Department of Development and International Relations
Sino-Japanese Crises from 2012 Bring Opportunities
for China’s New Diplomacy
Master Thesis
Supervisors: Jian Tao, Peer Møller Christensen
Submitted by: Rong Chen
Submitted on: 20th May 2014
Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... I
1. Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... 1
2. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 2
3. Methodology ........................................................................................................... 5
3.1.
Motivation and Main Focus ......................................................................... 5
3.2.
Research Method & Research Approach ...................................................... 6
3.3.
Empirical Data .............................................................................................. 7
3.4.
Structure ....................................................................................................... 7
3.5.
Choice of the Theory .................................................................................... 8
3.6.
Key Concept ................................................................................................. 9
3.7.
Limitations.................................................................................................. 11
3.8.
Project Design ............................................................................................ 12
4. Theory ................................................................................................................... 13
4.1.
Crisis Management ..................................................................................... 13
5. Analysis................................................................................................................. 21
5.1.
Signals of Intense Sino-Japanese Relation from 2012 ............................... 21
5.2.
China’s New Diplomatic Performance during the Crises .......................... 26
5.3.
Lesson-Learned from Dealing with the Sino-Japanese Crises ................... 37
6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 43
7. Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 46
Abstract
The Sino-Japanese relation has been in a historically low point since 2012. A
territorial row over the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands has been flared up after
right-wing Tokyo Governor Shintaro’s purchase of this group of islands. Besides this,
different attitudes towards Japan’s historical wartime doing was an ingrained thorn in
Sino-Japanese relation. With hawkish Abe taking into power, he has taken a tougher
position over the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands and paid tribute to the Yasukuni
shrine regardless of the strong condemnation of China and other Asian countries. On
the other hand, US’ high-key strategy of ‘Returning to Asia’ and its long-standing
security commitment with Japan make the intense Sino-Japanese ties even more
complicated. Against this backdrop, Chinese new administration led by Xi Jinping
realizes that there is urgency for them to handle this crisis and convert it into
opportunities to explore China’s full-pledged diplomatic horizon.
Out of this consideration, crisis management mode initiated by Ian I. Mitroff is
chosen as the theory for the thesis. Generally there exist five stages in the mode which
are signal detection, prevention & preparedness, damage containment, recovery and
learning. In the case of Sino-Japanese crisis, three of them are picked up in the
analysis part as the rest of two are skipped in reality. Guided by the revised crisis
management mode, the author starts from selecting typical incidents which imply the
deterioration of the Sino-Japanese relations. On the basis of it, the analysis of China’s
new diplomatic performance in managing the crisis is presented. After that a
rethinking or evaluation on China’s diplomatic performance during the crisis is added.
In this sequence, the author tries to show the intention of writing this thesis that
although the recent Sino-Japanese crisis from 2012 exerted more pressure on China’s
foreign policy-making, it made Chinese new leadership broaden their diplomatic
horizon and turn the risk into precious opportunities to promote the development of
China’s new diplomacy in a full-pledged manner. By studying the Sino-Japanese
I
crisis, China’s new diplomacy in Xi’s administration featured as more confident and
active is fully presented.
Key Words: the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations; crisis management mode,
China’s new diplomacy
II
1. Abbreviations
Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Japanese)
ICT – Information and Communications Technology
PPRR – Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery
LDP – Liberal Democratic Party
ADIZ – Air Defense Identification Zone
MTDP – Mid Term Defense Plan
MSDF – Maritime Self Defense Force
ASDF – Air Self Defense Force
GSDF – Ground Self Defense Force
APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
1
2. Introduction
Intense diplomatic relations between China and Japan have been received much
attention from the rest of the world nowadays. “Although China and Japan have been
deepening economic interdependence over the last two decades, their relationship has
been one of the tensest among the most important bilateral relationships in the world,
and the most recent territorial dispute on Diaoyu Islands between them has made it
even worse.”1 The lasting economic downturn caused by global economic crisis in
2008 and frequent political change of the ruling parties make Japan much worried
about its decline of power in Asia. On the contrary, China by virtue of its remarkable
economic performance and relative stable political transfer is expected to replace
Japan’s superiority in this region. “Now hardly a day goes by without a new flare-up
in the war of diplomatic attrition being fought out by China and Japan.” 2 It is argued
that the deterioration of the bilateral relations between these two countries will be the
keynote in the political realm of East Asia.
Shinzo Abe, Japan’s present prime minister, compared to his first term, turns to
maintain a tough stance on China. Abe, on his visit to Okinawa’s Ishigaki Island on 17
July 2013, firmly claimed that “his government would never make concessions to
China on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Japanese), and The Senkakus are an
inherent part of Japan’s territory in terms of history and international law and there is
no territorial dispute between the two countries.” 3 On the other hand, China’s
newly-elected president Xi Jinping also tries to adjust former moderate policy towards
Japan during Hu-Wen administration which highlighted economic cooperation and
interdependence between the two countries. With the ascendant of China’s
comprehensive strength and active integration into the international community,
1
Hiroki Takeuchi, “Sino-Japaneseese relations: power, interdependence, and domestic politics,” International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14 (2014) : 8.
2 “The Horcrux of the Matter,” The Economist, last modified 25 January, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21595026-intense-diplomatic-competition-between-china-and-japan-shows-t
empers-rising-dangerously-horcrux#sthash.9EwYSHAr.dpbs.
3 “Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,” Global Security. org, last modified 23 April, 2014,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm.
2
Chinese new leadership shows its willingness to become more confident and active in
its foreign-policy making as President Xi once said: “No foreign country should ever
nurse hopes that we will swallow the bitter fruit of harm to our country’s sovereignty,
security and development interests, published on Xinhua news agency – the
mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party.”4 Therefore, the escalation of territorial
dispute over Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea is not likely to come to an end in the
short run. Apart from the ownership over Diaoyu Islands, Japanese government’s
ambiguous attitude to its historical experience of invasion in China during the WWII
worsens the bilateral relationship. There is no doubt that Abe’s visit to Yasukuni
Shrine in 2013 as well as many right-wing Japanese officials’ remarks on the denial of
Nanjing massacre to a large extent irritates Chinese ruling elites as well as ordinary
Chinese citizens. It is commonly agreed that present Sino-Japanese relation since
2012 is in the most intense and frosty phase after their official establishment of
diplomatic relation.
The complexity of Sino-Japanese relation is closely related to the significant
involvement of the United States who intends to manipulate Japan to contain China’s
potential regional dominance in Asia. At the same time, backed up by the US’ security
commitment, Abe’s administration takes the initiative to exacerbate the anxiety about
‘China threat’ and counterbalance the rising China. The United States’ high-key
‘Returning to Asia’ strategy and the stable US-Japan alliance leave less room for
China to create a favorable external environment to explore its diplomatic relations.
Because of this, Chinese new leadership come to realize the previous low-profile
foreign policy should be adjusted to be more proactive which requires China’s voices
should be expressed and heard more in the international community. The strained
bilateral relations between China and Japan on the one hand, exert much pressure on
China’s diplomacy in East Asia, on the other hand, stimulate President Xi’s
administration to make some transformation of China’s diplomacy not only to Japan,
“Chinese Leader Affirms Policy on Islands,” Chris Buckley, The New York Times, accessed April 18, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/world/asia/incoming-chinese-leader-will-not-to-bargain-on-disputed-territory.
html?_r=0.
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but also to major powers such as the US and Russia as well as neighboring countries.
Hence, it is necessary for me to make a comprehensive analysis on the causes and
process of the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relation from 2012 so as to form a better
understanding of this crisis to China’s diplomacy. Against this backdrop, China’s
diplomacy is expected to make some transformation to deal with these crises.
Therefore, the problem of my research will be focused on:
Why the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations from 2012 bring opportunities for
China’s new diplomacy from the perspective of crisis management?
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3. Methodology
3.1.
Motivation and Main Focus
The author’s motivation to write this thesis is mainly out of the attention to recent
intense Sino-Japanese relations. China’s speedy economic growth makes Japan fear
its relative decline of power in Asia. With the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) coming
into power, the new Japanese cabinet pursues a hard-line foreign policy to divert
public complaint on the domestic stagnant economy. As for China, thanks to its
concentrated efforts on the domestic modernization in past 30 years, its economic
competitiveness as well as national pride is rapidly elevated. “Chinese new leaders
become increasingly confident in its ability to deal with territorial disputes on its own
terms. They also become more willing to proactively shape the external environment
rather than passively react to it and forcefully safeguard China’s national interests
rather than compromise them”.5 In terms of Diaoyu Islands dispute, Chinese central
government condemns Japan’s unilateral deed to these Islands and takes persistent
efforts to claim its ‘undisputed’ sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands. Apart from the
territorial disputes, Japan’s reluctance to repent for its historical wartime wrongs is
another major factor which intensified bilateral relations. Given the complexity of
Sino-Japanese relations, President Xi’s administration turns to a more active foreign
strategy which is different from the low-profile policy adopted by the last four
generations of leadership, to deal with the deteriorated Sino-Japanese diplomatic
crisis. Hence, the author’s curiosity is greatly aroused to correlate the research of
China’s new diplomacy with its performance in conducting sensitive Sino-Japanese
crises from 2012.
The main focus of this thesis is to make an in-depth analysis of China’s new
diplomatic performance in dealing with intractable Sino-Japanese relations from 2012.
Due to the limited scope of the thesis and different periods of Sino-Japanese relations,
recent intensity between two countries in regard to Diaoyu Islands and the historical
Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn,” Journal of
Contemporary China 22 (2013):545.
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5
issues in Abe’s second term is chosen to be analyzed. Crisis management system
mode is employed as it presents China’s diplomatic capacity in identifying,
responding and learning from the Sino-Japanese crisis. On the basis of it, China’s new
diplomacy which is characterized as more confident and active is clarified. The
escalation of territorial dispute on Diaoyu Islands and the long-standing divergence on
Japan’s historical aggression in China will be exemplified to clarify the progress of
China’s diplomacy in Xi’s administration. The author plans to interpret China new
leadership’s plan in making a difference in China’s diplomacy in the face of
Sino-Japanese relation.
