Federalism Neg
ENDI 4-Week
PC
EMORY
Printz
Index
No Federalism now .............................................................................................................................................. 2-3
No modeling............................................................................................................................................................ 4
No impact ................................................................................................................................................................ 5
Alt causality ............................................................................................................................................................ 6
Link Turn ................................................................................................................................................................ 7
Impact Turn- Fed Bad .......................................................................................................................................... 8-9
1
Federalism Neg
ENDI 4-Week
PC
EMORY
Printz
No Federalism now (1/2)
Federalism is dead States have no power
Wise and O’Leary 92 , Indiana University, Syracuse University
(charles, roesmary, Is Federalism Dead or Alive in the Supreme Court?, jstor)
Second, the Court's assertion in Garcia that the structure of federal politics is in itself sufficient to protect the power and authority of state governments has been dissected by analysts
as "wishful thinking" (Merritt, 1988, p. 15), as "difficult to sup- port" (Field, 1985, p. 109) and as difficult to take as "other than a good-hearted joke" (Van Alstyne, 1985, p. 1724).
The Garcia majority's broad statement that "the political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the states will not be promulgated" (1895, p. 556) would strike many
after reviewing the political and structural
changes in the national govern- ment, such as the rise of national interest group representation and the states no longer being
represented in the Senate, con- cluded, "In sum, the forces of centralization, barely sketched here appear to be overwhelming, while the built-in protec- tions for
states are enfeebled" (Derthick, 1986, p. 34). Finally, the decision in Garcia left the Court's door ajar to revisit the issue when it implied that although the present case did not
administrators managing intergovernmental programs as divorced from the reality of governing. Derthick, for example,
require the Court "[t]o identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the states under the Commerce Clause" (1985,
p. 556), future cases might. This does not mean all state control over policy and admin- istration is lost to the federal government until a new central federalism doctrine is
proclaimed. State and local administra- tors would be mislead if they were to wait for a new post- Garcia doctrine to be enunciated for cases involving direct congressional orders
pursuant to the Commerce Clause to redefine federalism policy. This is not to say that such a redef- inition might not help. It is just that federalism policy affecting public
administration is developed in so many other contexts (such as cases focusing on criminal and regulatory law) that it can not be understood merely in terms of the most clear-cut
challenges such as Garcia. Judicial federalism policy affecting public administration is the accumulation of decisions in diverse functional areas.
Even if the Court wanted to avoid the task of reconciling federal and state power, it cannot do so, because this central issue
reoccurs in individual controversies over particular federal and state policies and administrative actions. Thus, conflict over policy and
administration in diverse areas is the primary bat- tleground for determining federalism policy. Federalism is seldom confronted by the Court head-on, and thus the Court's approach
to federalism is not solidly grounded in any theory of what is required to maintain a fed- eral system of governance or a strong intergovernmental sys- tem of administration. This is
not to say interests of federalism are unrecognized in Supreme Court decisions. On the con- trary, on occasion, they are referred to and discussed and sometimes prevail over other
asserted interests. However, when it comes to federalism, the Court does not appear to employ any core doctrine but, instead, engages in case-by- case balancing in which the state side
of the equation is often represented by phrases that have not been developed by the courts such as "principles of federal/state comity"
Power has shifted to federal government
Wise and O’Leary 92 , Indiana University, Syracuse University
(charles, roesmary, Is Federalism Dead or Alive in the Supreme Court?, jstor)
Thus, originally the states were to occupy the preeminent position in regulation that affected most people's lives. The result was intended to emphasize and preserve pluralism and
localized choice: a regime of law beyond congressional com- mand for uniformity of behavior and law (Van Alstyne, 1987, p. 772). As is well known, the United States has become
more of a national culture and economy, and the expansion of the commerce power by the courts has shifted regulatory priori- ties. This has been occurring for some time. Dubnick and
Gitelson pointed out that the nationalization of regulatory policy took root during the middle 1960s and gained momentum and substantive form during the 1970s (1981, p. 39). They
demonstrated that the federal government has been able to use its legal capacities literally to force subna- tional units to act on behalf of national policies. This action legally and
constitutionally has comprised a revolutionary change in formal American government institutions (Ibid., p. 66; Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1984;
Zimmerman, 1991).2
According to the reasoning in Garcia, this change has pro- gressed to the point where the Supreme Court has
directed the states to ask the national legislature, through the political process, to restrain its national power. Whether for good
or ill, the preeminent regulatory position has shifted to the federal government. The question remaining is, What if anything is left to the states?
