments emerge in response to major geopolitical shifts in the global distribution
of power. The promotion of democracy might yield to the quest for enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism,
nationalism, and religion. The “global commons” could suffer from passive indifference or exploitation produced by a defensive concentration
on narrower and more immediate national concerns.¶ Some key
international institutions, such as the World Bank or the IMF, are
already under increasing pressure from the rising, poorer, but highly populated states—with China and India in the
forefront—for a general rearrangement of the existing distribution of voting rights, which is currently weighted toward the West.
That distribution has already been challenged by some states in the G-20 as unfair. The obvious¶ demand is that it should be based to a much
greater degree on the actual populations of member states and less on their actual financial contributions. Such a demand, arising in the
context of greater disorder and percolating unrest among the world’s newly politically awakened peoples, could gain popularity among many as
a step toward international (even though not domestic) democratization. And before long, the heretofore untouchable and almost seventyyear-old UN Security Council system of only five permanent members with exclusive veto rights may become widely viewed as illegitimate.¶
Even if a downward drift by America unfolds in a vague and contradictory fashion, it is likely that the leaders of the world’s second-rank powers,
among them Japan, India, Russia, and some EU members, are already assessing the potential impact of America’s demise on their respective
national interests. Indeed, the
prospects of a post-America scramble may already be discreetly shaping the
planning agenda of the chancelleries of the major foreign powers even if not yet dictating their actual policies. The Japanese,
fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may well be
considering closer political and even military cooperation as a hedge in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging
in wishful thinking (or even in schadenfreude) about America’s uncertain prospects, may well have
its eye on the independent states
Soviet Union as initial targets of¶ its enhanced geopolitical influence. Europe, not yet cohesive,
would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and
of the former
insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter EU, and Great Britain seeking to manipulate a balance within the EU while continuing to
preserve a special relationship with a declining United States. Others still may
move more rapidly to carve out their own regional
spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth.¶ None of the
foregoing, however, have or are likely to have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and
military power to even consider inheriting America’s leading role. Japan is dependent on the United States for military
protection and would have to make the painful choice of accommodating China or perhaps of allying with India in joint opposition to it. Russia
is still unable to come to terms with its loss of empire, is fearful of China’s meteoric modernization, and is unclear as to whether it sees its
future with Europe or in Eurasia. India’s aspirations for major power status still tend to be measured by its rivalry with China. And Europe has
yet to define itself politically while remaining conveniently dependent on American power. A genuinely cooperative effort by all of them to
accept joint sacrifices for the sake of collective stability if America’s power were to fade is not likely.
Decline collapses US extended deterrence- Causes tons of proliferation and instability
Brzezinski 2012 (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2012, “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power,” google books)
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An American
decline would impact the nuclear domain most profoundly by inciting a crisis of
confidence in the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella. Countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Japan,
Turkey, and even Israel, among others, rely on the United States’ extended nuclear deterrence for security. If
they were to see the United States slowly retreat from certain regions, forced by circumstances to pull back its guarantees,
or even if they were to lose confidence in standing US guarantees, because of the financial, political, military, and
diplomatic consequences of an American decline, then they will have to seek security elsewhere. That “elsewhere” security could
originate from only two sources: from nuclear weapons of one’s own or from the extended deterrence of another power—
most likely Russia, China, or India. It is possible that countries that feel threatened by the ambition of existing
nuclear weapon states, the addition of new nuclear weapon states, or the decline in the reliability of
American power would develop their own nuclear capabilities. For crypto- nuclear powers like Germany and
Japan, the path to nuclear weapons would be easy and fairly quick, given their extensive civilian nuclear industry, their
financial success, and their technological acumen. Furthermore, the continued existence of nuclear weapons in North Korea and the
potentiality of a nuclear-capable Iran could prompt American allies in the Persian Gulf or East Asia to build their
own nuclear deterrents. Given North Korea’s increasingly aggressive and erratic behavior, the failure of the six-party talks, and the
widely held distrust of Iran’s megalomaniacal leadership, the guarantees offered by a declining America’s nuclear
umbrella might not stave off a regional nuclear arms race among smaller powers.
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***Solvency***
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Solvency--- Reform
A2 Can’t change Cuba
Pascual 2009 (Carlos Pascual, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings institution, and Vicki
Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive
Engagement,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)
The prospect of significant revenues from oil, natural gas, and sugarcane ethanol in the next five¶
years could further integrate Cuba into global and regional markets. While in the short term Cuba will continue
to be heavily dependent on Venezu- ela for subsidized fuel, in five years offshore oil reserves, developed with Brazil, Spain,
Norway, and Malaysia, combined with the potential for ethanol production with Brazil, may increase net annual financial flows
to Cuba by $3.8 billion (at $50 per barrel of oil and $2.00 gallon of ethanol). If democratic countries increase their
economic stakes in Cuba, they will simultaneously enhance their political influence with its current
and future leaders. To be relevant to Cuba, the Obama ad- ministration will need to shape its policies now.