3.2.
Research Method & Research Approach
This thesis is largely based on a qualitative study as it aims to present a solid
understanding of China’s new diplomatic performance under Chinese new leadership
in the case of the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. The application of crisis
management system mode to this topic requires associating the features of each stage
with concrete foreign affairs in Sino-Japanese relations. In addition to this,
high-ranking officials’ statements as well as information released at News Briefing of
the governments will be the important source for the analysis. Hence, these
components are not likely to be directly reflected in the form of data. On the contrary,
qualitative method is much preferred in terms of its advantage in interpretation of the
elements. “Most obviously, qualitative research tends to be concerned with words
rather than numbers. Besides this, one of its distinguishing features is that qualitative
techniques from an epistemological position described as interpretivist, meaning that
the stress is on the understanding of the social world through an examination of the
interpretation of that world by its participants”.6 Therefore, qualitative method will be
practiced throughout the thesis. A comprehensive approach should be taken in the
analysis of China’s new diplomatic performance in dealing with the bilateral crises
which includes the relation with Japan, the major powers (US & Russia), the
neighboring countries and the Europe. The consideration of all these aspects will be
6
Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 266.
6
conducive to forming an insight into China’s new diplomacy.
3.3.
Empirical Data
The literature for reference of this thesis is largely based on the secondary material.
Since the qualitative method is wielded in the thesis, the texts used in the thesis will
be in “a cognitive manner to play the basic role of introduction” and “lays the
foundation for further interpretation and analysis” 7 as well. Therefore, the major
supported materials the author chooses are from published books and high-academic
journals. In terms of the internet sources, government official websites and prominent
news agencies like The Economist are also taken into consideration for the high
credibility. What’s more, the internet sources from the two mentioned channels also
reveal the latest situation which may be ignored or not assumed by the scholars and
published volumes.
China’s new diplomatic performance in handling the intense Sino-Japanese crises is
the focus of this thesis, hence, the general introduction of China’s foreign policy
before President Xi’s era in the following part will help the author to conclude the
China’s progress in diplomatic strategy. Furthermore, several typical catchphrases
proposed by Xi Jinping will be used as the evidence standing for the new perspective
of China’s diplomacy in Xi’s administration.
3.4.
Structure
The project is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction. The second
part is the methodology. The third part is the theory, which provides the theoretical
support to the following analysis. The fourth part is the analysis, which combines the
crisis management mode with the interpretation of China’s new diplomatic
performance in Sino-Japanese relation. The final part goes to the conclusion, which
aims to present an answer for the problem formulation.
Joanna Aneta Lalik, Xiaoxi Lou, Rong Chen, “The Transformation of China’s Foreign Policy In the Case of
South China Sea Dispute,” Project Module II, Aalborg University(2013): 7.
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3.5.
Choice of the Theory
Crisis Management Mode
Frictions between China and Japan have become one of the most frequent issues
raised in China’s press conference held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 2012.
The incumbent Japanese Prime Minister Abe took a series of steps to declare Japan’s
sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands, which aroused China’s strong condemnation. On the
other hand, Abe as well as other high-ranking Japanese officials’ visits to Yasukuni
Shrine offend China’s sensitivity over the humiliating and miserable past caused by
Japan’s militarism. This triggers a wave of outrage and protest in China’s society.
China’s new leadership is expected to take a tough position towards Japan under the
pressure of the rising public nationalism. However, Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine is
approved by over half of the public according to the opinion poll made by Jiji News
Agency on January 11th, 2014. It is predicted that Abe’s administration will continue
its uncompromising posture towards China in view of domestic support rate. Although
both sides try not to take the initiative to start a war, the deterioration of
Sino-Japanese relation is not likely to change in the short run. Hence, the tension
between China and Japan is a crisis which should be handled with crafted tactics.
With the ascent of China’s comprehensive strength, China’s new leadership realizes
the great necessity to adjust former low-profile diplomatic keynote to a more initiative
and progressive stance. Sino-Japanese relations play a significant role in China’s
overall diplomatic strategy. In view of the complexity of this bilateral relation,
multiple and comprehensive diplomatic efforts are needed. Against this backdrop, a
clue for China’s new diplomacy could be traced. The application of crisis
management mode will help the author have a better understanding of China’s new
diplomatic efforts in the face of Sino-Japanese crises. According to the mode, not only
China’s performance during the crises, but also China’s action before and after the
crises will be altogether taken into account. Through this process, a full picture of
China’s new diplomacy in Xi’s era will be presented. Hence, the employment of crisis
management model could interpret China’s attempts in dealing with the tensions
between China and Japan, at the same time reveals the tendency of China’s new
8
diplomacy under China’s new leadership. This is the main reason why the author
chooses crisis management mode as the theory.
3.6.
Key Concept
China’s New Diplomacy
According to ZHAO Kejin’s “China’s Diplomacy 3.0: China’s New Diplomacy in
Post 18th Party Congress”, the development of China’s diplomacy could be divided
into three periods: the first phase (1949-1979) is called revolutionary diplomacy in
which a clear line with the diplomatic system of the capitalist world dominated by
imperial powers was drawn. The priorities during this period were anti-imperialism
and safeguarding national independence and sovereignty. Besides this, the alliance
strategy should not be ignored. The second period (1979-2012) is featured as
development diplomacy which put an emphasis on the open-up reforms and the
integration into international system. It pursued a non-aligned and low-profile stance
to create a peaceful exterior environment for the development of domestic
modernization. The third stage from 2013 under the new leadership aims to behave
more positively and proactively which means China will shoulder more
responsibilities in accordance with its capacity to promote the mutual development
and world peace, at the same time be committed to protect its increasingly overseas,
maritime interests as well as in the region of polar and space.8 The new performance
of China’s diplomacy will be interpreted mainly from the two following aspects:
More openness and inclusiveness is reflected in China’s diplomatic concepts. On July,
2012, Xi Jinping attended the first World Peace Forum at Tsinghua University. He
stressed that “for a country to pursue its own development, we must also let other
people; to seek their own safety, you must also allow the safety of others; to pursue its
own better life, must also allow others better life. States must adhere to a cooperative
mind, the spirit of innovation and responsible attitudes, the same boat, win-win
Kejin, Zhao, “China’s Diplomacy 3.0: China’s New Diplomacy in Post 18th Party Congress,” Social Science 7
(2013): 10.
8
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cooperation, jointly cope with various problems and challenges.”9 This opinion was
highly affirmed by other participating scholars and politicians. Xi considered that
“zero-sum mentalities should be abandoned and nations should establish a new
security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation and
foster the notion of universal, common and cooperative security.”10 Furthermore, the
idea of ‘a community of common destiny and interests’ is frequently mentioned by
Chinese high-ranking officials at different occasions. President Xi, in his speech at
the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference in 2013 also appealed for the practice of
this new idea. He said: “While pursuing its own interests, a country should
accommodate the legitimate concerns of others. In pursuing their own development,
countries should promote the common development of all and expand common
interests among them. We should respect the right of a country to independently
choose its social system and development path, remove distrust and misgivings and
turn the diversity of our world and difference among countries into dynamism and
driving force for development.”11
More activeness and willingness in doing something is shown in China’s diplomatic
attitudes. China is expected to transform from a follower to a contributor to the
improvement of the international system. China’s initiative in a new mode of Sino-US
relationship is an evident proof. During Xi-Obama’s meeting in California, both
leaders hoped that this new mode could help the two countries to avoid the historical
tragedy of major powers. Just as Xi said “the vast Pacific Ocean has ample space for
China and the United Sates”12, this new mode aims to foster Sino-China relationship
“Xi Jinping’s Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Word Peace Forum,” Sourcejuice, last modified 7 July,
2012,http://www.sourcejuice.com/1505530/2012/07/07/Jinping-opening-ceremony-World-Peace-Forum-speech-fu
ll/.
10 “Xi addresses World Peace Forum,” China Daily Website, last modified 7 July, 2012,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-07/07/content_15557706.htm.
11 “Working Together toward a Better Future for Asia and the World,” China Daily Website, last modified 11 April,
2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/news/2013-04/11/content_16393483.htm.
12“Xi Jinping stirs nationalistic sentiments ahead of trip to U.S,” Keith Richburg, the Washington Post, last
9
modified 13 February, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/xi-jinpings-comments-stir-nationalist-sentiments-on-chinesetwitter-ahead-of-trip-to-us/2012/02/13/gIQADPunAR_blog.html.
10
on the basis of no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. This new
model advocates “China and US go beyond their differences in ideology and choices
on the development paths, and expand their common knowledge and plan the future
prospect for human progress.”13 It is considered that the development of the new
mode of Sino-US relationship is conducive to realizing the ‘Chinese Dream’ and the
‘American Dream’ in two countries respectively. Moreover, the harmonious
co-existence between China and the US will largely contribute to world peace and
development. In fact, this new mode of Sino-US relationship could also be applied to
China’s relationship with other major powers. Its key values will play a major
principle in guiding China’s diplomacy with these significant countries. The
progresses in concepts and attitudes indicate that China’s diplomacy is transforming
from negatively response to positively planning. This new look in China’s diplomacy
is expected to constantly executed by Chinese new leadership.
3.7.
Limitations
The interpretation of China’s new diplomacy in this thesis is based on the strained
Sino-Japanese ties since 2012. From the perspective of the specific Sino-Japanese
crises, China’s new diplomatic performances are manifested by its relations with
Japan, the major powers including the US and Russia, neighboring countries
especially those in the Southeast Asia and the Europe. However, the development of
China’s new diplomacy in Xi’s administration include more than these aspects
mentioned in this thesis, such as more practical Sino-Africa relations and China’s
more initiative in multi-lateral regional and international organizations. In view of the
correlation with China’s performance in dealing with the Sino-Japanese crisis, these
important aspects of China’s new diplomacy are not included in this thesis.
