Section II
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Homegrown Terrorism. Ex.
Daniel Patrick Boyd.
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Growing importance.
Intelligence services and
experts see “homegrown
terrorism” as a growing
threat due to the increasing
number of Westerners
embracing militant Islam,
coupled with the operatives’
familiarity with the societies
they are targeting and ease
of mobility.
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Conventional wisdom: Poverty
as “root cause.”
Hate crimes analogy.
Public opinion surveys:
Higher education levels more
likely to say suicide attacks
justified against Americans
and Westerners.
Participation in terrorist
groups.
Marc Sageman: Not crazy,
not suffering from personality
disorders.
• In August 2007, the NYPD released an
important study on radicalization
• Four phases homegrown terrorists go
through:
– Pre-Radicalization
– Self-Identification
– Indoctrination
– Jihadization
• Like a funnel
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Pre-Radicalization: Individual’s life before accepting
radical beliefs. Apparent normalcy.
Self-identification: Begin to explore Salafi Islam and
associate with the like-minded; often caused by
cognitive opening.
Indoctrination: Where an individual “progressively
intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi
ideology and concludes, without question, that the
conditions and circumstances exist where action is
required to support and further the cause. That action
is militant jihad.”
Jihadization: Action phase.
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Sageman, Post: It’s not how they think, it’s how they feel.
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April 2009 study, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An
Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process.
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Examines external signs in 117 homegrown terrorists.
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Steps:
- Adopting a legalistic interpretation of the faith
- Trusting only select, ideologically rigid religious authorities
- Perceived schism between Islam and the West
- Low tolerance for perceived theological deviance
- Attempts to impose religious beliefs on others
- Political radicalization
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Countercultural upbringing.
– Gadahn’s parents decided to eschew America’s consumerist lifestyle in
favor of austere isolation and self-sufficiency.
– Gadahn’s family lacked (by choice) a telephone, mailing address, and
even a toilet in their home.
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In his teens, Gadahn became obsessed with death metal.
– Gadahn: “My entire life was focused on expanding my music
collection. I eschewed personal cleanliness and let my room reach an
unbelievable state of disarray.”
– Formed a one-man death metal band called Aphasia.
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After going through a period where he felt “empty” and explored
evangelical Christian radio, Gadahn became Muslim.
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Small group: Gadahn soon fell in with a small group of men who
held evening discussion groups in the mosque.
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These men “wore turbans, long robes and long beards, and they
spent a lot of time criticizing other members of the mosque.”
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Legalistic. Zena Zeitoun: “Everything was haram to them in the
United States. If they saw a girl walking down the street in a short
skirt, that’s haram. If they saw you with a beer bottle in your hand,
that’s haram. If they saw a man and a woman holding each other,
that’s haram.”
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Gadahn began to adopt legalism early on.
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Gadahn’s outward signs
– Stopped shaving.
– Gave up music.
– Began to wear sandals with Saudi style robes or an Afghanstyle shalwar kameez
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Gadahn complied with group members’ instructions
– Told Gadahn to stop wearing jeans
– Women making tea.
– Hisham Diab and Khalil Deek called Gadahn their “little rabbit.”
– “He took everything [they] said as the Holy Grail.” -Saraah
Olson, Diab’s ex-wife
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Gadahn began to radicalize
politically during this period.
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Legalsim blended into his political
radicalization, as his companions
lectured just as naturally about
global politics as about the need
to stop wearing jeans.
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Olson and her son Ryan
described a cult-like atmosphere
in which Gadahn was not even
allowed to speak with his own
family, and was told that “if you’re
a good believer, you’ll kill them.”
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The small group called
mosque leader Haitham
Bundakji “Danny the Jew”
because of his moderate
practice of Islam: “He’s a weak
Muslim, he’s friends with
Jews, he goes to Baptist
churches, he hangs out with
the police department—he’s
just an awful Muslim.’”
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When Bundakji mildly
reprimanded Gadahn, Gadahn
punched Bundakji in the face.
Later pled guilty to
misdemeanor assault and
battery.
Haitham Bundakji, President of the
Islamic Society of Orange County
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As he radicalized, Gadahn came to see Islam and the West as
irreconcilably opposed. He isolated himself from non-Muslim family
members, tried to block out the Western world.
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Gadahn’s small apartment near the mosque was symbolic of this.
