Understanding childbearing in Europe
Tomáš Sobotka
Vienna Institute of Demography (Austrian Academy of Sciences), Wittgenstein
Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital
ICS Conference “Problematics of natality in Portugal”,
Lisbon, 15 January 2014
European fertility ups and downs
Distinct period “waves” in European fertility after 1990
 The 1990s: Fertility declines to record-low levels
 2000s: Fertility reversal, increasing period TFRs (ex. In PT)
 After 2008: Mostly declining fertility after the onset of the recession,
especially in Southern Europe
Shift towards later childbearing: strong influence on fertility trends
Economic uncertainty closely linked to fertility
Interrelated changes in values, family, gender relations, education
Worries about too low birth rates, diverse policy responses
The return of pro-natalism in policy debates
Jacques Chirac (1984): “In demographic term, Europe is vanishing. Twenty
years or so from now, our countries will be empty” (Teitelbaum, 2000).
Pritchett and Viarengo (2012: 55): Large parts of Europe committing “gradual
demographic suicide”
Agenda
•
•
•
•
•
European fertility trends and the shift to delayed childbearing
The “Great Recession” and fertility
Reproductive preferences
Government responses to low fertility & policy debates
Discussion: Low fertility in Portugal in a (Southern) European context
Data: Eurostat, Human Fertility Database, national statistical offices,
VID, own computations, surveys (GGS, FFS, EVS, other)
Regions: following main geographic, cultural, economic, welfare and
demographic divisions
- Western, Northern (Nordic), Southern Europe, “German-speaking”
countries
- Central, South-eastern, Eastern Europe (EU regions in blue, except
NO, ICE, CH)
European fertility trends and the
shift to delayed childbearing
Period Total Fertility:
North & West vs. South & Centre & East?
Source: own elaboration based on European Demographic Data Sheet 2014
(VID 2014), Eurostat and National Statistical Offices Data
Period Total Fertility:
Parallel trends in Portugal and Spain
Source: own elaboration based on European Demographic Data Sheet 2014
(VID 2014), Eurostat and National Statistical Offices Data
The shift to a later childbearing:
Mean age at first birth in selected countries
32
Western & Northern Europe
Spain
Central Europe
Eastern Europe
United States
Portugal
Mean age at first birth
30
28
26
Portugal
24
22
20
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Source: Sobotka 2013; computations from the Human Fertility Database,
Eurostat and data from national statistical offices
The „postponement transition“:
Key driving factors and consequences
Key driving factors:
• Expansion of university education, especially among women
– Enrollment in education not compatible with parenthood
– Women with tertiary education aged 30-34 in Portugal: 13% in 2001-> 31%
in 2011 (OECD Education at a Glance 2014)
• Economic uncertainty: unemployment, job instability, low wages
– Particularly prominent in Southern and Eastern Europe
• Unaffordable housing, limited rental market
• Efficient contraception, available abortion and “morning after” pill
• Delayed partnership formation
• Changed family values and preferences; higher acceptance of
childlessness, preference for non-family lifestyles
Why does delayed childbearing affect period
fertility?
The “tempo effect”:
• Shifting age at childbearing the most important factor influencing
short-term shifts in period total fertility rate (TFR) in Europe
• Also “explaining” extreme low TFR levels (<1.3) (Sobotka 2004,
Goldstein et al. 2009)
Why?