“Building a New China-US Relationship,” CHEN Jimin, China US Focus, last modified 27 June, 2013,
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/building-a-new-china-us-relationship/.
13
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3.8.
Project Design
Introduction
Methodology
Crisis Management
Mode
Analysis
1. Signals of the Crisis
2. Performance in the Crisis
3. Lesson-learning from the Crisis
Conclusion
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4. Theory
4.1.
Crisis Management
The study of crisis management is a vigorous field within political science and public
relation. A definition of ‘crisis’ will be introduced as the first step. “We speak of crisis
when a community of people—an organization, a town, or a nation—perceives an
urgent threat to core values or life-sustaining functions, which must be urgently dealt
with under conditions of deep uncertainty.”14 A variety of crises are likely to occur in
the public life, such as natural disasters and war, economic depression, terrorist
attacks, epidemics and failures of information and communications technology (ICT).
To make things worse, “Crises are inconceivable events that often take politicians,
citizens, and the media by complete surprise.” 15 This brings great challenge for
public authorities and their organizations to take efficient action to prevent the
interests of citizens from the threat in the circumstance of considerable time pressure
and lacking of integrated information about the causes and consequences. Based on
the definition presented above, a public crisis usually bears the following
characteristics: Abruptness, urgency and uncertainty.
The notion of crisis is often related to conflict and war. According to Professor HU
Ping in “International Conflict Analysis and Crisis Management Study”, “crisis is a
special phenomenon in the process of conflict formation. The range of crisis is smaller
than that of conflict.”16 It is generally considered that the ending of crises does not
mean conflicts to be resolved. The outbreak of war may trigger a crisis, and a crisis
may escalate into a war. However, in the present era appealing for peace and
development, crises are more manifested in the form of political tension. Hence, a
casual relationship doesn’t exist between crisis and war. Referring to the types of
crises, many a criteria have been proposed in the international academic community.
14
Arjen Boin, "Crisis Management," in International Encyclopedia of Political Science, eds. Bertrand Badie &
Dirk Berg-Schlosser & Leonardo Morlino, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2011), 495.
15 Boin, ibid.
16 Ping, Hu, International Conflict Analysis and Crisis Management Study (Beijing: Yi Wen Publishing Military,
2003), 98.
13
The dichotomous method which considers crises as either natural or human-made will
not be adopted in this thesis. This traditional classification, despite simplicity, is not
sufficient enough to deal with the diversity and complexity of crises nowadays which
usually bear the two-mentioned factors altogether. In this thesis, a classification
proposed by HU Ping in International Crisis Management and Its Research Methods
will be employed. Professor Hu regarded two considerations, namely threat
perception and international environment should be taken in defining the categories of
crises. “The first term called realistic crises, in which policy makers feel threatened
and the international environment also in change, for example the Cuban missile crisis
in 1962 and 9.11 Incident; the second term called isolated crisis, in which only policy
makers are threatened. This kind of crisis is usually caused by accidents, for example
Japanese toilet paper crisis; the third one called potential crises, in which only the
international environment is changing. This form of crisis is generally not escalated
into view.”17
Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara once said: “In
the future, strategies will not exist and it will be replaced by the crisis management.”
The study of crisis management was not booming until the 1960s with its focus on the
prevention of the war. Nowadays, crisis management is generally defined as “a set of
factors designed to combat crises and lessen the actual damage inflicted.”18 This
notion later is further equipped as “crisis management pertains to the strategic
protective actions taken within a community to prepare for, respond to, or recover
from the occurrence of a crisis.” 19 Ian I. Mitroff, the father of modern crisis
management, proposed a model for crisis management which is “based in an older
and widely cited disaster management model known as the ‘comprehensive
emergency management’ model, or PPRR (prevention, preparedness, response and
17
18
Ping Hu, “International Crisis Management and Its Research Methods,” Systems Engineering, 45 (1991): 2.
W. Timothy Coombs, Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage, 2012), 5.
19 Stacy Peerbolte, "Crisis Management," in Encyclopedia of Disaster Relief, eds. K. Bradley Penuel & Matt
Statler (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2011), 88.
14
recovery) model.” 20 It is composed of five stages (in Mitroff’s terms): signal
detection, prevention/preparedness, containment, recovery, and learning. The first two
stages are the prodromal steps to crisis management which determine the readiness of
the organization to handle a crisis. The rest of the three stages form the reactive
approach to crises, with activities implemented after the breakout of a crisis. Mitroff
considered that the former crisis management model neglects the importance of crisis
detection as the first step and the lesson-learning work in the end. Therefore, he added
these two essential stages to constitute a more rounded crisis life cycle.
Prevention & Preparedness
Signal Detection
Learning
Recovery
Damage
Containment
Crisis Management Mode by Mitroff
Stage 1: Signal Detection
According to Mitroff, a string of early warning signals are manifested long before the
occurrence of a crisis when there exist possibilities to prevent it from happening. “The
Institute of Crisis Management reported in a study that, in the last decade, sudden
crises accounted for only between 30 and 40 percent of the crises that the world has
faced; the remaining 60 to 70 percent were characterized as “smoldering” (creeping)
crises that emanated warning signals that were either detected but ignored or went
completely undetected.” 21 Hence, the real challenge for any public authority or
20
Alexandros Paraskevas, "Mitroff's Five Stages of Crisis Management," in Encyclopedia of Crisis Management,
eds. Bradley Penuel & Matt Statler & Ryan Hagen (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2013), 629.
21 Paraskevas, ibid., p.630.
15
organization is not to find crises but also to detect them in time.
The priority in the signal detection stage is to distinguish the signals that might warn
of a crisis from other ordinary ones in the daily operation of organizations. It is agreed
that the precise and timely analysis of signals determines to a large extent the
efficiency of the work in this phase. Therefore, a crisis signal detection network
comprising technical and human detectors is suggested to be established in the
organizations. “Technical detectors can be devices or machines that monitor functions
or data received by the organization's internal or external environment and are able to
identify changes in them. Human detectors can be members of the organization or
people external to the organization who have access to data pertinent to its functions
and are willing to transmit these data to the organization's decision-making centers.
They may be people specifically assigned to signal detection even if this may not be
their full-time occupation.”22 It is worth noting that the accuracy of the detectors
should be regularly updated and examined. Otherwise, these detectors may lead to
wrong decision-makings by policy makers. Moreover, an efficient communication
platform or channel is expected to be developed so that vital information will reach
the ears of senior management staffs without delay.
Stage 2: Prevention and Preparedness
Compared to the traditional PPRR model which regards prevention and preparedness
as two separate activities, Mitroff tends to put them together in the second stage. “In
this view, organizations can be either ‘crisis prone’ or ‘crisis prepared’.”23 Although
it is impossible to prevent all the crises by means of planning, a consciousness of
preparation will to some degree avoid a crisis or mitigate its consequences. Crisis
preparedness in the context of Mitroff’s model requires the organizations to formulate
a systematic planning to cope with a crisis which clarifies the pre-assignment of staffs,
resources and actions during a crisis situation. “Mitroff calls for crisis managers in
22
23
Paraskevas, ibid., p.632.
Paraskevas, ibid., p.633.
16
this stage to think like ‘controlled paranoids’, questioning every assumption about
what is normal, impossible, or absurd and unthinkable by taking even low probability
situations into consideration and bracing themselves for the worst-case scenario.”24 A
habit of over-caution is more welcomed than underreaction. The pre-establishment of
a crisis management plan will be conducive to time-saving since people are informed
of their responsibilities in advance. One reminder about the formulation of a crisis
management plan is not making it too detailed or complex. Concerning the
uniqueness of each crisis, each plan should be accommodated accordingly.
As for the personnel in the crisis management team, representatives from different
sectors with mixed knowledge and skills are encouraged to pick up. “Typical crisis
team membership includes representatives from legal, operations, public relations,
facilities management, and security.”25 A significant but often ignored step in this
stage is the practice of crisis management plans. “There are three types of exercises:
tabletop exercises, typically involving senior management staff and with the purpose
of introducing them to their roles and responsibilities in the execution of the plan;
functional exercises, usually more complex, involving a combination of tasks played
out in “real time;” and full-scale simulations involving multiple agencies with actual
players in the field.” 26 The exercises are considered to be the best approach to
examine the mistakes in the crisis management plans and to improve the efficiency as
well as coordination among different participants.
Stage 3: Damage Containment
Efforts in this stage are endeavored to alleviate further exacerbation of the crisis and
control the damage. “This is accomplished by attempting interventions in the source
of the crisis in order to reduce its intensity and control its impact and by safeguarding
24
Paraskevas, ibid., p.633.
W. Timothy Coombs, "Crisis and Crisis Management," in Encyclopedia of Public Relations, ed. Robert L.
Heath (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2013), 211.
26 Paraskevas, op. cit., p.634.
25
17
mission-critical assets and infrastructure.”27 It is commonly agreed that in the face of
a crisis public authorities are likely to perform well with a well-prepared plan in hand.
The coordination among different departments is highlighted because its efficiency is
closely related to the authorities’ tackling capacity of the crises. Besides this, the work
of information collection and dissemination should also be taken into consideration by
policy makers. The crisis management team members are required to get critical
information related to the crises under limited time: “what happened, what was the
cause, who was/might be affected, where it occurred, and how much damage and
what kind of damage was sustained.”28 The mentioned above information are vital for
the policy makers to make decisions on the disposition of a crisis. At the same time,
authorities need to make good use of different forms of social media to get correction
information out to the public. Therefore, a mature public communication skill is a
must for any authorizes to deal with crises.
