Introduction
1. This submission focusses on the role of government in building soft power for the UK. In
particular it addresses the following issues.
a. How should we understand concepts of influence and soft power.
b. What is the current state of the UK’s soft power
c. How should UK soft power be developed in the future.
The discussion here draws on research for a forthcoming book, Public Diplomacies: Foreign Public
Engagement in International Politics, that explores the role of soft power strategies in since the 19th
century.
What is Soft Power?
2. For the purposes of this submission influence refers to the ability of a country to get other
people to support or cooperate with its external policies. Soft power is a broader concept
relating to a country’s attractiveness. External public engagement organizations are official
or quasi-official organizations that are concerned with developing a country’s soft power
and influence. This used as an umbrella term to take in diplomatic, trade, cultural and
broadcasting organizations,
3. Soft power is normally discussed in terms of attractiveness however it would be wrong to
think merely in terms of a country’s image. In practice we can see two interacting
components relationships and reputation. Relationships between a country and those
outside can come from many different sources for example trade, tourism, education, or
scientific collaboration. Reputation comes both from the direct experience of relationships
and from more generalized information about a country, for instance via the media or
through a foreign country’s educational system. Positive reputations encourage the
formation of new relationships. Reputation can only be sustained over time if it supported
by the appropriate relationships. Ideally, the work of building and maintaining relationships
comes from those involved in them directly but where this is not feasible governments may
provide support to create relationships which would not otherwise exist.
From this relational perspective several corollaries follow
4. Soft power is an aggregate of many different relationships. Relationships and reputations
are built around many different areas of activity and may have very limited spillover. For
instance a country’s reputation for excellence in a particular scientific area may have little
relevance beyond researchers in that area.
5. A country’s reputation is different in sectors of activity and regions of the world. For
instance a country may have a high reputation for the quality of its manufactured goods but
not for tourism. While the Scandinavian countries enjoy a highly positive reputation in
Europe and North America reputations are much less positive in the Middle East.
6. Relationships are about something, and require appropriate resources, if you don’t have a
flourishing cultural sector or HE institutions it’s more difficult to form relationships in these
areas just as a lack of military resources will reduce influence in networks around security
issues.
7. Government and soft power interact in three ways.
a. Government policies support or obstruct the development of assets that people in
other countries find attractive, for instance leading universities or innovative
businesses.
b. Government develops mechanisms to make connections between soft power assets
and foreign publics, for instance the work of the UKTI, the educational advisory role
of the British Council, VisitBritain, the GREAT Campaign. Here government is
facilitating the work of private actors.
c. Government draws on soft power assets to support its foreign policies, for instance
using expertise from the NGO sector to influence foreign government thinking on an
issue.
8. These three roles interact, it is much easier to facilitate where you have attractive assets in a
country. Successful facilitation can lead to influence, where government by making a small
investment leads to the creation of self-sustaining relationships. For instance during the
Cold War the US support for performing arts, popular music and the publishing industry
created networks that could then be sustained on a commercial basis. These networks then
sustained interest in the US and ensured that its voice was heard. Existing connections
between countries and a positive reputation ease the task of exerting influence. In turn the
successful use of influence can ease the task of facilitation.
9. Because soft power is constructed in multiple networks there is no one size fits all strategy
to build it. Three tensions need to be managed. Firstly, the tension between the domestic
and international impact of domestically oriented policies. Restrictions on student visas may
fulfil domestic policy needs but are extremely damaging for the ability to build relationships
in the long term. Secondly, between the facilitative and influencing roles; what priority
should each receive? Thirdly, between different policy areas. The plural nature of soft
power creates major management problems. This is particularly the case for a country like
the UK which has a broad range of soft power assets and wishes to exert influence across
multiple regions and policy areas. The history of foreign public engagement in all countries
demonstrates recurring struggles over the correct priorities and methods.
10. To summarize: we build influence by building positive and beneficial relationships and hence
cultivating a positive reputation. But the influence effect of these relationships and
reputations may not be fungible, but be confined to the network (set of relationships)
concerned with a particular issue. This is consistent with the willingness of many people
around the world to consume American popular culture but to still maintain hostile attitudes
to the US.
