POL 315: Politics of War & Security
Dr. Kevin Lasher
Democratic
Peace Theor y
Rising Tide of Democracies
A number of states became
democracies after WW II (West
Germany and Japan)
36 democracies by 1962
Another wave of democratization in
late 1970s and 1980s (South Korea,
some Latin American states)
Rising Tide of Democracies
Additional democracies created with
the collapse of communism in USSR
and Eastern Europe (not all suceeded)
About half of the countries in the world
today are democracies
Rising Tide of Democracies
In 1992 Francis Fukuyama declared the
“end of history” in that all states were
moving along the path toward
democratic capitalism
Last twenty years has seen a slowing or
ending of the process of new
democracies
Some countries have retreated from
democracy
Rising Tide of Democracies
Russia under Vladimir Putin is a prime example of a country
that has moved far away from democracy after significant
democratic reforms in 1990s
Rising Tide of Democracies
So the spread of democracy seems to
have slowed
So what ?
“Democracies do not go to war against other democracies”
is the closest thing to an empirical law in International
Relations Theory
This statement is in dispute, depending on definitions of
democracy, war and a host of other critiques
We can eliminate most of these problems by concluding
that “Democracies almost never go to war with other
democracies, especially in the last two hundred years.”
Therefore the number of democratic states that exist is
relevant to the issues of war and peace
More democracies, less war
Today war between the US and Japan or the US and
Germany is almost “unthinkable.”
The United States was at war with both countries seventy
years ago.
War between Great Britain and France is equally
“unthinkable” despite the many wars these two countries
have fought in the past.
How did we get the
phenomenon of the
democratic peace?
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
 Liberal republics will not fight each
other because the citizenry must
consent, and they do not want to
pay the costs of war (lives, taxes,
damaged infrastructure, etc.)
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
 “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical
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


Essay” (1795)
Written when there were three
“democracies” (or fewer)
Argues that republics (democracies)
are inherently peaceful with other
republics
The key to international peace is
the spread of “republicanism”
No inevitability and no timetable
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
 Republican states consist of a free
market economy and
representative government with
separation of powers and equal
citizenship
 Liberal republics will establish a
“pacific union,” a reality in which
they will not wage war against each
other
 Liberal republics will obey a
cosmopolitan law welcoming to
foreign visitors and encouraging
mutual commerce
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
 Eventually all states will adopt a
liberal republican system and the
pacific union will expand to a
universal “perpetual peace”
 Kant makes no prediction when
such a peace will be established,
but clearly far in the future
 Key point is that liberal republics
(democracies) do not wage war
against each other
Rare Democracies
Kant’s idea about the “perpetual peace” was fairly well ignored
since there were so few democracies
Political scientists began to reexamine the idea as the number of
democratic states grew
Bruce Russett
Democracies operate under certain
restraints that make them more
peaceful in relations with other
democracies
Democratic peace is the result of
features of democratic states, and not
other factors correlated with
democracy
1993
Bruce Russett
Democracy
 Voting rights for substantial fraction
of citizens
 Government brought to power in
contested elections
 Executive popularly elected or
responsible to elected legislature
Bruce Russett
Interstate wars with 1000 or
more battle deaths
Bruce Russett
Russett argues no clear-cut cases of
interstate wars between democracies in
the period 1815-today
Other scholars disagree and examine
specific examples of “democratic wars”
American Civil War, 1861-65
Spanish-American War, 1898
World War I (Germany?)
Several others
Bruce Russett
Democracies do not wage war against
other democracies (a few possible
exceptons)
However, democracies do wage war
quite frequently against nondemocracies
Democracies are “peaceful” only when
dealing with other democracies
Many empirical studies confirming this
fact
WHY?
Bruce Russett
Structural/Institutional Model
Cultural/Normative Model
Structural/Institutional Model
Violent conflicts between democracies will be infrequent
because:
 In democracies, constraints of checks and balances, division of
power, and a need for public debate to enlist widespread
support will slow decisions to use large-scale violence and
reduce the likelihood that such decisions will be made
 Leaders of other states will perceive leaders of democracies
as so constrained
 Thus leaders of democracies will expect, in conflicts with
other democracies, time for the processes of international
conflict resolution to operate, and they will not fear surprise
attack
Structural/Institutional Model
Violent conflicts between non-democracies, and between
democracies and non-democracies, will be frequent because:
 Leaders of non-democracies are not constrained as leaders of
democracies are, so they can more easily, rapidly, and secretly
initiate large-scale violence
 Leaders of states (democracies and non-democracies) in
conflict with non-democracies may initiate violence rather
than risk surprise attack
 Perceiving that leaders of democracies will be constrained,
leaders of non-democracies may press democracies to make
greater concessions over issues in conflict
 Democracies may initiate large-scale violence with nondemocracies rather than make the greater concessions
demanded
Cultural/Normative Model
In relations with other states, decision-makers will try to follow
the same norms of conflict resolution which characterize their
domestic political processes.