Stage 4: Recovery
The recovery stage is about fixing the damage caused by the crisis. The target of this
stage is to turn the status of emergency to normal mode. Two critical things should be
paid attention to. The first one is the restoration of ‘business continuity’, that’s to say,
the normalization of the operations is of great importance to the organization’s
revitalization; the second is about the resumption of its connection with its
stakeholder groups after the crisis. It is widely considered that the more rapidly the
organization restarts its operation, the better position it is likely to achieve compared
to its competitors. Here, Mitroff adds that apart from the stress on the physical aspects
of recovery, the psychological sides should also be taken into account. The
combination of these two aspects will speed up the revival of the organization. With
regards to policy makers who failed to fulfill their commitment prior to or during the
critical stages, the performance during this stage plays an important role in regaining
their reputation among the public.
27
28
Paraskevas, ibid., p.636.
Coombs, "Crisis and Crisis Management," op. cit., p.213.
18
Stage 5: Learning
The learning stage calls for the efforts of re-examining and evaluating the crisis
management performance. Through this learning-experience, policy makers realize
the weaknesses and the aspects to be improved. Although the learning obtained from a
crisis is limited, it may bring some progress for the organization and to some extent
decrease its vulnerability to specific crisis. “In large-scale crises and disasters,
learning may result in knowledge-based adaptation that impacts not only the fringes
of the organization but also the core of its practices and policies.”29 It should be
pointed out that the learning stage is not a process looking for blame, but aims at
collecting valuable information for the future. Mitroff advocates institutional
organizations called ‘crisis learning center’ to be set up so that systematic information
will be stored and referenced whenever needed. In the practice of lesson-drawing
process, it is “constrained by the role of these lessons in determining the impact that
crises have on a society.”30 In some circumstances, other stakeholders could make
use of the lessons to promote policy reforms that present administration objects.
Therefore, the incumbent leadership plays a significant role in stimulating the
lesson-drawing process in the political and bureaucratic fields.
To sum up, the theoretical model proposed by Mitroff is a general one consisting of
five integrated stages. However, in the realistic world, a crisis may only experience
two or three stages due to the uniqueness of each crisis. The sequence of each stage in
Mitroff’s model may change slightly in daily operation, for example, learning is
expected to take place when the crisis is over, whereas learning activities occur in
each one of the stages. These phenomena will not affect the accountability of the
model. In the case of recent Sino-Japanese crisis studied in this thesis, three stages
named signal detection, damage containment and learning occurr in sequence, while
the other two steps called prevention & preparedness and recovery are skipped. It is
found that very few efficient measures are pre-established in the prevention &
29
30
Paraskevas, op. cit., p.636.
Boin, op. cit., p.498.
19
preparedness stage due to the continued escalation of Sino-Japanese crises. In addition
to that, the Sino-Japanese crises are not likely to be resolved in the short run. Hence,
these two stages are removed in this thesis. To form a better understanding of the
process of crisis management in the circumstances of Sino-Japanese relations, a
revised crisis management mode for the analysis of Sino-Japanese crisis in this thesis
is presented as follows:
Prevention & Preparedness
Signal Detection
Learning
Recovery
Damage
Containment
Crisis Management Mode in the Case of Sino-Japanese Crises
20
5. Analysis
5.1.
Signals of Intense Sino-Japanese Relation from 2012
According to the theory part, signal detection focuses on distinguishing those
‘dangerous’ events from those ordinary ones in timely and precisely fashion.
Therefore, a list of events signifying the intense Sino-Japanese relations is the priority
of this part. Compared to the natural crises whose signals generally appear before the
occurrence of the crises, the signals in diplomatic crises are hardly defined by a
concrete date. In the case of Sino-Japanese crises, it is not likely to end or may have
more escalation in the short run. Hence, the author tends to choose the signals on the
basis of their impacts and the two countries’ responses to them, rather than the date of
newly-elected Prime Minister Abe taking into power.
The purchase of Diaoyu Islands in Yoshihiko Noda’s cabinet on 11 September, 2012
was regarded as a key event directly leading to the deterioration of the bilateral
relation. This so-called ‘nationalization’ deed was interpreted by Beijing as a Japanese
unilateral action to change the status quo of Diaoyu Islands. In a response, China’s
Foreign Ministry spokesman HONG Lei at the press conference on 13 September,
said: “Chinese government is strongly against Japan’s illegal purchase of Diaoyu
Islands. China will take a series of measures to firmly defend its sovereignty and
territorial integrity. We urge Japanese government to correct its mistakes, stop
infringing China’s territorial sovereignty and return to the track of negotiation and
consultations to handle and resolve relevant issues.”31 This incident triggered Chinese
people’s strong patriotic sentiment that a wave of protests for safeguarding Diaoyu
Islands and boycotting Japanese goods was voluntarily raised during the year since
then. Although 2012 was the 40th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese
diplomatic relation, due to Japan’s ‘nationalization’ of Diaoyu Islands, a lot of
exchange activities and commemorations were put off or canceled. Chinese
government informed that the celebration ceremony on 40th anniversary of the
“China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Responds to Japan’s Illegal Purchase of Diaoyu Islands,” Xinhua News,
last modified 13 September, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-09/13/c_113071308_2.htm.
31
21
normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relation in the Great Hall of the People on
27th September, 2012 would be called off. Not only official activities but also civil
ones were postponed or removed such as the visit of a group of 30 Japanese non-party
congressmen to China on 26th September and the famous Japanese musician Tanimura
Shinji’s concert in Beijing this month were all canceled. “Chinese former Foreign
Minister YANG Jiechi on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing
said the sharp deterioration in Sino-Japaneseese relations was “single-handedly”
caused by Japan’s purchase of Diaoyu Islands.”32
The newly-elected Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe who was considered as a hawkish
nationalist seemed to have no intention to soothe matters. On 17 July, 2013, Abe went
to Okinawa Prefecture and visited Ishigaki Island which is only about 170 kilometers
away from the Diaoyu Islands. According to the Asahi Shimbun, the purpose of Abe’s
visit to Ishigaki Island was to encourage coast guards who are responsible for
patrolling the waters around the Diaoyu Islands. This visit made him the first sitting
prime minister to visit the island in 48 years. In his short speech to the 40 coast guards,
Abe stressed: “With frequent approaches and the wandering of Chinese government
vessels in surrounding waters, the security situation has become increasingly severe. I
am determined to take the lead in protecting our territories.”33 In the afternoon of the
same day during a campaign speech in the city of Ishigaki, Abe claimed: “the Diaoyu
Islands are undoubtedly an integral part of Japan, historically and under international
law and Japan won’t budge one bit.”34 Besides this, Abe also visited Miyako Island,
which is located about 160 kilometers from the Diaoyu Islands and is the place of a
Japan Air Self-Defense Force sub base. Abe remarked that the surveillance task of
Diaoyu Islands was shouldered by the air force on this island. Abe’s arrangement of
visiting these two remote islands during the election campaign of his Liberal
“Beijing Urges Senkaku Islands Reversal,” The Japanese Times, last modified 10 March, 2012,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/10/national/beijing-urges-senkaku-nationalization-reversal/#.U3C-YL
KBQgo.
33 “Abe Pays Visits to Diaoyu,” Yuhuan, Ling, Global Times, last modified 18 July, 2013,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/797032.shtml.
34 “Abe Pays Visits to Diaoyu,” ibid.
32
22
Democratic Party (LDP) was mainly seen to show his tough position over the Diaoyu
Islands. In response to the visit, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman HUA
Chunying said in a statement that “the Chinese government will take necessary
measures to resolutely safeguard its territorial sovereignty over the islets, and urged
Tokyo to face up to the history and reality and stop provocative words and deeds.”35
The standoff of the territorial dispute over Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan
has extended to the air with the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) by the Chinese government on 23 November, 2013. It
includes the airspace over Diaoyu Islands. China's Defense Ministry spokesman Yang
Yujun stressed at the press conference in the same day that “the Chinese government
has followed common international practices in the establishment of the zone, with
aims of protecting its state sovereignty and territorial and airspace security, and
maintaining flying orders. It is a necessary measure in China's exercise of self-defense
rights. It has no particular target and will not affect the freedom of flight in relevant
airspace.”36 Faced with Japan’s demand for its revocation, the spokesman indicated
that China’s decision on setting up the ADIZ is in line with the Charter of the United
Nations, international laws and practices and China's domestic laws and regulations,
including the Law on National Defense, the Law on Civil Aviation and the Basic
Rules on Flight. Furthermore, he added that “a relevant country established its air
defense identification zone as early as 1969, which is also about 130 kilometers from
the Chinese mainland at its closest distance.”37 Although YANG didn’t mention the
name, the most possible reference goes to Japan. On the other hand, the approval of
Japan’s five-year defense plan called the Mid Term Defense Plan (MTDP) from 2014
to 2018 and its latest National Defense Program Guidelines by the cabinet on 17
December, 2013 drew China’s close attention. Both two documents addressed Japan’s
great concern about China’s military capacity and expanding activities in water and
35
36
“Abe Pays Visits to Diaoyu,” ibid.
“China Exclusive: Defense Ministry spokesman responds to air defense identification zone questions,” Xinhua
News, last modified 23 November, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132912145.htm.
37 “China Exclusive: Defense Ministry spokesman responds to air defense identification zone questions,” ibid.