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Solvency--- Obama Leadership Key
Presidential leadership is key
Pascual 2009 (Carlos Pascual, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings institution, and Vicki
Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive
Engagement,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)
The president’s leadership in carrying out a new Cuba policy is essential because by law and prac- tice
it is his responsibility to determine the over- all conduct of U.S. foreign policy. in the case of Cuba, he has
ample executive authority to put in place a policy of engagement. if he wishes, he can expand bilateral
diplomatic relations, re- move Cuba from the list of terrorist countries, and rescind the current policy that grants im- mediate
legal residency to Cubans who enter the United States without visas. Should bilateral re- lations improve, he could
choose to negotiate the unresolved expropriated property claims of U.S. citizens and review the
status of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
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***2AC/Miscellaneous***
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2AC Terrorism Add-On
Lifting the embargo key to WOT
Johnson 2010 (Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, National Security Program
Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, September 16, 2010, Third Way Institute,
http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf)
Keeping the embargo in place requires that the US government devote time and resources to fighting
a Cold War-era threat. Senator Chris Dodd argued in a 2005 op- ed that the US spends “extraordinary
resources” each year to enforce the sanctions instead of devoting such resources to the fight against
terrorism.4 While the financial resources dedicated to enforcing the embargo may be limited compared to resources
dedicated to other causes, lifting the Cuban embargo could put the US in a better position to fight terrorist
organizations by freeing up resources currently enforcing the embargo.¶ For example, the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which governs travel and trade between the US and Cuba, is
also responsible for maintaining sanctions against truly problematic countries, including Iran and
North Korea. OFAC also is responsible for responding to economic threats posed by terrorist organizations and narcotics
traffickers. By ending OFAC’s need to regulate the Cuban embargo, OFAC could instead devote those
resources to respond to the current threats posed by rogue states and terrorist networks.¶ Cuba also
remains on the State Department’s state sponsor of terrorism list along with Iran, Syria, and Sudan,5 despite claims by experts
such as former National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism Richard Clarke that Cuba is only on the list for domestic
political reasons.6 A 1998 report by the US Intelligence Community determined that Cuba does not pose a threat to US national
security,7 yet the State Department continues to keep Cuba on the list. By normalizing relations with Cuba and
removing Cuba from the list, the State Department could better focus on actual state sponsors of
terror and instead use resources in the Western Hemisphere bureau to initiate a new path for engaging Cuba.
Terrorism causes miscalculation that draws in great powers and culminates in
extinction- also causes rising alert levels
Ayson 2010 (Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at
the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would
not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether
nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can
be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the
sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century
might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the
Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even
thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place
precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a
catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack,
and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive
exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and
tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small
nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third
parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the socalled n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an
act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear
attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the
picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist
groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as
easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United
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States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian
stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear
material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while
the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it
detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the
explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe
that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state
possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as
well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if
its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this
high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing
tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded
between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of
course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of
limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as
unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear
terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the
United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the
United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a
terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided)
confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate
aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s
armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment,
when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China
might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against
them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted
that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear
terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear)
retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to
support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China
might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their
spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem
from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as
Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things
nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a
degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the
question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It
could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would
extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council.
But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in
others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in
their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for
us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so
slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed
in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a
curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington
decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the
chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism
was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It
would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor,
and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that
prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action:
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and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the
threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may
be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been
one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response,
Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear
retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be
keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which
seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of
the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let
this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the
attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The
phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to
interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the
chances of nuclear restraint.
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A2 No Capability/Motive
Al Qaeda has the capability
Lawlor 2011 (Major General Bruce Lawlor, served on the White House’s Homeland Security Council and was the first chief of staff for
the Department of Homeland Security and currently director with Virginia Tech's Simulation and Decision Informatics Laboratory, December 15,
2011, “The Black Sea: Center of the nuclear black market,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/theblack-sea-center-of-the-nuclear-black-market)
Harvard's Project on Managing the Atom has published a comprehensive report on this threat, combining several well-known facts to create an
unsettling picture. First, several
terrorist groups, particularly Al Qaeda, have been trying to get their hands on
a nuclear weapon for years. Osama bin Laden referred to it as a "religious duty" and embraced the idea of an American Hiroshima.
Al Qaeda operatives have consulted with nuclear experts, tested conventional explosives for use in
nuclear bombs, and attempted to purchase working nuclear devices. There is nothing to suggest that
bin Laden's death has ended this quest. Second, the Harvard study notes that if a sophisticated terrorist
group acquired sufficient weapon-grade material, it would be able to build at least a crude, gun-type
atomic bomb (WMD Commission, 2005). A nuclear device of this type wouldn't be transported to the target by a sophisticated delivery
system; its more likely delivery mode would be a rental truck. Third, although terrorist groups may not be able to manufacture the plutonium or
weapon-grade uranium to make a crude bomb, it is not beyond their ability to buy or steal it. And fourth, nuclear smuggling is very difficult to
combat. Globalization, huge profit margins, and organized crime have created a multibillion-dollar illicit-trafficking market that is producing
ever more sophisticated methods of keeping contraband from being discovered. Nuclear contraband has become a part of that illicit market.
They have the capability
Hashmi 2012 (Muhammad Jawad Hashmi, defense analyst, M.Phil in Defence and Strategic Studies, January 29, 2012, “Al Qaeda In
Pursuit Of Nuclear Weapons/Radiological Material – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, http://www.eurasiareview.com/29012012-al-qaeda-in-pursuitof-nuclear-weaponsradiological-material-analysis/)
The pursuit of nuclear weapons and material by sub national groups has been an alarming challenge to
deal with. This article will examine groups like al Qaeda that are said to have the ability and motivation to
pursue nuclear capabilities. This study simultaneously provides an insight into the issues related to the demand for these weapons
capabilities and their supply.¶ According to Daniel Metraux, on the demand side of the nuclear market there
are small national groups working with political or religious belief structures that may be stirred to
pursue massive devastation. Some of these groups have large financial and organizational resources,
together with the physical assets. Some of these groups also enjoy sanctuary either in a lawless grey
zone or as guests of the local rulers where they can pursue their plans. On the other hand, in Japan, extensive legal
protections for religious organizations operate in a very permissive environment without much state interference.
