Negative – China CP
1NC
Shell – Development General
The People’s Republic of China should _________________________.
China best develops the ocean – massive successful efforts now
Resolves: Security agreements, maritime cooperation, general development, fighting piracy, navigation,
trade, sea lanes, disaster response, marine economy, environmental protection
Xuequan 14
[Mu, Editor Xinhua news, “China committed to peaceful settlement of maritime disputes”, 6/22/14,
Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/22/c_126652859.htm]
China is committed to settling maritime disputes through dialogue and negotiation on the basis of
respecting historical facts and international law, says visiting Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Li made the statement on Friday
when addressing the China-Greece Maritime Cooperation Forum in Athens, where he called for stronger maritime cooperation between
the two nations and expounded China's viewpoints on maritime affairs. SEA OF PEACE, COOPERATION,
HARMONY Pledging to jointly build a "sea of peace" with other countries, Li said China will unswervingly
follow the path of peaceful development and firmly oppose any act of hegemony in maritime affairs.
"China is a signatory state to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and has made active efforts to safeguard the principles of the convention," he said. China is willing to
strengthen communication and cooperation with related countries and improve bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms, so as to jointly safeguard free and safe navigation, fight piracy and terrorism,
respond to disasters and construct a maritime order of peace and tranquility. He added that China is
resolute in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is conducive to regional peace
and order as well. Proposing to build a "sea of cooperation," Li said China is willing to work with
maritime states to actively forge a cooperative partnership to build sea lanes, develop marine economy
and utilize marine resources, among other endeavors. He also proposed to build a "sea of harmony" and
shared his vision on protecting the marine environment. The organic coexistence of mankind and oceans
is the right way to deal with nature, he said, adding that all countries should properly treat the marine eco-environment to preserve oceans as mankind's reliable
and inhabitable home.
Shell – Exploration General
The People’s Republic of China should _________________________.
China’s best for exploration efforts – huge tech advantage and massive push for sea
dominance
Marlow 13
{Jeffery, Geobiologist, Researcher at the California Institute of Technology, “China’s Deep Sea
Ambitions,” Wired, 12/30, http://www.wired.com/2013/12/chinas-deep-sea-ambitions/#THUR}
Recently, China’s Jiaolong manned submersible became the world’s deepest-diving state-
sponsored research vessel, with four trips to 7,000 meters depth. Around the same time, news broke of plans for a
National Deep Sea Center, a $ 78 million facility that will operate the sea-going fleet and serve as a central base
for oceanographic research and technology development. Months later, the center’s director, Liu Baohua, announced a
nationwide search for oceanauts, men and women who will pilot Jiaolong and its planned sister sub around the ocean’s depths. It’s
all part of China’s rhetorical, financial, and strategic return to the sea ,
a realm that it dominated several centuries ago. Chinese maritime strength reached its apex in the early 15th century, as admiral Zheng He
crisscrossed the Indian Ocean with enormous fleets, returning with gifts (most famously a giraffe) for the Emperor. But a few years later, as political winds shifted,
the Ming Dynasty ended the epic voyages, choosing instead to focus on other, more local, priorities. This abrupt 180 is frequently cited as a cautionary tale
highlighting the dangers of isolationism, a poor strategic move that doomed the discoverers to become the discovered. So
why the resurgence in
sea-based activity ? Dean Cheng is a Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation and an expert on China’s
technological ambitions. He points to the innocuously named “863 Program” as an underappreciated
game changer that reconfigured the country’s relationship with technology across a number of
disciplines. In March of 1986 (hence the “863” title), four prominent engineers wrote to then-Chairman Deng Xiaoping, warning of
impending doom for civil society’s scientific institutions. A long-standing focus on military might had neglected other aims of
technological development, and if China didn’t redistribute its resources soon, it would be fated to watch the “new technological
revolution” from the outside. Xiaoping took the argument to heart, initiating research and exploration
programs focused on seven key fields: biotechnology, space, information technology, lasers, automation, energy, and materials science.
Marine Technology was added to the roster in 1996, well coordinated with the country’s broadening
“China has become much
more dependent on the oceans and ocean-based trade for food and commerce,” notes
regional influence and growing appetite for sea-based resources.
also like to know what’s off the coast; there are vast unexplored swaths of their seabed
as well as deeper ocean reaches that could prove useful.”
Cheng. “They’d
Solvency
A2: Advantages – Asia Pivot
Just another link to the influence DA – Asia Pivot crushes China Heg
Keck 14
[Keck, worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New
American Security and in the U.S. Congress, “China’s Growing Hegemonic Bent”, 6/26/14, The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-growing-hegemonic-bent/]
President Xi Jinping announced last month at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit in Shanghai.
David Cohen reminds us that the New Security Concept is likely more multi-faceted than it may appear at first glance. Nonetheless, at its core, the
New Security Concept is that “security in Asia should be maintained by Asians themselves.” As the Global Times reported about
Xi’s speech, it “stressed the role played by Asians themselves in building security, viewed as a rejection of
interference from outside the region.” During the speech, Xi also denounced alliances in the region. It makes
good sense that China would wants a U.S.-free Asia-Pacific — as China’s rise has proceeded, the U.S. has increasingly become the
only viable counterbalance to Beijing in the region. China’s relative influence would therefore be greatly enhanced by
America’s exit from the region. The same goes for an end to alliances to the region — not only does China lack any formal allies, but its size
ensures it will dominate any bilateral interactions with Asian nations. At the same time, the New Security Concept is transparently hegemonic. To begin with, the
realization of the primary goals of the New Security Concept — namely, the
would ensure China’s hegemony over the region.
exit of the U.S. from Asia and the end of alliances —
A2: Advantages – Economy
All their advantage just begs the question if US or China are key to the global
economy. It’s China:
The Chinese economy is key to the global economy— only they can drag the global
economy out of lethargy
Justin Yifu Lin 2011
[“China, the 'leading dragon' of the world economy”, Lin is a chief economist at the World Bank, BBC,
11/23/11, available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15861161, accessed 7/12/12//Thur]
Whether we are on the verge of an "Asian Century" or not, one thing is clear: there has already been a
dramatic shift in the geographic centre of the global economy. China is now front and centre, and its
role as a leading dragon can be beneficial for growth prospects for the world economy. The world
desperately needs engines of growth right now, and fortunately - with continued strong and pragmatic
economic policy making - China can provide that impetus. China is now the world's second biggest
economy and the largest exporter of goods, with 9.6% of the global share, followed by Germany, the
United States and Japan. China has an income per capita of $4,400 in current dollars and is well
established as a high-middle income country. China's foreign reserves, which now exceed $3 trillion, are
the largest in the world. Behind this rise, there has been a dramatic structural transformation entailing
rapid industrialisation, a massive movement out of agriculture, and an impressive stretch of traderelated growth. The 'advantage of backwardness' China has the potential to grow dynamically for
another 20 years. This is in part because, as of 2008, the country still had a capita income that was just
21% of US per capita income - measured in purchasing power parity terms. This US-China income gap is
evidence that a big technological gap still exists between China and the industrialised countries. China
can continue to enjoy the advantage of backwardness before closing the gap. By 2030, China's income
per head (measured in purchasing power parity) may reach about 50% of that in the United States. By
then, China's economic size (in purchasing power parity terms) may be twice as large as the US; and
measured at market exchange rates, China may be at least the same size as the US two decades from
now.
Mechanism – Aquaculture
China's aquaculture is light years ahead of the US – produce 70% of global output
-Specifically solves: economy, overfishing and food security
World Watch Institute 13
[World Watch Institute, there mission is through research and outreach that inspire action, the
Worldwatch Institute works to accelerate the transition to a sustainable world that meets human needs.
The Institute’s top mission objectives are universal access to renewable energy and nutritious food,
expansion of environmentally sound jobs and development, transformation of cultures from
consumerism to sustainability, and an early end to population growth through healthy and intentional
childbearing, "Fish Farming Continues to Grow as World Fisheries Stagnate," Copyright Date is 2013,
World Watch Institute, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5444 #KRUGER]
Asia and the Pacific region dominate global aquaculture production, accounting for more
than 90 percent.17 China is by far the world leader , with more than 45 million tons produced in 2006about 70 percent of global output and more than half of the total global value from aquaculture.
18
The next
closest producer is India, with just over 3 million tons. 19 The only country outside this region in the top 10 producing countries is Chile. 20 (See Figure 2.) At the same time that wild marine
, aquaculture production offers further growth potential. In China, more than
three quarters of the fish supply comes from aquaculture, while the average for the rest of the world is 20 percent and rising. SubSaharan countries in Africa have the largest untapped potential because of resources like clean water and unused land. Historically,
most of the world's aquaculture has focused on species that are relatively low on the food chain,
including seaweeds, shellfish, and herbivorous or omnivorous species like carp.23 However, recent
trends indicate stronger growth rates in carnivorous species like shrimp and salmon will continue,
especially as demand increases. (See Figure 3.) Due in part to this trend, growth in aquaculture now drives global fishmeal and fish oil production. Until recently,
catches face further decline or stagnation
21
22
24
fishmeal and fish oil were used primarily for pig and poultry production; today nearly 50 percent of fishmeal and 87 percent of fish oil is used in aquaculture. 25 In 1948, only 7.7 percent of wildcaught fish were reduced to fishmeal or fish oil, but that number has grown to 37 percent. 26 Because fishmeal and fish oil depend on overly taxed marine fisheries, increasing production on a
large scale is unlikely.27 Increasing the use of fishmeal and fish oil in aquaculture raises health and environmental concerns. The rendering process used to prepare these products concentrates
the toxins found in the fish, including carcinogenic dioxins, which accumulate up through the food chain to people who eat contaminated fish.28 This problem is seen clearly in farmed salmon,
which consistently have significantly higher levels of dioxin than their wild counterparts. 29 Another troublesome toxin that accumulates in fish is mercury, which is especially dangerous for
children.30 Dependence on rendered fish also decreases the efficiency of farming fish, as fish-derived feed products require more energy to produce than plant-based ones.31For farmed
salmon, as much as 90 percent of all energy inputs go into providing food for the salmon. 32 Indeed, farmed salmon can require five times more energy per edible protein unit than farmed
shellfish.33 Fish farms themselves, especially ones that raise carnivorous fish, can be a large source of water pollution, including nitrogen and excess nutrients that can create toxic blooms and
dead zones.34 Because fish are often raised in high densities to maximize profit, they can require antibiotics and other treatments for diseases, most of which end up in the water. 35 These
problems have led some researchers and fish farmers to consider alternative practices that would minimize environmental harm while allowing increased aquaculture production. For example,
integrated fish farming works at the ecosystem level, using a combination of fish, shellfish, and aquatic plants to filter wastes and provide a self-sustaining source of food.36 Integrated fish
With an ongoing food crisis and a
growing world population, seafood production could potentially play a vital role in addressing food
security and meeting development goals. Fish is highly nutritious and can be an important source of vitamins, minerals, and protein, even when consumed in minimal amounts.
farming has been used outside major urban areas to raise fish for food and treat human wastes at the same time. 37
38
A
recent World Bank survey showed that small-scale fish farming consistently pays off for workers by raising income, creating stable work, and increasing food supplies. 39 However, not all
seafood production is created equal:
overfishing is linked to poverty, leading to fewer jobs and taking away an important
source of income in developing countries.
40
Chinese aquaculture solves the affirmative – ensures food security, responsible fishing
practices, and economic growth
World Bank Group, 2 / 5 / 2014’, the World Bank Group is a multinational group intent on providing
economic aid to poor countries and supporting developing ones, “Raising More Fish to Meet the Rising
Demand,” http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/02/05/raising-more-fish-to-meet-risingdemand
A new World Bank report estimates that in 2030, 62% of the seafood we eat will be farm-raised to meet
growing demand from regions such as Asia, where roughly 70% of fish will be consumed. China will produce 37% of the
world’s fish, while consuming 38% of world’s food fish. By producing more seafood that is affordable and rich in nutrition, aquaculture
can help improve food security and livelihoods for the world’s poorest. The rise in seafood demand gives countries
the opportunity to expand and improve responsible fish and shellfish farming practices. Nearly two-thirds of the seafood we eat will be farm-
raised in 2030. This is according to "Fish to 2030: Prospects for Fisheries and Aquaculture," which concludes that as sources from wild capture fisheries approach their maximum take,
aquaculture—or fish farming—will help satisfy the growing global appetite for fish and seafood. The new World
Bank report projects that in 2030, aquaculture will produce half of the world’s supply of fish, including fish for food and other products such as
fishmeal. Meanwhile, 62% of the seafood that will end up on people’s plates will come from fish farms, which will grow production to meet rising demand—especially from Asia, where roughly
China will become a particularly large market for fish
70% of fish will be consumed. In 2030, an emerging middle class in
. With increased investment
in aquaculture, China will produce 37% of the world’s fish and consume 38% of the fish the world eats, the report estimates. The risks and environmental impacts of some aquaculture
practices have made headlines in recent years. The disease outbreaks in shrimp aquaculture in China, Thailand and Vietnam and in salmon farming in Chile illustrate some of the industry’s
growth of aquaculture also presents countries with the opportunity to expand and improve fish
farming so that it is sustainable and environmentally-responsible. By committing to improved
aquaculture practices, countries can deliver nutritious fish to more people while being mindful of
environmental impact.
challenges. But the
China key to solve aquaculture – highest motive and expertise
F.A.O., 2010’, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations is a branch of the U.N. that
seeks to eliminate poverty and increase the global usage of renewable resources, “REGIONAL REVIEW
ON STATUS AND TRENDS IN AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA-PACIFIC,”
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2311e/i2311e.pdf
The Asia-Pacific region contributes the major share to global food fish supply from farming; China
continues to be the biggest producer. It and seven other countries in the region (India, Indonesia, Thailand, Viet Nam, Bangladesh, the
Philippines and Myanmar) are in the top-ten ranked aquaculture producers in volume and value. The region has a high rate of food fish
consumption, estimated at 29 kg per person per year. To maintain this level for the next three decades
would require producing an additional 30 to 40 million tonnes of fish per year by 2050 to meet the
demand from a growing population. It has demonstrated the capacity to do so; during this decade many of the countries have produced more
food fish from aquaculture than from capture fisheries, and all six countries (China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Viet Nam and Bangladesh) that have attained a
production level of more than one million tonnes a year are in the region.
Globally, the top-ten aquaculture producers by quantity (excluding aquatic plants) in 2008 were China, India, Viet Nam, Indonesia,
Thailand, Bangladesh, Norway, Chile, Philippines and Japan; Asian states hold the top six positions. By value, the top-ten producers were China, India, Viet Nam,
Chile, Norway, Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh and the Philippines (Table 2). The growth rate of aquaculture production in the region remained very strong
at 11.4 percent between 2006 and 2008 (Figure 8). This growth used to result mainly from the continuously increasing production of China. However, the growth
rate of Asia-Pacific (without China) overtook that of China during 2006–2008, 16.1 percent compared to 9.4 percent. Asia-Pacific produced 2.9 million tonnes. By
tonnage, the countries that have shown the largest increases include Viet Nam (49 percent), Indonesia (31 percent), India (9 percent), Philippines (19 percent),
Bangladesh (13 percent), Myanmar (17 percent) and Malaysia (44 percent). China
produced 43 million tonnes in 2008 (including
aquatic plants), representing 63 percent of world aquaculture production. Although China’s production
is still increasing, its world market share decreased slightly from 67 percent in 2004 to 65 percent in
2006.
Mechanism – Methane Hydrates
China’s best at methane hydrate drilling – research and massive motive now
Zhang 13
[Linyi, is an author who recently graduated from Northwestern University’s Medill School of Journalism
with a Master’s degree, is reporting this summer from Circle of Blue’s news desk in Traverse City,
Michigan, "Deep Sea Gas: China Follows Japan in Pursuit of New Energy Source," September 6th, Circle
of Blue, http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2013/world/china-follows-japan-pursuit-deep-sea-gas/
#KRUGER]
Not to be outdone by their neighbors and rivals from Japan, Chinese scientists this summer have set out
to find a potentially vast new source of cleaner-burning fossil fuels, located beneath the floor of the
South China Sea. Surging Demand and Reliance on Foreign Energy China’s domestic market for natural gas is soaring. Demand
for natural gas in China surged to 130 billion cubic meters (4,590 billion cubic feet) in 2011, which is four times higher than in 2000, according toIEA’s 2012 China gas
report. Currently, about one-quarter of the nation’s natural gas supply is imported. But China’s 12th Five-Year Plan,
introduced in 2011, projects an increase to 35 percent of China’s gas that will be coming from beyond its borders by 2015. It should come as no surprise, then, that
more than a dozen cities on China’s Pacific coast are now building new terminals to receive liquid natural gas imports from nations in the Middle East and other
The exploration comes five months after Japan announced in March that it had
extracted natural gas from a new source of energy — methane hydrate, a type of natural gas
regions.
that is trapped in an ice shield and forms when methane and water combine at high pressure and low temperature — from the deepwater seabeds in the Pacific
Ocean, off Aichi Prefecture. Japan has since announced that it found more than 200 other sources of methane hydrate in the seabeds surrounding the island nation.
Methane hydrate reserves have the potential to contain more energy than any other fossil fuel, according to the U.S. Geological Survey and a 2011 study by the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Just one cubic meter of pure methane hydrate can be depressurized and warmed to produce 164 cubic meters at
room temperature and ambient pressure. Scientists estimate that 99 percent of methane hydrate reserves exist at water depths ranging from 300 meters (984 feet)
to more than 4,000 meters (13,123 feet), depths that encompass much of the planet. The methane hydrates are then buried an additional 50 to 250 meters (165 to
805 feet) below the ocean floor. With 32,000 kilometers (19,884 miles) of ocean shoreline,
China is hoping to find its own stockpile
of underwater methane hydrate reserves . Some Chinese experts have even compared the energy
potential of methane hydrate reserves in the South China Sea to that in Daqing — China’s largest oil field, discovered in
1959 — which produced 293 million barrels of oil in 2012. That is 50 million barrels more than the shale boom of North Dakota produced in 2012, according to U.S.
Energy Information Administration. Still, though the potential energy reserve is high, some energy authorities are not sure that methane hydrate can be a game
changer for China, especially when commercial production appears so far away. “The recent Japan pilot — which indeed was successful — is for a particular geologic
setting and hydrate play. And, even there, it is unclear whether production could be sustained at high rates and for long periods of time,” said Ruben Juanes,
associate professor in energy studies at MIT, during an interview with Circle of Blue. “It is unclear that hydrate production can be commercial in the short and
medium term, especially in light of the recent shale gas development. It is not easy for me to see when hydrate could play a big role in the energy mix.”
Deteriorating air quality and rising carbon emissions are driving China’s
urgent shift from coal combustion, which currently makes up 70 percent of the nation’s
energy consumption . China’s clean energy sector is the world’s largest, due to increases in power generation from wind
and water over the last decade . Likewise, demand for cleaner-burning natural gas in China has
experienced a four-fold increase over the past decade . But the Chinese have been less competent in developing reserves of
Unconventional Gas Markets
unconventional natural gas, specifically coal bed methane and deep shale gas. Technology challenges and water scarcity have been barriers to bringing gas to
market, despite a national push to explore every possible source and boost the production and use of natural gas. For instance, local officials resist unlocking shale
gas — large supplies may exist in northern, southwestern, and western China — unless hydraulic fracturing (fracking) technology can be improved. As it stands now,
each well uses approximately 11,000 to 19,000 cubic meters (3 million to 5 million gallons) of water per frack. The process of tapping deep seabed methane hydrate
by depressurization, meanwhile, does not involve water use at all. On the contrary, it produces water with no salts, which some models suggest could be an
important commodity — either for energy production or human consumption, depending on quantities produced — according to Tim Collett, a research geologist at
the United States Geological Survey (USGS) who studies gas hydrates. However, the technology for extracting commercial quantities of gas at reasonable costs is far
from being perfected, especially because dissociated, depressurized methane hydrates tend to reform if temperatures drop and pressures increase. “We don’t have
a good handle on production rates, and production rates are directly tied to the amount of produced water,” Collett told Circle of Blue, noting that the longest
hydrate production tests last only 10 to 20 days, whereas production data for other unconventional fuels has generally taken over a year. “
Hydrates are
primarily a research topic right now, but an interesting one .” The Wall Street Journal reported that the estimated cost
of tapping methane hydrate ranges from $US 1,059 to $US 2,100 per 1,000 cubic meters ($US 30 to $US 60 per 1,000 cubic feet), which is 10 to 20 times as high as
natural gas produced from deep shales in the United States and double to quadruple the imported liquid natural gas (LNG) market price in China during July.
Mechanism – MH 370
China’s best for 370 search – giant commitment now and HUGE motive to succeed
Jianfeng 4/12
[Zhang is editor for CCTV News,"Chinese President vows enhanced cooperation with Austrailia on
MH370 Search, "4/12/14, CCTV News,
http://english.cntv.cn/2014/04/12/ARTI1397286442822737.shtml #KRUGER]
Chinese President Xi Jinping met with visiting Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott Friday afternoon at the Great Hall of the
Xi expressed gratitude for Australia's search for the missing Malaysia
Airlines Flight MH370, adding that China will continue searching for the flight and stay in
close communication with the Australian side . Abbott also expressed gratitude for the immediate assistance that China
provided for Australia when the search for MH370 shifted from the northern corridor to the southern corridor in Australia. "China was
the very first country to provide ships for the search, and we've been very grateful for the
help ," he said. At a luncheon in Shanghai today, Abbott said he was confident that the signals picked up in the search were from the black
People in downtown Beijing.
box of the missing plane. The plane disappeared on March 8 en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing with 239 people on board. The flight
recorder could help solve the mystery of why the plane veered so far off course. The battery of the black box usually lasts for only a month and
is expected to die very soon. During the meeting, Xi said Abbott's leadership of such a delegation to China showed the great importance and
sincerity that the Australian side has attached to developing bilateral ties. Both important countries in the Asia-Pacific Region,
China and
Australia share broad and important common interests and have huge potential for cooperation, said Xi.
He said China is willing to work with Australia to push forward their strategic partnership and
maintain close high-level exchanges and multi-level dialogues so as to increase political
mutual trust. The president called on the two sides to speed up negotiations on a bilateral free trade
deal, and hoped that Australia could offer good conditions for investment by Chinese enterprises in Australia. The two sides should boost
exchanges and cooperation in the areas of military, combating transnational crime, and culture, and strengthen coordination and cooperation,
he said. He also called for joint efforts in coping with global challenges, such as climate change and cyber security. Noting that China and
Australia will host the summit of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Beijing and the G20 Leaders Summit this year, respectively, Xi said
the two sides should support each other in order to ensure positive results from the two meetings. Abbott said that China's development is an
opportunity for Australia, the region and the world, and Australia is willing to be China's reliable partner in long-term cooperation. Abbott said
he made the China visit a priority for his Northeast Asia visit, which aims to enhance bilateral strategic partnership and safeguard peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia
is ready to work with China to accelerate talks for a free trade deal
and welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest in Australia, he said. He said he hopes the two countries will beef
up cooperation in the areas of finance, education, science and technology, culture and tourism, and
jointly promote people-to-people exchanges. He welcomed Xi to attend the G20 Leaders Summit and visit Australia. He also
expects to participate in the APEC summit in Beijing in November. Before arriving in Beijing, Abbott attended the opening ceremony of the
Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2014 in south China's Hainan province and visited China's financial hub of Shanghai.