• Births “postponed” in 2010 are simply not realised in that year
• This may not affect generation’s (cohort) fertility rate
• However, late age at childbearing also increases the risk of infertility
and of not realising the “delayed” birth later in life
Demographic analysis: Two ways to address tempo effects
1) Computing alternative fertility indicators aiming to control for it
2) Looking at the “real” (completed) fertility of women aged over 40
Fertility in selected European countries, 2009-11:
conventional and tempo-adjusted TFR
2.24
1.93
1.80
1.60
1.54
1.62
1.60
1.39
1.39
1.40
1.37
1.60
1.38
1.53
1.66
1.80
1.66
2.00
1.92
1.79
1.90
adjusted TFRp* (2009-11)
2.02
2.20
1.99
1.99
TFR 2010
2.14
2.19
2.40
1.20
1.00
Data Source: European Demographic Data Sheet 2014 (VID 2014)
Cohort fertility trends and variation
• Considerably higher completed fertility (CTFR) than the period TFR
• In most countries, a stabilisation or slight increases projected in the
1970s cohorts (Myrskylä et al. 2013, Prioux et al. 2013, European
Demographic Data Sheet 2014)
• Earlier cohort fertility decline in Europe overshadowed by falling family
size in East Asia
Expected European CTFR range, 1975 cohort:
1.4 in Spain, 1.46 in Italy vs. 2.1 in Ireland, 2.04 in Norway and 2.02 in
France
• Portugal: shifting from a higher-ranking fertility to one of the lowestfertility countries in Europe
• Trend Portugal, alongside Spain, resembles a fast fertility fall in East
Asia
Cohort fertility trends and variation
Observed and projected completed cohort fertility in selected regions in
Europe, East Asia and in the United States, women born 1960-79
Cohort fertility (children per woman)
2.20
2.00
1960
1.80
1970
1.60
1979
1.40
1.20
1.00
Nordic
countries
Western
Europe
Central & Germany, Southern
Eastern
Austria,
Europe
Europe Switzerland
Portugal
United
States
East Asia
Myrskylä, M., J. Goldstein, and Y. Alice Cheng. 2013. “New Cohort Fertility Forecasts
for the Developed World: Rises, Falls, and Reversals.” Popul. Dev. Rev. 39 (1): 31–56
Contrasting patterns of family building, selected
countries
Number of children ever born, female birth cohorts ca. 1968
Share of women with
Completed fertility at 1.80 or higher Country
Higher, 2 or 3 children model
Norway
Higher, polarised
England & Wales
Higher, 2-child model, low childlessnessCzech Republic
Completed fertility below 1.70
Low, 1-child model
Russia
Low, polarised
Austria
Low, few large families model
Spain
No children 1 child 2 children 3+ children CTFR
11.6
14.6
42.2
31.7
2.04
20
14
38
28
1.91
7.9
19.5
53.6
19.0
1.89
7.9
21.5
16.8
40.2
22.8
28.1
39.4
38.0
44.1
12.5
17.8
11.0
• no systematic difference in childlessness between the countries with
higher and lower completed fertility
Data based on Human Fertility Database and ONS (for England and Wales).
1.62
1.59
1.52
The “Great Recession” and fertility
COMMON PRECONDITIONS FOR FAMILY
FORMATION in contemporary Europe
• Completing education
• Achieving relatively stable employment
• Accumulating resources (including sufficient housing)
• (Own housing: especially Southern Europe)
• Having a stable partner (marriage no longer necessary)
• Feeling ready for parenthood
– Not only support for families, but also living conditions and choices of
young adults in pre-family stage matter
– >2008: Economic position of young adults deteriorating rapidly in most
countries; potentially negative effects on family formation and fertility
The economic recession in Europe
Main pathways how the recession affected partnership formation and
fertility
 Unemployment, employment instability: loss of resources, inability to
accumulate resources, uncertainty about future, inability to make binding longterm decisions
 “Frozen” housing market, construction & mortgage lending
 Government cuts, also in social and family-related spending often affect
especially the young
 Stronger enrollment in university education & later home leaving?
 Wasted generation?
EU-27: 14% young adults (age 18-24) NEETs; (Not in Employment, Education or
Training) in 2013; rapid increase across Southern Europe to 29% in IT+GR, 24% in
ESP, 19% in PT
Strong effect of economic instability identified for first births and partnership
formation (also indirect effect on first births); especially for men (Adsera 2005,
2009, 2011; Pailhe 2009; Neels et al 2012; Schmitt 2012; Sobotka et al. 2011)
Trends in the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR), 2000-2013
(Southern Europe, EU, France)
2.20
France
2.00
Pre-recession:
2000-2008
EU
Italy
1.80
Greece
Portugal
Spain
1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Source: Own computations based on Eurostat 2014 and national statistical offices
data
Trends in the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR), 2000-2013
(Southern Europe, EU, France)
2.20
2.00
1.80
France
EU
Italy
1.60
Greece
Portugal
1.40
Spain
1.20
1.00
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Which countries most affected?
