The Limits to Europeanization
Kevin Featherstone
LSE
The limits…
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Ontological and empirical;
Problems with the independent variable;
Problems with the dependent variable;
Determining the intervening variables.
The independent variable?
• The source of the stimulus? What is
‘Europe’ ?
• We attribute diverse qualities to ‘Europe’ – without clear
definition. Explanatory rigour v. popular discourse.
• ‘Europe’ has a meaning greater than specific EU obligations.
• Delineate ‘transnational’ European pressures:
– Multi-dimensional: socio-cultural; economic; political.
– Actors: perceptions, understandings, norms, and values.
– Is there a European ‘model’? What is there to import into
the domestic system? Coherence and consistency.
Identifying the subject…
• Who are ‘we’?
– No ‘European ‘demos’: with whom do we
identify? Frames direction, purpose.
– Inclusion, exclusion: defining the boundaries of
‘Europe’ – historically, geographically,
culturally, etc. (shifting conceptions, crosscutting cleavages). Turkey?
– A changing ‘we’: multi-ethnic, multicultural.
The EU as the independent
variable
• ‘EU-isation’: EU explains domestic change.
• EU attributes: domestic opinion can ascribe to EU
qualities beyond matters of legal competence.
Expectations, understandings, tactics: e.g. identity
cards, privatisation.
• What is shared in the EU?
– Shifting understandings of the EU’s mission.
– Post Cold War: EU lacks a shared ‘narrative’ (T G Ash).
Affects domestic response & impacts.
Linking mechanisms vary:
• Form of stimulus: ‘hard law’ (regulations,
directives etc.) versus ‘soft law’ (open method of
coordination / Lisbon 2000 agenda). Differences
of ‘commitment device’: e.g. EMU v. Lisbon.
• Direction of stimulus: not just ‘top-down’ – EU
impact on domestic level – also ‘bottom-up’ –
national inputs at EU level. Interactive linkages.
• 2 complex arenas: EU institutional setting &
domestic institutional setting. Ontological
distinctions between structure & agency ?
‘Causality’?
• Independent variable: common EU
commitments, stimuli.
• Intervening variable: domestic
‘institutional’ conditions frame responses &
explain divergent outcomes.
• Dependent variable: domestic adaptation,
shifts. Comparison between member states.
The dependent variable: what is
changing?
• Politics: ideas (beliefs), interests, strategies.
• Polity: administrative adjustments, change
in processes and institutions.
• Policy: beliefs, agendas, content,
implementation.
Effects: breadth/scope?; depth?; permanent?
Asymmetrical empowerment.
Explaining divergent outcomes:
intervening variables
• Role of ‘Agency’ - intentional/unintentional
(Ioakimides). Discourse: legitimating adaptation
to EU (Schmidt, 2002).
• Role of ‘Structure’: follow ‘new institutionalism’.
– ‘misfit’ between EU & domestic (Knill & Lenschow,
1998). Adaptation most likely when EU does not
challenge core structures & practices.
– ‘push-pull’ (Boerzel, 2000): adaptation depends on
misfit & mobilisation of domestic actors in support.
– ‘Reform capacity’ (A. Heritier et al, 2001): a typology
of domestic conditions producing high/low capacity for
change.
Domestic Vetoes
• Hypotheses:
– Distances between veto players & their number will
determine adaptation (Tsebelis, 2002).
– the higher the number of veto points, the less likely is
adaptation (Heritier & Knill, 2000).
• Distinguish between:
– Individual & collective veto players (Tsebelis, 2002)
– Competitive (diffuse) / collective (consensual) veto
points (Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998)
– Formal (de jure) / informal (de facto) veto points
(Heritier & Knill, 2000).
Path dependence of domestic
system: resistence to change
• Corporatist model – interest mediation.
– Greek exceptionalism: state corporatism’;‘disjointed’;
‘parentela pluralism’. Clientelism; rent-seeking.
• ‘Varieties of capitalism’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001).
– Different institutional types shape economic
performance & responses to external pressures.
– Distinguish: liberal market economies (UK);
coordinated market economies (Germany; Sweden).
Greek exceptionalism?
• ‘Mediterranean capitalism’ ?(Amable, 2003); high
regulation, low competition.
• state capitalist ? (Schmidt, 2004);
– State mediates inter-firm relations; centrality of state in
econ dev.; heavy regulation; adversarial labour
relations.
• ‘mixed market economies’ (Molina & Rhodes,
2005).
– Unions & employers: strong, but fragmented. Problems
in delivering collective goods, sustaining coordination.
Identifying the constraints…
• Crude paradox in Greece: general discourse v.
opposition on distributional issues.
• Low state institutional capabilities
(implementation).
• Conflicting political interests (electoral,
clientelistic) undermines policy leadership.
• Disjointed, skewed union / employer
representation. Absence of stable social dialogue.
• Weakness of technocratic policy legitimation.
The research challenge: ‘Europe’
• ‘Unpack’ conceptual frame:
– Clear hypotheses: identifying the linking
mechanisms between EU stimuli and domestic
response. Distinguish actors & structures. [Also
assess depth & scope; permanence.]
– Causality – not coincidence, co-variance.
– Distinguish EU from other external pressures.
– ‘Europeanisation’: a predisposition to find
effects.
The research challenge: domestic
‘model’
• What ‘variety of capitalism’ in Greece?
Hypothesis: structures interests, behaviour and
produces domestic resistance. Show link with:
– State-centric. Heavy market regulation.
– Structure of firms: few big, many small.
– Employment pattern: importance of agriculture & selfemployment; few part-time. Black economy. High
labour costs.
– Clientelism, corruption.
• Stress here is on rational self interest, not values.
The limits to Europeanisation:
• Avoid fuzzy, aggregate assumptions of EU links &
effects. Primacy of EU impact? Rigour of research
design.
• Resilience to domestic change: rational interests
drawn from current ‘model’. Greek
exceptionalism explains membership behaviour?
• Changing identities, attributes of ‘Europe’.
Divergent national perceptions, expectations of
obligations, opportunities with direct/indirect links
to EU competences.
• Issues here of governability & coordination.