Mechanism – Mining
China’s perfect for deep sea metallurgical mining – have the motive because of
resource crunch and means given recent efforts
Economic Times 14
{“China Speeds up Indian Ocean Exploration for Minerals,” Xinhua News Agency via the Economic Times,
2/26, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-02-26/news/47705593_1_polymetallicsulphide-ore-deposit-international-seabed-authority-state-oceanic-administration}
China has said its research vessel surveying polymetallic deposits in the Indian Ocean has discovered two
hydrothermal and four hydrothermal anomaly areas as the resource-hungry country stepped up efforts to
extract minerals from the seabed. China's State Oceanic Administration (SOA) hailed achievements by Chinese scientists.
The SOA said that scientists onboard the "Dayang-1" research vessel discovered two seafloor hydrothermal areas and four
hydrothermal anomaly areas, and deepened understanding about the overall area. They also gained insight on
the origins of carbonate hydrothermal areas, and made successful attempts to explore for sulfide, state-run
Xinhua news agency quoted the SOA as saying. Hydrothermal sulfide is a kind of seabed deposit containing copper,
zinc and precious metals such as gold and silver. Firming up its foothold in India's backyard, China has
gained approval in 2012 to explore a 10,000 sq km polymetallic sulphide ore deposit in an international
seabed region of the southwest Indian Ocean. The 15-year approval was secured by China from the
International Seabed Authority (ISA). China's booming economy has forced it to look for minerals abroad. China
also has obtained exclusive rights to prospect in a 75,000-square-km polymetallic nodule ore deposit in the east Pacific Ocean
in 2001.
Mechanism – Offshore Wind
China empirically solves offshore wind best – US piecemeal structure comparatively
results in failure
Conathan 11
[Michael, is the Director of Ocean Policy at American Progress. His work focuses on driving progressive
solutions to the multitude of problems facing the world’s oceans. Prior to joining American Progress,
Mike spent five years staffing the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation’s
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard—initially serving a one-year
appointment as a Dean John Knauss Marine Policy Fellow before joining the committee full-time as a
professional staff member in 2007,"National Ocean Policy: A Path to America's Ocean Future ,"October
26, 2011,Center for American Progress Action Fund,
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/green/report/2011/10/26/10451/national-oceanpolicy-a-path-to-americas-ocean-future/ #KRUGER]
A June 2011 report by the nonpartisan Joint Ocean Commission, comprised of members of both the Pew and
U.S. Ocean Commissions, expressed strong ongoing support for comprehensive ocean planning and the National Ocean Policy,
stating, “the current sector-by-sector management system is incapable of providing the integrated,
comprehensive, and flexible approach needed to ensure that conflicts among proposed uses are
minimized and potential benefits enhanced.” In fact, strategic planning maximizes organizational efficiency and use of
taxpayer dollars. Contrary to the false depiction of the National Ocean Policy as excessive government regulation, it will bring all interested
parties to the table before key management decisions are made. This will improve opportunities for industry, communities, nongovernmental
organizations, and citizens to participate in the planning process and facilitate sustainable economic growth by providing transparency and
predictability for economic investments. The alternative is allowing developers of individual projects to drive the regulatory process without
adequate guidance from regulators or input from alternate stakeholders, a process that has been shown to lead to a seemingly endless string of
lawsuits, political quagmires, and a poisonous investment climate. There
is no better example of the inefficiencies inherent
in the piecemeal system than the offshore wind industry. Offshore wind is a viable and rapidly growing
piece of the energy picture in other parts of the world. Today European countries have installed nearly 3,000 megawatts of offshore
Europe and China combined have permitted more than 40,000 megawatts of
wind turbines in their oceans. The U nited S tates has permitted exactly 488 megawatts , and we have
wind facilities, and
yet to break ground on our first turbine.
Mechanism – Oil Drilling
China is a worldwide power in oil – best service, supply chain and equipment
Zhu and Callas 4/15
[Charlie Zhu is Chief Correspondent, Asia Energy Companies for Reuters, Andrew is an EMEA desk head
at Reuters, "China Inc joins the big league in oil and gas services, "February 15th, 2014, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/14/china-oil-equipment-idUSL3N0N00F920140414 #KRUGER]
Global oil companies are increasingly turning to China for services and equipment, attracted by
lower costs and a newly acquired expertise that is challenging more established rivals. State-run and privately
controlled Chinese rig makers, oil and gas services and engineering firms are showing up in
the supply chain everywhere from the Middle East, the North Sea and North America to frontier
areas like Mozambique. Chinese yards, having come from nowhere in less than a decade, are building
more jack-up rigs - the most common offshore rig used for shallow water drilling - than all the other yards in the
world put together , data from industry consultants IHS Petrodata shows. Helped by strong government support,
plentiful labour and an abundant supply of raw materials like steel, China
could become a major offshore oil equipment
manufacturing hub in less than 10 years, industry executives say, just like Singapore and South Korea overtook the United States
and Europe in the 1990s. "The Chinese provide products with better value," said Scott Darling, Hong-Kong based head of Asia
oil and gas research at JPMorgan, which hosted an investor tour of the Middle East last month to study the competitiveness of Chinese energy
The rise of
Chinese energy equipment manufacturers and services firms overseas, partly fuelled by the rapid expansion of state energy giants, is
putting pressure on established companies including Singapore oil rig makers Keppel Corp and Sembcorp Marine, and land
equipment and services suppliers. "And they are experts in managing supply chains, thanks to their domestic experiences."
drilling giant National-Oilwell Varco Inc (NOV). To stay ahead, both Keppel and Sembcorp are increasingly building more sophisticated
equipment, an area where Chinese firms still lack expertise. Leading the Chinese overseas expansion are state-controlled shipyards and units of
state giants China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), parent of PetroChina , Sinopec Group and China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC).
Chinese companies won over half the global orders for jackup rigs last year, up from around a third between 2008 and 2012, data from IHS
Petrodata showed. In the area of land drilling equipment, a number of privately run companies have emerged as major overseas players. These
include Honghua Group Ltd, the second-largest land rig manufacturer globally with 80 percent of revenue driven by overseas orders, and Hilong
Holding Ltd, which started its overseas foray in 2005 and is now the world's second-largest drill pipe maker after Houston-based NOV. "Drill
pipes are crucial to oil producers. Previously their drilling schedules were sort of dictated by just one company, NOV," Amy Zhang, Hilong's chief
strategy officer, told Reuters. "Now clients have more options. We filled in the gaps." CRUDE AND CLUNKY Manufacturing
energy
equipment is an expensive, labour-intensive and lengthy process, and with global energy firms trying to
cut costs, the affordability of the services offered by Chinese firms has trumped their relative lack of
experience. Exxon Mobil Corp, Total SA, BP PLC and Royal Dutch Shell have all pledged to cap spending due to pressure from their
shareholders, who want more generous payouts before cyclical oil prices start heading lower. China's oil and petrochemical equipment exports
were averaging at around $18 billion a year in the past few years, equivalent to the annual capital spending budget of a mid-sized international
oil company, industry data showed. Shell is currently the biggest buyer of equipment and services from China among its foreign rivals. Its China
procurement jumped to $3 billion last year from $1.9 billion in 2012 and $1 billion a year earlier, Shell China spokesman Jiangtao Shi said,
adding that one third of its 2013 China procurement was earmarked for projects outside China. Lower costs appear to be one of the main
attractions. COSCO Corp, China State Shipbuilding Corp , China Shipbuilding Industry Corp, Yantai CIMC Raffles and Offshore Oil Engineering
Corp can build a jack-up rig for $170-180 million, significantly lower than the $200-220 million price tag for the same rig built in Singapore.
Chinese manufacturers can also make land rigs, drilling pipes, bits, modules, pumps and valves at up to half the price of the same equipment
made elsewhere. Prices are so competitive that the United States in 2012 slapped hefty anti-dumping duties on imports of Chinese seamless
steel pipes, including pipes used for oil and gas drilling. "We
export a lot of petroleum and petrochemical gears. Most of them
are crude and clunky stuff but we make money from them," Zhang Kang, senior consultant at Sinopec, told Reuters. "We
also try to make more sophisticated equipment."
Mechanism – Renewables
China’s leading renewables development now – 5 year plan set the tone
CCICED Committee, 2011, China Council for International Cooperation on Energy and Development,
“CCICED 2011 Annual General Meeting,”
http://www.cciced.net/encciced/event/AGM_1/2011agm/proceeings/201205/P0201205243643012950
38.pdf
Green development has become a trend of times . A new round of industrial and scientific and
technological innovation is under sprout and multiplying. We will push forward the multi energy
clean development, improve the utilization of efficiency of energy resources and reduce resources
consumption to the greatest extent. We will plan, build and reconstruct different industrial parks
according to the requirement of circular economy, and establish the industrial system by the recycling
chain. We will also complete the resources recycling system, and promote the utilization of renewable
resources in large scale. We encourage the use of green products, carrying out green shopping, living
in green style and green consumption. Developing a circular economy will not only save resources and
reduce pollution from the source, but also play a role in “green development”, as is stated in the “12th
Five-Year Plan”. In line with principles of reduction, reuse and recycling, we should give priority to
reduction, aiming to improve resource efficiency. We need to promote the development of a recycling
economy throughout production, circulation and consumption. Moreover, we should accelerate the
construction of a resource recycling system for the whole society. We also need step up the
implementation of cleaner production in agriculture, industry, construction, business services and other
key areas, and bring pollutants and emissions under control from the source throughout the entire
process, while reducing resource consumption. We need a sound resource recycling system for
renewables, establish and improve systems of classified garbage recovery, sealed shipping, and central
treatment. We should promote green consumption patterns and lifestyle, advocating a civilized,
economical, and green low-carbon consumption concept in the whole society . We should put
green government procurement into practice, and gradually raise the proportions of energy-saving and
water-saving products as well as recycled products; strengthen policy support such as fiscal and financial
policies, technical support, and planning guidance; improve laws, regulations and standards; establish
the system of extended producer responsibility; develop technologies and product catalogues regarding
circular economy; and establish a renewable product identification system and a sound statistics
and assessment system for circular economy.
They’re feasible, cheap, and desired now – China’s perfect
WWF, 2 – 19 – 14, The WWF is an international wildlife conservation that promotes reduction of
pollution, “Groundbreaking analysis shows China's renewable energy future within reach,”
http://wwf.panda.org/?216412/China-renewables-report
By embracing conservation measures and renewable energy, China can transition to an 80 percent
renewable electric power system by 2050 at far less cost than continuing to rely on coal, according to a
new report from WWF-US. As a result, China’s carbon emissions from power generation could be 90
percent less than currently projected levels in 2050 without compromising the reliability of the electric
grid or slowing economic growth. The China’s Future Generation report was prepared by the Energy
Transition Research Institute (Entri) for WWF and uses robust computer modeling to simulate four
scenarios based on today’s proven technology : a Baseline, High Efficiency, High Renewables, and
Low-Carbon Mix scenario. To develop its findings, Entri examines China’s electricity supply and demand
on an hour-by-hour basis through 2050 using its advanced China Grid Model. “By fully embracing energy
conservation, efficiency and renewables, China has the potential to demonstrate to the world that
economic growth is possible while sharply reducing the emissions that drive unhealthy air pollution and
climate change,” said WWF’s China Climate and Energy Program Director Lunyan Lu. “This research
shows that with strong political will, China can prosper while eliminating coal from its power mix within
the next 30 years.” In addition to ramping up development of renewable power sources, the world’s
most populous and energy-hungry nation will need to simultaneously pursue aggressive energy
efficiency initiatives to reduce electricity demand. These efficiencies, including bold standards for
appliances and industrial equipment, can reduce annual power consumption in 2050 by almost half,
which would set the gold standard for these products globally and make the shift to a renewables-based
power system possible. “This research allows Chinese leaders to put the questions of technical feasibility
aside and economic viability aside. Instead, it is time to focus on how to enact the right policies and
establish the right institutions to ensure that China’s citizens and economy are receiving clean,
renewable electricity ,” said Lu. “The report shows that today’s technology can get China within
striking distance of WWF’s vision of a future powered solely by renewable energy .” The analysis
also describes recent Chinese regulatory efforts and challenges to increasing the percentage of
renewable electricity in the country, while providing a set of targeted recommendations for Chinese
leaders and policy makers on energy efficiency, prioritizing low-carbon electricity supply investments,
allowing price changes to reflect the true cost of service, and prioritizing collection and analysis of key
power usage data. “Both China and the United States are at a crossroads where leaders need to
choose between a future where healthy communities are powered by clean, renewable energy or a
future darkened by air pollution and the dangerous effects of climate change,” said Lou Leonard, WWF’s
US vice president for climate change. “This year, as all countries develop new national climate targets in
advance of talks in Paris, our leaders need to choose that brighter future. For Chinese leaders the
can meet bold new
targets with today’s technologies while cutting energy costs.”
choice is simple. This report shows that renewables are doable . China
Resolution – Development
China’s best – huge push for development now
Xinhua 14 [“Xi advocates efforts to boost China's maritime power”, Xinhuanet, 7/31/14,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-07/31/c_132591246.htm]BZhu
BEIJING, July 31 (Xinhua) -- President
Xi Jinping has championed efforts to build China into a maritime power,
adding that the country will pursue "converging interests" with other countries in oceanic development.
At a study session with members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee on Tuesday, Xi called for
efforts to learn more about and further manage maritime development. China
will safeguard its maritime rights and
interests, and make overall plans and take all factors into consideration, he said. Xi said China will adhere to the path
of peaceful development, but "in no way will the country abandon its legitimate rights and interests, nor will it give up its core national
interests." The president said China
will "use peaceful means and negotiations to settle disputes and strive to
safeguard peace and stability." Meanwhile, he stressed that China will prepare to cope with complexities,
enhance its capacity in safeguarding maritime rights and interests, and resolutely safeguard its maritime
rights and interests. The country will adhere to the policy of "shelving disputes and carrying out joint development" for areas over which
China owns sovereign rights, while also promoting mutually beneficial and friendly cooperation and seeking and expanding common converging
interests with other countries, Xi said. In the 21st century, oceans
and seas have an increasingly important role to play in
a country's economic development and opening up to the outside world, he said. Their status has
become more prominent in regards to safeguarding state sovereignty, national security and
development interests, as well as the advancement of a country's ecological civilization. The oceans and
seas have an increasingly important strategic status concerning global competition in the spheres of
politics, economic development, military, and technology, he said. The key report to the 18th National
Congress of the CPC held last November outlined the "maritime power" strategy, calling for enhanced
capacity for exploiting marine resources, protecting the marine environment and safeguarding China's
maritime rights and interests. At the study session, Xi underscored efforts to make marine industries a
pillar of China's national economy. Relevant parties should improve the capability and enlarge the fields
for exploiting marine resources so as to "cultivate the marine economy into a new growth point of the
country," he said. Xi also emphasized the "sustainable exploitation of marine resources," saying that
exploitation and protection, as well as pollution control and ecological remediation, should all be taken
into account. "All-out efforts should be made to curb the trend of the deterioration of the marine
ecological environment," Xi said. "(The authorities) should be resolute in taking measures to achieve remarkable improvement in
the marine ecological environment and ensure safe seafood, blue seas and skies, and clean beaches for the public," he said. Pollutants
from land-based sources should be effectively controlled and the establishment of an ecological
compensation mechanism should be accelerated, according to Xi. China should forcefully develop highend and advanced oceanic technologies in order to build China into a maritime power, Xi noted. He urged
relevant authorities to make breakthroughs in major fields like deep water, green and oceanic safety technologies and promote research and
development of core technologies and key generic technologies that are essential for marine economic restructuring. "China's maritime cause
has generally entered the best period of development after years of efforts," said the president. Xi said China must strive for unified
development in the ocean and on land as well as seek a harmonious human-ocean relationship during the development.
China will
depend on the ocean to prosper and will steadily promote the building of its maritime power through
peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation, he said. Zeng Hengyi, deputy chief engineer of the China National Offshore
Oil Corp., and Gao Zhiguo, a researcher with the China Institute for Marine Affairs under the State Oceanic Administration, made
representations and put forward their suggestions regarding maritime power at the session.
China leads ocean development
Rui Zhao, associate research fellow, “The Role of Ocean Industry in the Chinese National
Economy: An Input-Output Analysis” May 2013, Ocean Economy Department
National Marine Data and Information Service: Tianjin, China.
[/www.miis.edu/media/view/32499/original/zhao]
The 21st century is the century of ocean and blue civilization. Economic
globalization is accelerating to push inland economies to move
toward the ocean economy.2 Exploration and protection of ocean resources play an important role in
sustainable development, especially in China who has a vast sea territory. Since China adopted the policy of “reform and
opening” in 1978, China has witnessed the rapid development of marine resources, especially in the recent
decade. China’s marine economy has maintained a higher growth rate than that of the national
economy during the same period, yet it still has certain disparities with the global marine economy. As mentioned above, a new era of the
ocean economy in China has started ; the ocean economy will increase greatly in the near future.
According to the 2011 statistical bulletin of China’s Ocean Economy, the Ocean economy in China accounts for nomore than 10 percent of China's gross domestic product (GDP), and it is
mainly centered on traditional industries such as fishing, transport and tourism. Emerging industries, including marine-related biomedicine, power, chemicals and seawater utilization, only
account for five percent of marine output. Therefore, in this research, I will focus on traditional industries including the ocean transport industry, coastal tourism industry, shipbuilding industry
According to the China marine statistical yearbook 2011, major marine industries’
effects on value added of the national marine economy in 2010 reached 1618.78 billion Yuan,
up 17.4% from the previous year(unless otherwise specified, the growth rate is calculated in the comparable price). The coastal tourism
and marine communications and transportation industry still played a dominant role [16].
and marine fishery industry [15].
Resolution – Exploration
China should lead ocean exploration – Jiaolong tech is world class, leading
commitment/will, private sector support
Yuanqing 14
{Sun, syndicated columnist on Chinese governmental policy, “China Takes Lead In Underwater
Exploration,” China Daily: Asia, 7/3, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/lifestyle/201407/03/content_15146050.html#THUR}
The Jiaolong submersible won the 2014 Hans Hass Fifty Fathoms Award in Sanya, Hainan province, in June. The award is
jointly given by the Historical Diving Society Hans Hass Award Committee and Swiss watchmaker Blancpain. The submersible, independently
developed in China, reached as deep as 7,062 meters in the Mariana Trench in the western Pacific Ocean in 2012, setting
a new record among Chinese divers. The committee initiated a double prize for Cui Weicheng, deputy chief designer of Jiaolong, for his individual
achievements, and the State Oceanic Administration for its support in building the submersible. The award has been honoring individuals for excellence in
underwater science and technology since 2003. Previous recipients include renowned film director and diving pioneer James Cameron and Stan Waterman,
it is China that
is leading the world in its commitment to manned deep ocean
exploration, " says Krov Menuhin, chairman of the award committee and advisory board member at the Historical
pioneering underwater film producer and photographer. This is the first time a Chinese project has won the award. "Today,
Diving Society, an international non-profit organization that studies man's underwater activities and
promotes public awareness of the ocean. "And the far-sighted vision, the courage and the immense
engagement to implement this program is in keeping with the pioneering spirit of Hans Hass. He entered
the ocean with the same vision, courage and commitment," he says. The winners received a framed cast bronze plaque, with
an image of Hans Hass, designed by ocean artist Wyland. And Blancpain presented them Fifty Fathoms Bathyscaphe diving watches with specially engraved cases.
The brand will serve as the official time keeper for Jiaolong's future underwater expeditions. It also announced a collaboration with the State Oceanic
Administration to launch projects to raise public consciousness of the ocean in China in the coming years. The details are still being discussed. "We
are very
impressed with Jiaolong with its ability to constantly dive into new depths, especially its crew, whose courage, focus
and action enabled them to reach new frontiers all the time," says Marc Junod, vice-president and head of sales at Blancpain. The
research and
development of Jiaolong basically started from zero in 2002. None of the crew members had seen,
let alone been in, a virtual submersible before. Fu Wentao, one of the oceanauts of Jiaolong, shared his experience underwater, including
encounters with curious creatures. "Unlike the terrestrial creatures, those under the water are not cautious at all. They are actually very curious and will even swim
toward us," Fu says. Cui
is planning to launch a project to develop a submersible that will be able to dive as
deep as 11,000 meters with financial support from both the government and the private sector. "The
combination will fuel faster development in underwater science ," Cui says. "The sea is vast and rich,
but we have a lot of research to do before we can exploit it."
Answers
A2: No Money
No funding shortfalls – relatively MORE money than western states like the US and
investment NOW
Yuanqing 14
{Sun, syndicated columnist on Chinese governmental policy, “China Takes Lead In Underwater
Exploration,” China Daily: Asia, 7/3, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/lifestyle/201407/03/content_15146050.html#THUR}
Cui is planning to launch a project to develop a submersible that will be able to dive as deep as
11,000 meters with financial support from both the government and the private sector. "The
combination will fuel faster development in underwater science," Cui says. "The sea is vast and rich, but we
have a lot of research to do before we can exploit it." While funds for the financing of manned deep-ocean
explorations in the West are
drying up, China has just committed to a long-term project
that will change the way everyone thinks about the sea, says Menuhin. As the creator of the world's first modern diving
wristwatch, Blancpain has long been a supporter of major manned deep-water explorations. "We are not just getting involved today
because it is trendy to protect the Ocean. Our philosophy is to help as many people as possible to learn about,
and get familiar with, the underwater world. Because we believe that people can only respect and protect what they love. And they can only love what they know,"
says Junod.
China's economy is booming – they have room to spend
Kenny 2/4
[Charles, is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development. This article is adapted from his
book, The Upside of Down: Why the Rise of the Rest is Great for the West, "China's Booming Economy is
Nothing to Fear, "February 4th, 2014, TIME, http://time.com/4613/chinas-booming-economy-isnothing-to-fear/#KRUGER]
Last week, during
his State of the Union address, President Obama announced, “the United States is betterpositioned for the 21st century than any other nation on Earth.” While it isn’t quite clear what
indicators he was using to make that statement, we know one measure he wasn’t using: size.
It’s only a matter of time before China overtakes the U.S. as the world’s largest economy ,
thanks to economic growth that has been four or five times faster than the U.S. over the last couple
decades. For all the last few years have been grim economic times for America, the U.S. still ranks sixth out of 175 countries in average
income. But Americans have already lost bragging rights as the world’s largest trading nation, and China
may have overtaken the U.S. as world’s largest economy as well, according to former
International Monetary Fund economist Arvind Subramanian. Even the more pessimistic of China-watchers appear to
agree the U.S. will drop to second place by decade’s end at the latest. Will this doom the U.S. to a penurious future of lower average incomes,
as it slowly sinks into the stagnant backwaters of the global economy?
If they win cost is a key question, we win the debate – China’s ahead of the US
Kenneth Rapoza, Contributor to Forbes, “By the Time Obama Leaves Office, U.S. No Longer No. 1”,
3/23/2013, Forbes [http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/03/23/within-three-years-u-s-nolonger-no-1/]
By 2016, the United States will no longer be the world’s No. 1 economy. That title will be handed over to
none other than the current No. 2: China. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
in Paris said in report published this week that China was on course to surpass the U.S. economy in just
three short years. That’s about the time President Barack Obama will end his second term. The next president will potentially be the first one
since World War II that didn’t govern the world’s most powerful economy. Most forecasts, however, have China’s economy at No. 1 in 2020.
“From a long-range perspective, China
has now overtaken the Euro area and is on course to become the world’s
largest economy around 2016, after allowing for price differences,” OECD said in its China report released this week.