Multiple effects of the recession (changes 2007-12)
OECD countries
GDP
UNEMPL.
(<-3%)
(>+5%)
Greece
x
x
Ireland
x
x
Italy
x
x
Spain
x
x
Portugal
x
x
Hungary
x
Estonia
x
Slovenia
x
x
Iceland
x
Slovakia
Denmark
x
Finland
USA
EMPLOYMENT HH INCOME NEETS young WORKLESS HHBuying FOOD
(<-3% or more)
(<-3%)
(>15%)
(>2%)
(>+3%)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
TOTAL
SCORE
7
7
6
6
5
4
4
4
3
2
2
1
4
Outside OECD: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine most
affected
Which countries most affected?
Multiple effects of the recession (changes 2007-12)
OECD countries
GDP
UNEMPL.
(<-3%)
(>+5%)
Greece
x
x
Ireland
x
x
Italy
x
x
Spain
x
x
Portugal
x
x
Hungary
x
Estonia
x
Slovenia
x
x
Iceland
x
Slovakia
Denmark
x
USA
EMPLOYMENT HH INCOME NEETS young WORKLESS HHBuying FOOD
(<-3% or more)
(<-3%)
(>15%)
(>2%)
(>+3%)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Economically most stressed
Economically stressed
TOTAL
SCORE
7
7
6
6
5
4
4
4
3
2
2
4
Outside OECD: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine most
affected
Declines in period TFR between 2008 and 2012
Greece
US
Spain
Denmark
Portugal
OECD: 5 economically most stressed
OECD: 4 economically stressed + US
OECD: 12 other
Slovenia
European Union
Russia
-15.0 -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0
Change in period TFR 2008-12 (%)
Age schedule of childbearing: stronger declines
among young adults
Changes in fertility rates by age, 2008-12: EU, Portugal, and 5
economically most stressed countries
50
EU
40
Economically most stressed
% change in fertility rate
30
Portugal
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
2008-12
-50
15
20
25
Age
30
35
40
SOURCE:
Own computations based on
Eurostat database (2014)
Age schedule of childbearing: stronger declines
among young adults
Changes in fertility rates by age, pre-recession (2004-2008)
compared with the recession (2008-12) period
50
50
EU
40
Economically most stressed
20
10
0
-10
-20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-40
2004-2008
-50
20
25
Age
30
35
Portugal
20
-30
15
Economically most stressed
30
Portugal
% change in fertility rate
% change in fertility rate
30
EU
40
2008-12
-50
40
15
20
25
Age
30
35
40
First births most affected – except in Southern
Europe
Changes in fertility rates by birth order, in % (2008-12)
Percent decline in fertility rates
2.0
0.0
-2.0
-4.0
-6.0
1st births
-8.0
2nd births
-10.0
3rd births
-12.0
-14.0
-16.0
25 countries
Southern Europe
(GRE, ESP, PT)
Portugal
Reproductive preferences
(a joint research with Eva Beaujouan (VID))
Fertility intentions and ideals in Europe
• Remarkable lack of variation, two-child family norm almost universal
• Also no systematic variation by social status, very little difference
between men and women
Mean, women
3.00
Mean intended family size (Women)
Mean intended family
size of men and
women aged 25-29,
selected European
countries, 1990s (FFS
survey) and 2000s
(GGS survey)
2.50
2.00
1.50
FFS surveys (1990s)
GGS surveys (2000s)
1990s (15 countries): 2.18
2000s (10 countries): 2.16
1.00
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
Mean intended family size (Men)
3.00
Fertility intentions and ideals in Portugal
Mean intended family size of women aged 25-29 in 10 European
countries in 2000s (GGS survey): 2.16
Portugal, 2013, women aged 18-29
• Mean desired family size: 2.20
• Mean expected family size: 1.94
(Source: Inquérito à Fecundidade 2013, INE 2014, Figure 2.9)
A convergence in two-child family size ideal in
Europe?