Justice Powell, in his Garcia dissent, lament- ed, "Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to relegate the states to precisely the trivial role that opponents of the Constitution
feared they would occupy" (Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al., 1985, p. 575).
The states were, in the Court's eyes, little more than
another special interest group (C. Cooper, 1988, p. 240). (This may
overstate the diminished status of the states a bit, since the geographical basis for representation pushes
senators and rep- resentatives to uphold the interest of their states to some extent.) The fact is, it is not only Congress that can preempt state regulatory authority but federal agencies
as well, even when Congress has not expressly delegated preemptive regulatory authority to those agencies (Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan v. de la Cuesta, 1982, p. 141). The
Supreme Court has held that the regulatory powers of the states can be preempted under any one or a combination of constitutional bases including the Supremacy Clause, the
Spending Clause, and the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has declared several principles under the Supremacy Clause for finding that federal regulations will preempt
state and local regulations: 1. If Congress has delegated its authority to regulate in a particular area to a federal agency and the agency expressly states its intention to preempt state
law in that area; or The fact is, it is not only Congress that can preempt state regulatory authority butfederal agencies as well, even when Congress has not expressly
delegated preemptive regulatory authority to those agencies. 2. If Congress expressly or impliedly states its intention to preempt state regulatory authority, state law is dis- placed
regardless of whether or not it conflicts with federal regulation. 3. Regardless of Congress' intent to preempt, state law is displaced where it conflicts with federal regulation
(Wisconsin Public Intervenor, et al. v. Town of Mortimer, 1991, p. 4757; also Freilich, Connet, and Walters, 1988, p. 893). How this
has increasingly
given federal agencies the
power to significantly circumscribe state regulatory efforts is illustrat- ed by a recent case involving local regulation of cable TV. In the case of
City of New York v. the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (1988, p. 1637), the FCC announced its intention not to regulate signal quality but rather to promul- gate
standards that state and local governments could adopt and enforce. At the same time, however, the FCC forbade state imposition of stricter standards. Municipal governments
protested, arguing that the FCC was not given such authority by Congress in the Cable Communications Act. The Supreme Court found for the FCC, however, stating that absent a
find- ing by the lower court that the action was one that Congress would not have sanctioned, the FCC was within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority. Hence, the FCC
could preempt state regulation, including that which was not other- wise inconsistent with federal law (Ibid., 1988, p. 1645). The only limitation on federal agencies acting to preempt
state authority pursuant to a broad congressional delegation of power is that agencies expressly state their intent to preempt state authority and not merely imply it (California Coastal
Commission v. Granite Rock, 1987, p. 572).
2
Federalism Neg
ENDI 4-Week
PC
EMORY
Printz
No fed now (2/2)
Federalism has tanked
Wise and O’Leary 92 , Indiana University, Syracuse University
(charles, roesmary, Is Federalism Dead or Alive in the Supreme Court?, jstor)
The law was enacted primarily to curb the tax evasion that often occurs with the use of nonregistered "bearer" bonds. Bearer bond ownership is determined simply by who has physical
possession of the bond. Transfer of ownership of bearer bonds occurs merely by handing the bond to another person. Registered bonds, on the other hand, require that a state or local
government issuer keep a record of the owners of the bonds, including all ownership changes. By removing the tax-exempt status for bearer bonds and retaining the tax- exempt status
for registered bonds, Congress had de facto mandated the use only of registered bonds by state and local governments. The Supreme Court, overruling the case of Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. (1895, p. 429)-a case that had been precedent for over 90 years-reaffirmed its position espoused in the Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority case,
discussed above. Holding that Tenth Amendment limits to Congress' authority to regulate state activities are structural, not substantive, the Court maintained that the states must find
their protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not through the judiciary. No
constitutional protection is available to state
and local governments in this instance, the court held, and would not come into play unless the national political process
operates in "a defective manner" to the detriment of a state. The Court did not say what would constitute a "defective man- ner." The implications of South
Carolina v. Baker for the opera- tion of state and local governments are several. As Justice O'Connor's dissent stated, if Congress is able to tax local
and state bond interest, "it may strike at the very heart of state and local government activities" (1988, p. 1082).