They’ll WMD attack the US in the next 2 years- Neg evidence underestimates their
capability
Kanani 2011 (Rahim Kanani, founder and editor-in-chief of World Affairs Commentary, Citing Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior
Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, former
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy, former Chief of the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Department, Counter-terrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, recipient of the CIA Director’s Award, graduate
of the U.S. Military Academy, June 29th, “New al-Qaeda Chief Zawahiri Has Strong Nuclear Intent”, Forbes,
http://blogs.forbes.com/rahimkanani/2011/06/29/new-al-qaeda-chief-zawahiri-has-strong-nuclear-intent/)
We should be especially worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism under Zawahiri’s leadership. In
a recent report titled “Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons”, which I researched for
and contributed to, lead author Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence
at the U.S. Department of Energy, argues that al-Qaeda’s WMD ambitions are stronger than ever. And
that “this intent no longer feels theoretical, but operational.” “I believe al-Qaeda is laying the
groundwork for a large scale attack on the United States, possibly in the next year or two,” continues
Mowatt-Larssen in the opening of the report issued earlier this year by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard Kennedy School. “The attack may or may not involve the use of WMD, but there are signs that al-Qaeda is working on
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an event on a larger scale than the 9/11 attack.” Most will readily dismiss such claims as implausible and
unlikely, and we hope they are right, but after spending months with Mowatt-Larssen, who also served as
the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s WMD and terrorism efforts, scrutinizing and
cross-referencing Zawahiri’s 268-page treatise published in 2008 titled “Exoneration”, the analytics
steered us towards something far more remarkable than expected. “As I read the text closely, in the broader
context of al-Qaeda’s past, my concerns grew that Zawahiri has written this treatise to play a part in the ritualistic process of
preparing for an impending attack,” states Mowatt-Larssen. “As Osama bin Laden’s fatwa in 1998 foreshadowed
the 9/11 attack, Ayman Zawahiri’s fatwa in 2008 may have started the clock ticking for al-Qaeda’s
next large scale strike on America. If the pattern of al-Qaeda’s modus operandi holds true, we are in
the middle of an attack cycle.” Among several important findings, Zawahiri sophisticatedly weaves identical passages,
sources and religious justifications for a nuclear terrorist attack against the United States previously penned by radical Saudi
cleric Nasir al Fahd. Indeed, the language used, research cited, and arguments put forth are nothing short of detailed and
deliberate. Reading as both a religious duty to kill millions of Americans and a lengthy suicide note together, this piece of
literature is something we must take seriously with Zawahiri now at the helm of al-Qaeda. The time may have come for alQaeda’s new CEO to leave a legacy of his own. Concluding the author’s note, Mowatt-Larssen states, “Even if this theory
proves to be wrong, it is better to overestimate the enemy than to under-estimate him. Conventional
wisdom holds that al-Qaeda is spent—that they are incapable of carrying out another 9/11. Leaving aside
whether this view is correct, for which I harbor grave doubts, we will surely miss the signs of the next
attack if we continue to overestimate our own successes, and dismiss what terrorists remain capable
of accomplishing when they put their minds to it.”
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A2 Politics Link
Now is the right time to remove the embargo
Bandow 2012 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president
Ronald Reagan, December 11, 2012, “Time to End the Cuba Embargo,” CATO Institute,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo)
The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance. Every presidential candidate wants to
win the Sunshine State’s electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant voting bloc. ¶ But the political
environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no memory of
life in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who served in Havana: “for the first time in years,
maybe there is some chance for a change in policy.” And there are now many more new young Cuban Americans
who support a more sensible approach to Cuba.¶ Support for the Republican Party also is falling.
According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community in November, after receiving little
more than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United
States.¶ Barack Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the
island. He also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be essential politically.¶
Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though Republican vice-presidential nominee Paul
Ryan has defended the embargo in recent years, that appears to reflect ambition rather than
conviction. Over the years he voted at least three times to lift the embargo, explaining: “The embargo
doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was probably justified when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I
think its become more of a crutch for Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American
embargo.Ӧ There is essentially no international support for continuing the embargo. For instance, the European Union plans to
explore improving relations with Havana. Spain’s Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalo de Benito explained that the EU saw a
positive evolution in Cuba. The hope, then, is to move forward in the relationship between the European Union and Cuba. ¶ The
administration should move now, before congressmen are focused on the next election. President
Obama should propose legislation to drop (or at least significantly loosen) the embargo. He also could use his
authority to relax sanctions by, for instance, granting more licenses to visit the island.
Bipartisan support for repeal
Litvinsky 2009 (Marina Litvinsky, reporter for The Global Information Network, “Penny Worthy Being Saved,” Global
Information Network, April 1, 2009, Proquest)
bipartisan group of U.S. senators and interest groups is backing a bill
that would end the long economic embargo against Cuba, including travel restrictions to the island. The 'Freedom
to Travel to Cuba Act' was introduced Tuesday by Senators Byron Dorgan, a North Dakota Democrat
and Senate Democratic Policy Committee chair, and Michael Enzi, a Republican from Wyoming. They
were joined by 20 cosponsors, including influential Senators Christopher Dodd and Richard Lugar, the
American Farm Bureau Federation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Human Rights Watch (HRW).
"The people of Cuba ought to be free," said Senator Dorgan, pointing to the U.S.'s failed Cuba policy in
achieving this. The nearly 50-year-old embargo on Cuba is only "punishing American people," he said.
WASHINGTON, Mar. 31, 2009 (IPS/GIN) - A
If passed, the bill would prohibit the president from regulating or prohibiting travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal residents or any of
the transactions ordinarily incident to such travel, except in time of war or armed hostilities between the United States and Cuba, or of
imminent danger to the public health or the physical safety of U.S. travellers. The Cuban embargo, introduced in 1961 and subsequently
tightened further, prohibits travel to and business dealings with Cuba for all U.S. citizens. Many have argued that this policy actually thwarts
U.S. interests and further strengthens the government there. "The
U.S. embargo on Cuba is a 50-year failure, and lifting
the ban on travel is a good first step toward a more rational policy," said Myron Brilliant, senior vice president for
International Affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. "The embargo was implemented to try to bring freedom to Cuba, but it made a martyr
out of a tyrant and actually has helped prop up the regime." Sponsors of the bill include agricultural associations who
believe the lifting of travel restrictions to Cuba will increase U.S. agricultural sales of such commodities as poultry, wheat and soybeans.