The State of UK Influence
11. As Indicated by benchmarks such as the Anholt/GfK Nation Brand Index or Monocle IfG Soft
Power Index the UK’s national soft power is strong. An interesting perspective is offered by
recent French debates on the diplomatie d’influence, these have focused on the role of
specialist professional networks in influencing three areas, the specification of tenders for
major projects, standard setting and the development of policy ideas in each case the ability
of the UK to operate effectively is a matter for envy.
12. The UK’s current position is a product of relationships built up over a period of decades or
centuries and reflects the central role of the UK in international relations, as well as
consistent investment in soft power assets and foreign public engagement. However, there
are challenges in the changing international environment and in the consequences of the
current UK situation.
13. The growth of emerging powers creates new challenges for the UK. Firstly, there is the need
to forge relationships where existing links are relatively weak in competition with other
countries that see opportunities in the same regions. Secondly, emerging powers are
building their own soft power assets, for instance universities, that can compete with those
in the UK. Those same emerging powers are also investing in official public engagement
networks and strategies in order to facilitate links with other countries, for instance China,
Russia, South Korea, Turkey are all making major efforts to build their own networks of
cultural centres. New state sponsored broadcasting organizations have emerged that
compete with the BBC. The French external engagement machinery is also undergoing
major revisions.
14. While general reputation is only one element of the ability of the UK to forge relations and
build influence the impact of the financial crisis has been widely noted. In foreign policy
circles the invasion of Iraq, followed by questions over the UK performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan, plus defence cuts have all damaged UK reputation and influence. While these
events may only have medium term impacts they play into a narrative of UK decline.
The State of the UK External Engagement Organization.
15. Compared with other ‘big four’ practitioners US, France and Germany, the basic organization
of UK public engagement has been remarkably stable since the 1930s. This stability is seen
other countries as a sign of the success and workability of the system. The system consisting
of the FCO, a cultural relations organization; the British Council, an international
broadcaster: BBC and a trade and investment promotion body; currently UKTI. Policy
attention to this activity has varied over time; high in the 1950s and 1960s and low in the
1970s and 1980s. In the mid 1990s what had been referred to as ‘information work’ was
rechristened, as ‘Public Diplomacy’.
16. In 1997 the Labour government, launched a number of initiatives in relation to the UK’s
engagement organizations. It was believed that the post Cold War international
environment demanded a new focus on public engagement strategies and that a more
focused and coordinated approach was required. This work was given added impetus after
9/11 with the Wilton and Carter reviews of public diplomacy. These led to the creation of
new coordinating mechanisms.
17. The interest in public diplomacy needs to be placed in the context of broader trends in UK
foreign policy. Firstly, official foreign policy thinking has come to focus on a vision of what
might be termed ‘post-international politics’ where the chief issues are ‘global’ such as
terrorism or climate change that need to be addressed by international coalitions involving
international organizations, states and NGOs. This tended to shift attention away from
interstate relations. Secondly, reinforcing this general vision was the concern with ‘failed
states’, the successive experiences in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and
Iraq obviously drew much attention from MoD, DFID and the FCO and led to conceptual and
organizational innovations to facilitate joint working in addressing these issues.
18. The arrival of the coalition government did indicate some change in direction as William
Hague signalled that he wanted to give more attention to bilateral relationships, commercial
diplomacy and key diplomatic skills. Despite the commitment to expanding the UK
diplomatic network the pressure of spending cuts having dramatic effects beyond simply a
reduction in the level of activity.
19. Under the pressure of the Olympics it appears that any general attempt to coordinate UK
public diplomacy has been abandoned. A proposal for the NSC to develop a soft power
strategy also appears to have lapsed.
20. Cuts in government resources have resulted in the British Council becoming increasingly
dependent on other sources of funding and as such less responsive to government priorities.
The transfer of the BBC World Service to license fee funding will over time produce a service
that is reshaped by domestic license fee pressures and commercial opportunities. In both
cases we can expect the organizations to follow the money and to become less responsive to
foreign policy priorities.
21. The coalition government has committed the UK to spending 0.7% of GDP on aid as defined
by the OECD DAC definition, at the same time it committed to spending 30% of aid in fragile
states and in focusing aid on the poorest countries. In addition the 2002 Development Act
requires DFID aid to be used for poverty reduction. Further the conclusion of reviews of aid
carried out by the coalition limited the number of countries to which aid could be given.