Described as a “dungeon” by Zena Zeitoun, the apartment’s only
decorations “were Islamic sayings of the Prophet” on the walls, “and a
timetable for salat.”Walked to the mosque for prayers, did little else.
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Gadahn later expressed the idea of a fundamental schism in his first video
for al-Qaeda, saying that “the allegiance and loyalty of a Muslim is to
Allah, his Messenger, his religion and his fellow believers before anyone
and anything else…. If there is a conflict between his religion and his
nation and family, then he must choose the religion every time.”
NYPD Study Radicalization Timeline
Jihadization
Indoctrination
Self-Identification
Pre-Radicalization
When viewed in the context of the NYPD Study, our model
focuses primarily on activity taking place in the
self-identification and indoctrination stages.
Time Lapse
ATTACK
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Legalistic interpretation generally comes in step 2 of the NYPD study, selfidentification.
A legalistic interpretation of Islam refers to how believers interpret their
rights and obligations in relation to Islam’s holy texts. An individual who
has a legalistic interpretation of the faith has adopted a rules-based
approach to the religion, in which the Qur’an and sunnah provide strict
guidelines—not just for the practice of the faith, but also for virtually every
aspect of one’s daily life.
For many homegrown terrorists, developing a legalistic interpretation of
the faith is the foundational step for other movements toward radicalism.
High degree of prevalence. About half of the homegrown terrorists
examined in our study exhibited this aspect of the radicalization process:
of the 117 individuals surveyed, 57 (48.7%) had adopted a legalistic
interpretation. We could only determine that individuals had not embraced
a legalistic interpretation in four cases.
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Lackawanna Six: Kamal
Derwish, Juma al-Dosari.
Fort Dix Six. Duka brothers
became much more legalistic
two or three years before
their plot began.
A cousin: “They were praying
different, they were talking
different, they were telling
people what to believe.” The
cousin refused to attend
Eljvir Duka’s wedding when
he learned that no music
would be played.
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Between stages 2 and 3 of the NYPD’s model (selfidentification and indoctrination), individuals frequently
begin to trust only a certain set of Salafi-jihadi religious
scholars, and see other Islamic scholars as inauthentic.
– Trusting only certain scholars also implies the
inverse step of rejecting many scholars (more liberal)
as not conveying true Islam.
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FDD’s study found evidence of this manifestation of the
radicalization process in nearly one-third of the
homegrown terrorists surveyed (30.8%), with only
seven instances where it was clearly not present.
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Daniel Maldonado’s blog
spoke of his admiration for
Abdul Wahhab, Ibn
Taymiyya, Safar al-Hawali
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Mohammad Bouyeri
confronts his old imam: “I’ve
come to tell you what the real
Islam is. You don’t tell the
truth.”
Daniel Joseph Maldonado
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Doctor, 2007 Glasgow
bombings
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Shiraz Maher, former
member of Hizb ut-Tahrir:
“Bilal said ‘Look, you’d better
start praying and stop
playing.’ He was adamant
about it and put on this DVD
of [Abu Musab] al-Zarqawi
beheading a hostage. He
said ‘If you don’t change, this
is what we do. We
slaughter.’”
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Muriel Degauque: Would not
allow her visiting parents to
watch TV, drink alcohol.
Separation of gender.
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Jason Walters (Netherlands)
and brother—living with their
mother—would not allow her
to drink or watch TV. In the
summer of 2003, she felt so
threatened that she called
the police.
Muriel Degauque
Section III
I. Centralized vs. Decentralized
II. Transnational Crime and Terror
III. Oil and Terror
IV. Somalia
V. Terrorism as Political Protest
• These opposing trends are occurring
simultaneously.
• Centralized command: Decisions filter from top
to bottom. Examples: IRA, pre-9/11 al-Qaeda.
• Decentralized: Little control from the top, more
autonomy.
Al-Qaeda Case Study
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Before 9-11, al-Qaeda was centralized with a supreme
leader (bin Laden), a shura (consultation) council,
various committees, and a cadre of lieutenants in
charge of regions or cells.
– HARMONY documents
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After losing its safe haven in Afghanistan and operating
in a decentralized manner for several years, al-Qaeda’s
senior leadership regrouped in Pakistan. It is now
acting more like a centralized organization again.
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Importance of central leadership.
