The Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth MS. WEIGL Fifth Amendment Double jeopardy Self incrimination Eminent domain Blueford v. Arkansas 2012 On November 28, 2007, Alex Blueford and a friend of his were left in charge of the 20-month-old son of Blueford’s live-in girlfriend. Approximately one hour after being left with the child, Blueford’s friend called emergency services because the child was having difficulty breathing. The child died two days after being rushed to the hospital. A medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was a close head injury, and the State of Arkansas subsequently brought several charges against Blueford for the death of the child. Blueford v. Arkansas The state charged Blueford with capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury to consider each charge one at a time, and to consider the greater offenses before lesser offenses. After over four hours of deliberation, the jury returned. The forewoman stated that the jury was deadlocked. The Judge asked the forewoman about each charge, and she stated that the jury was unanimously against the capital murder charge, unanimously against the first-degree murder charge, and deadlocked on the manslaughter charge. The jury returned for further deliberation but remained deadlocked. The judge released the jury, and the court declared a mistrial. Blueford v. Arkansas The state sought to retry Blueford on all charges. Blueford filed a motion to dismiss the capital murder and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the jury had made a decision on those two counts. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the juror’s communication to the judge was a casual communication and not an acquittal. Blueford made an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. After the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied Blueford’s petition for rehearing, Blueford appealed the decision. Issues 1. Did the jury forewoman's announcements of unanimous votes on capital and first-degree murder constitute acquittals under the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, prohibiting Arkansas from retrying Blueford on those charges? 2. Was there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial on charges of capital and first-degree murder? Supreme Court Decision: 6 votes for Arkansas, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: Fifth Amendment No and yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit Arkansas from retrying Blueford on charges of capital and first-degree murder. Chief Justice Roberts rejected Blueford’s argument that the jury actually acquitted him of capital and first-degree murder. He determined that the forewoman's report was not a final resolution of anything, reasoning that the jury instructions left the jury free to reconsider its vote on the capital and first-degree murder charges after the forewoman's report. Unlike cases where acquittal on lesser charges precluded retrial on greater charges, the jury’s decision here was not final. Sixth Amendment Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid. Issue Does the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, as defined in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, apply to a defendant who was sentenced to a suspended sentence? Supreme Court Decision: 5 votes for Shelton, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Right to Counsel Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held, according to Argersinger, that a suspended sentence that may "end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty" may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded "the guiding hand of counsel" in the prosecution for the crime charged. The Court reasoned that, because the invocation of the suspended incarceration would constitute a prison term imposed for the assault offense of which defendant was convicted without the assistance of counsel, the Constitution required the provision of counsel. Justice Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that the Court's prior decisions emphasized actual imprisonment as the touchstone of entitlement to appointed counsel. The Fourteenth Amendment Proposed by Congress June 13, 1866; ratified July 9, 1868. Section 1 defines citizenship. It provides for the acquisition of United States citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Citizenship at birth is determined according to the principle of jus soli - "the law of the soil," where born; naturalization is the legal process by which one acquires a new citizenship at some time after birth. Under certain circumstances, according to the principle of jus sanguinis - "the law of the blood," to whom born. This section also contains two major civil rights provisions: the Due Process Clause forbids a State (and its local governments) to discriminate against, draw unreasonable distinctions between, persons. Section 2 eliminates the Three-Fifths Compromise provision. Essentially, all persons in the United States are counted in each decennial census, the basis for the distribution of House seats. The balance of this section has never been enforced and is generally thought to be obsolete. The Fourteenth Amendment Section 3 limited the President's power to pardon those persons who had led the Confederacy during the Civil War. Congress removed this disability in 1898. Section 4 also dealt with matters directly related to the Civil War. It reaffirmed the public debt of the United States; but it invalidated, prohibited payment of, any debt contracted by the Confederate States and also prohibited any compensation of former slave owners. Hollingsworth v. Perry 2013 In 2000, the citizens of California passed Proposition 22, which affirmed a legal understanding that marriage was a union between one man and one woman. In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that the California Constitution required the term “marriage” to include the union of same-sex couples and invalidated Proposition 22. Later in 2008, California citizens passed Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to provide that “only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized by California.” The respondents, a gay couple and a lesbian couple, sued the state officials responsible for the enforcement of California’s marriage laws and claimed that Proposition 8 violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. When the state officials originally named in the suit informed the district court that they could not defend Proposition 8, the petitioners, official proponents of the measure, intervened to defend it. The district court held that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Issues Do the petitioners have standing under Article III of the Constitution to argue this case? Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the state of California from defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman? Supreme Court Decision: 5 votes for Perry, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article III No, the petitioners do not have standing. The Court did not reach the question on the merits of the case. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal courts only have the authority to decide cases in which there is an “actual controversy,” which means that the complaining party must have suffered a “concrete and particularized injury” that can be redressed through court action. In this case, because the petitioners had only a generalized grievance in the form of a desire to defend Proposition 8, they did not have standing under Article III. The Court also held that the petitioners could not invoke the standing of the state to appeal because a litigant must assert his/her own rights and cannot claim relief through the intervention of a third party. Because the petitioners did not have standing to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that court did not have jurisdiction to reach a decision on the case.