Share of women aged 15-49 stating that an ideal family size is two (%);
Summary of different surveys across Europe
Share of respondents with a two-child ideal (%)
80
70
Portugal
Maximum
75% (upper quartile)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Mean
25% (Lower quartile)
Minimum
SOURCE:
Sobotka, T. and É. Beaujouan. 2014.
“Two is best? The persistence of a
two-child family ideal in Europe.”
Population and Development
Review 40(3): 391-419.
Portugal: Increasing small family size ideal?
Ideal family size in Portugal and Spain, 1981-2011; women aged
15-49 (different surveys)
60
Ideal of 2 children (%)
Mean Ideal Family Size
50
40
3.5
3.0
70
3.0
60
2.5
2.5
2.0
Ideal of 3+ children (%)
1.5
30
20
80
1.0
Ideal of 1 or no children (%)
10
0.5
0
0.0
1981 1990 1994 1995 2000 2001 2006 2011
EVS EVS ISP EVS WVS EB EB EB
Source: Sobotka & Beaujouan 2014
Percent with a given ideal
70
3.5
Mean ideal family size
Percent with a given ideal
80
50
2.0
40
1.5
30
20
1.0
10
0.5
0
0.0
1990 EVS 2001 EB 2006 EB 2011 EB
Mean ideal family size
Portugal
Spain
Government responses to low
fertility & policy debates
Source:
somatosphere.net
Family policy agenda in Europe
1990s and 2000s: Strong interest of governments in family
policies and potential effects of policies on birth rates
• Also clear from the regular UN survey on government views
• Increased spending in most OECD countries
• European Commission 2005: return to “demographic growth” one of
three essential priorities
• EU: policies aiming to support combination of employment and family
life and realisation of reproductive desires
Also promoting gender equality
 Explicit policy goals (e.g., public childcare coverage for children
below age 3)
• Eastern Europe: explicitly pro-natalist policies, also linked to
conservative agenda and nationalistic ideology
2008: cuts in government spending on families in some countries
Many governments think fertility is too low
Number of countries with a given view
Government view on fertility level and government policy on fertility in 22
countries ever reaching a period total fertility rate of 1.40 or below
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
Fertility too low
6
4
Policy to raise fertility
2
0
1996
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Source: UN reports, UN World Population Policy Database;
http://esa.un.org/PopPolicy/about_database.aspx
Public family policy discussions: different
ideological underpinning (stylised versions)
The “gender equality” or “feminist” discourse
• Gender inequality seen as an unfair obstacle for women, but also
to fam. life and fertility (accentuated by Green + Soc. Dem. Parties)
• Policies improving early childcare provision, employment of
women, equal pay, equal opportunities, and stronger involvement
of fathers (including dedicated paternity & parental leaves)
The “conservative” discourse
• Family instability and pressure on women to engage with career
often seen as reasons for low fertility
• Policies supporting marriage and married families with children
The “traditional,” “nationalistic,” or “anti-establishment” discourse
• Low birth rates seen as a threat to the long-term survival of the
nation; usually concerned with the dominant ethnic group, often
anti-migrant.
• Explicitly pronatalist policies, often targeting 2nd or 3rd births
Public family policy discussions: different
ideological underpinning (2)
The “equalization” (socialist/left) discourse
• Lack of resources (incl. housing) and income inequalities seen as
the main obstacles to starting or enlarging a family
• Promoting redistribution through taxes and benefits
The “liberal” discourse
• Perceived need to broaden the choices and options of different
population groups
• Promoting more work and lifestyle flexibility (part-time, flexible jobs,
but also childcare availability), supporting non-traditional families
(gay/lesbian couples, cohabiting couples, registered partnerships).