A2: No Will
Fiat solves their warrants – if a reasonable assumption of affirmative fiat involves
guaranteed passage of the plan, then a reciprocal understanding for the negative is
that they can ensure the CP gets done and supported. If the negative can lose on the
(un)popularity of the advocacy almost all CP and K alts vanish
Yes will – huge SQ push
Holmes 9
{James R, defense analyst for The Diplomat and a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College
where he specializes in U.S. and Chinese military strategy, “Chinese Soft Power in the Indian Ocean,”
APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 8/20,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450481#THUR}
To break with the inertia of the past , Beijing has sought to foster a greater maritime
consciousness in Chinese society. Despite the nation‘s meager stock of maritime lore, China‘s strategic elites
have turned to history to help cultivate an affinity among the Chinese body politic for seagoing ventures
in Southeast and South Asia, mustering popular support for oceanic endeavors. Hugely popular , both in China and
throughout maritime Asia, Zheng He helps Beijing reorient Chinese citizens toward the sea, instilling in them a
sense of mission. ―Today we are commemorating Zheng He‘s voyages,‖ editorializes the People’s Daily,
the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party‘s Central Committee, ―to promote the ethos with patriotism as the core...to strengthen the sense of
Adds the Liberation Army
Daily, the influential mouthpiece of the PLA General Political Department: The seas are not only wide roads towards international
exchange and a treasury of valuable strategic resources for sustainable human development, but are also an
important field in the world strategic pattern in which large powers strengthen their strategic positions and diplomatic voices. The
seas have already become ―new command fields‖ in international competition.... About 600 years ago, Zheng He led a huge fleet
overseas in an effort to materialize glory and dreams through the blue waves. Today the task of materializing the blue dream of
peaceful use of the seas has been assigned to our generation by history.7
identification with Chinese civilization and...strengthen the cohesiveness and the attraction of the Chinese nation.‖6
Negative – Influence DA
1NC
Shell
Continued Chinese non-military ocean explorations key to boost Chinese soft power
(and hard power via navy)
Holmes 9
{James R, defense analyst for The Diplomat and a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College
where he specializes in U.S. and Chinese military strategy, “Chinese Soft Power in the Indian Ocean,”
APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 8/20,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450481#THUR}
China grabbed headlines in late 2008 when it dispatched two destroyers and a combat logistics ship to the
Gulf of Aden on
counterpiracy duty. Over the ensuing months, the People‘s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN, or PLA Navy)
demonstrated capabilities that have eluded it to date, including the capacity to replenish fuel and stores far from Chinese
shores, to conduct repairs without the benefit of a nearby Chinese shipyard, and to conduct on-station relief between one detachment and its
all accounts, the Chinese flotilla coordinated its actions smoothly with the U.S.-led Task
Force 151, the European Union‘s Operation Atalanta, and the individual naval contingents trying to hold
open a transit corridor through the Gulf of Aden. In so doing, the PLAN compelled Western observers to
replacement. By
keep revising their once-mocking estimate of Chinese prowess on the high seas. The deployment
also laid down a marker on the prospects for a maritime entente in the Indian Ocean, going
against widespread notions (especially in India) that a Chinese presence in the region would menace regional
security. The PLA Navy is entering unfamiliar territory as its vessels cruise the Gulf of Aden, despite the seemingly inoffensive and even
healthful nature of counterpiracy patrols. For the past several years, Beijing has been attempting to ―shape‖ the
diplomatic and strategic environment in maritime Asia, projecting an image of itself as an innately
trustworthy great power . Beijing has retailed the story of Zheng He, the Ming Dynasty eunuch admiral who
voyaged to destinations throughout the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean six centuries ago, renewing
the Sinocentric system
of diplomacy and commerce that has characterized Asian politics for millennia. The Ming expeditions were
almost wholly nonviolent—a point Beijing never fails to hammer home with Asian interlocutors. This is the
kind of narrative that appeals both to sentiment among the Chinese populace and to key audiences
throughout Southeast and South Asia, where Chinese leaders may see fit to exercise naval power .
An attractive vision of China, they hope, will avert the tendency of lesser powers to band together
to balance Chinese power. Until now, Chinese diplomats have had the luxury to tell China‘s story how they wanted, since
deployments of PLAN forces beyond East Asia remained abstract. Beijing neither saw the need nor boasted the capacity to maintain strong
forces far from Chinese shores. Despite
the vast differences between the dynastic China of antiquity and today‘s
communist China, Beijing hopes to convince key audiences it remains pacific in outlook—and thus can
be counted on not to abuse the sea power it is amassing. By depicting itself as an inherently defensive
power , China has set a standard for its behavior at sea. Fellow Asian powers will hold it to this lofty standard— measuring
its actions against the story line Chinese leaders have developed around the Zheng He voyages.
Chinese soft power is awesome – solves Chinese economic growth, ASEAN cohesion,
free trade and SCS war
Jain 13
{Shresht, Researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, “South China Sea: Beijing Likely to
Employ Soft Power?” #4043, 18 July, http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/south-china-sea-beijing-likelyto-employ-soft-power-4043.html#THUR}
Hitherto, the real challenge for China in the South China Sea has been to safeguard its sovereignty. However, for
Beijing to cater to its energy
demands and domestic economy, it is expected to lessen its dependency upon hard power and
rely more on the soft power it possesses. Why it is important for China to embrace soft power in
the SCS? What could be the major components of soft power measures? And lastly, to what extent, this approach will restore confidence among the claimants
of the South China Sea? South China Sea and Beijing's Soft Power In Beijing’s perspective the effectiveness of soft power vis-àvis the SCS dispute will depend on, firstly its ability to shape the preferences of other claimants; Secondly, its
ability to legitimate Chinese values, culture and policies; and lastly, its capacity to construct rules and norms which limits
other’s activities(majorly the United States). In contrast to China’s reliance upon its military in the region, the PRC
possesses advantages of abundant soft power resources . Cultural exchange between China and Africa can be
a representative example of how China has been spreading its soft power. The commitment ranges from health and
financial assistance to academic and cultural exchanges. China's expanding soft power might be demonstrated by taking a
look at China's economic growth and economic engagement with numerous African nations. China's development of trade and
infrastructural investment on the African mainland and the spread of Chinese-led Confucius centres could give a positive
impression about China towards individuals in Africa. In context of Southeast Asia, both China and its
neighbours enunciate a broader idea of soft powe r. China appears to be using soft power to
incrementally push Japan, Taiwan and the United states. For instance, China’s aid to Philippines in 2003 and to Indonesia in 2002
was roughly greater than the United States. Beijing has also rebuilt relations with South Asian’s ethnic Chinese
organisations, and in nations like Cambodia, a feeder system has been created in which Cambodian student attend Chinese-language school funded from
the sources in mainland China. Similarly, China does not want to take the risk of sacrificing its domestic
economy by taking coercive measures. China’s leverage over Southeast Asia includes major economic
interest. As late as the 1990s, the US and Japan were major economic partners of Southeast Asia. No longerChina has displaced both to become the major trading partner to the region. With ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement as a
centrepiece, China has negotiated a plethora of economic agreements with the region including an
array of infrastructure projects linking Southeast with southern interior China. In addition to free trade agreements with
Southeast Asia, Beijing is negotiating closely with individual Southeast Asian states. In order for China to dangle
budgetary carrots before the members of the ASEAN it is important to take some steps closer to its peaceful
rise. The Rationale: Quest for Energy Security China’s demand for oil and gas resources and its drive for energy security
are
a political challenge of global dimension. The failure to persuade ASEAN states to
cooperate on energy security may lead to disastrous
consequences. It can only do so by
placing mechanisms which allows Sino-ASEAN joint exploration. As a country increasingly dependent on oil, China
believes the U.S and the major western oil companies wield influence over the world oil market and oil industries. China has earned limited rate of investment (ROI)
on its investment in the energy sector in the South China Sea as it has already made headway in the same in the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, Russia, Africa and Latin
America. One of the reasons for low ROI is due to the opaqueness in the quantum of resources that the Islands and reefs in the South China Sea has. Secondly,
China is squandering time and money by expanding its naval fleet well beyond what is required to protect its coast and sea line of communications. It is wary of
foreign oil companies conducting joint explorations with ASEAN countries. Will Chinese Soft Power Work? The
improvement at the ARF is
acknowledged as a huge step towards the peaceful resolution of the dispute. The reception of the guidelines
lessened pressures and promoted Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s). Also given the economic leverage that China has on
the South East Asian nations, it certainly would not want to lose its place to the US or Japan in
playing the role of major funder or technology provider in the joint development to explore oil and gas
reserves.
SCS conflicts causes extinction
Wittner 11, Professor of History at SUNY Albany
(Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?, www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national
conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of
U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The
gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength,
the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military
presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet,
there are signs that it could . After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear
weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War
and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the
latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of
course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet
Some
pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been
very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us
that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary
government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.
threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is
don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they?
Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to
respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear
attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that
nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national
missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other
nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those
Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that
the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five
claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though,
thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United
A nuclear attack by China would
immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and
radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced
to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would
blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter ” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating
worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse.
The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected
to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn,
has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities
over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is
States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail?
to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to
improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their
survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.
Specific Links
Anti-Piracy
Anti-piracy missions key to Chinese soft power
Holmes 9
{James R, defense analyst for The Diplomat and a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College
where he specializes in U.S. and Chinese military strategy, “Chinese Soft Power in the Indian Ocean,”
APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 8/20,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450481#THUR}
China's Maritime Soft Power and the Anti-Piracy Operation China's turn to its usable past has intersected with real events at sea. Until very recently, China has had
the luxury of making claims about its inoffensive and stabilizing entry into the maritime domain while keeping its navy relatively close to home. China's
neighbors had little basis to judge Beijing's invocation of history and cultural traditions since its lofty rhetoric far
outstripped its material capabilities and naval activities in the region. Consequently, China's reassurances have been casually
waved away as either cheap talk or as a temporary disguise behind which lay raw realpolilik thinking. Now, Beijing's sincerity can be
put to the test . The PLAN'S anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden offer an important empirical case
study for examining the validity of the Zheng He narrative. Several questions guide the following inquiry to measure the efficacy of Chinese maritime soft
power and to assess the extent to which Beijing has been able to match deeds with words. Have the Chinese sought to link explicitly the escort mission to Chinese
foreign policy principles and objectives consistent with the Zheng He narrative? How have the recipients of China's soft power message in the Indian Ocean basin
responded to the presence of Chinese naval power? How will Chinese maritime soft power pay longer-term dividends? Some preliminary answers to these
questions will highlight both the utility of and limits to Chinese soft power at sea. China's naval
operations in Somali waters were not
conceived overnight within a policy vacuum. For at least a decade, Chinese policymakers have anticipated the
need to cope with non-traditional security (^M'iStS;^-:) threats, which encompass drug and human trafficking, piracy, terrorism,
humanitarian disasters, arms smuggling, cyber crime, international economic/financial crime, and pandemics. Analysts contend that active efforts to
combat such challenges would not only fulfill China's responsibilities as a rising great power, but would also
accrue soft power over time. As Wu Weixing explains: As China's international influence grows and experience in
resolving hotspot problems accumulate, the international community's calls for China to shoulder big
power responsibilities have increased day by day. To exhibit a responsible great power image to the
international community not only benefits China's peaceful development, but also benefits the
construction of a harmonious world.39 The notion that contributions to international security would
bolster Beijing's image on the world stage and telegraph China's peaceful rise clearly resonates with Chinese strategists. At
the same time, Wu depicts an international environment that is highly receptive to China's exercise of its power commensurate with its emerging status.
Humanitarian Aid
Ocean development tied to humanitarian aid key to soft power – 04 Tsunami proves
Holmes 9
{James R, defense analyst for The Diplomat and a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College
where he specializes in U.S. and Chinese military strategy, “Chinese Soft Power in the Indian Ocean,”
APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 8/20,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450481#THUR}
Beijing's use of Zheng He as a diplomatic tool is also motivated in part by the relative paucity of the
country's "hard" power. A striking example followed the December 2004 tsunami, when countries such as the United
Stales, Japan, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand dispatched maritime assets to Indonesia to help in recovery operations off Aceh and the Sumalran coast.
Beijing demurred from deploying naval forces to aid relief efforts—underscoring its inability to use military power to
influence regional and world events. The goodwill generated by the U.S. Navy's exemplary tsunami relief effort was a
particularly jarring episode for Beijing. In their surprisingly unsparing appraisals, Chinese analysts vividly
portray Beijing's sense of helplessness when it witnessed—on the sidelines—America's impressive
conversion of its hard-edged power projection capabilities into a humanitarian vehicle. As Qu Zhaowei
laments: Although China had long wished to give full play to its own soft power in the region, because it did not possess
, it could only watch the United States reverse its negative image in the Asia-Pacific region
since the Iraq War.10 According to Qu, Chinese fears that America's " overwhelming soft power influence " might
adequate capabilities
negate China's engagement strategy in Asia spurred the PLAN to build large hospital ships as a strategic counter
move. The tsunami experience, then, painfully demonstrated a harsh reality: hard power must play an
effective role in underwriting soft power. As Bruce Elleman notes: When viewed in terms of the Confucian concept of ren, or "humaneness,"
Washington was able to outshine Beijing by far. China is
clearly aspiring to become a
regional superpower by using a whole range of government powers, including its military forces, but when put to the test
its naval forces failed." Beijing's lingering military weakness, inexperience in overseas environments, and deployment of forces to assure internal
security in provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang and regain control of Taiwan have prevented the PLA from building up forces in regions of real and growing interest.
These strategic impediments and pressing priorities explain the inaction in 2004. Without
hard power in these regions, Beijing has turned to
Zheng He as a stopgap, deftly proliferating an admirable idea of China through its sophisticated historical
narrative. This allows Chinese diplomats some say in Southeast and South Asian affairs while Beijing remains weak
at sea. It also helps Beijing mold diplomatic conditions in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean
basin in anticipation of a future buildup of naval power in regional waters, should Chinese leaders decide their interests warrant such
a buildup. And its invented soft power may give rise to an innocuous impression of China , helping
make the increasing Chinese political and military presence in coastal Asia palatable if not welcome
to regional governments. History, then, influences China's outlook on maritime affairs, imbuing Beijing's
oceanic aspirations with a sense of destiny. China's leadership routinely connects its grand strategy to past endeavors while attempting to
conciliate its maritime neighbors. In short, China's leaders are sculpting an impressive program of public diplomacy, using
the deeds of a venerated historical figure, backed by tangible signs of good faith, to rally domestic and international support
behind today's oceanic ventures.
MH 370
Search key to Chinese soft power – spills over to ensure China Heg
Ping 14
[Bai, Columnist Specialized in China Politics, “China displays soft power in MH370 search”, 4-19-14,China
Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014planemissing/2014-04/19/content_17447521.htm]
As the
frustrating, until now futile search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 wears on, some people may be wondering:
How long will China continue its big and costly operation in the Indian Ocean? China has contributed
nine warships and civilian vessels and six aircraft to the search mission fraught with twists and letdowns. It has
already cost many millions of yuan according to some unofficial estimates. The Chinese navy's announcement early this
week to cancel an international fleet review, partly because of the deployment of some of its most advanced
hardware in the Indian Ocean, has underscored the onerousness of its commitments. Although search teams have
seen little light at the end of the tunnel and the disappearance of the plane remains a mystery, China has shown no sign of
relenting. Its top leaders have repeatedly pledged to make greater efforts and work with other countries
to find the plane. Some cynics may interpret China's resolve as a mere show of its growing economic strength and rising naval capabilities. But
many people see in China a nation that has made the moral decision to take care of its
citizens wherever they may be . It's the power of attraction - not economic or military muscle - that
captures people's hearts and that is what China desires to increase . For years, China has been
exploring ways of translating potential sources of its soft power into real influence with some success.
Major drives of public relations include hosting the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games and the Shanghai 2010 World Expo, opening Confucius
institutes across the world and the "relaunching" of the State media to provide more information about the country. But foreign countries'
perception about China has more or less remained "one-sided", for they tend to associate its success on multiple fronts with the "China threat"
theory or its problems with the "China collapse" theory, according to officials and experts concerned about the nation's image. While some in
China still believe negative foreign views about China can be explained away by providing more information, many
have realized that
foreigners will continue to rely on their own media which reconstruct the image of China through a
different lens. Harvard University's Joseph Nye, who coined the term soft power, has described it as a type of
currency different from force or payoffs to engage in cooperation, or an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to
the achievement of those values. In laymen's language, the values and tenets associated with soft power could probably boil down to the
protection of citizens' rights, democracy and the rule of law, with safeguarding of people's interests being at the core. The
lost plane with
search for the
239 people on board, including 154 Chinese passengers, is a good opportunity for China
to showcase its people-first philosophy of governance . Its efforts have won accolades from home
and abroad, which have ranged from being "determined and forceful" in its response to taking "the high
moral ground" to being a " responsible superpower ". This is not the first time China is carrying out a
large operation to help its citizens in trouble overseas. In 2011, it evacuated more than 35,800 of its nationals from Libya
during the political crisis in that country. The operation, according to Chinese media reports, involved 91 domestic chartered flights, 12 military
flights, five cargo ferries, one escort ship, 35 foreign chartered flights, 11 trips by foreign passenger liners and some 100 bus runs. Yet the
ongoing multinational search for MH370, arguably one of the largest in aviation history, has attracted much
more global attention because of the potential loss of many human lives, daunting technical challenges and an
increasingly intricate international situation. However long and costly the mission may be, China will continue to
lead it full throttle . It must.
Internal Links
A2: Perm Solves/Not Zero Sum
American soft power rises directly trade off with Chinese ones – Perm fails
Holmes 9
{James R, defense analyst for The Diplomat and a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College
where he specializes in U.S. and Chinese military strategy, “Chinese Soft Power in the Indian Ocean,”
APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 8/20,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450481#THUR}
Given the uncertainties surrounding the prospects of China's maritime soft power, the United States should refrain from overreaction.
Washington should cautiously accept some of Beijing‘s claims to leadership in Asian waters, conditioning its approval upon China‘s willingness
to participate in regional maritime activities such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, which in theory should advance mutual political aims.
United States must remain wary of China‘s efforts to restore its supremacy in the
region. If China‘s ancient mariner supplies Beijing a way to apply soft power, he also provides the United
States with a measuring stick for China‘s intentions. Assuming the United States wants to preserve its own
At the same time, the
preeminence in Asia, it must watch for signs that China is deviating from the beneficent purposes
embodied in its Zheng He diplomacy. As Washington confronts a more competitive environment for influence in
South and Southeast Asia, it needs to devise a more coherent grand strategy of its own in the region, lest the
United States find itself less and less able to influence Asian affairs or, in the worst case, shut out of
Asia altogether .62 A forward military presence, in the form of ships, aircraft, and missiles, is no substitute for vigorous diplomacy. But
America has supplied the international public good of free navigation—long taken for granted—for six decades now, asking little in return.
Zheng He‘s era was fleeting by contrast, his endeavors occurred in a century long past, and in any event the Chinese Communist Party can
scarcely claim credit for the Ming Dynasty‘s short-lived seafaring exploits. The
tangible security benefits provided by U.S.
maritime power now furnish a solid foundation for an American soft-power counteroffensive .
Washington must build on this foundation,
lest it see its regional primacy go into
decline .
Perm can’t resolve the link – soft power fights are zero sum meaning perm doesn’t
increase US’ relative sway
Eades, 1/22/14
{Mark, Former Professor at Fudan University, Shanghai International Studies University, has published
articles on China and Sino-US relations in publications like U.S. News & World Report and USA Today,
“Soft Power, America vs. China: America Still Wins,” 1/22/14,
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/01/22/soft-power-america-vs-china-america-still-wins-2/]}
China is engaged in a soft-power war with America and the West. America may not have noticed this, but China has.
While America takes its soft power around the world for granted, China struggles to win even the
“hearts and minds” of its own citizens . “Soft power” is defined by Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye as “the ability to get what one wants
by attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment.” In contrast, “hard power” refers to a nation’s economic and military might. As Nye
writes in reference to China: “Great
that
powers try to use culture and narrative to create soft power
promotes their national interests, but it’s not an easy sell when the message is inconsistent with their domestic realities.”
Due to this inconsistency with domestic realities, and due to top-down government control over all of China’s cultural production and soft-power activities around the world, according to Nye,
China suffers a “soft-power deficit” that will be difficult to overcome. China’s “soft-power deficit” has been discussed elsewhere by
Nye and others. Arthur Guschin focused on “the incompatibility of the core audience in Western countries and the information product of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China.” As Guschin observed, Western audiences are unlikely to be swayed by mass media material featuring “Chinese culture and language with ideologically driven news” controlled and
censored by the Chinese government. Chinese academic Qiao Mu likewise commented that “government-funded efforts to promote Chinese culture overseas had failed because they were
often viewed as propaganda.” When it comes to soft power, as I wrote in a recent article at the Asia Times, “China still just doesn’t get it.” Due to government censorship, top-down control,
and the inconsistency of its message with domestic realities, China’s efforts to build itself “into a socialist cultural superpower” have met with little success. Chinese culture has considerable
global influence, but this influence mostly comes from Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Chinese American community in the United States, and other Chinese communities outside of mainland China.
Mainland China contributes comparatively little to the world’s appreciation of Chinese culture. As much as anyone may appreciate Chinese food, Chinese martial arts, Chinese philosophy, or a
Chinese New Year parade, mainland China’s global image remains overwhelmingly negative. Mainland China has produced a bumper crop of excellent film directors, but those directors usually
become world-famous only after their films are banned in mainland China. Mainland China has also produced a bumper crop of award-winning intellectuals, but most of those are either sitting
in Chinese prisons or in exile abroad. The most popular label for any mainland Chinese cultural product is not “Made in China,” but “Banned in China.” Mainland China suffers a “soft-power
deficit” not only abroad, but also at home. Even in mainland China, the official mainland version of “Chinese culture” is not very popular. American and Western culture, however, are
immensely popular, particularly among young people. In the more than five years I have spent teaching in China, young Chinese people with whom I have spoken show remarkably little
interest in mainland Chinese films, television shows, or popular music, and remarkably strong interest in American and Western cultural offerings. My Chinese students enjoy American movies,
television, and pop music because they find these more interesting and imaginative than anything the Chinese government allows to be produced in China. Few of my students express any
interest whatsoever in government-censored Chinese offerings. Don’t ask me why, but apparently Miley Cyrus twerking is more fun for Chinese 18-year-olds to see than the Long March reenacted by a People’s Liberation Army patriotic Chinese opera troupe. And for some reason, online TV coverage of the 2012 U.S. presidential election was more interesting for my Chinese
postgraduate students to watch than Chinese TV coverage of a simultaneous change of Chinese leadership in which the Chinese people had no say and the outcome was a foregone conclusion.
Go figure.
The Chinese government is aware of this, and doesn’t like it one bit . As I wrote in a recent post at Foreign Policy Blogs,
the Chinese Communist Party sees Western cultural influence in China as a threat to its hold on
power . This post includes several recent statements by Communist Party leaders on the threat of American and
Western cultural influence particularly on young people in China. These statements feature the obsessive and repetitive use of
Communist Party buzzwords and catch-phrases such as “Western hostile forces” (西方敌对势力) and Western
“cultural infiltration” (文化渗透 ) as threats to China’s “ideological security” (意识形态安全) necessitating intensified
“ideological work” (思想工作) and proper “guidance of public opinion” (舆论导向). The Communist Party’s fear of American and Western cultural influence in China is typified by a party
China is engaged in a soft-power war with the West, especially the United
States — an “ideological struggle” (意识形态斗争) and “competition in overall national strength” (国家综合国力竞争)
which it describes as a “ war without smoke ” (无硝烟战争). Then the statement goes on to accuse “Western hostile forces” of “cultural infiltration”
statement from July 2012. The statement contends that
and threatening China’s “ideological security.” Its enemies list includes major U.S. news organizations, Hollywood movies, and U.S. programs and charitable foundations such as the Fulbright
program, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, which sponsor educational and cultural programs with China. The soft-power war this statement described was not a war for
global influence, but a war for the “hearts and minds” of China’s own citizens. This statement and others like it are very revealing as to how the Communist Party views China’s relations with
the West and with Western culture. For Communist Party leaders, the influence of Western culture and Western democratic ideas in China are an object of fear. Lacking soft power even
among its own citizens — particularly its young people — how can China expect to win any soft-power contest with America and the West internationally?
