Responding to Terrorism:
Is the New Department of
Homeland Security the Answer?
National Center for Digital Government
Lewis Branscomb, Harvard University
Situation calls for new approach
to policy research & design
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New problems, poor fit to government
experience and structure. Even to ways of
thinking about roles of government.
High stakes, high levels of uncertainty.
Congress and administration are accustomed
to hot and cold war in which policy research
was thought to play a relatively minor role
What is needed is applicable social science
knowledge, coupled with technology options
New structure is needed to design the new
structure!
Policy analysis vs Policy design
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Analysis is necessary but not sufficient;
assumes existence of institutions for decision
Policy design focuses on effective action and
may not be analytically optimum
Absent a receptor for advice, able to act,
focus must be on case for action
Who were the receptors, post 9-11?
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Jack Marburger?
Gov. Ridge?
Congress?
Critical Role of Information in
Public Policy Formulation
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Can diffusion of information about the
new situation catch up with the need
for decisions?
Can government organize to acquire,
process and utilize a vast range of new
kinds of information?
What will be the sources of this
information?
OUTLINE
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Nature of the threat
Sources of vulnerability
Technical responses to the threats
Technical strategies
S&T priorities
Structural Issues in government
[1] Nature of the domestic,
catastrophic terrorism threat
Three Policy areas for
Protecting Our Society
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Foreign Policies
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Domestic Policies
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Policies to reduce poverty, injustice, authoritarian
rule, religious zealotry, are the only long term
solutions
Military strategies to discourage aid to terrorists
Trying to find all potential terrorists in the USA,
risking denial of civil liberties at home.
Hardening Potential Targets
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Mix of technical economic and behavioral isssues.
Asymmetric Warfare: How might
science and technology help?
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Cold War: asymmetry of Soviet ground forces
balanced by NATO technology.
Catastrophic terrorism is the ultimate in
asymmetric conflict;
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Now the asymmetry is reversed.
Each terrorist threat is in some ways a new
conflict.
Organized terrorism is the “privatization of war.”
To what extent can S&T compensate for the
reverse-asymmetry in terrorism threat?
The Terrorists’ Advantage
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Stealth and patience
Operatives under deep cover inside USA
International base of operations
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Possible type III terrorism – non-state
terrorists with rogue state support
Unknown and idiosyncratic objectives
Lack of clear political or military goals,
thus lack of any clear end game.
Offsetting Terrorists’ Advantage
with Technology and Operations
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Global intelligence and military
presence.
Possibility of making targets less
vulnerable, thus less attractive.
Possibility of damage limitation.
Possibility of enhanced recovery.
Possibility of forensic analysis.
Structural Problems Inhibiting
Contribution of Technology
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State and municipal governments have the
main responsibility for responding to attack,
mitigating harm, recovery.
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Severe deficits; have received little federal money
Have limited S&T resources
Private industry owns many if not most of the
targets; Who will harden them?
Federal government is responsible for
borders, intelligence and technology
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But almost all of the technical experience and
talent is outside the new Department of HS.
Terrorism threat does not fit
the conventional categories
War
Criminal justice
Foreign
Domestic
Temporary
Continuing
Federal
State and local
High tech
Low tech
Government
Industry
LMB assessment of progress
since 9-11-01 in preparedness
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Large cities and states are very active, but
have no money, little S&T resource.
Private sector owns most targets, awaits
Federal guidance on who is responsible.
Federal efforts stalled, awaiting new
Department
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No S&T for CT strategy ready for implementation
FY 2003 Budget for CT R&D only $0.5B
New Department has no budget yet
S&T departments/agencies are initiating many small uncoordinated efforts
Fed. Gov’t is infatuated with Iraq and WMD
New department is not sufficient
Sources of Vulnerability
Sources of Vulnerability
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Terrorists did not create them; science and
economics did.
They are a consequence of highly efficient
and interconnected systems we rely on for
key services -- transportation, information,
energy, food, finance, and health care.
Calls for a new, more resilient political
economy:
Ecological Economics
Slide 2
Critical Infrastructures
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85 % of US Infrastructure systems are owned
and run by private firms; not government.
They are deeply technically interdependent:
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Domino effects
Leads to threat of multiple, simultaneous attacks
What are government/industry
responsibilities? How can government
motivate industry investment in hardening?
How can the economy be both sustainable
and resilient?
[3] Varied nature of threats and
technical responses
Dual-Use Strategy: Imbedding
S&T strategy in civil economy
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Search for technologies that reduce
costs or provide ancillary benefits to
civil society to ensure
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increase likelihood that industry will invest in
hardening critical infrastructure;
more sustainable effort against terrorist threats
integration of HS R&D with rest of societal
research and engineering base
Possible Targets
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Human health and food systems
Energy systems
Communications and information services
Transportation systems (air, sea & land)
Cities and fixed infrastructure (buildings,
water supply, tunnels & bridges, people)
People and their response to terrorism
Institutions of government, real and symbolic
Terrorists’ Weapons
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Nuclear and radiological attacks.