These multiple commitments place severe constraints on how aid can actually be delivered.
Essentially the government is committed to spending more money in fewer countries in a
way consistent with multiple policies. The FCO (and the British Council) has been set targets
for their own ODA spend. Essentially as their own programme budgets are cut an increasing
proportion of what remains must be ODA compliant. One of the attractions of a funding
mechanism like the Conflict Pool is that it mixes ODA and non ODA budgets, in practice this
reflects the fact that in conflict situations it may be necessary to spend non-ODA funds in
order to facilitate ODA spend, for instance by providing security for development projects.
The result is a further skewing of overall programme spending as a result of the ODA target.
While the FCO does not have to meet the poverty reduction target not only are programme
budgets being cut but the flexibility of what remains is being limited.
The result is that not only is the machinery used to build British influence being starved of resources
it is becoming less capable, more fragmented and less flexible.
Towards a Soft Power Strategy for the UK
How can this situation be reversed?
22. The first step is a reassessment of what British foreign policy is for. Are the assumptions
that have guided foreign policy over the past 15 years still relevant? What will British
external policy need to look like in a Post-American or G-Zero world? Given the commitment
of emerging powers to national sovereignty how does this affect the way that the UK should
think about foreign policy? How will the UK deal with radical changes in the EU whether as a
result of a changing relationship between Eurozone and Non-Eurozone members or as a
result of a UK referendum? Review the extent to which government priorities, departmental
priorities and what departments are actually doing in the external area. To what extent are
priorities really priorities rather than list of bullet points. Assess the balance between
functional/issue priorities and country and regional ones. To what extent do foreign policy,
development and defence policies mesh? Priorities for soft power should emerge from this
reassessment.
23. Develop a cross-government soft power/influence doctrine that lays out the modes of soft
power and influence that can be applied in different cases. What are the networks that can
be constructed or mobilized? Here the developments around failed states provide a useful
model. Because this is an area where DFID, MoD and FCO need to work together there has
been considerable effort to develop shared strategies, approaches and funding mechanisms.
A similar approach can be applied around the influence agenda. For instance a crossgovernment understanding of how influence can be used in support of external policy goals
Part of this approach is about developing routine collaboration across agencies, this needs to
happen both in Whitehall and overseas. This concept will need to consider both long and
short term programmes of work.
24. At an organizational level the soft power concept needs to be developed on a crossgovernment basis. The Cabinet Office should work with the FCO and other departments to
monitor internal and external developments that affect the UK’s soft power.
25. Aspirations to cooperate need to be backed up with resources. The ability of the UK
government to support the development of soft power and to use influence in support of UK
policy goals is dependent on adequate funding. While the FCO has been expanding its
network, and presence is a foundation of influence, the reduction in programme resources,
combined with ODA requirements place narrow limits on what can be done. While the 0.7%
target gives the UK influence in issues around aid it gives very little benefit outside these
networks. In pure influence and soft power terms some of the resources would be better
employed elsewhere, for instance in building relations with emerging powers.
26. Again drawing on the experience with the Conflict Pool funding mechanism, an Engagement
Pool that could be drawn on to support soft power and influence projects would be a useful
way encourage greater involvement across government and beyond.
27. The success of soft power strategies both in facilitating the work of the non-government
sector and in developing influence depends on the ability of non-government and
government organizations to work together. It would be valuable to conduct a cross
government review of the networks that outward facing agencies maintain in the UK; for
instance in diaspora communities, business, NGOs, consultants, think tanks, universities.
How extensive are these networks? Do they include the right people and organizations. Is
there scope for different organizations to draw on each other’s networks? Do these
networks give the best understanding of the resources available to UK actors. External
facing departments would benefit from being able to draw on the widest range of resources.
28. Government agencies with primarily domestic remits should be required to give some
attention to potential international impacts of their decisions and programmes even. In
particular agencies with business, education, scientific, cultural and community
responsibilities have role to play.
Dr Robin Brown
18 September 2013
This evidence is being submitted in personal capacity