23
airspace. A redeployment of the Self Defense Forces from across Japan to the
southern periphery, close to Senkaku islands in the MTDP was in accordance with
Japan’s high alert on safeguarding the remote southern islands. “The number of
diesel-electric submarines for Japan’s navy—the Maritime Self Defense Force
(MSDF) is set to increase from 16 to 22. A boost in destroyers will bring the total
number from 47 to 54. Besides this, the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) will also
multiply the number of aircrafts which to deal with the increasing tasks of
intercepting foreign aircrafts particularly over the East China Sea. Japan is also
sending fighters southward. Naha Airport will receive a second squadron of F-15J air
superiority fighters, doubling the number of fighters based there from 20 to
40. Furthermore, Japan’s Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) will add a significant
division named amphibious brigade who is expected to undertake the main task of
‘seizing islands’.” 38 Apart from the update of military equipments, MTDP also
highlighted the consolidation of the U.S.–Japan security alliance; at the same time
actively work with Russia, India, Australia, South Korea, and the ASEAN states on
regional defense issues. Hence, the issue of these documents was interpreted by many
Chinese pundits as Japan’s full preparation for the potential conflict with China over
Diaoyu Islands and its intention of inviting the US and neighboring countries to
contain China.
The fraught Sino-Japanese relations were even jeopardized by Abe’s visit to Yasukuni
Shrine in December just a few days after his announcement of Japan’s new and
ambitious National Defense Plan. Not only China but also many other Asian nations
that suffered from Japan's wartime actions such as South Korea showed strong
opposition against Abe’s visit because Yasukuni is a symbol of Tokyo’s imperial
military past and is the place where honors 14 class-A war dead committing
atrocities during Japan’s invasion across the Asia. After his visit, Abe indicated to the
media that “what he did was just to show respects to those who lost their precious
“Inside Japan’s New Defense Plan,” Kyle Mizokami, USNI News, last modified 20 December, 2013,
http://news.usni.org/2013/12/20/inside-japans-new-defense-plan.
38
24
lives for Japan, and prayed that their souls may rest in peace. He also stressed that he
had no intention at all of hurting the feelings of the Chinese or the South Korean
people.”39 However, these conciliatory words could hardly be accepted by people in
the two countries. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs persistently claimed that “the
Yasukuni Shrine problem concerns whether or not Japan properly recognizes and
deeply reflects upon its history of invasion and colonialism, and whether or not it
respects the feelings of the people of China and other victim Asian countries.”40
Shortly after the visit, Beijing summoned Japan’s ambassador to deplore this act, at
the same time Qin Gang the spokesman of China’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a
concisely worded statement, saying “The Japanese leader's visit to the Yasukuni
Shrine is, in nature, an attempt to whitewash the history of aggression and colonialism
by militarist Japan, overturn the just trial of Japanese militarism by the international
community and challenge the outcome of WWII and the post-war international order.
The Japanese leader has gone out of his way to once again create a serious incident on
the issue of history, thus erecting a new, major political barrier to the improvement
and development of bilateral ties.”41
The deterioration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic crises is mainly manifested through the
events listed above. The purchase of Diaoyu Islands ignited the flame between China
and Japan. With newly-elected leaders taking up the positions in the two countries,
mutual provocation over the ownership of Diaoyu Islands and the approach to Japan’s
wartime doings seemed to suggest the frosty relationship between China and Japan is
not likely to be easily mended.
“Abe’s Visit to Controversial Japanese Shrine Draws Rare US Criticism,” George Nishiyama, The Wall Street
Journal, last modified 26 December, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304483804579281103015121712.
40 “Japanese PM Abe Visits Yasukuni Shrine, Chinese Reaction,” China Smack, last modified 26 December, 2013,
http://www.chinasmack.com/2013/stories/japanese-pm-abe-visits-yasukuni-shrine-chinese-reactions.html.
39
41
“The Statement by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Visit to
the Yasukuni Shrine,”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified 26 December,
203, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1112096.shtml.
25
5.2.
China’s New Diplomatic Performance during the Crises
The second stage in the crisis management mode is called prevention and
preparedness. It stresses the importance of pre-establishing a systematic plan to deal
with the occurrence of the crises. However, in the case of Sino-Japanese crisis, this
stage was not aroused great attention of Beijing and Tokyo and in most circumstances
was just skipped due to the rapid exacerbation of the crises. The principle of shelve
territorial disputes and carry out joint development in disputed waters proposed by
former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, though provides an alternative for territorial
disputes through mutual cooperation for the sake of energy exploration, failed to
present a feasible solution for the sovereignty issue. Hence, the author will not put this
policy under the category of prevention and preparedness. Referring to China’s
endeavors in the stage of damage containment, China’s new diplomatic performance
will be thoroughly interpreted as an evidence of its crisis management capacity. Its
efforts in dealing with the relationship of Japan, the US and Russia, the neighboring
countries in Asia and the European countries will be analyzed as follows.
With Japan
Concerning China’s new diplomatic approach to Japan, Chinese ambassadors’
collective protest action by media was a typical example. Shortly after Abe’s visit to
Yasukuni Shrine, more than 30 Chinese ambassadors published signed articles on the
local prominent newspapers in the host countries to strongly denounce Abe’s ‘ghost
worship’. The characteristics of China’s new diplomacy such as being more confident
and proactive are apparently shown during the process. Among these ambassadors,
the performance of China’s ambassador to UK, Liu Xiaoming should be highlighted.
In a BBC Newsnight TV episode on January 8, 2014, Liu and his Japanese
counterpart Keiichi Hayashi engaged in a tense debate over the ongoing
Sino-Japaneseese spat though not held face-to-face, but in two separate studio rooms.
Liu emphasized the importance of abiding by the Cairo Declaration which clearly
specified that Japan should return to China the territories it seized by force during the
WWII including the Diaoyu Islands. “Liu also made a special effort to reach out to the
26
British audience by quoting Winston Churchill’s famous saying: “Those who fail to
learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”42 Later, Liu’s performance was appraised
by most media for his more logically and skillfully expression than Hayashi. Besides
this, in his opinion article for The Telegraph, Ambassador Liu compared Japan’s
militarism to Voldemort, an extremely evil and violent figure in the popular book and
film series Harry Potter. It is not hard to conclude that Chinese new leadership pays
more attention to public relations, and is willing to “utilize more efficient means and
approaches to try and win more international empathy and support in Western
media.” 43 China’s initiative in reaching global audience is largely conducive to
winning the recognition of those who won World War II and to reshaping the national
image which was sometimes misunderstood by Western media. Chinese diplomats’
collective vocal condemnation to Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine is still a strategy by
the central government to control the escalation of Sino-Japanese crisis. With these
well-educated diplomats, China’s intention of pressuring Japan is achieved, at the
same time the risk of direct military confrontation is likely to be avoided.
Although Sino-Japanese relations have been severely damaged in the end of 2013 due
to Abe’s blatant visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and Chinese officials even
reacted that Chinese people don’t welcome Abe, both Beijing and Tokyo come to
realize that there is a great urgency for them to improve the bilateral relations not only
for the benefit of economy, but also for the regional stability in the Asia. April
witnessed two important visits which showed the two sides’ intention of mending
delicate bilateral ties. The first visit was by Hu Deping to Tokyo, the eldest son of the
late Chinese leader Hu Yaobang from April 6 to 13 at the invitation of Japan’s foreign
ministry. “Riding on his father's legacy as a friend of Japan and with direct access to
China's top leadership,”44 Hu Deping was considered as an appropriate envoy to help
“Global Media, China’s New Weapon against Japan,” Kai Jin, the Diplomat, last modified 13 January, 2014,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/global-media-chinas-new-weapon-against-japan/.
43 “Global Media, China’s New Weapon against Japan,” ibid.
44 “High Hopes for Princeling Hu Deping's Tokyo Visit,” Julian Ryall & Kristine Kwok, South China Moring Post,
42
last modified 10 April, 2014,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1474609/high-hopes-princeling-hu-depings-tokyo-visit.
27
improve the strained relations between China and Japan. During his stay in Japan, he
is scheduled to exchange views with many senior officials including Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yoshihide Suga and Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida as well as former
premiers Yasuo Fukuda and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. In his meeting with
Suga, Hu emphasized the need for cooperation instead of confrontation between the
two countries. Although some analysts doubted whether Hu’s arrival would make
much difference, it was at least evident to see China’s desire to thaw chilly ties.
In no time a Japanese counterpart was left for China to send the similar message of
repairing the worsening relations. Tokyo Governor Yoichi Masuzoe arrived in Beijing
on 26th April, 2014 at the invitation of the city government. This 65-year-old Masuzoe
was Abe's favored candidate during the governor election in February. During his
three-day visit to Beijing, Masuzoe was committed to playing a constructive role in
improving bilateral relations by having a series of meeting with major Chinese
officials among which the one with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang aroused the
most attention. During the meeting, Wang said: “the two countries should push
forward bilateral relations on the basis of the four China-Japan political documents, in
the spirit of taking history as a mirror to guide the future. The Chinese government
supports local friendly exchanges between the two countries and hopes that Beijing
and Tokyo will continue to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation.”45 At the press
conference after the meeting Masuzoe stressed that his visit was totally supported by
Prime Minister Abe who “hoped Sino-Japanese relations could take a turn for the
better.”46 Just as Masuzoe said: "If this can even help just a little to dispel some
misunderstandings or areas where there is not enough understanding, then this will be
the best thing about my visit,”47 this visit may predict that the reconciliation of
Sino-Japanese relation is likely to be put on the agenda by both sides. Therefore, the
arrangement of these two events was interpreted by analysts as opening an alternate
“Chinese Vice Premier Meets Tokyo Governor,” Xinhua net, last modified 26 April, 2014,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/26/c_133292188.htm.
46 “Tokyo governor passes on Japan PM's goodwill on China visit,” Ben Blanchard, Reuters, last modified 26
April, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/26/us-china-japan-idUSBREA3P05W20140426.
47 “Tokyo governor passes on Japan PM's goodwill on China visit,” ibid.
45
28
channel of dialogue between the two countries which made a good preparation for the
restart of stalled high-level exchange.
With Major Powers
Sino-US Relations
The role of the United States should not be overlooked in the formulation of China’s
new diplomatic strategy. It is the involvement of the United States that make it more
complex in dealing with Sino-Japanese crisis. With China’s growing economic and
political muscle, the United State feels increasingly uneasy about its predominant
position established after the World War II to be replaced by this rising challenger.