It’s all zero-sum
Yi 10
(March 25, 2010, Xiaoxiong Yi- Associate Prof. of PoliSci & director of the China Institute @Marietta,
“Reinventing America's smart power,” Coshocton Tribune, l/n)
It is clear the
rise of China's soft power, at America's expense, is an important issue that needs to be addressed. As
"In today's
information age, success depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins. Under the new conditions, a
Joseph Nye of Harvard University, who also invented the term "soft power" some 15 years ago, emphasized,
soft sell may prove more effective than a hard sell ... Power in a global information age, more than ever, will include a soft dimension of
attraction as well as the hard dimensions of coercion and payment. Combining these dimensions effectively is called 'smart power.'" The
United States was a smart power in the past. Serious challenges from China now are reducing America's
influence internationally. The United States has to wake up and focus on the task of rediscovering how to be a smart power again.
Impact
Overview
We read a ton of internals in 1NC Jain – here are the impacts
Chinese economic collapse causes nuclear war
Kaminski 7 (Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, “World Order: The Mechanics of
Threats (Central European Perspective)”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)
As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although
the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of
political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law,
clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an
economic crisis in China.
Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global
repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese
political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A
potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies
could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as
the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.
ASEAN strength prevents extinction
Rajaratnam 92 (S., Former Deputy Prime Minister – Singapore, “ASEAN: The Way Ahead” , 9-1,
http://www.aseansec.org/13991.htm)
Should regionalism collapse, then ASEAN too will
go the way of earlier regional attempts like SEATO, ASA and MAPHlLlNDO.
All that remains today of these earlier experiments are their bleached bones. Should the new regional efforts collapse, then
globalism , the final stage of historical development, will also fall apart . Then we will inevitably enter another
Dark Ages and World War III , fought this time not with gun-powder, but with
devastating than those exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
nuclear weapons far more
Free trade staves off extinction
Pazner 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your
Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)
The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations
over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from lessthan-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts
to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes
over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will
world, such tensions will
become more commonplace. Around the
give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances,
economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations
may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment
toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist
groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole
new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running
amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly
belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast.
Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like
John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United
States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and
religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate
quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing
biological or nuclear
weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread
destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a
new world war .
SCS – A2: No Impact
Draws in the US – goes nuclear
San Juan 12
(Erick, Managing Director of NEWSASIA and a former Director IV of the National Security Council, “Who
do we turn to?” http://www.goldstardailynews.com.ph/opinion/who-do-we-turn-to.html)
According to strategic observers, terrritorial disputes in South China Sea between countries in the region should be resolved only
under international law while China believe that it must be between the parties involved in the dispute. Internationalization of these problems
can reportedly cause undesirable consequences which could drag the security of the region . The Asean community has
seen this during the stand off between the Philippines and China. The Philippine government is perceived to be a
willing tool in the US expansionism. Even the US Coast guards took part in the said military exercises as part of the maritime security operation.
The American government is even willing to offer their services to the Asean nations to contain China. The US
assistant secretary for political and military affairs, Andrew Shapiro, talked about this with the military leadership of Thailand at a meeting in
Bangkok last June 22. Shapiro added that his government’s defense establishment is ready to participate in creating a system of deterrence to
any possible threat. The “permanent” stay of the US military in the region was perfectly achieved through the accreditation of their
humanitarian and rescue operation centers. According to the “China Choice,” a new book written by Professor Hugh White of the Autralia’s
National University’s Strategic Studies and a veteran China watcher, if
America tries to be dominant, if it tries to keep China in
the box, that it has been in these last few decades, then China’s going to push back. That’s going to make rivalry
more likely. Just like the Asean, Australia will be faced with that terrible situation of having to make a choice
between US and China, which is really a choice we don’t want to make, we can’t afford to make. White added that as rivalry
grows, a clash could ensue and grow to a war . the war could become a nuclear war if the two sides
aren’t very careful––a risk that we all have to be conscious of.
SCS – A2: No War
Escalates—recent provocations, U.S. rhetoric, Philippines defense treaty, U.S. troops in the region,
interest in controlling sea lanes, wrecks US/China relations
Carpenter, 12 (Ted Galen – senior fellow at the Cato Institute, July 10, “The Roiling South China Sea
Dispute”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-roiling-south-chinasea-dispute-7178)
The always troublesome
S outh C hina S ea territorial dispute between China and its neighbors is heating up again .
Vietnam and the Philippines currently present the principal challenges to China’s expansive claims in those waters.
Unfortunately, Washington seems inclined to back those challenges, which creates the danger of entangling the
U nited S tates in this emotional dispute.
Tensions flared
this spring when
the Philippines deployed several ships around Scarborough Shoal (which China
calls Huangyan Island) to strengthen its claim. Beijing reacted harshly to that move, gradually sending numerous fishing vessels
and naval-patrol boats to the area. It appeared that the bilateral quarrel was easing in June when the government of Benigno S. Aquino ordered his country’s ships to leave the
area. The Chinese foreign ministry promptly praised that move as a welcome, conciliatory gesture.
cordial atmosphere between the two countries soon faded. Reports circulated that the Aquino government intended
not only to have the Philippine ships return to the disputed waters but also that Manila would ask the U nited S tates to
initiate patrols by aerial drones to monitor Chinese moves in the area. Although Aquino later denied that his government is
seeking such patrols, Beijing’s reaction to the reports was just short of furious. An editorial in China Daily accused Manila
of being “obsessed with playing the role of troublemaker in the South China Sea.” The latest episode, the editorial went on, “shows
Manila is determined to drag Washington into its maritime dispute with China. By seeking backup from the U.S. in its quarrel
But the
with Beijing, Manila has ignored the goodwill shown by Beijing and is trying hard to complicate the issue.”
Unfortunately, Washington’s
behavior over the past year gives some credibility to China’s accusations. While attending
an economic summit in Bali in November 2011, President Obama went out of his way to highlight the importance of the U.S.
defense alliance with the Philippines and pledged to strengthen the relationship. Chinese officials considered his
comment worrisome because it immediately followed Secretary of State Clinton’s strongly pro-Philippines
statements regarding the rival claims in the S outh C hina S ea. “Any nation with a claim has a right to exert it,” Clinton said during
a visit to Manila on November 16, “but they do not have a right to pursue it through intimidation or coercion.” She added that “the
U nited
S tates will always be in the corner of the Philippines and we will stand and fight with you.” The Obama
administration backed up such rhetoric in early 2012 with a decision to deploy additional troops to that country—ostensibly to assist
the Manila government in combating terrorism.
Such rhetorical meddling is especially troubling because the U nited S tates has a defense treaty with the
Philippines. If Chinese and Philippine forces ever come to blows in the South China Sea, Washington is going to be in an
awkward and dangerous position. There certainly will be pressure, both from domestic hawks and other U.S. allies in East
Asia, not to appease China. But the potential damage to the crucial bilateral relationship with China if the United
States chose to back the Philippines militarily— even if outright war could be averted — is enormous.
As the world’s leading maritime power, the United States is understandably concerned about the South China Sea territorial dispute—especially China’s breathtaking claims to well over half of
crucial oceanic routes leading to Japan, South Korea and other
S ea. Chinese control of that body of water would give Beijing a
the waters. Beijing’s position has important economic and strategic implications. Many of the
countries in East Asia run
through the S outh C hina
grip on the economic jugulars of all of those nations and might cause Washington’s East Asian allies to reassess their close ties
to the United States.
Nevertheless, the Obama administration should
be wary of embroiling the United States in the South China Sea dispute by reflexively
backing Manila’s position. It would not be the first time that a small client state, emboldened by the perceived backing
of a large, powerful patron, managed to entangle that patron in a dangerous quarrel . Washington needs to back
off.
Add-On – Chinese Econ
Chinese soft power key to its economy.
CSIS 9
(March 2009, Center Strategic & International Studies, “Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the
United States,” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf)
Aware of the benefits of a sophisticated soft-power portfolio, Chinese leaders are aiming to deepen
relationships with all regions of the world, particularly the developing nations of Africa, the Americas, the Middle East,
and Southeast Asia. Beijing uses a variety of tools to increase its influence in the developing world that include economic incentives and military
cooperation; however, traditional soft power has also become a growing piece of how China acquires its influence. Although the
nature of
China’s relationships with the regions explored in this volume is largely economic , Beijing has also sought to
strengthen these relationships by promoting regional economic integration and security mechanisms, emphasizing the role of the United
Nations, participating in humanitarian missions, providing concessionary loans and debt relief, increasing cultural and academic exchange
programs and engaging local communities through skilled diplomats. There is a distinct style in China’s approach to relationship building: it
practices an omni-directional friendship policy that emphasizes the importance of state sovereignty and
noninterference with the objective of securing stable and sustainable access to resources and
opening new export markets to fuel its economy .4 Differences in regional geopolitical dynamics, however, require
Beijing to tailor its soft-power strategy in each of the four regions it is active.
Downturn causes WWIII.
Plate 3
(June 30, 2003, Tom Plate - professor of Policy and Communication Studies, “WHY NOT INVADE
CHINA?,” http://asiamedia.ucla.edu/TomPlate2003/06302003.htm)
But imagine
a China disintegrating- on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less
the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia
into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls,
which don’t’ want them and cant handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War
II revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia- once occupied by
Japan- into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir.
Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia style.
outright military invasion because
A2: No Escalation
Defense growth checks South Asia conflict and WMD transfer to Pakistan
Roy 3 (Denny, Orbis, Winter, Senior Research Fellow @ Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies)
is a possible upside to China’s evolving from a regional power into a great power with a global
outlook: China might develop a greater interest in promoting peace and preventing destructive events in far-flung
regions that otherwise have few direct consequences for China’s immediate neighborhood. As China’s capabilities
relative to India grow, Beijing’s need for a strong Pakistan decreases. This does not mean a stronger China will abandon its
long-standing relationship with Islamabad, but the strategic rationale for WMD transfers to Pakistan will be no greater than in
Furthermore, there
the past—unless the real target of such transfers is not India but the United States. While Chinese WMD proliferation, for reasons other than
raising revenue, is mainly a contingent hazard. It is a tool that a strong China could employ to imperil U.S. interests outside the Asia-Pacific or as
a bargaining chip to counter U.S. policies the Chinese find threatening (e.g., arms sales to Taiwan). Since the determining factor is the character
of Sino-U.S. relations, it can be anticipated that Chinese proliferation challenges will follow, rather than set, wide trends in that relationship.
Chinese economic collapse causes massive nuclear conflict
Srinivasan, Researcher at Rediff, 6/29/02 (“China: From mismanagement to collapse” Rediff.com)
One might say this is an internal problem for the Chinese, and outsiders should not worry. This is not so. Especially for India, now that Tibet
has been thoroughly dissolved and Han Chinese troops are on the Indian border for the first time in history, there is a
growing military threat. Ditto for all of Southeast Asia, wary about Chinese adventurism and ultra-nationalism as
already expressed in land-grabs in the Spratlys and Mischief Reef. From near-self-sufficiency in 1993-96, China will need to import 60 per
cent of its oil needs by 2020: this explains the urgency of grabbing possibly mineral-rich economic zones around these islands. And, of
course, this explains their overtures to Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics. What better way to distract people's
attention from economic folly and an ideologically bankrupt polity than by going to war ? I predicted in The Danger
from China in 1998 that China would attack Taiwan, Russia (in Siberia) and Japan (an electro magnetic pulse in the atmosphere)
in the next few years. They are building ballistic-missile-armed nuclear submarines, which they will have by the end of
the decade. China has 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles that can hit Los Angeles and San Francisco , so the
Americans had better worry too.
A2: No War
Shocks causes diversionary wars
DeWeaver 13
(Mark A., Ph.D., manages the emerging markets fund Quantrarian Asia Hedge, “The Threat Of A
Declining China,” 6-17-13, http://www.ibtimes.com/threat-declining-china-1310023)
As the Chinese juggernaut starts to lose momentum, should Americans be breathing a collective sigh of relief? Not really. Unfortunately,
China’s decline is likely to be a lot less peaceful than its rise. ¶ Slower growth will pose an existential
problem for the Chinese Communist Party. Ever since the end of the Maoist era in 1978, economic development has been
the Party’s primary source of legitimacy. A prolonged slowdown will weaken its hold on power in much the
same way that crop failures during imperial times undermined the emperor’s claim to the “mandate of heaven.” If China is not going to be
“number one” after all, some other justification for Party rule will be urgently needed. ¶
The Party’s best bet will be to play
the nationalist card , making the defense of the “motherland” its primary mission. This will not be difficult. It will be easy to
blame China’s economic failures on the machinations of foreign powers, even as Mao Zedong did in his famous speech
proclaiming the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. The fact that China had “fallen behind,” he said, was “due entirely to oppression and
exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments.Ӧ It
will also be easy to put the Chinese
economy on a war footing . China’s central planning institutions are well suited to the mobilization of resources for defense
industries. A military buildup would also help to alleviate excess capacity problems in heavy industry. Total excess capacity in the steel sector,
for example, already exceeds total U.S. capacity. Arms
manufacturing is likely to be seen as a good way to put idle
plants back online. ¶ The implications for China’s neighbors are already evident in Beijing’s increasingly
bellicose insistence on irredentist territorial claims. There have been escalating tensions with
Japan over the Senkaku Islands, spats in the S outh C hina S ea involving areas claimed by Vietnam, and even a
Chinese incursion into an Indian-controlled Himalayan region claimed by both Beijing and New Delhi. ¶ Such
incidents are often described as competitions for the control of natural resources such as the South China Sea’s oil and natural gas. They
are, however, better understood as consequences of the Party’s domestic agenda. And as public relations exercises they have
been remarkably successful. Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment is now at fever pitch, with many of China’s netizens expressing strident support
for military action against Japan to recover lost territories, right historical wrongs, and avenge past humiliations. ¶ U.S. policymakers need to
this type of nationalist sentiment is going to be the Party’s ace in the hole once the
economy slows . Beijing can therefore be expected to prefer that international disputes remain unresolved. Its objective will be to keep
realize that
the Chinese public distracted by possible foreign threats to China’s national security and economic development.
Collapse causes internal instability and refugees and crushes interdependence --escalates to major war
Kane 1 – Dr. Thomas M., Professor of Security Studies at the University of Hull, “China's Hunger: The
Consequences of a Rising Demand for Food and Energy”, Parameters, Autumn,
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/01autumn/Kane.htm
The Price of Failure Despite China's problems with its food supply, the Chinese do not appear to be in danger of widespread starvation.
Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of
general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would
be less lurid, but economic
collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse
came with a bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured . As the coastal cities
grow richer and more cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two
regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have
strengthened regional potentates at the expense of central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the
center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing
nomenclature. But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful
coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[49] Other social and economic developments
deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for
Chinese mores and social cohesion.[50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may
come to include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are
unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under
these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds.
Unemployment or severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings .
Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede, perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's
directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such developments. If faced
with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of communist
dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence. Spectacular
examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the
Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to
loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[51] If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil
unrest in
the PRC would disrupt trade relationships , send refugees flowing across borders , and force
outside powers to consider intervention . If different countries chose to intervene on different
sides, China's struggle could lead to major war . In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might try to
ward off its demise by attacking adjacent countries.
Decline sparks nationalism --- causes aggression
Mann 00 (James, China Expert, American Prospect, 6/5, Lexis)
The second political change the WTO will accentuate is already evident in China today. In
the face of growing economic
difficulties, the Chinese leadership is likely to adopt a much more assertive foreign policy. Strident
nationalism is the traditional diversion for any regime that is in trouble at home, and the Chinese Communist
Party is already treading down this well-worn path. There are officials and scholars in China today who argue privately for more tolerant and
conciliatory policies toward Taiwan, but they are being increasingly marginalized as the Chinese leadership finds the need for a show of
toughness. If WTO membership leads to economic
and social upheaval in China, then Beijing will probably become
still more truculent in its dealings with Taiwan, Japan, and the U nited S tates. (Once again, the next American
president will be forced to confront a problem with outdated assumptions and outmoded policies: The carefully qualified "one China" policy
formulated in the 1970s, when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party still dreamed of ruling the mainland, doesn't fit today's
realities.)
Add-On – Trade
China’s increase in hegemony key to free trade
Kurlantzick, 6
{Joshua, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia, “China’s Charm: Implications of
Chinese Soft Power,” June 2006, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf}
China’s rising soft power could prove benign or even beneficial in some respects. Why should Washington mind if
Beijing organizes summits of ethnic Chinese or promotes Chinese language? And as it emerges into great
power status, China has used its appeal to influence Southeast Asia to take steps Washington desires.
The ASEAN-China free trade agreement , possible only because of the appeal of China as an
economic model, has forced Southeast Asia leaders to think of the region as one economic bloc,
an idea U.S. companies prefer. China has proven influential on nontraditional security issues, working with its neighbors to address trafficking in drugs and people.
Free trade staves off extinction
Pazner 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your
Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)
The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations
over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from lessthan-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts
to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes
over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will
world, such tensions will
become more commonplace. Around the
give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances,
economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations
may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment
toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist
groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole
new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running
amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly
belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast.
Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like
John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United
States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and
religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate
quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing
biological or nuclear
weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread
destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a
new world war .
A2: No War
Overwhelming evidence
Boudreaux, 2006 (Donald J., Chairman of the Economics Department at George Mason University,
Want World Peace? Support Free Trade, Christian Science Monitor, November 20)
Plenty of empirical evidence confirms the wisdom of Montesquieu's insight: Trade does indeed promote peace. During the past 30
years, Solomon Polachek, an economist at the State University of New York at Binghamton, has researched the relationship
between trade and peace. In his most recent paper on the topic, he and co-author Carlos Seiglie of Rutgers University review the massive
amount of research on trade, war, and peace. They find that "the overwhelming evidence indicates that trade reduces
conflict." Likewise for foreign investment. The greater the amounts that foreigners invest in the United States, or the more
that Americans invest abroad, the lower is the likelihood of war between America and those countries with which it has
investment relationships. Professors Polachek and Seiglie conclude that, "The policy implication of our finding is that further
international cooperation in reducing barriers to both trade and capital flows can promote a more peaceful world."
Increases mutual interest in peace
Brooks, 1999 (Jason, Department of Journalism at Carleton University, “Make Trade, Not War”,
Independent Institute, http://www.independent.org/tii/students/GarveyEssay99Brooks.html)
Free trade is, in one sense, like a nuclear weapon. Which seems strange to say because trade is associated with peace and prosperity, while
nuclear weapons are synonymous with apocalypse and terror. But here is how they are alike: they both prevent war by making it more costly. A
strong argument exists that the only reason the Cold War never got "hot" between the United States and the Soviet Union was that nuclear
weapons made outright conflict unthinkable. Trade, in a similar way, binds the fortunes of people in the world together. It is the
best assurance of peace. By forging bonds between customers and suppliers around the world, trade gives citizens a
vested interest in the wellbeing of people in other countries -- war becomes a matter of mutual assured destruction, if
you will. With trade, a war abroad will have fallout at home. But while trade has the deterrent effects of powerful weapons, is far preferable
because of its other advantages. Where weapons are expensive, free trade brings prosperity and freedom. Where weapons bring terror, free
trade fosters harmony and encourages people to resolve disputes without violence. Richard Cobden, a nineteenth century British industrialist
and politician, often argued in favor of trade over armaments to discourage war. His recipe for peace remains as true today as it was more than
150 years ago: "The more any nation traffics abroad upon free and honest principles, the less it will be in danger of wars." Free trade is indeed
the wellspring of peace.
Add-On – Warming
Chinese soft power solves warming – spurs modeling.
CSIS 9
(March, Jesse Kaplan and Julianne Smith, “Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States:
competition and cooperation in the developing world”
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf)
When it comes to China and combating climate change, everyone, from Al Gore to T. Boone Pickens, recites a common yet troubling narrative: with global temperatures rising, the need for a
peak in global greenhouse gas emissions is incompatible with continued Chinese economic growth. The People’s Republic of China, which recently became the world leader in carbon
emissions, has completely ignored environmental considerations. Kinder critics explain that renewable energy is hopelessly expensive for developing countries. Conspiracy theorists grumble
Chinese obstructionism is
a primary obstacle to global efforts to combat climate change. If only the Chinese would do something,
the thinking goes, perhaps the United States would have an incentive to act as well. This narrative is familiar. It is also almost entirely
wrong. To be sure, the climate picture is alarming. Experts agree that to limit global warming to a moderately safe level of two degrees Celsius above the preindustrial
that China is determined to destroy the Pax Americana with emissions, if not with military and economic might. All, or at least most, agree that
norm, global carbon emissions will need to peak in the next decade and then be more than halved by 2050. Practically, this means that developed countries must have zero-carbon economies
by mid-century and developing countries must followe suit a few decades later. In quantifiable terms, the avoidable costs of climate change inaction range between 5 and 20 percent of global
gross domestic product (GDP) – approximately the cost of both world wars and the Great Depression combined. The environmental, human development, and quality-of-life costs are far
greater. Even before it passed the United States as the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, China figured prominently in climate change discussions. The International Energy Agency has
if China were to do nothing to curb emissions, it would emit more carbon dioxide during the
next 25 years than the worlds 26 richest counties combined. Almost every week a coal-fired and highly polluting power plant large enough to
projected that
service all of San Diego or Dallas opens somewhere in China, and the Chinese build enough such plants annually to light the entire United Kingdom. The Chinese coal sector alone produces
The
Chinese widely recognize that the threat of climate change is real, and they have taken significant steps
in recent years to counter that threat. To start, China has a National Climate Change Plan, something about which U.S.
environmentalists can only dream, and China has mustered a wide array of legislative, economic, and governmental
instruments to foster shifts to more sustainable industrial activity. China has invested heavily in renewable energy and has more
upward of 16 percent of global carbon emissions. These numbers are sobering. In contrast with the common narrative, however, they are not sobering only to Western eyes.
stringent efficiency standards for its automobiles than does the United States. In his annual address in 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao made 48 references to “environment,” “pollution” or
“environmental protection,” and party leadership has pursued efforts at structural reform to ensure compliance with environmental regulations.
However, significant
gaps between well-intentioned rhetoric and concrete action remain. In addition, Chinese efforts to stem emissions are sometimes
contradictory and not always effective. The country is nevertheless of the correct path, and its recalcitrance about addressing climate change is, if not a complete myth, not an obstacle to
engagement either. Villainizing China, while convenient, distorts reality and distracts from U.S. inaction.
Extinction
Tickell 8 (Oliver, Climate Researcher and Author – Kyoto2, “On a Planet 4C Hotter, All We Can Prepare
For is Extinction”, The Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)
We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this
looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and
dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief
Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our
extinction .
The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All
the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most
productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about
120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather
would become extreme and
unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying
capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die . Watson's call was supported by the government's
former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to
see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant
feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the
more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon
dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the
Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of
carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and
sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn
that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming
caused by human emissions could propel us
towards a similar hothouse Earth. But what are we to do? All our policies to date to tackle global warming have been miserable
failures. The Kyoto protocol has created a vast carbon market but done little to reduce emissions. The main effect of the EU's emissions trading
scheme has been to transfer about €30bn or more from consumers to Europe's biggest polluters, the power companies. The EU and US foray
into biofuels has, at huge cost, increased greenhouse gas emissions and created a world food crisis, causing starvation in many poor countries.
