Chapter Four
Domestic Politics and War
Domestic Politics and War
 Unitary state assumption: the treatment of
states as coherent actors with a set of
interests that belong to the state.
 This assumption can be a useful starting place
for analysis.
• However, states are legal and political constructs,
not beings capable of taking actions
Domestic Politics and War
 War is costly. But the costs of war are
distributed unevenly.
 Do wars serve the national interest?
• To answer such questions, we must consider
domestic actors’ different interests
Domestic Politics and War
 Which domestic interests drive foreign policy
choices depends on:
• The strategic interactions between actors
• The institutions within the state
 War is the outcome of interaction between or
among multiple states.
Core of the Analysis
 There are actors within the state who may
benefit from war:
• These actors may have institutional and
organizational advantages
• Their main effect is to increase the aggressiveness
of the state’s foreign policy
• Democratic political institutions can reduce their
influence
National Vs. Particularistic Interests
 General (national) interest:
• Something that most actors within the country
share.
 Narrow or particularistic interests:
• Interests held by a relatively small number of
actors within the country
National Vs. Particularistic Interests
 An example: The US has had a consistent
interest in oil and the Middle East.
• Nationally, oil is vital to the US’s military power
and economy
• Particularly, oil companies benefit from selling oil
 War may sometimes arise because it furthers
the narrow interests of particular actors.
Interactions, Institutions, and
Influence
 Without the unitary actor assumption,
individuals and groups with different interests
come into play.
• Institutions determine which actors and interests
have influence
 Some actors may have strategic advantages.
• Due to the collective action problem, small groups
may have more effective influence
Interactions, Institutions, and
Influence
 The extent of a group’s political influence
depends on its members ability to cooperate.
 Three kinds of actors:
• Leaders who make foreign policy decisions
• Organized groups within the country
(bureaucratic actors and interests groups)
• The general public
Interactions, Institutions, and
Influence
 The bureaucracy: different organizations that
make up a state’s structure.
• Includes the military, diplomatic corps and
intelligence agencies
 Interest groups: groups of individuals with
common interests that have organized in
order to push for policies that benefit their
members.
Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in
Order to Hold On to Power at Home?
 In 1982, Argentina sparked war with Britain
when it invaded the Falkland Islands.
• The territory was not especially valuable and
Britain had a far superior naval force
 Both governments had domestic problems:
• Both economies were in severe recessions
What Do Leaders Want?
 Leaders of states have many interests of their
own:
• Ideological beliefs, personal motivation, the desire
to stay in power, etc.
 Strategic politicians can use their control of
policy to share their political restraints.
• May use war to enhance their hold on power
The Rally Effect and the Diversionary
Incentive
 Rally effect: people’s tendency to become
more supportive of their own government
during a crisis.
 Approval ratings for a leader often jump at
the onset of a war.
• After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2008,
President George W. Bush’s approval rating
jumped 35 percent
The Rally Effect and the Diversionary
Incentive
The Rally Effect and the Diversionary
Incentive
 People “rally around the flag” because
international conflicts can:
•
•
•
•
Cause an increase in patriotism
Ease criticism of the government
Create a diversion from other problems
Give leaders an opportunity to scapegoat or
blame the country’s problems on foreigners
The Rally Effect and the Diversionary
Incentive
 At times, political leaders may face a
diversionary incentive:
• A temptation to spark an international crisis in
order to rally public support at home
 Gambling for resurrection:
• Taking a risky action, such as starting a war, when
the alternative is certain to be very bad
Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?
 The 1997 movie Wag the Dog depicted a
leader hiring a movie director to produce a
fake war in order to boost his ratings.
 But there is little evidence that leaders
systematically resort to force when they are in
trouble domestically.
• International conflict is more often initiated by
leaders who are politically secure
Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?
 Why do we not see stronger evidence of
diversionary incentives?
• Perhaps most leaders are not as cynical as
assumed and are not simply “office seeking”
• Or, the political benefits of war relative to peace
have to be large in order to eliminate the
possibility of peaceful bargaining
Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?
Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?
 The size of the bargaining range is determined
by the sum of war costs to both sides, a + b.
• If State A expects war benefits to equal r, the total
cost of war to State A is a – r
 Yet, even if the benefit r is greater than a, a
bargaining range could still exist that is shown
by: a + b – r
The Political Costs of War
 War can also impose domestic political costs.
 Public support for war changes as the costs
increase.
• The only US wars that remained popular
throughout were WWII, the Persian Gulf War and
the war in Afghanistan
The Political Costs of War
The Political Costs of War
 Leaders who fight losing or costly wars are
more likely to be removed from office than
those who win wars.
 Leaders should see war as a gamble not only
for the state, but for their political interests.
Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the
Military or Special Interest Groups?
 Though imperialism did not benefit Britain as
a whole, it was very profitable for wealthy
people who could invest overseas.
 A British economist, J. A. Hobson, argued that
wars are fought to benefit military and
business interests.
Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the
Military or Special Interest Groups?
 Military-industrial complex:
• An alliance of military leaders and arms
manufacturers who presumably have a vested
interest in an aggressive foreign policy
 While hawkish domestic interests do not lead
directly to the breakdown of bargaining, they
do create more opportunities for such
failures.
Bureaucratic Politics and the Military
 Decisions about war and peace are not only
shaped by state leaders, but also by the
interests of bureaucratic organizations.
 These organizations generally seek:
• Bigger budgets, more input into policy-making,
and opportunities for personal promotion
Bureaucratic Politics and the Military
 The military is usually the most influential
bureaucratic actor in matters of war.
 Does military influence over foreign policy
decision-making affect a state’s belligerence?
• The military sees benefits to war that other actors
may not
• Yet, it is important not to equate the military with
militarism
Interest Groups: Economic and Ethnic
Lobbies
 Interest groups organize around economic
and ethnic motives.
 Economic motives: when an actor’s income
depends on events in other countries
 Ethnic motives: when groups are motivated by
ethnic attachment or ideological interests to
support or oppose a particular country
Interest Groups: Economic and Ethnic
Lobbies
 Economic actors do not always prefer
belligerent policies.
• May depend on peaceful relations with other
countries
 Depending on where and how they do
business:
• Economic actors can have an interest in peaceful
relations with some countries and/or hostile
relations with others
How Can Small Groups Have A Big
Influence On Policy?
 The answer lies in the nature of the
interactions between these different actors
and the institutions that regulate their
relations.
 An example: The military’s influence derives
from the fact that it controls a vast portion of
a state’s coercive resources.
How Can Small Groups Have A Big
Influence On Policy?
 Political leaders rely on the information and
expertise of bureaucratic actors.
 When making decisions about war, the
military could shape the outcome by
manipulating the information that the leader
uses to calculated the expected value of war
and its alternatives.
How Can Small Groups Have A Big
Influence On Policy?
 How can interest groups “hijack” a state’s
foreign policy for their own narrow interests?
• Because taxpayers are more numerous, the costs
of intervention to any individual are quite low
 Organized interest groups can provide
political leaders with:
• Things they need and want in exchange for
favored policies
How Can Small Groups Have A Big
Influence On Policy?
 In a democracy, interest groups can also
promise the support of motivated voters.
• Examples: the Cuban-American and pro-Israel
lobbies
 However, just because a policy benefits a
particular group does not mean the policy
must have been enacted in order to benefit
that group.
How Can Small Groups Have A Big
Influence On Policy?
 For every foreign policy decision that might be
made to serve a narrow interest, there are
alternative arguments based on national
interests.
 For example: Some argue that imperialism
was a product of military-strategic
competition among the principal powers.
How Do Domestic Interests Affect
International Bargaining?
 By influencing the costs and benefits of
conflict:
• Domestic interests help determine the extent of
the state’s ambition in an international conflict
 However, these interests are generally not
sufficient to cause war in any given situation.
How Do Domestic Interests Affect
International Bargaining?
How Do Domestic Interests Affect
International Bargaining?
 What would happen if State A’s interests
changed in response to the influence of
hawkish actors?
 An example: the good is territory with oil in it
and the government’s core supporters are
environmentalists.
• The costs of war would be considered high, at
“aD” – war is considered unattractive
How Do Domestic Interests Affect
International Bargaining?
 If the dovish leader is replaced by a leader
who draws support from oil companies:
• More value is placed on the land, so “aH” is the
new expected cost of war
• The value of war now shifts to the right, but a
bargaining range still exists
 The shift creates a danger of war that did not
exist before.
How Do Domestic Interests Affect
International Bargaining?
 If war depends on features of the bargaining
interaction, such as:
• How information is distributed
• Whether states can credibly commit to a deal
 It is hard to argue that interest groups alone
can explain why crises sometimes become
wars.
Why Don’t Democracies Fight One
Another?
 Democratic peace: a well-established
observation that there are few, if any, clear
cases of war between mature democratic
states.
 The strength of the claim depends on how
one defines democracy – and what events one
considers war.
Why Don’t Democracies Fight One
Another?
 Democracies are not, overall, less war-prone
than other kinds of states.
• They are frequently at war with nondemocratic
states
 Is the absence of war among democracies
worldwide a coincidence?
What Is Democracy?
 Democracy: a political system in which
candidates compete for political office
through frequent, fair elections in which a
sizeable portion of the adult population can
vote.
 This includes two major aspects of democracy:
• Contestation and participation
What Is Democracy?
 Contestation:
• Is the ability of different individuals and groups to
compete for political office
 Participation:
• Is the ability of a large portion of the country to be
involved in the selection process through voting
What Is Democracy?
 Liberal is another term that often
accompanies democracy:
• A philosophy that emphasizes the value of
individual liberty
 Most liberal democracies, in addition to
allowing competition and voting have:
• Numerous protections of individual civil and
political rights, such as rights to free speech,
religion, political association and a free press
What Is Democracy?