The acknowledg- ment of this power in the hands of Congress is seen by many as the demise of federalism, the end of any Tenth
Amendment immunity for states, and the posing of immense challenges for state and local governments. Critics ask: Where will Congress stop? Many view the decision as opening
the door to a direct tax on state and local governments. Wrightson (1989, p. 55) urged state and local government officials to "plan for the worst in their policy dealings with the national
government, while doing their best to improve the odds." In May 1988, the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) issued the following policy statement: In as much as
when the federal government interferes through taxation with
sovereign activi- ties, it destroys the ability of state and local gov- emments to be meaningful partners contributing to the
vitality of the economy. Tax immunity must also remain reciprocal in order to maintain the delicate balance of power between
the states and the federal government (Government Finance Officers Association, 1988). Both the GFOA and the National Governors' Association (NGA) are
the power to tax remains the power to destroy, Congress and the President must recognize that
calling on Congress to amend the Constitution to exempt state and local bonds from federal taxation. The NGA also is calling for an amendment that would give states a right under
Article V of the Constitution to amend that docu- ment without calling for a constitutional convention. The NGA has suggested that a commission on federalism be creat- ed to study
the appropriate balance between federal and state governments and to proffer advice to Congress concerning the "steps needed to retain or restore balance in the federal sys- tem"
(National Governors' Association, 1988). Finally, the National Association of State Treasurers, as well as the Council of State Legislatures, convened task forces to consider alternatives to amending the Constitution, especially state initiatives and lobbying for congressional restraint. Given the prevalence of the use of the property tax to finance state and local
government activities, the case of Is Federalism Dead or Alive in the Supreme Court? 567 Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster (1989, p. 633) may
have even more widespread
olved in the public life of a poli- ty"
The supreme court does not recognize state power
Clewett 3 Associate Editor of State Government News
(Laurie,Federalism in flux, http://www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/sgn0310FederalismFlux.pdf)
Dresang’s comments echoed those made by Nagel as he described the Supreme Court’s relationship to the states in recent
years. Although many observers have remarked on the Court’s apparent embrace of federalism and its deference to states’
rights, Nagel said its record really shows “a very shallow form of respect and deference for state officials.” Those cases during the
1990s that were hailed as the beginning of a federalism revolution – which dealt with the commerce clause, the “commandeering” of state governments by
national laws, and state sovereign immunity – really did not affect the national government’s regulatory power, Nagel said. “The bulk of the national power to
regulate remains in place and did so throughout this so-called revolutionary period.” In addition, he said, to understand the Court’s overall record,
one must look not only at these federalism cases, but also at cases that deal with individual rights. Every time the national
government expands individual rights, it limits states’ authority to set policy over their own residents. “If you look at the record
of states’ rights and individual rights over the same period of time, what you see is … an enormous lack of respect and
deference for state institutions and state decisionmaking, and a concomitant decrease in the scope of regulatory power for the states.” “There are
many, many [cases] from grand, important issues like abortion to more technical, lower visibility issues … in which time after time the Supreme Court
deprecates the decisions of state legislatures and state officials in general,” Nagel said. Even those cases that, on the surface, appear to uphold state power
really indicate a preference for national authority when more closely examined, according to Nagel. In Grutter v. Bollinger, for example, one of the Michigan
affirmative action cases the Court heard during the last term, it held that the University of Michigan Law School may use race as an admissions criteria,
deferring to the law school’s judgment that diversity is essential to its educational mission. “But why are they to be deferred to?” Nagel asked. “Because this is
the judgment that was already made by Justice Powell several decades ago and had become the established law of the land because state officials were
following the instructions laid out by the Supreme Court. … What the court is really respecting and deferring to here is its own decision in the Bakke case”
(University of California Regents v. Bakke, 1978). Looking at the Court’s record during this past term and at its overall record for the last 15 years, “the
message that I see reading these decisions carefully,” Nagel said, “is essentially that when states follow the judgment and the
policies laid out by the national government – and especially by the Supreme Court – then they are entitled to great respect, but
not otherwise.” The Supreme Court’s apparent preference for national power over state power should come as no surprise, Nagel
said. Although the framers of the Constitution saw the states as “a source of important competition to the national government on both policy and the meaning
of the Constitution itself,” the very nature of the judicial function makes it difficult for judges to encourage or support this competition. Judges have to settle
disputes authoritatively, by showing that one side is right while the other is wrong, attempting to answer questions definitively. “ So judges as a matter of
habit … are not likely to respect over the long run this sort of messy, but in the end, ennobling, political process that is or was supposed to be our
system of federalism,” said Nagel. “The institutions you have to look to for independence of judgment and strength of will, for open-mindedness,” Nagel
said, “are not the people on the Supreme Court, but the people who occupy state legislative chambers.