So are all our efforts doomed to failure? Yes, so long as our governments remain craven to special interests, whether carbon traders or fossil
fuel companies. The carbon market is a valuable tool, but must be subordinate to climatic imperatives. The truth is that to prevent runaway
greenhouse warming, we will have to leave most of the world's fossil fuels in the ground, especially carbon-heavy coal, oil shales and tar sands.
The fossil fuel and power companies must be faced down. Global problems need global solutions , and we also need an
effective replacement for the failed Kyoto protocol. The entire Kyoto system of national allocations is obsolete because of the huge volumes of
energy embodied in products traded across national boundaries. It also presents a major obstacle to any new agreement – as demonstrated by
the 2008 G8 meeting in Japan that degenerated into a squabble over national emission rights.
A2: Not Anthropogenic
Warming is real and anthropogenic
Steffen 11 (Will, Climate Commissioner of Australia, “The Critical Decade,” July,
http://climatecommission.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/The-Critical-Decade_July-revision_Low-res.pdf)
By contrast to the noisy, confusing “debate” in the media, within the climate research community our
understanding of the climate system continues to advance strongly. Some uncertainties remain and will continue to do
so, given the complexity of the climate system, and the impossibility of knowing the future pathways of human political, social and technological
changes. Meanwhile there is much climate change science that is now well and confidently understood, and for
which there is strong and clear evidence. The evidence that the Earth’s surface is warming rapidly is now
exceptionally strong, and beyond doubt. Evidence for changes in other aspects of the climate system is also strengthening. The
primary cause of the observed warming and associated changes since the mid-20th century – human
emissions of greenhouse gases – is also known with a high level of confidence.
Last decade proves its anthropogenic
Hansen et al., 11 (James Hansen, Makiko Sato and Pushker Kharecha, NASA Goddard Institute for Space
Studies and Columbia University Earth Institute, “Earth's Energy Imbalance and Implications,” 5/5,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.1140)
Argo floats achieved good global distribution just in time for a valuable test of the effect of solar variability on Earth's
energy imbalance and climate. The last half of the first decade of the 21 st century witnessed the deepest
most prolonged solar minimum in the period of accurate solar monitoring that began in the late 1970s (Fig. 17). Earth's energy
imbalance during the solar minimum tests the effect of solar variability on climate, including any amplifications that may exist, such as the effect
of cosmic rays on clouds. The imbalance during solar minimum is the net effect of reduced solar irradiance and all other climate forcings,
principally the net human-made climate forcing. Volcanic aerosols added a small negative forcing (Fig. 18e) that assisted the negative solar forcing.
Human-made forcing has been growing for more than a century and thus has partially expended itself,
causing most of the 0.8°C global warming of the past century. However, because of the ocean's thermal inertia, the climate
system has only partly responded to the human-made forcing. The portion of the human-made forcing that has not been responded to constitutes
During the past 5-6 years the deep solar
minimum caused a negative forcing 5 . Precise measurement of the planetary energy imbalance allows us to
determine whether the positive human-made forcing or negative natural forcing is larger. A verdict is provided
a continuing forcing with positive sign (incoming energy exceeds outgoing energy).
by the ocean heat uptake found by von Schuckmann and Le Traon (2011), 0.42 W/m 2 for 2005-2010, averaged over the planet 6 . Adding the
small terms for heat uptake in the deeper ocean, warming of the ground and atmosphere, and melting of ice, the net planetary energy imbalance
exceeded +0.5 W/m 2 during the solar minimum. The strong positive
energy imbalance during the solar minimum, and
the consistency of the planet's energy imbalance with expectations based on estimated human-made
climate forcing, together constitute a smoking gun, a fundamental verification that human-made
climate forcing is the dominant forcing driving global climate change. Positive net forcing even during
solar minimum assures that global warming will be continuing on decadal time scales.
A2: No Impact – A2: Adaptation
Warming’s accelerating --- no adaptation
Traub 12 (James, fellow of the Center on International Cooperation, 11/2/12, “Adapt or Die”, Foreign
Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/02/adapt_or_die)
I'm one of the lucky ones. I live on the Upper East Side in Manhattan and I haven't lost a minute of power to Sandy. Many of my friends have, of course; as I write this, my wife's nephew, and
our god-daughter, are asleep in our apartment. The storm has upended vastly more lives than anyone expected -- the death toll in New York City is up to 38, while most of Hoboken, just across
the Hudson, remains underwater. Still, New York will feel like New York again quite soon, for a great Western capital is an inherently resilient place. "Can you imagine," asks Cristina Rumbaitis
Del Rio, a climate change expert at the Rockefeller Foundation, "something like this happening in Calcutta or Dhaka, where people live in substandard housing and there isn't the
the last few years, vast floods have
ravaged Manila and Bangkok; in 2005, storm waters killed close to 1,000 people in Mumbai. Coastal cities, of course, have
always been subject to floods and storm surges, but climate change has increased that vulnerability owing to rising sea
levels and the increasing violence of storms. And the number of people exposed to those risks has grown rapidly as people have
flocked to cities. Over 400 million people now live in urban areas situated 10 meters or less above sea level, most of
them in Asia. A sea-level rise of 38 centimeters has been estimated to increase by a factor of five the number of people
affected by such flooding. The U.S. Geological Survey has projected that oceans will rise by between 60 centimeters and 1.9
communications infrastructure to lead to the preparedness we saw in New York City?"¶ It doesn't take too much imagination. In
meters by 2100. Is that a graphic enough picture?¶ The long-term answer to the problem, of course, is to bend the curve of climate change
downward by reducing the amount of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere. But even should this somehow comes to pass, the
cumulative effects of global warming ensure that the kind of damage we have begun to see -- in farms and forests as well
as in cities -- will grow in the coming decades. This is why climate scientists and policy advocates have increasingly focused on adaptation
as the solution to the inevitable effects of global warming.¶ One Storm Away¶ Adaptation involves both big infrastructure projects, like the
kind of storm gates now being considered for New York City, and myriad changes in early-warning and evacuation systems, building design,
urban planning, wetlands development, and the like. It's
not cheap, though it's much cheaper than doing nothing. In a 2010 report, the World Bank
estimated that the cost of adapting to a world 2 degrees centigrade warmer than the historic baseline would be $70-$100 billion a year between now and 2050.¶ The likelihood that donor countries will mobilize such a vast sum,
which is roughly equal to the total amount now spent on development aid, is only slightly greater than the likelihood of drastic action to reduce global emissions. But the auguries are a little bit better. At the otherwise unsuccessful
2009 climate conference in Copenhagen, donors pledged to spend $10 billion a year over the ensuing three years on a combination of adaptation, especially in vulnerable countries, and "mitigation" -- reducing emissions -- while
building towards a goal of spending $100 billion a year by 2020. Most of those pledges have in fact been committed, including by the United States, whose share of the three-year total comes to $5.1 billion. So far, however, very
little of that money has been disbursed, apparently because the international financial institutions which hold it in trust have been slow to move. ¶ Adaptation, by its nature, is a localized activity, and there are innumerable pilot
projects and studies and actual programs going on in affected areas. Bangladesh, which according to the World Bank study is on the receiving end of 40 percent of the world's storm surges, has been adapting to calamity since the
1960s by building coastal embankments and shelters, planting trees, and establishing early-warning systems. The Rockefeller Foundation's Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network funds programs in 10 cities, mostly
medium-sized places like Surat, in western India, or Da Nang, in Vietnam. The program works with municipal leaders and local organizations to devise small-scale, high-impact measures such as modeling flood zones or building
public-health campaigns to reduce the incidence of malaria and other insect-borne diseases. But it's all very modest. In Bangladesh, for example, natural disasters already absorb 0.5 to 1 percent of gross domestic product; absent
more ambitious adaptation measures, that may well be the cost of each of the more severe cyclones expected in the future.¶ Who's going to pay for that? China and India, which together have almost a third of the affected coastal
population, are increasingly self-reliant, and should be expected to make serious contributions towards the cost of adaptation -- though their current position has been that the West has caused global warming, so the West should
pay for the consequences. What about us? Until Hurricane Katrina, citizens in the West could look on epic flooding as just another awful problem besetting the Third World. But that's a pre-global warming mentality. As John
Mutter, a climate scientist at Columbia's Lamont-Doherty Earth Institute, puts it, "one way to think about a world getting warmer is that the tropics are just bigger." Natural disasters once largely confined to 30 degrees from the
equator are now creeping towards the forties, where the West's great centers of commerce and creation lie. New York in 2030 may feel like Manila in 1970. Climate-change adaptation will become part of our lives because it will
you keep treating
the symptoms rather than the disease, the treatment will only get more expensive , and more desperate .
As Dean Bialek, director for climate change at the non-profit advisory group Independent Diplomat, puts it, "All the adaptation in the
world will fall way short if we don't peak global emissions before 2020, and U.S. leadership is the sine qua non to
a more concerted global effort, particularly in China." That is, China, as well as the other emerging nations whose rapidly expanding
have to. Whether that will make the West more or less likely to finance this adaptation and mitigation in more vulnerable parts of the world is another question.¶ Of
course, if
economies account for a growing fraction of emissions, must agree to sharply reduce the rate of emissions even while continuing to grow -- and
they will not do so unless the U nited S tates agrees to adopt equivalent measures.¶ In this respect, climate change is a
lot like nuclear nonproliferation. President Barack Obama understood very clearly that other states would not agree to restrain nuclear
proliferation unless and until Washington accepted its own end of the bargain -- reducing the stockpile of nuclear weapons. Within the limits of
what is politically impossible, Obama
has done just that. He has made virtually no progress on climate change because
global problem will only get worse. Still, recent polls have
it hasn't been politically possible to do so; but this, in turn, ensures that the
found that Americans do want the Washington to take a leadership position on climate change, though are leery of the kind of tax policies which might be required to address the problem.
Sandy may move the needle of public opinion a little further. Should he win next Tuesday, Mitt Romney, who cannot admit to even believing that humans cause climate change, is unlikely to
do anything about the problem. If Obama is re-elected, he will have no choice but to lavish a great deal of political capital on this intractable subject. But isn't that what a second term is for?
A2: No Warming
Warming real and ongoing
Hansen 12 (James, director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, “Climate change is here —
and worse than we thought,” 8/3, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/climate-change-is-here-and-worse-than-we-thought/2012/08/03/6ae604c2-dd90-11e1-8e43-4a3c4375504a_story.html)
My projections
about increasing global temperature have been proved true. But I failed to fully explore how quickly
a new analysis of the past six decades of global
temperatures, which will be published Monday, my colleagues and I have revealed a stunning increase in the frequency of
extremely hot summers, with deeply troubling ramifications for not only our future but also for our present. This is not
a climate model or a prediction but actual observations of weather events and temperatures that have
happened. Our analysis shows that it is no longer enough to say that global warming will increase the likelihood of extreme weather and to
repeat the caveat that no individual weather event can be directly linked to climate change. To the contrary, our analysis shows that, for the
extreme hot weather of the recent past, there is virtually no explanation other than climate change. The
deadly European heat wave of 2003, the fiery Russian heat wave of 2010 and catastrophic droughts in
Texas and Oklahoma last year can each be attributed to climate change. And once the data are gathered in a few
weeks’ time, it’s likely that the same will be true for the extremely hot summer the United States is suffering
through right now. These weather events are not simply an example of what climate change could bring. They are caused by climate
change. The odds that natural variability created these extremes are minuscule, vanishingly small. To count
on those odds would be like quitting your job and playing the lottery every morning to pay the bills.
that average rise would drive an increase in extreme weather. In
A2: Impact Turns – General
We also read internal links to Chinese hard power – that rise is possible and good –
ensures L.A and African stability, free trade, overpopulation, Chinese/Indian economic
growth, biotech development, failed/rogue state collapse
Hutchinson 13
[Martin, author of Great Conservatives, and co-author with Professor Kevin Dowd of Alchemists of Loss,
6-25-13, Asian Times (newspaper), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GECON-01250613.html]
US economic, military and foreign policy blunders make China's global dominance appear entirely
realistic , and for many observers inevitable. Last week, the Nicaraguan congress approved a US$40 billion project for a Chinese company to build an Isthmian canal parallel to Panama's. For
those of us prone to peering anxiously into the future, this gave a disquieting advance picture of the
new world of Chinese hegemony into which we are probably entering, whether we like it or not. As president Ronald Reagan famously remarked,
Nicaragua is only two days' drive from Harlingen, Texas. And presumably we can rely on China to cut that down a bit by improving the road! Historically we must remember that the natural position
of China is hegemony , though for several hundred years it only achieved that position by being deliberately geographically obtuse. Nevertheless, like ancient Egypt, for all but about 200 years of her
history
China has been militarily dominant over all powers it felt it had to deal with. We should also remember that the high point of Chinese civilization was not the
early Ming period of exploration by Admiral Zheng He under the Yongle emperor, but the apogee of the Song dynasty some three centuries earlier. The Zheng He voyages, while gigantic in scale, were strategically very unambitious
- they followed an entirely coastal route, not striking out away from the known world as Columbus was to do. Moreover, they were diplomatic efforts, rather than attempts to establish permanent trading routes, as the Portuguese
were to do in the East Indies, or colonize new areas, as the Spanish were to do in Mexico. If Zheng He had discovered California, it's likely he would have done little with it; if he'd stretched his voyage to almost twice its length and
sailed into Lisbon harbor, he would have been a spectacular sight for the Portuguese. However, his arrival would not have been psychologically daunting for the contemporaneous exploration efforts of Portugal's Henry the
Navigator, who knew of China's existence and nature through the travels of Marco Polo a century earlier. Song dynasty civilization, on the other hand, was in terms of technology and lifestyle superior to anything that had preceded
it, or anything that followed it until the Western Enlightenment 500 years later. Confucianism also is a very benign religion/philosophy compared with its Christian, Moslem, Hindu or even Buddhist approximate contemporaries.
We should not judge China solely by the current regime, the remnants of a dictatorship of unparalleled brutality, but instead by its overall record, the peaks of which were very enlightened indeed. There is no question that
China's enormous economic success in the last 40 years has brought forth a desire, both among the regime and among China's
people as a whole, to resume the position of global dominance it enjoyed for two millennia. Ten years ago, this ambition would have seemed quixotic, except over the
time-frame of half a century or more. Today, both because of China's economic successes and because of US economic,
military and foreign policy blunders, it appears entirely realistic, and for many observers inevitable. Whether China's
advance is something to be welcomed depends entirely on what kind of regime China has as a hegemon.
Two possibilities exist. First, China may continue its current growth on its current trajectory with its current regime,
with its GDP per capita increasing from about 15% of the US figure to about 50%. At that point, the inefficiencies and corruption of
China's current government system would prevent further progress towards the "frontier" affluence of the United States and the better-run European and Asian free-market economies. However, to a Chinese
regime concerned about its power position rather than the welfare of its citizens, this wouldn't matter.
With a gross domestic product per capita half that of the United States, China would have a GDP in
absolute terms about twice that of the US, since its population is four times that of the US. Indeed,
China's GDP would be as great as that of the US and the EU combined, although smaller free-market
countries like Canada, Australia and the free-market East Asian economies of Japan, South Korea and
the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations would still give the West a modest
preponderance (and no, Vladimir Vladimirovich, by allying with China you would not bring the position
back into balance; with only 130 million people by then and a GDP per capita constrained like China's by corruption and inefficiency you would still not be a serious economic
competitor, however impressive your missile count). In this case, you can imagine the Chinese playing the game of international
power politics rather like the old Soviet Union, at least in its less malign days after Stalin's death. The Nicaraguan canal, a $40 billion investment that is hopelessly economically unviable (as Panama's adjacent canal
has annual revenues of only $2.4 billion) would be followed by a naval base. China would enjoy the enthusiastic cooperation of the anti-American Ortega government, which would have been propped up by Chinese money and
when necessary information about its opponents. Daniel Ortega, in spite of having been around seemingly almost as long as Fidel Castro, is only 67 and in good health. Another 20 years of his rule would cement China's position in
Countries
like Venezuela and Argentina, with anti-Western regimes that got into economic trouble, would find China very helpful, although not all of these
the Western Hemisphere. China's economic extreme helpfulness to anti-Western regimes like Rafael Correa's Ecuador would also cement itself into long-lasting dictatorships under Chinese dominance.
interventions would be successful. Africa would also be dotted with Chinese satrapies , not all of
them entirely under its control, any more than all the Comecon bloc countries were entirely under the
control of the Soviet Union. Economically, free markets would dominate only in trade between the
Western powers themselves and those few wealthy nations in East Asia who feared Chinese domination.
Natural resources would be locked up by China in long-term contracts, backed by the threat of force. Of course, this world would be thoroughly economically suboptimal, especially in terms of innovation, which would take place
Nevertheless, China itself would benefit
from its advantageous resources and cheap-labor manufacturing operations overseas. Since China would remain semi-capitalist
only in the Western economies. In particular, the peoples of countries dominated by China would find their existence a miserable one.
and generally more efficient than the old Soviet Union, the Chinese hegemony would not run into the contradictions faced by the Soviet empire in the 1970s and 1980s. Certainly its wealth would prove ample to fund a massive
military machine, which would engage in few overt acts of aggression but would exert Chinese dominance whenever the opportunity arose. If this sounds like a resumption of the 1945-91 Cold War, it is. China would not be
economically communist (whatever its theoretical pretensions), and it's unlikely it to be ruled by an irrational monster like Stalin. Nevertheless, its economic autarky would impoverish much of the world, and its military might
would be used to seize advantages from those Western countries foolish enough to elect a Jimmy Carter, Willy Brandt or Harold Wilson. And because of its size and relative economic efficiency, it would be a far more dangerous
strategic opponent than the Soviet Union ever was. There is however an alternative. The continuation of China's current government is not inevitable, and nor is the gradual progress of its economy to a hegemonic level. There are
already signs of severe funds shortage in the Chinese banking system - the domestic interbank rate is up to 8%, a T-bill auction recently was only two-thirds subscribed and the People's Bank is trying to rein back credit hard, since
bank loan volumes are already 23% above last year. Since in 2006 there was reckoned to be $910 billion of bad debts in the Chinese banking system, and the anecdotes of entirely empty luxury office buildings are legion, there must
be a chance that the country's financial system will collapse, revealing "malinvestment" - to use the Austrian economic term - not seen since the Tower of Babel proved the folly of over-investing in ziggurats. In that event, the
Chinese economy will enter a deep recession, with unemployment, bankruptcies and the other attributes of misery. That won't end the Chinese prospects for growth, but it will very likely destabilize the Chinese political system,
causing unrest similar to that of Tiananmen Square in 1989, but with a much larger middle class and infinitely better communications. There is no certainty whatever that such an event will produce a benign outcome; in general,
street unrest doesn't, as was demonstrated two years ago in Cairo. However, if it produces a reshuffled authoritarian regime, we are simply back to Option 1 after a few extra years, while if it produces a socialist outcome Chinese
. If on the other hand, China reaches back into the mists of
its history and produces a Confucian democracy, a kind of Song dynasty with elected emperors, then Chinese economic and political emergence will take a very different
economic emergence will be aborted and hegemony will be unaffordable, as it was for Mao Zedong
form. Like the Song dynasty itself, which relied on barbarians for its military muscle and pursued a generally defensive international strategy (before being overwhelmed by the infinitely more aggressive but less agreeable
Mongols), a neo-Song regime would regard the Nicaragua canal as simply a canal, abandoning it as hopelessly uneconomic or finishing it if it had by then become economic to do so. Unlike the current Chinese regime, it would be a
thoroughly benign and cooperative member of the global order, like Germany or Singapore.
A neo-Song China would allow the free market to
flourish , but without the crony capitalism and protectionism of the current regime. Thereby it would
raise the incomes of its people far beyond the 50% of US incomes that would be the maximum for
the current China, but towards and even beyond the "frontier" of the highest incomes possible with the
current technological capability. It would be a pioneer in several areas of research, notably biotech, in
which its Confucian heritage would allow it to experiment in areas taboo to Judeo-Christians. A world
with such a China would be close to its optimum. It would have lower military spending than today,
because rogue states would be unable to destabilize a world dominated by the immensely wealthy neoSong China and its equally wealthy but smaller friends in the US, Europe and East Asia. India would
develop rapidly, with a wealthy free-trading China as its neighbor, and the poor countries of Africa and
Latin America would also be brought up towards "frontier" levels. Global population would peak and begin to
decline as the world became wealthier, with neo-Song China representing about 20% of the world's
population, but a rather larger percentage of its wealth, intellectual capability and civilizational
potential. Just as modern Germany is a highly prosperous and civilized member of the world community
and a force for much good, so too a neo-Song China could play a huge role in making this a happier
and richer planet . But whether we arrive at such a Nirvana, or whether we descend into a Manichean Cold War with the existing Chinese regime grown rich and arrogant is entirely in the lap of the gods,
to be driven by political and economic developments that are currently unknowable. Martin Hutchinson is the author of Great Conservatives (Academica Press, 2005) - details can be found on the website
www.greatconservatives.com - and co-author with Professor Kevin Dowd of Alchemists of Loss (Wiley, 2010). Both are now available on Amazon.com, Great Conservatives only in a Kindle edition, Alchemists of Loss in both Kindle
and print editions
L.A. instability goes global and nuclear
Rochlin 94 (James Francis, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College. “Discovering
the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America,” p. 130-131)
While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an
interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions
of declining U.S. influence in
the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in
some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development,
mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic
and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the
hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a
cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario,
instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin
America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the U nited S tates would be unable to perform
adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the
director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that
such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic
war . This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict
resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
Overpopulation causes extinction
Tobias 98 (Michael, Assistant Professor of Environmental Affairs and Humanities – Dartmouth College,
World War III: Population And The Biosphere At The End Of The Millennium, p. 408)
The second pattern of millennial long waves is analogous to mutational bacteria, viruses, and pesticide-resistant insects, namely, a shorter and
shorter period between undulations of disaster and rebound. What this has meant is that the more epidemics, crime, war and infant mortality,
the more rapid the human population resurges. Tragedy invokes biological success. The more disasters, the more people; the more people,
the more disasters. But the irony must not be missed. The logic of all things finite permits catastrophe only up to a point,
beyond which a tragedy too vast, one that has totally closed the ecological circle of attrition, will admit to no succession. Such
ineluctable confluences of human numbers following the wake of human self-destruction, must unleash a
global
Armageddon on a scale that will admit to no swift and easy population resurgence thereafter .
There
must come a time when one
inferno will actually prevent us from repopulating. A nuclear holocaust, for example; or an
ecological virus of global proportions. The will mean, of course, eventual extinction . For those who temporarily survive
this vague and distant bang, or whimper – however one view the generic calamity – it might be a blessing. But there is no consolation
whatsoever in this post-human scenario. The events of which I speak would undo, within a human generation or less, the dreams and miracles
of the most recent several hundred million years of biological activity.
Chinese economic collapse causes nuclear war
Kaminski 7 (Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, “World Order: The Mechanics of
Threats (Central European Perspective)”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)
As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although
the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of
political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law,
clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an
economic crisis in China.
Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global
repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese
political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A
potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies
could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as
the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.
Indian economic decline causes Indo/Pak nuclear war --- goes global
Bouton 10 (Marshall M., President – Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “America’s Interests in India”,
CNAS Working Paper, October,
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_USInterestsinIndia_ Bouton.pdf)
In South Asia, the most immediately compelling U.S. interest is preventing terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland originating in or facilitated by
actors in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To avert that possibility, the United States also has an interest in the stability and
development of both countries. At the same time, the United States has a vital interest in preventing conflict between Pakistan
and
India, immediately because such a conflict would do great damage to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan (such as the diversion of
Pakistani military attention away from the insurgency) and because it would pose the severe risk of nuclear escalation .