The sour maritime territorial disputes between China and its neighbors such as Japan
become a great opportunity for the US to return to Asian stage. This move is proved
by ‘US’ Pivot to Asia’ diplomatic strategy during Obama’s administration. On the
matter of the strained Sino-Japanese relations, Chinese new leadership consciously
knows that the stable US-Japan alliance should be taken into their consideration. The
development of China-US relationship has a great influence over the direction of
Sino-Japanese ties. Therefore, the development of Sino-US relationship is of great
importance in China’s crisis management system. Against this backdrop, Chinese new
administration is committed to promoting a positive and healthy relationship with the
US.
The two leaders had the first sit-down meeting at the former Annenberg Estate in
California from 7 June to 8. This landmark meeting in a ‘no-ties, shirtsleeves’
atmosphere was unprecedented in the history of U.S.-China relations. The two-day
schedule gave two heads plenty of time to enhance personal understanding of each
other, and “exchange views and reach common understanding on a wide range of
issues of their concerns in a candid and straightforward manner.”48This new form
showed Xi’s considerable confidence in presenting China’s new diplomatic posture in
“Time to Update the Major Power Relations between China and the US,” Wenzhao, Tao, China US Focus, last
modified 13 June, 2013,
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/time-to-update-the-major-power-relations-between-china-and-the-us/.
48
29
his generation of leadership. The most important achievement in this summit is that
the two leaders reached a consensus on building a new type of major power relations
between each other. As for the connotation of the new type of major power relations,
“Xi summed it up in three incisive phrases: no confrontation or rivalry, mutual respect
and cooperation for win-win results.”49 During his talk with Obama, President Xi
reiterated China’s commitment to peaceful development. He admitted that there
existed competition between China and the US in almost all areas: trade, science and
technology, etc, but “a collaborative yet healthily competitive interaction is ought to
be cultivated.”50 The US and China, as the No.1 developed country and the largest
developing country in the world, have much difference from ideologies to social
systems. Hence, mutual respect plays a fundamental role in dealing with the
differences in Sino-US relationship. On the basis of enhancing mutual respect, can the
two major powers “avoid the tragic path in major power politics where an established
major power competes against and later clashes with an emerging power but ends up
fighting each other in war.”51 In the era of globalization, the two countries should
broaden the fields for cooperation and develop common interests to create a win-win
result. Of course, the proposal of this new type of major power relations by Chinese
new leadership could not remove all the divergence between China and the US. On
the matter of the Diaoyu Islands, US’ side with Japan is not likely to totally change in
the foreseeable future. However, the promotion of the three new keynotes for Sino-US
relationship allows the White House to understand the new perspective of China’s
diplomacy and be willing to create more strategic discussions for the overall
development of Sino-US relations.
Sino-Russia Mode
Japan’s increasingly aggression in East China Sea and US’ return to Asia made China
feel much worried about its position and the external environment in Asia. Hence, Xi
“Time to Update the Major Power Relations between China and the US,” ibid.
“Opening a New Window at Sunnylands,” Dingli,Shen, China Us Focus, last modified 30 May, 2013,
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/opening-a-new-window-at-sunnylands/.
51 “Time to Update the Major Power Relations between China and the US,” ibid.
49
50
30
Jinping, upon assuming the presidency turned to tighten the relationship with China’s
largest neighbors in Eurasia –Russia. Both China and Russia want to strive for more
room for their presence in Asia in spite of US’ security guarantee in this region. This
common interest let Chinese new leadership put Sino-China relation on the top of its
diplomatic agenda. It is proved by the facts that Russia is the first destination chosen
for President Xi’s overseas trip, and Putin is the foreign leader Xi met frequently as
many as six times in 2013. Xi’s attendance in the opening ceremony for the Sochi
Winter Olympics was also a sign of strong cooperation between the two countries in
the circumstance of the collective resistance by many Western heads’ absence. “Xi
equated his visit to Russia for the Sochi Olympics to congratulating a neighbor on a
happy occasion.” 52 According to Reuters, Xi told Putin during his first visit to
Moscow: “I get the impression that you and I always treat each other with an open
soul, our characters are alike.”53 The personal chemistry between the two heads
would to some extent be conducive to the prospect of Sino-Russian relations.
The main purpose of Xi’s meeting with Putin is to consolidate the China-Russia
comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination which “is distinguished for high
mutual trust, fruitful bilateral cooperation, and deep sentimental attachment between
the two nations.” 54 Xi clearly indicated that “two countries should keep close
contact and coordination on major international and regional issues and strengthen
their close cooperation in economy.”55 It is known that both China and Russia are
challenged by Japan’s territorial ambition. At the same time, faced with US’
encirclement and its allies’ agitation in the South China Sea, Chinese new leadership
was eager for heating up Sino-Russia ties to relieve China’s external pressure in Asia.
As both two countries show sensitiveness towards Western criticism of their domestic
politics, Xi-Putin meeting allowed two countries to reach a consensus on “supporting
“Xi Jinping Arrives in Sochi, Meets with Putin,” Shannon Tiezzi, The Diplomat, last modified 07 February,
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/xi-jinping-arrives-in-sochi-meets-with-putin/.
53 “Xi Ushers in New Era of Sino-Russian Ties,” Sha, Liu and Jingjie, Yang, Global Times, last modified 23
March, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/770022.shtml
54 “Xi Jinping Arrives in Sochi, Meets with Putin,” op.cit.
55 “Xi Jinping Arrives in Sochi, Meets with Putin,” ibid.
52
31
each other in promoting their respective development and national renewal,
safeguarding core interests, and independently choosing their own development paths
and social and political systems.”56 This notion is once again highlighted in Xi’s
meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Beijing on 15 April, 2014,
during which “Xi called for enhanced political mutual support between the two
countries.”57 Just in the same day, the Foreign Ministers of the two sides also had a
talk stressing that “the two countries would hold joint celebrations in 2015 for the
70th anniversary of the end of World War II and Chinese people's victory against
Japanese aggression.”58 In fact, the two foreign ministers had a telephone talk on
Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine. The two counterparts showed their condemnation on
Abe’s visit. “Lavrov told Wang: Russia holds a completely identical stance with China
on the Yasukuni Shrine issue" and urged Japan to correct its "erroneous historical
view.” 59 Backed by Moscow’s commitment of collectively maintaining the
achievements after the World War II, China feels more confident in handling the
historical issues with Japan. The strong impetus of Sino-Russia ties will enhance the
two countries’ regional security presence in Asia.
With Neighboring Countries
The escalation of Sino-Japanese crises made Xi’s administration realize that it’s a high
time for China to further relations with other neighboring countries, especially those
in South East Asia. At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Abe actively promote
his partnership with India and ASEAN states in the name of ‘value-based diplomacy’
which emphasized Japan and these countries “have shared commitment to democracy,
human rights and the rule of law.” 60 By means of exaggerating the unsettled
“Xi Ushers in New Era of Sino-Russian Ties,” op.cit.
“President Xi Called for Enhanced Relations with Russia,” Xinhua net, last modified 15 April, 2014,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264622.htm.
58 “China, Russia Foreign Ministers Hold talks,” Xinhua net, last modified 15 April, 2014,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264927.htm.
59 “Chinese, Russian Foreign Ministers Criticize Abe’s Shrine Visit,” Global Post, last modified 31 December,
2013,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/131230/chinese-russian-foreign-ministers-crit
icize-abes-shrin.
60 “Abe’s Value Diplomacy Goes against the Grain,” English. People.cn, last modified 02 July, 2013,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8307032.html.
56
57
32
territorial disputes in the South China Sea between China and some Southeast Asian
countries, Abe aims to set up an Asian alliance to contain and isolate China. The
outburst of these two disputes in China’s adjacent sea at the same time is the last thing
Chinese leaders want to see. In order to create a sound surrounding environment for
China’s domestic reforms and national rejuvenation, Chinese new leadership decides
to advance close relations with neighboring countries. At the beginning of October in
2013, President Xi began his state visits to Indonesia and Malaysia, two important
members of the ASEAN and attended the 21st leaders' meeting of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Indonesia's Bali afterwards. During his maiden
visit to Southeast Asia, Xi’s catchphrase of building a community of common destiny
between China and ASEAN countries could not be missed. A Five-point proposal in
Xi’s address to Indonesian lawmakers can mainly reflect Xi’s understanding of this
idea: “Firstly, the two sides should build trust and develop good-neighborliness.
Secondly, China and ASEAN countries should work for win-win cooperation. Thirdly,
the two sides should stand together and assist each other. Fourthly, China and ASEAN
countries should enhance mutual understanding and friendship to increase the social
support for bilateral ties. Fifthly, China and ASEAN countries should stick to
openness and inclusiveness.”61 These points were later transferred to China’s updated
principle in handling the diplomatic relations with neighboring counties.
Shortly after his return from the APEC Summit, President Xi held a conference
focusing on the diplomatic work with neighboring countries in the coming five to ten
years from 24 to 25 October, 2013 in Beijing. This conference aroused great attention
of the media as it released signals of Chinese new leadership’s principles in
developing relations with neighboring countries. “Xi Jinping emphasized that the
basic principle of diplomacy with neighbors is to treat them as friends and partners, to
make them feel safe and to help them develop. The concepts of friendship, sincerity,
“China Vows to Build Community of Common Destiny with ASEAN,” English. People.cn, last modified 03
October, 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8416675.html.
61
33
benefit and inclusiveness should be highlighted.”62 Xi pointed out that “China needs
to develop closer ties with neighboring countries, with more friendly political
relations, stronger economic bonds, deeper security cooperation and closer
people-to-people contacts.”63 The proposal of building Silk Road economic belt and
Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century as well as the strategy of free trade zone by
Xi’s administration aims to accelerate closer economic cooperation between China
and neighboring countries. The development of regional economic integration on the
basis of mutual benefits is largely conducive to enhancing neighboring countries’
more friendly, closer tendency to China and “increasing China's affinity, magnetism
and influence.” 64 In addition to closer economic interaction, the CPC Central
Committee also indicated the necessity of promoting regional security cooperation.
