CONSTI I
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA – “Attrition Act” Abakada et al challenged the constitutionality of Attrition Act – established system of rewards/incentives upon revenue officials sourced from excess in revenue targets for the year. Allegedly power to fix revenue targets to the President w/o sufficient standards.
Untenable. Completeness test (there must be a policy to be executed) – satisfied: policy is to optimize revenue generation. Sufficiency of standards test (there must be adequate guidelines) – satisfied: President does not have sole discretion, undergoes scrutiny by
Development Budget Coordinating Committee (w/ standards for the said Committee in the said law as well). “Revenue target” = estimated revenue collection by BIR and BESF based
on Budget of Expenditures. Also sufficient standards for removal of collection officer (collection falls short by 7.5% of target) – analogous to incompetence, w/ due regard to all other laws.
SENATE v. ERMITA – “EO 464” Senate decided to investigate Venable Contract deal, wiretapping scandal, fertilizer scandal, and north rail proj. scandal. Formed committees for the purpose, invited members of exec. branch for inquiry in aid of legislation. Then Pres. Arroyo issued EO464, prohibiting all senior exec. officials, PNP, and AFP officials from attending w/o her prior approval (sec. 1). Also allowed other executive heads to determine whether lower ranking officials can be allowed to attend (sec. 3).
Assailed by a barrage of petitions.
Sec. 1 unconstitutional. Claim of executive privilege not made to depend on possession of privileged info. Attendance is compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation (under Sec. 21)
(optional in question hour under Sec. 22 in accord. w/ separation of powers – question hour is a feature borrowed from the parliamentary system where there is fusion of powers). The only way to be exempt from attending is through valid claim of executive privilege (not from the mere
fact that they are exec. heads. unless they are the President herself. Thus, Sec. 1 is valid only insofar as it refers to Sec. 22 (question hour) but not inquiry in aid of legislation.
Sec. 3 unconstitutional. It amounts to an implied claim of exec. privilege, unaccompanied by an explanation (w/c stands until reversed by the Pres.) – a misuse of the privilege.
Claim must be clearly asserted. There is no basis to assess the validity of the claim. Must justify that the info is really covered by privilege, though not with such particularity as to reveal the privileged info. Demanded by exceptional nature of the claim.
SABIO v. GORDON – “PCGG officials” Senate decided to investigate (in aid of legislation) anomalous losses of PHILCOMSAT, POTC, & Philcomsat Holdings. Invited Sabio, Chairman of PCGG (among other officials), who refused, invoked EO 1 prohibiting members or staff of PCGG from being testifying before judicial, admin, legislative proceedings (to ensure its unhampered performance). Cited in contempt, detained. Said prohibition is unconstitutional. Power of inquiry is inherent in power to legislate. Congress has right to conduct inquiries regarding all matters upon w/c it is competent to legislate (such as creation, regulation, abolition of government agencies in this case). Power to investigate also conferred (directly) upon congress committees, thus also all powers necessary to discharge, such as contempt powers.
Also violates the principle of accountability of public officers and peoples’ right to information. They cannot claim right to privacy bec. these are matters of public concern. As to claim of right against self-incrimination, this may only be invoked when the incriminating question is asked. Filing of criminal action also does not abate the senate inquiry.
NERI v. SENATE – “NBN-ZTE” See next digest for facts. Elements of presidential communication privilege: a) communication relates to a quintessential/non-delegable presidential power, b) communication by close advisor (operational proximity) of the president. Both satisfied.
President has non-delegable authority to enter into executive agreements, and Neri was a close advisor of the president. Failed to show a compelling need for the info are critical to exercise of its functions. Oversight function through compulsory process only if done for purposes of
legislation. Validity of claim of privilege depends not only on the ground but also on the procedural setting/context. Privilege was properly claimed (unlike in Senate v. Ermita). The particular ground relied upon was specified (diplomatic secrets, revelation would impair relations w/
China). Also, exec. not required to state its reasons in such a way as to reveal the secret.
NERI v. SENATE – “NBN-ZTE Deal / MR” Sec. Neri appeared before senate inquiry re: NBN deal awarded to ZTE company (he was allegedly bribed into giving approval). Refused to answer questions as to