Agricultural sales to Cuba have averaged 400 million dollars annually since 2000. "In
the long term we need to do more to
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open up channels of trade (in Cuba), like we do in other countries," said Bob Stallman, president of the American Farm Bureau
Federation. Proponents of the legislation point out that the 47-year-old embargo has done nothing to promote
democracy or force the Cuban government to obey human rights standards. "Human Rights Watch has been
monitoring human rights in Cuba for nearly two decades and the dismal state of human rights has not improved," said Jose Miguel Vivanco,
executive director of the Americas Division at HRW
Congress wants to repeal the embargo
Congress Daily 2009 (“GAO Report Gives Road Map for Lifting Cuban Embargo,” Congress Daily/ A.M., October 2,
2009, Proquest)
Three House lawmakers led by Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel offered a plan Thursday for ending the
Cuban trade embargo that has been in effect since 1962. Rangel and Reps. Barbara Lee , D-Calif., and Jeff Flake , R-Ariz.,
released a GAO report outlining steps that could be taken to end the embargo, which Rangel called "a
failed and outdated policy that has not resulted in any advances for the Cuban or American people."
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A2 Politics Link--- A2 Cuban Americans
A2 Cuban Americans hate the plan
Pascual 2009 (Carlos Pascual, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings institution, and Vicki
Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive
Engagement,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)
The majority of Cuban Americans now agree with the American public that our half-century-old policy
toward Cuba has failed. For the first time since Florida international University (FiU) began polling Cuban American
residents in 1991, a December 2008 poll found that a majority of Cuban American voters favor ending
current restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, and support a bilateral dialogue and normal diplomatic
relations with the Cuban regime by substantial margins.
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A2 Critique--- Lifting Embargo = D Rule
Moral obligation to end the embargo
Birns 2013 (Larry Birns, COHA Director, and, Frederick B. Mills, COHA Senior Research Fellow, January 30, 2013, “Best Time
for US-Cuba Rapprochement is Now,” http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-isnow/#sthash.ZisN1pQb.dpuf
Besides being counter-productive, there are also strong moral arguments for ending the embargo.
From a utilitarian point of view, the policy is objectionable because it has brought about needless
suffering without convincing evidence of praiseworthy results. One illustration of this is what happened during
what Havana calls the “special period in time of peace.” This refers to the economic crisis, hydrocarbon energy shortages, and
food insecurity that followed the collapse of Soviet Bloc (1989 – 1991) which was Cuba’s main trading partner and the source of
vital subsidies. The embargo took an especially harsh toll during the special period. According to a 1997 report Denial of Food
and Medicine: The Impact of the Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba by The American Association for World Health: “the
U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health and nutrition of large numbers of ordinary
Cuban citizens.” The report also observed that “the U.S. embargo has caused a significant rise in sufferingand even deaths-in Cuba.” The special period, including a serious food shortage in 1993, did not lead
to the country’s surrender, but to the decisive restructuring of the agricultural sector, a number of
economic reforms, and the diversification of trade.¶ A more recent report by Human Rights Watch also points to
the needless suffering caused by the embargo:¶ “The United States’ economic embargo on Cuba, in place for more than half a
century, continues to impose indiscriminate hardship on Cubans, and has failed to improve human rights in the country.” (2012
Report on Cuba)¶ The embargo, then, has harmed those whom it purportedly meant to benefit–the
average Cuban. A benevolent foreign policy towards Cuba would collaterally seek to benefit the
Cuban people, not bring hunger, hardship, and in some cases death to an innocent civilian population.
Since it is unlikely that the majority of Cubans would willingly impose such adversity on themselves or their kith and kin for over
fifty years, such a punitive and coercive measure fails another important test of moral acceptability.
H.O.V.A.
Guzman 2013 (Sandra Guzman, May 8, 2013, “Jay-Z and Beyoncé's trip to Cuba isn't the problem, the embargo is,” CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/07/opinion/guzman-beyonce-jay-z-cuba)
When does a romantic anniversary trip with your hubby to celebrate five years of marital bliss
become an international kerfuffle, complete with calls for you to be prosecuted for treason? Well, when
it's Cuba, where Americans are banned from traveling to for tourism, thanks to one of the most enduring embargoes in the
history of mankind.¶ Yesterday, Beyoncé stopped by ABC's "Good Morning America" and confessed the outcry
over her and Jay Z's trip to Havana was "quite shocking." Welcome to the land of cray cray, Bey.¶
Emotions run deep, high, and very bizarre when it comes to the subject of Cuba. When photos of the
celebrity couple strolling Havana were released, a political tumult of epic proportions erupted in
Florida. Sen. Marco Rubio and a small band of conservative Cuban-American politicos released a
statement vociferously demanding an investigation of the trip by the president and the Treasury
Department.¶ One anti-Castro activist went as far as to threaten to file a petition against the celebrity couple to be formally
prosecuted. Hova and Beyoncé's crime? Chilling in Havana.¶ There's little doubt the collateral damage and
suffering on both sides of the Florida Straits -- families divided, innocents killed, fortunes lost -- has
been profound. But it's high time we stop the madness and bring sanity to this debate.
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***Negative***
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1NC Latin America Relations Defense
Incompatible political views impede relations—lifting the embargo won’t solve
Hanson and Lee 13—Stephanie Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org. She manages the
editorial production of the website and covers economic and political development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is
Senior Production Editor at CFR [January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113]
What is the main obstacle in U.S.-Cuban relations?