Finally, the United States has an interest in peace and stability in South Asia as a whole. Instability and violence in nearly every one of India’s
neighbors, not to mention in India itself, could, if unchecked, undermine economic and political progress, potentially destabilizing the entire
region. At present, a South Asia dominated by a politically stable and economically
dynamic India is a hugely important
counterweight to the prevalent instability and conflict all around India’s periphery. Imagining the counterfactual scenario, a
South Asian region, including India, that is failing economically and stumbling politically, is to imagine instability on a scale
that would have global consequences , including damage to the global economy , huge
dislocations of people and humanitarian crisis, increasing extremism and terrorism , and much greater potential
for unchecked interstate and civil conflict .
Failed states cause nuclear war
TI 7 (Transnational Institute, Africa Studies Centre Report, “Failed and Collapsed States in the
International System”, April, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/reports/failedstates.pdf)
In the malign scenario of global developments the number of collapsed states would grow significantly. This would mean that several more
countries in the world could not be held to account for respecting international agreements in 33 various fields, be it commercial transactions,
debt repayment, the possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the use of the national territory for criminal or terrorist
activities. The
increase in failed states would immediately lead to an increase in international
migration , which could have a knock-on effect, first in neighbouring countries which, having similar politicoeconomic
structures, could suffer increased destabilization and collapse as well. Developments in West Africa during the last
decade may serve as an example. Increased international migration would, secondly, have serious implications for the Western world. In
Europe it would put social relations between the population and immigrant communities under further pressure, polarizing politics. An
increase in collapsed states would also endanger the security of Western states and societies. Health conditions
could deteriorate as contagious diseases like Ebola or Sars would spread because of a lack of measures taken
in collapsed areas. W eapons of m ass d estruction could come into the hands of various sorts of political entities,
be they terrorist groups, political factions in control of part of a collapsed state or an aggressive political elite still in control of
a national territory and intent on expansion. Not only North Korea springs to mind; one could very well imagine such
states in (North) Africa. Since the multilateral system of control of such weapons would have ended in part because of the decision of the
United States to try and check their spread through unilateral action - a system that would inherently be more unstable than a multilateral,
could be faced with an arms race that would sooner or later result in the actual use of
these weapons. In the malign scenario, relations between the US and Europe would also further deteriorate, in
questions of a military nature as well as trade relations, thus undercutting any possible consensus on stemming the growth of
collapsed states and the introduction of stable multilateral regimes towards matters like terrorism , nuclear weapons and
international migration. Disagreement is already rife on a host of issues in these fields. At worst, even the Western members of the
Westphalian system - especially those bordering on countries in the former Third World, i.e. the European states - could be faced with
negotiated regime - one
direct attacks on their national security.
A2: Impact Turns – A2: Sino/US War
No US-China confrontations – Chinese posturing and use of soft power make heg
benevolent
Holmes 9
{James R, defense analyst for The Diplomat and a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College
where he specializes in U.S. and Chinese military strategy, “Chinese Soft Power in the Indian Ocean,”
APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 8/20,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450481#THUR}
As it integrates a nautical element into its strategic thinking, Beijing understands that fellow Asian
powers and the United States, whose navy has ruled the Asian seas since World War II, will take a wary view
of China‘s newly expansive maritime strategy and the naval power that underwrites it. Calming fears that might give
rise to a countervailing coalition, perhaps under U.S. leadership, thus
has become a matter of some importance to the
success of China‘s grand strategy. Accordingly , Beijing is attempting to use the past to realign the
nation‘s identity with today‘s exigencies, portraying China as an intrinsically peaceful maritime
power . Accentuating the feats of Zheng He, who sojourned in maritime Asia without attempting military conquest, is one
means to this end. Indeed, Chinese officials have made the pacific aspects of Zheng‘s cruises a
mainstay of their regional diplomacy .8 By invoking Admiral Zheng, Beijing can reach out to nations
along the waterways the Ming ―treasure fleet‖—so named for the valuables it carried to trade with foreign peoples—once
helps soothe jitters about China‘s naval ambitions and
remind Asian nations that China once exerted a benign, sea-based
supremacy over the region
plied. In so doing, it
Affirmative – A2: China CP
2AC
Frontline
Perm do both – US-China ocean cooperation feasible and mutually beneficial
Department of State 12
{“U.S.-China Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Office of the Spokesperson, 7/12,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194891.htm#THUR}
to the
United States and China, the Asia-Pacific region, and the international
community of building a U.S.-China cooperative partnership based on
a
On the occasion of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
the United States and China underscored the benefits
mutual respect and mutual benefit and fostering
new type of relationship between major countries. Toward this end, through regular and substantive dialogue and consultation, the
United States and China are developing cooperative activities throughout the Asia-Pacific region. At this year’s ARF, the two
countries pledged to enhance and initiate collaborative efforts in the region, including in the areas of science
and technology, climate change, disaster warning and response, energy policy, forest management, fisheries management,
disease detection and control, and wildlife protection and conservation. Recent accomplishments in U.S.-China cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific include: Disaster relief: The United States and China co-hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum Seminar on the Laws and Regulations on Participation in International
Disaster Relief by Armed Forces in Beijing, June 10-12, 2012. Disaster response: The United States and China jointly funded and participated in an urban search and rescue (USAR) training
exercise aimed at improving USAR capacity of Indonesia and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
(INSARAG) Asia Pacific Regional Earthquake Response Exercise, jointly funded by USAID and the China Earthquake Administration, was hosted by the Government of Indonesia National Search
Disaster warning: The United States and China decided
to sign a Letter of Intent for a Collaborative Oceanographic Scientific Research Pilot Project for the
Development of South Sea Real-Time Tsunami Forecasting Capabilities between the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and China’s National Marine Environmental Forecasting Center in the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). Science and technology: The
United States and China signed the Framework Plan for Ocean and Fishery Science and Technology
Cooperation between NOAA and SOA. Climate change: The United States and China are developing the
Indian Ocean Southern Climate Observation, Reanalysis, and Prediction (ISOCORE) Program. Energy policy: The United States
and Rescue Agency and held in Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia, May 29-June 1, 2012.
and China are participating as partners in the Asia-Pacific Energy Regulatory Forum (APERF) to facilitate sharing of information on energy regulatory and policy practice and experience in the
Asia-Pacific Region, with China to attend the U.S.-hosted APERF meeting in Washington, D.C., in August 2012. Wildlife protection: The United States and China participated in a Special
Investigations Group meeting led by the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN) in Nanning, China, in June 2012. Forest management: The United States and China are
strengthening cooperation and exchange through the Asia-Pacific Network for Sustainable Forest Management and Rehabilitation (APFnet). Wildlife conservation: The United States and China
are collaborating on wild tiger conservation, including in the Asia-Pacific. Disease detection and control: The United States and China intend to expand collaboration between the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and China’s CDC to strengthen disease detection and control capabilities and networks in the Asia-Pacific. Fisheries management:
The United
States and China reaffirmed their commitment to expand cooperation on fisheries management
and jointly support the creation of the North Pacific Fisheries Commission.
China’s too poor for the plan – no cash
Evans-Pritchard 13
{Ambrose, International Business Editor, syndicated columnist on world politics and economics for 30
years, “China's Soaring Fiscal Deficit Rings Alarm Bells,” The Telegraph, 10/15,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/10380937/Chinas-soaring-fiscal-deficit-rings-alarmbells.html#THUR}
Borrowing by all levels of the Chinese government has soared to unprecedented levels and is now
one of the highest in the world , vastly complicating efforts by Beijing’s new leadership to keep growth on
track. Data from the International Monetary Fund shows that China’s budget deficit reached 9.7pc of GDP last year if regional spending is
included and one-off land sales are stripped out. This is higher than previously thought and above levels in the US,
India, or Southern Europe’s debt-stricken crisis states . Zhiwei Zhang from Nomura said it is disturbing
that “massive stimulus” on this scale has not stopped China’s growth rate has slowing sharply since 2010,
describing the latest rebound has “ unhealthy ” and likely to wither over coming months as Beijing is forced to tighten policy. “The
economic recovery is unsustainable,” he said. Analysts have long assumed that China’s authorities retain plenty of fiscal
but Beijing may already
have exhausted any further scope for budget stimulus . Fitch Ratings warns
firepower if needed to keep the expansion going as they clamp down on dangerous levels of credit,
that the pace of loan growth over the last five years takes China into uncharted waters, with debt
jumping from $9 trillion to $23 trillion, or 200pc of GDP. The economic “efficiency” of debt has collapsed .
Each extra yuan of debt now yields just 0.18 yuan of GDP growth. Mark Williams from Capital Economics said the growth spurt
over recent months has mostly been driven by “heavy, state-led industry”, a sign that the new leadership is still clinging to its outdated growth model. “Without
continued policy support, we doubt that the rebound will be sustained,” he said. There
are already signs that money growth is
flagging. Simon Ward at Henderson Global Investors says a key gauge of the money supply -- six-month real M1 -- has
slowed sharply over the late summer and is near levels that set off the last “ hard-landing” scare .
The measure gives an early warning for the economy roughly six months ahead. “Chinese September money
numbers cast doubt on hopes that the economy is regaining momentum,” he said. China’s central bank is taking
extreme measures to hold down the exchange rate to prevent a further loss of export competitiveness, especially against Japan. Capital Economics estimates that
Beijing bought $70bn of foreign bonds last month in a “frantic” bid to stop the yuan rising.
China is a terrible actor – can’t solve and US is comparatively better
Haiqing 13
{Tao, DO Editor, “Establish China's Marine Economy Development Systems,” 11/6,
http://en.theorychina.org/xsqy_2477/201306/t20130611_270465.shtml}
existing marine management system lacks integrated management . The
fragmented phenomenon in China's marine economy development is serious, such as the Bohai Bay, with
5800 km coastline and over 60 ports, owning a port on average less than 100 kilometers. Isomorphism causes regional
repeat construction and significant waste of resources. Therefore, China should establish Special Coordination Committee in
But as to the present situation, China's
charge of the marine economy at the level of Central Government, intensify and draft the marine economic development plan covering all industries and regions, in
order to improve the ability of marine resources exploitation, to break the region separation, so that the development of marine economy in all regions will
promote in harmony, forming a new pattern of ocean management. Establish the legal protection system and publish the Basic Law of the Ocean As the world's
economic center is now transferring to the Pacific, coastal states have set marine strategies and policies. Canada in 1996, the United States in 2000, and Japan in
2007, issued their National Marine Basic Law to protect its own interests. The
United States comprehensive ocean legislation
system has been in a leading position in the field of the world's oceans. In 2000, the U.S. Congress
passed the Marine Act 2000, set up an ocean policy assessment committee to reconsider and formulate
U.S. ocean policy . In 2004, the U.S. National Ocean Policy Committee submitted 21st Century Ocean Blueprint report, which made by far the most
thorough assessment of U.S. ocean policy and depicting the new blueprint for the U.S. maritime industry and development in the 21st century. Subsequently, the
United States released the U.S. Ocean Action Plan to put forward specific measures to implement the blueprint. Looking back at China, under The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and other relevant laws, China has jurisdiction over more than 3 million square kilometers of ocean. In the Declaration on the
Territorial Sea promulgated in 1958, China issued over 80 ocean-related laws and regulations for 50 years,
but China still lack the basic
principles throughout the entire marine legal system . Overall, China has no one similar to Japan's
Basic Law of the Ocean, to the disadvantage of managing national marine affairs and safeguarding
national maritime rights and interests. Wang Zhenmin, dean of Tsinghua University Law School, said that
the research foundation of the current domestic marine law is weak and the talents are short. The future
international competitions, whether on land or sea, will eventually be solved by legal forms.
Affirmative – A2: Influence DA
2AC
Frontline
Alt causes to China heg – historical suspicion, immigration, trade issues, Central Asian
competition, bad M.E. policy, human rights, general suspicion of ruse, hacking,
resource adventurism
Shambaugh 13
[David Shambaugh, a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington
University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, Falling Out of Love With China,
3/19/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/opinion/falling-out-of-love-with-china.html]
While pockets of positive views regarding China can be found around the world, public opinion surveys
from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project and the BBC reveal that China’s image ranges
between mixed and poor. And the negative view is expanding: for almost a decade, European public
opinion toward China has been the most negative in the world, but that is now matched in America and
Asia. There are likewise increasing signs of strain with Russia: on the surface, there is considerable
harmony of worldviews and interests, but underneath lie lingering historical suspicions, growing trade
frictions, problems stemming from Russia’s military sales to China, immigration controversies and
nascent strategic competition in Central Asia. China’s reputation has also deteriorated in the Middle East
and among the Arab League due to the country’s support for the Syrian and Iranian regimes as well as its
persecution of Muslim minorities in far western China, a policy that has also sullied its image in Central
Asia. Even in Africa — where relations remain positive on the whole — China’s image has deteriorated
over the past three years as a result of the flood of Chinese entrepreneurs, its rapacious extraction of oil
and other raw materials, aid projects that seem to benefit Chinese construction companies as much as
recipient countries and support for unsavory governments. A similar downturn is apparent in Latin
America for the same reasons. Finally, China’s most important relationship — with the United States —
is also troubled. It is now a combination of tight interdependence, occasional cooperation, growing competition and
deepening distrust. For both sides, the critical question is how to manage an increasingly competitive and distrustful relationship without its becoming a full-blown adversarial
relationship. Neither country has any experience handling such strategic competition amid deep
interdependence, although we can hope that the latter feature will buffer the former. While the decline
in China’s image may be global, the reasons differ from region to region. China’s huge trade surpluses
have contributed directly and indirectly to job losses around the world, but the impact on its image has
been most pronounced in Europe, Latin America and the United States, where China seems to loom as an
unprecedented economic threat. Meanwhile, China’s military modernization and regional muscle-flexing in
Asia has tarnished its reputation among its neighbors. Its unprecedented cyber-hacking has skyrocketed to the top of
the agenda of Sino-American relations in recent weeks, while China’s domestic human rights situation has been a long-standing concern in
the West. Underlying many of these complaints are China’s authoritarian political system and its business
practices, which are opaque and riddled with corruption. While trying to broaden their global operations, China’s multinational corporations
often encounter substantial difficulties establishing themselves abroad and gaining global market share. China does not have a single corporate brand listed in the top 100 of the annual
Given China’s growth rates, its image might not seem to matter
much. But it does. As a result of China’s declining image, its new president, Xi Jinping, and his new
foreign policy team face mounting foreign policy difficulties and challenges, both perceptually and
substantively. Mounting suspicions and growing frictions are part and parcel of being a global power. But China would be better advised to substantively engage foreign criticisms
than to reflexively dismiss them or respond with unconvincing public-relations campaigns. There are any number of immediate steps China could take. It should work to halt
its hacking. It should open its markets and reduce its trade surpluses, while restricting subsidies to its
foreign investment and exports. It should protect intellectual property rights and ratify and adhere to
the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which commits its members to
protect individual liberties. In foreign policy, it should involve itself in multinational negotiations under
the Law of the Sea Treaty to resolve its disputes in the South China Sea, negotiate a settlement with
Businessweek/Interbrand global rankings of respected corporate brands.
Japan over its disputed islands and pressure North Korea and Iran to end their nuclear programs. It
should also be transparent in its overseas aid programs and military budgets, and it should better
respect sensitivities in developing countries over China’s extraction of natural resources. Taking such steps would go
much further toward enhancing China’s international image than the billions of dollars the country is currently pumping into its overseas propaganda efforts.
They trade-off with US Heg, which prevents multiple extinction scenarios – they cause
war
Art 12
[Dr. Robert J., Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, May 2012,
“America’s Path Grand Strategy for the Next Administration” Center for New American Security
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AmericasPath_FontaineAndLord.pdf]
Why are these national interests crucial to the
United States? Clearly, the country must do all it can to protect the homeland
from attack – the prime directive of any grand strategy – especially from a WMD attack by a terrorist group or a
cyber attack . It is also in America’s interest to preserve as deep a peace as possible among the
great Eurasian powers because any war among them would be deeply destabilizing and costly and would risk
devastating state-sponsored
drawing in the United States in one way or another. The United States also has a vested interest in avoiding
intense security competitions among these states because such competitions could lead those states
to acquire WMD . Assured access to oil supplies for air, sea and land transportation is essential to the
global economy until the world can wean itself off its heavy dependence on oil for transportation, something
that is going to take decades, even with the greater push to switch to renewable energy sources. 11 An
open economic order
contributes to U.S. prosperity, but it also contributes to global economic growth and prosperity, both
of which help promote peace. Spreading democracy and the rule of law within states will make for a more peaceful and
prosperous world and will also lessen the need for costly military interventions because democracies are less likely
than nondemocracies to commit human rights abuses against their own populaces. Finally, averting severe climate change is
in the best interest of the United States because of the risks involved in kicking the earth into a new, irreversible and adverse climatic state
(even though under moderate climatechange scenarios, the United States will suffer less than developing states and many of the other great
presenting these national interests, I proposed that a forward defense posture –
retaining America’s key alliances and deploying American troops abroad, both onshore and afloat in three
key regions (East Asia, the Middle East and Europe) – would better realize and protect these interests than would a
grand strategy of isolationism or offshore balancing , both of which entail America ending its military alliances and
powers). After
bringing its troops home. In my usage, both isolationism and offshore balancing are strategies in which the United States would have no
standing military commitments in peacetime to defend other states and no forward bases abroad. 12 The U.S. Navy might steam the seven
seas, but all other U.S. troops would be at home, and there would be no standing military alliances or permanent overseas military bases. 13
Forward defense requires bases abroad and allies. Therefore, selective engagement argues for retaining key American alliances, not only
because they enable a
forward defense posture but also because they are tools of political management and enhance
cooperative solutions to regional security issues. In this view, key alliances retain enduring value. They ensure U.S. access to
overseas bases where needed, facilitate joint training in peacetime (and, consequently, joint operations in wartime), promote transparency and
a more open security dialogue, and help to structure expectations and develop shared attitudes about problem solving. Standing
alliances clearly experience difficulties and conflicts among their members, but they are generally more reliable tools for
projecting power into key regions than are ad hoc, informal arrangements (although those can also be useful under certain
conditions). I favor an in-theater military presence, either afloat or onshore because, in my view, America’s regional alliances
retain greater credibility – and are therefore stronger for reassurance and deterrence purposes – with some
U.S. forces in a region than with U.S. military guarantees but no forces in the region. Credibility is a
function of will and capability. In-theater forces enhance capability but are probably more important for
what they signify about will. Such forces are tangible and, therefore, more politically salient as manifestations of
political will than simple pledges on paper would be. In-theater forces are akin to actions speaking louder than words. Finally, the
United States must continue to provide global leadership . Without such leadership, solutions to global
collective action problems – whether they involve security or nonsecurity issues – are unlikely to arise. International politics is still
organized around the state model; consequently, states remain the primary, although certainly not the only, actors in world politics. The
United States is, and will continue for some time to be, the world’s most powerful state; therefore, its actions and
inactions strongly influence whether international initiatives will succeed or fail. If the leader does not lead, things
do not get done. By the same token, however, the leader cannot get others to follow unless it takes the interests of allies and other important
parties into account when formulating policies and taking action, instead of simply consulting after it has decided on a course of action. Thus,
although the United States has to lead, it also has to avoid excessive unilateralism
US/China competition causes a global nuclear war
Farley 14
[Robert, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, “Asia’s
Greatest Fear”, 6-9-14, The Nation Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asia-flames-us-chinawar-10621]
A war between the United States and China would transform some aspects of the geopolitics of East Asia,
but would also leave many crucial factors unchanged. Tragically, a conflict between China and the US might
be remembered only as “The First Sino-American War.” How the War Would Start Fifteen years ago, the only answers to “How would a war between
the People’s Republic of China and the United States start?” involved disputes over Taiwan or North Korea. A Taiwanese declaration of independence, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or
The expansion of Chinese interests and
capabilities means that we can envision several different scenarios in which direct military conflict
between China and the United States might begin. These still include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea scenario, but now also involve disputes in the
East and South China Seas, as well as potential conflict with India along the Tibetan border. The underlying factors are the growth of Chinese
power, Chinese dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance commitments to
a variety of regional states. As long as these factors hold, the possibility for war will endure. Whatever the trigger,
some similar triggering event would force the PRC and the US reluctantly into war. This has changed.
the war does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack against Chinese fleet, air, and land-based installations. Although the US military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-access
assets before they can target US planes, bases, and ships, it is extremely difficult to envisage a scenario in which the United States decides to pay the political costs associated with climbing the
ladder of escalation. Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have to wait for
Chinese missiles to rain down upon them, but the United States will almost certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military
combat before it can begin engaging Chinese forces. If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first
strike, or properly prepare to receive a first blow. At the same time, a “bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. Instead, a brewing crisis will steadily escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering
a set of steps on the part of the US military that indicate to Beijing that Washington is genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups, shifting deployment to Asia
from Europe and the Middle East, and moving fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment, China will need to decide whether to push forward or back down. On the economic side,
Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions (the US effort will likely involve a multilateral
effort), and will freeze each others assets, as well as those of any co-belligerents. This will begin the economic pain for capital
and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in
US allies support American efforts against China depends on how the war begins. If war
the United States can count on the support of South Korea and Japan
industrial production. How do the Allies Respond Whether
breaks out over a collapse of the DPRK,
likely
. Any war stemming
from disputes in the East China Sea will necessarily involve Japan. If events in the South China Sea lead to war, the US can probably rely on some of the ASEAN states, as well as possibly Japan.
