The problem of evil
Philosophy of Religion 2008
Lecture 5
Procedural work


Draft exam answers: complete in an hour!
Handwritten is fine, but do give references …
1.
2.
3.
4.

Does the ‘soul-making’ theodicy provide an satisfactory
answer to the problem of evil?
Is divine hiddenness essential to human freedom?
Is there a logical problem of evil for the theist?
If the universe shows evidence of design, does this prove
the existence of God?
Hand in by 4pm Friday Week 8.
Today
 A forgotten proof? Franklin’s ‘beer proof’ (!)
 Two problems of evil:
The logical problem
The evidential problem
…the coherence of theism and the existence of God
 Selected theistic responses
 Opposition to theodicy
Problems of evil: 1
 The logical problem: a problem of consistency:
 If God is good; and omnipotent; and omniscient
 There shouldn’t be human and animal suffering
 But there is – inconsistency?
 Which premise will the theist give up … ?
 (See Hume DCNR Part X)
The logical problem
 Mackie (‘Evil and omnipotence’): ‘God is
omnipotent, God is wholly good, yet evil exists
… the theologian it seems at once must adhere,
and yet cannot consistently adhere to all three’
 Strictly, to produce inconsistency, need added
premise(s). E.g.:
An omnipotent God can do anything
Good must always seek to eliminate evil
Pause for clarification
 Suffering as evil, or as the result of evil … so
evils/suffering interchangeable
 Evils:
Moral: resulting from human action/inaction
Natural: resulting from other causes
 God as good or God as loving?
 These last two may affect the sort of defence the
theist can mount
The logical problem