A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations,
experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of
the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at
Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for
Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged
U.S. policy in the region.
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2NC Latin America Relations Defense
Bad relations inevitable--- it’s not a priority
Hakim 2011 (Peter Hakim, President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, The United States and Latin America: The
Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011)
During the following ten years, US foreign policy attention turned sharply to the Middle East. Washington's integrationist strategy for the
Americas unravelled as its weaknesses and inconsistencies became increasingly visible. For their part, Latin American governments became
increasingly independent and assertive in their foreign policies, diversified in their international relations, and more inclined to challenge US
leadership and initiative. The United States has not yet come fully to grips with this changing context of hemispheric relations. The G.W. Bush
and Obama administrations remained, at least rhetorically, wedded to the idea of partnerships and shared responsibilities with Latin America,
but these concepts seem less and less relevant to the region's evolving context.
What the past two decades of US–Latin American relations may have most clearly revealed is how
difficult it is for Washington to define and execute a coherent policy in the region—with officials
constrained by domestic politics, far more urgent demands on its foreign policy resources, and an
increasingly independent and self-assured Latin America. The fact is that US policies toward Latin
American and the Caribbean are almost invariably derivative policies. They tend not to be the result of
a careful calculation of US interests and values and a clear view of what it will take to advance them. Instead,
they tend to be mostly shaped by US domestic political considerations or by the demands of global
issues.
Several alt causes
Hakim 2011 (Peter Hakim, President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, The United States and Latin America: The
Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011)
The electoral triumph of Barack Obama was enthusiastically welcomed in Latin America and the Caribbean.15 The spirited reaction to Obama's
election made it clear that Latin Americans wanted a good relationship with the United States, but that they also wanted the United States to
pursue a different approach to the region and to foreign policy generally. Expectations for the new administration were high throughout the
region.
In contrast to many of his predecessors, Obama did not present a grand vision or a broad strategy for US policy in the hemisphere. Instead, he
saw his presidency as an opportunity to solve some long-standing problems, reduce discord and friction, and encourage greater cooperation.
Most of all, he promised a change in style and emphasis—fundamentally a turn to multilateralism and partnership, and a closer alignment of
the United States and Latin American policy agendas. This would be a time to reinvigorate US relations in the hemisphere and perhaps set the
stage for a new approach to regional affairs, not to embark on major new initiatives.
Obama himself remains widely admired and extremely well liked in Latin America, but his administration has not
managed to improve the quality of US–Latin American relations or develop more productive regional ties.
The new president's overcrowded agenda has left little room for Latin America. Foreign policy has
generally taken a back seat to the US' economic problems, health reform and myriad other domestic challenges. Latin
America has had no chance of competing successfully for Washington's limited foreign policy attention with
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's nuclear ambitions and China's expanding global muscle.
The intense
and bitter partisanship of Washington has compounded the problem. Neither Democrats nor Republicans
have been eager to take on the politically volatile challenge of immigration reform, which remains the highest priority
issue for Mexico and most nations of Central America and the Caribbean.16 Though the US Congress finally
ratified the long-stalled free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, only one in six Democrats in the House voted for both pacts. A
Republican majority in the lower house of Congress now blocks any further relaxation of Cuba policy.
Finally, an increasingly assertive and politically divided Latin America has also complicated US
policymaking. Only a few countries are openly hostile to Washington, but across the region, governments
have demonstrated a growing independence from the US. They have built diverse relations
internationally, and increasingly resisted US approaches. These are natural trends for a region of middle income
countries that is expanding economically, more confident of its ability to resolve its own problems, and developing a significant global presence.
They do not necessarily represent a setback for the United States. Over time, they might well allow for more productive hemispheric
partnerships. But, today
they are a major source of friction in US–Latin American relations, which have
been strained by disagreements over Honduras, regional efforts to restore Cuba to OAS membership,
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South American opposition to the US–Colombia defence pact, and Iran's ties to Brazil and other
nations.
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Starter Pack
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Cuba Relations Defense
Bad relations with Cuba are inevitable
Hanson 2013 (Stephanie Hanson, associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, and Brianna Lee, Senior
Production Editor at CFR, January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)
What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations?¶ Experts say these issues
include:¶ Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five
dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of
conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National
Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides
prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote
condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006.¶ Guantanamo
Bay.
Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo
Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where
hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world
against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility
remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an
extended period.¶ Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida
traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong
voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.
The aff is insufficient
Hanson 2013 (Stephanie Hanson, associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, and Brianna Lee, Senior
Production Editor at CFR, January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)
What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations?¶ They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana,
Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward
Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration
strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years
for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009,
President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration,
thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes.¶
Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported
roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.
However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012.
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years.¶ Tension
between Cuba and the
United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled
to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish
community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through
a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen
years in prison.¶ Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a
positive relationship developing between the two countries. Raúl and Fidel Castro have both criticized
the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Raúl Castro accused the United States of "giving new breath to open
and undercover subversion against Cuba."
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
1NC Latin America Impact Defense
Latin American instability is inevitable and there’s no impact – American intervention
checks.
del Vago 2006 El Rincón del Vago, 2006 or later, http://html.rincondelvago.com/international-conflict.html
On the other hand, Donald Nuechterlein claimed that “the fundamental national interest of the United States is the defence
and the well-being of its citizens, its territory, and the U.S. constitutional system”. (3, Pg. 310) The Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice promised to resist what she called “the growth of anti-democratic populism in Latin America” (4).
While asserting that some rhetoric defined as populist is constructive, Rice said that in Latin America, that normally is not the
case. The U.S. agenda's vital interest is to push back a multilateral programme between the Venezuelan government and the
“axis of evil” that could shatter the flimsy Latin America stability. In other words, under unipolarity
dominated by a democratic pole we are likely to see more attempts to create or advance regional
security arrangements (5, Pg. 282), and this is being threatened by Hugo Chavez's new ideologies.