What Is Democracy?
 How could democracies be different when it
comes to war and peace?
 Two broad ways in which domestic
institutions can affect the likelihood of war:
• By influencing the interests of states and their
leaders
• By influencing the bargaining interaction between
and among countries
Representation, Accountability, and
Interests in War and Peace
 The costs of war are paid by society at large.
• A leader rarely has direct exposure to costs of war
 The interests of the ruler and ruled are not
always aligned.
Representation, Accountability, and
Interests in War and Peace
 One solution to this problem is to establish a
democratic government:
• The ruler would be accountable to the people
• This would align the interests of the ruler and
ruled
 Representative institutions could slow or stop
the decision to go to war.
Representation, Accountability, and
Interests in War and Peace
 Accountability: the ability to punish or reward
leaders for their decisions.
• Elections provide a simple mechanism for people
to impose these punishments
 Democratic leaders face higher costs from war
than do nondemocratic leaders.
Representation, Accountability, and
Interests in War and Peace
 Nondemocratic leaders also find that life after
losing office is not pleasant.
• Their removal from office usually occurs through
violent means
 Logic of accountability suggests that
democratic leaders should be more selective
about starting wars.
• Nondemocratic leaders may be willing to gamble
Democracy and Bargaining
 Democratic institutions make it easier to
overcome informational problems:
• Political systems are much more transparent
• Are more able to send credible signals in crises
 Transparency can reduce the risk of
preemptive war between democracies.
• Commitment to refrain from attacking is made
credible because neither can mobilize forces in
secret
Democracy and Bargaining
 Mechanisms of accountability mean that
public disapproval is more likely to result in
some sort of punishment for the democratic
leader.
 Institutions of accountability:
• Make it easier for democratic leaders to credibly
communicate their resolve because backing down
creates public disapproval
Domestic Institutions or Strategic
Interests?
 Could common interests account for the
democratic peace?
 The verdict Is mixed:
• War is a rare phenomenon and there were few
democracies in the nineteenth century
• Democratic states did experience a high number
of militarized disputes short of war
Domestic Institutions or Strategic
Interests?
 It is possible that democracy is not
responsible for democratic peace.
• Perhaps economic development accounts for the
democratic peace
• But there is less evidence that wealth promotes
peace between countries
 Democratic states may also have had
relatively similar interests.
Conclusion: What If All the World
Were Democratic?
 Political leaders may care about what is best
for their country, but also care about staying
in office.
 When groups with hawkish interests have
superior organization and resources, they can
push the state toward greater international
ambition.
Conclusion: What If All the World
Were Democratic?
 When interactions and institutions empower
those who bear the costs of war:
• They can exert a pacifying effect at the
international level
 The relative openness and transparency of
democratic political process can:
• Reduce informational and commitment problems
that cause bargaining to fail
Conclusion: What If All the World
Were Democratic?
 Two reasons to be cautious:
• Although the number of democracies has
increased over time, the spread of democracy has
also experienced reversals
• Not all democratic countries are liberal; some are
built on ethnic or religious identities that can
foster conflicts
Conclusion: What If All the World
Were Democratic?
Conclusion: What If All the World
Were Democratic?
 What if the public is motivated by nationalist,
ethnocentric, or even genocidal ideas?
 The international effects of democracy’s
spread may depend not only on the
institutions, but also on the interests of those
they empower.
What Do We Know? War and the Fate
of Political Leaders
 What happens to leaders who take their
countries into war? Three outcomes:
• Victories, small losses and big losses
 About 85 percent of leaders who lost costly
wars also lost office within a year of the war’s
end.
• Nondemocratic leaders face a much greater risk of
additional punishment
What Shaped Our World? The Kargil
War and the Limits of Democratic
Peace
 In 1999, India mobilized its troops to repel a
Pakistani military force from the disputed
Kashmir region.
• At least 1000 soldiers died
 India and Pakistan had already fought three
wars since their independence in 1948.
• But, at the time of war, both countries had
democratically elected governments
What Shaped Our World? The Kargil
War and the Limits of Democratic
Peace
 Why did two democracies go to war?
• The role of religious differences
• The influence of the military in Pakistan
• Little civilian oversight of the diplomatic
ramifications of the operation
 For democracy to act as a brake on
international conflicts, elected leaders must
have actual knowledge of and control over the
state’s military actions.
Controversy: Should We Assassinate
Leaders Rather Than Fight Their
Armies?
 Two arguments:
• Punish the “guilty” rather than the innocent
• The common interests of warring states could
produce a bargaining outcome that minimizes the
suffering and death of their populations
Controversy: Should We Assassinate
Leaders Rather Than Fight Their
Armies?
 However, even if particular assassinations
save lives:
• The general policy might be destabilizing for
international politics as a whole
 The norm against assassination:
• We should promote everyone’s interest in a
stable and predictable international order
Additional Art for Chapter 4