Possible defences for the theist?
The theist may simply deny one of the
premises (unattractive) …
More likely to point out that:
a) These premises need to be understood in a certain
way, or
b) The hidden premises (omnipotence all powerful,
goodness must oppose evil) are wrong
Possible defences
 So: perhaps
God is not good in our sense of morally good
Evil does not exist …
 Or:
God has reasons for allowing evil (goodness will not
always seek to overcome evil)
God has created the world in such a way that he
cannot intervene …
God not good?
 Does calling God ‘good’ mean morally good …
Goodness is not always a moral property
It may be a expression of gratitude..?
 Can God be subject to moral judgment?
 ‘God can no more be part of a moral community
[with his creatures] than he can be part of a
political community with them …’ (Kenny, What
is Faith?)
 Does the same apply to ‘loving’ …?
Evil doesn’t exist?
 Aquinas: evil is not a positive quality
 It is ‘a certain absence of a good’ (Summa
Theologiae - cf. discussion of omnipotence)
 So God cannot cause evil … but does he
therefore permit this absence to occur?
 Augustine: evil as ‘the name for nothing but the
want of good’ (City of God Bk XI)
 And this want arises from the fall, original sin …
The free will defence
 And note, the fall arises from human choice …
 Allowing choice seems to limit God’s power
 Challenges the hidden assumptions:
An omnipotent God can do anything
Good must always seek to eliminate evil
 ‘Greater good’ defences – goods which cannot
be achieved without allowing (possibility of) evil
The free will defence
 It is good to have free agents, and so it is good
to allow agents freedom
 God cannot let us be free and ensure we chose
good (incompatibilism)
 And so God must allow us to do evil …
 Plantinga: ‘thus is the power of an omnipotent
God limited by the freedom he confers upon his
creatures’
The free will defence
 But what relationship between God and
freedom?
 Is God still responsible for the actions of free
agents?
Since he created them, and sustains them
(Aquinas) God is not a worldly cause, so he can
bring human actions without limiting freedom
(compatibilism)
But is this plausible?
The free will defence
 General problem: is the good worth the evil?
Maybe if the free creatures do more good than evil?
 Can our free will account for natural evils?
As they affect both us and other creatures…
Should they be laid at God’s door?
Or the fall/original sin (Augustine, van Inwagen)
Free will and natural evils
 Maybe being able to enjoy free will depends on
the existence of natural laws, that will not always
work in our interests …
 We cannot all get what we want: what decides
the matter will be certain natural facts (Mawson)
 But what can this say about other creatures’
suffering – the fawn in the forest fire (Rowe)
 Do all creatures have free will?
Overcoming evils
 ‘The worst evils demand to be defeated by the
best goods. Horrendous evils can be overcome
only by the goodness of God’ (Marilyn Adams).
 We may not fathom the reasons for evil …
 … but God’s ensures that each person’s life is a
good to them, by ‘engulfing’ evils.
 God is still good, despite evils …
 Transcendent goods: relations with God; God’s
gratitude; identification with Christ …
Problems of evil: 2
 Or an evidential problem (Mackie MoT, Rowe):
 If there were an omni – God …
 There would not be evil/suffering
 But there is …
 So there cannot be such a God (modus tollens)
 Suffering as evidence for atheism - not proof,
but supports a ‘strong presumption’ (Mackie)
The evidential problem
 A Bayesian approach (e.g Draper in Copan and
Meister)
 This evidence may increase the balance of
probability of God’s non-existence
 By increasing the ‘antecedent probability’ of
atheism, prior to our considering any further
arguments
Some responses
 We know that God exists for some other reason
… so while this presents a problem, it cannot count
as evidence against His existence
 We don’t see the whole picture
Not having God’s omniscience, all the evidence is
not available to us
Relies on first point? Otherwise we can judge only
on evidence we have …
Combines with ‘greater good’ theodicies?
Defences and theodicies
 Defences: challenging one of the premises of the
argument
 Theodicy (after Leibniz): explaining why God
might act in a certain way
 Not always an easy distinction to draw …
 And defences may work against both forms of
argument, or only against one: careful!
Greater good arguments
 Is the existence of evil necessary to bring about
a greater good (cf free-will)? No ‘gratuitous evil?
 Hick: soul-making/Iranean theodicy:
God intends to bring us to moral/spiritual maturity
This must be a free choice: epistemic distance
‘A world without problems … would be morally static’
So to grow, we must live in a world with evil
But … could we not learn virtues in a good world?
Greater good arguments
 Swinburne: if we are to become morally mature
 … we must act freely, and have knowledge of
the consequences of actions, both good and evil
 Again, we cannot be force-fed this: we must
work it out inductively
 … and this means both bringing about moral evil
and having experience of natural evils
Against theodicy
 Are greater good arguments too anthropocentric
 Or not respectful of suffering humans, animals?
 Responses:
Acknowledge our lack of understanding: ‘if [God] is
there, he is surely something bigger and more
mysterious than a corrupt or stupid official’ (Midgley;
see also DZ Phillips)
God as human love and effort (Soelle)
 Are theodicies besides the point …?
References/additional reading
Seminar readings
 Davies Introduction Ch3 (2nd edn) or 10 (3rd edn)
 Davies Guide Part V
 Mackie: ‘Evil and omnipotence’ (Mind 64, Peterson)
 Mackie: Miracle of Theism Ch.9
 Rowe: ‘The problem of evil and some varieties of
atheism’ (Taliaferro & Griffiths)
 Augustine: City of God Bk XI (or passages in Peterson,
Davies, Hick Ch.2)

References/additional reading
Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part X
 Swinburne: Existence of God Ch.11, or Stump & Murray
Ch.25
 Hick: ‘An Iranean theodicy’ (in Hick, Peterson)
 Adams: ‘Horrendous evils and the goodness of God’ (in
Stump & Murray, Taliaferro & Griffiths)
 Midgley: Wickedness (extracts in Taliaferro & Griffiths)
 Against theodicy: see Clack and Clack Chapter 3.

Questions
 Can you distinguish the various defences and
theodicies?
 Which do you think are the strongest?
 Can we combine approaches to give a complete
defence of God’s existence in the face of both
moral and natural evils?