According to the logic of the balance-of-threat theory (Walt, 1987), “a hegemonic state can preserve its unipolar position by
using policies of accommodation and reassurance in its dealing with status quo states. The dominant state should reinforce
their sense of security and should also provide opportunities for these states to demonstrate power or enhance prestige
without challenging the existing order. It should also try to take steps to integrate `undecided' states more fully into the existing
order, thus turning then into status quo states (Mastanduno, 1999: 148-9 (5, Pg.286))”. Other reasons why the U.S. government
is deciding to strike against Venezuela is related to its oil. Venezuelan reserves are 78 billion barrels plus the new reserves
founded on the Orinoco: 300 billion are making this the biggest Oil reserve on the planet, and they are geographically located
under the United States front door, with no direct threats to be exported until Hugo Chavez's rise to power. Based on those
facts, the U.S. International policy against terrorism and such threats apply to Venezuela; Hugo Chavez is not a trustworthy
leader, he has not been afraid to set back approach from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is where the American
government is taking action, looking for sanctions based on Hugo Chavez antidemocratic deeds, and using the Inter-American
Democratic Charter to aisle the Venezuelan government. If this is not enough, the U.S. government might start using
the policy of direct intervention (First military option, with a low intensity). This phase is identified by a low profile of
paramilitary actions, sabotages, and others small war strategies. If their attitude remains aggressive and fearless,
that is when the complete U.S. military power starts taking action. In contrast, Hugo Chavez had already strike
the U.S., not as a terrorist but as a people's person, his strategy is completely unusual, he is given free oil using CITGO
Company, a subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), that is located is the U.S., to the people who are living in shelters,
and subsidizing up to 40 per cent of the oil market price for the people with low income. This strategy is making him to be
recognized as a hero on the east coast of the U.S. But this is not everything, the resulting savings from this initiative, known as
Low Income Heating Oil Program, are being used to pay the rent of the people with the lowest income in those communities.
Also is dividing politicians, in one side John Negroponte said `Chavez is using Venezuelan petrodollars to finance an
“extravagant international policy”, with no direct reference to the generosity with the poor of U.S.', on the other side Charles
Rangel, a Democrat, says `This gesture is an example, more Americans are complaining and asking for help to tackle the high
price of heat their places (status quo disruption) (6). This strategy have been a complete success, his populism has strike the
heart of the United States. Hugo Chavez is following also the scholarship of Griecco: `Dealing with the danger of
domination, at the same time, the very wide power disparities with the hegemon create a constant
fear of domination and entrapment. The overwhelming power of the hegemon threatens mainly the
foreign policy autonomy of the regional states, and also raises the danger of being pulled into unnecessary
adventures on its behalf. This also creates for regional states a strong incentive to organize on a regional
level. A regional arrangement can be formed in order to be able to maintain a reasonable degree of
independence and `voice' within its sphere on influence (Griecco, 1995). While the ability of each individual state
to influence the hegemon is limited, by working collectively they can have greater influence, and can make more credible and
meaningful threats to raise the cost of certain policies the hegemon may wish to pursue.' (5, Pg. 289). And that is the accord
that Hugo Chavez is building in Latin America. This agreement is their first steps between Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, and Argentina as
a regional enclave to step out from the American economic domain, and with the indirect-direct help from the Colombian
Revolution Army Forces (FARC, with more than 35,000 men) in case of an eventual attack from the U.S. Army against
Venezuela. As well, the Venezuelan Army reserves are three times the size of the American counterpart.
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Cuba Aff/Neg
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2NC Latin America Impact Defense
No great powers
Chipman 2009 (Dr John Chipman, March 5, 2009, International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Strategic Challenges in
Latin America” http://www.iiss.org/conferences/strategic-perspectives-on-latin-america/speeches/strategic-challenges-in-latinamerica-dr-john-chipman/)
Overall, the broad assessment must be that the diplomatic, economic and military interests of outside powers in Latin
America do not pose the sort of geopolitical challenge that could have a major security impact. While
natural resources and the economic realities of globalisation have drawn more countries to Latin America, perhaps reducing the
relative isolation of Latin America from the rest of the world, it is fanciful to read into this a prospective ‘great
game’ for influence and control. The need for the region to defend against an external threat is not
there in a way that should seriously affect defence policy or the sizing of armed forces.
No escalation
Dominguez et al 2003 (Jorge I. Dominguez, Clarence Dillon Professor of International Relations and director of the
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, David Mares, Manuel Orozco, David Scott Palmer, Francisco
Rojas Aravena, Andres Serbin, United States Institute of Peace, August, Peaceworks No. 50,
http://www.usip.org/publications/boundary-disputes-latin-america)
Since the start of 2000, five Latin American boundary disputes between neighboring states have resulted in the use of force,
and two others in its deployment. These incidents involved ten of the nineteen independent countries of South and Central
America. In 1995, Ecuador and Peru went to war, resulting in more than a thousand deaths and injuries and significant
economic loss. And yet, by international standards the Americas were comparatively free from interstate
war during the twentieth century. Latin Americans for the most part do not fear aggression from their
neighbors. They do not expect their countries to go to war with one another. The puzzle that this paper
seeks to solve is how to explain the following unusual cluster of traits in the hemisphere: ◗ Territorial, boundary, and other
disputes endure. ◗ Interstate conflict over boundaries is relatively frequent. ◗ Disputes sometimes escalate to military conflict
because states recurrently employ low levels of force to shape aspects of bilateral relations. ◗ Such escalation rarely
reaches full-scale war. ◗ Interstate war is infrequent indeed. Solving this puzzle may help point the way toward
more effective prevention and resolution of conflicts about borders and territory. It is encouraging to note that some of the
longest-lasting and most serious boundary disputes in South America have been settled since 1990—
Argentina and Chile, Ecuador and Peru, Chile and Peru, Brazil and all its neighbors. At the same time, however, similar border
disputes have been exacerbated in the cases of Guyana, Venezuela, and Colombia and in Central America. Each of this second
set of countries has been involved in at least one militarized interstate dispute since 1990. Nicaragua tops the list, having had
militarized disputes with four states. Venezuela and Honduras have each had militarized disputes with three neighboring states.