3
Federalism Neg
ENDI 4-Week
PC
EMORY
Printz
No modeling
Federalism will not be modeled- little influence
Wisniewski, 2005 Program Officer @ Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Master of Science in
Foreign Service degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service
(Jason R., “Engaging Putin’s Russia: Challenges and Opportunities for the West,” Schlesinger Working Group Report, spring,
http://isd.georgetown.edu/SWG_Putin%202005.pdf)
Interviewing implications for U.S. policy, many group members expressed doubt about the Putin government’s ability to successfully tackle Russia’s
underlying challenges and move the country away from one of these negative end-points and towards a positive trajectory. Members also generally
agreed that the U.S. had only a limited capacity to influence these developments—especially the internal ones—in the short term,
although debate remained about the U.S. ability to influence Russia in the long-run. The group concluded that, to the extent
that important U.S. interests continue to be at stake in Russian developments, the U.S. should remain selectively engaged
with Russia. At the same time the U.S. should avoid exaggerating Russia’s geopolitical relevance in strategically important areas, such as the Middle East
or Balkans where it has been less than helpful
Federalism will not be modeled- no influence
Zlobin 05 Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C.,
and the Editor of Demokratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization
(Nikolai Zlobin, Limited Possibilities and Possible Limitations, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/printver/822.html)
Washington’s strategy has proven to be erroneous: the possibilities for its influence on Moscow have decreased dramatically,
while Russia is now farther away from democracy than it was four years ago . (In all fairness, it must be said that, apart from the White
House’s position, these developments were also caused by objective factors: the high oil prices and economic growth in Russia have made it independent of
international financial institutions.)
Thus, two different U.S. strategies vis-И-vis Moscow have proven to be unsuccessful. Today, there is no unity in the American Establishment
as to what policy should be pursued toward Russia, as there is simply no more enthusiasm for the project . The Bush administration
has ceased to regard Russia as a strategic ally. The reason is not only the problems affecting Russia, but the White House’s general approach to international
relations. Actually, Washington has ceased to rely on allies, and its foreign policy rests on the assumption that the United States,
the world’s most powerful military, political and economic nation, does not need strategic support from the outside. America
can (and does) accept support from other countries within the frameworks of temporary coalitions set up to solve one or another problem, but tomorrow it
may lose interest in these countries, or even declare them enemies. Unfortunately, the Washington-Moscow relationship now works according to this
principle.
The transition to tactical military and political cooperation and, using what U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has called a “flexible” coalition,
strategically leads U.S.-Russian relations nowhere. Yet, it is convenient to the microscopic part of the Establishment in both countries which has
monopolized the bilateral contacts; this monopolization is yet another serious obstacle to progress. Washington continues the practice of focusing its efforts
on individual groups and personalities in Russia. This model has long exhausted itself, and its further use will effectively discredit the partnership idea.
4
Federalism Neg
ENDI 4-Week
PC
EMORY
Printz
No impact
No impact-Federalism is a cycle
Beland and Vergniolle 2004 Canada Research Chair in Public Policy at the University of Saskatchewan, and
historical institutionalism
(Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle, Fighting ‘Big Government’: Frames, Federalism, and Social Policy Reform in the United States.”
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html)
when it comes to conservative social issues like "family values" and "personal responsibility," the critique of federal "big
government" loses much of its political appeal and "moral centralization" prevails. Out analysis of the 1996 welfare reform provides ground to
Yet
this claim. The US Ideological Repertoire and Social Policy Centralization While the logic of "competitive state-building" usually characterizes the institutional
logic of Canada's inter-state federalism, US intra-state federalism has transformed regional entities (states) into institutionalized interest
groups represented directly in the federal legislative body (Senate). In intra-state federalism, regional discontents--for example the
US southern states' opposition to generous welfare benefits during the New Deal and the post-war era--are generally expressed
through the federal legislative process, never through formal bargaining between the states and the federal government (as it is the
case in inter-state federalism). In a way, this logic of intra-state federalism has contributed to a more radical, path-dependent centralization of
the US welfare state partly because the states have no formal institutional means (for example, the equivalent of federal-provincial conferences) to fight
against the gradual increase in federal government's social and economic interventions
Federalism cycles- Medicaid proves
Nathan 05 Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University at Albany, State
University of New York
(Richard P. Nathan, FederalismAndHealthPolicy, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/24/6/1458.pdf)
Medicaid’s experience demonstrates an important, related characteristic of U.S. federalism: its cyclicality. Generally, over time, the
national government has been the source of social policy initiatives in liberal periods in our history. In conservative periods, on the other hand, some states have
been sources of innovation and expansion in the social sector. In the 1920s, for example, when the country was “Keeping Cool with Coolidge,”
states were the source of progressive initiatives such as unemployment insurance, public assistance, and workers’ compensation.