Australia may also support the US over a wide range of potential circumstances. China faces a less
complicated situation with respect to allies. Beijing could probably expect benevolent neutrality,
including shipments of arms and spares, from Russia, but little more. The primary challenge for Chinese
diplomats would be establishing and maintaining the neutrality of potential US allies. This would involve an exceedingly
complex dance, including reassurances about Chinese long-term intentions, as well as displays of confidence about the prospects of Chinese victory (which would carry the implicit threat of
retribution for support of the United States). North Korea presents an even more difficult problem. Any intervention on the part of the DPRK runs the risk of triggering Japanese and South
Korean counter-intervention, and that math doesn’t work out for China. Unless Beijing is certain that Seoul and Tokyo will both throw in for the United States (a doubtful prospect given their
hostility to one another), it may spend more time restraining Pyongyang than pushing it into the conflict. War Aims The US will pursue the following war aims: 1. Defeat the affirmative
expeditionary purpose of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). 2. Destroy the offensive capability of the PLAN and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). 3. Potentially destabilize
the control of the CCP government over mainland China. Except in the case of a war that breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the first task involves either defeating a Chinese attempt to land
forces, or preventing the reinforcement and resupply of those troops before forcing their surrender. The second task will require a wide range of attacks against deployed Chinese air and naval
units, as well as ships and aircraft held in reserve. We can expect, for example, that the USN and USAF will target Chinese airbases, naval bases, and potentially missile bases in an effort to
maximize damage to the PLAN and PLAAF. The third task probably depends on the successful execution of the first two. The defeat of Chinese expeditionary forces, and the destruction of a
large percentage of the PLAN and the PLAAF, may cause domestic turmoil in the medium to long term. US military planners would be well-advised to concentrate the strategic campaign on the
first two objectives and hope that success has a political effect, rather than roll the dice on a broader “strategic” campaign against CCP political targets. The latter would waste resources, run
the risk of escalation, and have unpredictable effects on the Chinese political system. The PLA will pursue these ends: 1. Achieve the affirmative expeditionary purpose. 2. Destroy as much of
the expeditionary capability of the USAF and USN as possible. 3. Hurt America badly enough that future US governments will not contemplate intervention. 4. Disrupt the US-led alliance
The second(task)
involves the use of submarines, aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles to destroy US and allied installations and warships
system in East Asia. The first task requires the deployment of PLAN surface forces, possibly in combination with PLAAF airborne forces, to seize an objective.
across East Asia. The third and fourth tasks rest upon the second. The PLA will attempt to inflict sufficient casualties on US forces that future US decision-makers will hesitate to use force
against the PRC. Similarly, the survival of the
US-led alliance system requires that the United States successfully defeat
Chinese aggression; if it cannot, the alliance system could deteriorate and collapse. The United States
hasn’t lost a fighter in action since the 1999 Kosovo War, and hasn’t lost a major warship since World
War II. The sinking of a warship would likely also result in the greatest loss of life of any single action for
the US military in action since the Vietnam War. However, both US and Chinese strategists may overestimate US casualty aversion. The loss of a major
warship and its crew might serve to solidify US commitment (at least in the short term) rather than undermine it. The “Hold Your Breath” Moments The biggest moment will come when the
PLA makes an overt attack against a US aircraft carrier. This represents the most significant possible escalation against the United States short of a nuclear attack. If China decides to attack a
US carrier, the war no longer involves posturing and message sending, but rather a full-scale commitment of capabilities designed to defeat and destroy enemy military forces. The means for
this attack matters. An attack launched from a ship or a submarine makes any PLAN military vessel fair game for the United States, but doesn’t necessarily incur US attacks against PLAAF
The most dangerous form of attack would involve a ballistic
missile volley against a carrier. This is true not simply because these missiles are difficult to intercept,
but also because such missiles could carry nuclear warheads. The prospect of a nuclear state using a
conventional ballistic missile against another nuclear state, especially one with a presumptive nuclear
advantage, is laden with complexity. The next “hold your breath” moment will come when the first US missiles strike Chinese targets. Given the
overwhelming nuclear advantage that the United States holds over China, the first wave of US attacks
will prove deeply stressful to the PRCs military and civilian leadership. This is particularly the case if the Chinese believe that they can
win at the conventional level of escalation; they will worry that the United States will bump to nuclear in order to retain its
advantage. We can expect that China will deploy its submarines in advance of the onset of hostilities. The surface fleet is a different story, however. In any high intensity combat
airbases, Second Artillery missile installations, or even naval installations.
scenario, the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force will see Chinese warships as legitimate targets for destruction, and will attack with air and subsurface assets. Indeed, even hiding in port
probably won’t prevent attacks on the PLAN’s largest ships, including the carrier Liaoning and the big new amphibious transport docks. China will only sortie the PLAN under two
circumstances; if it feels it has sufficient force protection to allow a task force to operate relatively unmolested, or if China’s position has become desperate. In either situation, US submarines
will pose the most immediate threat to the surface forces. Under most war scenarios, China needs to fight for some affirmative purpose, not simply the destruction of US or Japanese military
forces. This means that the PLAN must invade, capture, supply, and defend some geographical point, most likely either Taiwan or an outpost in the East or South China Sea. The PLA will need
to establish the conditions under which the PLAN can conduct surface support missions. Who Will Win? The most difficult question to judge is “who will win?” because that question involves
assessing a wide variety of unknowns. We don’t know how well Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles will function, or how destructive US cyber-attacks against the PLAN will prove, or how
dangerous the F-22 Raptor will be to conventional Chinese fighters, or how effectively the different elements of the PLAN will cooperate in actual combat. Finally, we don’t know when the war
will start; both the PLA and the US military will look much different in 2020 than they do in 2014. However, in general terms the battle will turn on these questions: 1. Electronic Warfare: How
Attacking US forces will depend on
communication between seers and shooters. To the extent that the US can disrupt this communication, it can defang the PLA. Conversely, Chinese cyberseverely will the United States disrupt Chinese communications, electronic, and surveillance capabilities?
warfare against the United States could raise the domestic stakes for American policymakers. 2. Missiles vs. Missile Defenses: How well will the USN and USAF be able to defeat Chinese
ballistic and cruise missiles? The PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery have a bewildering array of missile options for attacking deployed and deploying US forces in depth. The American capacity
to survive the onslaught depends in part on the effectiveness of defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as the ability to strike and destroy launchers within and around China. 3.
Joint Operations: How well will the disparate elements of the PLA operate together in context of high intensity, disruptive military operations? Unlike the US military, the PLA has little relevant
combat experience from the last three decades. On the flipside, how well will US “Air-Sea Battle” work prepare the USN and the USAF for working together? 4. Quality vs. Quantity: Chinese
forces are highly likely to achieve local numerical superiority in some types of assets, primarily aircraft and submarines. The (narrowing) gap between US and Chinese technology and training
War Would End This war doesn’t end with a surrender
signed on a battleship. Instead, it ends with one participant beaten, embittered, and likely preparing for
the next round. The best case scenario for an American victory would be a result akin to the collapse of the Imperial German government at the end of World War I, or the
will determine how well American forces can survive and prevail in such situations. How the
collapse of Leopoldo Galtieri’s military government after the Falklands conflict. Humiliating defeat in war, including the destruction of a significant portion of the PLAN and the PLAAF, as well
as severe economic distress, could undermine the grip of the CCP on Chinese governance. This is an extremely iffy prospect, however, and the United States shouldn’t count on victory leading
to a new revolution. What if China wins? China can claim victory by either forcing the United States into an accommodation to US goals, or by removing the alliance framework that motivates
and legitimates US action. The United States cannot continue the war if South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines no longer have an interest in fighting. Either of these require doing
significant damage to US military forces and, potentially, to the US economy. The impact of a defeat on US domestic politics would be tough to predict. The United States has “lost” wars in the
past, but these defeats have generally involved negotiated settlements of areas not particularly critical to US global interests. It’s not clear how the US people would interpret a major military
defeat at the hands of a peer competitor, especially a peer competitor that continues to grow in military and economic power. The President and political party that led the US into war would
The biggest diplomatic and political challenge that
both countries face will probably be finding a way for the other side to give up while maintaining its
“honor.” No one benefits if this war becomes a struggle for regime survival, or for national prestige. How the
likely suffer dramatically at the polls, at least after the immediate shock of defeat wore off.
Peace Begins The prospect for US conflict with China in the Asia-Pacific depends on a basic appreciation of the changing balance of economic and military power. World War I could not change
the fact that Germany would remain the largest and most powerful state in Central Europe. Similarly, war is unlikely to change the long-term trajectory of Chinese growth and assertiveness. A
key to peace involves the re-establishment of productive economic relations between China, the United States, and the rest of the Pacific Rim. Regardless of how the war plays out, it will
almost certainly disrupt patterns of trade and investment around the world. If either side decides to attack (or, more likely, inter) commercial shipping, the impact could devastate firms and
countries that have no direct stake in the war. However, the governments of both the US and China will face strong pressures to facilitate the resumption of full trade relations, at least in
consumer goods. China will not find it difficult to reconstruct war losses. Even if the United States effectively annihilates the PLAN and the PLAAF, we can expect that the Chinese shipbuilding
and aviation industries will replace most losses within the decade, probably with substantial assistance from Russia. Indeed, significant Chinese war losses could reinvigorate both the Russian
shipbuilding and aviation industries. Moreover, the war will, by necessity, “modernize” the PLA and PLAAF by destroying legacy capability. A new fleet of ships and planes will replace the
legacy force. War losses to trained personnel will hurt, but the experience gained in combat will produce a new, highly trained and effective corps of personnel. This will lead to better, more
realistic training for the next generations of PLA soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Win or lose, the Chinese military will likely be more lethal a decade after the war. The United States may have a
harder time replacing losses, and not only because US warships and aircraft cost more than their Chinese counterparts. The production lines for the F-15 and F-16 are near the end, and the US
no longer produces F-22. Moreover, US shipbuilding has declined to the point that replacing significant war losses could take a very long time. This might prove particularly problematic if the
war demonstrated severe problems with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Given US intention to arm the USAF, USN, and USMC with F-35 variants over the next decade, proof of inadequacy would
In victory or defeat, the US will suffer
substantial military and economic damage. Even if the US wins, it will not “solve” the problem of China;
even in the unlikely event that the CCP collapses, a successor regime will still dispute China’s littoral.
Potentially, victory could cement the US-led alliance system, making the containment of China
considerably less expensive. Assuming that the war began with an assertive Chinese move in the East or
wreck force planning for the foreseeable future. The United States will have to face the “was it worth it?” question.
South China Sea, the United States could plausibly paint China as the aggressor, and establish itself as
the focal point for balancing behavior in the region. Chinese aggression might also spur regional allies (especially Japan) to increase their defense
expenditures. A war could invigorate US government and society around the long-term project of containing China. The US could respond by redoubling its efforts to outpace the Chinese
military, although this would provoke an arms race that could prove devastating to both sides. However, given the lack of ideological or territorial threats to the United States, this might be a
tough sell. Finally, the United States could respond by effectively removing itself from the East Asian political scene, at least in a military sense. This option would be hard for many in the US to
swallow, given that generations of American foreign policy-makers have harbored hegemonic ambitions. Conclusion The window for war between the United States and China will, in all
likelihood, last for a long time. Preventing war will require tremendous skill and acumen from diplomats and policymakers. Similarly, the demands of positioning either side for victory will
continue to tax diplomatic, military, and technological resources for the foreseeable future. At the moment, however, we shouldn’t forget that China and the United States constitute the heart
of one of the most productive economic regions the world has ever seen. That’s something to protect, and to build on.
Impact Defense – ASEAN
ASEAN ineffective—Thai/Cambodian conflict, no enforcement mechanisms, collapse of
ASEAN unity inevitable
Busbarat, 11 (Pongphisoot ‘Paul’ Busbarat – Research Associate in the Department of Political &
Social Change in the School of International, Political & Strategic Studies at the Australian National
University and former policy analyst at the Bureau of International Security Affairs at the Office of the
National Security Council of Thailand, May 20, “Thai-Cambodian conflict: an obstacle to the ASEAN
Community 2015?”, East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/20/thai-cambodianconflict-an-obstacle-to-the-asean-community-2015/)
The 18th ASEAN Summit held in Jakarta had as its theme ‘ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations.’ But against this backdrop of
hopes for increased integration, the current Thai-Cambodian dispute highlights fundamental problems
among ASEAN member countries.
The conflict has developed within complex political conditions in both countries. Thailand’s current domestic situation, however, has been especially aggravating to the relationship as attempts by conservative groups — led by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or the Yellow
Shirts — to discredit the pro-Thaksin faction has leveraged nationalistic sentiments.
The nationalists attack Thaksin and his allies as ‘selling the nation’, citing the sale of Thaksin’s telecom company, Shin Corp, to Singaporean Temasek in 2005 and the Samak government’s support of Cambodia’s listing of Preah Vihear Temple as a UNESCO World Heritage in 2008. Despite
the World Heritage status having nothing to do with any legally binding border demarcation, the PAD has successfully convinced many Thais that the temple’s joint listing will lead to the loss of Thai sovereignty over the disputed 4.6 square kilometre area adjacent to the te mple. While
Prime Minister Abhisit and his Democrat Party supported PAD’s nationalist agenda over this issue when in opposition, PAD’s ma nipulation of nationalist attitudes has gone beyond what Abhisit envisaged, resulting in the government’s being pressured into adopting hawkish measures
against Cambodia.
The military is another important factor in prolonging the armed conflict, as the dispute keeps the military involved in politics and justifies budget increases (including a recent THB1.80 billion (US$59.3 million) for its operations along the Thai-Cambodian border). The Thai military used to
play an important role in Thailand’s relations with neighbouring countries but lost this prerogative to the Foreign Ministry in the 1990s following democratisation. With the fall of democracy following the 2006 coup, the military has increasingly reinserted its old role and sometimes taken
different stances to the government. Evidence of the military’s hand can be seen in the government’s decision to renege on its support for Indonesian observers in the disputed area.
How the conflict will be resolved remains uncertain. Thailand prefers bilateral talks, seeing disadvantage in raising the issue
at the regional and international levels, although past bilateral negotiations have been unsuccessful. ASEAN, under
Indonesia’s chairmanship, has tried to offer assistance on several occasions since February this year, and Thailand has uncomfortably
accepted this role. The recent peace deal brokered by Jakarta during the ASEAN Summit brought about the term of reference for both parties
to resolve the conflict, including steps of supporting bilateral negotiations and allowing an observer team to monitor the ceasefire. But both
countries are presently still playing around with wording and preconditions; and without good
will and concession made by
both toward peace, ASEAN, not equipped with any enforcement measures, can do little.
A parallel development is also happening at the ICJ as Cambodia recently submitted a request to the Court to interpret the 1962 border ruling. The conflict may be resolved if both parties
accept the new interpretation peacefully. But if the ICJ rules in Cambodia’s favour, nationalist sentiment in Thailand will likely intensify, degrading the Thai-Cambodian relationship further. This
would also greatly damage Thailand’s economic interests, and, from a geostrategic perspective, Thailand would lose its role in mainland Southeast Asia to other regional players, especially
increasingly influential China and Vietnam.
repercussions of this conflict at the regional level may be farther and deeper than anybody would expect. Foremost,
not only are bilateral relations deteriorating but ASEAN’s unity is threatened . The conflict may drift
ASEAN apart, at least in terms of political unity, affecting the progress of regional cooperation. A number of ASEAN
leaders have expressed this concern. During the Summit, Philippine President Benigno Aquino said, ‘How can we have
one ASEAN, one family if we have two major components who cannot solve their problems?’ After the Summit, the
Malaysian deputy foreign minister also expressed frustration, blaming Thailand for not respecting the agreement previously made in
The
Jakarta, a claim the Thai foreign ministry rejected.
Significantly, this
conflict reveals that ASEAN countries may not be ready for the next stage of integration. The
sense of community is not ripe enough for any steps beyond inter-state cooperation. Ironically, as a founding
member of ASEAN, originally playing an active role in consolidating ASEAN’s unity and development, Thailand has become an
obstacle to the group’s progress. Other founding members also have the potential to react similarly when it
comes to sovereignty issues, as the Spratly Islands show.
This conflict could suggest that the integration theory based on the European model of neo-functionalism, which ASEAN has looked up
to, may not be suited to this part of the world. More energy and resources need to be directed toward socio-cultural community building. ASEAN’s
shared identity needs to be fostered with a stronger foundation of mutual respect, understanding and brotherhood among Southeast Asians. With such bonds, nationalism will hardly be able
to stir up hatred between neighbours and friends.
Without achieving ASEAN’s socio-cultural pillar, other regional activities, including
security and economic cooperation, cannot be sustained.
The recent Summit’s goals — achieving ASEAN Community by 2015, maintaining a safe and stable region, and making ASEAN
active in solving global problems — seem distant. The Thai-Cambodian conflict is not only a diplomatic
embarrassment but highlights ASEAN’s underlying inability to transcend the archaic concept of sovereignty to
manage the conflict peacefully. Consequently, a true ASEAN Community according to ASEAN Vision 2020 may have to
stay a vision for quite some time.
Impact Defense – Chinese Econ
Collapse doesn’t lead to unrest—new leadership will push reforms, government isn’t
panicking
Bremmer, 13 (Ian – president of Eurasia Group, 7/19, “Will China’s slowing growth lead to unrest?”,
Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/ian-bremmer/2013/07/19/will-chinas-slowing-growth-lead-tounrest/)
Recently, it seems no developing country is safe from sudden, unexpected protests. In Brazil and Turkey, empowered middle classes pushed back against perceived governmental injustice;
protests erupted, and leaders’ approval ratings dropped precipitously. In Egypt, the economic picture was as ugly as the political one, and the military’s ouster of President Mursi has fomented
conflict and instability.
China may look like a candidate for the type of protests currently sweeping the developing world. Not only is a
newly empowered middle class demanding better services and more accountability from government — growth has also
tapered off in recent quarters. Don’t hold your breath . At least for the time being, China is well-positioned to
navigate such challenges far better than its emerging market competitors.
Let’s start with the economy. For years pundits, and many Chinese government officials, thought that if China’s GDP
growth rate ever fell below 8 percent, it would set off an unemployment crisis that would raise the risk of social and
political instability in the country. Well, China’s finance minister was in Washington last week and said that the Chinese
economy could handle 7 percent or even 6.5 percent growth — a lower rate than China has experienced in 23 years.
But unlike many other emerging markets, China views slower growth as a manageable challenge. The government actually
recognizes that a slowdown is necessary to meet its reform and rebalancing goals, and is working now to score political
points among the population by arguing that it’s doing so. In particular, Beijing hopes that the slowdown will force industrial
consolidation and less resource consumption, which could slow environmental degradation — which has been a major point of
political vulnerability for the government. Slower growth should also calm the real estate sector, where rising prices have
been a major sore point for urban Chinese. China’s new leadership is betting that progress on these fronts will outweigh the downside risks
they’ll face as job losses tick up in the face of slower growth.
is a strong case to be made that China’s slowing growth rate is actually a good sign.
willing to begin
undertaking modest economic reforms; it is, in effect, letting bubbles shrink rather than grow until they pop. This approach is
characteristic of the new leadership that took charge in March of this year: they are less risk averse and they have a more
long-sighted handle on the necessary economic changes that China will have to undertake.
The new president himself is a cause for optimism. Xi Jinping has a more assertive, off-the-cuff style; he is a more
spontaneous, charismatic leader than his predecessors, and early reviews in China’s blogosphere suggest a favorable first impression. Xi is
using this boldness to work to consolidate his support within the Communist Party.
From a global perspective, there
The fact that Beijing hasn’t just reflexively pumped capital into the system to keep growth rates up shows that it is
And the extent to which he is successful will mean even more capacity for even more reform over
time.
All of this doesn’t mean that China’s stability should be taken for granted, or that there aren’t looming problems on the horizon. The very fact that China doesn’t face significant near-term instability could lead to complacency and give it wiggle room to delay necessary reforms. China still needs long-term and significant economic and political transformations to get it from
“developing” to “developed.” It has too many changes coming to its demographics, manufacturing costs, and environmental needs to get away with ignoring them in perpetuity. (The U.S. can sympathize.) While it’s a good sign that the current leadership is allowing lower growth rates in order to implement some economic reform, thus far, all changes are happening inside the
system, not to the system itself. Easy growth was the low-hanging fruit for China over the past thirty years. Now the government is reaching a bit further up the tree. But they still have a very long way to go to get to the upper branches.
middle class that has different demands from the largely rural
population that China is still trying to lift out of poverty. In the near term the new government’s tolerance for
slower growth is actually positive for helping to address some of these concerns. But eventually, Beijing will have to reconcile
China’s other major threat is the stratification that any developing country has to navigate. As I’ve written about in the past, the growth of the Chinese economy has created a new
two increasingly divergent populations. This, again, is a long-term issue. But as these issues go unaddressed, and as more Chinese become rich enough to prioritize new sorts of rights and
privileges, the chances of unrest will rise.
Don’t believe the idea that China is a ripe victim for this wave of developing world protests, or that China’s
slowing growth rate is a sign of an imminent hard landing. China’s near-term picture looks surprisingly
bright . But after that, the larger question still looms: Can Xi Jinping and his government handle the looming storm clouds while they are still a good way off?
Impact Defense – Free Trade
No trade impact
Fletcher, 11 (Ian Fletcher is Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, former
Research Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council M.A. and B.A. from Columbia and U Chicago,
"Avoid Trade War? We're Already In One!" August 29 2011 www.huffingtonpost.com/ianfletcher/avoid-trade-war-were-alre_b_939967.html)
The curious thing about the concept of trade war is that, unlike actual shooting war , it has no
historical precedent
. In fact,
there has never been a significant trade war,
"significant" in the sense of having done serious economic damage.
All
history records are minor skirmishes at best. ¶
¶ The
standard example free traders give is that
Smoot-Hawley
either caused the Great Depression
or made it spread around the world. this does not survive serious examination and has actually
Go ahead. Try and name a trade war. The Great Trade War of 1834? Nope. The Great Trade War of 1921? Nope Again. There isn't one.
America's
But
tariff of 1930
canard
,
been denied by almost every economist who has actually researched the question in depth
-- a
ranging from Krugman on the left to Friedman on the right.¶ The Depression's cause was
monetary. The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon
It then panicked,
miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933,
Trade had nothing to do
with it ¶ As for the charge that Smoot caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was too small a
group
Paul
Milton
during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble.
depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed to breathe.
.
change to have plausibly so large an effect
it only applied to about one-third of America's
trade: about 1.3 percent of our GDP
Our
tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions
. For a start,
. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent -- not a terribly big jump. Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914.
, and the recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to
spread worldwide without tariff increases.¶ As the economic historian (and free trader!) William Bernstein puts it in his book A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World,¶ Between 1929 and 1932, real GDP fell 17 percent worldwide, and by 26 percent in the United
most economic historians now believe that only a miniscule part of that huge loss of both world
GDP
can be ascribed to the tariff wars
Had all
international trade been eliminated, and had no domestic use for the previously exported goods
been found, world GDP would have fallen by the same amount -- 9 percent
States, but
and the United States' GDP
. .. At the time of Smoot-Hawley's passage, trade volume accounted for only about 9 percent of world economic output.
. Between 1930 and 1933, worldwide trade volume fell off by one-third
to one-half. Depending on how the falloff is measured, this computes to 3 to 5 percent of world GDP, and these losses were partially made up by more expensive domestic goods. Thus, the damage done could not possibly have exceeded 1 or 2 percent of world GDP -- nowhere
The inescapable conclusion: contrary to public perception, Smoot-Hawley did
not cause, or even significantly deepen, the Great Depression ¶ The oft-bandied idea that Smootnear the 17 percent falloff seen during the Great Depression...
.
Hawley started a global trade war of endless cycles of tit-for-tat retaliation is also mythical.
¶ With the exception of discriminations
the extent of discrimination
against American commerce is very slight ...By far the largest number of countries do not
According to the official State Department report on this very question in 1931:
in France,
discriminate against the commerce of the United States in any way .¶
The doom-loop of spiraling tit-for-tat
retaliation between trading partners that paralyzes free traders with fear today simply did not
That is to say, foreign nations did indeed raise their tariffs after the passage of
Smoot, but this was a broad-brush response to the Depression itself, aimed at all other foreign nations without distinction, not a retaliation against the U.S. for its own tariff.
happen. ¶
Smoot-Hawley is a deliberately fabricated myth , plain and simple We should not
"Notorious"
.
allow this myth to paralyze our policy-making in the present day.¶ There is a basic unresolved
paradox at the bottom of the very concept of trade war . If, as free traders insist, free trade is
beneficial whether or not one's trading partners reciprocate, then why would any rational nation
start one
and the U.S. --
, no matter how provoked?
The only way to explain this is to assume that major national governments
like the Chinese
governments which, whatever bad things they may have done, have managed to hold nuclear
weapons for decades without nuking each
are not players of realpolitik, but
schoolchildren ¶ When the moneymen in Beijing, Tokyo, Berlin, and the other nations currently
other over trivial spats --
.
running trade surpluses against the U.S. start to ponder the financial realpolitik of exaggerated
retaliation
they will discover the advantage is with us, not them
against the U.S. for any measures we may employ to bring our trade back into balance,
. Because
they are the ones with trade surpluses to lose, not us.¶ So our present position of weakness is, paradoxically, actually a position of strength. ¶ Likewise, China can supposedly suddenly stop buying our Treasury Debt if we rock the boat. But this would immediately reduce the
value of the trillion or so they already hold -- not to mention destroying, by making their hostility overt, the fragile (and desperately-tended) delusion in the U.S. that America and China are still benign economic "partners" in a win-win economic relationship.¶ At the end of the
China cannot force us to do anything economically that we don't choose to
We can -an irresponsible but not impossible scenario -- repudiate our debt to them
as the ultimate
counter-move to anything they might contemplate
¶ Thus a certain amount of back-and-forth token retaliation (and loud squealing) is indeed
likely if America starts defending its interests in trade as diligently as our trading partners have been
defending theirs, but that's it . The rest of the world engages in these struggles all the time
day,
. America is still a nuclear power.