El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, and Colombia have each had militarized disputes with two neighbors. Since 1990 militarized
interstate disputes have been frequent, therefore, yet only the dispute between Ecuador and Peru in 1995
escalated to war.
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1NC Soft Power Defense
Soft power is ineffective
Ford 2012 (Christopher A. Ford, formerly Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Technology and Global Security at
Hudson Institute, May 17, 2012, “American 'Soft Power': Allure and Confusion,” Hudson Institute,
http://rs.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=9096)
When viewed through this prims of usability, I suggest that U.S. "soft power" stacks up much less well
than is usually alleged vis-à-vis the ability of a Leninist soft power "competitor" such as the People's Republic of China
(PRC) to manipulate, if it wishes, most aspects of its multifaceted interactions with the outside world. Making the situation
worse, I suggest that the Obama Administration has fallen into the trap of putting faith in the supposedly
transformative aspects of America's "soft" impact at the expense of its willingness to employ those
relatively few usable elements of "soft power" that actually are available to the leaders of a free and
democratic society that by virtue of this very freedom can do little to twist and skew their country's
economic and socio-cultural interactions in the service of political and propaganda objectives. The
administration, I suggest, has thus relied upon "soft power" as a kind of magical balm for all sorts of
policy problems, turning it from one potentially useful policy tool into a recipe for evading difficult
choices.
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Cuba Aff/Neg
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2NC Soft Power Defense
Obama can’t project soft power
Ford 2012 (Christopher A. Ford, formerly Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Technology and Global Security at
Hudson Institute, May 17, 2012, “American 'Soft Power': Allure and Confusion,” Hudson Institute,
http://rs.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=9096)
The current U.S. administration certainly talks big about the virtues "soft power," but when it comes
to actually trying to use it – as opposed to simply placing one's trust in vague notions of globalization-facilitated socioeconomic convergence that will make everything come out alright whether or not one faces up to difficult policy trade-offs and
actually exerts effort to bring about changes in the world – Washington is remarkably ambivalent. One hears
grandiose talk of "navigating by our values" and leveraging these values into "soft power," but the
Obama Administration has been strangely reticent about actually promoting those values overseas.
Indeed, President Obama himself has said that he sees nothing particularly exceptional about the very
American values by which we are expected to "navigate" and which we are supposedly to model for others in the world.
(Everyone, we are told, believes themselves special.) Could one imagine a more absurd foundation for ideational
"soft power" projection than such politically-correct relativism?
Our competitors are more effective soft powers than us
Ford 2012 (Christopher A. Ford, formerly Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Technology and Global Security at
Hudson Institute, May 17, 2012, “American 'Soft Power': Allure and Confusion,” Hudson Institute,
http://rs.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=9096)
Not everybody in the contemporary world, however, has such a passive approach to "soft power."
Indeed, one can perhaps see in contemporary China the polar counterpoint to the Obama
Administration's lassitude. Moreover, thanks to the extent to which the ruling Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) still penetrates so much of Chinese society – being able to exert considerable control, when it wants to, over
business, financial, media, and cultural institutions (the most significant of which are still actually run directly by the state and
supervised by the Party anyway) – the modern PRC is conspicuous in the degree to which its system
combines (a) the capacity to exert a real degree of purposive control over the facets of China's social
and political engagement with the outside world with (b) a notable willingness to use such tools in
pursuit of national objectives. When such a conjunction occurs in a country having the considerable
(and still growing) economic weight of the modern PRC, "soft power" – in the sense of usability that I
emphasize in my article – can be quite real indeed.
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1NC Heg Impact Defense
Heg doesn’t solve war
Barbara Conry (former associate policy analyst, was a public relations consultant at Hensley Segal Rentschler and an expert
on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia at the CATO Institute) and Charles V. Pena (Senior
Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser on
the Straus Military Reform Project at the CATO Institute) 2003 “47. US Security Strategy” CATO Handbook for Congress,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-47.pdf
Another rationale for attempting to manage global security is that a world without U.S. hegemony
would soon degenerate into a tangle of chaos and instability, in which weapons proliferation,
genocide, terrorism, and other offensive activities would be rampant. Prophets of such a development
hint that if the United States fails to exercise robust political and military leadership today, the world is
condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century—or perhaps do something even worse.
Such thinking is seriously flawed. First, instability in the international system is nothing new, and most
episodes do not affect U.S. vital interests. Furthermore, to assert that U.S. global leadership can stave
off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overstates the power of any single country to influence
world events. Indeed, many of the problems that plague the world today, such as civil wars and ethnic
strife, are largely impervious to external solutions. There is little to back up an assertion that only
Washington’s management of international security can save the world from political, economic, or
military conflagration.
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2NC Heg Impact Defense
Empirically proven
Christopher J. Fettweis (Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College) 2010 “Threat and Anxiety in US
Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82
One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do
not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe
in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of
American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its
defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on
defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and
other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and
global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William
Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet
America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly
plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe
that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that
would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security
dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing
presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of
international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of
all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the
United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W.
Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach
the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.
International system resilient – no conflict
Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence
for What Purpose?” http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/
Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some
scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number
continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need
not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient.
Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne
by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat
posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more
today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman
Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-
states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States
were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play
a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are
credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign
policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the
center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to
this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.