“The new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and
cooperation is advocated together with the notion of comprehensive security, common
security, and cooperative security.”65 Chinese leaders hope that the proposal of new
security concept could to some extent dispel misgivings of neighboring countries and
enhance its influence in the regional security mechanism. To sum up, the tensions in
China’s peripheral areas allows China’s new leadership to redefine its neighboring
diplomacy in a full-pledged manner. Only by virtue of this all-round boost between
China and its neighbors, can a peaceful and stable surrounding environment around
China be established.
With the European Countries
Europe is also taken into serious account of China’s broader diplomatic horizon under
the Xi-Li leadership. Chinese leaders realize it is their great responsibility to
62“Xi
Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified 25 October, 2013,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1093870.shtml.
63 “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,”
ibid.
64 “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,”
ibid.
65 “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,”
ibid.
34
initiatively introduce China’s story to the outside world and higher China’s voice in
the international system dominated by Western powers who have different
development paths, ideologies and cultural background from China. In the case of
Sino-Japanese crises, China’s resolution in safeguarding sovereignty and territorial
integrity is sometimes misinterpreted by the Western media as China’s increasingly
aggression and apparent ambition in dominating the Asia and the world as its next
step. Hence, apart from elevating China’s hard powers such as economic and military
strengths, the approaches to enhance China’s soft powers should be given more
consideration. In January this year Abe’s comments on “comparing Sino-Japanese
relations to those between Germany and Britain on the eve of World War One”66 at
the World Economic Forum in Davos, once again intensified the world’s anxieties
about the feasibility of China’s peaceful development. China felt that in addition to
conventional diplomatic protest, a ‘go out’ plan is needed to exchange its real
opinions with the developed countries in Europe. Therefore, Xi’s tour around the
Europe at the beginning of Year 2014 is an evident example of Beijing’s awareness of
“spreading China's own model of governance and development and removing the
doubts about a rising China.”67
Xi Jinping spent nine full days for his first presidential visit to Europe, during which
he had stops in the Netherlands, France, Germany and Belgium as well as the
European Union headquarters in Brussels. This visit is historically important in
China-EU relations as “it is the very first visit paid to the EU institution by Head of
State of China since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the EU in
1975.”68 Although economic cooperation lay on the top of Xi’s agenda due to several
trade tensions between the two sides such as the dispute over the price of Chinese
“Japanese PM Compares China-Japan Relations to Pre-WWI Europe,” CCTV.com, last modified 29 January,
2014, http://english.cntv.cn/program/asiatoday/20140129/105202.shtml.
67 “Xi Deepens EU Strategic Ties,” Global Times, Sun Xiaobo, last modified 01 April, 2014,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/851976.shtml.
68 “Address at the Seminar on President Xi Jinping's Visit to Europe and China-EU Relations By H.E.
66
Ambassador Yang Yanyi, Head of the Chinese Mission to the EU at the Brussels Press Club,” Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified 27 March, 2014,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1141531.shtml.
35
solar panels in the last year, President Xi did his utmost to clarify what kind of
country of China is manifested by his speech in the Belgian city of Bruges — derived
from the old Flemish for "bridges". With vivid description, Xi aimed to present a
more transparent picture of China to the European audience. Five features of China
were listed by Xi as follow: “a time-honored civilization, the experience of many
vicissitudes, a socialist country with Chinese characteristics, the world's biggest
developing country and a country undergoing profound changes.”69 Chinese splendid
civilization has cultivated “a strong sense of national confidence in the Chinese
people and a national spirit with patriotism at the very core.”70 The history of being
invaded by foreign powers make Chinese so dearly cherish peace and firmly
safeguarding its sovereignty. That is the main reason for China’s choice of an
independent foreign policy of peace. China’s unique development path is determined
by its distinctive culture, history and circumstances. By employing a Chinese proverb
“the tasty orange, grown in southern China, would turn sour once it is grown in the
north,”71 Xi smartly clarified the causes for China’s insistence on its own model.
Through nearly half of his speech on the real China, Xi aimed to encourage European
countries to form a solid understanding of China from the perspective of “its history,
culture, the Chinese people's way of thinking and the profound changes taking place
in China today.”72 Referring to the directions of China-EU strategic partnership,
President Xi proposed to “build four bridges for peace, growth, reform and the
progress of civilization.”73 Xi’s speech at the Körber Foundation also left a deep
impression on the world. His quotation of “Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s saying:
‘History should not encumber memory. It should enlighten common sense.’ And
Former Chancellor Willy Brandt comment ‘He who forgets the past will get sick in
his soul”74 was interpreted as Beijing’s warning of Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s
“Speech at the College of Europe,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified
02 April, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1144230.shtml.
70 “Speech at the College of Europe,” ibid.
71 “Speech at the College of Europe,” ibid.
72 “Speech at the College of Europe,” ibid.
73 “Speech at the College of Europe,” ibid.
74 “Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Körber Foundation,” Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified 29 March, 2014,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1148640.shtml.
69
36
approach to history. Xi explicitly indicated that “China will never pursue development
at the expense of other countries' interests or follow a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.”75
It is not difficult to find that Chinese new leadership learns to higher China’s voices
and seek for more support and recognition in the international platform. Xi’s
diplomatic attempts of proactively introducing China and spreading China’s domestic
and foreign policies during his stay in Europe was an significant step to dispel the
prejudice and misinterpretation of China’s newly tough stance to Japan.
5.3.
Lesson-Learned from Dealing with the Sino-Japanese Crises
According to the sequence in the crisis management mode, the fourth stage goes to
recovery which emphasizes on the efforts of turning the status of emergency to
normal mode after the crises come to an end. However, in the case of Sino-Japanese
crises, it is not likely to be resolved in the short term. The ruling elites of both sides
are not expected to compromise on the sovereignty of territorial issue concerning the
domestic and foreign policy requirements. Hence, the step of recovery will be omitted
in this thesis. Next to the recovery is the last step called learning. Although learning is
put at the end of crisis management mode by Mitroff focusing on evaluating the
performance, it may also occur in the middle of the mode. In this thesis, some
reflection could still be obtained through the analysis of China’s new comprehensive
diplomatic horizon in dealing with the Sino-Japanese crisis such as the role of social
media during the crisis. These points will be the important sources for the stage of
learning.
The Role of Social Media
The deterioration of Sino-Japanese crisis also leads to the sharp decline of people’s
favorable impression to the other country. According to the 9th Japan-China Joint
Popular Opinion Poll organized by Japanese Genron NPO and China Daily in 2013,
the percentage of Chinese favorable impression to Japan and Japanese positive
75
“Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Körber Foundation,” ibid.
37
impression to China has reduced to the lowest rate in the last nine years with less than
10% in both countries.76 People participating in the survey in Japan consisted of 1000
ordinary people and 805 intellectuals, while in China respondents were composed of
1540 ordinary people, 200 elites from the government, media, NGO and Research
Institutes as well as teachers and students from five universities named Perking
University, Qstinghua University, Renmin University, University of International
Relations and China Foreign Affairs University.
Source: The 9th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll Analysis Report on the
Comparative Data, accessed 20 April 2014,
http://www.genron-npo.net/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=59:the-9th-japan-china-public-opinion-poll&catid=2:research&Itemid=4.
According to the chart above, it was found that the percentage of Chinese unfavorable
or relatively unfavorable impression about Japan was as high as 92.8%, while a
comparative figure of Japanese polled came to 90.1%.77 The first cause for the
worsening of people’s likeability reflected from the survey is the escalation over
76
“The 9th Japan-China Public Poll,” The Genron NPO, last modified 13 August, 2013,
http://www.genron-npo.net/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=59:the-9th-japan-china-p
ublic-opinion-poll&catid=2:research&Itemid=4.
77 “The 9th Japan-China Public Poll,” Ibid.
38
Diaoyu Islands which accounted for 77.6% and 53.2% in China and Japan
respectively.78 The historical issue about Japan’s wartime doing went to the second
place. Besides this, this survey also found that domestic media played a major role for
the people from the both sides to access to the information about the other country. In
the side of China, 89.1% ordinary people and 81.2% elites and college teachers and
students agreed that Chinese media was the most important channel for them to get
the latest news about Japan. In Japan, this manner won 95% ordinary people’s
approval.79 The results of this survey lead the author to rethink the influence of social
media to people’s impression to the other country. Generally speaking, the coverage
of social media should be in a true and objective way. However, in reality it is really
difficult for the media to report strictly according to the facts concerning its own
national interests. With the rapid development of the Internet, many new social media
are vigorously rising such as Weibo, QQ and internet forum. Chinese people
especially the young generation at their 20s to 30s are more willing to get the
information via internet or mobile media and exchange their opinions in the network
community. In the case of Diaoyu Islands dispute, mainstream media tried to convey
China’s tough stance on safeguarding its sovereignty, while some of the media
over-exaggerated the confrontation between China and Japan and even predicted the
war between the two countries is going to outbreak soon after. This kind of report to
some extent misled the public that the solution for Sino-Japanese crises could only
resort to military means. In such circumstances, people’s anti-Japan sentiment may
grow stronger and turn to violence which did great harm to the stability and security
of China’s society. Therefore, a more sensible attitude is called for among the media.
Besides this, a more comprehensive perspective is expected to present by the media to
the public. It is not difficult to find that most Chinese media rest on Japan’s
infringement of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, less attention
was given to the base of Japan’s doing and Japanese understanding of the issue as
well as some key concepts such as the baseline of territorial sea. The introduction this
78
79
“The 9th Japan-China Public Poll,” Ibid.