They will expect decision-makers in other states likewise to
follow the same norms of conflict resolution which characterize
those other states’ domestic political processes.
Cultural/Normative Model
Violent conflicts between democracies will be infrequent
because:
 In democracies, relevant decision-makers expect to be able to
resolve conflicts by compromise and non-violence, respecting
the rights and continued existence of opponents.
 Therefore democracies will follow norms of peaceful conflict
resolutions with other democracies, and will expect other
democracies to do so with them.
 The more stable the democracy, the more will democratic
norms govern its behavior with other democracies, and the
more will other democracies expect democratic norms to
govern its international behavior.
 If violent conflicts between democracies do occur, at least one
of the democracies is likely to be politically unstable.
Cultural/Normative Model
Violent conflicts between non-democracies, and between
democracies and non-democracies will be frequent because:
 In non-democracies, decision-makers use, and may expect
their opponents to use , violence and the threat of violence to
resolve conflict as part of their domestic political process.
 Therefore, non-democratic states may use violence and the
threat of violence in conflicts with other states, and other
states may expect them to use may use violence and the
threat of violence in such conflicts.
 Democratic norms can be more easily exploited to force
concessions than can non-democratic ones. To avoid
exploitation democracies may adopt non-democratic norms
in dealing with non-democracies.
Which Model is Correct?
“Evidence supports both of these explanatory models. The
debate between their proponents is not settled, nor should it be
seen entirely as a debate. They are not fully separable in theory
or in practice. Both make a contribution, and the two kinds of
influence reinforce each other to produce the democratic
peace.”
“Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that the normative
model is the more powerful . Norms … were somewhat more
strongly associated with peace between democracies than was
our measure of structural/institutional constraints.”
Russett, p.119
Which Model is Correct?
Other scholars have elaborated on Russett’s explanatory models
Empirical results show that democracies rarely fight one another
There has been a fair amount of dissatisfaction with the causal
explanations offered by Russett and others
More work needs to be done to explain exactly WHY
democracies rarely fight one another
Peaceful Democracies?
 Are democracies generally more peaceful?
Peaceful Democracies?
 Research is contradictory, but generally NO
Peaceful Democracies?
 Democracies and non-democracies frequently go to war
with other non-democracies
Peaceful Democracies?
International Wars 1816-2005
Democracies vs. Democracies
0
Democracies vs. Non-Democracies
166
Non-Democracies vs. Non-Democracies
205
Peaceful Democracies?
 Great Britain and France (and other stats) waged wars of
colonialization and some wars during the process of decolonialization in 1940s-1960s
 US has frequently gone to war against non-democracies (for
a variety of reasons) since World War II
US Wars since 1980s
 1983:
Invasion of Grenada
 1986:
Air attacks on Libya in response to terrorist actions
 1989-90:
Invasion of Panama
 1991:
Gulf War with Iraq
 1995:
US and NATO bombing of Bosnian Serbs
 1999:
Air attacks on Serbia to protect province of Kosovo
 2001-present:
Invasion of Afghanistan
 2003-2011:
Invasion of Iraq
 2004-present:
Drone strikes on terrorist forces in various countries
More Democracies, More Peace
 Ranks countries as “Free,” “Partly

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Free,” and “Not Free”
In 2015, 89 of 195 countries (46%)
were ranked as “Free”
Democracies = “Free”
Very little change since 2000
Half-way to Kant’s notion of
“perpetual peace”
Should the US (and other countries) try to support the
spread of democracy as a means to promote world peace?
Clinton, Bush, Obama have all made the “more
democracies, less war” argument
Yes, but only in the most general and broadest sense
Very difficult to help build democracy in other countries,
except at the margins
Other policies such as strengthening international and
regional institutions and encouraging most countries to
participate in the global economy might be more beneficial
than actually “promoting democracy”
Improving peacekeeping and combatting fragile states
might also be more beneficial than actually “promoting
democracy”
Interstate war between two countries of any type is
becoming more and more rare