(or stop paying the interest)
. More plausibly, we might simply restore the tax on the interest on foreign-held bonds that was repealed in 1984 thanks to Treasury
Secretary Donald Regan.
without doing much harm ; it will be no different if we join the party
.
Rules and economic self interest check global trade conflict
Ikenson, 09 [Daniel, associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “ A
Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” March 12, 2009,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10651]
Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a
sturdy rules-based system of
trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the
risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO
members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty
would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would be a substantial
decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in
historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in
the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal
protectionism" is actually not that "massive ," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to
the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So
the highest permissible rates.
If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse
impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most
developing countries that have
room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would
not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from
India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark
that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and
have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic
situation. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to
stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements."
In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own
$586 billion stimulus bill.12 But even
more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken
to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise
business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the
Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the
items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican
import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have
fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13 And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended
tariffs entirely
on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital
equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of
late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15
Meanwhile, on February 27, a
new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10
member countries of the A ssociation of S outh e ast A sian N ations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on
96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist
measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain
interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a
growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one
another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to
accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices
through policy constraints
Trade does not solve war—there’s no correlation between trade and peace
Martin et al., 8 (MARTIN, MAYER, AND THOENIG 2008 (Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—
Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER,
University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic
Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of
Economic Studies 75)
Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and
the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be
traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process
was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however,
that during
the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut
one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and
multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a
simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly,
while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear
evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence
of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.
Impact Defense – SCS
No conflict in the SCS—both sides not too aggressive, experts
Thayer, 13 (Carlyle A. Thayer – Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales, May 13,
“Why China and the US won’t go to war over the South China Sea”, East Asia Forum,
http://www.eastasiaforum .org/2013/05/13/why-china-and-the-us-wont-go-to-war-over-the-southchina-sea/)
China’s increasing assertiveness in the S outh C hina S ea is challenging US primacy in the Asia Pacific.
Even before Washington announced its official policy of rebalancing its force posture to the Asia Pacific, the United States had undertaken steps to strengthen its military posture by deploying
more nuclear attack submarines to the region and negotiating arrangements with Australia to rotate Marines through Darwin.Since then, the United States has deployed Combat Littoral Ships
to Singapore and is negotiating new arrangements for greater military access to the Philippines.
But these developments
do not presage armed conflict between China and the U nited S tates. The P eople’s L iberation
A rmy Navy has been circumspect in its involvement in S outh C hina S ea territorial disputes, and the U nited S tates has
been careful to avoid being entrapped by regional allies in their territorial disputes with China. Armed conflict between
China and the U nited S tates in the S outh C hina S ea appears unlikely.
Another, more probable, scenario is that both countries will find a modus vivendi enabling them to collaborate to
maintain security in the S outh C hina S ea. The Obama administration has repeatedly emphasised that its policy of
rebalancing to Asia is not directed at containing China. For example, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander of the
US Pacific Command, recently stated, ‘there has also been criticism that the Rebalance is a strategy of containment. This is not the
case … it is a strategy of collaboration and cooperation’.
No escalation – hardliners are moderating and regional coop is rising – our evidence cites high
ranking Chinese officials
Buszynski, 12 (Leszek Buszynski Spring, Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at
the
Australian National University, Washington quarterly spring 2012, “The South China Sea: Oil,¶ Maritime
Claims, and¶ U.S.—China Strategic¶ Rivalry”)
Aware that events have moved against China since at least the July 2010¶ ASEAN Regional Forum, the Hu Jintao
leadership has attempted to defuse¶ tensions over the S outh C hina S ea. The aggressive posture
adopted by some¶ Chinese military representatives and the all-too-forceful push for a sphere of¶ influence in the Western Pacific
has threatened a backlash against China and¶ may be pushing ASEAN even closer to the United States.¶ In the meantime, Hu
Jintao’s foreign policy coordinator, State Councilor (and¶ de facto national security advisor) Dai Bingguo, has moved to
control the¶ situation and prevent Chinese policy from being hijacked by that increasingly¶ evident
aggressive nationalism in China. In a speech at the ASEAN secretariat¶ in Jakarta on January 22, 2010, Dai declared that
China was not seeking¶ ‘‘hegemony,’’ that it did not want to ‘‘eject the U.S. from Asia,’’ and that the¶
S outh C hina S ea would be left for future generations to resolve.¶ 53¶ In an article in¶ the Wall Street Journal, Dai told
his U.S. audience that ‘‘China has never thought¶ of vying for leading position [sic] in the world,’’ that China has cooperated with¶
the U nited S tates over various trouble spots, and is a ‘‘partner the United States¶ can count on.’’¶ 54¶ China has also
moved to dampen tensions with Vietnam, its main competitor¶ and rival in the South China Sea. Dai visited Hanoi
from September 5—9, 2011¶ for the fifth meeting of the China—Vietnam Steering Committee on¶ Cooperation. While there, he issued a
statement that ‘‘both sides agreed to¶ boost coordination in regional affairs and to promote China—
ASEAN relations. Both sides also agreed to properly handle their¶ dispute over the S outh C hina S ea
through¶ deep consultation to maintain friendly¶ relations of the two counties.’’¶ 55¶ Soon after,¶ Wu Bangguo,
chairman of the standing¶ committee of China’s National Peoples’¶ Congress, met Vietnamese general secretary¶ Nguyen Phu Trong in Beijing
and declared that¶ China wanted to strengthen political trust with¶ Vietnam and resolve existing problems in¶ bilateral relations.¶ 56¶ On
October 15, both China
and Vietnam agreed to¶ strengthen military cooperation by increasing contacts
between high-ranking¶ officers and establishing a hotline between their respective defense ministries.¶
They also agreed to joint patrols along their land border and the Gulf of Tonkin,¶ to increase mutual visits by naval vessels, and to discuss the
joint development of¶ the sea area.¶ 57¶ In Vietnam, anti-China rallies had been taking place in Hanoi¶ and Ho Chi Minh City since June 2011,
but by October the protesters were¶ rounded up and the demonstrations terminated.¶ 58
Impact Defense – Warming
No extinction---mitigation and adaptation will solve
Mendelsohn, 9 (Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of
Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic
Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf)
These statements are largely alarmist and misleading . Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves
attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic
consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next
few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a
century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will
be no or little adaptation . The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of
the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and
many of these “ potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all
apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range
climate risks . What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.
*No warming --- most recent evidence
Happer 3-27 (William, Brackett Professor of Physics – Princeton University, Fellow – American Physical
Society, Member – National Academy of Sciences, “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall
Street Journal, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html?mod=googlen
ews_wsj)
What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years .
Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from
NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The latest (February 2012)
monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly less than the average since
the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979. The lack of any statistically significant warming for over a
decade has made it more difficult for the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its
supporters to demonize the atmospheric gas CO2 which is released when fossil fuels are burned. The burning of fossil fuels has been one
reason for an increase of CO2 levels in the atmosphere to around 395 ppm (or parts per million), up from preindustrial levels of about 280 ppm.
CO2 is not a pollutant . Life on earth flourished for hundreds of millions of years at much higher CO2
levels than we see today. Increasing CO2 levels will be a net benefit because cultivated plants grow better and are more resistant to
and other supposedly harmful effects of CO2 have been
greatly exaggerated . Nations with affordable energy from fossil fuels are more prosperous and healthy than those without. The
direct warming due to doubling CO2 levels in the atmosphere can be calculated to cause a warming of
about one degree Celsius. The IPCC computer models predict a much larger warming, three degrees Celsius or even
more, because they assume changes in water vapor or clouds that supposedly amplify the direct warming from CO2. Many lines of
observational evidence suggest that this "positive feedback" also has been greatly exaggerated . There has indeed been some
drought at higher CO2 levels, and because warming
warming, perhaps about 0.8 degrees Celsius, since the end of the so-called Little Ice Age in the early 1800s. Some of that warming has probably
come from increased amounts of CO2, but the timing of the warming—much of it before CO2 levels had increased appreciably—suggests that a
substantial fraction of the warming is from natural causes that have nothing to do with [hu]mankind .
Frustrated by the lack of computer-predicted warming over the past decade, some IPCC supporters have been claiming that
"extreme weather" has become more common because of more CO2. But there is no hard evidence this is
true. After an unusually cold winter in 2011 (December 2010-February 2011) the winter of 2012 was unusually warm in the continental United States. But the winter of 2012 was bitter in
Europe, Asia and Alaska. Weather conditions similar to 2012 occurred in the winter of 1942, when the U.S. Midwest was unusually warm, and when the Wehrmacht encountered the
formidable forces of "General Frost" in a Russian winter not unlike the one Russians just had. Large fluctuations from warm to cold winters have been the rule for the U.S., as one can see from
records kept by the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA. For example, the winters of 1932 and 1934 were as warm as or warmer than the 2011-2012 one and the winter of
1936 was much colder. Nightly television pictures of the tragic destruction from tornadoes over the past months might make one wonder if the frequency of tornadoes is increasing, perhaps
due to the increasing levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. But as one can read at Andrew Revkin's New York Times blog, dotearth, "There is no evidence of any trend in the number of potent
tornadoes (category F2 and up) over the past 50 years in the United States, even as global temperatures have risen markedly." Like winter temperatures, the numbers, severity and
geographical locations of tornadoes fluctuate from year-to-year in ways that are correlated with the complicated fluid flow patterns of the oceans and atmosphere, the location of the jet
stream, El Niño or La Niña conditions of the tropical Pacific Oceans, etc. As long as the laws of nature exist, we will have tornadoes. But we can save many more lives by addressing the threat of
tornadoes directly—for example, with improved and more widely dispersed weather radars, and with better means for warning the people of endangered areas—than by credulous support of
schemes to reduce "carbon footprints," or by funding even more computer centers to predict global warming. It is easy to be confused about climate, because we are constantly being warned
ominous predictions are based on
computer models. It is important to distinguish between what the climate is actually doing and what
computer models predict. The observed response of the climate to more CO2 is not in good agreement with model
predictions.
about the horrible things that will happen or are already happening as a result of mankind's use of fossil fuels. But these
1AR
Extn – Alt Causes
China can’t resuscitate heg – media censorship, fights with US
Gao, 14
[Helen, reporter for Aljazeera based in Beijing, “China’s misunderstood soft power”, 12/15/13,
Aljazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/china-misunderstood-soft-power20131213132010506486.html]
There was a time when China had more success convincing the world that it is serious about
building its "soft power" . It opened news bureaus in prime locations in world-class metropolises, vowing to establish a global
media brand that rivals BBC and Al Jazeera.
It dispatched thousands of teachers to distant continents, to staff the
hundreds of government-funded Confucius Institutes that offer free Chinese-language classes to
interested learners . It bankrolled billion-dollar projects in Central and Southeast Asia, while
helping to upgrade transportation and energy infrastructure in Africa . These efforts are still continuing,
but the government's latest actions , against foreign media outlets, seem to be the strongest indicator
yet of shifting priorities in its dealing with the world. In November, it denied a visa to American journalist Paul
Mooney, who became the second correspondent, after Melissa Chan of Al Jazeera, to be forced out of the country in the past two years. Later
in the month, it conducted unannounced inspections of Bloomberg's bureaus in Beijing and Shanghai, after media reports that Bloomberg
spiked a story on the financial ties between a Chinese billionaire and government officials. Most recently, there is growing concern among two
dozens of reporters at Bloomberg and the New York Times, that they might not receive visas from the Chinese government in time to continue
steps taken by the government, to punish foreign media for their
China coverage, have raised international concern. They prompted US Vice President Joe
Biden to warn of a possible American retaliation on his recent visit to China . Moreover, China's
unrelenting attitude, Western observers argue, suggests that it is "losing interest in soft
power" . When the government confronts discourses it considers too threatening, it decides, as Evan Osnos in the New Yorker put it, that
their work in China next year. Such
"being liked is less important than simply surviving."
Can’t garner trust – military opperations
Heydarian, 4/12/14
{Richard Javad, specialist on Asian geopolitical/ economic affairs for Aljazeera,“The end of China's soft
power?” 4/12/14, Aljazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/end-china-softpower-japan-terr-201441014352559758.html}
"Will China invade its neighbors?" This is a question I tend to be bombarded with whenever I present lectures or attend talks on East Asian
affairs. From Tehran to Tokyo, one can sense the growing anxiety towards China's international influence. People
are beginning to
pay more attention to China's military budget than its trade and investment relations with
the developing world . In sanctions-hit Iran, many merchants have been complaining about China's allegedly opportunistic business
practices, while industrialists and consumers have raised concerns over the macroeconomic and safety implications of cheap imports from
China. In
Japan, many are worried about their country's ability to defend itself against a rising China,
with the ongoing dispute in the East China Sea sparking a national debate over the proposed revision
of Japan's post-War pacifist constitution. In countries such as the Philippines, popular views towards
China have turned dramatically negative, particularly due to the ongoing maritime disputes in
the South China Sea. Worryingly, the antipathy towards China has assumed even an ideological colour, with many Filipinos including some top-level officials I have come across - rehashing Cold War paranoia vis-a-vis communist countries.
In fellow communist
countries such as Vietnam, China is increasingly seen in pejoratively historical terms : as an
aggressive imperial power to the north.
Extn – Heg Bad – Crowds Out US
Even if Chinese Heg is good, the shift causes transitions that lead to global wars
Khanna, ’09 – Director of the Global Governance Initiative at the New America Foundation (Parag, The
second world: how emerging powers are redefining global competition in the twenty-first century, p.
337-338)
Even this scenario is optimistic, for superpowers are by definition willing to encroach on the turf of others—changing the world map in the
process. Much as in geology, such tectonic shifts always result in earthquakes, particularly as rising powers tread on the entrenched position of
The sole exception was the twentieth century Anglo-American transition in which
Great Britain and the United States were allies and shared a common culture—and even that took two
world wars to complete.57 As the relative levels of power of the three superpowers draw closer, the
temptation of the number-two to preemptively knock out the king on the hill grows, as does the lead
power’s incentive to preventatively attack and weaken its ascending rival before being eclipsed.58 David
the reigning hegemon.56
Hume wrote, “It is not a great disproportion between ourselves and others which produces envy, but on the contrary, a proximity.”59 While
the density of contacts among the three superpowers makes the creation of a society of states more possible than ever—all the foreign
ministers have one anothers’ mobile phone numbers—the deep differences in interests among the three make forging a “culture of peace”
The
uncertain alignments of lesser but still substantial powers such as Russia, Japan, and India could also
cause escalation. Furthermore, America’s foreign lenders could pull the plug to undermine its grand
strategy, sparking economic turmoil, political acrimony, and military tension. War brings profit to the
military-industrial complex and is always supported by the large patriotic camps on all sides. Yet the notion
more challenging than ever.60 China seas, hyperterrorism with nuclear weapons, an attack in the Gulf of Aden or the Straits of Malacca.
of a Sino-U.S. rivalry to lead the world is also premature and simplistic, for in the event of their conflict, Europe would be the winner, as capital
would flee to its sanctuaries. These great tensions are being played out in the world today, as each superpower strives to attain the most
Global stability thus hangs
between the bookends Raymond Aron identified as “peace by law” and “peace by empire,” the former
advantageous position for itself, while none are powerful enough to dictate the system by itself.
toothless and the latter prone to excess.61 Historically, successive iterations of balance of power and collective security doctrines have evolved
from justifying war for strategic advantage into building systems to avoid it, with the post-Napoleonic “Concert of Europe” as the first of the
modern era.62 Because it followed rules, it was itself something of a societal system.* Even where these attempts at creating a stable world
order have failed—including the League of Nations after World War I—systemic learning takes place in which states (particularly democracies)
internalize the lessons of the past into their institutions to prevent history from repeating itself.63 Toynbee too viewed history as progressive
rather than purely cyclical, a wheel that not only turns around and around but also moves forward such that Civilization (with a big C) could
become civilized.64 But did he “give too much credit to time’s arrows and not enough to time’s cycle”?65 Empires
and superpowers
usually promise peace but bring wars.66 The time to recognize the current revolutionary situation is
now—before the next world war.67
That said, US still is key – Heg prevents great power wars, regional instability and
prolif
-provides leverage for de-escalation
-creates alliances
-bolsters deterrence
-checks anarchy
Brooks 13
[Stephen, Associate Professor of Government (Dartmouth), M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science (Yale),
written in collaboration with Ikenberry and Wohlforth,
“Don’t Come Home America: the Case Against Retrenchment, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3
(Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3703_Brooks%20Wohlforth%20Ikenberry.pdf]
engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global
security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to
A core premise of deep
restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments
also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its
partners more secure , reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten
others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful
effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the
war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier ” is provided in the works of John
Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms
races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs
at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war .
Global nuclear war
Brooks 13 – Stephen G., Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, G. John ikenberry,
Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global
Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul and William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government
at Dartmouth College, “Lean Forward”, Foreign Affairs, January / February, 92(1)
advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits. In fact,
budgetary savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally
engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into
unnecessary wars. The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments
reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals . They help maintain
They are wrong. In making their case,
the
an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it
easier for the U nited S tates to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats . Were the
U nited S tates to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the
unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential. AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States'
assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that
"its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands
and the amount required for its replacement--numbers that are hard to pin down. If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear
arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for
"offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security
commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings
would be modest at best , since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing
costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power
abroad. The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels
of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already
begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500
"restraint," an
billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The
Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies. Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The
significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney s proposed non- war spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the
One such alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it
"prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is no evidence that countries have banded
nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs. UNBALANCED
together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the U nited S tates' military capacity on their own-- or
that they will do so in the future. Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true
counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the U nited S tates is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening
to other major states and that it faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor
would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security
guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the
United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has convinced
the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point. If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback--especially during the administration of George W.
since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to
balance against the U nited S tates by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting.
Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft
balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice
only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the U nited S tates benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and
Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet
institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several
Another argument for retrenchment holds that the U nited S tates
will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from
Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms.
more productive purposes--infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on--that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they
historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued
because other major powers balanced against them--a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use
their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the
pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear
relationship between military expenditures and economic decline. To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around A quarter
otherwise would. The
hegemony but
of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe,
Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense--a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its
any money freed up from dropping global
commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy. Likewise, U.S. allies' economic
defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And
growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S.
defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels-just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen
further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance. LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and
critics of an expansive grand strategy worry that the U nited S tates might get dragged into unnecessary wars. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens
those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts--a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance
History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the
danger of entrapment and structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is nearly
commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake.
impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World
War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new
historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious
decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment. If anything, alliances reduce the
risk of getting pulled into a conflict. In East Asia , the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were
designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to " constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against
adversaries that could entrap the U nited S tates in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the
U.S.
Taiwan ese relationship. After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of
entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence. For many advocates of
retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like
America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed
such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes. Furthermore,
they contend, the United States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the UN, famously asked Colin
If the U.S.
military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like
Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would
Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?"
not disappear . The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its
high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations. Besides, the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand
strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war. Likewise,
continuing the current grand strategy in no way
condemns the U nited S tates to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has
generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations--what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the
country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing. KEEPING THE PEACE Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment
current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a
dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony
from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their
own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent
claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the
dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could
peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine.
If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South
Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear , which could provoke a destabilizing
reaction from China . It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain
nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the U nited S tates, which used its security
commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the U nited S tates to leave the Middle East, the countries
currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel , Egypt , and Saudi Arabia --might act in ways that would intensify the region's security
dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe . Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a postit's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays
and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its
periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising
powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition , advocates of retrenchment
American Europe,
tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at
states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states,
and perhaps even start regional proxy wars , all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional
what cost? Were
insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt , Saudi
Arabia , Japan , South Korea , and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional
competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two
states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals
with less robust arsenals . As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit
transfers , irrational decisions , accidents , and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role
By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington
dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in
which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no
further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP
to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the U nited S tates' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and
the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence
regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and
pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender
for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for
regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the U nited S tates will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia
misses the underlying security logic of the current approach.
and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the U nited S tates should get out of
Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the
Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most
important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would
guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its
economic leadership . In addition to protecting the world economy from instability , its military
commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that
allow trade to flow freely and cheaply . Were the U nited S tates to pull back from the world, the task of securing
the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to
cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways
that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for
example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took
advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses,
and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of
the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and
prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example,
has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place
as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater
ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro
that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that
responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for
other forms of international cooperation . Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps
believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States'
the U nited S tates. In order to counter transnational threats , such as terrorism , piracy , organized
crime , climate change , and pandemics , states have to work together and take collective action. But
cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its
broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that
reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security
first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary
issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies
in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the
benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it
comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position
United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The
than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to
deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since
their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains
among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian
Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL
WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments
There is little evidence that the U nited S tates would save much money switching to a smaller global
posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend
itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the U nited S tates to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent
the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming,
simply don't hold up.
and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This
is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its
strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is
what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing
world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's
globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how
the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power.
The results could well be disastrous .
Extn – Heg Bad – Spurs Sino/US War
As China grows more powerful, it is becoming more bellicose
Mosher, 13
[Mosher, president of the Population Research Institute and author of “Hegemon: China’s Plan to
Dominate Asia and the World” (Encounter, 2000), “China’s approaching hegemony”, 7/12/13,
Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/12/chinas-approachinghegemony/?page=all]
Everywhere we look, we see evidence of China’s increasing aggressiveness. Since September, China has
been vigorously asserting its new claim to the Senkaku Islands by sending a constant stream of naval
vessels and planes to harass Japanese patrol boats there. Not only that, a top Chinese general has
questioned the legitimacy of Japanese claims not just to the tiny Senkakus, but also to the entire Ryukyu
Island chain, including Okinawa with its U.S. military bases. In May, Chinese troops intruded nearly 12
miles into Indian territory, withdrawing only after India agreed to withdraw its own troops from the
area. The high-altitude border dispute, which has been simmering since the Sino-Indian War of 1962,
involves territory the size of Greece with a population of more than 1 million. Then there is the South
China Sea, where China has been aggressively asserting its sovereignty over the 1.4 million-square-mile
stretch of open ocean. In November, Beijing announced that Chinese authorities would board and seize
control of foreign ships that “illegally enter” the area that it claims is part of the province of Hainan.
Seizing ships in international waters is an act of war under international law. China also has sowed seeds
of conflict by continuing to expand its military presence in the area. Last year, it seized the Scarborough
Shoal, which lies off the coast of the Philippines. When that country protested, China reacted by saying
that the Philippines‘ claims were illegal and that it never would agree to international arbitration over the shoal or any other
claims. In January, it issued a map that for the first time precisely delineated its grandiose claim. What the
map shows is the largest attempted land grab since World War II. It is as if Nazi Germany had claimed
the entire Mediterranean Sea as sovereign territory. On it goes. Nearly every month, China is making a
new territorial claim or bullying its neighbors over an existing one. Worse yet, it is defining these claims, like its longstanding claims to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, as “core interests” that are vital to national survival and are emphatically not up for negotiation.