Also wider access to assisted reproduction
 In political reality, these discourses often mixed (also
pragmatic “shopping around” for different ideas and concepts to
appeal to the voters)
Examples of family policy trends
• Expanding public childcare coverage for children below age 3
(Germany, Austria many EU countries (EU target to achieve at least 33%
coverage in each country)
• Shorter, but well-paid parental leave, with remuneration up to 100% of
the previous wage (Estonia, Germany, Poland). Also stimulating earlier
return to employment
• Flexible leave arrangements: more flexibility in selecting leave period,
“multispeed leave” (Czech Republic, Austria, Germany), fathers and
mothers can flexibly alternate (Norway)
• Stronger involvement of fathers, including extra parental leave for
fathers only (Nordic countries, Germany, Austria)
• Cash support to newborns and children: baby bonus in Spain (200710), childcare allowances in Ukraine, “maternity capital” established at
the time of child’s birth (second births in Russia)
• Tax rebates
Why and when are policy interventions justified?
Diverse policy motivations: Most family-related policies not motivated by
pronatalist concerns
• EU policies: also motivated by “enabling” people to fulfill their fertility
intentions; not explicitly pronatalist
• Is explicit pronatalism justified? And when?
• Is the goal of increasing intended family size justified?
Important considerations
• No unintended consequences?
• Increasing unwanted / unplanned / mistimed / teenage childbearing?
• Financially sustainable? Examples: Maternal capital in Russia,
“maternity grants” in Ukraine, baby bonus in Spain (2007-10)
• Causing more than a short-lived “tempo shift”?
• Addressing the wishes and “needs” of the people desiring to have
children? (Good data & surveys needed!)
Discussion:
Low fertility in Portugal in a
(Southern) European context
Institutional conditions: The family & policy trends
prior to the recession (OECD 2011, 2014; OECD FP database)
Most shared with neighbouring Spain
Most contributing to lower and delayed fertility
• Higher education expansion, especially among women
• Economic uncertainty, especially among young adults: high % of
temporary employment (21% against 11% OECD average in 2007)
• Low government spending on families: Public spending on family
benefits (1.7% in 2009) equal to Spain and below OECD average 2.6%
• The elderly-bias in social spending (Vanhuysse 2013)
• Relatively short parental leave (120 days with 100% income repl.)
• High income inequalities, rising social status stratification in fertility,
lower access to childcare among low-income families?
• Unequal gender division of household labour: stronger disparities than
PL, ESP, comparable to IT, MEX
The recession has accelerated some of the previous family
trends
The “lost generation” of contemporary young adults?
• Sharp fall in fertility & marriage rates, esp. young adults
• Rapidly falling fertility in disadvantaged groups, including migrants
(ESP)
• Birth postponement, declining 2nd and 3rd birth rates
• More uncertainty in intentions among the childless
• Longer stay in parental home? (evidenced in the US)
• More NEETS
Why so low fertility in Portugal?
• Period TFR in Portugal in 2013 (1.21) probably lowest in Europe
• Period TFR showing most rapid decline in Europe after 2000
• Also fast falls in cohort fertility, rapid increase in one-child families
Combination of temporary factors (education expansion,
economic recession) with the long-lasting structural and
institutional factors (employment insecurity, gender inequalities,
limited social spending on families)
 Many of these factors will not go away even if the economy recovers
 Scope for policy action; should consider not only families, but
especially young adults in pre-family stage
Worries about low fertility should not be overdone
• Societies can largely adapt to low fertility
• (Cohort) family size of women still well above the period TFR
(ca. 1.55 in the mid-1970s cohorts)
• Migrants contribute to higher number of births and population
replacement in most European countries (and in Portugal prior
to 2010)
• “Optimal fertility” arguably below replacement due to increased
productivity driven by highly educated workforce and high
costs of education & training (Striessnig and Lutz 2014)
• Low fertility supports higher consumption and thus has a
positive effect on material standard of living (Lee et al. 2014)
tomas.sobotka@oeaw.ac.at
Work on this presentation was funded by the European
Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh
Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Grant
agreement n° 284238 (EURREP).
EURREP website: www.eurrep.org