whether Gloria followed up on the project, or instructed him to prioritize/approve it. Claimed executive privilege. Neri was sustained. There is presumptive presidential communications privilege
(conversations, closed-door cabinet meetings) in the same way as deliberations of the judiciary. Fundamental to the operation of the executive branch. This presumption should be given priority in the absence of compelling need for disclosure. Separation of powers.
Operational proximity rule: only communications that are close enough to the president as to be revelatory of his deliberations are exempt (this is satisfied, as Neri is adviser to president, not remote official). Also, not mere generalized privilege is claimed; there was claim as to confidential communications in relation to diplomatic relations w/ China (a recognized exception). Diplomatic negotiations should be confidential.
Peoples’ right to info is not unlimited, subj. to reasonable restrictions. Committees failed to prove that the communications sought are critical to its exercise of legislative functions (burden
is upon the senate committees). Thus committed GADLEJ in issuing contempt order. The investigative power is also subj. to constitutional restraints. Subpoena made no reference to any pending bill. Congress must also publish its rules; true that it is a continuing body, but the proceedings of the present congress are separate from those of the previous congresses w/ published rules.
TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY – “senate version of house bill” EVAT Law assailed as unconstitutional.
That it did not originate exclusively from the HR (revenue bill, must originate exclusively therefrom) – because when HB was passed to Senate, apparently the Senate already had its own version w/c eventually it passed. Senate thus has only power to propose/concur w/ amendments. EVAT law is valid. Even though the senate may adopt its own version, still it cannot pass such version unless a similar bill originates from the HR. But after the HB is passed, the Senate can already pass its own version (co-equality of the 2 houses). True they must originate fromt the HR, being the body w/ broader representation. But, much leeway granted to senate in proposing/concurring w/ amendments to such bills. May practically re-write the entire bill, may even refuse to act upon it or disregard it.
ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO – “The Impeachment Drama case” Impeachment of Pres. Estrada disintegrates. The EDSA Dos drama ensues, the mass resignation of his Cabinet follows & he leaves
Malacañang. Is Erap deemed “resigned?” Yes. SC considers him to be resigned on the basis of
the totality of his acts and the attending circumstances present during the volatile period. Pres.
Arroyo sworn into office – SC holds that she is not just acting president but is actually incumbent president; the confirmation of Congress as a co-equal branch was given great
weight. Pres. Estrada prosecuted by the Ombudsman based on the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices
Act, Sec. 15 thereof provides that separation or cessation of a public official from office is not a bar to prosecution under this Act.
The exact nature of Impeachment is debatable, but when impeachment proceedings become moot due to resignation of the Pres. the proper criminal (plunder, bribery, graft &
corruption) & civil actions may proceed against him in ordinary courts. Conviction in
Impeachment is not a requisite to criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman. Unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State; hence they stand on the same footing as any other
trespasser. They are not protected by Executive Immunity from suit.
DAVID v. ARROYO – Opposition reported to conspire w/ NPA. Magdalo Group escaped from detention, called upon people to rise against government. Oplan Hackle was discovered – plan to assassinate
President during PMA Homecoming in Baguio. Bomb discovered there next day. Members of PNP &
AFP reported to plan defection. Telecom sites bombed in Bulacan & Bataan. Ary outposts in Benguet raided. Massive street protests took place. Pres. Arroyo issued PP 1017 & GO 5 calling the
armed forces to suppress lawless violence, declaring state of emergency. All rally permits revoked. Rallyists dispersed, some arrested (such as Randy David). Opposition members arrested.
Daily Tribune raided, effects confiscated. The assail PP1017 & GO 5 unconstitutional. PP1021 issued revoking PP 1017 after peace was restored. Issues discussed as follows:
 Moot? No. Grave violation of constitution, exceptional character of event, capable of repetition, need for controlling principles to guide bench and bar.