James T. Patterson noted that the states “preceded the federal government in regulating large corporations, establishing minimum labor
standards, and stimulating economic development.”3 He added that “the most remarkable development in state government in the
1920s was the increase in spending.”4 State initiatives planted the seeds of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal.
The key to the argument about the essentially pro-governmental activist influence of federalism cycles over time is to convince the reader that in
liberal times nationally, recalcitrance and opposition to change by some states have not been as important for social policy as the state-push factor in conservative
periods.
The historical record and the Medicaid experience support this position, but I grant that definitive proof is a hard standard
to satisfy for theories of this kind.
5
Federalism Neg
ENDI 4-Week
PC
EMORY
Printz
Alt causality
Alt causality- no child left behind killed federalism
Reeher 08 associate professor of political science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs. Syracuse University
(Grant Reeher, Will States Get Help From Feds This Time? The Post-Standard , jstor)
Wars always increase the power of the national government, and the effects often extend to the domestic sphere. This war has been no
different.
But war isn't the whole story. No Child Left Behind, the president's signature domestic policy initiative, represents a striking shift
toward greater national control over an arena that had been left mostly to the states. The law included funding to support its
implementation, but state administrators assert that full compliance requires them to tap their own scarce resources. Across party lines,
many state legislatures and governors have bitterly resisted the law's testing-based accountability requirements, limited funding, and
what they claim are its harmful effects on actual learning.
No child left behind has killed federalism
Shippy 06 Patrick Henry College, Bachelor of Arts in Government
,
(Paul Shippy hat Has Happened to Federalism? The Conflict over No Child Left Behind, http://www.tpaulshippy.com/Federalism&Education.htm)
Although NCLB is an extension of this worthy effort, it has radically changed the federal-state relationship on the issue of
education. No longer is the federal government simply providing funds to help disadvantaged students while leaving the details of the programs to the states.
Now the federal government has specified that every student in America must meet a standard, determined which standard is
acceptable, and regulated the details of how progress is measured. This level of regulation imposed upon the states by the federal government
is unprecedented in our nation’s history, at least in this area. Not only have relations between the federal and state governments been
damaged by the conflict over the law, the very nature of federalism has been altered. As Patrick McGuinn of Drew University put it,
NCLB “has created a new educational federalism in the United States” (McGuinn 2005, 68).
Conflict over the No Child Left Behind Act has arisen in the United States from the perceived lack of adequate funding, and criticism about inflexibility and
intrusiveness. While it may be cheap to administer a test, the costs of actually teaching the material being tested are much higher, according to educators, and none
of these costs are provided by NCLB. It is laudable to ensure a quality educational standard for every student, but can the federal government effectively determine
when and how a student is educated well? While NCLB is criticized as both unfunded and one-size-fits-all, what happens to the nation’s political system? How are
the people being represented when the states are in conflict with the federal government over the care of their most precious interests, their children? NCLB has
created this conflict, and thereby damaged federalism.
6
Federalism Neg
ENDI 4-Week
PC
EMORY
Printz
Link Turn
Turn- An increase in federal action increases state power
openjurist.org 85
(768 F2d 1077 Granite Rock Company v. California Coastal Commission, http://openjurist.org/768/f2d/1077)
Similarly, the Senate Report demonstrates Congress's intent not to restore state authority within the coastal zone if a federal act otherwise preempts it over a
specific subject matter. In its statement of the CZMA's purpose, the Senate explained that the CZMA is merely a cooperative funding
provision that "has as its main purpose the encouragement and assistance of States in preparing and implementing
management programs to preserve, protect, develop and whenever possible restore the resources of the coastal zone of the
United States." S.Rep. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4776, 4776. The Senate indicated that the
CZMA is designed to promote this purpose of "enhanc[ing] state authority," id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at
4776, through the means of providing "Federal grants-in-aid to coastal states to develop coastal zone management programs
[and] ... grants to help coastal states implement these management programs once approved." Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. &
Ad.News at 4776. See also Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 104 S.Ct. 656, 659, 78 L.Ed.2d 496 (1984) (Secretary of the Interior).
These grants were intended only to give coastal states an incentive "to exercise their full authority over the lands and waters
in the coastal zone," 16 U.S.C. Sec. 1451(h) (emphasis added), and not to restore authority that the states might previously have
lost through federal preemption. See S.Rep. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4795 ("There are no
changes in existing law resulting from this legislation.").