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Cuba Aff/Neg
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1NC/2NC Prolif Defense
No cascade of proliferation – its all alarmist rhetoric
Muthia Alagappa, pub. date: 2008, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center, “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons
and Security in 21st Century Asia,” accesed: 1-6-09, p. 521-2, Google Books
It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the
domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventative action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of
these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On
the
domino effect, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programs have not fueled new programs in
South Asia or beyond. Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is
grounded in that country’s security concerns about the U ntied S tates and Tehran’s regional aspirations. The North Korean
test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has
not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence
commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S.-Japan security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan
would embark on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the
American extended deterrence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without
dramatic change in it’s political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear
weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea
should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea.
The North Korean nuclear test has not spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability. The point is that
each country’s decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is contingent on its
particular security and other circumstances. Through appealing, the domino theory is not predictive;
often it is employed to justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for example,
did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that sub region (Lord 1993,
1996). In the nuclear arena, the nuclear
programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security chain
reaction, not mechanically falling dominos. However, as observed earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North
Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy
makers. Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of
individuals who have a vested interest in accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Such analysts
are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the
basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.
Robust statistical studies prove prolif decreases war and escalation
Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, pub. date: 2007, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle Beardsley, Asst.
Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory Univ., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” accessed: 12-18-09,
http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/44/2/139
The literature on international conflict is divided on the impact of nuclear proliferation on state conflict. The optimists’
argument contends that nuclear weapons raise the stakes so high that states are unlikely to go to war when nuclear weapons
enter the equation. The pessimists rebut this argument, contending that new proliferators are not necessarily rational and that
having nuclear weapons does not discourage war but rather makes war more dangerous. Focusing on one observable
implication from this debate, this article examines the relationship between the severity of violence in crises and the number
of involved states with nuclear weapons. The study contends that actors will show more restraint in crises
involving more participants with nuclear weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB)
project, the results demonstrate that crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to end without
violence and, as the number of nuclear actors involved increases, the likelihood of war continues to
fall. The results are robust even when controlling for a number of factors including non-nuclear
capability. In confirming that nuclear weapons tend to increase restraint in crises, the effect of nuclear weapons
on strategic behavior is clarified. But the findings do not suggest that increasing the number of nuclear actors in a crisis can
prevent war, and they cannot speak to other proliferation risks
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Jeff Bess
1NC/2NC Econ Defense
Econ collapse doesn’t cause war – prefer our studies
Samuel Bazzi (Department of Economics at University of California San Diego) and Christopher Blattman (assistant
professor of political science and economics at Yale University) November 2011 “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence
of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices”
http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4
VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—
Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and
political transitions in economics and political science. Yet we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks,
even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive
commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from
commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of
resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that
war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard
the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine.
Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results
include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should
provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly
exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other time-varying variables, like rainfall and
foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks
and generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of
evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the
value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing
empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit
both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This
countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our
findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the
extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship
only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in
conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either
small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices
and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship
between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t
mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The
same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and
political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to
distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately, however, the fact that commodity
price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that
political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One
possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination
challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one
type or another are ubiquitous. If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other
shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock. The same argument has been made in debunking
the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of
publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the
conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and
conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions,
and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability. Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern
that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that a
published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of
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tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and
when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of
conflict is an extreme case of all these. Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent
variables or publishes systematic robustness checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of
published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have
grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule:
scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar
(or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further
analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate, the consequences are
dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones .20
Economic collapse doesn’t cause war – no causal connection
Barnett (senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online
columnist for Esquire magazine) August 2009 “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis”
Thomas P.M.
http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of
scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading
to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging
markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly
worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.
None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed
to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the
economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity
conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia
conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most
important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long
struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a
most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist
movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea,
Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global
economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and
Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to
and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises
with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we
pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command,
for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: * No significant uptick
in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?);
* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); * Not a single state-on-state
war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); * No great improvement or
disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); *
A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the
strain); and * No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its
role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and
its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up
their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world
record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented
"stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power
dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the
economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that
remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate
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economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was
no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function,
and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the
economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality
displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed
connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not
prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes,
even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S.
dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to
this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising"
China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial
markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome
a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this
global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I
expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fearmongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.
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1NC Politics Link
Plan costs capital
Birns 2013 (Larry Birns, COHA Director, and, Frederick B. Mills, COHA Senior Research Fellow, January 30, 2013, “Best Time
for US-Cuba Rapprochement is Now,” http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-isnow/#sthash.ZisN1pQb.dpuf
There would probably be a political price to pay by the Obama administration for taking steps
towards reconciliation with Havana, but if Obama’s election to a second term means that there is to be a progressive
dividend, surely such a dividend ought to include a change in US policy towards the island. Mirabile dictu, the Administration
can build on the small steps it has already taken. Since 2009, Washington has lifted some of the restrictions on
travel between the US and Cuba and now allows Cuban Americans to send remittances to relatives on
the island. The Cuba Reconciliation Act (HR 214) introduced by Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY) on January 4,
2013, and sitting in a number of congressional committees, would repeal the harsh terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of
1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, both of which toughened the embargo during the special period in Cuba. The Cuba
Reconciliation Act, however, is unlikely to get much traction, especially with ultra-hardliner Representative
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chairing the House Foreign Relations Committee, and her counterpart,
Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who is about to lead the Senate Foreign Relations Body. Some of the antiCastro Cuban American community would likely view any of the three measures advocated here as a
capitulation to the Castro brothers. But as we have argued, a pro-democracy and humanist position is not in any way
undermined, but might in fact be advanced by détente. An end to the embargo has been long overdue, and the judgment of
history may very well be that it ought never to have been started.
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