Improper to sue president; immune from any civil/criminal case during incumbency. But may be removed only through impeachment.

 Exercise of commander in chief power may be reviewed, not to determine w/n president made the right decision, but only to ensure that he did not act arbitrarily. In this case,
President’s exercise of calling-out power is not bereft of factual basis.
 First provision of PP1017 only refers to calling-out power of President (who may call out armed forces to prevent/suppress lawless violence). Only first part of
“graduated sequence of powers” – next of w/c is suspension of privilege of habeas
corpus, and then martial law. Pres. is in the best position to determine when to use it.

It is not a declaration of Martial Law. Only exercise of calling out powers.
 But it is void to the extent that it authorizes President to issue decrees. Cannot
issue decrees w/ same effect as law. Also may call upon military to enforce laws relating to lawless violence, not unrelated laws such as customs or family laws.
 Cannot authorize herself to take-over businesses affected with public interest.
Involves exercise of emergency powers (not just to declare national emergency).
May declare state of emergency w/o Congress approval, but needs such approval for exercise of emergency powers.
ECHEGARAY vs. SEC. OF JUSTICE – “suspension of execution” Leo Echegaray was convicted for the rape of his own daughter & was sentenced to death. The SC, however, suspended the execution of his sentence based on the circumstance that there is a pending move in Congress to repeal the death penalty, w/c some members of the court believed to be unconstitutional. Sec. of Justice claims that judgment was final & executory – hence execution is ministerial. The SC held that the courts possess the power to control the enforcement of their decisions even upon finality. The convict is still possessed of collateral rights (i.e. If he becomes insane, cannot be executed). Such suspension of the execution is an exercise and is part of judicial power.
Does not infringe upon power of President to grant reprieves. In light of supervening events though,
TRO is lifted – President signified he will not grant pardon, move for repeal of death penalty law in
Congress defeated. The TRO hasserved its humanitarian purpose already.
FRANCISCO v. HR – “Davide Impeachment” Impeachment against Chief Justice Davide commenced in
Congress (House) – second impeachment complaint. House Rules assailed as contrary to Constitution
(House requires sufficiency of form & substance for petition to be deemed “filed” triggering the 1-year bar). Determinants for transcendental importance: a) character of the funds/assets involved, b) clear disregard for constitutional/statutory prohibition, c) lack of any other party w/ more direct/specific interest. Satisfied in this case. Liberal attitude if matter is of
transcendental importance. Following have standing: Atty. Macalintal, Candelaria, Francisco, WWII
Veterans Legionnaires (as citizens), Sen. Pimentel as member of Congress. Soriano has no legal standing; intervened as taxpayer, did not allege illegal disbursement.
There is a justiciable controversy. Test: w/n there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers/functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then court is duty bound to take cognizance. Also courts will not pass upon issue of constitutionality unless it is the lis
mota of the case (deemed satisfied in this case). Possibility of constitutional crisis will not restrain court from exercising its duty.
DAVID v. ARROYO – On the issue of legal standing. Not just any citizen may bring an action to challenge constitutionality of govt. acts. Must show that he has sustained (or will sustain) direct injury as a result of the action. Not sufficient that he has general interest common to all members of the public (direct injury test). But being mere procedural technicality, may be waived by Court if the matter is of transcendental importance – w/ far-reaching implications, court adopts liberal attitude.