7
Federalism Neg
ENDI 4-Week
PC
EMORY
Printz
Impact Turn- Fed Bad (1/2)
Federalism amplifies conflicts- empirical evidence
Lyons 4/09 Department of Political Science at The University of Akron
(Bill Lyons, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL,
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/miller0409.htm)
In THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM Lisa Miller has produced a powerfully thoughtful empirical analysis
of the various ways that
American federalism amplifies some conflicts and mutes others in our ongoing debates about how best to reduce the harms
associated with crime and punishment. Miller analyzes news accounts, lobbying disclosure forms, transcripts of key informant interviews, and hundreds
of legislative committee meetings at local, state and Congressional levels and concludes that the ways that crime control debates migrate,
from local city councils to state legislatures to the US Congress, have “significant implications for how we conceptualize crime
and its consequences” (p.172). The broad-based, quality-of-life concerns articulated by the citizen groups who dominate the more democratically vibrant
local venues are gradually reframed as simply calls for more police and more extreme forms of punishment as representatives “truncate a broad range of
concerns into narrow, readily accessible frames that are continually reproduced by the policy process at the state and national
levels” (p.172).
Federalism increases crime
Lyons 4/09 Department of Political Science at The University of Akron
(Bill Lyons, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL,
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/miller0409.htm)
The pragmatic and holistic perspectives that citizens bring to these debates at city council meetings is squeezed out by a federalist system more attentive to the
bureaucratic interests of police and prosecutors than to problem solving in those communities most victimized by crime. Federalism provides multiple
pathways of access, but the two pathways with resources (state and national) construct the concerns of a narrow, professionalized, and
affluent elite as salient, while marginalizing the publics who are concerned about a larger menu of inter-related quality-of-life
issues by framing their concerns and their communities as outside the mainstream policy process. As Miller puts it, “This book
argues that U.S. federalism shapes the representation of group interests and the policy environments at each level of government in
ways that severely underrepresent the interests of citizens facing serious crime victimization – most frequently the poor and racial
minorities” (p.5).
The structures of American federalism create an interest group politics at local, state and national levels that favors more punitive
and volitional approaches to crime than is supported by the concerns and perspectives of those living in closest proximity to
criminal victimization. And as crime control debates move from one venue to another, Miller’s data demonstrate that narrow parochialism, insulating
lawmakers from effective citizen influence, is not unique to politics at the local level. In fact, the “federalization of [*239] crime control – that is the
presence of crime control as an active agenda item at all three levels of government – generates a systematic bias in the interest
group environment across levels of government. Highly active single-issue groups and crime control bureaucracies are mobilized
into the political process at the state and national levels while broad citizen groups . . . are mobilized out of it” (p.7, italics in original).
8
Federalism Neg
ENDI 4-Week
PC
EMORY
Printz
Impact Turn- Fed Bad (2/2)
Federalism increases crime
Lyons 4/09 Department of Political Science at The University of Akron
(Bill Lyons, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL,
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/miller0409.htm)
Miller concludes that her data document a “representational bias of federalism” (p.27) that helps us understand
how “the
federalization of crime generates bloated criminal justice agency budgets and crime frames fixated on punishing offenders and
depoliticizes citizen engagement” (p.179), while leaving bureaucratic agencies “largely insulated from public pressure for actually
resolving crime problems” (p.180), and creating powerful obstacles reducing the ability of “local groups to reframe the crime issue
beyond the reactive, punishment-oriented frame that characterizes most policy making” (p.183).
The data presented in this book make it clear that citizens have more control over local government leaders, perhaps because local
governments are the most impoverished of the three levels, and as Katznelson (1976: 220) put it, this leaves local leaders only able to try
to “manage [*241] the consequences of their inability to solve urban problems.” According to Miller’s data, as government becomes more able
to act, citizen voices are first muted in local political spectacle and then systematically ignored in state and national policy making and resource allocation.
Those living in communities of concentrated disadvantage then, can add this additional disadvantage (though this will not likely come as
news to these residents): the system is structured to favor making salient those conflicts found at the intersection of narrow and largely white interest groups with
the resources to hawk designer messages and the bureaucratic imperatives of criminal justice agencies. This study carefully and persuasively unpacks
and reveals how the structure of federalism creates pathways of access that enable precisely this type of skewed interest group
dynamic, a dynamic that is at least partly responsible for decades of ineffective, and extremely punitive, crime policies.
9