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The ultimate example of decentralized action.
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Examples of lone wolf terrorism in the U.S.
– July 4, 2002: Hesham Mohamed Hadayet.
– March 3, 2006: Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar.
– July 2006: Naveed Haq, Seattle Jewish Federation
building. He said that he was upset about U.S.
support for Israel and the Iraq war.
– 2009: Holocaust Museum shooting.
• Connections
between
transnational crime
and terrorism are
deepening.
• Roots in Soviet
Union’s collapse.
• Advantages to
terrorists; converse
advantages to law
enforcement. “Al
Capone model.”
• Drug trafficking: Hizballah
• Financial scams: identity theft, bank fraud
(i.e. credit card fraud), cigarette
smuggling, counterfeiting (clothes,
cigarette rolling papers, Viagra)
• Immigration fraud (i.e. sham marriages)
• Money laundering/illegal money transfers
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Aribtrage scheme.
Bob Fromme, deputy sheriff, JR’s Tobacco.
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One day he noticed four olive-skinned young men were buying
huge numbers of cigarettes. There was nothing wrong with this,
except that each bought exactly 299 cartons, one less than the
number that would require paperwork. One man paid for
everything in cash; entire transaction cost close to $30,000.
This became a regular pattern.
Fromme tailed the vans to the state line, and watched as the
drivers crossed north into Virginia, or west into Tennessee.
Fromme called a friend and ATF. His friend told him that the men
were smuggling cigarettes.
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ATF began around-the-clock surveillance. Soon the ATF
established that the smuggling ring involved more than a dozen
Arabs who had settled into middle-class Charlotte neighborhoods.
Each smuggling van led a secret motorcade of five ATF cars. The
cars would take turns following so that no vehicle was in the
smugglers’ rearview mirror for too long. The agents sometimes
changed clothes, switched license plates.
Investigators found that the smugglers didn’t seem to spend much
of the money. Where were all the profits going?
Brothers Mohamad Hammoud and Chawki Youssef Hammoud
would buy van loads of cigarettes in North Carolina, where the tax
was 5 cents/pack, and sell them in Michigan, where the tax was 75
cents/pack. Profits to Hizballah.
Also sham marriage.
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At its peak, Al Haramain had
offices in more than fifty
countries and an annual
budget of $30–80 million.
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Al Haramain’s U.S. branch
and two of its directors were
indicted in January 2005 for
illegally moving money out of
the country. Central to the
prosecution was the
requirement that anyone who
transports more than
$10,000 in or out of the U.S.
is required to provide details
in Form 4790.
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In February 2000, an Egyptian man wire transferred about $150,000 to an
Al Haramain bank account in Ashland. In an e-mail, the donor stated that
the money was designed “to participate in your noble support to our
muslim brothers in Chychnia.”
Shortly after, Al Haramain director Soliman al-But’he flew from Saudi
Arabia to the U.S., where he met another director, Pete Seda.
On March 10, the two men went to a branch office of Bank of America and
bought 130 American Express traveler’s checks, all in the $1,000
denomination. Seda also collected a $21,000 Bank of America cashier’s
check.
Left without declaring; inflated value of building purchased in New Jersey.
Lessons:
– Why did al-But’he fly from Saudi Arabia to Oregon to pick up the
check?
– Example of “Al Capone” model at work.
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Bin Laden’s shift. From
declaring it off limits to urging
operatives “focus your
operations on it.”
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Zawahiri, Sawt al-Jihad.
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Actual targeting: Feb. 2006
Aramco attack using Aramco
uniforms and vehicles.
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Impact: Prices, wars, ripple
effect. (And funding terrorists.)
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Can we change oil as currency?
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Many young Somalis living in the U.S.
and elsewhere have left and joined alShabaab. Minneapolis-St. Paul.
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Shirwa Ahmed, October 2008. Came
to the U.S. in 1995, graduated from
Roosevelt High School in 1999.
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September 2009: Troy Kastigar sixth
American killed in Somalia.
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Following bombings that targeted gas pipelines
operated by Canadian company EnCana, one observer
noted that such attacks are “almost like the price of
doing business.”
Do some segments of the population accept that
violence is a justifiable response to views or actions
with which they strongly disagree?
And will it grow deadlier over time?
• Understanding ideology, radicalization,
emerging trends important.
• We’re all on the front lines now.