Taxpayer – show illegal disbursement of public funds

Voter – show interest in validity of election law
 Citizen – issue is of transcendental importance w/c must be settled early
 Legislator – infringement upon legislative prerogative
In this case:
 KMU has standing – Org. may assert rights of its members
 Cadiz, et al. (as member of IBP) – no standing, no alleged injury to IBP as an
institution (too general an interest)

 Loren – no standing as taxpayer, no allegation of illegal disbursement of funds, she was then not a member of Senate, hence cannot allege infringement of legislative prerogatives; fact that she had case before electoral tribunal is inconsequential
 All others have standing (legislators, press establishments closed, persons arrested)
PEOPLE v. MATEO – “intermediate appeal to CA” Mateo sentenced by trial court to reclusion perpetua for each of 10 counts of rape of his step-daughter Imelda. Sec. 5 (2) provides that SC shall review cases where penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. But SC made a rule that first, there must be intermediate appeal or review to the CA, then by the SC. Is this allowed? Yes. Justified by Sec. 5
(5) – power of the SC to promulgate rules concerning practice & procedure in all courts
(rule-making power). Reason for the law: CA is a trier of facts. Thus, allows CA to review the facts of the case, appreciation of evidence, etc. before being elevated to SC.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME v. NLRC – “NLRC, certiorari to CA” Aricayos was “operations manager” of
St. Martin, dismissed form work for allegedly misappropriating money supposedly for tax purposes.
Filed case before Labor Arbiter (ruled in favor of St. Martin), reversed by NLRC. St. Martin filed petition for certiorari (Rule 65) to the Supreme Court. Case remanded to the CA. Under the present law, there is no appeal from orders of the NLRC (removed) but this is w/o prejudice to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 – w/c is the proper vehicle for judicial review of NLRC decisions. Certiorari is w/in concurrent jurisdiction of CA & SC – but by
virtue of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, must be filed before CA first. It will allow CA to reexamine factual issues, thus more advantageous, and prevents circuitous proceedings (i.e. filed before SC w/c remands the case to NLRC/CA bec. it cannot consider factual issues).
MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO – “by-passed ad interim appointments” PGMA appointed ad interim to
COMELEC Benipayo (chair), Borra & Tuason each to term of 7 years. Commission on Appointments did not act upon it (by-passed). Congress adjourned. PGMA later reappointed them. Matibag questioned re-appointment – allegedly violates prohibition against re-appointment & temporary (hence revocable) appointments. Claims that once his appointment is by-passed by CoA, can no longer be reappointed.
Untenable. Ad interim appointment is permanent & irrevocable once appointee qualifies to the office. Effective until disapproved by CoA or until next adjournment of Congress. If ad
interim appointee is by-passed by CoA President may re-appoint them after next adjournment of Congress bec. prohibition against re-appointment does not apply to bypassed appointments (after all, there is no disapproval by the CoA). Confirmation of CoA necessary to trigger prohibition against re-appointment. Lapsed ad interim appointment does not constitute a “term of office.”
SEMA v. COMELEC – “shariff kabunsuan” ARMM legislature created the province of Shariff Kabunsuan, separating from Maguindanao a number of municipalities, and allocated a legislative district therefor.
Power to create provinces granted to ARMM under RA9054 (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act). Valid?
Hell no! True that Congress may delegate power to create LGUs (such as power of province/city/municipality to create barangay, subj. to criteria in LGC). But under LGC, only
Act of Congress can create provinces, cities, & municipalities. Also, a province (or city w/ more than 250k population) cannot be created w/o a legislative district (bec. Consti requires that each province have at least 1 representative in House) and the power to
create/re-apportion legislative districts is vested exclusively w/ Congress. ARMM’s legislative powers confined only w/in its jurisdiction; cannot affect composition of national legislature.
NORTH COTABATO v. GOVT. PEACE PANEL – “Bangsamoro” RP Negotiating Panel entered into a MOA-
AD (Ancestral Domain) w/ MILF for creation of “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE):
 recognizing the Bangsamoro peoples’ right to self-governance
 empowers it to enter into trade relations w/ foreign states
 ensuring its participation in international meetings (ASEAN, UN, etc) on border agreements and other related matters
 granting it rights to internal waters and territorial waters and sharing of minerals/economic resources w/ national government over the latter (3:1 in favor of BJE)
 joint jurisdiction over territorial waters, but exclusive jurisdiction over internal waters, w/ full right to exploit resources therein
 guaranteeing that it will secure its territory against foreign invasion

 stating that Bangsamoro ancestral domain not part of the public domain (treated as
Bangsamoro homeland)
 practically treats BJE as an “associated state” in international law (a transitional device leading to full independence as exemplified by Micronesia & Mashall Islands w/ respect to US)
SC Ruling: UNCONSTITUTIONAL!! UNCONSTITUTIONAL!! UNCONSTITUTIONAL!!