Biological weapons against human and
agricultural health systems.
Military chemical weapons;
Industrial chemicals: toxic, & explosive
Fuels
Cyber attacks on telecoms, data or controls.
Transportation systems used as weapons.
Inducing western gov’ts to amplify terror
Response of People
to Terrorist Threat
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People to provide accurate and trustworthy
information quickly and authoritatively.
Fear, confusion & loss of public confidence in
those responsible for protection.
Is government needlessly amplifying the
threat, thus doing terrorists psychological job
for them?
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Need for meaningful warning systems.
Need for local leadership and resources.
Danger of virtual attack (biological or radiological)
Technical strategies
The “system of systems”
technical challenge
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Attacks are likely to involve multiple complex
systems
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Multiple critical industrial infrastructures
Federal state and local authorities and responders
Complex networks of sensors
Data fusion and data mining
Priority setting requires modeling and
simulating attack and response, red teaming
proposed solutions.
Analysis of technology strategies
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Repair the weakest links in vulnerable
systems and infrastructures.
Use defenses-in-depth (do not rely only on
perimeter defenses or firewalls).
Use “circuit breakers” to isolate and stabilize
failing system elements (soft failure modes).
Build security and flexibility into basic designs
Design systems for real people, behaving as
they can be predicted to behave.
Civil Liberties vs Technology
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Sensors may reduce need for personal &
package inspections.
Data mining could threaten civil liberties
Biometrics
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much more reliable than drivers license
can also be used to intrude on personal privacy
Don’t prove “who you are.”
Technical programs must evaluate balance
between effectiveness and civil impact
Keeping Information
from Terrorists
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A very broad range of basic research
information will be needed to counter terror
threats.
“Sensitive but unclassified” has been
suggested but is unworkable.
Science journals already being attacked for
publishing science deemed useful to
terrorists.
Military style classification based on clear
criteria is the only workable answer
Setting Counter
Terrorism Priorities
How to set S&T priorities?
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Vulnerability and value of the target
Ability of S&T programs to harden
target
Dual use value of the S&T outcomes
Value of the target to terrorists
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Satisfaction of terrorists’ goals
Capability of terrorists to attack it
Likelihood of success
Terrorists’ Priorities
Which would they choose if they had the capability:
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Spread disease germs among the population?
Destroy the Statute of Liberty?
Flood New Orleans?
Shut down the New York Stock Exchange?
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US counter terrorism strategy requires predicting their
priorities. This requires better
intelligence and understanding
of radical Islam.
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Structural Issues in Government
Industry and States
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Incentive structure for critical infrastructure
industries and owners of key buildings and
facilities.
State and city input to national S&T strategy.
Funding S&T development in response to
state and municipal needs.
Giving states and cities resources for
restructuring EOCs, training, deployment and
exercising of new systems.
Department of
Homeland Security
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Law now provides for an
Undersecretary Technology with broad
technical authority.
Dep’t is assembled from the “border”
control agencies; none have a strong
S&T research, acquisition & deployment
experience.
New department has 6 S&T institutions.
Relationship of DHS to S&T
agencies of federal government
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With almost all S&T capability outside
the Department, a strong national
technical strategy is required.
Implementation of such a strategy
depends on a strong & effective OHS
and OSTP in the White House.
Neither exists, nor seems likely soon.
Some Research Priorities
– Understanding the Problem
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Understanding Terrorists’ target priorities
Roots of terrorism and foreign policy options
Understanding people’s response to terror
Public Administration
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New Department – making it work
Fed – state – county – city – industry
collaboration.
Balancing domestic intelligence with civil
rights
Some Information Science
Research Priorities
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Designing screening and data systems
involving new technologies
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Implications of universal identifiers
Designing and managing dining mining
systems that protect civil liberties
Countering false-information attacks
Arranging for credibility by officials
briefing the public about S&T threats
A New Economics?
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Policies for inducing private sector to
harden critical infrastructure
Creating economic incentives to
generate a more resilient infrastructure
Anticipating impact on economy and
means for minimize it
Encouraging innovation when there are
not quantifiable market incentives
A New Urgency for
Education Reform
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New role for social science in understanding
roots of terrorism and routes to reducing
demand for it.
Training first responders in use of high tech
systems
Introducing a more mature view of the world
and America’s place in it into K – 16
education
Understanding how the media might be
helped to be more balanced and constructive
in reporting on terrorism
Dramatically expanding language skills
Problem of contributing good
policy design to authorities
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Who wants the advice and will pay for it?
Who can implement the advice?
What institutional barriers prevent the advice
from being taken?
How will the agenda for urgent matters
evolve, with war in Iraq etc?
How can one get information on which to
base the analysis and design?