The feature TENSE and the Simple
Present in Truth-Conditional Pragmatics
Kasia Jaszczolt
University of Cambridge
http://www.cus.cam.ac.uk/~kmj21
IPrA panel Expressions of Time in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface,
Riva del Garda, 15 July 2005
1
Temporality and tense in DRT (Kamp and Reyle
1993; Kamp, van Genabith & Reyle forthcoming)
2
Temporality and tense in DRT (Kamp and Reyle
1993; Kamp, van Genabith & Reyle forthcoming)
Contextual input to representation structures (DRT
and Default Semantics, Jaszczolt 2005)
3
Temporality and tense in DRT (Kamp and Reyle
1993; Kamp, van Genabith & Reyle forthcoming)
Contextual input to representation structures (DRT
and Default Semantics, Jaszczolt 2005)
Merger representations (Jaszczolt 2003, 2005)
4
Temporality and tense in DRT (Kamp and Reyle
1993; Kamp, van Genabith & Reyle forthcoming)
Contextual input to representation structures (DRT
and Default Semantics, Jaszczolt 2005)
Merger representations (Jaszczolt 2003, 2005)
Merger representation for Simple Present expressing
futurity
5
Temporality and tense in DRT (Kamp and Reyle 1993; Kamp,
van Genabith & Reyle forthcoming)
Contextual input to representation structures (DRT and Default
Semantics, Jaszczolt 2005)
Merger representations (Jaszczolt 2003, 2005)
Merger representation for Simple Present expressing futurity
Conclusion: truth-conditional semantics or pragmatics?
6
(1) Mary will go to the opera tomorrow night.
(2) Mary is going to the opera tomorrow night.
Mary goes to the opera tomorrow night.
(4) Mary is going to go to the opera tomorrow
night.
(3)
7
‘The algorithm must represent the temporal
information that is contained in the tense of a
sentence and in its temporal adverb (if there is one).’
Kamp & Reyle (1993: 512)
8
‘…[the feature] TENSE has three possible values,
past, present, and future, signifying that the described
eventuality lies before, at, or after the utterance time,
respectively. The value of TENSE for a given
sentence S is determined by the tense of the verb of S.
When the main verb is in the simple past, TENSE =
past; when it is in the simple present, TENSE = pres;
and when the verb complex contains the auxiliary
will, TENSE = fut.’
Kamp & Reyle (1993: 512-513)
9
(5)
(6)
Tom plays with the Cambridge Philharmonia.
Tom plays in the Royal Albert Hall tomorrow.
10
‘bottom-up’ vs. ‘top-down’ pragmatic
enrichment (Stanley 2002 vs. Recanati 2002,
2004)
Various uses to which Simple Present can be
put in English are well handled by a
contextualist (‘top-down’) account.
11
Default Semantics
(Jaszczolt 2002; 2003; 2005, forthcoming)
quasi-contextualism
merger representations
12
Stage I
combination of word meaning
and sentence structure
compositional
merger representation
conscious pragmatic inference 1
social-cultural defaults1
cognitive defaults
Stage II

social-cultural defaults2

conscious pragmatic inference 2
Fig. 1
Pragmatic information, such as the output of CD,
SCD 1 and CPI 1, contributes to the truth-conditional
content of the utterance.
The representation of the truth-conditional content is
a merger of information from (i) word meaning and
sentence structure, (ii) conscious pragmatic processes,
and (iii) default meanings. Merger representation.
14
Default Semantics uses an adapted and
extended formalism of DRT but applies it to
the output of the merger of these sources of
meaning.
15
(1) Mary will go to the opera tomorrow night.
(regular future)
16
netx
et
n<t
tomorrow night (t)
Mary (x)
e
go to the opera (x)
(2) Mary is going to the opera tomorrow
night. (futurative progressive)
(3) Mary goes to the opera tomorrow night.
(‘tenseless future’, Dowty 1979)
18
Grice’s (2001) Equivocality Thesis: Modals
are univocal across the practical/alethic
divide.
Acc – modal operator, ‘it is (rationally)
acceptable that’
19
Acc ￂp
‘it is acceptable that it is the case
that p’
Acc ! p
‘it is acceptable that let it be that p’
20
Stage I
combination of word meaning
and sentence structure
compositional
merger representation
conscious pragmatic inference 1
social-cultural defaults1
cognitive defaults
Stage II

social-cultural defaults2

conscious pragmatic inference 2
Fig. 1
xte
[Mary]CD (x)
tomorrow night (t)
ACCn e
e:
[x go to the opera]WS
generalized MR: rf, fp, tf
xte
[Mary]CD (x)
tomorrow night (t)
[ACCrf e]WS,CD
e:
regular future
[x go to the opera]WS
xte
[Mary]CD (x)
tomorrow night (t)
[ACCfp e]WS, CPI 1
e:
futurative progressive
[x go to the opera]WS
xte
[Mary]CD (x)
tomorrow night (t)
[ACCtf e]WS, CPI 1
e:
tenseless future
[x go to the opera]WS
Gradation of modality: strength of informative intention
tf
1
fp
rf
0
M
s〚Pt1,…,tn〛s'
iff s = s' and {〚t1〛M,s,…, 〚tn〛M,s}  I(P)
So,
n
M
〚ACC
e〛
s

s' iff s= s' and
i.
〚e〛M,s  I(ACCn)
ii.
ACCn  {[ACCn]CD , [ACCn]CPI}
iii.
=├
Conclusions
The general notion of modality (Acc)
subsumes various expressions of futurity (rf,
fp, tf). It can be translated into the DStheoretic operator ACCΔn.
28
Conclusions
The general notion of modality (Acc)
subsumes various expressions of futurity (rf,
fp, tf). It can be translated into the DStheoretic operator ACCΔn.
ACCΔn, combined with CD and CPI 1, allows
for representing the degrees of modality and
the degrees of informative intentions
associated with the acts of communication that
make use of these different forms.
29
Pragmatic composition view:
‘…even if the semantic value of a word is fixed by
language (and context, if saturation is necessary),
composing it with the semantic values for other
words often requires help from above [top-down
process, KJ]. It is semantic composition which has a
fundamentally pragmatic character.’
Recanati (2003:139).
30
Merger representations are compositional.
They are mental representations that are
coarse-grained equivalents of thoughts.
31
Merger representations are compositional.
They are mental representations that are
coarse-grained equivalents of thoughts.
Merger representations have truth conditions.
32
Merger representations are compositional. They are
mental representations that are coarse-grained
equivalents of thoughts.
Merger representations have truth conditions.
Default Semantics applies the amended and extended
DRT mechanism to merger representations (e.g.
incorporation of the operator on eventualities ACC e)
33
A disclaimer: Interactive Default Semantics is
not an alternative to DRT: it uses its tools ‘one
level higher’, to the analysis of acts of
intentional communication. Compositionality
is predicated of the representations of these
acts.
34
K.M. Jaszczolt, 2005, Default Semantics:
Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of
Communication, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
35
Select references
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Jaszczolt, K.M. 2005. Default Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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36
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