Concept of “associated state” not recognized by the Constitution, implies powers that go beyond anything that may be validly granted to LGUs under the Consti.
 Violated Art. X, Sec. 1 (no such creature under Consti. as BJE) – only province, city, municipality, barangay, & autonomous regions recognized
 Violated Art. X, Sec. 15 – creation of autonomous regions [assuming it even was
one] must be consistent w/ national sovereignty & territorial integrity (both violated by BJE)
 BJE was practically a sovereign state w/in context of Montevideo Convention
(elements: people, territory, government, sovereignty – all satisfied)
 Various municipalities automatically included in it w/o plebiscite (just bec. they agreed to be part of ARMM, doesn't mean that they agree to be part of BJE, must have new plebiscite)
 Cannot possibly be covered by Art. X, Sec. 20 (9) – “such other matters as may be
authorized by law…” – imbues BJE w/ diplomatic & treaty-making powers w/c are solely vested in the President, cannot simply be granted to BJE by law
 Violates Art. II, Sec. 22 – promotes rights of indigenous cultural communities, but must not be inconsistent w/ national unity (in this case, defeats national unity, causes division)

Violates Organic Act of ARMM – recognizes all Moros & Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to be accepted as “Bangsamoros” indiscriminately, against the classifications found in Organic
Act of ARMM
 Violates Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act – violates clear procedures necessary to constitute ancestral domains, instead arbitrarily delineates them

Violates international law – indigenous people only have right to internal self-
determination, does not obligate states to grant them near-independent status of an associated state

True that president has power to conduct peace negotiations (unstated residual
powers) – she may consider implementation of policies requiring statutory/constitutional amendment, but cannot unilaterally implement them w/o assent of Congress, she
may only recommend them. But in this case, she is binding the RP under international law to implement them (in fact w/ a deadline). This is unconstitutional!
FRANCISCO v. HR – “initiated” First impeachment case filed vs. all justices of SC (by Erap) – June 2,
2003. Referred to Committee on Justice, dismissed for insufficiency of form & substance. Second complaint filed Oct. 23, 2003 vs. CJ Davide. Petitioners sought to enjoin it – allegedly violation of
Consti. provision stating that no impeachment may be initiated against same official more than once w/in 1 year. Sustained; impeachment barred. Impeachment deemed initiated even if
Committee on Justice finds insufficiency in form & substance. “Initiated” = filing of the verified complaint + initial action of HR on such complaint (such as referral to Committee or endorsement by at least 1/3 of its members). Requirement for initial determination of
Committee (sufficiency of form & substance) before it is deemed initiated is
unconstitutional. Note: impeachment proceeding ≠ impeachment case. Impeachment case is decided by Senate after official has been validly impeached (successfully charged before HR).
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO – “Erap trial” Impeachment case vs. Erap before Senate declared functus officio after walkout of prosecutors (due to refusal of Senate to open envelope w/ incriminating evidence),
EDSA II, removal of Erap from Presidency. Now charged criminally before Ombudsman. Erap claims
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction bec. he was not convicted in impeachment case. Untenable!
Purpose of impeachment is only removal from office & disqualification to hold any other office. Conviction in impeachment case not condition precedent to criminal prosecution
once ousted (he was deemed constructively resigned). To sustain him will make him perpetually immune from such prosecution. Immunity from suit only lasts while he is in office, not beyond.