“The 9th Japan-China Public Poll,” Ibid.
39
kind of information by the media is conducive to leading the public to form a more
rational and muti-dimensional understanding of the bilateral crisis. The strengthening
of social media’s responsibility actually plays a significant role in the stage of
prevention in the crisis management system. Both Tokyo and Beijing are expected to
take a serious consideration of their effort in this aspect.
The Dilemma of the Principle of Shelving the Dispute
The principle of shelving the dispute was proposed by Deng Xiaoping to provide an
alternative mean of solving territorial disputes between China and its neighboring
countries. It initially aimed at the dispute over Diaoyu Islands. Later, it was also
applied to dealing with the disputes in the South China Sea between China and other 9
Southeastern Asian countries. However, the Abe government recently denied that
there existed any agreement between Japan and China to ‘shelve’ issues regarding the
Diaoyu Islands. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Kan Yi-wei said “There has never
been consensus achieved on shelving disputes.”80 On the website of Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan, it asserts: “There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are
clearly an inherent part of the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based
upon international law. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved
concerning the Senkaku Islands.”81 This denial put the intense bilateral ties into a
graver situation. Hence, a recalling of the history of Sino-Japanese relations is
necessary to find out why the two countries hold opposite opinion on this principle.
In the 1970s, Chinese and Japanese governments were preparing for the normalization
of diplomatic ties between the two sides. According to a series of commentary and
narration based on Japanese documentaries, the first reference of Diaoyu Islands was
on the third summit of the Sino-Japaneseese diplomatic normalization talks between
the then Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese former premier Zhou
“Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change,” China Institute of
International Studies, Xin, Zhai, last modified 20 January, 2014,
http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-01/20/content_6623684.htm.
81 “About the Senkaku Islands,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html.
80
40
Enlai on 27 September, 1972 in Beijing. During the meeting, when the Japanese
delegate asked China’s attitudes towards the Diaoyu Islands, Zhou answerd: “It is not
good to discuss this at this time. This has become an issue because of (the discovery
of) oil (in the region). Neither Taiwan nor the Unites States would pay any attention
(to the issue) if it were not for oil.”82 This meeting was important as “Prime Minister
Tanaka regarded the Diaoyu Islands issue as a significant and pending issue that
should be put forward and negotiated on important diplomatic occasions.”83 Zhou’s
status was inherited by Deng Xiaoping who considered that the principle of ‘shelving
the dispute’ was the best choice for China at that time for China’s relatively weak
national strength and the urgent need for winning support from the United States and
Japan against the threat of soviet Union. On 10 August, 1978, another significant
meeting related to Diaoyu Islands was held between Deng Xiaoping and Sunao
Sonoda in Beijing during which Deng indicated: “we should not touch it now. It won’t
matter if we stay in line with the Peace and Friendship Treaty and put it off for several
years. (…) Our generation won’t be able to sort it out. Let’s leave it to the next
generation or our grandchildren. They will find a way out.”84 Despite the oral form of
agreement, a tacit consensus on the Diaoyu Islands could be detected between the two
sides from these meetings. This tacit consensus of ‘shelving the disputes’ has
generally guided the peaceful development of Sino-Japanese relations for the past 40
years. However, with Abe’s ignorance of this agreement, many scholars show their
concerns about the feasibility of this principle in nowadays Sino-Japanese relations.
From author’s perspective, the dilemma of ‘shelving the disputes’ principle centers on
the difficulty of maintaining the continuity of the foreign policies in two countries. In
Japan, the incumbent Abe’s cabinet disregards former Japanese leaders’ avowable
attitudes towards the shelving the disputes’ consensus for the sake of consolidating its
political sustainability and “creating a favorable atmosphere for amending and
82
83
84
“Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change,” ibid.
“Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change,” ibid.
“Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change,” ibid.
41
re-interpreting the constitution.”85 The tougher stance on foreign affairs can to some
extent divert public’s attention on the domestic governance. Besides this, a certain
degree of tension in Japan’s security environment is easier for the government to
convince Japanese people of regaining collective self-defense right which is a vital
step of Abe’s ambition for turning Japan into a real normal country. In China,
although the principle of ‘shelving the disputes’ has been upheld by the past four
generations of leadership, few efforts was concentrated on working out solutions
during the period of laying aside the disputes. ‘Shelving the disputes’ is a general
strategy in the specific context of China. It is considered that more concrete measures
are expected to formulate to deal with the escalation of disputes. That’s to say, more
specific mechanism such as interactive maritime warning system between the two
countries should be added to the content of ‘shelving the disputes’. Only in this way,
can the principle of ‘shelving the disputes’ play a positive role in preventing the crisis
in Sino-Japanese relations.
85
“Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change,” ibid.
42
6. Conclusion
The deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations since 2012 is regarded as one of the
hottest issues in the international community. Territorial disputes over Diaoyu Islands
and the historical approach to Japan’s wartime doing are the two major causes for the
deadlock between the two countries. Newly elected leaders Shinzo Abe in Japan and
Xi Jinping in China both intend to take a tough position in their foreign policies
related to national sovereignty and integrity. The involvement of the United States
makes the situation in East Asia even more complex. Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy
and the long-standing US-Japan Security Treaty commitment make Japan become
more aggressive in its confrontation with China. In the domestic society, thanks to the
advance of social media, Chinese people especially those at their 20s to 30s become
more active in expressing their opinions on China’s foreign policy-making. With the
elevation of China’s comprehensive strength, the national pride among Chinese
people also become stronger. Hence, the voice calling for China’s tough position in its
diplomacy among the public becomes higher which to some extent limits Beijing’s
diplomatic decisions. In this circumstance, Chinese new leadership realizes that it is
urgent for them to re-examine China’s foreign policies and make some adjustments
accordingly.
Crisis management mode is chosen as the theory in this thesis as the author believe
that the escalation of Sino-Japanese crisis on the one hand intensifies the instability of
China’s surrounding environment, on the other hand inspires Chinese new leadership
to explore its diplomatic horizon in a full-pledged manner, during which the crisis has
been transformed into opportunities for China’s diplomacy. According to the sequence
of the crisis management mode, the first priority is to find out the events that could
indicate the worsening ties between China and Japan. It is commonly considered that
Japan’s nationalization of Diaoyu Islands inflame antagonism between the two
countries. Chinese government then cancelled many exchange activities and
commemorations to show its strong dissatisfaction. More typical incidents occur in
43
2013 such as Abe’s inspection to remote islands close to the Diaoyu Islands aiming at
declaring its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, China’s establishment of the East
China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), the issue of two ambitious
defense documents by Japanese cabinet and Abe’s tribute to controversial Yasukuni
Shrine. The list of these flaring incidents
After detecting the ‘risky’ events in the intense Sino-Japanese relation, the new
diplomatic efforts of Chinese new leadership in containing the negative impacts
brought about by the deterioration of Sino-Japanese ties is clarified as the second step.
During taking his post as China’s president, Xi Jinping has put forward many
catchphrases on China’s diplomacy which are termed by some Chinese scholars ‘Xi
Jinping Doctrine of Chinese diplomacy.’86 In the face of Japan, multi-dimensional
efforts have been made with the combination of hard and soft approaches. The most
noteworthy was that Chinese diplomats learned to take the initiative to speak up
China’s voice by means of different foreign media. In light of the US’ significant role
in Sino-Japanese relations, Xi proposed to establish a new type of major power
relations between the two countries. Although Xi broke the convention of choosing
the United States as the first destination of his state trip abroad, the California Summit
allowed the two head to exchange ideas in a more frank and relaxed way. The
essences of a new type of US-China relationship reflect Beijing’s political wisdom
and its expectation for the direction of this big power relationship with “the lowest
objective of having no confrontation or conflict, medium objective of mutual respect,
and the highest objective of cooperation and win-win. All three objectives can be
pursued in parallel.”87 In addition to the US, Xi’s administration also attaches great
importance to reinforce the relation with Russia. This move claimed by Xi was not
aligned diplomacy, but a comprehensive strategic partnership in which both sides will
respect and support each other’s core interests. Hence, it is more advanced and
independent compared to the old aligned form. Referring to China’s neighbors, the
86
“The Xi Jinping Doctrine of Chinese Diplomacy,” China US Focus, Kun, Zhai, last modified 25 March, 2014,
http://www.chinausfocus.com/print/?id=36743.
87 “The Xi Jinping Doctrine of Chinese Diplomacy,” ibid.
44
new concept of ‘building a community of common destiny’ was raised by Xi to ensure
a peaceful and stable surrounding environment. Western media’s bias on China and
their siding with Japan in Sino-Japanese crises allowed Chinese new leadership to
introduce the nowadays China to the West and encourage them to have a better
understanding of China. This consideration of improving China’s image is clearly
reflected in Xi’s trip to the Europe.
From the analysis of these diplomatic endeavors, the capacity of Chinese new
leadership in managing the Sino-Japanese crises is evidently proved. However, it is
not the end of the crisis management mode. The critical stage of learning requires the
author to reexamine the diplomatic performance by Chinese new leadership. In terms
of the role of social media, more responsibility and openness are needed since they
play a vital role in spreading and interpreting a country’s foreign policy. As for the
principle of ‘shelving the disputes’, is in an embarrassing situation with Japan’s denial
of this agreement. Despite originally being proposed to prevent the possible conflict
between China and Japan, it fails to realize that function. Therefore, more concrete
measures are expected to formulate to deal with the escalation of disputes. These
points could be used for enriching the stage of prevention by which the possibility of
the outbreak of Sino-Japanese crisis could be effectively reduced. Therefore, China’s
new diplomacy in Xi’s administration featured as more proactive and confident is
fully manifested through its handling of Sino-Japanese crises. To sum up, the
deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations does not put China into a passive status;
instead, Chinese new leadership alters it into precious opportunities to bring forth new
diplomatic approaches with the other countries.
45
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