LA BUGAL B’LAAN v. RAMOS – “service contract” Philippine Mining Act of 1995 enacted to govern exploration, development (etc) of mineral resources. Govt. entered into a Financial & Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) w/ WMC Mining (Australian). Substantially, it was a service
agreement w/c allows the Aussie Company to explore & exploit the mineral resources in the contract area (parts of Mindanao) w/ full possession thereof, determine the processes to be employed, construct roads, improvements & facilities therein, binding itself to perform the mining operations, providing all necessary services technology, etc. Valid? No. Both Mining Act & the FTAA are void.
Under Consti. participation of foreign-owned corporations limited to technical or financial assistance for large-scale operations involving petroleum and minerals. 1987 Consti. did away w/ “service contracts” w/c lodged management & control over the enterprise to the
(foreign) service contractor (as in this case). Policy of the law is for state to assume full control
& supervision over natural resources.
On MR, SC RECONSIDERED. Govt. may enter into service contracts subj. to strict compliance w/ last 2 paragraphs of Sec. 2.

Only over minerals, petroleum, & other mineral oils

Must be in accordance w/ standards, uniform terms, etc of the general law

President must be the signatory

Must report to Congress w/in 30 days after execution of agreement
Possible to enter into service agreements. Wording of Sec. 2 (may enter into technical/financial assistance…) is not restrictive, admits of other possible schemes.
Framers of Consti. realized that foreign participation would necessarily entail more than just technical assistance, but actual investment & management. Did not intend to ban service contracts, only to provide safeguards to prevent abuse, perceiving insufficiency of Filipino capital to undertake exploration. The Govt. through its agencies (DENR, MGB) still exercises full control & supervision.
CRUZ v. SEC. OF DENR – “IPRA” Constitutionality of provisions of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) challenged – as violative of regalian doctrine, & due process. Provides that ancestral domains form communal property of IPs, granting them rights to harvest/exploit nat. resources, enter into agreements concerning the same, application of customary law & traditions/practices in resolving disputes, all doubts resolved in favor of IPs. SC Voting: 7-7 (tie). Thus, still constitutional.
Pro Opinions: Ancestral lands are not public domain – they are private, belong to IPs. But
the ownership over ancestral domains does not include the natural resources. The right to negotiate & enter into agreements cover only exploration but not exploitation of nat. resources & for the purpose of protecting the same only. Also, though the IPs have priority of rights to explore/exploit the resources, it is not an exclusive right. State does not lose control over such resources (may still enter into co-production, etc. w/ private entities to exploit them).
Anti-Opinions: Amounts to abdication of state’s rights over vast patrimony, including relinquishment of control over nat. resources vested by Consti. upon state in favor of IPs.
This was provided by the law itself. This violates Consti. provision that the State owns all natural resources.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS – “manila hotel Privatization prog. of Govt. Sold at public bidding up to
51% of Manila Hotel. Bidders: Manila Prince (Filipino Corp.) and BHD Corp. (Malaysian). BHD won
(higher bid); Manila Prince filed case for prohibition, claims that Manila Hotel forms part of national patrimony, thus should be owned by Filipinos, not foreigners. SC sustained Manila Prince. Art. XII,
Sec. 10 mandates that in the grant of concessions, privileges, rights covering national patrimony, there should be preference for qualified Filipinos (Filipino First Policy). This provision is self-executing. Manila Hotel forms part of national patrimony. Nat. Patrimony
contemplates also cultural heritage, not just nat. resources. Existence of Manila Hotel impressed w/ public interest; it is a historical relic.
TAÑADA v. ANGARA – “GATT/WTO” Philippines became signatory to GATT/WTO, concurred w/ by
Senate. Agreement generally places imported products on same footing as local ones (gen. most favored nation clause, national treatment of foreign goods, parity provisions, etc). Assailed for violating Filipino First Policy under Consti. Untenable. Preference for Filipino labor, materials, goods is only a guiding principle, not self-executing. Not judicially enforceable; violation creates no cause of action. Consti. never intended an isolationist policy. Promotes equality

& reciprocity subj. only to the protection for Filipino enterprises against foreign competition
that is unfair. GATT itself has provisions vs. unfair competition (anti-dumping, provisions vs. import surges, etc.) SC will not decide the advantages/disadvantages of GATT, only its legality.
CONSTI II
RURAL BANK OF BUHI v. CA – “CB receivership of banks / subsequent review” CB through Rural
Bank Savings & Loan Assoc. ordered examination of books/accounts of Rural Bank of Buhi, found massive irregularities (fictitious loans & pending accounts), thus became insolvent. Placed it under receivership (eventually ordered liquidated). Buhi filed petition for injunction – claiming violation of due process (not able to prove that they were not insolvent). Untenable. No prior notice & hearing required before bank may be placed by CB under receivership. CB may act immediately in case of prima facie showing of insolvency, BUT its actions are subj. to subsequent judicial
inquiry. Otherwise, dire consequences could arise” bank runs, panic, etc.
SEC. OF DEFENSE v. MANALO – “writ of amparo” Manalo Brothers suspected of being sympathizers w/
NPA (their brother Ka Bestre is NPA). Members of CAFGU & military barged into their house, abducted them, blindfolded, brought to detention camp (Sapang, Bulacan), kept in a bartolina, tortured repeatedly. Medically treated only to be tortured further. There they witnessed horrendous extrajudicial killings. Confronted there by Gen. Palparan, told them to tell their parents not to participate in human rights rallies (otherwise, they will be killed), further detained (18 months in all).
Able to escape when they were ordered to raise poultry in Pampanga. Filed petition for Writ of
Amparo.
Granted. Writ of Amparo is expedient remedy vs. forced disappearances & extralegal killings & abductions w/o due process. Substantial evidence suffices for writ to issue. True that they have already escaped, but Writ will still issue. Their right to liberty & security
includes right to live free from threat & fear. Actual liberty need not be deprived for right to be violated, if not free from psychological threat.
CARLOS SUPERDRUG v. DSWD – “discounted medicines” Senior Citizens Act mandated 20% discount on, among others, medicines. Allows drugstores tax credit (deductible from gross income) for said discount. Drugstores assail law as unconstitutional (confiscatory), and that tax credit does not fully compensate them for the loss. Presumption of constitutionality prevailed. State, in exercise of police power, may impose upon private enterprise the burden of partly subsidizing a govt. program. Right to property not absolute, must yield to the common good when so needed.
Besides, drugstores did not present financial reports/statements to substantiate their claim of great losses.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD – “mandatory drug tests” Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992 imposed random mandatory drug testing for the following:
1.
Candidates for public office = UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Amounts to additional qualification other than those imposed by the Constitution.
2.
Students in secondary/tertiary levels = VALID. Tests are random/suspicionless. Thus, does not zero-in on anyone, does not aim to incriminate. Within prerogative of educ. institutions to require drug-test as condition for admission. There are adequate safeguards, the intrusion is minimal. (Here, SC relied upon US cases of Veronia vs. Acton & Board of
Educ. vs. Earls)
3.
Public & Private Employees = VALID. Mere administrative search, thus no probable cause needed. Privacy expectation is reduced in office environment, esp. for public employees who must always be accountable to the people. Also random w/ adequate safeguards.
4.
Persons charged before Prosecutors Office = UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Not random & suspicionless; rather it zeroes-in on the accused. Violates right to privacy & self-incrimination.
PEOPLE v. CANTON – “airport search” Susan Canton to board plane to Vietnam, passed thru metal detector w/c sounded, frisked by airport security, noticed bulge in abdomen, genital area, & thigh.
She claimed it was just money, subjected to thorough search in comfort room, 3 tapped packages

recovered, verified as shabu. Arrested & convicted, assails validity of the search & arrest. Search
valid. Airport search is a recognized exception under RA 6235. Every ticket issued to passenger contains waiver, that passenger & luggage will be subj. to search, otherwise not allowed to board aircraft. Less expectation of privacy in such places as airport. Only minimal intrusion arising
from such search. Demanded by public safety. This is not search incidental to lawful arrest (bec. in such case arrest must come first), neither stop & frisk (w/c is limited to weapons that may be used vs. frisking officer.) Arrest valid, she was in flagrante delicto.
CHAVEZ v. GONZALES – “Hello Garci tapes” Sec. Bunye produced 2 versions of the Hello Garci wiretapped conversation allegedly between you know who. Atty. Paguia released a version of the said tape. Sec. Raul Gonzales issued warning to reporters that those who published it will be held liable under Anti-Wiretapping Law. NTC issued statement stating that broadcast of such tapes will result to suspension/revocation of licenses. These statements constitute prior restraint. Presumed unconstitutional. Gov’t. failed to overcome the presumption by proving clear & present danger to the national security (besides the credibility of the tapes is still in question). Rule against prior restraint covers all acts of the Govt. even speeches & statements of officials.
No need for formal orders or circulars.
BAYAN, KARAPATAN vs. ERMITA – “permit to rally / CPR / regulation / maximum tolerance” The
Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) was implemented by the Executive to strictly enforce the provisions of BP No. 880 – particularly the “no permit no rally” policy. It resulted to the violent dispersal of various protest actions and assemblies – hence the assault upon its constitutionality. BP
No. 880 requires a permit to be issued by the Mayor who must be informed of the date, time, and place of the rally, and who may deny the issuance of the same if, to his judgment, there exists a
clear and present danger. It also mandates the designation of freedom parks where protesters may organize peaceful actions w/o the need of a permit.
BP No. 880 is not an absolute ban on public assemblies but is merely a content-neutral restriction that regulates the time, place, and manner of assemblies to the extent needed to
avoid clear and present danger. Hence, it is a valid enactment and does not violate the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble. The content of the rally is immaterial, the permit may only be denied in case of a clear and present danger, and in the absence of such, it must be issued. The SC requires the designation of freedom parks from the various LGUs, otherwise all public parks w/in the said LGUs will be deemed freedom parks.
BP No. 880 requires maximum tolerance, w/c is the highest degree of restraint that the peace-keeping authorities must observe during assemblies. Dispersal should be the last resort; all peaceful means of conciliation between the police and the protesters must first
be pursued. The CPR is thus struck down for being inconsistent w/ the rule and constitutes a darkness that shrouds freedom of expression. (From Consti 2 DDs)
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR – “concubinage / church approval / sincerity / compelling state interest”
Soledad Escritor was an interpreter for the Las Piñas RTC, who was charged administratively for
immoral conduct for co-habiting w/ Quilapio w/o the benefit of marriage over the last 20 years, their union bearing a child. At the time they started co-habiting, Escritor was still married, but at the time she entered the judiciary, she was already a widow. Escritor and Quilapio were members of the
Jehovah’s Witness. They secured a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” signifying their church’s approval of their union in accordance w/ their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the case at bar has put a burden upon her free exercise of religion, and she
likewise appears to be sincere in her religious beliefs. She procured the certificate 10 years after their union began, and not merely after being implicated or before entering the judiciary.
Apparently nothing from her actuations would constitute grossly disgraceful and immoral acts so much as to warrant administrative sanction.
Doctrine of “benevolent neutrality” – in the Philippines, while the state must remain religiously neutral and pursue only secular goals, at the same time it must strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible. Thus, morality could allow for accommodations under the law, provided no compelling state interest is involved.

The State therefore undertakes the burden of satisfying the “compelling state interest” test to justify any possible sanction to be imposed upon Escritor’s exercise of religious freedom.
There are 3 tests that have to be determined in this case:
1.
The sincerity and centrality of religious beliefs
2.
The right to free exercise may only be overcome by a “compelling state interest”
3.
The means adopted by the State should be least restrictive of free exercise
The case is thus REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator to determine the case based on the above considerations. The Solicitor General is likewise ordered to intervene.
Consolidated Dissents:
Escritor’s conduct constitutes the felony of concubinage – clearly w/in the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code. Religious beliefs, no matter how sincere, cannot exempt from liability under the
RPC for criminal acts. (From Consti 2 DDs)